MILITARY REFORM 10/15/09

MILITARY POLICY
A. Great power military problems
a. Defense of empire, European threats
B. War dept. reforms (root reforms)
a. Professional education, reorg., chief of staff and general staff
b. Weapons, tactics, modern war
C. Navy dept. reforms
a. Gen board & overseas bases
b. Warships construction

US MILITARY PROBLEMS IN 1898

A. New empire
a. Protection of Philip., Hawaii, panama canal
b. Need for expeditionary force in asia, cuba
B. Lack of trained reserve for war
a. Reg. army too small, guard too disorganized
C. War dept. is peacetime bureaucracy
a. Unable to handle wartime mobilization, supply, training
D. Many officers unfit for high command
a. No professional education after W.PT
b. No exp., education for large units, combined arms
c. Promotion system based on seniority, not merit
d. Most officers commissioned after 1898

ELIHU ROOT, SEC. OF WAR 1899-1903

A. Army had to become global force ready for modern warfare
B. Problems of 1898
a. Bureaus unable to shidt from peacetime to wartime priorities
b. No org. for war panning or prep
c. Uneducated sr. officers unable to adapt to new circumstances
d. No trained reserves for wartime

PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION
A. Problem: Officers unprepared for cmd duties
a. How to educate jr. officers in duties the would have as rise in rank
B. Command and Gen Staff school 1903
a. Large units ops
b. Combined arms doctrine
C. Army war college 1903
a. Part of army gen. staff
b. Students and faculty work on project and plans assigen by Chief of staff
i. War planning (mobilization strategy)
ii. Equipment, doctrine, administration
ROOT REFORMS: ARMY REORGANIZATION ACT 1901
A. Inc. US army auth. from 27000 to 90000
B. Seeks to eliminate line-staff rivalry
a. Create uniform professional officers corps with doth line and staff exp.
i. Vacancies in staff (adj gen., inspector, gen. staff) must be replaced
by line officers for 4 year term
ii. Fails to anticipate need for specialized skills in modern warfare

CHIEF OF STAFF AND GEN. STAFF

A. Abolishes cmding gen. and creates chief of staff as top advisor to sec. of war
B. Creates a fen, stadd of 45 officers to advise chief of staff
C. Chief of staff and gen staff fo not command tactical units
a. Advise and oversee prep of army for war
i. War plans, doctrine, training, inspections, weaponry

ARMY STAFF PROBLEMS

A. Root never makes clear who is ultimately in charge
a. Does COS cmd bureau heads or do they serve under sec. of war and
report to congress
b. What is chief’s wartime role?
i. Does he stay in DC or cmd all army forces?
ii. If he remains in DC, does field cmdr outrank him?
c. are there bureaus outside Gen. staff’s supervision?
d. Personality conflicts
B. Chief and Gen. Staff are caught in day to day minutiae, unable to do long range
planning or monitor state of army
C. Gen staff lacks pool of educated officers to serve
a. Skilled staff officers retained in DC, denied troop comman
i. Creates resentment from field offecers who are having to work
extra for officers in DC or at schools
b. war college is more training for gen. staff assignment than learning
stratefy, nat’l defense, conduct of war

ARMY PERSONNEL PROBLEMS

A. unable to recruit sufficeient troops
a. auth for 90000
b. 1905: 67000; 1908=76000; 1914: 97000
B. Overseas garrisons
a. Philippines:1902: 21000; 1904-1912: 18000
b. Hawaii: 1902: 200; 1914: 9000
C. Officer absenteeism
a. 1900-1907 officer resig. Inc 500%
b. 27% avg in combat units in 1909
D. Inexper, poorly disciplined troops
a. Virtually all E-Vets left service by 1904
b. Desertion rate: 11% in 1905
 c. Elite enlisted and officer positions undermanned

MANPOWER: MILITIA OR “DICK” ALT 1903

A. reforms 1792 militia act
B. unorganized militia
a. all males 18-45, under individual states, no federal subsidies, not a
wartime reserve
C. Org. milita (nat’l guard)
a. Fed. Funded and equipped, must see fed standards for organization, drill,
inspections, annual training
b. Designated primary federal manpower reserve, in war will go into service
as distinct nat’l guard units, not as individual for reg. army

PREP FOR MODERN WAR

A. Field service regulations
B. Light, mobile forces for colonial war
a. Changes to large forces capable of fighting against anoter great power

NAVAL LESSONS OF 1898

A. Viewed as vindication of naval buildup and Mahan’s concept of fleet action, sea
power
B. Provides new USMC mission—take and hold adv. Fleet bases
C. BUT…
a. Spain’s probably only nation US could not fight that would have justified
Mahan’s strategy
b. Command of sea does not guarantee ability to occupy territory

DEV. NAVAL STRATEGY

A. Gen. board
a. Admiral George Dewey
b. Navy’s mission
i. Def. US and overseas professions
ii. Support trade
c. Need for Panama canal
d. Color plans
i. Red (Great Britain), Black (Germany)
1. carib. Theater
ii. Orange (Japan)
1. pacific theater

USMC NEW MISSION

A. Navy needs bases for global ops
a. Coaling, resupply, repair
B. Lessons of 1898 (Cuba)
 a. Army wont cooperate
b. Marines take base (Guantanamo)
C. Adv. Base force
a. Lands (unopposed) and est. base def.
b. Primarily seaborne artillery unit
c. Navy fails to spport ABF, Marines soon tied up w/ pacification duties in
Carib. – idea remains

STRAT and BATTLE FLEET

A. Flt action to defeat enemy flt, achieve “sea control”
a. Strat. Mobility to operate globally
i. Bases and logistics
ii. Panama canal
B. Two ocean navy

WILLIAM S. SIMS AND YOUNG TURKS

A. Gunnery problems
a. Battle of Santiago, US ships had 1-2% accuracy
i. Against helpless opponent at 1000 yards
b. spd, roll, distance inhibit accuracy
c. continuous aim firing
B. USN tries to suppress Sims finding, Sims goes public
C. Teddy Roosevelt and naval aides
a. Makes him naval aide, inspector gunnery
b. Interg. Navy into one system of gunnery
c. Req. officers to standardize whole navy

WARSHIP CONSTRUCTION
A. Issues
a. Firepower (more and bigger guns) or Armor?
b. Fewer and bigger guns vs. mult. Battery?
c. Range and Speed or firepower and protection?
B. US warships shift from ltd range coast defense (atlantic) to long range offensive
(pac)?
a. Cruise of “great while flt” (1907-1908) to secure international recognition,
public support
C. Shift of USN to all big gun battleship as foundation of fleet
a. USS SC (1908) 1st dreadnought

TORPEDO BOATS AND DESTROYERS

A. Comp. air torpedoes—29 kts, 800yds, can destroy battleship
B. Torpedo boat cheap, fast, easy to build
a. Ltd to coastal waters, “deny control” to warships
C. torpedo boat leads to “torpedo boat destroyers’ to accompany flt, deal w/ inshore
threats

ASYMETRIC THREATS: SUBS AND AIRCRAFT

A. Do not challenge enemy flt in surface action DNT do challenge “control” of sea
B. Initially perceived as coast defense weapons
a. Range and armament increase dramatically