Interwar Era 1919-1940

• US strategic goals
• Army Missions and capabilities
o National defense act, 1920
o Pacific and continental defense
o Modernization

• Army Aviation
o Postwar missions vs Air Power theory
 Billy Mitchell and Chesapeake Tests
 Improvements in aviation technology
 Strategic bombardment and its critics

Interwar constroversy and Us strategic objectives

Interwar as a case study in transformation
Technological, organizational, doctrinal challenges
Why did some military forces adapt and others failed?
US strategic objectives and threats
-1920’s— Isolationism and low taxes
-1930’s—Economic recovery and isolationism
-Threats
Anglo-Japanese alliance
War with Japan in Pacific
Mexican border and Latin American instability
National Defense Act 1920
Creates “army of the US” for peace and war
300000 US army (regulars)
Continental defense and expeditionary duty
Able to repel raid on US, deploy overseas for small wars
Establishes Hawaii, Philippine, and Canal zone commands
Self contained, ready for immediate war (20-50000 troops)
Training reserves in peace and conscript mass army in war providing
administration, planning, and leadership
435000 National Guard and Organized Reserves
Trained reserves for wartime, ROTC in peacetime
US divided into 9 corps, each of 6 divisions composed of US Army, Guard, and reserves
Able to mobilize 500000 troops trained and organized for war

The Hollow Army

1920 National defense act unfunded
US Army (130-140000) insufficient for missions
Largest tactical unit in cont. US is brigrade
No funds for modernization
Requirements to use up WWI surplus
National Guard (180000)
Training is minimal, equipment obsolete
 Organized reserves not implements
Reserve officers cannot be promoted because of insufficient troops to gain
experience
CoS Pershing decides top priority is to maintain organization for wartime mobilization
Keeps corps, division administration
Planning focuses on industrial and manpower mobilization
Emphasis on officer education for higher command in war

Overseas Forces
Supposed to be ready for immediate defense of territory and to hold out for 30-90 days
-Hawaii—top priority, given much of limited resources
Maneuvers demonstrate ability to defeat invasion, reveal danger of aerial
attack on pearl harbor
-Philippines
Army and Navy unable to agree whether PI can be or should be defended,
written off in mid 30’s
Maneuvers demonstrate futility of defense against Japanese
-Panama
Strong harbor defenses, difficult terrain to invade
Maneuvers demonstrate danger of aerial attack
Douglas MacArthur, CoS 30-35
Set priorities in Great Depression
Fights to maintain officer corps
Slows modernization—cuts research, weapons, disbands armored units
Emphasizes industrial and manpower mobilization planning
Four Army Plan
-USA-NG force for immediate use until wartime army mobilized and industry
shifts to war production
Philippine Commitment
Immediate relief of PI if attacked

Armored warfare
1920 defense act makemechanized forces part of existing Infantry and Calvary branches
Infantry sees tanks as mobile fortress to assist attack on trenches
Calvary views tank as long range weapon to break through enemy lines
Conflicting missions inhibit design of tank
Experiments with Armored warfare
Inability to determine proper tank design
Bureauractic battles over weight, armament

1928 Expiremental Mechanized Force

Combined tanks, infantry, calvary, field artillery
Disbanded by MacArthur in 1931
Calvary Branch experiments 1930s
Emphasis on very light, fast, long range tanks to perform calvary mission of
reconnaissance, raids
US tanks designs had weak armor, inadequate firepower
 World War II: Pacific
• Impact of Jap victories, 41-42
• Creation of defensive barriers
• US navy and Central Pacific
• Organization and Task forces
Command and fleet islorganization
• Carrier Operations and island hopping
• Impact of Technology
 Aircraft carriers (essex class)
 Aircraft and aerial warfare
• Mistubishi Zero, F6F hellcat, F4U Corsair
 Battle of Philippine Sea, 18-20 June 1944
• Submarines and commerce raiding
o Prewar doctrine
o Unrestricted submarine warfare declared Dec 1941
 Japs began war with 8 mil tons of merchant shipping, had 2 mil left
 Oct 1944 US subs sink 300000 tons
Destruction og merchant marines means Jap cannot obtain resournces from conquest—
industrys soon out of materials
Nany later claiones that kapn would have had to surrender from starvation, industrial
cllapse even w.o atomic bomb
• Amphibious Warfare
o Island hopping
 Marines seize bases for logistic and air bases wchi allow USN to sustain
advance

Jap Strategy
• US Industrial and manpower would defeat Japan in long war
• Seize island bases, force US fleet to fight away through defensive screen
• Japanese fleet waits until US fleet weakened, then defeats it in decisive battle
o US will seek negotiated peace
Japanese assumptions
Distances, lack of bases meant fighting at extreme end of logistical lines
 Batteles and campaigns would be fought and determined by
relatively small forces
 Qualitative superiority in key technologies and combat skills would
give japan victory
 US lacked fighting spirit, could not sustain defeats
Impact of Jap Victories
 Sneak attack and Day of Infamy
 Unified Americans behind war
 Revenge, no compromise
 Demand for complete destruction of Japan
  In long run was a disaster for Japan

Japanese Offensives
Launched attacks, seized bases and infiltrated

US Navy Strategy
Destruction of battlefleet prevented immediate strike at Jap’s fleet
Decisions to launch spoiling attacks in 42-43
Ensure defense of Australia, supply lines
Inhibit construction of Jap bases on pacific islands, new guinea
Wait until US industry produced warships necessary for Central pacific island-
hopping advance to Japan

US Navy and Pacific

Adm. Ernest J. King
Adm. Chester Nimitz
Fleet organization
3rd fleet William J Halsey
5th fleet Raymond Spruance
ships were same for 3&5 fleets, staffs were different, allowed one
fleet staff to be planning while the other was conducting
operations
7th fleet Thomas Kinkaid
Primarily used to support ground operations

Carrrier Operations 1942

Fast carrier task forces
Built around 7 carriers in pacific
• Consisted of battleships, cruisers, destroyersm etc and 1-2
aircraft carriers
• Long range aerial strikes at isolated Jap bases
• Prevented Japan from deploying fleet for decisive battle
Battle of Midway 4 June 1942 shifts balance of carriers in pacific
♦ Japs lose 4 carriers

Essex-Ticonderoga class aircraft carriers and post-43 carrier war

24 carriers commissioned in 2 years
33 knots full speed, range 15000 miles 80-100 aircraft
♦ Impact on Operations
♦ Shift to multi carrier attacks on Jap bases
♦ Japs uncertain if attack is raid or beginning of invasion
o Should they send out fleet?
♦ Some islands attacked, other bypassed

AERIAL WAR
Japanese emphasis on elite pilots, Xero gave short-term advantage 41-43 BUT
♦ Inadequate industrial strength to manufacture and deploy 2nd generation
airplanes, stuck with zero
♦ Inadequate pilot replacement program
♦ Result, by late 43 pilots and planes outclassed and no ability to regain
dominance
US unprepared in 41, but long term advantages
♦ 1942: US aviators developed tactics (thach weave, dive and break) to
compensate for inferior planes
♦ USN implements large polot training replacement program US industry
manufactures, deploys 2nd generation airplanes
By 1944, US planes and pilots dominant

Mistubishi A6M Zero, Model 21

Ultimate dogfighting airplane, very maneuverable but req highly skilled pilot
To increase agility and range, armor protection stripped, lacked self-sealing
gas tanks
Performance characteristics
Max speed 331 mph, ceiling 32000’
Range 1600 miles
Armament: 2 7.7mm MG, two 20mm cannon

F6F Hellcat
Highspeed maneuverable, rugged, heavy armor
Better rate of claim than Zero, better in drive
Multipurpose—close air supportm ait-to-air, attack enemy shipping, easily transportable
Performance
Max speeds 380mph
Range 945 miles
Ceilings 37000
Armament 6 .50 cal

F4U Corsair
Much faster than 0 better rate of climbm, 5000 higher ceiling,, maneuveravke
very rugged heavily armored
Great mulitpuroise airplane—ai to air ground support
Max speed 420mph ceiling 37000 feet
Range 1560 miles

Battle of Philippine Sea

IJN determines must fight decisive battle
Effort to lure US fllet close to attack from 9 carriers and land aviation
US deplot task force 58
Us decides against battleship battle, launches air
Jap aerial attacks on carriers smashed by defeneder’s air cover
 2 carrierssunk by us

Us counterattack of 550 airplanes

Japs take catastrophic losses to aviation, warships, cannot challenge USN for control of
pacific