IN RE: EDILLON 84 SCRA 554 (1978)

Facts:
This is an administrative case against Edillon who refuses to pay his IBP membership dues
assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24,
Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of
membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same. He contends that the
stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights of being compelled to be a
member of the IBP in order to practice his profession and thus deprives his rights to liberty and
property and thereby null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not it assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property of
the respondent?
Held:
The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar associations that
are organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership of which is voluntary. The IBP
however is an official national body of which all lawyers must be a member and are subjected to
the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which includes payment of reasonable annual
fee for the purpose of carrying out its objectives and implementation of regulations in the
practice of law. The provisions assailed does not infringe the constitutional rights of
the respondent as it is a valid exercise of police power necessary to perpetuate its existence with
regulatory measures to implement. The name of Edillon was stricken out from the rolls of
attorney for being a delinquent member of the bar.

MALABAN V RAMENTO 129 SCRA 359 (1984)

FACTS:
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation. They were granted a permit to hold a meeting to protest the merger of two units of
the university. On the scheduled date, the students continued their meeting beyond the scheduled
time and held it in a different place from that indicated in the permit. They expressed in a
vehement language their opposition to the merger and as a result, classes and office work
was disturbed. Petitioners were placed under preventive suspension. On appeal, they were found
guilt of holding an illegal assembly and oral defamation. They were suspended for one academic
year. They filed a petition for certiorari in the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the suspension of students for one academic year was violative of the
constitutional rights of freedom of assembly and free speech?
HELD:
Yes, necessarily their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public
interest is not subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a
showing of clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.
The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy or disorder. If
assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities who
are devoid to deny such request. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time
and place of an assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of non-academic
personnel. However, in violation of terms, penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the
offense.

UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION (UPSU) vs. HON.

BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA
FACTS
Petitioner union filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route managers at
Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and,
on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route managers are
managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for union membership pursuant to Art. 245 of
the Labor Code.
Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. Its petition was dismissed by the Third Division for lack of showing that
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion. But petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, pressing for resolution its contention that the first sentence of Art. 245 of the
Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join
unions, contravenes the constitution.
Citing the Courts ruling in Nasipit Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
petitioner argues that previous administrative determinations of the NLRC do not have the effect
of res judicata in this case, because labor relations proceedings are non-litigious and
summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities.

ISSUES
W/N res judicata applies to administrative proceedings?
HELD:
YES. The doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary administrative proceedings. As
early as 1956, in Brillantes v. Castro, the Court sustained the dismissal of an action by a trial
court on the basis of a prior administrative determination of the same case by the Wage
Administration Service, applying the principle of res judicata. Recently, in Abad v. NLRC the
Court applied the related doctrine of stare decisis in holding that the prior determination that
certain jobs at the Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. were project employments was binding in
another case involving another group of employees of the same company. Indeed, in Nasipit
Lumber Co., this Court clarified toward the end of its opinion that the doctrine of res
judicata applies . . . to judicial or quasi judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of
administrative powers. Proceedings for certification election are quasi judicial in nature and,
therefore, decisions rendered in such proceedings can attain finality.
At the very least, the principle of finality of administrative determination compels respect for the
finding of the Secretary of Labor that route managers are managerial employees as defined by
law in the absence of anything to show that such determination is without substantial evidence to
support it. Nonetheless, the Court, concerned that employees who are otherwise supervisors may
wittingly or unwittingly be classified as managerial personnel and thus denied the right of selforganization, has decided to review the record of this case.

ACOSTA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR 132088, 28 June 2000; Second Division, De Leon Jr

FACTS:
Petitioners are teachers from different public schools in Metro Manila. On various dates in
September and October 1990, petitioners did not report for work and instead, participated in
mass actions by public school teachers at the Liwasang Bonifacio for the purpose of petitioning
the government for redress of their grievances.
Petitioners were administratively charged with such offenses as grave misconduct, gross neglect
of duty, gross violation of civil service law, rules and regulations and reasonable office
regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service and absence without official leave. Petitioners failed to answer these
charges. Following the investigations conducted by the DECS Investigating committees,
Secretary Cario found petitioners guilty as charged and ordered their immediate dismissal from
the service. Petitioners appealed and the CSC modified the said orders of Secretary Cario to six
(6)
months
suspension
without
pay.
Appeal to CA: Denied

ISSUE:
Whether Petitioners participation in the mass actions was an exercise of their constitutional
rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances

HELD:
These mass actions were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and
unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers sworn duty to
perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons.
The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute, public
employees do not have the right to engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose.
Further, herein petitioners, are being penalized not because they exercised their right of
peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievances but because of their successive
unauthorized and unilateral absences which produced adverse effects upon their students for
whose education they are responsible.
As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, It is not the exercise by the petitioners of their
constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was punished, but the manner in which they
exercised such right which resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service and
classes in various public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there are efficient and nondisruptive avenues, other than the mass actions in question, whereby petitioners could petition
the government for redress of grievances.
It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail
services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied government
employees. It may be conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances and noble intentions in

staging the mass actions, but that will not justify their absences to the prejudice of innocent
school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize an illegal work stoppage.