G.R. No.

101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all
surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents
ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA,
minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA,
CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES,
minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA
FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her
parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA.
CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by
their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V.
PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE
PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her
parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION
T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and
JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA
DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented
by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA,
MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE
GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their
parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN,
MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID,
FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA,
minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA
ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA,
minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA
ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed
CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA
CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all
surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents
RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN
and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by
their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO,
CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL,
minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and
MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity
as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO,
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a
balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically
associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility"
and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of
whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed
before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein,
now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined
by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the
Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and
non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging
in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and
natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio
S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new
Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered
upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as
a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of
the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit,

use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's
virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others
who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but
are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the
Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is
prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under
the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine
archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million
(30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant
rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna
may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and
chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of
indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and
flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in
order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land
area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%)
for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential,
industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of
this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host
of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from
drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as
of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a
result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of
which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of
Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil
fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded
estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum
approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the
endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora
and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities,
including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the
siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals
and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced
by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which
result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands
and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent
mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of
multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of
supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of
electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process
carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic
climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise
known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences
of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present
expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film
evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16)
million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the
country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more

than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of
the country's land area.

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is

conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June
1977)

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin
old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of
the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature
and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the

aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of
the State to

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have

granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to
cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging
purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is
hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares
per annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays
and holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of forest
resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and
irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the
plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident
and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages
enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced
and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and
irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their
successors who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this
rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the
benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the
defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant
a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached
as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's
to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's
is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors
who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren
and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures
which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is
manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine
Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy
of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve
conditions under which man and nature can thrive
in productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present
and future generations of Filipinos and;

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and

wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)."
(Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and
resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV,id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature."
(Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of
humankind the natural law and violative of plaintiffs' right to
self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law
other than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of
the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a
Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1)
the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue
raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July
1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the
complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the
motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against
him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result
in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental
law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set
aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the
parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have
also joined the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a
cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right
to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192
creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law
and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and selfperpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the
respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to
safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged

grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements
(TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a
judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's nonimpairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in
this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that
even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well
settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public
interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to
allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the
complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the
"protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such
allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action.
They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging
should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be
properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of
Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not
to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of
a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that
the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once
issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for
twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be
revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice
and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other
forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the
TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be
violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural
matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The
original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with
this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is
indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common
and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the
Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it,
becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them
before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid
class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are
present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter
being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors
assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a
class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in
its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia,
the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every
generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put
a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We
shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous

consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments
adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and
rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the
Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we
believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell
short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right
they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong
they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC).
Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with
vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified
data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint
against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it,
being impressed with political color and involving a matter of public
policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing
violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the
three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how
we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed
to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a
specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with
vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading
of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to
a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the
preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under

the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of
Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a
different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by
the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to
predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the wellfounded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and
protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all
else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those
to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the
debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between
Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who
sponsored the section in question:

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of

the Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in Section 1 thereof which
reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the
benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as
well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with
the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the
objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of
such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments
of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system
that takes into account social and environmental cost implications
relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically
speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher
authority. Said section provides:

MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all
forms of pollution air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment
necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the
same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance
would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of
the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and
utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon
C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of
which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper
use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically
forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in
reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as
well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be
provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits
derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations
of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of
the State to ensure the sustainable use, development,
management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including
the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment,
and equitable access of the different segments of the population to
the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not
only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It
is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value
system including social and environmental cost implications relative
to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.

Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural

Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of
the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of
carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation
of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the
objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the
"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June
1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152
(Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a
continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and
improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive
and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic
and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos,
and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is
conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of
the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the
environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the
other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under
its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No.
192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the
said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty
or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they
claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or
rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the
plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the

ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question
submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;
furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point
for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to
be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true,
may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in
the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the
rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and
circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the
absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct
appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted,
what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens,
there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the
statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the
specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly,
the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the
cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as
party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable
parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a
political question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or
legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is
principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies
already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless,
be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from
judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of
judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to
review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of
the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and
particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the
wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and
to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of
course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a
very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the
disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court,
noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even
less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature,
we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases,
even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution
clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is
the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The
court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how
we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not
shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the
respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his
motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he
would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing
undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license
holders because he would have forever bound the Government to
strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions
regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and
welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners,
into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry
Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the
President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract,
concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted
herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs.
Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates
the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within
the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or
privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would
be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal,
state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested
right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs.
Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the
principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a
privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in
the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be
validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not
deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law
clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548,
October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause,
which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be
passed. 27
cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are

contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive
issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber
licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because
by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been
passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of
advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs.
Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not
meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to
reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public
health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by
the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New
York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General, 30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of
contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern.
The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental
interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are
absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use
his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom
of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private
right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the
state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the nonimpairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the
respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing
or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no
contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover,
with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of
right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is
hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18
July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The
petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license
agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG, METRO MANILA and/or MAYOR

RICARDO D. PAPA, JR., respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ALEJANDRO A. MARQUEZ,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 79, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MORONG, RIZAL; GREENFIELD VENTURES INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and R. J. ORION DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR
WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 162, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
PASIG, METRO MANILA; IRMA FISHING & TRADING CORP.; ARTM
FISHING CORP.; BDR CORPORATION, MIRT CORPORATION and
TRIM CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or
MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MORONG, RIZAL; BLUE LAGOON FISHING CORP. and ALCRIS
CHICKEN GROWERS, INC.; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or
MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MORONG, RIZAL; AGP FISH VENTURES, INC., represented by its
PRESIDENT ALFONSO PUYAT; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA
and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE EUGENIO S. LABITORIA,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 161, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
PASIG, METRO MANILA; SEA MAR TRADING CO. INC.; EASTERN
LAGOON FISHING CORP.; MINAMAR FISHING CORP.;
MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B.
PACIS,respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
It is difficult for a man, scavenging on the garbage dump created by
affluence and profligate consumption and extravagance of the rich or
fishing in the murky waters of the Pasig River and the Laguna Lake or
making a clearing in the forest so that he can produce food for his
family, to understand why protecting birds, fish, and trees is more
important than protecting him and keeping his family alive.
How do we strike a balance between environmental protection, on the
one hand, and the individual personal interests of people, on the other?

G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE HERCULANO TECH,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 70, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
BINANGONAN RIZAL; FLEET DEVELOPMENT, INC. and CARLITO
ARROYO; THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR
ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE AURELIO C. TRAMPE,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 163, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
PASIG; MANILA MARINE LIFE BUSINESS RESOURCES, INC.
represented by, MR. TOBIAS REYNALD M. TIANGCO;

Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and

sustainable development, Republic Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna
Lake Development Authority." This Government Agency is supposed to
carry out and effectuate the aforesaid declared policy, so as to
accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake
area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act clearly
named, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies
for social and economic development.
Presidential Decree No. 813 of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
amended certain sections of Republic Act No. 4850 because of the
concern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and
the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and
prospective uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply,
irrigation, fisheries, and the like. Concern on the part of the Government
and the general public over: the environment impact of development

on the water quality and ecology of the lake and its related river
systems; the inflow of polluted water from the Pasig River, industrial,
domestic and agricultural wastes from developed areas around the lake;
the increasing urbanization which induced the deterioration of the lake,
since water quality studies have shown that the lake will deteriorate
further if steps are not taken to check the same; and the floods in
Metropolitan Manila area and the lakeshore towns which will influence
the hydraulic system of Laguna de Bay, since any scheme of controlling
the floods will necessarily involve the lake and its river systems,
likewise gave impetus to the creation of the Authority.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4850 was amended to read as follows:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the national
policy to promote, and accelerate the development and balanced
growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities
and towns hereinafter referred to as the region, within the context of
the national and regional plans and policies for social and economic
development and to carry out the development of the Laguna Lake
region with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and
ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution. 1
Special powers of the Authority, pertinent to the issues in this case,
include:
Sec. 3. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby further amended by
adding thereto seven new paragraphs to be known as paragraphs (j),
(k), (l), (m), (n), (o), and (p) which shall read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(j) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, to
engage in fish production and other aqua-culture projects in Laguna
de Bay and other bodies of water within its jurisdiction and in
pursuance thereof to conduct studies and make experiments,
whenever necessary, with the collaboration and assistance of the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, with the end in view of
improving present techniques and practices.Provided, that until
modified, altered or amended by the procedure provided in the
following sub-paragraph, the present laws, rules and permits or
authorizations remain in force;
(k) For the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities
in Laguna de Bay,the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
issue new permit for the use of the lake waters for any projects or
activities in or affecting the said lake including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals
and the like, and to impose necessary safeguards for lake quality
control and management and to collect necessary fees for said
activities and projects: Provided, That the fees collected for fisheries
may be shared between the Authority and other government
agencies and political sub-divisions in such proportion as may be
determined by the President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Authority's Board: Provided, further, That the
Authority's Board may determine new areas of fishery development
or activities which it may place under the supervision of the Bureau
of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources taking into account the overall
development plans and programs for Laguna de Bay and related
bodies of water: Provided, finally, That the Authority shall subject to
the approval of the President of the Philippines promulgate such
rules and regulations which shall govern fisheries development
activities in Laguna de Bay which shall take into consideration
among others the following: socio-economic amelioration of
bonafide resident fishermen whether individually or collectively in
the form of cooperatives, lakeshore town development, a master
plan for fishpen construction and operation, communal fishing
ground for lake shore town residents, and preference to lake shore
town residents in hiring laborer for fishery projects;
(l) To require the cities and municipalities embraced within the
region to pass appropriate zoning ordinances and other regulatory
measures necessary to carry out the objectives of the Authority and
enforce the same with the assistance of the Authority;

(m) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding,

to exercise water rights over public waters within the Laguna de Bay
region whenever necessary to carry out the Authority's projects;
(n) To act in coordination with existing governmental agencies in
establishing water quality standards for industrial, agricultural and
municipal waste discharges into the lake and to cooperate with said
existing agencies of the government of the Philippines in enforcing
such standards, or to separately pursue enforcement and penalty
actions as provided for in Section 4 (d) and Section 39-A of this
Act: Provided, That in case of conflict on the appropriate water
quality standard to be enforced such conflict shall be resolved thru
the NEDA Board. 2
To more effectively perform the role of the Authority under Republic Act
No. 4850, as though Presidential Decree No. 813 were not thought to be
completely effective, the Chief Executive, feeling that the land and
waters of the Laguna Lake Region are limited natural resources
requiring judicious management to their optimal utilization to insure
renewability and to preserve the ecological balance, the competing
options for the use of such resources and conflicting jurisdictions over
such uses having created undue constraints on the institutional
capabilities of the Authority in the light of the limited powers vested in it
by its charter, Executive Order No. 927 further defined and enlarged the
functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumerated the
towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay
Region".
Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are the following provisions of
Executive Order No. 927 which include in particular the sharing of fees:
Sec 2. Water Rights Over Laguna de Bay and Other Bodies of
Water within the Lake Region: To effectively regulate and monitor
activities in the Laguna de Bay region, the Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all surface water
for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region including
navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures,
fish corrals and the like.
For the purpose of this Executive Order, the term "Laguna de Bay
Region" shall refer to the Provinces of Rizal and Laguna; the Cities
of San Pablo, Pasay, Caloocan, Quezon, Manila and Tagaytay; the
towns of Tanauan, Sto. Tomas and Malvar in Batangas Province; the
towns of Silang and Carmona in Cavite Province; the town of
Lucban in Quezon Province; and the towns of Marikina, Pasig,
Taguig, Muntinlupa, and Pateros in Metro Manila.
Sec 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby empowered to
collect fees for the use of the lake water and its tributaries for all
beneficial purposes including but not limited to fisheries, recreation,
municipal, industrial, agricultural, navigation, irrigation, and waste
disposal purpose; Provided, that the rates of the fees to be
collected, and the sharing with other government agencies and
political subdivisions, if necessary, shall be subject to the approval
of the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the
Authority's Board, except fishpen fee, which will be shared in the
following manner; 20 percent of the fee shall go to the lakeshore
local governments, 5 percent shall go to the Project Development
Fund which shall be administered by a Council and the remaining
75 percent shall constitute the share of LLDA. However, after the
implementation within the three-year period of the Laguna Lake
Fishery Zoning and Management Plan, the sharing will be modified
as follows: 35 percent of the fishpen fee goes to the lakeshore local
governments, 5 percent goes to the Project Development Fund and
the remaining 60 percent shall be retained by LLDA; Provided,
however, that the share of LLDA shall form part of its corporate
funds and shall not be remitted to the National Treasury as an
exception to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1234.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is important to note that Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 813
defined the term "Laguna Lake" in this manner:
Sec 41. Definition of Terms.

(11) Laguna Lake or Lake. Whenever Laguna Lake or lake is used

in this Act, the same shall refer to Laguna de Bay which is that area
covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual
maximum lake level of elevation 12.50 meters, as referred to a
datum 10.00 meters below mean lower low water (M.L.L.W). Lands
located at and below such elevation are public lands which form part
of the bed of said lake.
Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of
1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the
provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal
governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within
their municipal waters because R.A. 7160 provides:
Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges.
(a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery
privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges
therefor in accordance with the provisions of this Section.
(b) The Sangguniang Bayan may:
(1) Grant fishing privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussel or
other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a definite zone of the
municipal waters, as determined by it; . . . .
(2) Grant privilege to gather, take or catch bangus fry, prawn fry
or kawag-kawag or fry of other species and fish from the municipal
waters by nets, traps or other fishing gears to marginal fishermen
free from any rental fee, charges or any other imposition
whatsoever.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 447. Power, Duties, Functions and Compensation. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(XI) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant exclusive
privileges of constructing fish corrals or fishpens, or the taking or
catching of bangus fry, prawn fry orkawag-kawag or fry of any species
or fish within the municipal waters.
xxx xxx xxx
Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue
fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen operators took
advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to the
consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of
July, 1995, occupied almost one-third of the entire lake water surface
area, increasing the occupation drastically from 7,000 hectares in 1990
to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayor's permit to construct
fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policies
adopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake
carrying capacity.
To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore municipalities of
separate independent policies in the operation of fishpens and fishcages
within their claimed territorial municipal waters in the lake and their
indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have already saturated the lake
area with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental
problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to
the general public that:
In compliance with the instructions of His Excellency PRESIDENT
FIDEL V. RAMOS given on June 23, 1993 at Pila, Laguna pursuant to
Republic Act 4850 as amended by Presidential Decree 813 and
Executive Order 927 series of 1983 and in line with the policies and
programs of the Presidential Task Force on Illegal Fishpens and Illegal
Fishing, the general public is hereby notified that:

1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the

Laguna de Bay Region, which were not registered or to which no
application for registration and/or permit has been filed with Laguna
Lake Development Authority as of March 31, 1993 are hereby
declared outrightly as illegal.
2. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures so
declared as illegal shall be subject to demolition which shall be
undertaken by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and
Illegal Fishing.
3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures
declared as illegal shall, without prejudice to demolition of their
structures be criminally charged in accordance with Section 39-A of
Republic Act 4850 as amended by P.D. 813 for violation of the same
laws. Violations of these laws carries a penalty of imprisonment of not
exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand Pesos or
both at the discretion of the court.
All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures declared as illegal in accordance with the foregoing
Notice shall have one (1) month on or before 27 October 1993 to
show cause before the LLDA why their said fishpens, fishcages and
other aqua-culture structures should not be demolished/dismantled.
One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned
owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aquaculture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures
within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be
effected.
Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases
against the Authority before various regional trial courts, to wit: (a) Civil
Case No. 759-B, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal, filed by Fleet Development, Inc.
and Carlito Arroyo; (b) Civil Case No. 64049, for Injunction, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig, filed by IRMA Fishing and Trading Corp.,
ARTM Fishing Corp., BDR Corp., MIRT Corp. and TRIM Corp.; (c) Civil
Case No. 566, for Declaratory Relief and Injunction, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 163, Pasig, filed by Manila Marine Life Business
Resources, Inc. and Tobias Reynaldo M. Tianco; (d) Civil Case No. 556M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch
78, Morong, Rizal, filed by AGP Fishing Ventures, Inc.; (e) Civil Case
No. 522-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by Blue Lagoon and Alcris
Chicken Growers, Inc.; (f) Civil Case No. 554-, forCertiorari and
Prohibition, Regional Trial Court, Branch 79, Morong, Rizal, filed by
Greenfields Ventures Industrial Corp. and R.J. Orion Development
Corp.; and (g) Civil Case No. 64124, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 15, Pasig, filed by SEA-MAR Trading Co., Inc. and Eastern
Lagoon Fishing Corp. and Minamar Fishing Corporation.
The Authority filed motions to dismiss the cases against it on
jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were invariably denied.
Meanwhile, temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary mandatory
injunction were issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64124, 759 and 566 enjoining
the Authority from demolishing the fishpens and similar structures in
question.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, G.R.
Nos. 120865-71, were filed by the Authority with this court. Impleaded
as parties-respondents are concerned regional trial courts and
respective private parties, and the municipalities and/or respective
Mayors of Binangonan, Taguig and Jala-jala, who issued permits for the
construction and operation of fishpens in Laguna de Bay. The Authority
sought the following reliefs, viz.:
(A) Nullification of the temporary restraining order/writs of
preliminary injunction issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64125, 759 and
566;
(B) Permanent prohibition against the regional trial courts from
exercising jurisdiction over cases involving the Authority which is a
co-equal body;

(C) Judicial pronouncement that R.A. 7610 (Local Government

Code of 1991) did not repeal, alter or modify the provisions of R.A.
4850, as amended, empowering the Authority to issue permits for
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna
de Bay and that, the Authority the government agency vested with
exclusive authority to issue said permits.
By this Court's resolution of May 2, 1994, the Authority's consolidated
petitions were referred to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision, dated June 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
Authority's consolidated petitions, the Court of Appeals holding that: (A)
LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of government whose
decision or order are appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the
LLDA charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar as
fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar
as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been
repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991; (D) in view of the
aforesaid repeal, the power to grant permits devolved to and is now
vested with their respective local government units concerned.
Not satisfied with the Court of Appeals decision, the Authority has
returned to this Court charging the following errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PROBABLY
COMMITTED AN ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE LAGUNA
LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY IS NOT A QUASI-JUDICIAL
AGENCY.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT R.A. 4850 AS
AMENDED BY P.D. 813 AND E.O. 927 SERIES OF 1983 HAS
BEEN REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT 7160. THE SAID RULING
IS CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES AND
JURISPRUDENCE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE POWER TO
ISSUE FISHPEN PERMITS IN LAGUNA DE BAY HAS BEEN
DEVOLVED TO CONCERNED (LAKESHORE) LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS.
We take a simplistic view of the controversy. Actually, the main and only
issue posed is: Which agency of the Government the Laguna Lake
Development Authority or the towns and municipalities comprising the
region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its
environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is
concerned?
Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority,
Republic Act No. 4850, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 813,
and Section 2 of Executive Order No. 927, cited above, specifically
provide that the Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for
any projects or activities in or affecting the said region, including
navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish
corrals and the like. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the
Local Government Code of 1991, has granted to the municipalities the
exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The
Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals,
oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a
definite zone of the municipal waters.
We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily
repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development
Authority and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de
Bay and the lake region.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express
provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the
Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of
the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments.
The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed.

It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development

Authority constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local
Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory
construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general
law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a wellsettled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a
particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent
statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent
to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are
broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law." 3
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute,
the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent
more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as
an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances
forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not
favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments
of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered
by a subsequent general law by mere implication. 4
Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should
prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991.
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority,
which are environmental protection, navigational safety, and sustainable
development, there is every indication that the legislative intent is for the
Authority to proceed with its mission.
We are on all fours with the manifestation of petitioner Laguna Lake
Development Authority that "Laguna de Bay, like any other single body
of water has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km lake
surface water, the eight (8) major river tributaries and several other
smaller rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km basin or watershed
transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces, greater
portion of Metro Manila, parts of Cavite, Batangas, and Quezon
provinces, constitute one integrated delicate natural ecosystem that
needs to be protected with uniform set of policies; if we are to be serious
in our aims of attaining sustainable development. This is an exhaustible
natural resource a very limited one which requires judicious
management and optimal utilization to ensure renewability and preserve
its ecological integrity and balance."
"Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a
national policy geared towards the protection, conservation, balanced
growth and sustainable development of the region with due regard to
the inter-generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part
of the earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this need
when they passed this LLDA law the special law designed to govern
the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources."
"Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts
of management policies where lakeshore local government units
exercise exclusive dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The
garbage thrown or sewage discharged into the lake, abstraction of water
therefrom or construction of fishpens by enclosing its certain area, affect
not only that specific portion but the entire 900 km of lake water. The
implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water resource
management policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and
sustainably develop Laguna de Bay." 5
The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was
clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is evident from the fact that
Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering local
governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II,
of Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific Provisions On
The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power Of Local Government
Units."
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose
of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay
region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control
and management. 6 It does partake of the nature of police power which
is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all
State powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of

the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power should

prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting
Laguna de Bay.
There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and
other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of
Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees
collected.
In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a quasi-judicial
agency or not, it is our holding that, considering the provisions of
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4850 and Section 4 of Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake
Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 304, 306, which
we quote:
xxx xxx xxx
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally
pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases
where the special law provides for another forum. It must be
recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized
administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act
No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective
the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San
Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and
adequate provisions for environmental management and control,
preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems,
and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration
and pollution. Under such a broad grant of power and authority, the
LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the
responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region
from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the
discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the
aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among
others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs,
and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within
the region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises
where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of
the LLDA for the development of the region.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has
only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise
a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as
are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the
exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter, as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in
the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease
and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be
reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
there is no question that the Authority has express powers as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with
authority to issue a "cease and desist order" and on matters
affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fishcages and other
aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. The Authority's pretense,
however, that it is co-equal to the Regional Trial Courts such that all
actions against it may only be instituted before the Court of Appeals
cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of legal
questions affecting the powers of the Authority as provided for in its
charter, the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the
Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the
enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of
municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers
as are by its charter vested on it.

Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing authority will

render nugatory its avowed purpose of protecting and developing the
Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this power
would render useless its reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if
not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development Authority. This, the Local
Government Code of 1991 had never intended to do.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction are
hereby granted, insofar as they relate to the authority of the Laguna
Lake Development Authority to grant fishing privileges within the Laguna
Lake Region.
The restraining orders and/or writs of injunction issued by Judge Arturo
Marave, RTC, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal; Judge Herculano Tech, RTC,
Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal; and Judge Aurelio Trampe, RTC, Branch
163, Pasig, Metro Manila, are hereby declared null and void and
ordered set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The Municipal Mayors of the Laguna Lake Region are hereby prohibited
from issuing permits to construct and operate fishpens, fishcages and
other aqua-culture structures within the Laguna Lake Region, their
previous issuances being declared null and void. Thus, the fishing
permits issued by Mayors Isidro B. Pacis, Municipality of Binangonan;
Ricardo D. Papa, Municipality of Taguig; and Walfredo M. de la Vega,
Municipality of Jala-jala, specifically, are likewise declared null and void
and ordered cancelled.
The fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures put up by
operators by virtue of permits issued by Municipal Mayors within the
Laguna Lake Region, specifically, permits issued to Fleet Development,
Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc.,
represented by, Mr. Tobias Reynald M. Tiangco; Greenfield Ventures
Industrial Development Corporation and R.J. Orion Development
Corporation; IRMA Fishing And Trading Corporation, ARTM Fishing
Corporation, BDR Corporation, Mirt Corporation and Trim Corporation;
Blue Lagoon Fishing Corporation and ALCRIS Chicken Growers, Inc.;
AGP Fish Ventures, Inc., represented by its President Alfonso Puyat;
SEA MAR Trading Co., Inc., Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corporation, and
MINAMAR Fishing Corporation, are hereby declared illegal structures
subject to demolition by the Laguna Lake Development Authority.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 171947-48

February 15, 2011

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
SPORTS,1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
MARITIME GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Petitioners,
vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined
by DIVINA V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS,
JR., DINAH DELA PEA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA
LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA,
FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL
AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN
R. OPOSA,Respondents.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
On December 18, 2008, this Court rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos.
171947-48 ordering petitioners to clean up, rehabilitate and preserve
Manila Bay in their different capacities. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005
Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the
September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are

AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent

developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC
Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed
defendant-government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve
Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea
waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative
Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and
other forms of contact recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development,
and proper use of the countrys environment and natural resources,
and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary
government agency responsible for its enforcement and
implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement its
Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the
rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the
earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination
meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to
ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action
in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative
Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the
DILG, in exercising the Presidents power of general supervision and
its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management
programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD
1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial
establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river
systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not
limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (ParaaqueZapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros
Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay
(Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other
minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water into the
Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they
have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as
prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If
none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying
establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks
within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water,
and human wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros,
and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines and
other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the MWSS is directed to
provide, install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste
water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where
needed at the earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275, the LWUA, through the local water districts
and in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install,
operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the
efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the
provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where
needed at the earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, the DA, through the BFAR, is
ordered to improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is
also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite,
Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using
recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila
Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP
Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in
coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA
8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent
marine pollution in the Manila Bay.

(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 and the International

Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is
ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge
and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated
wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and
apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs
and projects for flood control projects and drainage services in
Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs,
PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle
and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments
established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable
laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR
(Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-MalabonTullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros
in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of
programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the
country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite,
and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP
Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government
agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures, constructions,
and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other
applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan)
Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the
Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and
esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain
a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one
(1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial
jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the
maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also
ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the appropriate
criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of
RA 9003, Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other
existing laws on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of
RA 9275, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine
if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities
for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming
from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be
non-complying, a reasonable time within which to set up the
necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental
sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec.
56 of RA 9003, the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution
prevention, waste management, environmental protection, and like
subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds
and hearts of students and, through them, their parents and friends,
the importance of their duty toward achieving and maintaining a
balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire
Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in
the General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to
cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and
preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the
countrys development objective to attain economic growth in a
manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of
our marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd,
DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also
of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing
mandamus," shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the
Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in
accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

The government agencies did not file any motion for reconsideration
and the Decision became final in January 2009.

shown full compliance with the Courts orders, the Court exercises
continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the judgment.

The case is now in the execution phase of the final and executory
December 18, 2008 Decision. The Manila Bay Advisory Committee was
created to receive and evaluate the quarterly progressive reports on the
activities undertaken by the agencies in accordance with said decision
and to monitor the execution phase.

There being no encroachment over executive functions to speak of, We

shall now proceed to the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory
Committee.

In the absence of specific completion periods, the Committee

recommended that time frames be set for the agencies to perform their
assigned tasks. This may be viewed as an encroachment over the
powers and functions of the Executive Branch headed by the President
of the Philippines.
This view is misplaced.
The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an
exercise of judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the
execution of the Decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative
function of the Court. None of the agencies ever questioned the power
of the Court to implement the December 18, 2008 Decision nor has any
of them raised the alleged encroachment by the Court over executive
functions.
While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission
of plans of action, data or status reports, these directives are but part
and parcel of the execution stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court. Section 47 of Rule 39 reads:
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.The effect of a
judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
xxxx
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties of their successors
in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear that the final judgment includes not only what appears upon its
face to have been so adjudged but also those matters "actually and
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto." Certainly, any activity
that is needed to fully implement a final judgment is necessarily
encompassed by said judgment.
Moreover, the submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Secs. 7
and 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases:
Sec. 7. Judgment.If warranted, the court shall grant the privilege of
the writ of continuing mandamus requiring respondent to perform an act
or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied and to grant such
other reliefs as may be warranted resulting from the wrongful or illegal
acts of the respondent. The court shall require the respondent to submit
periodic reports detailing the progress and execution of the judgment,
and the court may, by itself or through a commissioner or the
appropriate government agency, evaluate and monitor compliance. The
petitioner may submit its comments or observations on the execution of
the judgment.
Sec. 8. Return of the writ.The periodic reports submitted by the
respondent detailing compliance with the judgment shall be contained in
partial returns of the writ. Upon full satisfaction of the judgment, a final
return of the writ shall be made to the court by the respondent. If the
court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the
satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket. (Emphasis
supplied.)
With the final and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of continuing
mandamus issued in MMDA means that until petitioner-agencies have

Several problems were encountered by the Manila Bay Advisory

Committee.2 An evaluation of the quarterly progressive reports has
shown that (1) there are voluminous quarterly progressive reports that
are being submitted; (2) petitioner-agencies do not have a uniform
manner of reporting their cleanup, rehabilitation and preservation
activities; (3) as yet no definite deadlines have been set by petitioner
DENR as to petitioner-agencies timeframe for their respective duties;
(4) as of June 2010 there has been a change in leadership in both the
national and local levels; and (5) some agencies have encountered
difficulties in complying with the Courts directives.
In order to implement the afore-quoted Decision, certain directives have
to be issued by the Court to address the said concerns.
Acting on the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee,
the Court hereby resolves to ORDER the following:
(1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), as
lead agency in the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004, shall submit to
the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the updated Operational Plan for
the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy.
The DENR is ordered to submit summarized data on the overall quality
of Manila Bay waters for all four quarters of 2010 on or before June 30,
2011.
The DENR is further ordered to submit the names and addresses of
persons and companies in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan that generate toxic and hazardous
waste on or before September 30, 2011.
(2) On or before June 30, 2011, the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) shall order the Mayors of all cities in Metro Manila;
the Governors of Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and
Bataan; and the Mayors of all the cities and towns in said provinces to
inspect all factories, commercial establishments and private homes
along the banks of the major river systemssuch as but not limited to
the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region
(Paranaque-Zapote, Las Pinas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-TullahanTenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers,
the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, and the Laguna De
Bayand other minor rivers and waterways within their jurisdiction that
eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay and the lands abutting it,
to determine if they have wastewater treatment facilities and/or hygienic
septic tanks, as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, rules and
regulations. Said local government unit (LGU) officials are given up to
September 30, 2011 to finish the inspection of said establishments and
houses.
In case of non-compliance, the LGU officials shall take appropriate
action to ensure compliance by non-complying factories, commercial
establishments and private homes with said law, rules and regulations
requiring the construction or installment of wastewater treatment
facilities or hygienic septic tanks.
The aforementioned governors and mayors shall submit to the DILG on
or before December 31, 2011 their respective compliance reports which
will contain the names and addresses or offices of the owners of all the
non-complying factories, commercial establishments and private homes,
copy furnished the concerned environmental agency, be it the local
DENR office or the Laguna Lake Development Authority.
The DILG is required to submit a five-year plan of action that will contain
measures intended to ensure compliance of all non-complying factories,
commercial establishments, and private homes.

On or before June 30, 2011, the DILG and the mayors of all cities in
Metro Manila shall consider providing land for the wastewater facilities
of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) or its
concessionaires (Maynilad and Manila Water, Inc.) within their
respective jurisdictions.
(3) The MWSS shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the
list of areas in Metro Manila, Rizal and Cavite that do not have the
necessary wastewater treatment facilities. Within the same period, the
concessionaires of the MWSS shall submit their plans and projects for
the construction of wastewater treatment facilities in all the aforesaid
areas and the completion period for said facilities, which shall not go
beyond 2037.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MWSS is further required to have its
two concessionaires submit a report on the amount collected as
sewerage fees in their respective areas of operation as of December 31,
2010.
(4) The Local Water Utilities Administration is ordered to submit on or
before September 30, 2011 its plan to provide, install, operate and
maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities in said cities and towns and
the completion period for said works, which shall be fully implemented
by December 31, 2020.
(5) The Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Fisheries
and Aquatic Resources, shall submit to the Court on or before June 30,
2011 a report on areas in Manila Bay where marine life has to be
restored or improved and the assistance it has extended to the LGUs in
Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan in
developing the fisheries and aquatic resources in Manila Bay. The report
shall contain monitoring data on the marine life in said areas. Within the
same period, it shall submit its five-year plan to restore and improve the
marine life in Manila Bay, its future activities to assist the
aforementioned LGUs for that purpose, and the completion period for
said undertakings.

(8) The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) shall

submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the names and
addresses of the informal settlers in Metro Manila who, as of December
31, 2010, own and occupy houses, structures, constructions and other
encroachments established or built along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan
Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the NavotasMalabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways
and esteros, in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws. On or
before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit its plan for the removal of
said informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid houses,
structures, constructions and encroachments, as well as the completion
dates for said activities, which shall be fully implemented not later than
December 31, 2015.
The MMDA is ordered to submit a status report, within thirty (30) days
from receipt of this Resolution, on the establishment of a sanitary landfill
facility for Metro Manila in compliance with the standards under RA 9003
or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit a report of the
location of open and controlled dumps in Metro Manila whose
operations are illegal after February 21, 2006,3 pursuant to Secs. 36 and
37 of RA 9003, and its plan for the closure of these open and controlled
dumps to be accomplished not later than December 31, 2012. Also, on
or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, as Chairperson of the
National Solid Waste Management Commission (NSWMC), shall submit
a report on the location of all open and controlled dumps in Rizal,
Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity as
NSWMC Chairperson, shall submit a report on whether or not the
following landfills strictly comply with Secs. 41 and 42 of RA 9003 on the
establishment and operation of sanitary landfills, to wit:
National Capital Region
1. Navotas SLF (PhilEco), Brgy. Tanza (New Site), Navotas
City

The DA shall submit to the Court on or before September 30, 2011 the
baseline data as of September 30, 2010 on the pollution loading into the
Manila Bay system from agricultural and livestock sources.
(6) The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) shall incorporate in its quarterly
reports the list of violators it has apprehended and the status of their
cases. The PPA is further ordered to include in its report the names,
make and capacity of the ships that dock in PPA ports. The PPA shall
submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the measures it intends
to undertake to implement its compliance with paragraph 7 of the
dispositive portion of the MMDA Decision and the completion dates of
such measures.
The PPA should include in its report the activities of its concessionaire
that collects and disposes of the solid and liquid wastes and other shipgenerated wastes, which shall state the names, make and capacity of
the ships serviced by it since August 2003 up to the present date, the
dates the ships docked at PPA ports, the number of days the ship was at
sea with the corresponding number of passengers and crew per trip, the
volume of solid, liquid and other wastes collected from said ships, the
treatment undertaken and the disposal site for said wastes.

2. Payatas Controlled Dumpsite, Barangay Payatas, Quezon

City
Region III
3. Sitio Coral, Brgy. Matictic, Norzagaray, Bulacan
4. Sitio Tiakad, Brgy. San Mateo, Norzagaray, Bulacan
5. Brgy. Minuyan, San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan
6. Brgy. Mapalad, Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija
7. Sub-zone Kalangitan, Clark Capas, Tarlac Special
Economic Zone
Region IV-A

(7) The Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group shall submit on
or before June 30, 2011 its five-year plan of action on the measures and
activities it intends to undertake to apprehend the violators of Republic
Act No. (RA) 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 and other
pertinent laws, ordinances and regulations to prevent marine pollution in
Manila Bay and to ensure the successful prosecution of violators.

8. Kalayaan (Longos), Laguna

9. Brgy. Sto. Nino, San Pablo City, Laguna
10. Brgy. San Antonio (Pilotage SLF), San Pedro, Laguna

The Philippine Coast Guard shall likewise submit on or before June 30,
2011 its five-year plan of action on the measures and activities they
intend to undertake to apprehend the violators of Presidential Decree
No. 979 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976 and RA 9993 or the
Philippine Coast Guard Law of 2009 and other pertinent laws and
regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the
successful prosecution of violators.

11. Morong, Rizal

12. Sitio Lukutan, Brgy. San Isidro, Rodriguez (Montalban),
Rizal (ISWIMS)
13. Brgy. Pintong Bukawe, San Mateo, Rizal (SMSLFDC)

On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA and the seventeen (17) LGUs in
Metro Manila are ordered to jointly submit a report on the average
amount of garbage collected monthly per district in all the cities in Metro
Manila from January 2009 up to December 31, 2010 vis--vis the
average amount of garbage disposed monthly in landfills and
dumpsites. In its quarterly report for the last quarter of 2010 and
thereafter, MMDA shall report on the apprehensions for violations of the
penal provisions of RA 9003, RA 9275 and other laws on pollution for
the said period.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and the LGUs in Rizal, Laguna,
Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan shall submit the names and
addresses of the informal settlers in their respective areas who, as of
September 30, 2010, own or occupy houses, structures, constructions,
and other encroachments built along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando
(Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the
Laguna de Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways and esteros that
discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay, in breach of RA 7279 and
other applicable laws. On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and the
aforesaid LGUs shall jointly submit their plan for the removal of said
informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid structures,
constructions and encroachments, as well as the completion dates for
such activities which shall be implemented not later than December 31,
2012.
(9) The Department of Health (DOH) shall submit to the Court on or
before June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the owners of septic
and sludge companies including those that do not have the proper
facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage
coming from septic tanks.
The DOH shall implement rules and regulations on Environmental
Sanitation Clearances and shall require companies to procure a license
to operate from the DOH.
The DOH and DENR-Environmental Management Bureau shall develop
a toxic and hazardous waste management system by June 30, 2011
which will implement segregation of hospital/toxic/hazardous wastes
and prevent mixing with municipal solid waste.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DOH shall submit a plan of action to
ensure that the said companies have proper disposal facilities and the
completion dates of compliance.1avvphi1
(10) The Department of Education (DepEd) shall submit to the Court on
or before May 31, 2011 a report on the specific subjects on pollution
prevention, waste management, environmental protection,
environmental laws and the like that it has integrated into the school
curricula in all levels for the school year 2011-2012.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DepEd shall also submit its plan of
action to ensure compliance of all the schools under its supervision with
respect to the integration of the aforementioned subjects in the school
curricula which shall be fully implemented by June 30, 2012.
(11) All the agencies are required to submit their quarterly reports
electronically using the forms below. The agencies may add other key
performance indicators that they have identified.
SO ORDERED.

In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)

Summary
At the end of World War II, General Tomoyuki Yamashita commanded
part of the Japanese Army in the Philippines, where his subordinates
tortured, raped, and killed thousands of Filipino civilians. After the war
ended, the United States held Yamashita responsible for these atrocities
and tried him in a military commission that lacked many of the
procedural and evidentiary protections customary to courts-martial and
civilian criminal trials. In a split decision, the Supreme Court upheld his

conviction. The Court held that the power to convene a military

commission to try violations of the laws of war extended after the
cessation of hostilities, and that Yamashitas commission had power to
try him for command responsibility because that was a violation of the
laws of war.
Although this case was not cited much after the end of World War II, its
holdings experienced a resurgence of importance beginning in the
1990s. As to command responsibility, In re Yamashita was the first
instance in which a commander had been held responsible for his
subordinates violations of the laws of war. The case served as the
beginning of the development of command responsibility under
international law, eventually being incorporated into the Geneva
Conventions, applied in the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, and adopted by the International Criminal Court in
2002.
As to the authority of military commissions, In re Yamashita was part of
a quartet of World War II-era cases (in concert with Ex Parte
Quirin (LINK), Hirota v. MacArthur (LINK), and Johnson v.
Eisentrager (LINK)) upon which the Bush Administration relied to defend
its trials of Guantanamo detainees by military commissions. The Bush
Administration argued that In re Yamashita recognized the trial of enemy
combatants as a fundamental incident of war and that Congresss 2001
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (LINK to 2001 AUMF) thus
empowered the President to establish military commissions for trying
Guantanamo detainees. The Supreme Court in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld (LINK) disagreed, instead interpreting In re Yamashita as a
limitation on the Presidents power to establish military commissions
absent a violation of the laws of war or specific congressional
authorization. There, Justice Stevens observed that In re
Yamashita had been stripped of its precedential value.
Procedural History
The Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of the Philippines denied
Yamashitas petitions for writs of habeas corpus and prohibition, and
Yamashita sought review of this denial in the U.S. Supreme Court by
filing a petition for certiorari. Yamashita also directly applied in the
Supreme Court for leave to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and
a petition for a writ of prohibition. During the pendency of this case, the
Philippine Islands were still an American territory, and the Supreme
Court had statutory jurisdiction to hear cases arising in the Philippines
under 28 U.S.C. 349 (1940).
Facts
Near the end of World War II, General Tomoyuki Yamashita commanded
the Imperial Japanese Armys Fourteenth Army Group, which was
stationed primarily in the Philippine Islands. His troops there
committ[ed] brutal atrocities, raping, torturing, and killing thousands of
Filipino citizens between October 9, 1944, and September 2, 1945.
These atrocities allegedly occurred as part of Yamashitas deliberate
plan and purpose to massacre and exterminate a large part of the
civilian population of Batangas Province, and to devastate and destroy
public, private, and religious property.
On September 3, 1945, Yamashita surrendered to United States forces
and subsequently became a prisoner of war. The United States charged
Yamashita with violating the laws of war by disregarding and failing to
discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of members
of his command by allowing them to commit brutal atrocities against
people of the United States and of its allies and dependencies,
particularly in the Philippines. U.S. General Styer, the commanding
general of the United States Army Forces for the Western Pacific,
appointed a military commission of five Army officers to try Yamashita.
Yamashitas attorneys argued that Yamashita was unaware of and did
not order his subordinates acts and that neither United States military
law nor the international laws of war recognized command responsibility
in such a situation. Therefore, his attorneys concluded, the military
commission lacked jurisdiction because Yamashitas charges were not
violations of the laws of war. The commission rejected Yamashitas
argument of ignorance, relying on the widespread nature of the
atrocities to impute knowledge to Yamashita.

Yamashitas case proceeded to trial, which lasted two months, from

October to December 1945, and involved the testimony of more than
286 witnesses. The military commission found Yamashita guilty on
December 7, 1945, and sentenced him to death by hanging.
Yamashita petitioned the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands for a
writ of habeas corpus, which was denied on limited jurisdictional
grounds. He then sought review in the United States Supreme Court,
which held that the military commission had authority to try Yamashita
for command responsibility.
Following the United States Supreme Courts decision, Yamashita
turned to President Harry Truman for clemency, but President Truman
decided not to intervene. Yamashita was hanged in the Philippines in
February 1946. Two and a half years later, the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East found Yamashitas Chief of Staff, Akira Muto, to
share[] responsibility for these gross breaches of the Laws of War
because Muto was in a position to influence policy. Like Yamashita,
Muto was hanged.
Holding:
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Stone addressed two questions:
whether the military commission was lawfully established and, if so,
whether the commission could lawfully try Yamashitaafter hostilities had
ceased for his failure to stop his subordinates from committing violations
of the laws of war
The majority held that the military commission was lawfully established
by the President and Congress, relying heavily on Ex Parte
Quirin (LINK). The President had instructed his commanders to
proceed with the trial, before appropriate military tribunals, of such
Japanese war criminals as have been or may be apprehended.
General Styer, who had command over the Philippines, had validly
ordered the creation of the military commission. Congress had
constitutional power to define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law
of Nations, and by enacting the Articles of War (LINK TO 10 U.S.C.
14711593), Congress had exercised its Define and Punish Power by
statutorily authorizing the trial of enemy combatants via military
commissions for violations of the laws of war. Yamashitas military
commission was therefore authorized by both the President and
Congress.
Moreover, the commission did not lose its authority to try Yamashita
simply because hostilities had ended. The majority held that Congresss
war power, from which the commission derives its existence, is not
limited to victories in the field [of battle], but carries with it the inherent
power to guard against the immediate renewal of the conflict and to
remedy . . . the evils which the military operations have produced. To
hold otherwise would, the majority recognized, undermine the practical
administration of the system of military justice under the law of war
because the vast majority of offenders would not be apprehended and
subjected to trial until after the cessation of hostilities. Consequently,
Congress and the President had the constitutional authority to prosecute
violations of the laws of war via military commission, at least until peace
is agreed upon or proclaimed.
The majority further held that the military commission had authority to try
Yamashita for his failure to prevent his subordinates violations of the
laws of war. The military commissions authority was limited to trials for
violations of the laws of war. The question, then, is whether the law of

war imposes on an army commander a duty to take such appropriate

measures as are within his power to control the troops under his
command for the prevention of [his troops violations of the laws of
war], . . . and whether [the commander] may be charged with personal
responsibility for his failure to take such measures when violations
result. The majority answered that question in the affirmative. The
majority reasoned that the law of war presupposes that its violation is to
be avoided through the control of the operations of war by commanders
who are to some extent responsible for their subordinates.
Yamashita could thus be tried for his failure to prevent his troops
atrocities. But the Court did not decide whether the military commission
correctly found Yamashita guilty. Rather, the majority limited its inquiry
to the authority of the military commission to proceed; because it did
have such authority, its verdict was not subject to judicial review merely
because [the commission may] have made a wrong decision on
disputed facts. [C]orrection of [the military tribunals] errors of decision
is not for the courts but for the military authorities which are along
authorized to review their decisions.
Lastly, the Court held that the evidentiary and procedural protections
guaranteed by the Geneva Conventions, Congresss Articles of War, and
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution did not apply to
Yamashitas trial. The Articles of War applied only to trials of American
personnel, and the relevant portions of the Geneva Conventions applied
only to trials for crimes committed after capture. And in any event, the
majority concluded that the commissions rulings on evidence and on
the mode of conducting [its] proceedings against [Yamashita] are not
reviewable by the courts, but only by the reviewing military authorities.
Based on this assessment, the Court declined to consider whether the
Fifth Amendments guarantee of due process applied to Yamashitas
trial.
Justice Murphys dissent. Justice Murphy wrote a dissent, which
argued for a guarantee of Fifth Amendment due process rights to any
person who is accused of a crime by the Federal Government or any of
its agencies.
Justice Murphy also provided a more detailed factual analysis of the
situation facing Yamashita and the forces under his command from
1944-1945, amid the U.S.militarys robust and effective campaign to
retake the Philippines. Under these circumstances, where Yamashita
exercised diminishing control over his forces, Murphy noted that
[i]nternational law makes no attempt to define the duties of a
commander of an army under constant and overwhelming assault; nor
does it impose liability under such circumstances. Justice Murphy
continued his dissent with a discussion about the obligations and
liabilities of commanders in the field during wartime.
Justice Rutledges dissent. Justice Rutledge also dissented,
describing the procedural due process failures which resulted in the
conviction of Yamashita. Justice Rutledge agreed with the conclusion
reached by Justice Murphy, but focused his dissent on the constitution
of the commission and other matters taking place in the course of the
proceedings, relating chiefly to the denial of reasonable opportunity to
prepare petitioners defense and the sufficiency of the evidence,
together with serious questions of admissibility, to prove on offense, all
going as I think to the commissions jurisdiction.