Wagalla Massacre Chronicles

Part Two: A Premeditated act of Genocide

By Salah Abdi Sheikh
The official government reports available show that Wagalla Massacre was a military operation
gone wrong. According to a report prepared by Etemesi Committee, there was no clear
operational order given to the junior commanders of the army and the police. The District
Security Committee panicked and made terrible errors and the methods of interrogation they
used was unusual and unprofessional. The acting DC and the OCPD demonstrated clear lack of
leadership and tact and in their cowardice left the situation to junior Military and Police officers.
Etemesi Committee reached one damning conclusion that threw a spanner in the works of all the
official truths about Wagalla Massacre. The District Security Committee members were to date
unwilling to state the truth regarding the incident. The credibility of the officers is hence
doubtful. Despite its damning conclusion, there is one problem; Etemesi inevitably relied on
doctored reports and explanations of those who perpetrated the massacre that the incident was as
result of operation gone wrong. The more plausible explanation is it was planned that way.
To understand Kenyas policy towards Somalis of Kenya, one must look beyond the borders in
the politics of Somalia and Ethiopia. Kenya and Ethiopia have a security pact that is intended to
put up a defense against Somalia. In all the massacres that took place in North Eastern Kenya,
there was instigation of some cross-border activity. When people were killed in Malka Mari,
Ethiopian forces or militias had burned a Kenyan military vehicle. Kenya ended up killing its
own citizens because of the policy of not differentiating Somalis wherever they may live. The
idea of they all look alike exists to date. When Garissa town was burnt by the military in 1980,
the idea was to flush out one Abdi Mathobe who went to Somalia, armed himself and came back
for revenge. The Somalia connection to all the violations on Somalis of Kenya was manifested in
the 1989 Kenya Somali Verification and Registration which led to mass deportation of Somalis
out of Kenya. The idea behind this exercise was the notion that there were, according to Daniel
Arap Moi, Vice-President of Kenya in 1978, Somalis who have sympathy with Somalia. It
took the Kenya government eleven years to implement Mois 1978 directive.
Wagalla Massacre happened at confluence of three potent forces; Somali clan chauvinism,
Somalia border instability and Kenyas suspicion and subjugation of its Somali population. At
the time of Wagalla Massacre there was bitter conflict between Degodia and Ajuran sub-clans.
The official story states that Degodia had become aggressively hostile and this phrase
aggressively hostile was used in the minutes of PSC and DSC. The Ministerial Statement given
in parliament chronicles aggressive action by Degodia sub-clan against the Ajuran sub-clan. As
the hostilities between the two sub-clans escalated, the government came in and asked both
groups to surrender their arms. The Minister of State Office of the President, Hussein Maalim
visited Wajir in December, 1983 and gave each group 10 days to bring in their guns and

ammunitions. By the end of the grace period Ajuran had complied but Degodians had shown
little response. Etemesi report says a total twelve guns were surrendered by the two groups,
with Degodia only surrendering one. The grace period was extended by 10 more days and this
time more guns were surrendered. Ajuran surrendered 26 and Degodia surrendered 8. This was
an arms race in reverse.
Official reports say instead of implementing the government directives, the Degodia started
migrating to nearby Mandera and Garissa Districts. They were however stopped by the
respective District Security Committees. Further the Security Committees minutes bring in a
new angle which was picked by the Etemesi Report. Degodia threatened to assassinate senior
civil servants. This particular language seems to pervade the whole official story; they had to
be killed because they were aggressively hostile, refused to surrender more guns, migrated to
other districts and threatened to assassinate senior civil servants. This story was cooked up to
look like the government was protecting one group of Somalis by killing another group
wantonly. The schism between Somali sub-clans flared and ebbed since the time immemorial and
continues to date. It is easy to poke holes in this official narrative. The first gaping hole is how
many guns did each group own? How did the number of guns surrendered become a measure of
compliance? Etemesi Report observes that the number of guns surrendered should not have been
a yardstick of compliance or discrimination. Second, the clan clashes were confined to Giriftu
Division, why were Degodia clansmen abducted from Wajir South, Wajir East, Moyale District,
Mandera District and Garissa District? Why was Wajir Town being burnt? Again Etemesi Report
asks this pertinent question. It also observes that burning of the aerials (huts) in Bulla Jogoo in
Wajir Township was unjustified and uncalled for in view of the fact that the plots had been
officially allocated to the owners. A close reading of the official story reveals a determined
effort to confound everyone with tales of raging, armed and out of control tribal militia
rampaging through the district.
There has always been the suspicion among Wajir residents that Wagalla Massacre was
engineered to tame an armed rebellion against a government rather than to quell tribal tension.
There was no armed rebellion against the Kenya government in Wajir in 1984 in which the
Degodia sub-clan played any role. There was however an armed rebellion against the
government of Somalia in which Degodia had a not so insignificant involvement. There was
Somalia National Movement (SNM), also known as iriria which apparently operated within five
miles of the Kenyan border. A brief prepared for Kenya Intelligence Committees visit to North
Eastern Province between 8 and 10 February 1984, states that this rebel group operated in
Sidamo and was recruiting Kenyans along the border. The leader of this group was according to
the brief, one Sheikh Yarrow Haji Ibrahim, Degodia from Wajir who according to the brief was a
defector from Somali National Army. The brief states that although the rebel leaders ambition
was primarily against the Somali government, chances of him changing the the idea against
Kenya, if he (ever) succeeds cannot be ruled out.

Somalias involvement was given credence by claims made in parliament by Ahmed Khalif in
March 1984 after the massacre. According to a report that appeared in the Weekly Review of 13th
April 1984, a certain rebel group had a camp five miles from the Kenya border. The report
quoting a senior North Eastern politician claimed that there existed in the province an
underground political movement called iriria, which was responsible for the violence. The
politician claimed that iriria was an alliance of small tribal groupings backed by a livestock
agency in Nairobi, which was using huge amounts of money to recruit local people in pursuit of
an eventual foreign objective. After Wagalla Massacre these was the last reference ever made
to iririas existence in the province. It is dropped from the official story like it never existed
thereafter.
The last potent force that may have played a catalyst role in Wagalla Massacre is the Kenya
governments official suspicion of its Somali population. Between 1978 and 1984 three
massacres occurred in the three districts of North Eastern Province. In Mandera district in 1978,
hundreds were killed at Malka Marri when a Kenyan military vehicle was allegedly burnt by an
Ethiopian militia. In Garissa District in 1980, half of the town was burnt, people murdered and
their bodies thrown into the river according to witnesses. There was a clear reference to Garissa
incident in the minutes of the Provincial Security Committee meetings where in his remarks the
PC refers both military operations as impromptu security operations and in the second
reference indicates judging from previous events in Garissa in 1980, the DSC Wajir decided to
round-up Degodia male adults. The incidents in Mandera and Garissa were not as publicized as
Wagalla Massacre probably because they were indiscriminate and the numbers involved were
fewer. However, there was a pattern of the military running rampage on the population and
massacring them at will.
The government explanation that the massacre was a normal operation gone wrong falls flat
against evidence provided in its own reports. Wagalla Massacre was a premeditated genocide
targeting a small community identifiable by distinct ethnic reference and location. The primary
objective was mass murder and displacement, the first was achieved but the second objective
failed. According to the Wajir DSC special meeting of 9 February 1984, the primary objective of
the operation was to apprehend the killers of six civilians on that day. There were no other
objectives stated by the DSC. The strategy was clear, to spread the military across the district,
round up all Degodia tribesmen and interrogate them until they identify the killers among them.
The DSC observed since the exercise is a big, the security personnel in the district will not be
able to cover it adequately, the OC 7KR and O.C.P.D were asked to request for more
manpower from their respective superiors. The minutes of the DSC says nothing about the
objectives other than to apprehend some killers and does not mention Wagalla Airstrip or any
other holding place for the prisoners. The PSC meeting of 14 February 1984, the last day of the
massacre however, provides a list of two objectives; to ask all Degodia tribesmen who possess
illegally acquired firearms to surrender them to the authorities immediately and to try and
obtain the from the Degodia tribesmen under interrogation any names of known people in

possession of illegal firearms, so that such people can also be rounded up and be made to
surrender illegal firearms. Again the PSC omits the primary objective of the operation provided
by the DSC which purports to have ordered the operation. The PSC goes further and says The
only convenient and suitable place to gather all those rounded up was agreed to be at the Wajir
civilian airstrip. This detail was not provided at the beginning of the operations on 9 February
when the DSC Wajir met and authorized an operation against the Degodia sub-clan. Official
story gets murkier, the PSC restates its objectives on 17 February 1984 an as an explanation
indicates that the operation was carried out after defenseless civilians were killed.
Etemesi report provides a clear list of objectives which includes all the DSC and PSC have said
about the security operations but adds its own aims which were never in any of the minutes of
the district and provincial security teams. The aims of the operations according to the committee
were: to force Degodia to surrender their firearms, try and get names of the bandits who killed
the family of six (6) in Griftu, Force all the Degodias to their traditional grazing area i.e Wajir
East, Restore law and order. Tying up all these mutating reasons for Wagalla, it is evident that
there was a plan which was probably too sinister to be on official documents. The objective of
mass displacement of a population who by 1984 were a majority in a constituency, off the land,
was one clear indication that Wagalla Massacre was designed to shock its victims to submission
or cause such atrocious annihilation that it would be difficult for the targeted community to ever
regenerate. This attempt itself is a sign that genocide was afoot.
Events preceding Wagalla Massacre point to the premeditated nature of this heinous crime.
Prominent Degodia leaders were detained for instigation to violence before the massacre. This
included Former MP Abdisirat Khalif, Chairman Wajir County Council Mohamed Ali Noor,
Former Councilor Omar Ali Birik and local resident Ahmed Elmi Daud. This indicated that the
operation was not an impromptu security situation but a well planned military operation. The
other event was the disarming of 52 APs and 5 Police officers who were from Degodia sub-clan.
Etemesi Committee indicates that Wajir DSC were reacting to intelligence reports from Garissa,
whereby it was alleged that the Degodias were planning to retaliate against the government and
use Degodias in the system to assassinate civil servants. The other startling issue was that on 11
February 1984 when people were gathered at Wagalla Airstrip naked, lying face forward on the
hot surface, the DSC, according to Etemesi report withdrew the ID cards. By the time Etemesi
committee was writing its report, the IDs had not been returned to the owners.
After the massacre, rescue teams led by Sister Analena Toneli and Mohamed Ibrahim Elmi,
current MP for Tarbaj Constituency, collected survivors and bodies from all over the district.
They also provided much of the information. The government did not take this rescue effort
lightly and came hard on the Catholic lay sister. Etemesi Report recommended that Analena
Tonelis activities at the TB Manyatta that she managed for over 10 years be observed. In few
months DSC Wajir recommended that she be declared a security risk and eventually she was
deported. The PSC Garissa in concurrence but careful with the likely international fallout noted,

 DSC should do more homework, rather than base their case on her stand in the recent Wagalla
incident
In the end the perpetrators got a pat on the back and are still living in the Kenyan society
oblivious to the blood of the innocent victims on their hands. Wagalla Massacre remains stain on
the conscious of the Kenya government, past, present and the future. Etemesi Committee
recommended that communal punishment be suspended, the likes of Nabwire, Tiema and
Mudogo be given severe reprimand, transferred and dealt with departmentally and finally and
most importantly, Degodias confidence in government be restored. The committee
recommended, The governments immediate task should be to try and restore the confidence of
the Degodias and to wrap up their recommendation they repeated the same line word for word
just for emphasis. 32 years later, their recommendations still fly out of the page for any
government official interest enough to read and implement. For a committee that was operating
under such severe restrictions, the Etemesi Report in most parts except where they relied on the
regional security committees, provides an insight unlike no other about Wagalla Massacre. The
official truth about Wagalla Massacre however was convoluted and corrected to fit into rogue
security team and military operation gone wrong paradigm. Nothing could be further from the
truth; Wagalla Massacre happened the way it happened because it was planned that way.
Salah Abdi Sheikh is the author of Blood on the Runway: The Wagalla Massacre of 1984
salah.sheikh@yahoo.com