PEOPLE V.

ROBERTO ESTRADA

comprehend the significance of the trial and his

relation to it.

G.R. NO. 130487

Accused was convicted for murder and sentenced to
death. Defense interposed insanity with proof of his
history of mental illness filed for suspension of
arraignment and suspension of proceedings. Both
were denied without subjecting accused to mental
examination.
HELD:
Case remanded for the conduct of a proper mental
examination to determine competency to stand trial.
By depriving appellant of mental examination, the trial
court effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial and
the proceedings before the court are therefore
nullified. He who invokes insanity as an exempting
circumstance must prove it by clear and positive
evidence. The absence of direct proof however, does
not entirely discount the probability that accused was
not of sound mind at that time. In passing the question
of the propriety of suspending the proceedings, the
test is found in the question whether the accused
would have a fair trial with the assistance which the
law secures or gives. There are 2 distinct matters to
be determined under this test (1) whether the
defendant is sufficiently coherent to provide his
counsel with information necessary or relevant to
constructing a defense and (2) whether he is able to

The determination of whether a sanity investigation or

hearing should be ordered rests generally in the
discretion of the trial court. In the case, the trial court
took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of the
accused. The trial judge however is not a psychiatrist
or psychologist or some other expert equipped with
the specialized knowledge of determining the state of
a persons mental health. The court should have at
least ordered the examination of the accused,
especially in the light of the latters history of mental
item.
In re Winship
Brief Fact Summary. A preponderance of evidence
found that Winship (D), a 12-year old boy, committed
an act that if committed by an adult would have been
a crime, thus justifying the juvenile delinquency he
was charged with. Winship (D) contended that a
finding such as this had to be based on proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Among the essentials of

due process and fair treatment required during the
adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an
act that would constitute a crime if committed by an
adult is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Facts. A New York Family Court judge found Winship

(D) by relying on a preponderance of the evidence, the
standard of proof required by S 744(b) of the New York
Family Court Act, guilty of an act (stealing money from
a pocketbook in a locker) that if done by an adult,
would have constituted the crime or crimes of
Larceny. That the proof might not establish guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt was accepted by the judge
and this finding supported the juvenile delinquency
charge against Winship (D). This position of the court
was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals and it
also sustained the constitutionality of S744 (b).
However, a review was granted by the United States
Supreme Court.

Issue. Is proof beyond a reasonable doubt among the

essentials of due process and fair treatment required
during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is
charged during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile
is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if
committed by an adult?
Held. (Brennan, J.) Yes. Among the essentials of due
process and fair treatment required during the
adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an
act that would constitute a crime if committed by an
adult is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The
requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be
established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt has a

long history and this has been constitutionally required

in most of this Courts opinions. As it is in adult
criminal prosecutions, the constitutional safeguard of
proof beyond reasonable doubt is of utmost
importance during the adjudication stage of a
delinquency proceeding. Reversed.

Concurrence. (Harlan, J.) A judge handling a juvenile

proceeding should not water down the factual
conclusion that the accused committed the criminal
act with which he/she is charged than be required in a
criminal trial. Therefore, the worthy goals which the
juvenile justice system seeks to achieve should not be
interfered with by the imposition of such a standard of
proof.

Discussion. The response of the majority to Justice

Blacks dissent where he said, The Court has never
clearly held, however, that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is either expressly or impliedly commanded by
any provision of the Constitution was Lest there
remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of
the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that
the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged.
Olaguer v Military Commission No. 34

GR No. L-54558 May 22, 1987

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-inChief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period
not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours
from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing
to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote
of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by
the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires
it.cralaw
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twentyfour hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call.cralaw
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate
its decision thereon within thirty days from its
filing.cralaw

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation

of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the
civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.cralaw
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged
for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly
connected with, invasion.cralaw
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within three days,
otherwise he shall be released.cralaw
GANCAYCO, J:

FACTS:
June 13. 1980 -the respondent Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines 3 created the
respondentMilitary Commission No 34 to try criminal
case filed against the petitioners.
July 30, 1980 - an amendedcharge sheet was filed for
seven (7) offenses, namely:
(1) Unlawful possession of explosives and
incendiarydevices;
(2) Conspiracy to assassinate President, and Mrs.
Marcos;
(3) Conspiracy to assassinate cabinetmembers Juan
Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno;
(4) Conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. ArturoTangco,
Jose Roo and Onofre Corpus;
(5) Arson of nine buildings;

(6) Attempted murder of Messrs. LeonardoPerez,

Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and
Fabian Ver; and
(7) Conspiracy and proposal tocommit rebellion, and
inciting to rebellion.
December 4, 1984 - pending the resolution of the
Petition, the respondent Military Commission No. 34
passedsentence convicting the petitioners and
imposed upon them the penalty of death by
electrocution.
The thrust of petitioners arguments is that military
commissions have no jurisdiction to try civiliansfor
offenses alleged to have been committed during the
period of martial law. They also maintain that
theproceedings before the respondent Military
Commission No. 34 are in gross violation of their
constitutional right todue process of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction
to try civilians while the civil courts are open and
functioning
HELD:
WHEREFORE,
DISMISSED - the Petitions for habeas corpus are for
having become moot and academic.
GRANTED - The Petitions for certiorari and prohibition.
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL - The creation of the
respondent Military Commission No. 34 to try civilians
like the petitioners is hereby declared unconstitutional
and all its proceedings are deemed null and void. The
temporary restraining order issued against the
respondents enjoining them from executing the
Decision of the respondent Military Commission No. 34

is hereby made permanent and the said respondents

are permanently prohibited from further pursuing
Criminal Case No. MC-34-1 against the petitioners. The
sentence rendered by the respondent Military
Commission No. 34 imposing the death penalty on the
petitioners is hereby vacated for being null and void,
and all the items or properties taken from the
petitioners in relation to the said criminal case should
be returned to them immediately.
RATIO:
(1) Military commissions or tribunals have no
jurisdiction to try civilians for alleged offenses when
the civil courts are open and functioning.Due process
of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where
the accused stands to lose either his life or his liberty),
the accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial.
Civilians like (the) petitioner placed on trial for civil
offenses under general law are entitled to trial by
judicial process, not by executive or military process.
(2) Judicial power exists only in the courts, which have
"exclusive power to hear and determine those matters
which affect the life or liberty or property of a citizen.
In Toth v. Quarles, 40 the U.S. Supreme Court
furtherstressed that the assertion of military authority
over civilians cannot rest on the President's power as
Commander-in-Chief or on any theory of martial law.
(3) Following the principle of separation of powers
underlyingthe existing constitutional organization of
the Government of the Philippines, the power and the
duty of interpretingthe laws as when an individual
should be considered to have violated the law) is
primarily a function of the judiciary. It is not, and it
cannot be the function of the Executive Department,
through the military authorities. And as long as the
civil courts in the land remain open and are regularly

functioning, as they do so today and as they did during

the period of martial law in the country, military
tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over
civilians for offenses committed by them and which are
properly cognizable by the civil courts.
(4) Respondent Military Commission No. 34 appears to
have been rendered too hastily to the prejudice to the
petitioners, and in complete disregard of their
constitutional right to adduce evidence on their
behalf.Thus, even assuming arguendo that the
respondent Military Commission No. 34 does have the
jurisdiction to try the petitioners, the Commission
should be deemed ousted of its jurisdiction when, as
observed by the SolicitorGeneral, the said tribunal
acted in disregard of the constitutional rights of the
accused. Indeed, it is well-settled that once a
deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist,
the tribunal that rendered the judgment in question is
deemed ousted of jurisdiction.
(5) Proclamation No. 2045 (dated January 17, 1981)
officially lifting martial law in the Philippines and
abolishing all military tribunals created pursuant to the
national emergency effectively divests the respondent
Military Commission No. 34 (and all military tribunals
for that matter) of its supposed authority to try
civilians, including the herein petitioners. The said
proclamation states:
"The military tribunals created pursuant thereto are
hereby dissolved upon final determination of case's
pending therein which may not be transferred to the
civil courts without irreparable prejudice to the state in
view of the rules on double jeopardy, or other
circumstances which render prosecution of the cases
difficult, if not impossible."

(6) Certainly, the rule of stare decisis is entitled to

respect because stability in jurisprudence is desirable.
Nonetheless, reverence for precedent, simply as
precedent, cannot prevail when constitutionalism and
the public interest demand otherwise. Thus, a doctrine
which should be abandoned or modified should be
abandoned or modified accordingly. After all, more
important than anything else is that this Court should
be right.
Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986)
FACTS: Assassination of former Senator Benigno
"Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that
had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His
brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into
the back of his head by an assassin. The military
investigators reported within a span of three hours
that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was
then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only
days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired
gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him
down in turn.

President was constrained to create a Fact Finding

Board to investigate due to large masses of people
who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning
yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.

The fact is that both majority and minority reports

were one in rejecting the military version stating that
"the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando

Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the

soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have
shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of
a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only
difference between the two reports is that the majority
report found all the twenty-six private respondents
above-named in the title of the case involved in the
military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority
report would exclude nineteen of them.

Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that

Galman was the killer.

Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining

respondent court from rendering a decision in the two
criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-totwo votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for.
The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to
file a reply to respondents' separate comments and
respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a
copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.

But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-twovote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition
and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same
Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5day period counted from receipt of respondent
Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which
apparently was not served on them).

Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,

alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal
ground for such action and urging that the case be set
for a full hearing on the merits that the people are
entitled to due process.

However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its

decision acquitting all the accused of the crime
charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving
them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that
with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the
instant case had become moot and academic.
Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their

second motion for reconsideration alleging that
respondents committed serious irregularities
constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of
justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights
of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights
as an accused.

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double

jeopardy clause.

RULING: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration

is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases
which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch
and with careful regard for the requirements of due
process.

Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose

15 months later when former Pres. was no longer
around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion
for reconsideration that he revealed that the
Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors
were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the AquinoGalman murder case. Malacaang wanted dismissal to
the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the
Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference planned a
scenario of trial where the former President ordered
then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the
participation of each respondent; decided that the
presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division)
would personally handle the trial. A conference was
held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady
and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were
with the President. The conferees were told to take the
back door in going to the room where the meeting was
held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in
the reception hall waiting to see the President. During
the conference, and after an agreement was reached,
Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na
lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room
Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and
uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.

The Court then said that the then President (codenamed Olympus) had stage-managed in and from
Malacaang Palace "a scripted and predetermined
manner of handling and disposing of the AquinoGalman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the
Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and
decided the same acted under the compulsion of some
pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to
resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the
case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondentsaccused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos
came up with a public statement aired over television
that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military
escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was,
therefore, not a source of wonder that President
Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner
consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at
the same time, would clear his name and his
administration of any suspected guilty participation in
the assassination. such a procedure would be a better
arrangement because, if the accused are charged in
court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the
benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby
avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses
shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in
office.

More so was there suppression of vital evidence and

harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of
witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination.
According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these
persons because they said Marcos was in power. The
assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran;

no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by

virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated
testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of
the accused and their confinement in a military camp,
instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of
proceedings and developments from Malacaang and
by Malacaang personnel. The partiality of
Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That
President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six
accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In
rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid
itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and
partiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious.
The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally
ignored and disregarded.

exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of

injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and
suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where
the people and the world are entitled to know the
truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at
stake.

The record shows that the then President misused the

overwhelming resources of the government and his
authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of
the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder
cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very
worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive
officer who shall address any order or suggestion to
any judicial authority with respect to any case or
business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of justice."

Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved

ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition
and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan
from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance
of by the Court which had required the respondents',
including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although
no restraining order was issued anew, respondent
Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its
decision of total absolution of all the accused pending
the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the
respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion
on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which
substantively prejudiced the petitioner.

Impartial court is the very essence of due process of

law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and
treatment of the cases by public respondents at the
secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only after
fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely
disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab
initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to

There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of

acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued
without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches,
therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no
judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither
binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing
out of it are void.

With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the

cases must now be tried before an impartial court with

an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must

now face trial for the crimes charged against them
before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor
with all due process.

dishonored by drawee Prudential Bank as it is drawn

against a closed account. Salazar replaced said check
with a new one, this time drawn against Solid Bank. It
is again dishonored for being drawn against
uncollected deposit (DAUD).

The function of the appointing authority with the

mandate of the people, under our system of
government, is to fill the public posts. Justices and
judges must ever realize that they have no
constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve
only the public interest as they see it in accordance
with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution
and their own conscience and honor.

The DAUD means that the account to which the check

was drawn had sufficient funds. However, the fund
cannot be used because it was collected against a
deposited check which is yet to be cleared.

Salazar vs People
G.R. No. 151931
23 September 2003
Callejo Sr., J.
Doctrine: If the trial court issues an order or renders
judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence
of the accused and acquitting him but also on the civil
liability, the judgment on the civil aspect of the case
would be a nullity as it violates the constitutional right
to due process.
Facts:
In 1997, petitioner Anmer Salazar and Nena Jaucian
Timario were charged with estafa before the Legazpi
City Regional Trial Court. The estafa case allegedly
stemmed from the payment of a check worth P214,000
to private respondent J.Y. Brothers Marketing
Corporation (JYBMC) through Jerson Yao for the
purchase of 300 bags of rice. The check was

Trial ensued. After the prosecution presented its

evidence, Salazar filed a demurrer to evidence with
leave of court, which the trial court granted.
In 2002, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting
Salazar, but ordered her to remit to JYBMC P214,000.
The trial court ruled that the evidence of the
prosecution failed to establish the existence of
conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt between the
petitioner and the issuer of the check, Timario. As a
mere endorser of the check, Salazar's breach of
warranty was a good one and did not amount to estafa
under Article 315 (2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code.
Timario remained at large.
As a result, Salazar filed a motion for reconsideration
on the civil aspect of the decision with a plea to be
allowed to present evidence. The trial court denied the
motion. Because of the denial of the motion, she filed
petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court alleging she was denied due process as
the trial court did not give her the opportunity to
adduce evidence to controvert her civil liability.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Salazar was denied due process.
HELD:
Salazar should have been given by the trial court the
chance to present her evidence as regards the civil
aspect of the case.
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a
judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case
where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b)
where the court declared that the liability of the
accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused was acquitted. Moreover,
the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if
there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal
action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist or where the accused
did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the
court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the
criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the
judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in
double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the
offended party or the accused or both may appeal
from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case
within the period therefor.
Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
Court explained the demurrer to evidence partakes of
a motion to dismiss the case for the failure of the

prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable

doubt. In a case where the accused files a demurrer to
evidence without leave of court, thereby waives his
right to present evidence and submits the case for
decision on the basis of the prosecution's evidence he
has the right to adduce evidence not only on the
criminal aspect, but also on the civil aspect of the case
of the demurrer is denied by the court.
In addition, the Court said if the demurrer is granted
and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused
has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of
the case unless the court also declares that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist.
If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment
not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the
accused and acquitting him but also on the civil
liability, the judgment on the civil aspect of the case
would be a nullity as it violates the constitutional right
to due process.

People Vs. Judge Donato

198 SCRA 130
G.R. No.79269
June 5,1991
Facts:
Private respondent and his co-accused were charged
of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts committed
before and after February 1986. Private respondent
filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the facts

alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has

no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court
has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants;
and (d) the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987
Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed
that the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore
since rebellion became a capital offense under PD
1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5
June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No.
187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and
1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135
of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the
amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the
bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a
condition that he shall report to the court once every
two months within the first ten days of every period
thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail
to and to allow it to present evidence in support
thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the
accused will not comply with this main condition of his
bail. It was contended that:
1.
The accused has evaded the authorities for
thirteen years and was an escapee from detention
when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2.
He was not arrested at his residence as he had
no known address;
3.
He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado
Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a
Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
4.
The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite,"
turned out to be also a false address;

5.
He and his companions were on board a private
vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and
address were also found to be false;
6.
Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11
January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was offered
and paid for his arrest.
This however was denied. Hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to
bail.
Held:
Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is
absolute since the crime is not a capital offense,
therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence.
It is only when it is a capital offense that the right
becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the
Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K
without hearing the prosecution.
Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990,
providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to the crime
of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not
favorable to him.
Accused validly waived his right to bail in another
case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements were
made therein: accused to remain under custody,
whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion will be released immediately, with a
condition that they will submit themselves in the
jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was

dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of a

person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver.
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the
constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right
which is personal to the accused and whose waiver
would not be contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law.
Obosa vs. Court of Appeals [GR 114350, 16 January
1997] Third Division, Panganiban (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 4 December 1987, Senior State Prosecutor
Aurelio C. Trampe charged Jose T. Obosa and three
others with murder on two counts, by separate
amended informations filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 56, for the ambush-slaying of
Secretary of Local Governments Jaime N. Ferrer and his
driver Jesus D. Calderon, which occurred on 2 August
1987, at about 6:30 p.m., at La Huerta, Paraaque,
Metro Manila, as Secretary Ferrer was riding in his car,
going to the St. Andrew Church near the plaza of La
Huerta, to hear Sunday mass. Each information alleged
that the killing was with the attendance of the
following qualifying/aggravating circumstances, to wit:
treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior
strength, nighttime purposely sought, disregard of the
respect due to the victim on account of his rank and
age (as to Secretary Ferrer), and by a band. The
Prosecutor recommended no bail, as the evidence of
guilt was strong. During the trial of the two cases,
which were consolidated and tried jointly, Obosa was
detained at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila.
At the time of the commission of the two offenses,
Obosa was a virtual "escapee" from the National
Penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, particularly,

at the Sampaguita Detention Station, where he was

serving a prison term for robbery as a maximum
security prisoner. Indeed, by virtue of a subpoena
illegally issued by a judge of the Municipal Trial Court
of Sariaya, Quezon, Obosa was escorted out of prison
to appear before said judge on the pretext that the
judge needed his presence so that the judge could
inquire about the whereabouts of Obosa. While Obosa
was out of prison, he was able to participate in the
commission of the double murder now charged against
him as principal for the ambushslaying of Secretary
Ferrer and his driver. In its decision dated 25 May
1990, the lower court found Obosa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide on two counts. On 31
May 1990, the lower court promulgated its decision
and on the same occasion, Obosa manifested his
intention to appeal and asked the Court to allow him to
post bail for his provisional liberty. Immediately, the
lower court granted Obosa's motion and fixed bail at
P20,000.00, in each case. On 1 June 1990, Obosa filed
a written notice of appeal, dated 4 June 1990, thereby
perfecting appeal from the decision. On 4 June 1990,
Obosa filed a bailbond in the amount of P40,000.00,
through Plaridel Surety and Assurance Company,
which the lower court approved. On the same day, the
lower court issued an order of release. The prison
authorities at the National Penitentiary released Obosa
also on the same day notwithstanding that, at the time
of the commission of the double murder, Obosa was
serving a prison term for robbery. On 6 September
1993, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed with the Court of Appeals an
urgent motion, praying for cancellation of Obosa's bail
bond. Obosa promptly filed an opposition, to which the
People submitted a reply. Thereupon, the appellate
Court issued its Resolution dated 19 November 1993:

a) canceling Obosa's bail bond, b) nullifying the trial

court's order of 31 May 1990 which granted bail to
Obosa, and c) issuing a warrant for his immediate
arrest. Obosa's twin motions for reconsideration and
quashal of warrant of arrest proved futile as the
appellate Court, on 9 March 1994, after the parties'
additional pleadings were submitted and after hearing
the parties' oral arguments, issued its second
Resolution denying said motions for lack of merit.
Obosa filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether the bailbond was validly approved by
the trial court.
Held: Since Obosa did file the written notice of appeal
on 1 June 1990, Obosa's appeal was, perforce,
perfected, without need of any further or other act,
and consequently and ineluctably, the trial court lost
jurisdiction over the case, both over the record and
over the subject of the case. While bail was granted by
the trial court on 31 May 1990 when it had jurisdiction,
the approval of the bail bond was done without
authority, because by then, the appeal had already
been perfected and the trial court had lost jurisdiction.
Needless to say, the situation would have been
different had bail been granted and approval thereof
given before the notice of appeal was filed. As the
approval was decreed by the trial court in excess of
jurisdiction then the bailbond was never validly
approved. On this basis alone, regardless of the
outcome of the other issues, it is indisputable that the
petition should be dismissed. Nevertheless, Section 13,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that
"all persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by

sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as

may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required." Herein, while Obosa, though convicted of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, was nevertheless originally charged
with a capital offense. Obosa can hardly be unmindful
of the fact that, in the ordinary course of things, there
is a substantial likelihood of his conviction (and the
corresponding penalty) being affirmed on appeal, or
worse, the not insignificant possibility and infinitely
more unpleasant prospect of instead being found
guilty of the capital offense originally charged. In such
an instance, Obosa cannot but be sorely tempted to
flee. Our Rules of Court, following the mandate of our
fundamental law, set the standard to be observed in
applications for bail. Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure. In Borinaga vs. Tamin,
which was promulgated in 1993, the Court laid down
the guidelines for the grant of bail. However, said
guidelines, along with Rule 114 itself, have since been
modified by Administrative Circular 12-94, which was
issued by the Supreme Court and which came into
effect on 1 October 1994. Verily, had Obosa made
application for bail after the effectivity of said circular,
the case would have been readily and promptly
resolved against Obosa. Pursuant to amendments, not
only does the conviction of Obosa for two counts of
homicide disqualify him from being admitted to bail as
a matter of right and subject his bail application to the
sound discretion of the court, but more significantly,
the circumstances enumerated in paragraphs a, b, d
and e of Paragraph 3, Section 5 of the 1994 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which are present in Obosa's
situation, would have justified and warranted the

denial of bail, except that a retroactive application of

the said circular is barred as it would obviously be
unfavorable to Obosa. But be that as it may, the rules
on bail at the time of Obosa's conviction do not favor
Obosa's cause either. The appeal in a criminal case
opens the whole case for review and this includes the
penalty, which may be increased. Thus, on appeal, as
the entire case is submitted for review, even factual
questions may once more be weighed and evaluated.
That being the situation, the possibility of conviction
upon the original charge is ever present. Likewise, if
the prosecution had previously demonstrated that
evidence of the accused's guilt is strong, as it had
done so in the present case, such determination
subsists even on appeal, despite conviction for a lesser
offense, since such determination is for the purpose of
resolving whether to grant or deny bail and does not
have any bearing on whether Obosa will ultimately be
acquitted or convicted of the charge. While the
accused, after conviction, may upon application be
bailed at the discretion of the court, that discretion
particularly with respect to extending the bail
should be exercised not with laxity, but with caution
and only for strong reasons, with the end in view of
upholding the majesty of the law and the
administration of justice. And the grave caution that
must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in
granting bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated
and exemplified in Administrative Circular 12-94
amending Rule 114, Section 5 which now specifically
provides that, although the grant of bail is
discretionary in non-capital offenses nevertheless,
when imprisonment has been imposed on the
convicted accused in excess of 6 years and
circumstances exist (inter alia, where the accused is
found to have previously escaped from legal

confinement or evaded sentence, or there is an undue

risk that the accused may commit another crime while
his appeal is pending) that point to a considerable
likelihood that the accused may flee if released on bail,
then the accused must be denied bail, or his bail
previously granted should be cancelled. In sum, bail
cannot be granted as a matter of right even after an
accused, who is charged with a capital offense,
appeals his conviction for a non-capital crime. Courts
must exercise utmost caution in deciding applications
for bail considering that the accused on appeal may
still be convicted of the original capital offense
charged and that thus the risk attendant to jumping
bail still subsists. In fact, trial courts would be well
advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for
a lesser crime than the capital offense originally
charged, to the appellate court's sound discretion. The
trial court had failed to exercise the degree of
discretion and caution required under and mandated
by our statutes and rules, for, aside from being too
hasty in granting bail immediately after promulgation
of judgment, and acting without jurisdiction in
approving the bailbond, it inexplicably ignored the
undeniable fact of petitioner's previous escape from
legal confinement as well as his prior convictions.
G.R. NO. 189122, March 17, 2010 Leviste v. CA, et al.
Digest Corono, J.:
FACTS:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas,
petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime
of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as

minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion

temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of
Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application
for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his
advanced age and health condition, and claiming the
absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners
application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in
the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion
to extend bail during the course of appeal should be
exercised with grave caution and only for strong
reasons.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Petitioner quotes Section 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court was present. Petitioners theory is that,
where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more
than six years but not more than 20 years and the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an
appellant pending appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the discretionary nature of the grant of bail
pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be
granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court?

HELD:
Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental
considerations of procedural and substantive rules.
Petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of
Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion.
He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals
should have granted bail in view of the absence of any
of the circumstances enumerated in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree.
Pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
expressly declared to be discretionary.
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera,
another authority in remedial law, is of the same
thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It
is a matter of right when the offense charged is not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail
becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a
matter of discretion, except when any of the
enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be
denied. (emphasis supplied)

In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound

judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has
the discretion to grant or deny bail.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the
appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion,
that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the
enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so
determines, it has no other option except to deny or
revoke bail pending appeal.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore,
any application for bail pending appeal should be
viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the
determination of discretion stage, where the appellate
court must determine whether any of the
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 is present; this will establish whether or not the
appellate court will exercise sound discretion or
stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail
pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage
where, assuming the appellants case falls within the
first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion,
the appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the
demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it
may either allow or disallow bail.

alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of

options), there is more than one possible outcome,
with the selection of the outcome left to the decision
maker. On the other hand, the establishment of a
clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion.
Thus, by severely clipping the appellate courts
discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere factfinding body in applications for bail pending appeal in
all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial
court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six
years, petitioners theory effectively renders nugatory
the provision that upon conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to
bail is discretionary.
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced
as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of
Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to
read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons
in custody, shall before final conviction be entitled to
bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a
capital offense or an offense which, under the law at
the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail, is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

A finding that none of the said circumstances is

present will not automatically result in the grant of
bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use
the less stringent sound discretion approach.

Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar

with respect to future as well as pending cases before
the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the
following policies concerning theeffectivity of the bail
of the accused, to wit:

However, judicial discretion has been defined

as choice. Choice occurs where, between two

2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense

or an offense which under the law at the time of its

commission and at the time of the application for bail

is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail,
and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser
offense than that charged in the complaint or
information, the same rule set forth in the preceding
paragraph shall be applied;
Amendments were further introduced in
Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16,
1994 which brought about important changes in the
said rules as follows:
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit
the accused to bail.
Denial of bail pending appeal is a matter of wise
discretion.
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x
(emphasis supplied)
After conviction by the trial court, the
presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly,
the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the
grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk
of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised
with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

De la Camara vs. Enage [GR L-32951-2, 17 September

1971] Resolution En Banc, Fernando (J): 8 concur, 1
concurs in result, 1 took no part
Facts: Ricardo de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of
Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental was arrested on 7
November 1968 and detained at the Provincial Jail of
Agusan, for his alleged participation in the killing of 14
and the wounding of 12 other laborers of the Tirador
Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, on 21
August 1968. Thereafter, on 25 November 1968, the
Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court of First
Instance a case for multiple frustrated murder and
another for multiple murder against de la Camara, his
co-accused Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo,
resulting from the aforesaid occurrence. Then on 14
January 1969, came an application for bail filed by de
la Camara with the lower court, premised on the
assertion that there was no evidence to link him with
such fatal incident of 21 August 1968. He likewise
maintained his innocence. Judge Manuel Lopez Enage
(Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch II) started
the trial of de la Camara on 24 February 1969, the
prosecution resting its case on 10 July 1969. The
Judge, on 10 August 1970, issued an order granting de
la Camara's application for bail, admitting that there
was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove
that de la Camara would flee even if he had the
opportunity, but fixed the amount of the bail bond at
the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00, the sum of
P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple
murder and P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple
frustrated murder. On 12 August 1970, the Secretary
of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed
of such order, sent a telegram to the Judge stating that

the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting that a

P40,000.00 bond, either in cash or property, would be
reasonable. De la Camara filed motion for
reconsideration to reduce the amount. The Judge
however remained adamant. De la Camara filed a
petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. In the
meanwhile, de la Camara had escaped from the
provincial jail.
Issue: Whether the judge has absolute discretion in the
determination of the amount of bail, excessive enough
to discourage the accused from fleeing.
Held: Where the right to bail exists, it should not be
rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is
excessive. So the Constitution commands. If there
were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes
meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no
mention of such a guarantee were found in the
fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that the
United States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition
against excessive bail. As construed in the latest
American decision, "the sole permissible function of
money bail is to assure the accused's presence at trial,
and declared that 'bail set at a higher figure than an
amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is
"excessive" under the Eighth Amendment." Nothing
can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged
order of 10 August 1970 fixing the amount of
P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by de
la Camara, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information
charging multiple murder, there being 14 victims, and
the sum of P355,200.00 for the other offense of
multiple frustrated murder, there being 12 victims, is
clearly violative of this constitutional provision. Under
the circumstances, there being only two offenses
charged, the amount required as bail could not

possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for

murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for
frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in the
present case that the Department of Justice did
recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two
offenses. No attempt at rationalization can give a color
of validity to the challenged order. There is grim irony
in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but
at the same time being required to post such an
exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that
the lower court judge would apparently yield to the
command of the fundamental law. In reality, such a
sanctimonious avowal of respect for a mandate of the
Constitution was on a purely verbal level. There is
reason to believe that any person in the position of
petitioner would under the circumstances be unable to
resist thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced
as he must have been to a state of desperation. In the
same breath that he was told he could be bailed out,
the excessive amount required could only mean that
provisional liberty would be beyond his reach. It would
have been more forthright if he were informed
categorically that such a right could not be availed of.
There would have been no disappointment of
expectations then. De la Camara's subsequent escape,
however, cannot be condoned. That is why he is not
entitled to the relief prayed for. What the Judge did, on
the other hand, does call for repudiation from the
Supreme Court.
Government of Hong Kong vs Olalia
Facts

Private respondent Muoz was charged before Hong

Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by
virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of
Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong
Administrative Region filed a petition for the
extradition of the private respondent. In the same
case, a petition for bail was filed by the private
respondent.

The petition for bail was denied by reason that there

was no Philippine law granting the same in extradition
cases and that the respondent was a high flight risk.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
and was granted by the respondent judge subject to
the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the

condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will
appear and answer the issues raised in these
proceedings and will at all times hold himself
amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will
further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this
undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of
the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this

Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice

and discretion of filing its own motion for hold
departure order before this Court even in extradition
proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government

prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to
the nearest office, at any time and day of the week;
and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to
require that all the assets of accused, real and
personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the
condition that if the accused flees from his
undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the
government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but

was denied by the respondent judge. Hence, this
instant petition.
Issue
WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail
Ruling
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.
Ratio Decidendi
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail;
that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory

law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to

bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.
On the other hand, private respondent maintained that
the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights
extends to a prospective extraditee; and that
extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged
deprivation of ones liberty.
In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in
Government of United States of America v. Hon.
Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila,
Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan
Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the
constitutional provision on bail does not apply to
extradition proceedings, the same being available only
in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of
the following trends in international law:

(1) the growing importance of the individual person in

public international;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe
these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the
individual under our fundamental law, on one hand,
and the law on extradition, on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international
law, where emphasis is given to the worth of the
individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court

departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that an

extraditee may be allowed to post bail.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY ALEJANO, PN (MARINES)
CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES) CAPT.
GERARDO GAMBALA, PA LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN
CAPT. MILO MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG ANTONIO
TRILLANES IV, PN HOMOBONO ADAZA, and
ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO
vs.
GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, SEC.
ANGELO REYES, and SEC. ROILO GOLEZ
G.R. No. 160792 August 25, 2005
FACTS: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321
armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers,
entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier
Luxury Apartments (Oakwood), an upscale
apartment complex, located in the business district of
Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers
of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its
immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly
renounced their support for the administration and
called for the resignation of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.
Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several
negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers
later defused the explosive devices they had earlier
planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks.
On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of
the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service

Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers

to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took place
while military and civilian authorities were
investigating the soldiers involvement in the Oakwood
incident.
On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an
Information for coup detat with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers
involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident. The
government prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup
detat as defined and penalized under Article 134-A of
the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as
amended. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
03-2784. The trial court later issued the Commitment
Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio
Trillanes IV (Trillanes) and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to
the Commanding Officers of ISAFP. On 2 August 2003,
Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service
Commanders to take into custody the military
personnel under their command who took part in the
Oakwood incident except the detained junior officers
who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.
Petitioners filed a petition for Habeas Corpus before
the CA, however the same was denied. The Court of
Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The
appellate court pointed out that the detainees are
already charged of coup detat before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in
this case as the detainees confinement is under a
valid indictment, the legality of which the detainees
and petitioners do not even question.

ISSUE: WON the denial of the petition for Habeas

Corpus was valid
HELD: YES
For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for
habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination
of the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the
alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then it should
issue the writ and release the detainees. In the present
case, after hearing the case, the Court of Appeals
found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively
participating in the hearing before the Court of
Appeals, petitioners are estopped from claiming that
the appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into
the merits of their petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of
habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to address the
detainees complaint against the regulations and
conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy
of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the
cause of detention of a person. The purpose of the writ
is to determine whether a person is being illegally
deprived of his liberty.If the inquiry reveals that the
detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the
person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful,
then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.
The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not
a writ of error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.
A mere allegation of a violation of ones constitutional
right is not sufficient. The courts will extend the scope

of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is

present: (a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional
right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b)
the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence;
or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such
sentence is void as to the excess.
AS TO DENIAL OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL: The scheduled
visiting hours provide reasonable access to the
detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to confer
with the detainees. The detainees right to counsel is
not undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in the
hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano
Commission, petitioners were given time to confer with
the detainees, a fact that petitioners
themselves admit.23 Thus, at no point were the
detainees denied their right to counsel.
AS TO INHUMANE PUNISHMENT: The boarding of the
iron grills is for the furtherance of security within the
ISAFP Detention Center. This measure intends to fortify
the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from
passing on contraband and weapons from one cell to
another. The boarded grills ensure security and
prevent disorder and crime within the facility. The
diminished illumination and ventilation are but
discomforts inherent in the fact of detention, and do
not constitute punishments on the detainees.
The limitation on the detainees physical contacts with
visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response to valid
security concerns.
AS TO RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION: The

letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP

authorities were not confidential letters between the
detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who
received the letters from detainees Trillanes and
Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees
personal courier and not as their counsel when he
received the letters for mailing. In the present case,
since the letters were not confidential communication
between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials
of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If
the letters are marked confidential communication
between the detainees and their lawyers, the
detention officials should not read the letters but only
open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of
the detainees.
ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN: DIGEST AND COMMENTS
G.R. No. 213847; August 18, 2015
Ponente: Bersamin
Doctrines:
Primary objective of bail The strength of the
Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the
accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to
the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of
bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at
trial.
Bail is a right and a matter of discretion Right to bail
is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution
and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure to wit: No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail

when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the

stage of the criminal prosecution.

2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is

not a flight risk.

FACTS:
On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was
charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the
basis of his purported involvement in the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially,
Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail,
which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a
warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to
Petitioner's voluntary surrender.Petitioner again asked
the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was
heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that:
(a) Prosecution had not yet established that the
evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of
his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty
would only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail
and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age and
physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its
assailed resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise denied.

HELD:
1. YES.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of
right unless the crime charged is punishable
byreclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is
strong.
a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if
ever petitioner would be convicted, he will be
punishable by reclusion perpetua.
b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that
petitioner's guilt is strong.

Bail as a matter of right due process and

presumption of innocence.
Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides
that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This
right is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be
released on bail.
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of
the accused at trial and so the amount of bail should
be high enough to assure the presence of the accused
when so required, but no higher than what may be
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.
Bail as a matter of discretion
Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987
Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is
strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any
criminal offense, shall be bailable.

Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense

punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life
imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual

delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by
the circumstance of reiteration;

Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been

established that the evidence of guilt is strong.Where
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be
granted according to the discretion of the court.

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal

confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;

Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:

Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death,reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary. The application for
bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court
despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has
not transmitted the original record to the appellate
court. However, if the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application
for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the
appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused
may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty
during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail
subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon
a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:

(c) That he committed the offense while under

probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit
another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of
any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial
Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.
Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death,
or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetuasubject to
judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the
court held: [S]uch discretion may be exercised only
after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt
of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he
should be granted provisional liberty. Bail hearing
with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte).
The hearing should primarily determine whether the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
The procedure for discretionary bail is described
in Cortes vs. Catral:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of

discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a
hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise
its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong
based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge
the accused upon the approval of the bailbond
(Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.
2. YES.
Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to
bail
The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's
responsibility to the international community arising
from its commitment to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. We therefore have the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process and for detainees to avail of
such remedies which safeguard their fundamental
right to liberty. Quoting fromGovernment of Hong Kong
SAR vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as

value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights. The Philippines,
therefore, has the responsibility of protecting
and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process, ensuring that those
detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the
detention and order their release if justified. In
other words, the Philippine authorities are under
obligation to make available to every person
under detention such remedies which safeguard
their fundamental right to liberty. These
remedies include the right to be admitted to
bail. (emphasis in decision)
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion
Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail
to ensure the appearance of the accused during the
trial and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing
of the fragile health and advanced age of Petitioner. As
such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
in denying the Motion to Fix Bail. It acted whimsically
and capriciously and was so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty [to allow
petitioner to post bail].
CYRIL CALPITO QUI vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 196161

September 26, 2012

Facts: Petitioner was charged with two counts of
violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No.
(RA) 7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
The RTC in Quezon City convicted petitioner as
charged, and sentenced her to two equal periods of
imprisonment for an indeterminate penalty of 5 years,
4 months, and 21 days of prision correccional in its
maximum period, as minimum, to 7 years, 4 months,
and 1 day of prision mayor in its minimum period, as
maximum.
Petitioner then appealed and subsequently filed an
Urgent Petition/Application for Bail Pending Appeal.
The OSG urged for the denial of the bail application on
the ground of petitioners propensity to evade the law
and that she is a flight-risk. The CA denied petitioners
application for bail pending appeal on the basis of Sec.
5(d) of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue: Is the accused entitled to the right to bail?
Ruling: No. Sec. 5 of Rule 114, Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary. xxx

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is

imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon
a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
xxx
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate
the probability of flight if released on bail;
xxx
Petitioner disobeyed court processes when she lied in
order to justify her non-appearance on the March 8,
2010 hearing before the RTC. She gave the excuse that
her father was hospitalized and died days later when in
fact her father died a year ago. The RTC notice sent to
petitioners bonding company was also returned with
the notation "moved out," while the notice sent to
petitioners given address was returned unclaimed
with the notation "RTS no such person. The fact of
transferring residences without informing her
bondsman and the trial court can only be viewed as
petitioners inclination to evade court appearance, as
indicative of flight. Consequently, the Court agrees
with the appellate courts finding of the presence of
the fourth circumstance enumerated in the abovequoted Sec. 5 of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Also, petitioners argument that she has the
constitutional right to bail and that the evidence of
guilt against her is not strong is spurious. Certainly,

after one is convicted by the trial court, the

presumption of innocence, and with it, the
constitutional right to bail, ends. Therefore, petitioner's
application for bail pending appeal is denied.
G.R. Nos. 104492-93 May 31, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ORLANDO FRAGO, accused-appellant.
JUDICIAL QUESTION:
Whether or not he is guilty of rape in crim. case no.
9144?
FACTS:
The accused, Orlando Frago was charged with rape
and attempted rape docketed as criminal cases nos.
9144 and 9145. The information states that the
accused Orlando Frago committed the crime in the
early morning of 26 September 1990 in the Poblacion
of Quezon, Palawan.

Jicelyn Lansap, 15 years old girl, was boarding in a

house which belongs to Fortunato Moral with her
relatives. Before intruding the house of Jicelyn, first the
accused who was ice cream vendor went inside the
residence of Ronalyn Pastera secretly at around three
forty-five in the morning. He was about to take Ronalyn
out of the room but she suddenly woke up and shouted
for help. Then, her father immediately responded by
switching the lights up. Thus, the accused had to
escape from the house. Since he fail to defile Ronalyn,
he next went to the boarding house of Jicelyn which
was fifty meters away from the house of Ronalyn.

Jicelyn Lansap was bodily carried by accused Orlando

Frago to a nearby house belonging to Dado Andor.
Then at around five-thirty in the morning, she was
awakened by appellant who was already strangling
her. She was hurt by the accused especially her private
part and found out that she had been raped. At the
same day, Ronalyn's father and Jicelyn reported to
police authorities.

In Crim. Case No. 9145, it was acquitted due to lack of

clear and convincing evidence that the accused Frago
performed the act of crime of rape against Ronalyn
Pastera. In Crim. Case No. 9144, the accused claimed
that at nine in the evening of september 25, 1990, he
fell asleep with his family after his tiring work and
woke up at six on next morning. In his appeal, he
imputes error to the trial court in convicting him on the
basis of an identification which was made without the
assistance of counsel. Also, according credence to the
story of Jicelyn, thereby it is denying his constitutional
right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.

The court sustains the defense on the insufficiency of

the identification of appellant Orlando Frago. With the
testimony of Jicelyn, she has no reliable basis for
pointing to the accused as the person who raped her.
She said that the face was covered, and she did not
have the opportunity to observe the height of the
rapist; and, that the only evidence of sexual
intercourse is the result of the medical examination.
On the other hand, the Pastera sisters may have
recognized the accused positively because their room
was lighted and also he was not wearing anything on

his face. They identified him on 28 September 1990,

14 whereas Jicelyn pointed him out only on 8 October
1990. Since they are neighbors, Pastera family might
have shared the identity of accused to Jicelyn. Then,
the identification of appellant by Jicelyn is doubtful.

RESOLUTION:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding
accused-appellant ORLANDO FRAGO guilty of rape in
Crim. Case No. 9144 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
he is ACQUITTED as his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt. It appearing that he is
detained, his immediate release from custody is
ordered unless he is held for another cause.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANNY GODOY JUDGE

EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR vs. MAURICIO REYNOSO, JR.
and EVA P. PONCE DE LEON - Case Digest
Constitutional Law 1 - Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANNY GODOY
JUDGE EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR vs. MAURICIO
REYNOSO, JR. and EVA P. PONCE DE LEON
Facts: A complaint was filed by judge Eustaquio Z.
Gacott, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and
Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, to cite for indirect
contempt Mauricio Reynoso, Jr., a columnist, and Eva P.
Ponce de Leon, publisher and chairman of the editorial

board, respectively, of the Palawan Times. His Honor's

plaint is based on an article written by respondent
Reynoso, Jr. in his column, "On the Beat," and
published in the July 20, 1994 issue of said newspaper
which is of general circulation in Puerto Princesa City.
The complaint avers that the article tends to impede,
obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade the
administration of justice; that the article contains
averments which are disrespectful, discourteous,
insulting, offensive and derogatory; that it does not
only cast aspersions on the integrity and honesty of
complainant as a judge and on his ability to administer
justice objectively and impartially, but is an imputation
that he is biased and he prejudges the cases filed
before him; and that the article is sub judice because it
is still pending automatic review.
Issue: Who has jurisdiction in contempt proceedings
where the alleged contumely is committed against a
lower court while the case is pending in the Appellate
or Higher Court
Held: In whatever context it may arise, contempt of
court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do
an act, in such a manner as to create an affront to the
court and the sovereign dignity with which it is
clothed. As a matter of practical judicial
administration, jurisdiction has been felt properly to
rest in only one tribunal at a time with respect to a
given controversy. Partly because of administrative
considerations, and partly to visit the full personal
effect of the punishment on a contemnor, the rule has
been that no other court than the one contemned will
punish a given contempt.
The rationale that is usually advanced for the general
rule that the power to punish for contempt rests with

the court contemned is that contempt proceedings are

sui generis and are triable only by the court against
whose authority the contempt are charged; the power
to punish for contempt exists for the purpose of
enabling a court to compel due decorum and respect
in its presence and due obedience to its judgments,
orders and processes: and in order that a court may
compel obedience to its orders, it must have the right
to inquire whether there has been any disobedience
thereof, for to submit the question of disobedience to
another tribunal would operate to deprive the
proceeding of half its efficiency.

both the moral and legal effect of a punishment for

contempt would be missed if it were regarded as the
resentment of personal affronts offered to judges.
Contempts are punished as offenses against the
administration of justice, and the offense of violating a
judicial order is punishable by the court which is
charged with its enforcement, regardless of the court
which may have made the order. However, the rule
presupposes a complete transfer of jurisdiction to the
appellate court, and there is authority that where the
contempt does not relate to the subject matter of the
appeal, jurisdiction to punish remains in the trial court.

There are, however, several jurisprudentially and

statutorily recognized exceptions to the general rule,
both under Philippine and American jurisprudence, viz.:

4. A court may punish contempts committed against a

court or judge constituting one of its parts or agencies,
as in the case of a court composed of several
coordinate branches or divisions.

1. Indirect contempt committed against inferior court

may also be tried by the proper regional trial court,
regardless of the imposable penalty.
2. Indirect contempt against the Supreme Court may
be caused to be investigated by a prosecuting officer
and the charge may be filed in and tried by the
regional trial court, or the case may be referred to it
for hearing and recommendation where the charge
involves questions of fact.
3. In People vs. Alarcon, et al., supra, this Court ruled
that "in the interrelation of the different courts forming
our integrated judicial system, one court is not an
agent or representative of another and may not, for
this reason, punish contempts in vindication of the
authority and decorum which are not its own. The
appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court
, and this last court becomes thereby charged with the
authority to deal with contempts committed after the
perfection of the appeal." The apparent reason is that

5. The biggest factor accounting for the exceptions is

where the singular jurisdiction of a given matter has
been transferred from the contemned court to another
court. One of the most common reasons for a transfer
of jurisdiction among courts is improper venue. The
cases involving venue deal primarily with the question
whether a change of venue is available after a
contempt proceeding has been begun. While generally
a change of venue is not available in a contempt
proceeding, some jurisdictions allow such a change in
proper circumstances.
6. A new court wholly replacing a prior court has
jurisdiction to punish for violations of orders entered
by its predecessor, although where the successor court
is created by a statute which does not extinguish
jurisdiction in the predecessor, an affirmative transfer
of jurisdiction before the contempt occurs is necessary
to empower the successor court to act.

7. Transfers of jurisdiction by appellate review have

produced numerous instances where contempt against
the trial court has been punished in the appellate
court, and vice versa. Some appellate courts have
taken the view that a contempt committed after an
appeal is taken is particularly contemptuous of the
appellate court because of the tendency of such
contempts to upset the status quo or otherwise
interfere with the jurisdiction of such court.

11. Some contemptuous acts are also crime, usually

misdemeanors, which are often punishable in other
courts than those against which the contemptuous act
was done.

8. A judge may disqualify himself, or be disqualified, on

a contempt hearing or in the main case, which
circumstance may require a transfer of jurisdiction, but
where a judge is disqualified only in the main case,
because of matters which do not disqualify him in a
contempt proceeding, the regular judge should sit in
the contempt proceeding. Likewise, where the regular
judge, is absent or otherwise unavailable and an order
is entered by another judge and made returnable to
the proper court, the regular judge may punish for
violations of orders so entered.

tried before the court actually contemned.

9. Where the same act is a contempt against two or

more courts, it is no bar to contempt proceedings in
one of them that there is also a contempt against the
other.
10. While professional disciplinary proceedings have
been resorted to as a punishment for contempt, the
more recent view is that punishment is of secondary
importance to the need to protect the courts and the
people from improper professional practice. To the
substantial extent that disciplinary action remains a
punishment, disciplinary measures imposed by
another court than the one contemned furnish an
exception to the rule against punishing for contempt of
another court.

12. Finally, a conviction for contempt against another

court has been allowed to stand on the basis that the
failure of the defendant to make timely objection
operated as a waiver of the right to be

The rule, as now accepted and deemed applicable to

the present incident, is that where the entire case has
already been appealed, jurisdiction to punish for
contempt rests with the appellate court where the
appeal completely transfers the proceedings thereto or
where there is a tendency to affect the status quo or
otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of the
appellate court. Accordingly, this Court having
acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for indirect
contempt against herein respondents, it has taken
judicial cognizance thereof and has accordingly
resolved the same.
Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles
[For Child Abuse]- A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC,
January 31, 2008
Facts:
Respondent was convicted for violation of RA
7610. Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco
(SSP Velasco) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) wrote
a letter to then CJ Panganiban inquiring whether it is
possible to order the immediate suspension of the
respondent. The matter was referred to the OCA for
comment and recommendation where they

recommended that respondent be indefinitely

suspended. The Court's Second Division approved all
of these recommendations, thus, suspending
respondent from performing her judicial functions
while awaiting the final resolution of her criminal
cases. Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration; he claimed that the suspension order
was wielded against her without affording her the
opportunity to be heard since she was not furnished
copies of SSP Velasco's letter and OCA's Administrative
Complaint. Thus, respondent submitted that her
suspension is essentially unjust. Moreover, respondent
manifested that the two criminal cases against her are
on appeal before the CA and have, therefore, not yet
attained finality. As such, respondent still enjoys the
constitutional presumption of innocence and her
suspension clashes with this presumption and is
tantamount to a prejudgment of her guilt. SSP Velasco
filed an Urgent Appeal/Manifestation manifesting that
respondent continuously defied the courts Resolution.
Velasco reiterated that due to her conviction on two
counts of child abuse, respondent no longer enjoys the
constitutional presumption of innocence and should
remain suspended in order to erase any suspicion that
she is using her influence to obtain a favorable
decision and in order to maintain and reaffirm the
people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary.
Issues: Whether or not grounds exist to preventively
suspend the respondent pending the resolution of this
administrative case.
Held:
We resolve the issue in the negative. The Court
cannot fully agree with the recommendation of the
OCA. By parity of reasoning, the fact of respondent's

conviction by the RTC does not necessarily warrant her

suspension. We agree with respondent's argument that
since her conviction of the crime of child abuse is
currently on appeal before the CA, the same has not
yet attained finality. As such, she still enjoys the
constitutional presumption of innocence. It must be
remembered that the existence of a presumption
indicating the guilt of the accused does not in itself
destroy the constitutional presumption of innocence
unless the inculpating presumption, together with all
the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or
explanation, proves the accused's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Until the accused's guilt is shown in
this manner, the presumption of innocence continues.
Moreover, it is established that any administrative
complaint leveled against a judge must always be
examined with a discriminating eye, for its
consequential effects are, by their nature, highly
penal, such that the respondent judge stands to face
the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. 41 As
aforementioned, the filing of criminal cases against
judges may be used as tools to harass them and may
in the long run create adverse consequences. The
OCA, as well as SSP Velasco, failed to prove that other
than the fact that a judgment of conviction for child
abuse was rendered against the respondent, which is
still on appeal, there are other lawful grounds to
support the imposition of preventive suspension.
Based on the foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the
resolve that, while it is true that preventive
suspensionpendente lite does not violate the right of
the accused to be presumed innocent as the same is
not a penalty, the rules on preventive suspension of

judges, not having been expressly included in the

Rules of Court, are amorphous at best. Likewise, we
consider respondent's argument that there is no
urgency in imposing preventive suspension as the
criminal cases are now before the CA, and that she
cannot, by using her present position as an RTC Judge,
do anything to influence the CA to render a decision in
her favor. The issue of preventive suspension has also
been rendered moot as the Court opted to resolve this
administrative case.
However, even as we find that the OCA and SSP
Velasco have not clearly and convincingly shown
ample grounds to warrant the imposition of preventive
suspension, we do note the use of offensive language
in respondent's pleadings, not only against SSP
Velasco but also against former CA Lock. To reiterate
our previous ruling involving the respondent, her use
of disrespectful language in her Comment is certainly
below the standard expected of an officer of the court.
The esteemed position of a magistrate of the law
demands temperance, patience and courtesy both in
conduct and in language. Illustrative are the following
statements: "CA Lock's hostile mindset and his
superstar complex"; "In a frenzied display of arrogance
and power"; "(CA Lock's) complaint is merely a
pathetic echo of the findings of the trial court"; and
"when (CA Lock) himself loses his objectivity and
misuses the full powers of his Office to persecute the
object of his fancy, then it is time for him to step
down." In the attempt to discredit CA Lock, respondent
even dragged CA Lock's son into the controversy, to
wit:

It is noteworthy to mention that CA

Lock's hostile attitude was aggravated
by his embarrassment when the
undersigned mentioned to him that she
knew how he used his influence to
secure a position for his son at the RTC
Library of Pasay City which was then
managed by Judge Priscilla Mijares. CA
Lock had made sure that his son be
assigned to the library to enable the
latter to conveniently adjust his
schedule in reviewing for the bar
examination.
Neither was SSP Velasco spared. Of him, the
respondent said: "A reading of the motion for
reconsideration readily discloses that it is mainly
anchored on SSP Velasco's malicious speculations
about the guilt of the undersigned. Speculations,
especially those that emanate from the poisonous
intentions of attention-seeking individuals, are no
different from garbage that should be rejected
outright"; and "His malicious insinuation is no less than
a revelation of his warped mindset that a person's
position could cause pressure to bear among
government officials. This brings forth a nagging
question. Did SSP Velasco use his position at the DOJ
to 'cause pressure to bear' and obtain a favorable
disposition of the administrative cases lodged against
him by the undersigned? Is he afraid of his own
ghost?" It must be stressed again that, as a dispenser
of justice, respondent should exercise judicial
temperament at all times, avoiding vulgar and

insulting language. She must maintain composure and

equanimity. The judicial office circumscribes the
personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of
restrictions. This is the price that judges have to pay
for accepting and occupying their exalted positions in
the administration of justice. One final word. The
parties herein have admitted in their various pleadings
that they have filed numerous cases against each
other. We do not begrudge them the prerogative to
initiate charges against those who, in their opinion,
may have wronged them. But it is well to remind them
that this privilege must be exercised with prudence,
when there are clearly lawful grounds, and only in the
pursuit of truth and justice. This prerogative does not
give them the right to institute shotgun charges with
reckless abandon, or allow their disagreement to
deteriorate into a puerile quarrel, not unlike that of two
irresponsible children.
US vs Ash
Brief Fact Summary. A number of informants were
asked to identify a number of suspects in connection
with a bank robbery. The respondent, Ash (the
respondent), challenged the identification because
counsel was not present at what was arguably a
critical stage of the prosecution.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. An accused does not have
the right to counsel at a post indictment photographic
lineup

Facts. The Supreme Court of the United States

(Supreme Court) granted certiorari to resolve the

split in the circuits as to the issue of whether an
accused has the right to counsel at a post indictment
photographic lineup. The Supreme Court held that the
right to counsel at a display at which the defendant
himself was not entitled to be present was not
embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution (Constitution). The Court of
Appeals reversed.
Issue. Whether the Sixth Amendment of the
Constitution grants an accused the right to have
counsel present at a post indictment photographic
identification procedure?
Held. The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution does
not grant an accused the right to counsel during a post
indictment photographic identification procedure
because the accused himself is not entitled to be
present, rendering it impossible that the accused will
be confused or overpowered by the proceedings.
Dissent. The dissent writes to emphasize that the
photographic lineup is indeed a critical stage of the
proceedings.
Concurrence. Justice Potter Stewart (J. Stewart)
concurs to emphasize the point that any issues
involved could be resolved through traditional methods
such as cross examination.

Discussion. The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution

guarantees the assistance of counsel during stages of
the proceeding at which a defendant is faced with
either the intricacies of the law, or a zealous
prosecutor. Neither of these situations exist at a

photographic display. The historical test to be applied

to the Sixth Amendment issues indicates that the right
has only been expanded when new facts have
demanded it for the protection of the defendant.
Rock vs Arkansas
Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner, Rock (the
petitioner), was charged with manslaughter for
shooting her husband, and sought to introduce her
own testimony that had been refreshed by hypnosis.
An expert witness corroborated the petitioners
refreshed testimony that the gun was defective. The
trial court ruled that hypnotically refreshed testimony
was inadmissible per se and the Arkansas Supreme
Court
affirmed.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The states legitimate
interest in barring unreliable evidence does not justify
a per se exclusion because the evidence may be
reliable in an individual case.

Facts. During a domestic dispute, the petitioner shot

her husband. Because she could not remember the
precise details of the incident she submitted to
hypnosis by a licensed hypnotherapist. After the
hypnosis, the petitioner recalled that she did not have
her finger on the trigger when the gun fired during a
scuffle. An inspection by an expert revealed that the
gun was defective. The trial court ruled that no
hypnotically refreshed testimony would be admitted.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the conviction,
ruling that hypnotically refreshed testimony was
inadmissible per se.

Issue. Does an evidentiary rule prohibiting the

admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony per se
violate a defendants right to testify on her own
behalf?
Held. Criminal defendants have a right to testify in
their own behalf under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution (Constitution), the Compulsory Clause of
the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution, and the Fifth
Amendment constitutional privilege against selfincrimination.
Restrictions placed on a criminal defendants right to
testify by a states evidentiary rules, may not be
arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are
designed to serve.
The states legitimate interest in barring unreliable
evidence does not justify a per se exclusion because
the evidence may be unreliable in an individual case.
Dissent. An individuals right to present evidence is
always subject to reasonable restrictions. Traditionally
the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme
Court) accords the respect to the states in the
establishment of their own evidentiary rules and
procedures. The Arkansas Supreme Courts decision
was a permissible response to a novel and difficult
question.

Discussion. A defendant in a criminal case has the

right to take the witness stand and testify in his own
defense. This right can be found in several places in
the Constitution. A state may not apply a rule of

evidence that permits a witness to take the stand, but

arbitrarily excludes material portions of his testimony.
The right to present relevant testimony is not without
limitation, but a state must evaluate whether the
interests served justify the limitation imposed on the
defendants constitutional right to testify. The Arkansas
Supreme Court failed to perform the constitutional
analysis necessary when a defendants right to testify
is at stake. More traditional means of assessing
information such as cross-examination are effective
tools for revealing inconsistencies. A states legitimate
interest in barring unreliable evidence does not extend
to per se exclusions that may be unreliable in the
individual case.
People vs Santocildes
FACTS:

Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape

of a girl less than nine years old. The court rendered a
decision finding appellant guilty as charged. However,
during the proceeding, accused-appellant was not
represented by a member of the Bar. Hence, he filed a
Notice of Appeal and praying that the judgment
against him be set aside on the ground that he was
denied of his right to be represented by a counsel
which results to the denial of due process. The Office
of the Solicitor General maintains that notwithstanding
the fact that appellant's counsel during the trial was
not a member of the Bar, he was afforded due process
since he was given opportunity to be heard and
records reveal that said person handled the case in a
professional and skillful manner.
ISSUE:

Whether or not a person not member of the Philippine

Bar may represent an accused in a criminal
proceeding.
HELD:
NO.
The presence and participation of counsel in criminal
proceedings should never be taken lightly. Even the
most intelligent or educated man may be convicted
without a counsel, not because he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his
innocence.
The right of the accused to counsel is guaranteed to
minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system
where the accused is pitted against the awesome
prosecutory machinery of the State. A person has the
right to due process, he must be heard before being
condemned - a part of person's basic rights. The right
to counsel of an accused is enshrined in the
Constitution (Art. III,Secs. 12 & 14(2)], Rules of
Criminal Procedure (Sec. 1 of Rule 115), Art. 8, Sec. 5
of the Constitution and the Rules of Court (Sec. 1 of
Rule 138)
The assailed judgment is Set Aside, and the case is
hereby Remanded to the trial court for new trial.
Pecho v People 262 SCRA 518 (1996)
Facts: The decision of the Supreme Court for
convicting the accused for the complex crime of
attempted estafa thru falsification of official and
commercial document was assailed with the
contention of the defense that the accused may not be
convicted of the crime for double jeopardy. The charge
against the accused was on violation of RA 3019 of

which he was acquitted because it only penalizes

consummated crime. In the absence of evidence that
shows that the crime was consummated the accused
was acquitted but the court held judgment of
prosecuting his conviction for attempted estafa thru
falsification of official and commercial document which
is necessarily included in the crime charged. Accused
invokes the defense of double jeopardy since his
acquittal from the charge involving RA 3019 is a bar for
prosecution on the crime of attempted estafa thru
falsification of official and commercial document and
that the accused was not informed of this charge
against him in the filing of the information.

Issue: Whether or not the accused was informed of

the nature and cause of the crime to which he is
convicted
Held: The court presented the objectives of the right
of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause
of the crime he is charged with as follows:
1.
To furnish the accused with such a description of
the charge against him as will enable him to make his
defense;
2.
To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for
protection against a further prosecution for the same
cause;
3.
To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that
it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should be had.

In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts

must be stated: not conclusions of law. The complaint
must contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime. What
determines the real nature and cause of accusation
against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated
in the information or complaint and not the caption or
preamble of the information or complaint nor the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, they being conclusions of law. It follows
then that an accused may be convicted of a crime
which although not the one charged, is necessarily
included in the latter. It has been shown that the
information filed in court is considered as charging for
two offenses which the counsel of the accused failed to
object therefore he can be convicted for both or either
of the charges.
However by reviewing the case at bar the SC finds lack
of sufficient evidence that would establish the guilt of
the
accused
as
conspirator
to
the
crime
of estafa beyond reasonable doubt, the prior decision
of the SC was deemed to be based merely on
circumstantial evidence, thus the accused was
acquitted.
SECTION 1
ANDAYA vs. PEOPLE, 2006
FACTS:

Complainant Armed Forces and Police Savings and

Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) is a non-stock and
non-profit association authorized to engage in savings
and loan transactions. In 1986, petitioner Noe S.
Andaya was elected as president and general manager
of AFPSLAI. During his term, he sought to increase the
capitalization of AFPSLAI to boost its lending capacity
to its members. Consequently, the Board of Trustees of
AFPSLAI passed and approved a Resolution setting up
a Finders Fee Program whereby any officer, member
or employee, except investment counselors, of
AFPSLAI who could solicit an investment of not less
than P100,000.00 would be entitled to a finders fee
equivalent to one percent of the amount solicited.

petitioner caused it to appear in Disbursement Voucher

No. 58380 that Diosdado Guillas was entitled to a
finders fee from AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00
when in truth and in fact no finders fee was due to
him; (2) the falsification was committed on
Disbursement Voucher No. 58380; and (3) the
falsification caused damage to AFPSLAI in the amount
of P21,000.00.

ISSUE:
Are disbursement vouchers commercial documents
(negotiable instruments)?

An information for estafa through falsification of

commercial document was filed against petitioner.
Noe S. Andaya, being then the President and General
Manager of the AFPSLAI, was accused of having
caused and approved the disbursement of the sum of
P21,000.00, from the funds of the association, by
making it appear in Disbursement Voucher No. 58380
that said amount represented the 1% finders fee of
one DIOSDADO J. GUILLAS [Guilas]; that by virtue of
said falsification, said accused was able to encash and
receive a MBTC Check for the said amount.
The facts alleged in the information are sufficient to
constitute the crime of falsification of private
document. Specifically, the allegations in the
information can be broken down into the three
essential elements of this offense as follows: (1)

HELD:
NO. It appears that the public prosecutor erroneously
characterized the disbursement voucher as a
commercial document so that he designated the
offense as estafa through falsification of commercial
document in the preamble of the information.
However, as correctly ruled by the trial court, the
subject voucher is a private document only; it is
not a commercial document because it is not a
document used by merchants or businessmen to
promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions nor is
it defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce or
other commercial law. Rather, it is a private
document, which has been defined as a deed or

instrument executed by a private person without the

intervention of a public notary or of other person
legally authorized, by which some disposition or
agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth, because
it acted as the authorization for the release of the
P21,000.00 finders fee to Guilas and as the receipt
evidencing the payment of this finders fee.
The information in the case at bar is valid, however,
there is a variance between the allegation in the
information and proof adduced during trial with respect
to the third essential element of falsification of private
document, i.e., the falsification caused damage or was
committed with intent to cause damage to a third
party.
To reiterate, petitioner was charged in the information
with causing damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of
P21,000.00 because he caused it to appear in the
disbursement voucher that Guilas was entitled to a
P21,000.00 finders fee when in truth and in fact
AFPSLAI owed no such amount to Guilas. However, he
was convicted by the trial court of falsifying the
voucher with criminal intent to cause damage to the
government because the trial court found that
petitioners acts were designed to lower the tax base
of Hernandez and aid the latter in evading payment of
taxes on the finders fee.
This variance material and prejudicial to petitioner
which, perforce, is fatal to his conviction in the instant
case. By the clear and unequivocal terms of the
information, the prosecution endeavored to prove that

the falsification of the voucher by petitioner caused

damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00 and
not that the falsification of the voucher was done with
intent to cause damage to the government. The
defense applicable for each is different.
Conde vs. Rivera [GR 21741, 25 January 1924] First
Division, Malcolm (J): 7 concur
Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in
Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no less
the five information for various crimes and
misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and
counsel at hearings no less than on 8 different
occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice
been required to come to the Supreme Court for
protection, and now, after the passage of more than 1
year from the time when the first information was filed,
seems as far away from a definite resolution of her
troubles as she was when originally charged.
Issue: Whether mandamus will ie to compel the
dismissal of the information in light of delays in the
trial of the case.
Held: The Philippine organic and statutory law
expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy
trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has
a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she
may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in
defiance of law. Dismissed from her humble position,
and compelled to dance attendance on courts while
investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed
without her consent, is palpably and openly unjust to
her and a detriment to the public. By the use of upon
the appropriate information, could have attended to

the formal preliminary examination, and could have

prepared the case for a trial free from vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays. The Government of
the Philippine Islands which should be the last to set
an example of delay and oppression in the
administration of justice. The Court is thus under a
moral and legal obligation to see that these
proceedings come to an end and that the accused is
discharged from the custody of the law. Thus, where a
prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
postponements of the trial of a defendant against his
protest beyond a reasonable period of time, the
accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in
mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or
if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to
obtain his freedom. Hence, the Supreme Court ordered
the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas to abstain from further
attempts to prosecute Conde pursuant to informations,
and dismissed the charges pending before the justice
of the of Lucena, Tayabas.

claimed. The state sought review by the Court of

Appeals of the First Appellate District of Ohio, which
reversed the common pleas and affirmed the judgment
of the mayor. On 4 May 1926, the state Supreme Court
refused Tumey's application to require the Court of
Appeals to certify its record in the case. Tumey then
filed a petition in error in that court as of right, asking
that the judgment of the mayor's court and of the
appellate court be reversed on constitutional grounds.
On 11 May 1926, the Supreme Court adjudged that the
petition be dismissed for the reason that no debatable
constitutional question was involved in the cause. The
judgment was then brought to the US Supreme Court
upon a writ of error allowed by the Chief Justice of the
state Supreme Court, to which it was rightly directed.

Tumey vs. Ohio [273 US 510, 7 March 1927] Taft (CJ):

Facts: Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and was
brought before Mayor Pugh, of the village of North
College Hill, charged with unlawfully possessing
intoxicating liquor. He moved for his dismissal because
of the disqualification of the mayor to try him under
the 14th Amendment. The mayor denied the motion,
proceeded to the trial, convicted Tumey of unlawfully
possessing intoxicating liquor within Hamilton county
as charged, fined him $100, and ordered that he be
imprisoned until the fine and costs were paid. Tumey
obtained a bill of exceptions and carried the case on
error to the court of common pleas of Hamilton county.
That court heard the case and reversed the judgment,
on the ground that the mayor was disqualified as

Held: All questions of judicial qualification may not

involve constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship,
personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest
would seem generally to be matters merely of
legislative discretion. But it certainly violates the 14th
Amendment and deprives a defendant in a criminal
case of due process of law to subject his liberty or
property to the judgment of a court, the judge of which
has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in
reaching a conclusion against him in his case. Herein,
the mayor has authority, which he exercised in the
case, to order that the person sentenced to pay a fine
shall remain in prison until the fine and costs are paid.
The mayor thus has a direct personal pecuniary
interest in convicting the defendant who came before
him for trial, in the $12 of costs imposed in his behalf,

Issue: Whether the pecuniary interest of the Mayor and

his village, and the system of courts in prosecuting
violations of the Prohibition Act, renders the mayor
disqualified from hearing the case.

which he would not have received if the defendant had

been acquitted. This was not exceptional, but was the
result of the normal operation of the law and the
ordinance. The system by which an inferior judge is
paid for his service only when he convicts the
defendant has not become so embedded by custom in
the general practice, either at common law or in this
country, that it can be regarded as due process of law,
unless the costs usually imposed are so small that they
may be properly ignored as within the maxim "de
minimis non curat lex." The Court cannot regard the
prospect of receipt or loss of such an emolument in
each case as a minute, remote, trifling, or insignificant
interest. It is certainly not fair to each defendant
brought before the mayor for the careful and judicial
consideration of his guilt or innocence that the
prospect of such a prospective loss by the mayor
should weigh against his acquittal. But the pecuniary
interest of the mayor in the result of his judgment is
not the only reason for holding that due process of law
is denied to the defendant here. The statutes were
drawn to stimulate small municipalities, in the country
part of counties in which there are large cities, to
organize and maintain courts to try persons accused of
violations of the Prohibition Act everywhere in the
county. The inducement is offered of dividing between
the state and the village the large fines provided by
the law for its violations. The trial is to be had before a
mayor without a jury, without opportunity for retrial,
and with a review confined to questions of law
presented by a bill of exceptions, with no opportunity
by the reviewing court to set aside the judgment on
the weighing of evidence, unless it should appear to be
so manifestly against the evidence as to indicate
mistake, bias, or willful disregard of duty by the trial
court. Thus, no matter what the evidence was against

him, the defendant had the right to have an impartial

judge. He seasonably raised the objection, and was
entitled to halt the trial because of the disqualification
of the judge, which existed both because of his direct
pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because of his
official motive to convict and to graduate the fine to
help the financial needs of the village. There were thus
presented at the outset both features of the
disqualification. The judgment of the Supreme Court of
Ohio is reversed, and the cause remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the present opinion.
Bracy vs Gramley
Brief Fact Summary. Defendant sentenced to death
by a corrupt judge pressed a judicial-bias claim.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. If a defendant can
demonstrate good cause for discovery in a judicialbias claim, he may then rebut the presumption that
the judge properly discharged their official duties.

Facts. Defendant Bracy was convicted for an

execution-style triple murder. He was sentenced to
death by Judge Maloney. Maloney was proven to be
corrupt. Defendant contended that his Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process rights were violated.
Issue. Whether petitioner is entitled to discovery
under [the Habeas Corpus rules] to support his judicialbias claim.
Held. Yes. The Supreme Court prefaced its holding by
listing the tangled history of Maloneys corruption,
concluding that if it could be proved

Re: Petition for radio and television coverage of the

multiple murder cases against Maguindanao Governor
Zaldy Ampatuan, et al., A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC/A.M. No.
10-11-6-SC/A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC. June 14, 2011.
Post under Political Law at Sunday,
2011 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

October

16,

Right to fair trial v. freedom of the press. (J.

Abad)

On the possible influence of media coverage on the

impartiality of trial court judges, the Court found that
prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right
to a fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances
test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v.
Desierto, that the right of an accused to a fair trial is
not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive
publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an
accused to a fair trial, and that there must be
allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a
judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of
possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual
prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a
fair trial.
Crawford vs Washington
Brief Fact Summary. Petitioners wife gave a taperecorded description of the stabbing her husband was
involved in. The tape was played at trial, but she did
not
testify.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. [W]here testimonial
statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability

sufficient to satisfy
confrontation.

constitutional

demands

is

Facts. Petitioner stabbed a man who allegedly tried to

rape his wife. He and his wife, Sylvia, were arrested
and interrogated. Sylvias statement cast doubt on her
husbands assertion of self-defense. At petitioners
trial, Sylvias tape was used at trial, although she
herself did not testify due to Washingtons martial
privilege rule. Petitioner objected. Prosecutor invoked a
hearsay exception. The Washington Court of Appeals,
after applying a nine-part test, it upheld the conviction.
Issue. [W]hether the States use of Sylvias
statement violated the Confrontation Clause.
Held. Yes. After examine the history behind the
Confrontation Clause, the Supreme Court arrived at
two conclusions about it. First, the principal evil at
which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the
civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly
its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against
the accused. Based on this, the Court rejected the
view that the Confrontation Clause applies of its own
force only to in-court testimony, and that its
application to out-of-court statements introduced at
trial depends upon the law of Evidence for the time
being.
Second, that the Framers would not have allowed
admission of testimonial statements of a witness who
did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to
testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity
for
cross-examination.
It concluded that [i]n this case, the State admitted
Sylvias testimonial statement against petitioner,

despite the fact that he had no opportunity to crossexamine her. That alone is sufficient to make out a
violation of the Sixth Amendment. In so doing, it
overruled Ohio v. Roberts, which conditioned the
admissibility of all hearsay evidence on whether it falls
under a firmly rooted hearsay exception or bears
particularized
guarantees
of
trustworthiness.
Concurrence. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice
OConnor, disagreed with the Courts decision to
overturn Roberts.

Discussion. Where testimonial evidence is at issue,

however, the Sixth Amendment demands what the
common law required: unavailability and a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.
People vs Pido G.R. No. 92427, August 2, 1991
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the lower court
convicting, ROBERTO R. PIDO of the crime of rape,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of April 1980, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of
force and intimidation, to wit: by holding the neck of
the complainant simultaneously poking a deadly
bladed instrument against her, threatening to kill her
should she shout for help and ordering her to remove
her entire clothings, have sexual intercourse with the
undersigned complainant, against her will.
The complaint was filed with the then Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila. It was
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 61752 and was
assigned to Branch 35 thereof.

The accused entered a plea of not guilty when

arraigned on 13 July 1981.
On January 3, 1990, the trial court promulgated its
decision convicting the accused of the crime of rape
and sentencing him to a penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In summary the testimonial evidence as presented by
the prosecution as part of or as res gestae points to
the accused as having committed rape based on the
testimony of the alleged victim Teresita Gam and her
cousin Lydia Sulit who allegedly saw the accused leave
the house after committing the heinous act. (She did
not see the actual rape). On the other hand, the
accused denies the accusation and on his part alleged
that it was Teresita Gam who invited her into the house
and had consensual sexual intercourse with him. He
further narrates that they were former sweethearts
and they broke up previously because Teresita worked
in a club and became a prostitute. The alleged rape
took place on April 15, 1980, Teresita reported the
alleged crime the following month May 1980.
ISSUE:
The basic issue which these conflicting theories raise
is whether or not the guilt of the accused-appellant
has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
DECISION:
We have carefully and meticulously reviewed and
analyzed the evidence for the prosecution in this case
and, guided by the jurisprudential principles and
considerations adverted to in the exordium of this
decision, We find that the prosecution failed to
discharge its duty to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Reversal of the decision
appealed from is inevitable.
It is the teaching in various rulings that in rape cases,
the testimony of the offended party must not be

accepted with precipitate credulity. Common sense

and logic, and above all the duty to render impartial
justice, which is expected from judges, demand that
the testimonies of witnesses must be viewed in their
totality. This of course means that due attention must
be given to the cross-examination. It is the province of
the latter to test the credibility of the witnesses,
expose falsehood or half-truth, uncover the truth which
rehearsed
direct-examination
testimonies
may
successfully
suppress,
and
demonstrate
inconsistencies on substantial matters which create
reasonable doubt. In short, cross-examination is an
indispensable instrument of criminal justice to give
substance and meaning to the Constitutional right of
the accused to confront the witnesses against him and
to show that the presumption of innocence has
remained steadfast and firm.
This case then provides one more occasion for this
Court to take exception to the rule that appellate
courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of
the trial court considering that it is in a better position
to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying. 33 Two special considerations in
this case justify such departure. Firstly, it was another
judge (Judge Alfredo Lazaro) who heard and received
the whole testimony on direct examination of the
complainant and the major portion of her testimony on
cross-examination. Judge Makasiar, who decided the
case, did not then have sufficient basis to form an
opinion as to the complainant's deportment and
manner of testifying. Secondly, the trial court had
ignored
or
overlooked
substantial
facts
and
circumstances, as hereafter shown, which would affect
the result of the case.

WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to establish

the guilt of the accused for the crime of rape as
charged beyond reasonable doubt, the decision of the
trial court in Criminal Case No. 61752 is hereby
REVERSED and another is hereby entered ACQUITTING
the accused Roberto R. Pido, with costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE V. ORTIZ-MIYAKE
FACTS:
Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal
recruitment in large scale, following a complaint
filed by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and
Rosamar del Rosario. Marasigan had also
charged her with estafa by means of false
pretenses.
Only Marasigan was able to testify, however, as
the other two complainants were abroad.
Marasigan said Ortiz-Miyake promised her a job
as factory worker in Taiwan. The former gave
her P5,000 initially as placement fee, which
amount subsequently became P23,000 paid in
installments upon the demands of the accused.
Accused gave assurances that Marasigan would
have no problem getting a visa and a plane
ticket. She was unable to go to Taiwan, as there
was no ticket booked for her and, in fact, the
supposed agency did not even know Miyake.
On the other hand, Generillo was represented by
her mother, while del Rosarios sister testified in
court on the latters behalf. As they were not
personally present, however, during the
transactions with Miyake, they could only claim
they gave certain amounts that were supposed

to go to Miyake, and concluded that since their

relatives had not been able to leave as promised
by Miyake, then they were necessarily victims of
illegal recruitment by the accused. A POEA
representative also testified that Miyake had no
authorization to recruit workers for overseas
employment. [Miyake claiming she only offered
discounted plane tickets to the supposed
victims]
TC convicted the accused, largely basing their
decision on the previous decision rendered by
Paranaque MeTC, where the two complainants
now absent had filed charges of estafa against
Miyake. The Court there had convicted Miyake.

ISSUE: won Miyake can be held liable for illegal

recruitment on a large scale
HELD/RATIO: Ortiz-Miyake guilty only of simple illegal
recruitment (and estafa).
LC: RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT IS ". . . ANY ACT OF
CANVASSING, ENLISTING, CONTRACTING TRANSPORTING,
UTILIZING, HIRING OR PROCURING WORKERS AND
INCLUDES REFERRALS, CONTRACT SERVICES, PROMISING
OR ADVERTISING FOR EMPLOYMENT, LOCALLY OR ABROAD,
WHETHER FOR PROFIT OR NOT; BECOMES ILLEGAL IF ONE
HAS NO AUTHORIZATION FOR PERFORMING SUCH ACTS;
BECOMES LARGE SCALE IF DONE AGAINST THREE OR MORE
PERSONS WHETHER INDIVIDUALLY OR AS A GROUP

Right of accused to confront del Rosario and

Generillo was not afforded her. Testimonies of
sister and mother, respectively, mere hearsay.
Although testimonies from the previous case
could have been used, the decision convicting
the accused of another crime (in that previous
case, estafa) cannot be sustained for being

violative of the accuseds right to confront

witnesses.
Conviction of illegal recruitment does not
preclude conviction for estafa. Burden of proof
was only successfully established as to victim
Marasigan. Since large scale not established,
conviction is only for simple illegal recruitment
(and estafa).

US vs Scheffer
Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Scheffer (the
Respondent), was charged and convicted in military
court on several criminal charges, including use of
methamphetamine. He claimed he did not knowingly
use the drug, and he passed a polygraph test. The
Respondent sought to introduce the polygraph test as
evidence
to
support
his
credibility.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Under the United States
Constitution (Constitution), the defendants right to
present relevant evidence is subject to reasonable
restrictions to accommodate other legitimate interests
in the criminal trial process.

Facts. The Respondent, an airman stationed at an air

force base in California, failed to show up for work on
April 30. He remained absent until May 13, when he
was arrested during a traffic stop and returned to the
base. His urinalysis revealed the presence of
methamphetamine. He was tried by general courtmartial on charges of using methamphetamine, failing
to go to his appointed place of duty, wrongful absence,
and uttering insufficient funds checks. He testified that

he never knowingly used drugs. The Respondent

sought to introduce the evidence of a polygraph test in
support of his own testimony. The military judge
denied the motion base on Military Rule of Evidence
(M.R.E.)Rule 707, which provides that a polygraph
examination shall not be admitted into evidence. The
Respondent was convicted on all counts, and the Air
Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces reversed, holding that a
per se exclusion of polygraph evidence offered
by an accused to support his credibility violates his
Sixth Amendment constitutional right to present a
defense.
Issue. Does a rule of evidence which does not allow
the admissibility of polygraph evidence,
unconstitutionally harm the right of the accused to
present a defense?
Held. Justice Clarence Thomas (J. Thomas) delivered
the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States
(Supreme Court). In reversing the Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces, the Supreme Court held that
M.R.E. Rule 707 does not unconstitutionally abridge
the right of accused members of the military to
present
a
defense.
Dissent. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens) filed
a dissenting opinion, arguing that M.R.E. Rule 707 is
unconstitutional because it abridges the constitutional
right of the accused to present a defense. He notes
that M.R.E. Rule 707 does not allow the accused the
opportunity to persuade the court that the evidence
should be admissible for any purpose. Further, the
polygraph evidence went to the heart of the
Respondents case because his defense rested on the

theory

that

he

unknowingly

ingested

the

drug.

Concurrence. Justice Anthony Kennedy (J. Kennedy)

filed a concurring opinion joined by Justice Sandra Day
OConnor (J. OConnor), Justice Ruther Bader
Ginsburg (J. Ginsburg), and Justice Stephen Breyer
(J. Breyer). J. Kennedy disagreed with the majoritys
reasoning that the jurys role in making credibility
determinations is diminished when hearing evidence of
a polygraph. Further, he argued that the holding
contradicts Rule 704(a) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which provides that opinion or inference
testimony, otherwise admissible, is not objectionable
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided
by the trier of fact.

Discussion. The exclusion of the evidence in this case

does not significantly undermine fundamental
elements of the defense. Polygraph evidence has been
determined to be too unreliable, and the purpose of
M.R.E. Rule 707 is to ensure that only reliable evidence
is introduced. In order to be unconstitutional, the
exclusion of evidence must undermine fundamental
elements of the defense.
People vs. Salas
Facts:
Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in
the CFI Cebu but before he could be arraigned the case
was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a
result of the reinvestigation, an amended information
was filed, with no bail recommended, to which he
pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced, but while it was

in progress, the prisoner, escaped. The judge, learning

later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and
ordered Abong's rearrest. Abong, however, was gone.
Nonetheless (Bernardo Salas), the prosecution moved
that the hearing continue in accordance with the
constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia
under certain circumstances. the judge denied the
motion, however, and suspended all proceedings until
the return of the accused. The order of the trial court is
before the Supreme Court on certiorari and
mandamus.

notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided

that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear
is

Issue: Whether Abong may be tried in absentia, in

light of his escape.

result, had to be discontinued as long as the defendant

had not reappeared or remained at large.

Held:

As his right tobe present at these stages was then held

not waivable even by his escape, such escape thus
operated to the

Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides

that "In all criminal prosecution, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial
and

unjustified." The purpose of this rule is to speed up the

disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in
the past be indefinitely deferred, and many times
completely abandoned, because of the defendant's
escape.
The old case of People v. Avancea (32 OG 713)
required his presence at certain stages of the trial
which as a

fugitive's advantage, and in mockery of the

authorities, insofar as the trial could not proceed as
long as he had
not been recaptured. The doctrine laid down in that
case has been modified by Section 19, which now
allows
trial in absentia,

public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to

have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed

Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart

his continued prosecution and possibly eventual
conviction provided only that: a) he has been
arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and

c) his failure to appear is unjustified. Thus, the right to

be present at one's trial may now be waived except
only at that stage where the prosecution intends to
present witnesses who will identify the accused. Under
Section 19, the defendant's escape will be considered
a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to
notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent
it from continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to
have received due notice. The same fact of his escape
will make his failure to appear unjustified because he
has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and
protection, of the law.

Doctrine:
their escape should have been considered a waiver of
their right to be present at their trial, and the inability
of the court to notify them of the subsequent hearings
did not prevent it from continuing with their
trial. They were to be deemed to have received
notice. The same fact of their escape made their
failure to appear unjustified because they have, by
escaping, placed themselves beyond the pale and
protection of the law.