Navarro vs.

Villegas [GR L-31687, 26 February 1970]

1. The Mayor of the City of Manila (Villegas) expressly stated his willingness to grant
permits for peaceful assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays
when they would not cause unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities of the
community and has further offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as
the site of demonstration sought to be held that afternoon.
2. The Mayor believes that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as to compared to one at the
Sunken Gardens as he suggested, poses a clearer and more imminent danger of public
disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of
such assemblies, and petitioner has manifested that it has no means of preventing such
disorders.
Navarro filed the petition for mandamus.

Issue: Whether the Mayor possesses discretion to determine the public places to be used for
assembly, i.e. the Sunken Garden, instead of Plaza Miranda.

Held: the Mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public
places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and to
minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order. Consequently, every time
that such assemblies are announced, the community is placed in such a state of fear and tension
that offices are closed early and employees dismissed, storefronts boarded up, classes suspended,
and transportation disrupted, to the general detriment of the public. Civil rights and liberties can
exist and be preserved only in an ordered society. Navarro has failed to show a clear specific
legal duty on the part of Mayor to grant their application for permit unconditionally. Thus, the
Court denied the writ prayed for by Navarro and dismissed their petition.
NAVARRO V. VILLEGAS - Sunken Gardens as alternative to Plaza Miranda - The Mayor
cannot be compelled to issue the permit. A permit should recognize the right of the applicants to
hold their assembly at a public place of their choice, another place may be designated by the
licensing authority if it be shown that a clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no
change was made.

Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.
and Court of Industrial Relations (1973)
Facts Union officers of the Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc. (PBM) were dismissed for
allegedly violating the no strike-no lockout provision of their collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) after staging a mass demonstration at Malacaang. PBMEO was set to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969 against abuses of the Pasig police, where
employees on the first, regular, and third shifts will participate. PBMEO informed company two
days before the said demonstration and asked to excuse all the workers participating. But a day
before the demonstration, PBM said the rally should not prejudice normal office operations, thus
employees without prior filing of a leave of absence who fail to report for the first and regular
shifts on March 4 shall be dismissed for violating their CBA. However, union officers said there
was no violation because the demonstration was against the Pasig police and not the company.
They added that the rally was an exercise of their freedom of speech. In a decision penned by
Judge Joaquin Salvador of the Court of Industrial Relations, eight of the Philippine Blooming
Mills Employment Organization (PBMEO) officers were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith
and were thus removed as employees of PBM. PBMEO filed a motion for reconsideration, which
CIR dismissed the motion for passing two days late from the 10-day deadline the court allowed.
Issue Whether or not CIR and PBM Co. Inc. violated PBMEOs freedom of expression and
assembly on the grounds that PBM Co. illegally dismissed its employees for participating in a
mass demonstration.
Held VIOLATED. The rally was not against the company and therefore there is no violation of
the no strike-no lockout provision of their CBA. To charge PBMEO of bargaining in bad faith
extends the jurisdiction of the CBA and inhibits freedom of speech. The company failed to
protect its employees from the Pasig polices abuse of power, went to the extent of dismissing
their employees, and instead prioritized material losses. Moreover, CIR could have easily
accepted the motion for reconsideration. Procedural rules do not supersede the Constitution and
may be overruled in a bid to achieve justice, especially in cases of free speech.
CBA collective bargaining agreement; a contract between a company and its employees that
lays out work hours, wages, and other terms and conditions of employment

Strike right of employees to refuse to go to work; cessation of work

Lockout right of employers to suspend work and to refuse to hire workers

Jose B.L. Reyes vs Ramon Bagatsing

November 26, 2011 125 SCRA 553 Political Law Freedom of Speech Primacy of the
Constitution over International Law
Retired Justice Jose BL Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a
permit to rally from Luneta Park until the front gate of the US embassy which is less than two
blocks apart. The permit has been denied by then Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing. The mayor
claimed that there have been intelligence reports that indicated that the rally would be infiltrated
by lawless elements. He also issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies
within the 500 feet radius of the US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was his intention to
provide protection to the US embassy from such lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And that under our constitution we adhere to
generally accepted principles of international law.
ISSUE: Whether or not a treaty may supersede provisions of the Constitution.
Whether or not the rallyists should be granted the permit.
HELD:
I. No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats from any
lawless element. And indeed the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted
principles of international law. But the same cannot be invoked as defense to the primacy of the
Philippine Constitution which upholds and guarantees the rights to free speech and peacable
assembly. At the same time, the City Ordinance issued by respondent mayor cannot be invoked if
the application thereof would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed rights.
II. Yes. The denial of their rally does not pass the clear and present danger test. The mere
assertion that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators does not suffice. In this

case, no less than the police chief assured that they have taken all the necessary steps to ensure a
peaceful rally. Further, the ordinance cannot be applied yet because there was no showing that
indeed the rallyists are within the 500 feet radius (besides, theres also the question of whether or
not the mayor can prohibit such rally but, as noted by the SC, that has not been raised an an
issue in this case).

MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO [129 SCRA 359; G.R. NO.62270; 21 MAY 1984]
Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent Gregorio Araneta
University. They sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting
from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other
students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball
court (VMAS), However, they held the general assembly at the second floor lobby of the VMAS,
contrary to what is stated in the permit. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and
vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science
with the Institute of Agriculture. The same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building
and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. Even they rallied
beyond the period allowed. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be
held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that
they were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal
assembly. The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal against private respondents Director of NCR of the Ministry of Education,
Culture and Sports. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal
assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the
disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year.
Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty
imposed, there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of
free speech.

Held: Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if
during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But with the
activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and
present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of
disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others."
The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational
institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or
involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment
unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a
right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the
placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost,
however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be
aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in
school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power
to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions
as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the
non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred
should not be disproportionate to the offense.

BAYAN v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA

G.R. NO. 169838; 25 APR 2006
Facts
Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue. BAYANs rally was violently
dispersed. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained by the police. KMU asserts that the
right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of Calibrated
Preemptive Response (CPR) being followed to implement it.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them
in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They
seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the no permit, no rally policy and the CPR
policy announced on Sept. 21, 2005.

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless
of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and
is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly
form part of the message for which the expression is sought.
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a
curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it
puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies
without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are
not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being
an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside
from being void for being vague and for lack of publication.
KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P.
No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the
legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the
Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too
comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain
events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane. As
to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before
the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the
policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and
violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to
peaceably assemble.
Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to prevent
grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and
trade. It is content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies.
According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P.
No. 880. and that the permit is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and
that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all rallies.
Issue Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional.
Held No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly
and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P.
No. 880.
B.P. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the
time, place and manner of the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would
use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because
assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and
entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance1 is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and
is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. There is, likewise, no priorrestraint,
since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and

must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is
used by some police agents to justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in
lieu of maximum tolerance, this was declared null and void.
The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps
for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the
establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and
municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to
the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably
assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet
complied with Section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR),
insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and
VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY
OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other
respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED

Aglipay v. Ruiz (Case Digest)

Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937
Facts:
Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against
respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage
stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic.
The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil.
Legislature, contemplates religious purpose for the benefit of a particular sect or church.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?
Held/Reason:
The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does
not contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only to
advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist and the government just took advantage of an
event considered of international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision
on the separation of the Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that Religious freedom,
as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial
of its influence in human affairs. Emphasizing that, when the Filipino people implored the aid
of Divine Providence, they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of
men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as

elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects
and denominations.

ANDRES GARCES vs. Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO

G.R. No. L-53487. May 25, 1981.

FACTS:
Pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City, a wooden
image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by the barangay council with funds raised by
means of solicitations and cash, duly ratified by the barangay assembly in a plebiscite,
reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration of the feast day of the saint. As per
Resolution No. 6, the image was brought to the Catholic parish church during the saint's
feast day which also designated the hermano mayor as the custodian of the image. After the
fiesta, however, petitioner parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea, refused to return
custody of the image to the council on the pretext that it was the property of the church
because church funds were used for its acquisition until after the latter, by resolution, filed
a replevin case against the priest and posted the required bond. Thereafter, the parish
priest and his co-petitioners filed an action for annulment of the council's resolutions
relating to the subject image contending that when they were adopted, the barangay
council was not duly constituted because the chairman of the Kabataang Barangay was not
allowed to participate; and that they contravened the constitutional provisions on
separation of church and state, freedom of religion and the use of public money to favor
any sect or church.
ISSUE:
Whether the barangay council's resolution providing for purchase of saint's image with
private funds in connection with barangay fiesta, constitutional.
HELD:
Yes. Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valenzuela, Ormoc City, "reviving the
traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Seor
San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valenzuela", and providing for: (I) the acquisition
of the image of San Vicente Ferrer; and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the
barangay's projects, funds for which would be obtained through the "selling of tickets and
cash donations", does not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious
liberty, nor appropriate money for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image
was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of the waiting

shed is entirely a secular matter. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the
celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for
the purpose of favoring any religion or interfering with religious beliefs of the barrio
residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the
patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is
nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the
barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the
acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the
resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained
tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives
of the masses.

Garces v. Estenzo statue of San Vicente Ferrer A resolution of the barangay council for
soliciting contributions to buy a statue of the barangays patron saint and the use of such fund for
said purpose does not violate the Constitutions provision prohibiting use of public funds for religious
purpose; statue was purchased by barangay funds so it belongs to the barangay and not to the
parish

ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., herein

represented byPROF. ABDULRAFIH H. SAYEDY,
petitioner, vs.
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVESECRETARY of the Office of the President of the
Philippines, herein represented by HON.ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary,
and the OFFICE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS,herein represented by its Executive Director,
HABIB MUJAHAB HASHIM,
respondents.
G.R. No. 153888 July 9, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines, Inc. is is a non-governmental organization
that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. Among
the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and
issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. Respondent Office of the
Executive Secretary issued EO 46 which designated respondent OMA (Office on Muslim
Affairs) the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory
activities resulting to the lost revenues on the part of the petitioner. Petitioner assails the
constitutionality of EO 46 first on the provision on the Separation of Church and State. It is
unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification
scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can
lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. According to petitioner, the subject EO was issued

with utter haste and without even consulting Muslim people's organizations like petitioner before
it became effective.
Issue: Whether or not EO 46 violates the principle of separation of Church and State?
Ruling: Yes. OMA was created in 1981 through Executive Order No. 697 (EO 697) "to ensure
the integration of Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of Filipino society with due regard to
their beliefs, customs, traditions, and institutions." Furthermore, OMA does not intrude into
purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause and the "free exercise of
religion provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution.
Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn
from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food
products as halal, EO 46encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein
petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption.
Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced
Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal
food. Accordingly, only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. But in the case at
bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive muslim organizations, like
herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that
the health of muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive
power to issue halal certifications.

Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz

Facts: Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June 28,
1993,Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine
Independent Church. Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed
a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the
Regional Trial Court. They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done
without trial thus violating their righto due process of law.
Issue: What is the role of the State, through the Courts, on matters of religious intramurals?
Held: The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is
a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the
performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of
religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.Civil Courts will not

interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or
property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have
jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property.
Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.

American Bible Society v City of Manila GR No. L-9637, April 30, 1957
FACTS:
In the course of its ministry, the Philippine agency of American Bible Society (a foreign, nonstock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation) has been distributing and selling bibles
and/or gospel portions thereof throughout the Philippines. The acting City Treasurer of Manila
informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November
1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayors permit and municipal license, in
violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364. The
society paid such under protest and filed suit questioning the legality of the ordinances under
which the fees are being collected.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila are constitutional and valid
2. Whether the provisions of said ordinances are applicable or not to the case at bar
RULING:
1. Yes, they are constitutional. The ordinances do not deprive defendant of his constitutional right
of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, even though it prohibits
him from introducing and carrying out a scheme or purpose which he sees fit to claim as part of
his religious system. It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered
unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff society.
2. The ordinance is inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. Even if
religious groups and the press are not altogether free from the burdens of the government, the act
of distributing and selling bibles is purely religious and does not fall under Section 27e of the
Tax Code (CA 466). The fact that the price of bibles, etc. are a little higher than actual cost of the
same does not necessarily mean it is already engaged in business for profit. Thus, the Ordinances
are not applicable to the Soc