Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 135904

January 21, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALVIN TAN y LAGAMAYO, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Alvin Tan (hereafter TAN) seeks his acquittal
by a reversal of the 29 June 1998 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20688 which affirmed his
conviction for violating Republic Act No. 6539, An Act Preventing and Penalizing Carnapping. 2 TAN's motion for
reconsideration of said decision and motion for oral arguments were denied for lack of merit by the Court of Appeals
in its 6 October 1998 resolution.3 Said decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals affirmed the 19 December
1994 judgment of conviction against TAN by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 95, Quezon City in Criminal Case No.
Q-93-45449.
TAN's indictment4 for violation of Republic Act No. 6539 reads as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away one (1) Mitsubishi Gallant car colored blue, bearing Plate No. CGS723 owned by one PHILIP SEE, of undetermined value, to the damage and prejudice of said Philip See.
Upon his arraignment on 14 July 1993 and with the assistance of counsel, Tan pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial
immediately ensued as the parties waived the holding of a preliminary conference.
The trial court's terse recapitulation of the prosecution evidence proceeded in this manner: 5
. . . [P]rivate complainant Philip See is the registered owner of a 1987 Mitsubishi Gallant four-door valued at
P420,000.00, bearing plate no. CGS-723, colored blue, and with motor no. 4G32-FG2704 and serial/chassis
no. A161UL-3011. Sometime in March 1992, accused Alvin Tan was introduced to Philip by Alvin's fiancee,
one Vienna Yu, and from then on, Philip and Alvin became friends and started to see each other on several
occasions thereafter.
On November 7, 1992, about 9:30 a.m., Philip together with his wife Ruby See and Robert Chua (a
neighbor) was at his place of residence . . . when Alvin arrived thereat. He made it known to Philip that he
was intending to buy Philip's aforesaid car and that he wanted to test-drive it. On account of their friendship
and believing Alvin's assurance that he would return the car after he shall have test-driven it, Philip granted
Alvin's request . . . . On thus getting hold of the car, Alvin sped away and never returned. In vain, Philip
waited for Alvin to show up and return the car; Alvin simply did not show up, much less cause the return of
the car.
Thus, Philip started to call up and look for Alvin at his office at Roosevelt Avenue, QC, but Alvin avoided him
by refusing to answer the telephone calls or pretending he was not around; and Philip's attempts to see Alvin
at his office similarly proved futile, for whenever Philip would go to said office, Alvin would refuse to see him.
Dismayed though he was, Philip desisted as long as he could from reporting and complaining about the
matter to the authorities; Philip still believed that being a friend, Alvin eventually would come around to
returning the car to him. Meanwhile, sometime on March 5, 1993, with the assistance of some personnel of
the Land Transportation Office (LTO), Philip was able to cause the car's 1993 renewal registration in the
absence of the vehicle and he was issued the corresponding official receipt therefor.
1wphi1.nt

Sometime on May 19, 1993, Philip again tried to see Alvin at his place at Roosevelt. Again Philip was told
that Alvin was not around. One of Alvin's employees, however, advised Philip to the effect that the car was
parked and hidden right behind Alvin's warehouse. The location of the warehouse having been given to him,
Philip went to the place and at a distance of some five feet, he saw the vehicle parked at the rear end of the
warehouse. To his shock and surprise, he saw that parts of the car, like the bumper, a door, and several

interior accessories, had been dismantled and were already missing. Worse, several pieces of wood were
piled on top of the car as if purposely hide and conceal it from view.
Still failing to recover his car, Philip on or about June 2, 1993, formally lodged a complaint for carnapping
against Alvin before the QC police station. Some two days later, or on June 4, 1993, Philip reported the loss
of his car to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Traffic Management Command and he accordingly signed
the corresponding complaint sheets. Too, an alarm for the subject car was issued. To his further shock and
consternation, Philip was informed by the PNP's Highway Patrol Group (HPG) that somebody had applied
for a clearance to sell the car and that the applicant was made to appear as one Philip See. . . . Philip
denied his alleged signature on the application and also denied having supposedly applied for clearance to
sell his vehicle.
Meanwhile, acting on the complaint lodged by Philip against Alvin before the QC police station 1, the police
authorities scheduled a visit to the place of Alvin, with Philip being asked by them to pinpoint and identify
Alvin in the course thereof. Accordingly, at Alvin's place, he was identified and invited by the police to the
station for investigation. While still at Alvin's office, Philip saw on top of Alvin's table what Philip believed to
be accessories from his car, consisting of a two-way radio antenna and car stereo, which appeared to him to
have been dismantled from the subject car.
At that time Alvin took the car supposedly to test-drive it on November 7, 1992, the car was in top condition,
had low mileage, was "fully loaded" with complete interior accessories including an imported Kenwood
stereo, and had imported magwheels.
Expectedly, Tan impugned the prosecution's version and presented a completely diverse tale.
Firstly, TAN asserted that Philip See (hereafter SEE) filed the complaint to purposely collect a debt from him and
wittingly use the court as collecting agent. Secondly, TAN claimed that SEE instituted the complaint in revenge of the
quarrels they had over TAN's girlfriend whom SEE wooed, and (2) in retaliation against the complaint for grave
threats and illegal possession of firearms filed by one of TAN's employees against SEE.
TAN then traced this legal predicament to the time when his girlfriend introduced him to SEE in March 1992. TAN
and SEE instantly became friends for they shared a similar acumen for business and passion for target shooting.
Inevitably, they engaged in and entered into several business transactions which resulted in TAN's indebtedness to
SEE in the amount of P800,000. Inspite of this, SEE still offered to sell the subject Mitsubishi Galant to TAN for the
amount of P280,000. TAN declined the offer. SEE persisted to the extent that he brought the car to TAN's residence
on 26 November 1992 and generously suggested that he would just add into the latter's existing indebtedness to
him the car's purchase price.
Sometime in February 1993, SEE tried to collect the car's purchase price but TAN had still no funds. So TAN
suggested that he would apply with a bank for a car loan using the car as security and apply the proceeds of said
loan in payment for the car. SEE agreed. Subsequently, TAN submitted in his name a loan application with the BPI
Family Bank in Makati. In compliance with the requirements of the loan application, SEE personally supervised the
car's appraisal and inspection on 19 March 1993. TAN additionally maintained that he and SEE signed a deed of
sale covering the subject automobile but that TAN did not receive a copy of said deed upon SEE's pretext that he
would use it for facilitation of the loan.
The bank approved the loan application but only in the amount of P129,000. Naturally, SEE considered the amount
insufficient and hence, refused to accept the terms of the loan. Consequently, TAN did not seek the release of the
loan.
The friendship eventually soured and the resulting "misunderstanding" with SEE impelled TAN on 19 May 1993 to
instruct his warehouse overseer to return the car to SEE's residence. TAN's employee drove the car to SEE's house,
parked the car outside the gate and then handed over the keys of the car to SEE's wife, Ruby.
Tan was therefore surprised when on 14 June 1993, police officers arrived at his residence and invited him to the
police station; this, to TAN's additional bewilderment, was in connection with SEE's complaint for the carnapping of
the car he already returned. TAN peacefully went with the police authorities to the station. 6
Weighing the evidence thus proffered, the trial court believed in the prosecution's version, particularly in SEE's clear,
positive, and straightforward account which said court found amply demonstrated that SEE had withdrawn the
consent initially given to TAN when the latter went beyond test-driving and appropriated the car for his own use and
benefit. To the trial court, TAN's failure to return the car and his consequent appropriation thereof constituted

unlawful taking the gravamen of the crime charged. It then concluded that TAN was obviously actuated by intent
to gain. The trial court then considered as completely undeserving of belief, TAN's supposition that despite his heavy
indebtedness and given his increasing difficulty to pay his loans, SEE had benignly extended him credit, delivered to
him the subject car and bestowed upon him the ultimate privilege of paying the car at his convenience. Thus, in a
decision promulgated on 19 January 1994, the trial court convicted TAN, the dispositive portion of which read as
follows:7
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Alvin Tan y Lagamayo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of carnapping charged herein, defined and punished in Sec. 2, in connection with Sec. 14, both of Rep. Act
No. 6539 . . . and, accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
of from fourteen years, eight months, and fifteen days as minimum, to seventeen years and four months as
maximum; to restore to the offended party, Philip See, the subject car . . . or in default thereof, to indemnify
said offended party in the sum of four hundred twenty thousand pesos; and, to pay the costs, without
prejudice to the application of Rep. Act No. 6127 in accused's favor.
TAN filed a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence which was granted by the trial court in
its 4 July 1994 order. SEE then moved for reconsideration, but was denied by the trial court in its 1 March 1995
order. SEE challenged these aforementioned orders of the trial court in a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of
Appeals. On 23 August 1995, the appellate court gave due course to and granted the petition. TAN assailed the
decision of the Court of Appeals through a petition for review before the Supreme Court, which promptly dismissed
the petition.8
Subsequently, based on TAN's "Notice of Appeal Ex Abundanti Ad Cautelam," the trial court ordered the elevation of
the records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, TAN challeged the Court of Appeals' affirmance of his, conviction. He argues before this Court that the
appellate court erred in (1) ignoring the peculiar nature of the law on carnapping, (2) disregarding that there was no
unlawful taking, and (3) rejecting circumstances on record which, if considered, would be sufficient to acquit him on
reasonable doubt.
In invoking the specificity of the carnapping law, TAN contends that the Court of Appeals should not have employed
as bases for his conviction the basic principles in theft enunciated in (1) People v. Roxas,9 where rice was received,
carted away and consumed, (2) U.S. v. de Vera,10 where a bar of gold and P200 in bank notes were received for
examination and changing into coins but instead appropriated, and (3) People v. Trinidad,11where a ring was
received for pledging but was sold and the proceeds thereof appropriated for the personal use of receiver.
A cursory reading of the pertinent portion of the challenged Court of Appeals decision reveals that the basic
principles of theft alluded to pertain to the signification of unlawful taking and as to when this takes place. Thus, the
Court in Roxas, de Vera and Trinidad declared that "the unlawful taking or deprivation may occur at or soon after the
transfer of physical possession" where "an act done by the receiver soon after the actual transfer of possession
resulted in unlawful taking." In such a case, "the article was taken away, not received, although at the beginning the
article was in fact given and received." Hence, in applying these principles, the Court of Appeals adopted the theory
of the Solicitor General that SEE entrusted his car to TAN merely for test driving, and the latter initially received the
same for that purpose only; TAN must perforce be deemed to have unlawfully "taken" the car soon after the testdriving for he failed to show-up and return said vehicle. 12
There is no arguing that the anti-carnapping law is a special law, different from the crimes of robbery and theft
included in the Revised Penal Code. It particularly addresses the taking, with intent of gain, of a motor vehicle
belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things.13 But a careful comparison of this special law with the crimes of robbery and theft readily
reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful taking, intent to gain, and that personal property
belonging to another is taken without the latter's consent. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly deals with
the theft and robbery of motor vehicles.14 Hence, a motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when it has been
taken, with intent to gain, without the owner's consent, whether the taking was done with or without violence or
intimidation of persons or with or without the use of force upon things. Without the anti-carnapping law, such
unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall within the purview of either theft or robbery which was certainly the case
before the enactment of said statute.
Obviously, TAN's proposition that the rudiments of theft, particularly as regards unlawful taking, should not have
been applied by the Court of Appeals, was misplaced. We shall see later on that the appellate court's interpretation
redounded in TAN's favor. As an element common to theft, robbery and carnapping, unlawful taking its import,
intention and concept should be considered as also common to these crimes. 15 However, we reject the Court of

Appeals' acceptance, hook, line and sinker of the Office of the Solicitor General's thesis that there was unlawful
taking in this case.
SEE asserted that on 7 November 1992 he turned over possession of his Mitsubishi Galant to TAN for test-driving
only, but the latter did not return the same after the lapse of not just several hours but a number of months. SEE
formally filed the complaint for carnapping on 2 June 1993. In the meantime, during the seven-month interval when
the car was allegedly in TAN's possession, (1) SEE had persistently and perseveringly attempted to talk to and see
TAN but the latter adamantly refused to respond to his telephone calls or personally receive him in his visits; (2)
SEE was able to register the car with the LTO on 5 March 1993; and (3) SEE had seen his car on 19 May 1993 from
a distance of some five feet, parked at the rear of TAN's warehouse and in the initial stages of dismantling. SEE also
believed that "being a friend, [TAN] eventually would come around to returning the car to him." 16
Even solely from this testimony, this Court finds that there was no unlawful taking. A felonious taking may be defined
as the act of depriving another of the possession and dominion of movable property without his privity and consent
and without animus revertendi.17 Thus, an unlawful taking takes place when the owner or juridical possessor does
not give his consent to the taking; or, if the consent was given, it was vitiated; or in the case of Roxas, Trinidad and
de Vera, where an act by the receiver soon after the actual transfer of possession constitutes unlawful taking. In the
last scenario, the receiver's act could be considered as having been executed without the consent of the giver.
SEE's testimony clearly evinced his assent to TAN's taking of the car not only at the time he yielded the physical
possession thereof for the alleged test-driving but even thereafter, for he neither withheld his consent nor withdrew
the same during the seven month period the car was with TAN. At the very least, SEE tolerated TAN's possession of
the car. A contrary conclusion inspires only disbelief. For if the car was truly carnapped, why did SEE wait for seven
months before he reported the same? Further, TAN's alleged refusal to meet SEE despite his repeated attempts to
do so should have sufficiently alerted him of the former's supposed malevolent intent, yet he still did not report the
taking. Even if he failed to report the taking, months after the alleged test-driving, he had allegedly seen his car in
the initial stages of dismemberment on 19 May 1993 yet, again, he did not report the carnapping on that day nor on
the next, but much later on 7 June 1993 or almost a month thereafter.
SEE said he believed and expected that the car would inevitably be returned to him. This is not only unsatisfactory
but irreconcilable and contradictory with his imputations of carnapping. For if he believed that the vehicle would be
returned to him for friendship's sake then he could not have at the same time also believed that this friend
carnapped his car. Clearly, SEE's behavior immediately preceding, contemporaneous and subsequent to the alleged
unlawful taking was definitely not the distraught conduct of a man whose car was carnapped. He was even able to
register the averred stolen vehicle without sounding the alarm.
A fortiori, the cases of Roxas, Trinidad and de Vera cited by the Court of Appeals have no application here as no
unlawful deprivation or taking of SEE's possession of, enjoyment and benefit over the car occurred soon or long
after his initial consent to the transfer thereof. Neither was there an act executed by TAN soon after the alleged testdriving that would constitute unlawful taking. These conclusions are buttressed by TAN's testimony, duly supported
by documentary evidence, that SEE cooperated with him for the availment of a car loan with the BPI Family Bank in
Makati, and that SEE personally attended to the inspection and appraisal of the subject car. The records, therefore,
do not support the finding of carnapping.
Noticeably, the Court of Appeals' erroneous contrary conclusions were heavily predicated on the arguments of the
Office of the Solicitor General that TAN's failure to show a written deed of sale and to seek the release of his car
loan "were inconsistent with [the latter's] idea of sale." It then posed four questions which it concluded "certainly
debilitated the pretensions of [TAN]," thus:18
If there was really a deed of sale, why could not [TAN] present a copy thereof?
Assuming arguendo that [SEE] got [TAN's] copy of the deed of sale, why did he not secure another copy
from the notary public who notarized the same? Or, better still, why did he not present the notary public to
testify on the fact of the sale?
Why did [SEE] have to sell the subject car to [TAN] at P280,000.00 when the latter was admittedly indebted
to the former to the tune of P800,000?
If [TAN] really bought the subject car from private complainant, why did he have to return the same (car) to
the lafter on May 14, 1993?
From this line of reasoning, we easily deduce that the Court of Appeals simply equated the lack of a written deed of
sale to SEE's lack of consent to TAN's taking of the car. But the mere absence of a written contract of sale in this

case does not necessarily mean that SEE did not also consent to the taking nor that TAN's possession of the car
was unlawful. The prosecution still has the onus probandi of showing that TAN's taking was unlawful. What took
place in these proceedings was that the appellate court magnified the weakness of the defense and overlooked the
prosecution's failure to discharge the onus probandi to show beyond reasonable doubt that the crime of
carnapping was indeed perpetrated. In short, the Court of Appeals and the trial court simply believed and accepted
the prosecution's tale. It ignored the basic legal precepts that conviction rests upon the strength of evidence of the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense; and assuming that the evidence of the
accused is weak, the same is no reason to convict, especially, as in this case, where the case of the prosecution is
not strong enough to sustain a conviction. 19 To reiterate, the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution, and unless
the State succeeds in proving by overwhelming evidence the guilt of the accused, the constitutional presumption of
innocence applies. A conviction in criminal cases must rest on nothing less than the moral certainty of guilt. 20
There is no quarrel in the conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, for upon this principle
hinges the rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals is
limited to reviewing errors of law. However, it appears on record that the appellate court overlooked, ignored, and
disregarded some fact and circumstance of weight or significance that if considered would have altered the result.
Cogent reasons therefore exist justifying the disregard of the findings of the appellate court, superseding the same
with our own determinations and conclusions, and ordering the reversal of the questioned decision and resolution of
said Court of Appeals.21
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the herein impugned 29 June 1998 decision and 6 October 1998
resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's judgment convicting accused-appellant Alvin Tan of
violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; a new judgment is entered
ACQUITTING said accused-appellant on ground of reasonable doubt.
1wphi1.nt

Costs de Officio.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-51370 August 31, 1981
AMADO IZON and JIMMY MILLA petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DE CASTRO*, J.:
Petitioners were charged, together with Pedro Divino, in the Circuit Criminal Court, Third Judicial District, Olongapo
City, with Robbery with Violence Against Person, under an information reading as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of September, 1977, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together
and mutually helping one another and by means of violence and intimidation applied upon the
person of Reynaldo Togorio committed by the accused Jimmy Milla y Castillo and Pedro Divino y
Batero who were armed with bladed weapon which they pointed to one Reynaldo Togorio and used
in stabbing him and the accused Amado Izon y Bartulo who helped in mauling him thereby inflicting
upon said Reynaldo Togorio the following physical injuries, to wit:
Incised wound 2 cm. long and 2 cm. deep lateral aspect upper third arm right. Incised
wound 2 inches long between thumb and index finger left Abrasion sternoclavicular
function along 6 rib left. Linear abrasion 3 cm. long level of 7th rib, anterior axillary
line right

which injuries shall require medical attendance for a period of less than nine (9) days, barring
complications, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away one
(1) motorized tricycle with motor No. B100-25-648 with Chasis No. B120-05589 and Plate No. MCH
Q4102 or with a total value of P11,000.00, Philippine Currency belonging to Reynaldo Togorio to the
damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned amount of Pll,000.00. However, the
motorized tricycle Zukurmi 120, Motor No. B1OO-25-648 with Chasis No.B-120-05589 was
recovered. 1
Pleading guilty upon arraignment, petitioners were sentenced to the penalty provided in Republic Act No. 6539
known as Anti-Car-napping Act of 1972 which defines motor vehicle as follows:
Motor vehicle is any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power using the public
highways, but excepting road rollers, trolley cars, street sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers,
bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts amphibian trucks, and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles
which run only on rails or tracks, and tractors, trailers and traction engines of all kinds used
exclusively for agricultural purposes. Trailers having any number of wheels, when propelled or
intended to be propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall be classified as separate motor
vehicle with no power rating. 2 (Emphasis supplied).
Contending that the court a quo erred in imposing the penalty prescribed in the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 instead
of that prescribed in the Revised Penal Code for simple robbery with violence, because the information did not
allege that the motorized tricycle stolen was using the public highway, so as to make it a motor vehicle as the term is
defined in the carnapping law, and therefore failed to inform them that they were being charged under the cited
statute, in violation of their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against the
petitioners came to this Court with the instant petition for review.
The principal issue thus raised is whether a motorized tricycle is a motor vehicle within the definition given to the
term by the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.
As a consequence of their contention that the motorized tricycle is not a motor vehicle under the definition of the
aforecited Act, petitioners also claim that they are not properly informed of the cause and nature of the accusation
against them in violation of their constitutional right.
Petitioners maintain that the tricycle in question is not a "motor vehicle" as the anti-carnapping law defines the term
because it is not licensed to operate on the "public highways." The Solicitor General contends otherwise with the
following argument:
The word "public" means "common to all or many; general; open to common use" (Black's Law
Dictionary 1393 [Revised 4th Ed.]. On the other hand, 'highway' refers to a 'free and public road way,
or street; one which every person has the right to use (idem. at p. 862). lt is clear that a street within
a town is a public highway if it is used by the public. To limit the words "public highways" to a national
road connecting the various towns, as petitioners' suggest (Reply dated January 25, 1980) would
create a distinction which the statute itself does not make. Under petitioners' proposition, a
distinction should be made between motor vehicles operating within a town like the motorized
tricycle involved herein, and those using roads connecting towns. This, however, goes against the
well known maxim that where the law does not distinguish, no distinction should be made (Robles
vs. Zambales Chromite Mining Co., 104 PhiL 688). It is also to be pointed out that to limit the
application of the Act to motor vehicles travelling between different towns, may lead to absurd
results. For example, privately owned motorcycle used by its owner in travelling from one province to
another would be covered by the law. Upon the other hand, a motorized tricycle (with sidecar) which
is more expensive than the former but operated within towns would not be protected by the law. No
unreasonable intendment should be read into a statute so that an injustice may be worked or an
absurb result produced (In re Moore's Estate, N.Y.S. 2nd 281, 165 Misc. 683). It can be concluded,
therefore, that the motorized tricycle involves in this case is a 'motor vehicle' within the ambit of
section 2 of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. The lower court correctly imposed the penalty for
violation of said Act on herein petitioners. 3
We perceive no reason not to accord full validity of the Solicitor General's argument, not even on the petitioner's
submission that a motorized tricycle, not having licensed to use a public highway, is not a motor, vehicle under the
provision of the anti-carnapping act.

From the definition cited by the Government which petitioners admit as authoritative, highways are always public,
free for the use of every person. There is nothing in the law that requires a license to use a public highway to make
the vehicle a "motor vehicle" within the definition given the anti-carnapping law. If a vehicle uses the streets with or
without the required license, same comes within the protection of the law, for the severity of the offense is not to be
measured by what kind of streets or highway the same is used; but by the very nature of the vehicle itself and the
use to which it is devoted. Otherwise, cars using the streets but still unlicensed or unregistered as when they have
just beet bought from the company, or only on test runs, may be stolen without the penal sanction of the anticarnapping statute, but only as simple robbery punishable under the provision of the Revised Penal Code. This
obviously, could not have been the intention of the anti-carnapping law.
Going over the enumerations of excepted vehicle, it would readily be noted that any vehicle which is motorized
using the streets which are public, not exclusively for private use, comes within the concept of motor vehicle. A
tricycle which is not included in the exception, is thus deemed to be that kind of motor vehicle as defined in the law
the stealing of which comes within its penal sanction.
In any event, it is a matter of judicial notice that motorized tricycles are running in droves along highways admittedly
public, as those going to the north like Baguio City. Those motorized tricycles certainly come within the definition of
the law, even under the restricted construction that petitioners would want given to it. If these tricycles are "motor
vehicles" then, there is no cogent reason to treat the tricycle in question differently.
With the foregoing discussion, it would logically follow that the petitioners complaint of not having been informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against them and for which they were convicted upon their plea of guilty, is
unfounded, legally and factually.
Again, on tills point, We find the observation of the Solicitor General valid, We have no other course than to sustain
it. Thus
A perusal of the information (Annex 1 of respondent People's Comment dated November 16, 1979)
readily shows that petitioners were not thereby informed that they were being accused for violation
of the Revised Penal Code. The charge merely designated the offense as one for: "ROBBERY WITH
VIOLENCE AGAINST PERSON." The facts alleged in the information make out a case of
"carnapping". This offense is defined in section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539 as 'the taking, with intent
to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things The information clearly specified
that what was taken and carried away was "one (1) motorized tricycle." Herein petitioners cannot
claim that they were misled by the information into pleading guilty. It is not necessary for the
protection of the substantial right of the accused, nor the effective preparation of his defense, that he
be informed of the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. He must look to the
facts alleged (People vs. Cosare, 95 PhiL 656; U.S. vs. Lim San 17 Phil. 275).
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 201092

January 15, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee,

vs.
JOEL AQUINO y CENDANA @ "AKONG," Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before this Court is an appeal from a Decision dated July 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
04265, entitled People of the Philippines v. Joel Aquino y Cendana alias Akong, which affirmed with modifications
the Decision dated September 18 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 12 which convicted
appellant Joel Aquino y Cendana alias Akong for the felony of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
in Criminal Case No. 483-M-2003 and for the crime of violation of Republic Act No. 6539 otherwise known as the
Anti-Camapping Act of 1972 in Criminal Case No. 484-M-2003.
1

The pertinent portion of the lnformation dated December 9, 2002 charging appellant with Murder in Criminal Case
No. 483-M-2003 is reproduced here:
3

That on or about the 6th day of September, 2002, in San Jose del Monte City, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with an ice pick and with intent to
kill one Jesus O. Lita, with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab with the said ice pick the said Jesus O. Lita, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon him mortal wounds which directly caused his death.
On the other hand, the accusatory portion of the Information also dated December 9, 2002 accusing appellant with
violating Republic Act No. 6539 in Criminal Case No. 484-M-2003 reads:
4

That on or about the 6th day of September, 2002, in San Jose del Monte City, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with an ice pick and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent [to] gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof,
take, steal and carry away with them one (1) tricycle with Plate No. TP-9198 valued at P120,500.00, belonging to
Jesus Lita and Sisinio Contridas, to the damage and prejudice of the said owners in the said amount
of P120,500.00; and that on the occasion or by reason of said carnapping, the said accused, pursuant to their
conspiracy and with intent to kill, attack, assault and stab Jesus Lita, owner and driver of the said tricycle, hitting him
on the different parts of his body which directly caused his death.
Arraignment for the two criminal cases was jointly held on February 13, 2004 wherein appellant pleaded "NOT
GUILTY" to both charges.
5

As indicated in the Appellees Brief, the following narration constitutes the prosecutions summation of this case:
On September 5, 2005, at around 8:30 in the evening, the victim Jesus Lita, accompanied by his ten-year old son,
Jefferson, went out aboard the formers black Kawasaki tricycle. Upon reaching San Jose del Monte Elementary
School, appellant Joel Aquino together with Noynoy Almoguera a.k.a. Negro, Rodnal, Bing, John Doe and Peter
Doe boarded the tricycle. Noynoy Almoguera instructed the victim to proceed to the nipa hut owned by appellant.
Upon reaching the said nipa hut, Jesus Lita, appellant and his companions had a shabu session while Jefferson was
watching TV. After using shabu, Noynoy Almoguera demanded from the victim to pay Five Hundred Pesos
(P500.00), but the victim said that he had no money. Appellant shouted at the victim demanding him to pay. Bing
suggested to her companions that they leave the nipa hut. Thus, the victim mounted his tricycle and started the
engine. Noynoy Almoguera and John Doe rode in the tricycle behind the victim while appellant and Rodnal rode in
the sidecar with Jefferson [sitting] at the toolbox of the tricycle. Inside the tricycle, appellant pointed a knife at
Jefferson while Noynoy Almoguera stabbed the victims side. After the victim was stabbed, he was transferred inside
the tricycle while appellant drove the tricycle to his friends house where they again stabbed the victim using the
latters own knife. Then they loaded the victim to the tricycle and drove to a grassy area where appellant and his
companions dumped the body of the victim. Thereafter, they returned to appellants residence. Jefferson told the
sister of appellant about the death of his father but the sister of appellant only told him to sleep.
The next day, Jefferson was brought to the jeepney terminal where he rode a jeepney to get home. Jefferson told
his mother, Ma. Theresa Calitisan-Lita, about the death of his father.
In the meantime, SPO3 Servillano Lactao Cabading received a call from Barangay Captain Danilo Rogelio of
Barangay San Rafael IV, San Jose Del Monte City, Bulacan thru the two (2) way radio, that the body of a male
person with several stab wounds was found dead on a grassy area beside the road of the said barangay.
Immediately, SPO3 Cabading together with a police aide proceeded to the area. Thereat, they found the dead body
whom they identified thru his Drivers License in his wallet as Jesus Lita, the victim. Also recovered were a big
stainless ice pick about 18 inches long including the handle and a tricycle key. The police officers brought the body
of the victim to the Sapang Palay District Hospital. Thereafter, they proceeded to the address of the victim.

Ma. Theresa Calitisan-Lita and Jefferson were about to leave for the morgue when they met SPO3 Cabading
outside their residence. SPO3 Cabading informed Ma. Theresa that the body of the victim was found in Barangay
San Rafael IV. Jefferson told SPO3 Cabading that he was with his father at the time of his death and he brought the
police officers to the place where his father was stabbed and to the hut owned by appellant. Thereat, the police
officers recovered a maroon colored knife case and the sandals of the victim. Appellant was invited to the police
station for questioning but he refused alleging that he does not know anything about the incident. The police officers
were able to obtain a picture of appellant which was shown to Jefferson and he positively identified the same as
"Akong" one of those who stabbed his father. Likewise, a video footage of Noynoy Almoguera alias "Negro" was
shown to Jefferson and he likewise identified the person in the video footage as the same "Negro" who also stabbed
his father.
Dr. Richard Ivan Viray, medico-legal, who conducted an autopsy on the victim, concluded that cause of death is
Hemorrhagic Shock due to multiple stab wounds.
6

However, appellant held a different version of the events of this case. In his Appellants Brief, the succeeding
account is entered:
[Appellant] denied the accusations against him. On September 6, 2002, he was working as a laborer/mason in the
construction of his uncles (Rene Cendana) house located at Area C, Acacia Homes, Cavite, together with Paul
Maglaque, Eman Lozada, Raul Lozada and Lorenzo Cendana. They worked from 7:30 x x x in the morning until
4:30 x x x in the afternoon, with lunch and "merienda" breaks from 11:30 x x x to 12:00 oclock noon and 3:00
oclock to 3:15 x x x in the afternoon, respectively. After work, they just stayed in their barracks located within their
workplace. They would prepare their food and take supper at around 7:00 oclock to 7:30 x x x in the evening, after
which, they would smoke cigarettes. They would go to bed at around 8:00 oclock to 9:00 oclock in the evening.
He goes home to Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte City, Bulacan every Saturday. During Mondays, he would
leave their house at around 4:00 oclock to 5:00 oclock in the morning and would arrive at his workplace at around
8:00 oclock or 9:00 oclock in the morning.
[Appellant] does not know either Ma. Theresa Lita, his son Jefferson, or the victim Jesus Lita. Also, he does not
know a certain Noynoy Almoguera and alias Rodnal. Likewise, he denied using illegal drugs (i.e., shabu).
[Appellant] knew SPO3 Cabading because the former had served as a police aide to him since he was seventeen
(17) years old. He had no misunderstanding with the police officer. He cannot think of any reason why Ma. Theresa
Lita and Jefferson pointed to him as one of the perpetrators of the subject crimes.
Paul Maglague (Paul) corroborated [appellants] testimony. On September 6, 2002, a Friday, [appellant] was working
with him, together with Roldan Lozada and Oweng Cendana, at Area C, Dasmarias, Cavite, in the construction of
Boy Cendanas house, Pauls brother-in-law. Paul was the cement mixer while [appellant], being his partner, carries
it to wherever it is needed. Their work ends at 5:00 oclock in the afternoon. After their work, they just stayed in their
barracks located within their workplace. [Appellant] was their cook. They usually sleep at around 8:00 oclock to 9:00
oclock in the evening. They get their pay only during Saturdays. Hence, they would go home to Bulacan every
Saturday.
At around 6:00 oclock to 7:00 oclock in the evening of September 7, 2002, they left Cavite and went to their
respective homes in Bulacan.
On the night of September 5, 2002, [appellant] slept together with Paul and their other co-workers inside their
barracks. Paul woke up in the middle of the night to urinate and was not able to see whether the accused was there,
as there were no lights in the place where they were sleeping. The following morning, [appellant] was the one who
cooked their food. (Citations omitted.)
7

At the conclusion of trial, a guilty verdict was handed down by the trial court on both criminal charges. The
dispositive portion of the assailed September 18, 2009 Decision states:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 483-M-2003, the Court finds the Accused JOEL AQUINO alias "Akong" guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. The Court hereby orders the accused JOEL AQUINO to pay the heirs of Jesus Lita, the expenses
incurred in his burial and funeral services in the total amount of Sixty Thousand One Hundred (P60,100.00) Pesos
as actual damages, the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

In Criminal Case No. 484-M-2003, the Court likewise finds the accused JOEL AQUINO alias "Akong" guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating R.A. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Law, and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment pursuant to Section 14 of the said R.A. 6539. The said accused is also
ordered to pay the amount of Sixty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy-Five (P65,875.00) Pesos representing
the total installment payments of the Motorcycle.
The accused is also ordered to pay costs of this suit.

Insisting on his innocence, appellant filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court upheld
the judgment of the trial court along with some modifications. The dispositive portion of the assailed July 29, 2011
Decision of the Court of Appeals, in turn, reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
a) In Criminal Case No. 483-M-2003, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole. Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim actual damages in the sum
ofP60,100.00, duly proven during the trial, P75,000.00 civil indemnity, P75,000.00 moral damages
andP30,000.00 exemplary damages.
b) In Criminal Case No. 484-M-2003, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
Fourteen (14) years and Eight (8) months, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months, as
maximum and to pay the sum of P65,875.00 representing the total installment payments of the motorcycle.
9

Hence, appellant seeks the Courts favorable action on the instant appeal. In his Brief, appellant reiterated the
following errors allegedly committed by the trial court when it adjudged him guilty of the charges leveled against him:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED LONE EYEWITNESS POSITIVELY
IDENTIFIED THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS ONE OF THE PERPETRATORS OF THE CRIMES.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT TREACHERY ATTENDED THE KILLING.

10

Appellant challenges his conviction by arguing that the trial court was not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt because it only relied on the incredible and inconsistent testimony of Jefferson Lita the sole eyewitness
presented by the prosecution. He contends that if Jefferson was indeed present during the murder of his father,
Jesus Lita, then it would be highly inconceivable that Jefferson would have lived to tell that tale since he would most
likely be also killed by the perpetrators being an eyewitness to the crime. Furthermore, appellant maintains that he
cannot possibly have committed the crimes attributed to him because, on the night that Jesus was murdered, he
was asleep in the barracks of a construction site somewhere in Dasmarias City, Cavite.
We are not persuaded.
It is settled in jurisprudence that, absent any showing that the lower court overlooked circumstances which would
overturn the final outcome of the case, due respect must be made to its assessment and factual findings, moreover,
such findings, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court. After a
thorough examination of the records of this case, we find no compelling reason to doubt the veracity of the findings
and conclusions made by the trial court.
11

With regard to appellants inquiry into the credibility of the lone eyewitness of the prosecution, we depend upon the
principle that the trial court is in a better position to adjudge the credibility of a witness. In People v. Vergara, we
elaborated on this premise in this wise:
12

When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the guiding rules some of which are that (1) the
appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court, unless there is a showing that it had

overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have
affected the result of the case, which showing is absent herein; (2) the findings of the trial court pertaining to the
credibility of a witness is entitled to great respect since it had the opportunity to examine his demeanor as he
testified on the witness stand, and, therefore, can discern if such witness is telling the truth or not; and (3) a witness
who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent on crossexamination is a credible witness.
13

Jurisprudence also tells us that when a testimony is given in a candid and straightforward manner, there is no room
for doubt that the witness is telling the truth. A perusal of the testimony of Jefferson indicates that he testified in a
manner that satisfies the aforementioned test of credibility. More importantly, during his time at the witness stand,
Jefferson positively and categorically identified appellant as one of the individuals who stabbed his father.
14

We quote the relevant portions of Jeffersons detailed testimony:

[PROSECUTOR CARAIG]
Q Why do you know that your father died on the early morning of September 6, 2002, in Sapang Palay, San Jose
del Monte?
xxxx
A Because we left the house together at 8:30 in the evening, and my father looked at the calendar.
Q You said you were with your father. Do you know where were you going at that time?
A To the house of Akong.
Q And what mode of transportation did you take, as you said, you were going to the house of Akong?
A Our tricycle, sir.
Q Do you know the trade mark of that tricycle of your father?
A Kawasaki, sir.
Q Do you know the color of that tricycle?
A Black, sir.
Q While on your way to the residence of Akong, could you please tell us if there was any unusual incident that took
place?
A Yes, sir, there was.
Q What was that?
A My father was being stabbed. x x x x
Q Did you see who stabbed your father?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many?
A There were three (3) of them.
Q If you will see those three (3) persons again, can you still identify them?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are they inside the courtroom?

A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please look around and point to them.
INTERPRETER
Witness pointed to accused Joel Aquino inside the courtroom.
[PROSECUTOR CARAIG]
Q Who else?
A The others are not here.
Q Now, prior to the stabbing incident and you were able to recognize the three, one of them you identified here
inside the courtroom. What was Joel Aquino doing when you first saw him?
A He was inside our tricycle sitting.
Q You are referring to the sidecar of your tricycle?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said a while ago that you and your father were only the one[s] on board the tricycle. Why was he, that Joel,
now inside the tricycle?
A They rode in our tricycle.
Q You are referring to Aquino together with his two (2) companions?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where in particular did these three (3) persons ride in your tricycle?
A Joel Aquino was inside the sidecar of our tricycle while the other two (2) rode at the back of my father.
Q At that precise moment, where were you seated?
A Also inside the sidecar, sir.
Q You are sitting side by side with Aquino? Is that what you mean?
A No, sir.
Q While inside the tricycle, what did Aquino do, if any?
A He pointed his knife at me.
Q What else?
A Nothing else.
Q What about the two (2) companions, what did they do, if any?
A Inunahan nila agad ang Tatay ko sa tagiliran.
Q What do you mean by "inunahan"?
A They stabbed my father on his side.
Q Did you see what part of the body of your father was stabbed?

COURT:
Witness pointing to the right side of his stomach.
[PROSECUTOR CARAIG]
Q What happened to your father when he was stabbed?
A He appeared dizzy and he was placed inside the sidecar.
Q And who brought your father inside the sidecar?
A The two (2) other persons previously at the back of my father.
Q And at that time, what did Joel do?
A He started driving the tricycle.
Q Did Aquino drive the tricycle after he started it?
A Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q And did you come to know where did Joel Aquino proceed?
A To their house, sir.
Q How far was that house of Aquino from the place where your father was stabbed?
A Quite far, sir.
Q Were you able to reach the house of Joel Aquino?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did Aquino and these two (2) persons do to your father when you reached his house?
A They brought him down from the tricycle.
Q Where did these three (3) persons bring your father?
A They brought my father to their friend.
Q Did you come to know who was that friend where your father was brought?
A I do not know the name of their friend.
Q What happened to your father when he was brought to their friend?
A My father was already dying and they went back to him and stabbed him several times.
Q How many times was your father stabbed at that time?
A I do not know, sir.
Q Did you see who stabbed him again?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who?

A The three (3) of them.

Q Do you mean to say that Aquino at that time stabbed your father?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you see what kind of weapon did these three (3) persons use in stabbing your father? A My fathers own knife.
Q Who among the three (3) used your fathers knife?
A Akong po.
Q That Akong was the friend of the three (3) persons to where these three (3) persons brought your father?
A No, sir.
Q You are referring to one of the two (2) companions of Joel?
A Yes, sir.
Q And after that what else transpired next?
A They boarded my father to the tricycle.
Q How about you?
A While they were boarding my father to the tricycle, Akong pointed his knife at my stomach.
Q Were the three (3) persons able to board your father inside your tricycle?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what did the three (3) persons do after your father was already inside the tricycle?
A They started the tricycle.
Q And then what happened next?
A After they started the motorcycle, they drove the tricycle and threw away my father.
Q Did you see the act of these three (3) persons throwing your father away from the tricycle?
A Yes, sir.
Q How far were you from them when they threw your father?
A More or less about 5 to 6 meters, sir.
Q Describe the place where your father was thrown.
A It was a grassy area.
Q The grass are tall?
A Short grass, sir.
Q And after your father was thrown away, what did the three (3) persons do?
A They started our tricycle and left my father.

15

In the face of this serious accusation, appellant puts forward the defense of alibi. We have held that for the defense
of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission

of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate
vicinity. These requirements of time and place must be strictly met. A review of the evidence presented by appellant
reveals that it falls short of the standard set by jurisprudence. Appellant failed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at San Jose Del Monte City, Bulacan when Jesus was
murdered. His own testimony revealed that the distance between the locus delicti and Dasmarias City, Cavite is
only a four to five hour regular commute. Thus, it would not be physically impossible for him to make the round trip
between those two points from dusk till dawn of September 5-6, 2002 and still have more than enough time to
participate in the events surrounding the murder of Jesus.
16

17

Furthermore, the only person that could corroborate appellants alibi is his friend and former co-worker, Paul
Maglaque. However, we have consistently assigned less probative weight to a defense of alibi when it is
corroborated by friends and relatives since we have established in jurisprudence that, in order for corroboration to
be credible, the same must be offered preferably by disinterested witnesses. Clearly, due to his friendship with
appellant, Maglaque cannot be considered as a disinterested witness.
18

Nevertheless, it is jurisprudentially settled that positive identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be
fabricated and is inherently unreliable. It is likewise settled that where there is nothing to indicate that a witness for
the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony
is entitled to full faith and credit. In the case at bar, no allegation was made nor proven to show that Jefferson had
any ill motive to falsely testify against appellant.
19

20

With regard to appellants argument that Jefferson would surely have also been killed by his fathers murderers had
he indeed witnessed the crime, we can only surmise and speculate on this point. Whatever may be the killers
motivation to spare Jeffersons life remains a mystery. Nonetheless, it does not adversely affect what has been
clearly established in this case and that is the cold-blooded murder of Jesus by a group of assailants which includes
herein appellant.
According to jurisprudence, to be convicted of murder, the following must be established: (1) a person was killed; (2)
the accused killed him; the killing was with the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide.
21

Contrary to appellants assertion, the qualifying circumstance of treachery did attend the killing of Jesus. We have
consistently held that treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. On this point, we quote with approval
the Court of Appeals discussion of this aspect of the case, to wit:
1wphi1

22

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim,
depriving him of any real chance to defend himself. Even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his
person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. Records disclose that Jesus was stabbed by the group on
the lateral part of his body while he was under the impression that they were simply leaving the place where they
had [a] shabu session. Judicial notice can be taken that when the tricycle driver is seated on the motorcycle, his
head is usually higher or at the level of the roof of the side car which leaves his torso exposed to the passengers
who are seated in the side car. Hence, there was no way for Jesus to even be forewarned of the intended stabbing
of his body both from the people seated in the side car and those seated behind him. Thus, the trial courts finding of
treachery should be affirmed. There is treachery when the means, methods, and forms of execution gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and such means, methods, and forms of execution were
deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person. What is decisive in an
appreciation of treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend
himself. (Citations omitted.)
23

However, in contrast to the pronouncements of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we cannot consider
abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance in this case. As per jurisprudence, when the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. Since there
is no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, in accordance with
Article 63 paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, it being the lesser penalty between the two indivisible penalties
for the felony of murder which is reclusion perpetua to death.
24

25

However, we concur with the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the penalty of life
imprisonment for carnapping originally imposed by the trial court. Life imprisonment has long been replaced with the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659. Furthermore, the said penalty is

applicable only to the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide which is not obtaining in this case.
Jurisprudence tells us that to prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not
only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the
killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. The appellate
court correctly observed that the killing of Jesus cannot qualify the carnapping into a special complex crime because
the carnapping was merely an afterthought when the victims death was already fait accompli. Thus, appellant is
guilty only of simple carnapping.
26

It is enshrined in jurisprudence that when death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1)
civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.
27

There being no aggravating circumstance since, as discussed earlier, abuse of superior strength is absorbed in the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, the award of P75,000.00 as moral damages should be decreased
toP50,000.00. Such an amount is granted even in the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the
victims heirs.
28

Pursuant to current jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 and exemplary
damages in the amount of P30,000.00 is correct. The amount of actual damages duly proven in court in the sum
of P60,100.00 is likewise upheld. Finally, we impose interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all damages from the
date of finality of this ruling until fully paid.
29

30

31

With regard to appellants conviction for simple carnapping, we affirm the penalty of imprisonment imposed by the
Court of Appeals which is fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months, as maximum. Likewise, we uphold the order upon appellant to pay the sum of P65,875.00 representing
the total amount of the installment payments made on the motorcycle.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 04265, affirming the conviction of appellant Joel Aquino Cendana alias "Akong" in Criminal Cases No. 483-M2003 and 484-M-2003, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that:
(1) The amount of moral damages to be paid by appellant Joel Aquino Cendana alias "Akong" in Criminal
Case No. 483-M-2003, is decreased from Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) to Fifty Thousand
Pesos (PS0,000.00); and
(2) Appellant Joel Aquino Cendana alias Akong is ordered to pay interest on all damages at the legal rate of
six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 103299 August 17, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOPE VIENTE y MAPILI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Abel C. Coloma for accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In an information filed on 4 April 1989 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, accused Lope Viente y Mapili
was charged with the violation of Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise know as the Anti-Carnapping Act, in that:
. . . on or about the 29th day of January, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating with two others whose true names, identities and whereabouts are still
unknown and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent
of (sic) gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by then and there poking a gun
at the nape of one Narciso Cabatas y Limora, driver of an Isuzu passenger jitney with Plate No.
DVB-424, with Motor Number 386028 and Chassis Number SPMM-10408-86-C, valued at
P150,000.00, owned by Lucila Crespino y Manzalan, grabbing the wheels (sic) of the said vehicle
and pushing the said driver off the same, take, steal and carry away the said passenger jitney,
against the will of said Narciso Cabatas y Limora, to the damages and prejudice of the said owner in
the aforesaid sum of P150,000.00, Philippine Currency. 1

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-72203 and was assigned to Branch 28 (Pilot Court) of the said
court.
Trial on the merits ensued after the accused had entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment on June 1989. 2
The prosecution presented as its witnesses Narciso Cabatas, Lucila Crispino and Sgt. Wilfredo Bautista for its
evidence in chief. The witnesses for the defense were Jaime Nuay, Jesus Benitua, Romeo Rosales, Nona Nuay,
Atty. Elpidio Unto (defense counsel) and the accused. The prosecution recalled Mrs. Crispino and Sgt. Bautista as
rebuttal witnesses while the defense presented the accused and his brother, Vaselides Viente, as surrebuttal
witnesses.
A demurrer to evidence filed by the defense after the prosecution had rested its case was denied by the court. 3
On 17 October 1991, the trial court, per Judge Rosalio G. De la Rosa, promulgated its decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping or
violation of Republic Act 6539 and is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of thirty (30) years and to
indemnify the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. 4
The accused (hereinafter referred to as the Appellant) seasonably filed a notice of appeal which the trial court
approved. This Court accepted the appeal in the Resolution of 19 February 1992.
On 7 May 1992, the appellant wrote this Court a letter 5 wherein he stated that his counsel, Atty. Elpidio D. Unto, had
failed to file a formal offer of evidence in the court below and had later abandoned him. He asks that a counsel de
oficio be assigned to him.
On 10 June 1992, this Court relieved Atty. Unto as counsel for the appellant and subsequently appointed Atty. Abel
C. Coloma of Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pea & Nolasco as counsel de oficio. 6
The appellant and the appellee filed their main briefs on 25 September 1992 and 9 March 1993, respectively. The
former filed a Reply Brief on 20 April 1993.
The facts of this case, as culled from the records and the pleadings, are as follows:
Narciso Cabatas is the driver of an Isuzu passenger jeepney owned by Lucila Crispino which plies the BaclaranCubao route. At about 4:00 a.m. of 29 January 1989, Cabatas left Libertad, Pasay on board the jeepney in order to
ply his route. 7 At the corner of Gil Puyat and Taft Avenues, three men boarded the passenger jeepney and sat at the
back. One of the men sat directly behind Cabatas on the left side of the jeepney while the other two sat at the right side
opposite the first one. Upon reaching the corner of Taft Avenue and Malvar Street near the Philippine Women's University
at about 4:15 to 4:30 a.m., one of the three men signaled Cabatas to stop. When Cabatas stopped the jeepney in front of
the Philippine Women's University, one of the two men seated at the right side poked a gun at Cabatas' nape and ordered
the other passengers to alight from the jeepney. The other passengers got down from the jeepney; thereafter one of the
men pulled Cabatas to the right front seat while the man seated directly behind Cabatas transferred to the driver's seat. It
was at this point that Cabatas saw the face of the one who had taken hold of the steering wheel. Cabatas was then
shoved out of the jeepney by one of the men at the back. While on the pavement, Cabatas heard one of the men utter:
"Pareng Lope, patakbuhin mo na ang jeep!" The three men then drove off. 8
Cabatas immediately reported the incident to the Western Police District (WPD) Anti-Carnapping Section at
WPD Headquarters in U.N. Avenue, Manila. 9 He was advised to return at 8:00 a.m. of the following day with
registration papers of the vehicle. He went to Lucila Crispino, told her of what transpired and mentioned to her
statement
uttered
by
one
of
10
carnappers.

the
the
the
the

The next day, Cabatas and Mrs. Crispino went to the WPD. He was assured by the officers of the WPD AntiCarnapping Section that they would immediately send out an "Alarm Report" of the incident. 11
Cabatas and Mrs. Crispino also reported the incident to the PC/INP Anti-Carnapping Section at Camp Crame,
Quezon City as well as to the PC CAPCOM at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Tagig on 15 April 1989. 12 Cabatas told
the CAPCOM officers that he had twice seen the suspect riding in passenger jeepneys plying the Baclaran-Divisoria
route. 13 Thereupon, Lt. Alfredo Orbeta, Sgt. Wilfredo Bautista and Sgt. Eduardo Bautista asked him to accompany them in
a surveillance operation along Taft Avenue. The first day of surveillance proved unfruitful. On the second day of
surveillance or on 31 March 1989, Cabatas and the CAPCOM officers posted themselves at the corner of Taft Avenue and

Pedro Gil Street. Cabatas then spotted the suspect aboard a northbound passenger jeepney and pointed him out to the
CAPCOM officers. The CAPCOM officers told Cabatas to go home and, afterwards, to proceed to the CAPCOM
headquarters the next day. The CAPCOM officers then followed the suspect and apprehended him along Taft Avenue in
front of the Jai Alai Building. The person arrested was identified as Lope Viente, the herein appellant. The following day at
the CAPCOM headquarters, Cabatas positively identified the appellant from a five-man line-up as the one who had
grabbed the steering wheel of the jeepney. 14

It appears that the day before the appellant's arrest, Atty. Elpidio Unto had visited Lucila Crispino in her residence,
accompanied by a man and a woman, both of whom he did not introduce to Mrs. Crispino. Atty. Unto pleaded to
Mrs. Crispino not to suspect his nephews who he said were good people. 15 Lucila was cordial enough, but told Atty.
Unto she would file a case against whoever stole her jeepney. The man who had accompanied Atty. Unto was later
identified as the appellant. 16
While in the custody of the CAPCOM, the appellant executed a: "Sinumpaang Salaysay" (Exhibit "L") dated 31
March 1989. He was also brought to the Department of Justice (DOJ) where he executed a handwritten statement
(Exhibit "N"). The handwritten statement contains the certification of State Prosecutor Hernani T. Barrios that he had
personally examined the appellant and that he is satisfied that the appellant voluntarily executed and understood his
affidavit. Both statements were given without the assistance of counsel.
The appellant relies on the defense of alibi which his witnesses tried to weave. Jaime Nuay testified that he is a
driver-jeepney operator and that he has known the appellant since childhood. The appellant was his alternate driver,
a conductor of one of his jeepneys and a pig butcher. During the incident in question, the appellant was at his
(Nuay's) residence at 2230 Muoz Street, Malate, Manila butchering hogs from 2:00 a.m. to 5:00 a.m. and then
slicing and cooking the meat from 5:00 a.m. until 10:00 a.m. 17
Jesus Benitua, who is a resident of 2240 Muoz Street, Malate, Manila, knows the appellant to be a driver and
conductor. Benitua testified that the latter stays at the residence of Jaime Nuay, his (Benitua's) next-door neighbor.
On 29 January 1989 at 2:00 a.m., he saw the accused butchering pigs at the house of Jaime Nuay. 18
Romeo Rosales, a former driver of Mrs. Crispino, testified that at about 7:00 or 8:00 o'clock in the morning of 29
January 1989, he was with the appellant eating and drinking at the latter's place. The appellant is his "barkada" and
the brother of his "compadre," Vaselides Viente. 19
Nona Nuay, the wife of Jaime Nuay, corroborated the testimony of the other witnesses that the appellant was at their
residence butchering and cooking pigs. The appellant is a third cousin of her husband, Jaime Nuay. 20
Atty. Elpidio Unto, then counsel for the defense, testified for the appellant, 21 acting as both the examining lawyer and
the defense witness. He declared that he, together with the appellant and the sister of Derio Punto, went to the residence
of Mrs. Crispino and pleaded to the latter not to suspect his relatives as they are good people. 22 He did not bother to
introduce the appellant to Mrs. Crispino. 23 The appellant was his former bodyguard who is probably capable of killing
somebody but not of stealing. 24 He averred that he had filed administrative and court cases against the CAPCOM officers
and that the would submit a formal offer of documents anent these matters. The record shows, however, that he failed to
do so. 25
The appellant testified that he worked as an alternate driver and conductor from Monday to Saturday each week,
and as a pig butcher on Sundays. He is known to the Crispino spouses and Narciso Cabatas. He was arrested on
31 March 1989 and brought to the CAPCOM where he was tortured and forced to execute a statement (Exhibit "L").
He was then brought to the DOJ where he executed another statement (Exhibit "N") under threat of death from the
accompanying CAPCOM officers. 26
In his main brief, the appellant makes the following assignment of errors:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSES OF DENIAL AND
ALIBI GIVEN BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CREDIBLE AND
CORROBORATIVE TESTIMONIES OF ACCUSED'S WITNESSES IN SUPPORT OF THE
DEFENSES OF DENIAL AND ALIBI.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6539. 27

In support of the first assigned error, the appellant insists that Narciso Cabatas is not a credible witness because he
readily admitted that the owners of the stolen jeepney are his relatives and employers; hence, he is "specifically
inclined to color his statements, to suppress the truth, or to state what is false." Furthermore, he points out the
inconsistency between Cabatas' court testimony that he was shoved out of the jeepney and his statement entered in
the Alarm Report (Exhibit "A") that he decided to jump off for fear of his life. He also questions the failure of Cabatas
to immediately inform the police or Lucila Crispino concerning the statement one of the carnappers uttered.
We are not persuaded.
The relationship of Cabatas with the owners of the stolen jeepney neither disqualifies him from testifying nor renders
his testimony unworthy of belief considering the lack of showing of any improper motive compelling him to testify
falsely against the appellant. The latter's suggestion that "Cabatas was pressured to point to anyone as the probable
carnapper since it was he who lost the vehicle subject of this case" is nothing but a self-serving conclusion which
finds no support whatsoever. We have held that a witness' relationship to a victim, far from rendering his testimony
biased, would even render it more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the
crime to accuse somebody other than the real culprit. 28 Nor is the testimony of a witness discredited by the mere fact
that he is an employee of the complainant. 29
The claimed inconsistency is more apparent than real. We adopt what the appellee said in refutation thereof:
The sworn statement imputed to Cabatas is not what appellant claims it to be. Exhibit "A" is merely
an Alarm Report prepared by the Anti-Carnapping Section of the Western Police District, U.N.
Avenue, Manila, which very briefly summarizes the events reported by Cabatas. Worse, it is not
under oath. It seems that said report was prepared solely by the investigating officers after hearing
Cabatas' narration. Moreover, Exhibit "A" is in English, a language alien to Cabatas testified that his
highest educational attainment was merely Grade 6. He cannot speak or write English (tsn. Oct. 4,
1989, p. 59). Whatever inaccuracies and omissions in the translation of Cabatas' story, therefore,
can not be taken against him or be regarded as in any way detracting from his credibility as a
witness.
xxx xxx xxx
Appellant conveniently fails to mention, however, that Cabatas' Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March
30, 1989, given before the Office of the Regional Investigation Unit, Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan,
corroborates practically all material points of his testimony at the trial. . . . . In Exhibit "B," Cabatas
categorically stated that he was pushed/shoved out of the jeepney and that he later heard one of
appellant's companions utter the alleged statement. Exhibit "B" is a real affidavit, subscribed and
sworn to by Cabatas, unlike Exhibits "A", which is merely an Alarm Report. If consistency between
extrajudicial statement/affidavit, and testimony in open court is appellant's yardstick of a witness'
credibility, surely, Cabatas more than adequately measures up to this standard. 30
The allegation that Cabatas failed to forthwith inform Lucila Crispino about the statement he heard from one of the
carnappers, viz., "Pareng Lope, patakbuhin mo na and Jeep!" is traversed by the testimonies of Narciso Cabatas
and Mrs. Crispino that the former had informed the latter of the said utterance on the day of the incident. 31
The reticence of Cabatas to immediately reveal the said statement to the police officers was satisfactorily explained:
he was then afraid. 32 The natural reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information to the police authorities in criminal
cases is a matter of judicial notice. 33 He might have deemed it the better part of valor not to give the name of the accused
who was still at large and who probably recognized him. Such reluctance should not affect his testimony. The decisive
factor is that he in fact identified the accused. 34
Finally, the appellant argues that it is highly improbable for him to forcibly take a jeepney from someone who could
easily identify him. He states that he is known to both Narciso Cabatas and Mrs. Crispino, which, however, the two
deny. Defense witness Romeo Rosales declared that Cabatas and the appellant known each other because "this is
the Visayan custom, that when we met we became (sic) close to each other." Yet, in the same breath he stated that
he knew Cabatas only by face, 35 although both he and Cabatas are Visayans. Jaime Nuay, who used to drive for Mrs.
Crispino, also testified that he did not know the name of one of the drivers. 36 Considering the fact that there were more
than thirty drivers employed by Mrs. Crispino 37 and that Romeo Rosales took the appellant as his conductor without the
permission and knowledge of Mrs. Crispino, and even paid the appellant out of his own pocket, 38 it is not improbable that
the appellant was now known to Cabatas and Mrs. Crispino.

The appellant's attempts to discredit Narciso Cabatas not having met with success, the issue then boils down to
whether his defense of alibi should be favorably considered.
Axiomatic is the rule that the said defense cannot prevail over the positive identification of an accused. 39 In the
instant case, there is no doubt in our minds that the appellant was positively identified by Cabatas. The efforts of the
defense counsel during cross-examination to cast doubt thereon only succeeded in strengthening Cabatas' testimony.
Thus:
ATTY. UNTO:
Q Mr. Witness, you said during the last session that you looked at the person who
took the wheel of the jeepney from you and you saw his face, is that right?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
Q And how long and how many seconds or minutes were you able to see his face?
A It was like this, sir. That man who took the wheel from me came from the backseat
of the jeepney. So that when he transferred to the driver's seat I looked at him and
then he shoved me and then this man pushed me towards the right portion of the
front seat.
ATTY. UNTO:
Q And in fact, at that time you did not know his name yet, is that right?
A Yes, sir. I did not know his name yet as of that date.
Q And did you ever come to know his name later.
A Yes, sir. I came to know his name later.
Q How?
A Well, I heard his companion called him by his name. I heard his companion said:
"Pareng Lope, patakbuhin mo na ang jeep."
COURT:
Q How many were his companions?
A He has two companions and his companions told him: "Pareng Lope, patakbuhin
mo na."
ATTY. UNTO:
Q And please tell us, before his companions uttered those words you never
recognized his face and you never knew his name is "Lope"?
A I was able to recognize the face of the accused.
Q How did you recognized his face or what is your basis on how you were able to
recognize his face?
A Because the place was already well lighted.
COURT:
Q Was the interior of your passenger jeepney with lights on?

WITNESS:
A Yes, Your Honor. As a matter of fact the lights in the interior part of the jeepney
were on. 40
Besides, we agree with the observation of the appellee that the appellant's testimony "does not contain any
information as to his activities on the date and the time of the carnapping incident." In short, he was completely
silent regarding vital facts in support of the defense of alibi. His tongue stubbornly refused to express it. Only his
witnesses testified on what he did and where he was at the time the carnapping took place. Thus, we have here a
situation where, as aptly put by the appellee, "appellant's alibi is not really his," or the witnesses concocted the alibi
for the appellant which the latter did not even bother to corroborate. All told, the alibi in question cannot convince
any rational mind and miserably fails to cast any dubiety on the positive identification of the appellant.
That three witnesses 41 testified in support of the appellant's defense of alibi will not suffice to exonerate the latter. In
determining the sufficiency of evidence, what matters is not the number of witnesses but the credibility, nature and quality
of the testimony. 42 Witnesses are weighed, not numbered, and the testimony of a single witness may suffice for conviction
if otherwise trustworthy and reliable. 43 The matter of assigning values to declarations at the witness stand is best
performed by a trial judge who is in a far advantageous position than us to distinguish more competently the prevaricators
among the witnesses from those who testified the truth. 44
In passing, it may be noted that although the appellant's Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit "L") and handwritten
statement (Exhibit "N") were obtained from him without the assistance of counsel, their inadmissibility under
paragraphs (1) and (3), Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution has not been squarely raised before us. In any
event, we find it unnecessary to dwell on their inadmissibility since the evidence on record is more than adequate to
warrant the appellant's conviction. Where there is independent evidence, apart from the appellant's uncounselled
confession that he is truly guilty, he accordingly faces a conviction. 45
We agree with the Solicitor General that the trial court erred in imposing upon the appellant a straight penalty of
imprisonment for thirty years. The carnapping in this case was committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons. The penalty prescribed therefor under Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539 is "imprisonment for not
less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years." Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, 46 if an offense is punished by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the said law and the minimum shall not be
less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. The proper penalty to be imposed should not, therefore, be thirty
years, but an indeterminate penalty which is hereby set at seventeen (17) years and four (4) months as minimum to thirty
(30) years as maximum.
WHEREFORE, except as to the modification regarding the penalty, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED in
all other respects. As modified, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from seventeen (17) years and four (4) months as minimum to thirty (30) years asmaximum.
Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179041

April 1, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ARNEL NOCUM,* REY JOHNNY RAMOS, CARLOS JUN POSADAS, PANDAO POLING PANGANDAG (all at
large), Accused,
REYNALDO MALLARI, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the January 31, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00930,
which dismissed the appeal of appellant Reynaldo Mallari (Mallari) and affirmed with modification the December 15,
2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 276, Muntinlupa City in Criminal Case No. 00-551 finding
Mallari guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping with homicide.
Factual Antecedents
On May 25, 2000, an Information3 was filed charging Mallari and co-accused Arne! Nocum (Nocum ), Rey Johnny
Ramos (Ramos), Carlos Jun Posadas (Posadas) and Pandao Poling Pangandag alias Rex Pangandag
(Pangandag) with violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as
amended by RA 7659.4 The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about September 12, 1998 in Muntinlupa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain for
themselves and without the consent of the owner, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and
carry away one motor vehicle more particularly described as follows:
Make/Type

:-

Toyota Tamaraw FX

Motor No.

:-

7K-0157101

Chassis No.

:-

KF52-011609

Plate No.

:-

PXT- 143

Color

:-

Med. Grey Net

valued at more or less Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of its owner,
Lourdes Eleccion, in the aforestated amount and in the course of the commission thereof, Erico Medel, the driver of
the said vehicle, was killed.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
When the case was called for arraignment on November 10, 2000, only Mallari appeared as his co-accused remain
at-large. He pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. 6 Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Prosecution's Version
The prosecutions lone witness was Chris Mahilac (Mahilac), a self-confessed member of "FX gang," a syndicate
notorious for carjacking Toyota FX vehicles. The modus operandi of the gang is to carnap Toyota FX vehicles,
transport them to Mindanao, and have them registered and sold to prospective buyers there. Together with Mallari
and several others, Mahilac was previously charged with carnapping7 before the RTC of Paraaque City but was
later on discharged to be a state witness.8 Consequently, Mahilac was placed under the Witness Protection Program
of the Department of Justice (DOJ).9
Mahilac testified that the "FX gang" was active in Metro Manila and Mindanao. 10 Nocum led the syndicates criminal
activities in Metro Manila while Pangandag, who was the head of the Land Transportation Office in Lanao Del
Norte,11 led the Mindanao operations.12 Ramos, Posadas and Mallari were members of the gang.13
On September 6, 1998, while in Calamba, Laguna, Mahilac received a call from Nocum 14 informing him of
Pangandags arrival in Manila on September 12, 1998.15 Subsequently, Mahilac, Nocum, Pangandag, Ramos,

Posadas and Mallari met in Chowking fastfood restaurant in Poblacion, Muntinlupa City.16 During the said meeting,
Pangandag demanded that their group deliver two Toyota FX vehicles to him in Lanao Del Norte by Monday or
Tuesday of the following week.17 Nocum agreed and gave Mallari P20,000.00 for operating expenses. Mahilac
received P3,500.00 and was instructed to meet the group in Cagayan de Oro City.18
As the group was departing from the restaurant, a Toyota FX taxi with plate number PXT-143 passed-by.19Mallari
flagged it down, talked to the driver, and boarded the same together with Ramos and Posadas. 20 They proceeded
south.21
On September 14, 1998, Mahilac arrived in Cagayan de Oro City and proceeded to McDonalds Restaurant on
Limketkai Street.22 Mallari, Ramos and Posadas arrived at around 4:14 p.m. on board the same Toyota FX taxi that
Mallari flagged down in Muntinlupa City.23 They agreed to proceed to Iligan City en route to Tubod, Lanao del Norte,
where said vehicle was to be delivered to Pangandag. 24 Mallari told Mahilac not to board the said vehicle because its
back portion reeked of the dried blood of the FX taxi driver, Erico Medel (Medel), who was stabbed to death while
resisting the group.25 Mallari also informed Mahilac that Medels corpse was dumped somewhere in Atimonan,
Quezon.26 Mahilac thus took a taxi to Iligan City.27
Upon their arrival in Iligan City, Pangandag instructed them to take the vehicle to his residence in Tubod, Lanao del
Norte.28 They arrived at Pangandags residence and were given P250,000.00 as consideration for the
vehicle.29 Mahilac received P20,000.00 as his share.
The gang continued to engage in this nefarious activity until Mahilacs arrest by law enforcement officers. 30
In the meantime, on September 27, 1999, a cadaver in advance state of decomposition was found along Zigzag
Road, Barangay Malinao Ilaya, Atimonan, Quezon. It was interred in the municipal cemetery of Atimonan, Quezon
but was later on exhumed for identification.31 Based on the four extracted teeth and a piece of white "FILA"
shoe,32 the mother and the wife of the victim positively identified the cadaver to be that of Medel.
Appellant's Version
Mallari denied any knowledge of the carnapping incident.33 He also denied knowing Nocum, Ramos and
Posadas.34 He testified that he was with his wife and two children in their home in Tunasan, Muntinlupa City at the
time the alleged carnapping occurred.35 He claimed that on June 25, 1999, four men in civilian clothes came to his
house and forced him to board a van36 where he was blindfolded. He was then taken to Camp Crame, Quezon City.37
According to Mallari, Mahilac was his employer.38 He was unaware of Mahilacs reason for implicating him in the
case.39
Mallari further testified that while in detention, he was made to sign a document which he cannot remember.40 He
was taken to the DOJ and told that his case would be studied if he signs a document the contents of which were
duly explained to him.41 Should he not sign the same, he will be charged immediately with carnapping with
homicide.42 He therefore decided to sign the documents without the assistance of a lawyer, but continued to be
detained in Camp Crame, Quezon City.43
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On December 15, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision44 finding Mallari guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
carnapping with homicide. The trial court ruled that the testimony of Mahilac that Mallari participated in the theft of
the FX taxi and the killing of its driver, Medel, cannot be negated by Mallaris denial and uncorroborated alibi. It also
found that the commission of the crime was a result of a planned operation with Mallari and all the accused doing
their assigned tasks to ensure the consummation of their common criminal objective. 45
The trial court further held that Mahilac would not have known about the killing of Medel if he had not been informed
by Mallari. He had no reason to falsely accuse Mallari and even implicated himself by: (1) admitting his presence
during the planned theft of the FX taxi; (2) admitting his presence in Cagayan De Oro City together with Mallari; (3)
directing Mallari and his co-accused to proceed with him to Pangandag in Lanao Del Norte; and (4) receiving the
sum of P20,000.00 as his share in the criminal operation.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, Accused Reynaldo Mallari is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
CARNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE and is hereby sentenced to die by lethal injection.
The Jail Warden of Muntinlupa City is hereby directed to bring Reynaldo Mallari to the New Bilibid Prison where he
may serve his sentence.
It Is SO ORDERED.46

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered its Decision47 affirming with modification the ruling of the trial court. The
appellate court held that Mahilacs positive identification of Mallari as a member of the "FX gang" and his
participation in the theft of the FX taxi and killing of its driver, Medel, sufficiently established his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The discovery of the remains of Medel in the vicinity mentioned by Mallari to
Mahilac also gave credence to the latters testimony.
The CA further held that the trial courts determination on the credibility of Mahilac must be given great respect and,
as a rule, will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of cogent reason. The CA also found no ill-motive on the
part of Mahilac to testify falsely against Mallari.
According to the CA, the fact that the prosecution presented Mahilac as its sole witness is of no moment. His
positive and credible testimony is sufficient to convict Mallari, 48 whose defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over
the straightforward testimony of the former.49
However, the CA modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua pursuant to RA 9346 50 which prohibited the
imposition of the death penalty.51
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed December 15, 2003 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276, in Criminal Case No. 00-551, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the death penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Republic Act No.
9346, which did away with the imposition of death penalty.
SO ORDERED.52
Mallari filed a Notice of Appeal.53 On October 15, 2007,54 we accepted the appeal and notified the parties to file their
supplemental briefs. However, Mallari opted not to file a supplemental brief in the absence of new issues to be
raised. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it is likewise adopting the Appellees Brief it
filed with the CA as its Supplemental Brief.55
The Assignment of Errors
The errors assigned in the Appellants Brief are as follows:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DESPITE THE LACK OF MATERIAL EVIDENCE
TO JUSTIFY HIS CONVICTION; and
II. GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE ACCUSED- APPELLANT COMMITTED THE CRIME
CHARGED, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH
DESPITE THE LACK OF EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE MERE ALLEGATION BY THE LONE
PROSECUTION WITNESS CHRIS MAHILAC THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT PARTICIPATED IN THE
KILLING OF ERIC MEDEL.56
Mallari assails the credibility of Mahilac. He contends that as a state witness under the Witness Protection Program
of the DOJ, Mahilac would implicate just any person as his cohort to justify his inclusion in the program. 57 Mallari
also argues that the evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 58
On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict
Mallari.59Finally, the prosecution sought civil indemnity and moral damages of P50,000.00 each.60
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Carnapping defined; Burden of the prosecution in a case for Carnapping with Homicide.
Section 2 of RA 6539 defines carnapping as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another
without the latters consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things." The crime of carnapping with homicide is punishable under Section 14 61 of the said law, as amended by
Section 20 of RA 7659. To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not
only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the
killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." Thus, the
prosecution in this case has the burden of proving that: (1) Mallari took the Toyota FX taxi; (2) his original criminal

design was carnapping; (3) he killed the driver, Medel; and (4) the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." 62
The trial and appellate courts held that the prosecution was able to discharge its burden of proving that Mallari was
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping with homicide. These courts ruled that Mallari stole the FX taxi driven
by Medel after he agreed to illegally supply his co-accused with this type of vehicle. The trial and appellate courts
found that Mallari killed Medel in the course of the commission of the carnapping.
We find no reason to deviate from these courts evaluation as to Mallaris culpability.
The crime of carnapping with homicide, as well as the identity of Mallari as one of the perpetrators of the
crime, is duly established by circumstantial evidence.
The culpability of Mallari for the complex crime of carnapping with homicide is duly established by the confluence of
circumstantial evidence. Mahilac testified that he was present when Mallari and his co-accused, all members of the
"FX Gang," gathered in Muntinlupa City to plan and conspire to steal vehicles and sell them to unscrupulous buyers
in Mindanao. Immediately after said meeting, Mahilac saw Mallari hail the FX taxi driven by Medel, talk to him, board
it together with two other conspirators, and head south towards the direction of Quezon province. A few days later,
Mallari and his companions met Mahilac in Cagayan De Oro City on board the same FX taxi they rode in Muntinlupa
City. All these show that Mallaris original criminal design was to carnap the taxi and that he accomplished his
purpose without the consent of its owner. In addition, when the vehicle was brought to Cagayan de Oro City, its
driver, Medel, was no longer with them. The vehicle also reeked of dried human blood. Upon inquiry by Mahilac,
Mallari admitted that the dried blood belonged to Medel who had to be killed for resisting the group. Mallari also told
him that Medels body was dumped along Zigzag Road in Atimonan, Quezon. Mallari and his co-accused
received P250,000.00 upon delivery of the FX taxi to its final destination. These prove that Medel was killed in the
course of the commission of the carnapping.
The identity of Medel as the driver of the taxi was established by his mother and wife who both stated that he was
the driver of the taxi on the day it was stolen by Mallari and his co-conspirators. 63 The two later on identified his
corpse when it was discovered in the same vicinity which Mallari told Mahilac to be the place where they dumped
the dead body of Medel.64
In fine, all the elements of the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, as well as the identity of Mallari
as one of the perpetrators of the crime, were all proved beyond reasonable doubt. The foregoing circumstances
inevitably lead to the lone, fair and reasonable conclusion that Mallari participated in stealing the FX taxi driven by
Medel and in killing him.
Mallaris defense of alibi deserves no credence.
Mallaris claim that he was helping his wife with household chores at the time the crime was committed does not
deserve credence. This defense of alibi cannot prevail over the testimony of Mahilac which, taken in its entirety,
leads to the reasonable conclusion that Mallari participated in the commission of the crime.
Moreover, alibi is inherently weak, unreliable, and can be easily fabricated. 65 Hence, it must be supported by credible
corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the accused. 66 Here, Mallari could have presented
evidence to support his alibi, but oddly, he did not. Thus, such a defense fails.
The Penalty
Under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 as amended by Section 20 of RA 7659, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner or driver of the vehicle is killed in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. 67 In this case, the trial court considered as
aggravating circumstance the commission of the offense by a member of an organized or syndicated crime group
under Article 62 of the RPC as amended by RA 765968 and, hence, imposed upon Mallari the death penalty.
However, under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, all aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be
alleged in the Information. This new rule took effect on December 1, 2000, but applies retroactively to pending cases
since it is favorable to the appellant.69 Here, there is no allegation in the Information that Mallari was a member of a
syndicate or that he and his companions "had formed part of a group organized for the general purpose of
committing crimes for gain, which is the essence of a syndicated or organized crime group." 70 Hence, the same
cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance against Mallari. Thus, in consonance with Article 63(2) of the
RPC, which provides that in the absence of any aggravating circumstance in the commission of the offense, the
lesser penalty shall be applied. Mallari must, therefore, suffer the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. 71 Mallari is
also not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 372 of RA 9346.
The Damages
For the killing of Medel, we award to his heirs the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence.73 Said heirs are also entitled to an award of moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00 as in all cases

of murder and homicide, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. 74 We cannot,
however, award actual damages due to the absence of receipts to substantiate the expenses incurred for Medels
funeral. The rule is that only duly receipted expenses can be the basis of actual damages. 75"Nonetheless, under
Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the
victim suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved." 76 We therefore award the sum
of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages to the heirs of Medel.. "In addition, and in conformity
with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages an interest at the legal rate of 6o/o from
date of finality of this Decision until fully paid."77
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00930
finding appellant Reynaldo Mallari guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of carnapping with
homicide is AFFIRMED with the following modifications: ( 1) appellant Reynaldo Mallari is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole; and, (2) appellant Reynaldo Mallari is ordered to pay the
heirs of Erico Medel the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,P25,000.00 as
temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, and interest on all these damages assessed at the legal rate of 6%
from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 141162-63

July 11, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ERLINDA DELA CRUZ, LARRY PERIDAS and GERRY VENTURINA (at large), accused.
ERLINDA DELA CRUZ and LARRY PERIDAS, accused-appellants.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is an appeal of the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78, finding
accused-appellant Larry Peridas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide in Criminal Case No. 828-M-98, and
finding both accused-appellants Erlinda Dela Cruz and Larry Peridas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Republic Act. No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, in Criminal Case No. 829-M-98.
Accused-appellants Erlinda Dela Cruz and Larry Peridas, together with Gerry Venturina, were charged in the
following informations:
Criminal Case No. 828-M-98
That on or about the 15th day of January, 1998, in the municipality of Pulilan, province of Bulacan, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused armed with bladed instrument
and with intent to kill one Ysmael Mananquil, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength
and treachery, attack, assault and stab with the bladed instrument the said Ysmael Mananquil y Aguilar,
hitting the latter on the different parts of his body, thereby causing him serious physical injuries which directly
caused his death.
Contrary to Law.1
Criminal Case No. 829-M-98
That on or about the 15th day of January, 1998, in the municipality of Pulilan, province of Bulacan, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring, confederating
together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain
and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take steal, and carry away with them one (1)
taxi car "KIA" bearing Plate No. PVS 468, belonging to one Alvin G. Sanchez, to the damage and prejudice
of the said owner.
Contrary to Law.2
The two cases were consolidated. Upon arraignment, both accused-appellants entered a plea of not guilty. Accused
Gerry Venturina, on the other hand, remained at large. After joint trial, judgment was rendered against accusedappellants, the dispositive portion3 of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered,
1. In Crim. Case No. 828-M-98
accused Erlinda dela Cruz y Sanchez is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, while accused Larry
Peridas is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years 4 months and 1 day to 20
years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the bereaved family of victim Ysmael Mananquil the
amount of P60,000.00 as compensatory damages and P75,000.00 as indemnity for the victims death.
2. In Crim. Case No. 829-M-98

accused Erlinda dela Cruz y Sanchez and Larry Peridas are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Violation of Republic Act 6539 otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended,
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua will all its accessory penalties.
The instant cases as against accused Gerry Venturina are hereby ordered sent to the files of ARCHIVED
cases pending the arrest of said accused. Accordingly, let a warrant of arrest be issued for his immediate
apprehension to stand trial before this Court.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On January 15, 1998, at about 2:30 in the morning, accused-appellants Erlinda Dela Cruz and Larry Peridas went to
the house of Meliton Estrella in Poblacion, Plaridel, Bulacan on board a KIA Pride taxicab, which Dela Cruz drove.
When they arrived at Estrellas house, Dela Cruz went inside to invite him to go with them, while Peridas stayed in
the taxicab. When Estrella went out, he saw a man lying on the floor of the taxicab whose head was being pinned
down by Peridas foot. Afraid of being implicated, Estrella refused to go saying, "Ilayo ninyo yan at baka pati ako ay
madamay."4 Accused-appellants left and proceeded to the house of accused Gerry Venturina in Baliuag, Bulacan.
There they stripped the taxicab of all its accessories.5
Later that day, at about 7:00 a.m., Peridas returned to Estrellas house. Peridas told Estrella that he had killed the
man and Venturina threw away the body in Pulilan.6 Since his clothes were covered with bloodstains, he borrowed
clothes from Estrella and asked him to burn his sando and t-shirt. Estrella did not burn the bloodied clothes. Instead,
he turned them over later to the National Bureau of Investigation Office in Pulilan.
Peridas left to fetch the son of Dela Cruz. He returned to Estrellas house at about 10:30 to 11:00 a.m. There, he
waited for Dela Cruz, who arrived at past twelve noon driving the same taxicab Estrella earlier saw. The license
plate of the vehicle had been replaced from one bearing the number: PVS 468 to one with the number: TAU 667.
Accused-appellants, together with Estrella and Dela Cruzs son, boarded the taxicab and drove to Guimba, Nueva
Ecija. Along the way, they were flagged down at a checkpoint set up by the Traffic Command. Dela Cuz was unable
to show her license and the vehicles registration, but the police officers let them through after she told them that she
is the wife of Gerry Venturina.
They stopped by Laur, Nueva Ecija to borrow money from a friend of Dela Cruz, after which they proceeded to
Peridas house in Guimba. That same night, Dela Cruz drove back to Plaridel. Before she left, Estrella tried to
borrow money from Dela Cruz for his fare back to Plaridel but she turned him down. So, Estrella had to stay in
Guimba for three days until he was able to borrow money from Peridas on the pretext that he was going to fetch
Dela Cruz.
When Estrella arrived in Plaridel, he informed his elder sister about the incident. Together, they reported the matter
to Capt. Ileto and SPO4 Ireneo Mauricio, then to NBI-Pulilan, where he turned over the sando and t-shirt which
Peridas asked him to burn. The investigation led to the recovery of the corpse of Ysmael Mananquil in Pulilan,
Bulacan as well as the taxicab used by accused-appellants, which was found five meters away from the residence
of Dela Cruz. Eventually, accused-appellants Dela Cruz and Peridas were arrested.
In her defense, accused-appellants Erlinda Dela Cruz alleged that at 2:00 a.m. of January 15, 1998, she was asleep
in her house in Ma. Lourdes Subdivision, Tabang, Plaridel, Bulacan, together with her siblings, children and
accused-appellant Larry Peridas. On January 16, 1998, she stayed home to do her chores. On January 18, 1998,
she stayed home in the morning and, in the evening, went to the Monte Carlo Videoke in Baliuag where she worked.
She claimed that during all this time, she never saw Meliton Estrella.7
Accused-appellant Larry Peridas likewise testified that he was sleeping in the house of Dela Cruz on January 15,
1998, when the alleged crimes took place. He stayed there for a few days and helped in the housework. 8
One Reynaldo Trinidad corroborated accused-appellants testimonies that they were in Dela Cruzs house on the
date and time of the alleged commission of the crimes.9
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment against accused-appellants. Hence, this appeal, which raises the
following issues:

I
WHETHER OR NOT THE SO-CALLED INVESTIGATION OF THESE TWO CASES HAVE BEEN
IMPROPERLY MADE AND WRONGLY EXECUTED.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESIDING JUDGE RELIED HEAVILY ON WITNESS MELITON ESTRELLAS
PERJURED TESTIMONY.
III
WHETHER OR NOT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ARE APPLICABLE IN THESE CASES.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT DEFENSE EVIDENCE HAVE BEEN GLOSSED OVER AND GIVEN SCANT
CONSIDERATION BY THE TRIAL COURT.
In their joint brief, accused-appellants allege that the following irregularities attended the investigation of the case, to
wit: (1) that nothing was done by the authorities from the time Capt. de Armas of Plaridel called that a cadaver was
retrieved from Barangay Agnaya until January 22, 1998, when Inspector Ileto received information about a
carnapping and murder incident; (2) that Meliton Estrella actually gave himself up for his implication in the murder
and carnapping; (3) that Inspector Ileto and SPO4 Mauricio did not conduct an investigation but merely relied on the
NBI report which was a complete falsehood; (4) that the subject taxicab, which was parked adjacent to the PNP
Crime Laboratory, was not subjected to physical and forensic investigation; (5) that the NBI and PNP committed
shortcuts in pursuing the investigation; (6) that NBI Agent Serafin Gil is not a lawyer and violated their rights under
the Miranda doctrine; and (7) that Inspector Ileto is a graduate of Bulacan National Agricultural School with no
background in criminal investigation and intelligence.
The above arguments involve factual issues, the resolution of which require our re-evaluation of the trial courts
findings of facts. To do so, however, will be an unnecessary deviation from the jurisprudential rule that conclusions
of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are generally not disturbed by appellate courts. Trial courts are in a
better position to decide the issues, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial.10 The exception to this rule is where there is proof of some fact or circumstance
of weight and influence that might have been overlooked, or its significance misinterpreted, by the trial court which,
if properly considered, could affect the result of the case.
After a meticulous review of the records, we find no compelling reason to depart from such rule.
The evidence on record show that, contrary to accused-appellants assertion, it was only on January 22, 1998 that
SPO4 Ireneo Mauricio, Capt. Ileto11 and NBI Agent Serafin Gil12 first came to know, through Meliton Estrella, about
the carnapping of the taxicab, the killing of the driver thereof and the subsequent dumping of the body somewhere
in Pulilan. Acting on the information given by Estrella, they were able to recover the subject vehicle at Dela Cruzs
house in Agnaya, Plaridel, Bulacan, and asked the family of Ysmael Mananquil to identify his decomposing corpse.
Anent the claim that Dela Cruz was arrested without warrant, forced to sign a document, and detained for more or
less 3 to 4 weeks,13 there is no showing that she objected to the manner of her arrest and detention before she
entered her plea and participated in the trial. Pertinent hereto is our ruling in People v. Lopez,14 to wit:
[I]t is too late for appellant to raise the question of his arrest without a warrant. When accused-appellant was
arrested and a case was filed against him, he pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, participated in the trial
and presented his evidence. Appellant is thus estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. It is wellsettled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection
is deemed waived. Besides, this issue is being raised for the first time by appellant. He did not move for the
quashal of the information before the trial court on this ground. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to
his arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by
entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial. Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from
error.

Coming now to the sufficiency of proof of their guilt, accused-appellants contend that the testimony of Meliton
Estrella was perjured; that the evidence against them consisted of circumstantial evidence which was not sufficient
to establish their guilt; and that the trial court merely glossed over and gave scant consideration to the evidence they
presented.
The contentions lack merit. We agree with the trial courts findings that the testimony of prosecution witness Meliton
Estrella was clear, straightforward and devoid of any signs of artificiality. Moreover, no improper motive was imputed
on Estrella who positively identified both accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the offense. 15
Accused-appellants next assail the trial courts reliance on circumstantial evidence. We have long held that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction in criminal cases where there is more than one circumstance
derived from the facts duly given and the combination of all is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. The test for accepting circumstantial evidence as proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is: the series of
circumstances duly proved must be consistent with each other and that each and every circumstance must be
consistent with the accuseds guilt and inconsistent with his innocence. 16
In the case at bar, the trial court based its judgment of conviction on the following established facts: that Dela Cruz
and Peridas arrived in Plaridel at 2:30 in the morning of January 15, 1998 on board a taxicab; that the accessories
of the taxicab were removed and its license plate was replaced; that accused-appellants were unable to produce the
registration papers of the vehicle; that the subject vehicle was identified as the one driven by Ysmael Mananquil
before its loss on January 15, 1998; and that the missing taxicab was recovered by the police from Dela Cruz. 17
We find that the foregoing facts constitute an unbroken chain of events that undeniably point to the culpability of
accused-appellants for violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act. The testimony of Meliton Estrella was corroborated by
the testimony of SPO4 Mauricio, NBI Agent Serafin Gil and Capt. Ileto. The testimony of the police officers carried
with it the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. 18 Moreover, accused-appellants failed to
overcome the disputable presumption that "a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act." 19
The trial court convicted accused-appellant Larry Peridas only of homicide based on its finding of guilt due to
Peridas admission to Meliton Estrella that he had disposed of (tinapos) Manaquil, whose body was dumped in
Pulilan, Bulacan, where it was later found by the police. Prior to that, Estrella saw Peridas stepping on the head of
Manaquil on the floor of the carnapped vehicle. In other words, it was Peridas who was with the victim when the
latter was last seen alive by Estrella.20 However, the allegations of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength
and treachery as qualifying circumstances were not sufficiently established, thus the crime committed was only
homicide.21
In Aballe v. People,22 we held that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense
may be given in evidence against him and any person, otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard the
confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. The said
witness need not repeat verbatim the oral confession; it suffices if he gives its substance.
In the recent case of People v. Zuela,23 we ruled that an admission made to a private person is admissible in
evidence against the declarant pursuant to Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court, which states that the "act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him."
In their defense, accused-appellants can only raise alibi and bare denial. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses,
because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the
defendant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must likewise demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time. Furthermore, alibi cannot prevail over the
positive and unequivocal identification of accused-appellants. Categorical and consistent positive identification,
absent any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over accusedappellant's defense of denial and alibi. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is
negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law.24
The trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellants separately on the charges of carnapping and homicide,
rather than qualified carnapping or aggravated form of carnapping,25 as defined in Section 14 of Republic Act No.
6539, as amended by Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, which imposes the penalty ofreclusion perpetua to
death whenever the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.

In the case at bar, accused-appellants were charged separately with the crimes of carnapping and murder. We
cannot convict them of the crime of qualified carnapping, which consists of the two crimes alleged in the two
separate information, without impairing their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them.26
However, the trial court erred in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime of carnapping, considering
that the Information neither alleged that the victim was killed in the course of the commission of the carnapping or
on occasion thereof,27 or that the carnapping was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any
person. The crime alleged being only carnapping under the first clause of R.A. 6539, Section 14, as amended, the
proper penalty to be imposed must not be less than fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and not more than
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law 28, if the offense is punished by a
special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall
not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by
the same. Thus, we hold that the proper penalty to be imposed on each of the accused-appellants is an
indeterminate sentence of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months, as maximum.
On the other hand, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal, the range of which is from twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no modifying
circumstance, we hereby sentence accused-appellant Larry Peridas to a prison term of eight (8) years, four (4)
months and ten (10) days of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20)
days of reclusion temporal, as maximum29
Finally, we reduce the award of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) ordered by the trial court as indemnity
for the victims death to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), consistent with current jurisprudence. 30
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in
Criminal Case No. 828-M-98, finding accused-appellant LARRY PERIDAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8)
years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and
twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In addition, said accused-appellant LARRY PERIDAS is
ordered to pay death indemnity to the heirs of Ysmael Mananquil in the amount of P50,000.00.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 829-M-98, finding
accused-appellants LARRY PERIDAS and ERLINDA DELA CRUZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that said accused-appellants are
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months, as maximum.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,

G.R. No. 174658

Present:

- versus -

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,* and
BRION, JJ.

MARLON DELA CRUZ @

DAGUL,* ADRIANO MELECIO,
JESSIE REYES @ PISO, and Promulgated:
JEPOY OBELLO,
February 24, 2009
Appellant.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Two Informations, one for violation of Republic Act No. 6539 (the Anti-Carnapping
Law), and the other for Robbery with Homicide, were filed against appellant Marlon dela Cruz
(dela Cruz), together with Adriano Melecio (Melecio), Jessie Reyes (Reyes), and Jepoy Obello
(Obello) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City.

The accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 2001-0423-D, for
violation of the Anti-Carnapping Law, reads:
That on or about the 4th day of June, 2001, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
MARLON DELA CRUZ @ Dagul, ADRIANO MELECIO y Sendo, JESSIE REYES
y Evangelista @ Piso and JEPOY OBELLO, with intent to gain and by means of
violence or intimidation against persons, confederating, together, acting jointly and
helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally take,
steal, and drive away a Yamaha motorized tricycle with sidecar, belonging to one
JULIANA [sic] TAMIN, without her knowledge and consent, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter.[1]

The accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 2001-0424-D,

for robbery reads:
That on or about the 4th day of June, 2001, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
MARLON DELA CRUZ @ Dagul, ADRIANO MELECIO y Sendo, JESSIE REYES
y Evangelista@ Piso and JEPOY OBELLO, with intent to gain and by means of
violence or intimidation against persons, confederating together, acting jointly and
helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfuly and criminally, rob one
TEOFILO TAMIN SR. of his earnings and cash money in the amount of P6,000.00
and drive away his motorized vehicle, and with intent to kill the latter, attack, assault,
and use personal violence upon said TEOFILO TAMIN SR. by hitting his head
several times, thereby causing his death thereafter due to intrecranial injury, brain
hemorrhage and laceration secondary to depress fracture as per Autopsy Report and
Certificate of Death, both issued by Dr. Benjamin M. Bautista, to the damage and
prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased, TEOFILO TAMIN SR., in the amount
of P50,000,00.00 and other consequential damages. [2]

Melecio and Obello have remained at large. Dela Cruz and Reyes, on arraignment,
pleaded not guilty.[3] Reyes was later to be acquitted.

From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is gathered:[4]
At 2:00 in the morning of June 4, 2001, Teofilo Tamin Sr. (the victim) was discovered
dead beside his push cart stall along Perez Boulevard, Dagupan City. A motorized tricycle which
the victim and his son jointly owned was missing and which appears to have been parked near
the stall, as was the victims belt bag containing P17,000. The missing cash included the amount
which was intended to pay for two months amortization of the motorcycle.
Autopsy of the victim yielded the following:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
Cadaver was in rigor mortis and small body built.

Contusion hematoma, 15x16 cm, left periorbital area and zygomatic area ( in
front of left ear).
Contusion hematoma, 5x4 cm, mid left parietal area, level 12 cm above the
right ear.
Contusion hematoma, 6x5 cm, mid right parietal area, level 6 cm above the
right ear.
Contusion hematoma, 14x10 cm, occipital area with depress skull fracture 4x3
cm.
Linear skin abrasion, P shape, 4 cm, left mid clavicular line, level 4.5 cm below
the left nipple.
INTERNAL FINDINGS
Intracranial hemorrhage, moderate.
Cerebral hemorrhage, 10x8 cm, left parietal temporal area with laceration.
Cerebral hemorrhage, 10x9 cm, right parietal temporal area with laceration.
Depress skull fracture, 4x3 cm, occipital area.
Cerebellum hemorrhage, 9x6 cm, midline more in right with laceration.
Cause of death: intracranial injury, brain hemorrhage and laceration secondary
to depress fracture.
Due to: mauling.[5] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Dr. Benjamin Marcial O. Bautista who conducted the autopsy opined that the injuries on
the victims head were caused by the employment of a hard object while the wound on the chest
was caused by a sharp instrument.
The Dagupan City police recovered the sidecar attached to the motorcycle a kilometer
away from the crime scene at a roadside corner.
From information gathered from bystanders, the police learned that de la Cruz, a
notorious thief who had previously been convicted for theft, and an unidentified man were seen
riding on a red Yamaha motorcycle on June 4, 2001; that from a surveillance conducted, de la
Cruz was not in his Dagupan residence; and that his mother Maria Rosario (Maria) is living in
the municipality of San Quintin.
On June 8, 2001, the San Quintin police reported to the Dagupan City police that a red
motorcycle was recovered from de la Cruzs mother Marias house in San Quintin, and that
Melecio was apprehended, while de la Cruz [6] and Obello escaped. De la Cruzs friends Angelica
Perez (Angelica) and Anna Datlag (Anna), who were at the time staying at Marias house, were
invited for questioning.

Anna related to the police, which she echoed at the witness stand, as follows: On June 2,
2001, while she, Angelica, de la Cruz, and Obello were on vacation in Lupao, Nueva Ecija, de
la Cruz left for Dagupan City and returned on June 4, 2001 on board a red motorcycle together
with Melecio. When she asked where he got the motorcycle, de la Cruz replied that it came
from his uncle. Also on June 4, 2001, the group proceeded to de la Cruzs mother Marias house
in San Quintin, with de la Cruz and Angelica on board the motorcycle, while the rest boarded a
bus. The group stayed in Marias house for four days.
Anna further related: On June 6, 2001, she asked de la Cruz who owns the red motorcycle
to which he replied that he took it from an old man who was sleeping after he hit the old man
with a stone and Melecio stabbed him at the right side of his body, following which they took
the money of the old man.
As a result of follow-up investigations, the police invited Reyes for custodial
investigation. The police later returned the motorcycle to the victims wife Julita after she
identified it as the one attached to the sidecar of the victim.
Upon the other hand, de la Cruz put up alibi, [7] claiming that he was asleep in his house at
Callejon Extension, Dagupan City on the night of January 3, 2001; that on waking up the
following day, January 4, 2001, Obello and Melecio arrived and invited him to, as he did join
them to San Quintin on board a motorcycle which the two claimed belongs to their uncle; that
the group went first to Lupao, Nueva Ecija where they met Anna and Angelica who, on his
invitation, joined them in San Quintin where they stayed for a few days.
De la Cruz went on to claim as follows: While they were in San Quintin, Melecio and
Obello asked him to look for a buyer of the motorcycle, drawing him and his mother Rosario to
scold the two and ask them to go home. The two insisted on staying in San Quintin, however,
until they could find a buyer of the motorcycle. The two eventually admitted that they took the
motorcycle from an old man whom they had hit. His mother thereupon asked him to send his
friends away, which he did, but they refused to leave.Not wanting to be implicated in a crime,
he went home to Dagupan on June 7, 2001.
After trial, Branch 43 of the Dagupan City RTC convicted dela Cruz of both charges. As
reflected early on, it acquitted Reyes. The trial court disposed:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused MARLON DELA CRUZ alias Dagul
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the felonies of robbery with Homicide AND
Violation of R.A. No. 6539 (An act preventing and penalizing carnapping) and in
conformity with law, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA in each case.
Accused JESSIE REYES is ordered acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt.
Further, accused is ordered to pay the victims wife the following to wit:
1.
2.
3.
4.

P50,000.00 as indemnity;
P50,000.00 as moral damages;
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
P31,234.00 representing funeral/burial miscellaneous expenses;

5. P17,000.00 representing victims money intended to pay two (2) months

installment of his new motorized tricycle;
Be it stressed that victims carnapped motorized tricycle was recovered.
The BJMP of Dagupan City is ordered to commit the person of the accused to
the National Penitentiary immediately and without unnecessary delay.
SO ORDERED.[8]

On appeal before the Court of Appeals, de la Cruz faulted the trial court
I
X X X IN RELYING HEAVILY ON SUPPOSITIONS AND PRESUMPTIONS TO
JUSTIFY THE CONVICTION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT MARLON DELA
CRUZ SINCE THERE WAS NO EYEWITNESS TO THE CRIMES COMMITTED
AGAINST THE PERSON OF TEOFILO TAMIN, SR.
II
X X X IN BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ANNA
DATLAG DESPITE THE REMARKABLE MOTIVE BEHIND HER ACT OF
PINNING DOWN ACCUSED-APPELLANT MARLON DELA CRUZ.[9]
III
XXX IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA FOR EACH
CASE.
IV
XXX IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE SANS EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE SAME.[10] (Underscoring supplied)

The Court of Appeals affirmed de la Cruzs conviction, but modified the penalty in light
of the following observations:[11]
x x x [T]he trial court erred in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua in
both cases, for the crime of carnapping, considering that the information only alleged
that DELA CRUZ committed the crime by means of violence or intimidation against
persons and did not allege that the victim was killed in the course of the commission
of the carnapping or on occasion thereof.In the same way that recidivism cannot be
appreciated against DELA CRUZ notwithstanding his admission in court that he was
priorly convicted of theft, a crime punished under the same title of the Code as the
crime of robbery with homicide, and was just released from Muntinlupa at the time of
the trial of the second case. Said aggravating circumstances were not alleged in the
information in consonance with the requirement of Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
Also, while the Court acknowledges that certain losses and expenses were
actually incurred by the wife of the victim and her family, the Court notes that except

for the amount of P13,000.00 representing the payment made to Funeraria Dagupan,
the other expenses for funeral/burial of the victim were not properly substantiated by
receipts. For which reason, We cannot grant the same. The allegation also that the
earnings of the day, taken by DELA CRUZ and MELECIO from TEOFILO, SR.,
amounted to P10,000.00 [sic] was not sufficiently proven. It is so exuberant [sic]
considering the nature of the business of the victim at the time the incident
occurred. The grant of exemplary damages is also deleted in the absence of
aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime as alleged in the
information.[12] (Underscoring supplied)

The Court of Appeals thus disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding no error committed by the trial
court in arriving at the assailed decision, the same is AFFIRMED with modifications:
(a)

Finding accused-appellant Marlon dela Cruz @ Dagul guilty of robbery with

homicide and sentencing him [to] the penalty of reclusion perpetua;

(b)

Finding accused-appellant Marlon dela Cruz @ Dagul guilty of the crime of

carnapping by means of force and violence upon person and sentencing him
[to] the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 17 years and four months as
minimum to 30 years as maximum.

(c)

Ordering the accused-appellant Marlon dela Cruz @ Dagul to pay the

victims wife:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

P50,000 as indemnity;
P50,000 as moral damages;
P13,000 as funeral and burial expenses;
P7,008 [P3,504 x 2] representing the two months earnings set aside
for the amortization of the vehicle;
(5) P20,000 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.[13] (Emphasis and italics in the original; underscoring
supplied)

Hence, the present appeal of de la Cruz (hereafter appellant).[14]

The appeal is bereft of merit.
There being no eyewitness to the commission of the crime, the following provision of
Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court on circumstantial evidence applies:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.

Conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained, provided the

circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which lead to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.[15]
In the cases at bar, the prosecution proved the following facts:
1. Appellant left Lupao, Nueva Ecija for Dagupan on June 2, 2001 and returned to
Lupao on June 4, 2001, this time on board a red Yamaha motorcycle;
2. On June 4, 2001, the victim was found dead near his stall, and his money and the
tricycle (motorcycle cum side car) were missing;
3. The result of the autopsy of the victim showed that, among other things, he had a
wound on the head which was opined to have been caused by a hard object;
4. On June 4, 2001, appellant together with his friends, left Lupao for his mothers house
at San Quintin. Appellant and his friend Angelica boarded the red Yamaha
motorcycle;
5. The sidecar forming part of the tricycle was eventually recovered a kilometer away
from the locus criminis;
6. Appellant and his friends stayed in his mothers house at San Quintin for four days or
up to June 8, 2001 in the course of which appellant confessed to Anna that he took the
red Yamaha motorcycle and some money from an old man whom he had hit with a
stone and whom Melecio stabbed; and
7. The red Yamaha motorcycle to which the sidecar was attached was recovered on June
8, 2001 from the house of appellants mother at San Quintin and was returned to the
victims wife Julita after she identified it to be that of the victims.
Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another
without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things.[16]

Robbery with homicide, on the other hand has the following elements:
1. the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against
persons;
2. the property taken belongs to another;
3. the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animo lucrandi;
4. by reason of the robbery or on occasion thereof, homicide is committed. [17]

From the combination of the above-enumerated proven circumstances, the existence of

the elements of carnapping and robbery with homicide, as well as the identity of appellant as
the one or one of those who committed the crimes, can be reasonably inferred.
Appellant impugns prosecution witness Annas testimony about his confession to her as
hearsay, however. This Court is not persuaded. Section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that [t]he declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or
of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him. People v.
Licayan[18] instructs:
Accused-appellant cannot validly claim that the statement made by
Rogelio Jun-jun Dahilan, Jr. as to the location of the victims body is hearsay. Any oral
or documentary evidence ishearsay by nature if its probative value is not based on
the personal knowledge of the witnesses but on the knowledge of some other person
who was never presented on the witness stand,because it is the opportunity to crossexamine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are
hearsay. In the instant case, Rogelio Dahilan, Jr. testified that accusedappellant indeed told him where the victims body can be found.[19] (Italics in the
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The records show that appellant cross-examined prosecution witness Anna. Her testimony
about appellants confession to her is not thus hearsay. Such confession is in fact corroborated by
the evidence for the prosecution, viz: the victims body bore injuries on the head which the doctor
opined to have been caused by a hard object; and the motorcycle was eventually recovered on
June 8, 2001 from the house of appellants mother to which appellant and company repaired to
on June 4, 2001[20] and stayed up to June 8, 2001.
Appellant goes on to brand as biased Annas testimony by trying to pin [him] . . . in order
to save herself. Not only was Anna not charged of complicity in the commission of the crimes,
however. She has not been shown to have any motive to testify falsely against him.
Finally, appellant argues that even if the allegation on the loss of some cash were true, the
same should be absorbed in carnapping since carnapping and robbery have the same element of
taking with intent to gain.[21] The Court is likewise not persuaded. Carnapping refers specifically
to the taking of a motor vehicle. It does not cover the taking of cash or personal property which
is not a motor vehicle. As the Court of Appeals noted,
x x x Two (2) articles were taken from TEOFILLO, SR., his tricycle and some
cash. The taking of the tricycle constitutes a violation of the anti-carnapping law, RA
6539, while the taking of the cash from tEOFILO, SR. by hitting him with a stone and
stabbing him in the chest constitutes the crime of robbery with homicide under Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code.[22]

WHEREFORE, the challenged June 30, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 127500

June 8, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NOEL SANTOS y CRISPINO and FELICIANO FUNCION alias JON-JON, accused, NOEL SANTOS y
CRISPINO, accused-appellant.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, 1 convicting accusedappellant of violation of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, also known as the Anti-Carnapping Act, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, on the basis of an Information the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on or about the 18th day of June, 1995, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, and by means of violence employed against RUEL
VALENTINO MORALES, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and drive away from the
latter a Toyota Tamaraw, bearing Plate No. UAM 540, Engine No. 2-C 2928663 and Chassis No. CF500012454 valued at P387,000.00 and belonging to TEODULO NATIVIDAD y DELA CRUZ, to the damage
and prejudice of said owner in the amount of P387,000.00; that as a result of the violence employed on the
person of RUEL VALENTINO MORALES, the latter sustained injuries which caused his death. 2
The above Information, which named as accused Noel Santos and one John Doe, was amended on July 31, 1995
to cancel the designation of John Doe and substitute in its place the name of Feliciano Funcion, alias Jon-jon.3 Up to
the time of the rendition of the assailed decision, however, accused Funcion remained at large.
The prosecution presented ten witnesses during trial, consisting of the apprehending and investigating officers of the
Pasay City and Magalang, Pampanga police stations, the medico-legal officer, and the family and friends of the
victim. Also submitted in evidence were the articles recovered at the scene of the crime, including the murder
weapon and personal belongings of both the victim and accused-appellant.
PO3 Alfredo Galang was manning the traffic at the intersection in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga at around 2:30 in
the morning of June 19, 1995 when he noticed an "overspeeding" Toyota Tamaraw FX. He signaled for the vehicle

to pull over to the side of the road, approached the vehicle then asked the driver for his license. The driver, who
turned out to be accused-at-large Jon-jon Funcion, handed him an expired driver's license without plastic cover
issued in the name of the victim, Ruel Morales. 4 Observing that the driver and his companion, herein accusedappellant, were acting suspiciously, PO3 Galang asked them to turn on the lights inside the vehicle, to which
accused-appellant complied. He then borrowed the key to the rear door of the FX from the driver. While PO3 Galang
was opening the rear door, the driver fled unpursued towards a nearby sugarcane field. The rear portion of the FX,
as PO3 Galang found out shortly thereafter, contained the dead body of victim Ruel Morales wrapped in the seat
cover and curtains of the vehicle.
This account was corroborated by Ernesto Gonzales, one of two traffic aides then stationed at the traffic outpost in
Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga, and who assisted PO3 Galang in the inspection of the FX and the apprehension of
accused-appellant.
PO3 Galang took custody of accused-appellant, who all through out the incident remained seated in the front
passenger seat of the FX. He called a funeral parlor to collect the corpse, brought the FX and accused-appellant to
the Magalang police station, and immediately executed an affidavit of arrest 5 against accused-appellant.
The next day, accused-appellant was brought by one SPO2 Nuqui of the Magalang police station to the Pasay City
police station and indorsed to the officer on duty, SPO2 Renato Guzman. It was SPO2 Guzman who interviewed
accused-appellant, who in turn denied responsibility for the death of Morales and pointed all the blame at accusedat-large Jon-jon Funcion.
Also delivered to the Pasay City police were an autopsy report of the body of the victim, a gray Toyota Tamaraw FX
with Plate No. UAM 540, and the items recovered therein. SPO1 Manuel Abenoja, the evidence custodian of the
Pasay City police station, identified in open court the articles recovered from inside the FX, namely: a deformed and
blood-stained kitchen knife, a stone measuring about 3 to 4 inches across, a Certificate of Registration pertaining to
the Toyota Tamaraw FX issued in the name of Teodulo C. Natividad, a pair of checkered short pants, a wrist watch,
a brown scapular necklace, two leather wallets, a PCIBank card in the name of Ruel Valentine Morales, a Makati
Public Safety Office badge, three pictures of Ruel Morales, a pair of denim long pants, a leather belt, three pairs of
shoes, and assorted identification papers in the name of Ruel Morales.6
Dr. Ma. Lourdes Natividad, rural health physician of Magalang, Pampanga, conducted the post-mortemexamination
of the body of the victim. Based on her findings, the cause of death was hemorrhage as a result of the victim's
fractured skull. Dr. Natividad testified to the presence of the following injuries on the victim's body: fracture of the
frontonasal bone (between the victim's eyes 7); multiple lacerations, incisions and hematoma on the face and arms,
abrasions on the face and lower extremities, and ligature extending horizontally from right to left and covering
almost two-thirds of the neck.8 In her testimony, the doctor stated that the fracture between the victim's eyes and the
contusions were likely caused by a blunt instrument, while the lacerated and incised wounds were inflicted by a
sharp instrument. The ligature across the neck could have been caused by strangling with a rope. 9
Three of the victim's friends who last saw him alive were also presented as prosecution witnesses. Elizalde Claridad
declared that at around 11:00 in the evening of June 18, 1995, he was drinking with his friends at the corner of Lim
and M. Reyes Streets in Makati City when Ruel Morales drove by in a Toyota Tamaraw FX. Morales called to him
and asked that he accompany him in looking for his (Morales's) brother, Hoppy. Morales was wearing a T-shirt,
shorts, slippers and a lady's Rolex wrist watch with gemstones. They drove around Barangay Bangkal in Makati
then proceeded to Padi's Point, a restaurant-bar at Pasay Road, also in Makati; unable to locate the brother,
Morales dropped him off at the corner of Lim and M. Reyes Streets and drove back to Pasay Road. The next time
he saw Morales was the next day, when they fetched his body in the morgue in Pampanga.
Meanwhile, Arnie Bordeos testified that on the night of June 18, 1995, between 10:00 to 11:00, he saw Ruel Morales
in a Toyota Tamaraw FX along M. Reyes and General Luna Streets in Makati conversing with two persons by the
side of the road. Earlier to this conversation, these two persons approached him and his friends and talked to them
in a drunken and rude manner. One of them, whom he identified as herein accused-appellant, even bragged that he
was the nephew of a city mayor. He then saw Morales opening the passenger doors to let the two persons in, then
Morales drove away with the two on board. Leo Soriba, who was with Arnie Bordeos at the time, corroborated this
account.
Teodulo Natividad testified that he was the owner of the Toyota Tamaraw FX where the victim's body was found. He
stated that on June 18, 1995 he lent the FX to the victim, Ruel Morales, who was a good friend of his and who often
borrowed the FX from him. The vehicle was recovered and restored to him by the Pasay City police. It had a dent on
the roof and the seat covers and curtains were missing, but it was in otherwise good condition. 10

Antonio Morales, Jr. presented receipts covering the expenses incurred by his family for the wake and burial of his
brother. The total costs reflected in the receipts amounted to P56,319.30. He also stated that his brother worked as
an entertainer in Japan, earning US$1,000.00 a month. 11 He was, however, unable to submit documentary evidence
to support this.
In contrast to the ten witnesses presented by the prosecution, defense presented as its sole witness accusedappellant himself. In his version of the story, accused-appellant was at the Malvar Sports Complex in Bangkal,
Makati City on June 18, 1995 at around 10:00 in the evening. He was playing darts with accused-at-large Jon-jon
Funcion and two other friends, when Jon-jon told them that he was in need of money as he needed to go to Tarlac to
see his girlfriend. Because no one among them could lend him money, Jon-jon asked accused-appellant to
accompany him to the house of one Councilor Ferdie Eusebio from whom he intended to borrow money. Upon
reaching Eusebio's house, however, Jon-jon decided against it because it was already late at night and it seemed as
if the occupants of the house were already asleep. They returned to the Malvar Sports Complex where one of their
friends, Jeffrey Abigabel, suggested they try borrowing money from his friend, Joel. Jon-jon left with Funcion to go to
Joel, but they returned shortly after. Jeffrey then said he was going home, and as Jeffrey was walking away from
them a Toyota Tamaraw FX stopped beside him. Accused-appellant saw Jeffrey converse with the driver of the FX,
then Jeffrey went on his way and the FX went towards Mabolo Street. Accused-appellant then said that Jon-jon
asked him who the driver of the FX was, but he answered that he did not know. Then Jon-jon left towards the
direction of Mabolo Street, saying "didiskarte raw siya ng pera." 12
At this point, accused-appellant decided to go home. While walking along Macabolos Street he met the FX, being
driven by Jon-jon, which stopped beside him. The person on the front passenger seat opened his window, and he
observed that the person was "gay". Jon-jon asked him where he was going, and when he said he was on his way
home, he and the "gay" passenger invited him to ride with them and that they will drop him off at his house. He
identified the passenger as "Sharon", or the victim Ruel Morales in the instant case. Accused-appellant accepted the
offer and boarded the FX.
However, instead of dropping him off at his house in Malibay, Pasay City, Jon-jon drove to PICC, where they parked
in a dark area where the trees screened off the light of the electric lamps. Jon-jon then asked accused-appellant to
step out of the FX, saying that he and "Sharon" had matters to discuss. He consented, walking about 8 meters away
from the vehicle. Because it was dark, he could not see the interior of the FX but he observed that it was "umuuga",
or rocking lightly, for about 10 to 15 minutes. He came to the conclusion that the two were having sex.
Then Jon-jon called him and alighted from the middle right-side door of the FX. When accused-appellant
approached, Jon-jon placed his right arm on the right shoulder of accused-appellant, and the latter noticed from the
open car door that someone was lying inside the FX. He asked Jon-jon what happened and he reportedly replied,
"Don't ask anymore, you might be the next one." 13 Then he felt something poke him sharply on the neck, and Jonjon said in an angry voice, "Just follow what I instructed (sic), if not, I will kill you." 14 Jon-jon then told him to remove
the seat covers of the FX and as he did so, Jon-jon went behind him leveling the knife on accused-appellant's neck
with one hand while holding to the waistband of accused-appellant' pants with the other. 15 Jon-jon made him cover
the dead body, with the seat covers; then Jon-jon tied both of accused-appellant's hands behind his back, took his
wallet and made him sit on the front passenger seat of the FX. He then placed a seat belt around him, locked the
door at his side, started the engine and drove to Buendia Avenue and north to Pampanga. All the while Jon-jon
reportedly threatened to kill him if he attempted to escape or to alert anyone, such as the toll booth personnel, of
what was happening. 16 Throughout his testimony, which ran the course of four hearings, accused-appellant insisted
that he had no opportunity to escape and that he was overcome by fear of accused-at-large Jon-jon Funcion.
When they were accosted at the intersection in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga, accused-appellant testified to the
following chain of events: Jon-jon pulled over to the side of the road, unfastened the seat belt around accusedappellant, untied accused-appellant's hands, threw something at the back of the vehicle, turned on the light, told
accused-appellant to remove his (accused-appellant's) sweatshirt, wore the sweatshirt to cover the blood stains on
his arms, turned off the light, threatened him some more, took money from accused-appellant's wallet, then
alighted. 17 All of this presumably transpired during the interim that it took for PO3 Galang, who was at a distance of
about 30 meters away, 18 to approach the FX.
At some point in his testimony, accused-appellant said that while the policeman and Jon-jon were talking, he called
to one of the traffic aides and said that there was a dead body at the back of the car. 19 This, however, was not in the
testimony of Ernesto Gonzales, one of the traffic aides present at the time.
After Jon-jon Funcion fled and the police officer found the dead body at the back of the FX, they approached
accused-appellant who remained seated at the front passenger seat and led him to the nearby police outpost. He
was then brought to a police station where he was placed under investigation.

The trial court viewed with disbelief the version of accused-appellant. In its decision rendered on October 25, 1996,
it declared:
The Court believes that Jon-jon alone could not inflict all the wounds on Morales alias Sharon which caused
his death. So that the claim of Santos that he had no participation in the killing of Morales is not credible.
Santos himself testified that his friend Jon-jon was in need of money as he was to go to his girlfriend in
Tarlac. When they were not able to borrow money from Councilor Eusebio, Morales came along and invited
them to PICC. Morales alias Sharon being a gay wanted to use Jon-jon and Santos who were teenagers.
While there is no direct evidence in the killing of Morales, the presumption is that the person found in the
unexplained possession of the stolen effects is the author of the aggression and death of the victim and the
robbery committed on him. (People vs. Prado, G.R. No. 95260, March 8, 1996) At the time they were
committing the crime, their action impliedly showed a unity of purpose between them and a concerted effort
to bring about the death of Morales. (People vs. Ferrer, et. al., G.R. Nos. 114931-33, November 16, 1995)20
Thus, the trial court made a finding of implied conspiracy and meted out a judgment of conviction. The dispositive
portion of the assailed decision is quoted as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Noel Santos y Crispino GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended (Anti-Carnapping Act). There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the Court sentences him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to
indemnify the heirs of Ruel Valentino Morales in the amount of P50,000.00; the amount of P56,319.30 as
damages, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 21
On appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:
1. The trial court gravely erred in finding that Noel Santos is guilty of violating Republic Act No. 6539, as
amended (the "Anti-Carnapping Act"), considering that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of Noel
Santos beyond reasonable doubt.
1a. The trial court gravely erred in finding that there was conspiracy between Funcion and Noel
Santos, and that their actions showed unity of purpose and a concerted effort to bring about the
death of victim Morales.
1b. The trial court gravely erred in finding that Noel Santos participated in the forcible taking of the
Tamaraw FX and the killing of victim Morales.
1c. The trial court erred in finding that Funcion alone could not inflict all the wounds victim Morales
sustained.
2. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the presence
of Noel Santos in the vehicle when the crime was committed by Funcion.
2a. The trial court gravely erred in finding Noel Santos guilty based on a presumption that the person found
in the unexplained possession of the stolen effects is the author of the aggression and death of the victim
and of the robbery committed on him, considering that Noel Santos was able to fully explain his presence in
said vehicle where the body of the victim Morales was found. 22
Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two things: the fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of
all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged, and the fact that the accused is the perpetrator
of the crime. In the instant case we find the prosecution unable to discharge on both aspects, leaving us with no
option but to acquit on reasonable doubt.
"Carnapping", as defined by Republic Act No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act, as amended, is the taking, with
intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against
or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. 23 By the amendment in Section 20 of Republic Act No.
7659, Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act now reads:
Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section
Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for
not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more that seventeen years and four months, when

the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things, and by
imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, what the
carnapping is committed by means of violence or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall; be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
On the last clause, three amendments have been made to the original Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act: (1) the
change of the penalty from life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of
the phrase "in the commission of the carnapping" to "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof." 24 This third amendment makes clear the intention of the law to make the offense a special
complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons. 25 Thus, under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the
prosecution not only has to prove the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of Ruel
Morales 26 but more importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and that
the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." Needless
to say, where the elements of carnapping are not proved, the provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act would cease to
be applicable and the homicide or murder (if proven) would be punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
In the herein case, we find the charge of carnapping unsubstantiated for failure of the prosecution to prove an
unlawful taking. The application of the presumption that a person found in possession of the personal effects
belonging to a person robbed or killed is considered the author of the aggression, the death of the person, as well
as the robbery committed, has been invariably limited to cases where such possession is either unexplained or that
the proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto. 27The
rebuttal of such presumption, invariably employed in cases of robbery and theft under the Revised Penal Code,
validly applies to a case of carnapping, for indeed the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping is
the same, and had it not been for the enactment of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle
would certainly fall within the purview of either theft or robbery. 28
However incriminating the circumstances of accused-appellant were having been apprehended in an
"overspeeding" Toyota Tamaraw FX, which later turned out to be owned by the victim's friend, and where the victim's
body and a blood-stained knife were found he did in fact set up a defense of duress on which, as the records
plainly show, he had been subjected to exhaustive cross-examination by the prosecution. During cross-examination,
accused-appellant adhered to his version of the story, insisting that his presence in the FX was for no reason other
than as a captive of accused-at-large. While we are not prepared to say that the explanation of accused-appellant
is seamless, the point we want to make at this juncture is that once an explanation is offered for the possession of
the stolen effects, the presumption arising from unexplained possession may not anymore be invoked and the
burden shifts once more to the prosecution to produce evidence that would render the defense of accused
improbable. On this burden we find the prosecution in the instant case unable to discharge.
1awphi1

The carnapping not being duly proved, the killing of Ruel Morales may not be treated as an incident of carnapping.
Nonetheless, even under the provisions of homicide and murder under the Revised Penal Code, we find that the
guilt of accused-appellant was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
The trial court itself admits that there is no direct evidence indicating the guilt of accused-appellant for the killing of
Ruel Morales. Following are the circumstantial evidence relied upon for his conviction: first, accused-appellant was
in the Toyota Tamaraw FX containing the victim's body and a blood-stained knife; second, the FX was caught
"overspeeding" at 2:30 in the morning at a provincial intersection, and the occupants were acting suspiciously; third,
earlier accused-appellant was seen with accused-at-large in Pasay City, appearing drunk and behaving rudely; and
fourth, he was seen with accused-at-large boarding an FX being driven by the victim, the same FX where the
victim's body was subsequently found.
For circumstantial evidence to convict, the Rules of Court require that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 29 On the latter, decided cases expound that the circumstancial
evidence presented and proved must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. 30
The circumstances abovementioned do not lead to an inference exclusively consistent with the guilt of accusedappellant. Quite to the contrary, we observe that while the arresting officer was preoccupied with opening the rear
door of the FX, at which time accused-at-large took the opportunity to flee, accused-appellant remained seated on
the front passenger seat, a behavior quite uncommon for a guilty man faced with the inevitability of arrest. Although

no one corroborated accused-appellant's allegation that he volunteered the information that there was a dead body
at the back of the car, his demeanor all throughout the search of the FX and during his arrest was, to say the least,
not inconsistent with the hypothesis of innocence. He did not resist arrest, and during his testimony he did not waver
in insisting that it was accused-at-large alone who was responsible for the crime.
Thus, even if we accept as credible all the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, it does not rule out the
probability of accused-appellant's story that it was accused-at-large who killed Morales then threatened him at
knife-point having taken place, for there were no eyewitnesses to the killing itself, and all the prosecution was
able to show were the events before and after the killing of Morales.
A situation as this calls for the application of the equipoise rule, which requires that where the inculpatory
circumstances are capable of two inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence and the
other compatible with a finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty and therefore is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction. 31
Our ruling to acquit does not hold a corollary upholding of the credibility of the testimony of accused-appellant. The
basis of the acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means that the evidence of the prosecution was not
sufficient to sustain the guilt of accused-appellant beyond the point of moral certainty. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt, however, is a burden particular to the prosecution and does not apply to exculpatory facts as may be raised
by the defense; the accused is not required to establish matters in mitigation or defense beyond a reasonable doubt,
nor is he required to establish the truth of such matters by a preponderance of the evidence, or even to a
reasonable probability. 32 An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the accused's innocence
may be doubted, 33 for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the
weakness of the defense. 34
Having resolved against the individual culpability of accused-appellant in this manner, the theory of implied
conspiracy of the trial court must likewise fail.
WHEREFORE, the decision in Criminal Case No. 95-7258 of Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City is
hereby REVERSED. Accused-appellant Noel Santos y Crispino is ACQUITTED on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt. His immediate release from detention is hereby ordered, unless other lawful
and valid grounds for his further detention exist. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 132788

October 23, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ISAIAS FERNANDEZ y VERAS a.k.a. "ISAIAH FERNANDEZ," ROBERT "BOBBY" KIWAS y BINAWE, JOHN
DOE, PETER DOE and CHARLIE DOE, accused,
ISAIAS FERNANDEZ y VERAS a.k.a. "ISAIAH FERNANDEZ," appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6, dated January 14, 1998,
in Criminal Case No. 14390-R, finding appellant Isaias Fernandez y Veras, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Republic Act No. 6539,2 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and sentencing him to death.
In an Information dated June 18, 1996, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged herein appellant,
Robert "Bobby" Kiwas, and three Does with violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659,
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of April 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain and without the consent of the owner thereof,
conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and drive away a motor vehicle described as follows:
MAKE---------------------------TOYOTA
SERIES--------------------------TAMARAW FX
TYPE OF BODY---------------WAGON
PLATE NO.---------------------AVF-723
MOTOR NO.--------------------2C 3020507
SERIAL/CHASSIS NO. ------CF50 0016027
belonging to SPOUSES JEFFRED ACOP & JOSEPHINE ACOP and driven by CLIFFORD GUINGUINO y GORIO
and on the occasion and by reason of said carnapping, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, the accused attacked, assaulted and shot the said Clifford Guinguino y Gorio, thereby inflicting upon
the latter: Cardio Respiratory failure, Hypovolemic shock, Cardiac tamponade, Hemothorax Intra Abdominal
Hemorrhage Secondary to Gunshot Wound, Multiple, which caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
On May 21, 1997, appellant Fernandez, who was then at large, was arrested by elements of the Philippine National
Police Criminal Investigation Group (PNP-CIG) in Baguio City, by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the trial
court.4
The following day, appellant was arraigned and with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the indictment. 5He
waived pre-trial. Thereafter, the case was set for continuous trial to terminate within sixty (60) days, pursuant to
Supreme Court Adm. Order No. 104-96. 6 Appellant was tried separately as his co-accused, Robert "Bobby" Kiwas,
had been earlier tried and convicted of the offense charged.
The facts of this case, as drawn from the records, are as follows:
Engineer Jeffred Acop, a resident of Baguio City was the owner and operator of two Tamaraw FX taxis, registered
as "RAMA."7 One of said taxis was maroon in color and bore registry plate no. AVF 723. Its regular driver was
Clifford Guinguino.8
On the morning of April 21, 1996, Guinguino took out the maroon Tamaraw FX taxi to ply his daily rounds in Baguio
City.9 Later that day, sometime between 6:00 to 7:00 p.m., prosecution witness Arcadio Awal, Guinguinos brother-inlaw10 and a taxi driver by occupation, encountered the latter driving the "RAMA" taxi of Engr. Acop at Governor Pack
Road, Baguio City11 while Guinguino was driving the maroon Tamaraw FX "RAMA" taxi towards Marcos Highway.
Awal used to drive the "RAMA" taxi that Guinguino was driving. 12 Guinguino had four or five male passengers on
board.13 Awal, however, failed to recognize the faces of Guinguinos passengers as it was already dark and the two
vehicles were moving at a fast clip.14 Awal and Guinguinos vehicles passed each other quickly and they blew the

horns of the vehicles they were driving as an exchange of greetings. It was to be the last time that Guinguino was
seen alive. Eng. Acop waited that whole night for Guinguino to return the taxi he was driving but in vain. 15
At around 8:00 a.m. of April 22, 1996, Police Precinct No. 5 in Baguio City received a call informing them that a
dead body was to be found at Interior Balacbac, Baguio City.16 Immediately, SPO4 Lucio Alvarado, who took the call
and his fellow law enforcer, SPO1 Wilfredo Cabayanan, proceeded to the area. On seeing that there was indeed a
male corpse in the area, apparently the victim of foul play, SPO4 Alvarado immediately left to call a medico-legal
officer, leaving SPO1 Cabayanan to secure the crime scene. The latter initially examined the cadaver and saw that it
had sustained several gunshot wounds.17
After some minutes, Dr. Arsenio B. Avenido, a medico-legal officer of the Baguio City Health Department arrived.
After his own preliminary examination of the victims remains, Dr. Avenido surmised that the victim had been killed
either late in the evening of the previous day or very early in the morning of April 22, 1996. 18 The corpse was then
removed from the scene to enable Dr. Avenido to conduct a proper autopsy.
The post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Avenido showed that the victim had sustained the following injuries:
HEAD No evidence of external physical injury
NECK Gunshot wound 3 cm. x. 0.3 cm., 2.4 cm. in depth latero medial neck right point of exit once
THORAX Wound gunshot 1.4 x 0.7 cm., 3 cm. in depth hypochondrium left
ABDOMEN Gunshot wound 1.4 cm. x 1 cm., 4 cm. in depth anterior lumbar right. 19
In the course of his examination, Dr. Avenido recovered a slug from the body, which a ballistic examination showed
had been fired from a .22 caliber firearm. 20 He turned over the slug to the police for a ballistic examination. 21 Dr.
Avenido found the cause of death to be:
Cardio respiratory failure, hypovolemic shock, cardiac tamponade, hemothorax intra abdominal hemorrhage due to
gunshot wound, multiple.22
Meanwhile, on April 23, 1996, Engr. Acop accompanied by Awal and Magdalena Guinguino, the victims mother,
went to Baguio City Police Precinct No. 5 to report that Acops Tamaraw FX taxi and its driver were missing. When
shown the corpse found by the police at Interior Balacbac, Acop identified it to be the remains of his missing driver,
Clifford Guinguino. The Baguio City police force then conducted a series of search and recovery operations to find
and get back the missing motor vehicle, but to no avail. Having come up empty through their efforts, the Baguio City
police then spread the word about the missing vehicle to the police units in the nearby provinces and requested their
assistance in locating it.23
While the Baguio City police were still busy with what proved to be fruitless efforts to locate the "RAMA" Tamaraw
FX taxi, which seemed to have vanished from the face of the earth, late one evening in the last week of April 1996,
prosecution witness Laurencio Ducusin, the barangay captain of Casanfernandoan, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, was
informed by some of the barangay tanods, that a Tamaraw FX had stopped at one of their checkpoints. Ducusin and
the tanods were at that time doing the nightly ronda in the barangay.24
Ducusin proceeded to the checkpoint and saw a maroon Tamaraw FX driven by his brother-in-law, the appellant
herein.25 He had four male companions with him aboard the vehicle, one of whom was referred to as
"Kiwas."26Ducusin then got aboard the vehicle and they proceeded to his house, with the appellant driving.
On reaching his house, Ducusin exerted all efforts to be hospitable to his visitors. 27 The appellant then informed
Ducusin that the vehicle he was driving was owned by the appellants kumpare. Ducusin noticed, however, that they
were armed with firearms of various calibers, 28 but gave no further thought to it since he knew for a fact that the
appellant was working as a security officer for a Baguio-based security agency.29
The appellant and his group stayed for two (2) days at the house of Ducusin. They left the vehicle with him, saying
that they would be back for it.30
Several days later, three of appellants companions, one of whom Ducusin recognized as Kiwas, returned to
Ducusins place and took the vehicle with them. 31 After leaving for places unknown, they returned and stayed with
Ducusin for another two days. When they departed, they left the vehicle with Ducusin, on the pretext that it had a
defect.32
After several more days, Kiwas together with four companions returned and like the last time, Kiwas drove away the
vehicle only to return after several hours. 33 When Ducusin asked why they were using the vehicle although it
supposedly had a defect, Kiwas replied that they would have it repaired. 34 The group then left, leaving Ducusin again
in possession of the vehicle. They promised to return for the vehicle with the appellant whom they referred to as
"sir."35

After the lapse of several days, a mechanic arrived at Ducusins house saying that the appellants group had sent
him to effect repairs on the vehicle. 36 Meanwhile, Ducusin had parked the vehicle inside the camalig of his mother,
Catalina Ducusin, which was some two hundred (200) meters away from his house. 37
The mechanic worked for several days. He changed its chassis 38 and then repainted the vehicle, changing its color
from maroon to gold.39
Ducusin was made suspicious by this turn of events and fearful that the vehicle was not really owned by his brotherin-laws kumpare, he confided his suspicions to SPO2 Maximiano Balelo of the Pozorrubio Police Station on June 5,
1996.40 SPO2 Balelo recalled that on April 23, 1996, the Baguio City Police Command advised them to be on the
lookout for a carnapped maroon Tamaraw FX taxi with the marking "RAMA," which had been taken by unidentified
men in Marcos Highway in the evening of April 21, 1996. 41 The Pozorrubio police conducted surveillance operations
to determine if the vehicle was in their area of jurisdiction.
SPO2 Balelo then advised his superior officer, Chief Inspector Lorenzo Pedro, Pozorrubio Chief of Police, about the
information he received from Ducusin. Elements of the Pozorrubio police immediately conducted surveillance
operations in barangay Casanfernandoan to verify Ducusins report.42
On June 5, 1996, the police confirmed the information given by Ducusin that a Tamaraw FX was indeed to be found
in Casanfernandoan. The next day, the police recovered said vehicle at the camalig of Ducusins mother. They
called up Engr. Acop in Baguio City and asked him to go to Pangasinan to see if the vehicle recovered was his
missing Tamaraw FX taxi.
Despite the change in its color, Engr. Acop was able to identify the vehicle recovered by the Pozorrubio police as his
missing RAMA taxi. His identification was made through the stickers that he placed on the vehicle, the floormats, the
steering wheel cover, and the several dents on its body. 43 He also tried his spare key in the vehicles ignition to
determine if this would fit. It turned out to be a perfect fit. 44 Engr. Acop could not identify the vehicle through its
engine number or chassis number, leading him to believe that both the engine and the chassis had been changed,
but nonetheless, the vehicle recovered bore the same production number (JY 999-02) as his missing Tamaraw FX.
The recovered vehicle was then brought back to Baguio City.
In Baguio City, a macro-etching examination was conducted by Alma Margarita D. Villaseor, the PNP Forensic
Chemist at Camp Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad. 45 The examination showed that the engine number of the recovered
vehicle had not been tampered with, but the chassis number (EVER 96-49729-C) was different from that in its
certificate of registration (CF-50-0016027).46 This led Villaseor to conclude that the chassis had been
replaced.47 Nonetheless, Villaseor observed that the vehicle could still be identified through its production number
(JY 999-02), a secret manufacturers number used to distinguish a particular vehicle from others of the same make
or model.48
One of the witnesses presented by the prosecution, Robert Reyes, a marketing executive of Toyota Cubao, Inc.,
testified that there are three (3) ways by which a Toyota vehicle may be identified: (1) by the engine number; (2) by
the chassis number; and (3) its production number. Reyes categorically declared that no two (2) Toyota vehicles
would have identical engine, chassis, and production numbers. 49 Reyes also identified the production number of the
Toyota (JY 999-02) as that indicated in the sales invoice prepared by Toyota Cubao, Inc. when the said vehicle was
sold by them to NORCAR Allied Motors in Baguio City.50
Honorio Danganan, owner of NORCAR Allied Motors, an authorized Toyota dealer in Baguio City declared on the
witness stand that he sold a Toyota Tamaraw FX to the spouses Acop with the following vehicle identification
markings: (1) Engine number: 2C-302507; (2) Chassis number CF-50-0016027; and (3) Production number JY 99902.51 Danganan stated that although the recovered vehicle now had a different chassis number, it still bore the
original production number JY 999-02, thus leading him to conclude that there is a very big possibility that it was the
same vehicle he sold to the spouses Acop.52
To prove that appellants group is a syndicate organized for carnapping activities, the prosecution adduced in
evidence the information filed against appellant, Kiwas, and four other men, before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet
for carnapping with violence of another Toyota Tamaraw FX belonging to a certain James Advincula. 53
At the trial, herein appellant raised the defense of denial and alibi in his bid to escape culpability. He claimed that on
April 21, 1996, the date when Clifford Guinguino was killed, he was working at the office of BISAI until 11:00
p.m.54 Among the things he did was to prepare his belongings as he was scheduled to go to Balatoc, Antamok,
Sangilo to deliver the pay of the guards stationed there. After he was through with his preparations, he went straight
home to Brookside, Baguio City.55
Appellant further claimed that on April 28, 1996, he went home to Bued, Binalonan, Pangasinan, after office hours.
He said his family was throwing a thanksgiving party for his daughter Carla Joy Fernandez, who just graduated from
St. Louis University with a nursing degree. 56 Carla Joy, however, was not present at said affair as she was already
attending board review classes in Manila. 57 He added that it was in the midst of the family party that at about 11 p.m.
Kiwas arrived. He said Kiwas was one of the security personnel of BISAI. Together with five (5) male companions,
Kiwas came on board a Toyota Tamaraw FX with "RAMA" markings on the sides.58

According to appellant, Kiwas introduced to him one of his companions, "Benny," as a kumpare. "Benny" was
supposedly in need of money and willing to mortgage the vehicle to the appellant. 59 As the latter had no money with
him, Kiwas asked if they could go to the appellants sister in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, to mortgage the vehicle. 60
Appellant stated that he accompanied Kiwas and his group to his sisters residence in Pozorrubio. They arrived in
town at around 11:00 p.m. There they ran into a checkpoint manned by the barangay police. Appellant informed
them that he was looking for the barangay captain, Laurencio Ducusin, who happened to be his brother-in-law.61
When Ducusin arrived, the appellant claimed that he informed him about the offer of "Benny" to mortgage the
vehicle. As Ducusin was agreeable, appellant then asked Kiwas to take him back to Binalonan as it was already late
and he had to report for work the following day in Baguio City. 62 He denied staying at the Ducusin residence for two
days. He said Ducusin and two of the companions of Kiwas brought him back to Binalonan right away, arriving there
at around two oclock in the morning.63
To buttress his alibi that he was at work in BISAI the night of April 21, 1996, when Clifford Guinguino was killed and
the Toyota Tamaraw FX vehicle he was driving disappeared, the appellant presented Rolanda Paraan, former
Administrative Manager of BISAI and two accounting clerks of said security agency, namely: Emma Ruth Alcantara
and Evelyn Madarang.
1awphi1.nt

Alcantara and Madarang corroborated appellants alibi that he worked from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. on April 21,
1996.64 Appellants defense presented the payroll of BISAI and his daily time record. But on cross-examination, none
of the defense witnesses could state with certainty where appellant was from the time he reported to work in the
morning to the time he left in the evening. 65 As appellants own testimony showed, his work as security operations
officer was mainly in the field, supervising and inspecting the security guards deployed in various places in Baguio
City.66 Neither Alcantara nor Madarang could categorically state whether appellant had in fact returned to the office
from his rounds of the security postings to log out at 7:00 p.m. since both ladies left the BISAI offices at 5:00 p.m.
On January 14, 1998, the trial court promulgated its judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ISAIAH FERNANDEZ Y VERAS, also known as Isaias Fernandez,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 14 of Republic Act 6539, as amended by Section 20 of
Republic Act 7659 (Qualified Carnapping where the driver of the carnapped vehicle, Clifford Guinguino, was killed in
the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof) as charged in the Information in
conspiracy with Robert Kiwas (who was already convicted after a separate trial earlier) and others whose identities
and whereabouts are yet unknown, and hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH to be
implemented in accordance with law; to indemnify jointly and severally with his confederates, the heirs of Clifford
Guinguino the sum of P50,000.00 for his death, P74,945.00 as actual damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages,
and P1,590,000.00 as unearned income; and to likewise indemnify jointly and severally with his confederates, the
spouses Jeffred Acop and Josephine Acop, the owners of the carnapped subject taxi, the amount of P373,500.00 as
value of the carnapped vehicle, all indemnifications are without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and
to pay the proportionate costs.
SO ORDERED.67
In view of the imposition of the death penalty, the records of Criminal Case No. 14390-R were elevated to this Court
for automatic review.
Before us, the appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT FERNANDEZ IS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
QUALIFIED CARNAPPING.
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON
RECORD TO PROVE THAT FERNANDEZ COMMITTED QUALIFIED CARNAPPING.
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN LENDING UNDUE CREDENCE TO WITNESS LAURENCIO DUCUSINS
PATENTLY UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY.
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON
RECORD TO PROVE THAT FERNANDEZ CONSPIRED WITH ROBERT KIWAS AND THREE (3) JOHN DOES TO
COMMIT QUALIFIED CARNAPPING.
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON PATENTLY INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS
FINDING OF GUILT AGAINST FERNANDEZ.

E. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO LEND CREDENCE TO FERNANDEZ VERSION OF THE
EVENTS.
1a\^/phi1.net

F. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED FERNANDEZ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT

UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING ON FERNANDEZ THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH.
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT FERNANDEZ IS A MEMBER OF AN ORGANIZED GROUP OR
SYNDICATE ENGAGED IN AN ILLEGAL CARNAPPING SCHEME. 68
Briefly stated, the issues for our resolution are: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain appellants conviction;
and (2) the propriety of the penalty imposed.
On the first issue, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the essential elements of carnapping as
defined in Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended. He contends that, assuming arguendothere
is on record circumstantial evidence against appellant, nonetheless such evidence could not be relied upon by the
trial court to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt that he participated in the unlawful taking of the vehicle and
fatal shooting of its driver. Instead, according to appellant, the most that could be attributed to him is that he
accompanied the group of Kiwas in bringing the stolen vehicle to Laurencio Ducusin in Pangasinan.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the undisputed factual circumstances
established by the prosecution constitute an unbroken chain of events which lead fairly and reasonably to but one
conclusion, namely: that the appellant is guilty of the offense charged.
For circumstantial evidence to be a sufficient basis for a conviction, the following requisites must be satisfied: (1)
there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 69
Considering the evidence on record, with the submission of the parties, we find the prosecution evidence sufficient
to sustain appellants conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, we find no reason to deviate from the trial courts
assessment as to appellants culpability for carnapping with homicide.
The trial court found appellant and his companions were in control and possession of the subject vehicle soon after
the shooting of the driver, Clifford Guinguino. Witness Laurencio Ducusin testified that when the group of appellant
arrived in Pozzorubio, Pangasinan, appellant who was addressed as "Sir" by his companions, was the one driving
the vehicle. Appellant himself admitted that the taxi he rode in going to the Ducusins had the marking "RAMA" on
it.70
In the absence of an explanation of how one has come into the possession of stolen effects belonging to a person
shot, wounded and treacherously killed, he must necessarily be considered the author of the aggression, the death
of the person, as well as the robbery committed.71 This presumption is consonant with Rule 131 (3) (j) of the Rules of
Court72 and validly applies to a case of carnapping for, indeed, the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and
carnapping is the same and, had it not been for the enactment of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the unlawful taking of the
motor vehicle would certainly fall within the purview of either theft or robbery. This presumption extends to cases
where such possession is either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of
independent evidence inconsistent thereto. 73 Appellant having failed to give a plausible explanation for his
possession of the stolen Tamaraw FX, perforce, he is presumed to have taken the vehicle away from the rightful
owner or possessor thereof.
We have no reason to doubt Ducusins credibility as a witness. Ducusin is appellants own brother-in-law, but he is
also a Barangay Captain. Despite his relationship with appellant, his sense of justice proved unerring. He bared his
suspicion to the police that the vehicle left in his care was a hot item. Appellant tried to ascribe ill-motive on Ducusin
for testifying against him, but appellant failed in this regard. Absent a showing that the witness was actuated by an
improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit.74 This rule has a more compelling application when the witness testifies against a relative, for no person
would implicate in a crime his own kin, disregarding the unspeakable social stigma it may cause against his entire
family, unless that person seeks only the truth, for justice to prevail.
We find that sufficient circumstantial evidence exists, consistent with appellants guilt, and inconsistent with his
innocence. 75 Against appellant are the following circumstances: (1) He and his group were in possession of the
stolen Tamaraw FX after its driver was shot to death. (2) The victim, Clifford Guinguino, was last seen between 6 to
7 p.m. that night, with five men aboard the FX dovetailing with the testimony of Ducusin that appellants party of five
men were on board the vehicle when they arrived in Pangasinan before midnight sometime in the latter part of April.
(3) Appellant who was addressed as "Sir" by the group, was the one driving the vehicle when he, Kiwas, and three
John Does arrived in Pangasinan hours after the Guinguinos fatal shooting. (4) On arrival in Pangasinan, appellant
and Kiwas were armed with .22 caliber guns while the others were carrying .38 caliber guns, which match the

wounds of the victim, some of which were characteristic of .22 caliber bullets while the others were bigger, typical of
a .38 caliber. (5) Appellant and his group left the vehicle at the Ducusins at the pretext that it needed repairs,
although it was brand new and was able to run all the way from Baguio. (6) Instead of just repairing it, a man sent by
appellants group changed the engine and chassis of the vehicle and repainted its body from maroon to gold. (7)
Appellant did a vanishing act from his work a day after the stolen car was identified by its owner and placed
in custodia legis. (8) He went into hiding and was unheard of until his arrest.
The foregoing factual circumstances constitute evidence of weight and probative force which may even surpass
direct evidence in its effect upon the Court. 76 The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence under Sec. 4, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court 77 is that the guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one particular piece of
evidence. Circumstantial evidence is like a rope composed of many strands and cords. One strand might be
insufficient, but five together may suffice to give it strength. 78 Here, strands of evidentiary facts weaved together
compels to conclude that the crime of carnapping with homicide has been committed, and that the appellant cannot
hide behind the veil of presumed innocence.
Lastly, we find appellants defense of alibi inadequate to support his exculpation.
According to appellant, on April 21, 1996, he was at work from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. and the next day, April 22,
from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. He presented in this regard his payroll receipts as supporting evidence. However, as
found by the trial court, his claim that he worked on April 21, 1996 in BISAI from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m. is contradicted by
his own daily time record, which stated that he was at work from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. only that day. Also, the Accounting
Clerk from BISAI who prepared the said payroll, said there was no way of ascertaining whether appellant was in fact
present at his post of duty because, as roving supervisor, he checked security guards in their posts located at
various client-establishments.
1vvphi1.nt

Appellant claims that he went down to Binalonan to attend his daughters graduation thanksgiving party on April 28,
1996. There at about 11 p.m., Kiwas and five companions whom he had not met before arrived on board the subject
"RAMA" taxi and spoke to him about their dire need of cash and their willingness to mortgage the subject taxi,
according to appellant. Since he was cash-strapped himself, appellant said, he accompanied them to the house of
his sister and brother-in-law, Laurencio Ducusin, in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. They arrived in Pozorrubio at about
midnight. But, according to appellant, it was not he but only Kiwas and his group who transacted business with his
sister. Thereafter, at 2 a.m. the next day, the group brought him back to Binalonan while Kiwas and others spent the
rest of the night in Pozorrubio with the Ducusins.
As the trial court observed, appellants version of events runs contrary to ordinary human experience. His story
taxes ones credulity too much.
Why would appellants family set the celebration of his daughters graduation on a date when supposedly the
celebrant was in Manila already reviewing for the board exams? Whats the logic behind Kiwas driving all the way
from Baguio to Pangasinan in the middle of the night just to borrow money from appellant? Why was Kiwas
accompanied by five men just to get the alleged loan? What prompted appellant to rush with a group of strangers to
his sisters house in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, in the middle of the night? Why borrow only P10,000, but leave a new
FX taxi worth P400,000 as collateral? All these questions beg to be answered, but in vain, as we try to make sense
of appellants tale.
As a supervisor of the security agency, appellant was not a novice in the nuances of the law. Seeing the taxis
"RAMA" markings boldly written on it, appellant should have been more circumspect as to vehicles ownership. Why
didnt he inquire for the registration papers of the FX? For someone of his stature and experience, it was rather odd
that he did not inquire into the basics of a rush transaction.
Even more puzzling, appellant did not present his sister to corroborate the essentials of his story. The defense had
no corroborating witnesses at all to back appellants version. His denial and alibi have no leg to stand on.
In sum, we find no reason nor justification to reverse the findings and conclusions of the trial court. In affirming
convictions, the evidence required remains, as always, one beyond reasonable doubt, though we do not ask for
proof that excludes all possibility of error.79 Only moral, not absolute, certainty is what the fundamental law requires.
In this case, considering the circumstances of the case, we entertain no doubt on appellants guilt.
As to the penalty, the trial court imposed the death sentence on appellant. Pursuant to the last clause of Section 14
of the Anti-Carnapping Act, amended by Section 20 of Republic Act 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
is imposable when the owner or the driver of the vehicle is killed in the course of the commission of the carnapping
or on the occasion thereof. 80 Considering as aggravating the commission of the offense by a person belonging to an
organized or syndicated crime group under Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, 81 the
trial court imposed the extreme penalty on appellant. But appellants defense now questions the propriety of
imposing on him the death sentence.
Under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, both aggravating and qualifying
circumstances must be alleged in the information. Being favorable, to the appellant, this new rule can be given
retroactive effect as they are applicable to pending cases.82

In this case, the allegation of being part of a syndicate or that appellant and companions had formed part of a group
organized for the general purpose of committing crimes for gain, which is the essence of a syndicated or organized
crime group,83 was neither alleged nor proved by the prosecution. Hence, we agree that it was error for the trial court
to sentence appellant under Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659.
No aggravating circumstance having been alleged or proved properly in this case, the provisions of Article 63 (2) of
the Revised Penal Code should be applied. Without mitigating nor aggravating circumstance found in the
commission of the offense, the lesser penalty for the offense, which is reclusion perpetua, should be imposed on
appellant.
As to damages, the amount of the trial courts award for lost earnings needs to be recomputed and modified
accordingly.
The Court notes that the victim was 27 years old at the time of his death and his wife testified that as a driver of the
Tamaraw FX taxi, he was earning at least P250.84 Hence, the damages payable for the loss of the victims earning
capacity following the formula85 used by the Court in People v. Visperas, G.R. No. 147315, January 13, 2003, is
computed thus:
Gross Annual Earnings

= P250 x 261 working days in a year

= P 65,250

Net Earning Capacity

= 2/3 x (80-27) x [P 65,250- P 32,625]

= 35.33 x P 32,625

Lost Earnings

= P 1,152,641

With respect to the award by the trial court of P200,000 in moral damages, in line with prevailing jurisprudence, it
should be deleted for lack of needed proof. The award of P74,945 as burial and other expenses is also deleted for
lack of adequate proof, but the victims heirs are entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000 pursuant
to case law. The award of P373,500 to the Spouses Jeffred and Josephine Acop, as restitution of the value of their
FX taxi, should also be upheld because it is supported by evidence on record. 86
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6, dated January 14, 1998, in
Criminal Case No. 14390-R, finding appellant ISAIAS FERNANDEZ y VERAS a.k.a. "ISAIAH FERNANDEZ" guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Republic Act No. 6539 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim CLIFFORD GUINGUINO the
sum of P50,000 as civil indemnity, P1,152,641 representing lost earnings, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
Appellant is also ORDERED TO PAY the owners of the FX taxi, Spouses Jeffred and Josephine Acop, the amount
of P373,500, as restitution for the stolen vehicle. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 159280

May 18, 2004

AUGUSTO SIM, JR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and The PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a Decision 1 by
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 21, 2003 affirming with modification the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 34, finding petitioner Augusto Sim, Jr. and co-accused Elison Villaflor guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, instead of Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) thereof, as well as its Resolution3 dated August 1, 2003 denying appellants Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioner and co-accused Elison Villaflor were sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prisin correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusin temporal, as
maximum, and to indemnify the private complainant Jay Byron Ilagan the sum of P480,000.00 representing the
amount paid for the purchase of the car that was impounded by the authorities.
Elison Villaflor and Augusto Sim, Jr., were formally charged with the crime of Estafa in an Information dated
September 6, 1999 which reads:4
That on or about May 2, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud Jay Byron Ilagan in the following manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false
manifestations which they made to said Jay Byron Ilagan to the effect that they are selling one (1) colored
green Nissan Pathfinder pick-up with motor number PD27-555735 bearing Plate No. BCF-620 in the amount
of P480,000.00 registered in the name of Henry Austria, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and
succeeded in inducing said Jay Byron Ilagan to give and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said
accused the amount of P480,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said
accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent, as the said car is a stolen car and they are
not the owner, and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact they did obtain the amount of P480,000.00 which
amount once in their possession, with intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated,
misapplied and converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Jay
Byron Ilagan in the aforesaid amount of P350,000.00, Philippine currency.
Contrary to law.
Private complainant Jay Byron Ilagan is a tire supplier whose store, Marfi Tire Supply, is located along the
highway at San Pablo City, Laguna. He had been dealing with accused Elison Villaflor for twenty years, as
the latter is engaged in the same business of selling tires and rims at 39 C-3 Road, Dagat-Dagatan,
Caloocan City.
In March 1998, private complainant talked to Elison somewhere in Tondo, Manila, and expressed his interest
in buying a vehicle. Elison told him that he knew someone who sells vehicles at a cheap price, and that he
had bought a Toyota Tamaraw FX at lower than the market price. Private complainant then asked Elison to
ask if there was an Isuzu pick-up for sale. A month later, Elison called private complainant to inform him that
he was able to find a 1997 Nissan Pathfinder. They agreed to inspect the vehicle together as private
complainant wanted to buy it before his birthday on May 31, 1998. 5
On April 30, 1998, only Elison went to Dagupan City to get the Nissan Pathfinder from his friend, petitioner Augusto
Sim, Jr. Petitioner told Elison that the Nissan Pathfinder was given to him by a customer in payment of a debt and
had been used only for a year.
Elison brought the 1997 Nissan Pathfinder to San Pablo City. Private complainant at first did not like the vehicle
since it was not the brand he was looking for. Elison said that his kumpadre would look at the vehicle as the latter
was also interested in it.6
Private complainant decided to buy the 1997 Nissan Pathfinder at the agreed price of P480,000.00. The amount
was paid in five checks issued by Fe Ilagan under her account at Solidbank-San Pablo Branch. One check was
dated May 6, 1998 in the sum of P350,000.00, and four checks in the sum of P32,500.00 each was dated June 6,
July 6, August 6 and September 6, all in 1998.7

Elison gave private complainant photocopies of the Certificate of Registration (C.R.) and Official Receipt (O.R.)
issued by the Land Transportation Office (LTO) showing the name of the owner as one Henry Austria. While waiting
for the processing of the papers, the vehicle was parked at private complainants place. After a week, Elison brought
the deed of sale which private complainant signed without the signature of the owner, Henry Austria. After private
complainant signed the deed of sale, he gave it back to Elison to be brought back to Dagupan City for signing by the
owner/vendor and transfer of registration in the name of private complainant. 8
On June 7, 1998, Elison returned and delivered to private complainant the deed of sale signed by the owner/vendor,
together with the new C.R. and O.R. issued by the LTO of Lingayen, Pangasinan in the name of private
complainant.9
The checks given by private complainant in payment of the vehicle were deposited by petitioner in his name at
Solidbank-Dagupan Branch. All five checks were debited in favor of petitioner. After receiving the registration papers
from Elison, private complainant was eventually able to use the Nissan Pathfinder.10
On October 28, 1998, private complainants vehicle was apprehended by Anti-Carnapping operatives of the
Philippine National Police (ANCAR NCRTMO). The vehicle and its registration papers were inspected and thereafter
brought to Camp Crame. It turned out that the vehicle was a "hot car" as it had been reported stolen on November
29, 1997 by its real owner, Golf Construction of the Philippines, Inc. pursuant to the Alarm Sheet issued by the PNP
Traffic Management Group.11
Private complainant accompanied the ANCAR operatives to the residence of Elison. He went with them to Camp
Crame, and named petitioner as the owner of the vehicle. However, they were not able to locate petitioner right
away. Meanwhile, the vehicle was impounded by the authorities. The investigation revealed that its original motor
and chassis numbers were replaced and/or tampered but its Production Number remained intact. Eventually, the
real description of the vehicle was fully established and identified by no less than the manufacturer/assembler of the
unit, Universal Motors Corporation.12
Private complainant spoke with Elison about the possible recovery of the money paid by him for the confiscated
vehicle. On November 30, 1998, private complainant met petitioner for the first time. Petitioner signed a Promissory
Note with Deed of Undertaking whereby he obligated himself to pay private complainant the amount of P480,000.00
plus attorneys fees of P50,000.00 in scheduled installments. Petitioner issued a check in the amount of P75,000.00
but private complainant did not encash it, thinking that if he does, petitioner would not pay him anymore. Private
complainant was unable to recover the money paid by him to petitioner.13
Thereafter, Elison and petitioner were charged with estafa under a criminal information dated September 6, 1999.
Elison was arraigned on September 17, 1999; while petitioner was arraigned on June 1, 2000. Both pleaded "not
guilty."
After trial, the trial court convicted both Elison and petitioner of the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment with the modification that
appellants should be convicted of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, assigning the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT RULED THAT CONSPIRACY IS PRESENT CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE ON THE ACQUITTAL OF HEREIN PETITIONER.
Two issues are presented before this Court: (1) Whether there was conspiracy between petitioner and Elison
Villaflor in defrauding private complainant Jay Byron Ilagan; and (2) Whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.
On the first assignment of error, petitioner argues that there is no conspiracy between him and co-accused. He
points that it was only co-accused Elison Villaflor who dealt with private complainant. The latter had not even met
him before he was allegedly forced to sign the amicable agreement.

Petitioner further alleges that contrary to the findings of the appellate court, there is no convincing evidence to show
that petitioner performed any previous or simultaneous act with Elison in committing the offense against private
complainant. The witnesses presented by the prosecution did not show or prove that petitioner directly participated
in the commission of the offense or performed an act which would show community of purpose with Elison.
Petitioners argument is bereft of merit.
Even in the absence of direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime, conspiracy may be deduced from
the acts of the perpetrators before, during and after the commission of the crime, which are indicative of a common
design, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.14 Conspiracy is deemed implied when the malefactors
have a common purpose and were united in its execution. Spontaneous agreement or active cooperation by all
perpetrators at the moment of the commission of the crime is sufficient to create joint criminal responsibility.15
In Erquiaga v. Court of Appeals,16 we ruled that conspiracy, as a rule, has to be established with the same quantum
of proof as the crime itself and shown as clearly as the commission of the crime. However, conspiracy need not be
shown by direct evidence, but may take the form of circumstances which, if taken together, would conclusively show
that the accused came to an agreement to commit a crime and decided to carry it out with their full cooperation and
participation.
As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, petitioners actions in relation to the fraudulent sale of the Nissan
Pathfinder to private complainant clearly established conspiracy as alleged in the information, which acts transcend
mere knowledge or friendship with co-accused Elison. 17 Notwithstanding the fact that it was only Elison who dealt
with or personally transacted with private complainant until the time the sale was consummated, by his own
testimony petitioner admitted all the acts by which he actively cooperated and not merely acquiesced in perpetrating
the fraud upon private complainant.18 That petitioner is a conspirator having joint criminal design with Elison is
evident from the fact that as between them, both knew that petitioner was the person selling the vehicle under the
false pretense that a certain Henry Austria was the registered owner.19 Petitioner, together with Elison, clearly
deceived private complainant in order to defraud him in the amount of P480,000.00, to the latters damage and
prejudice. In addition, the acts of petitioner in deliberately misrepresenting himself to private complainant as having
the necessary authority to possess and sell to the latter the vehicle so that he could collect from him P480,000.00
only to renege on that promise and for failure to reimburse the said amount he collected from private complainant,
despite demand, amount to estafa punishable under Art. 315, par. 2 (a).
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the findings of fact of the trial court, aptly observed: 20
That conviction under the afore-cited provision is more proper is evident from the trial courts finding that
appellant Augusto Sim, Jr. from the very beginning was aware that the subject vehicle was not his nor given
to him in payment of debt as he made appellant Villaflor to believe. Nonetheless, appellant Villaflor was not
absolved from liability, having actively conspired with appellant Augusto Sim, Jr. to convince private
complainant to purchase the Pathfinder upon their false pretense and representation that said vehicle was
being sold by its real owner, Henry Austria, the name appearing in the registration papers and deed of sale
under circumstances clearly showing their knowledge that the status of said vehicle is dubious or
anomalous, as in fact it turned out to be a "hot car" or had been stolen/carnapped from its true owner. The
totality of the evidence indicates a common or joint design, purpose and objective of the accused-appellants
to defraud private complainant who parted with his money upon the belief that there is no problem regarding
the ownership of the Pathfinder sold to him by the appellants.
The trial court rejected the argument of the defense that it was private complainant who supposedly had the vehicle
and its registration papers checked at Camp Crame before buying the same. It pointed out that verification would
have been difficult considering that the motor and chassis numbers in the registration papers are correct but the
name of the owner appearing therein is false.
Elisons false pretense in holding out that he had authorization from the owner to sell the 1997 Nissan Pathfinder
was made in conjunction with petitioners fraudulent misrepresentation that he was legally entitled to possess the
aforesaid vehicle. The evidence shows that petitioner and Elison acted in conspiracy to deceive private complainant
into buying a stolen Nissan Pathfinder, thereby defrauding the latter in the amount of P480,000.00, and upon their
false pretense and representation as to the real status of the vehicle, i.e., that said unit is in fact being sold by its
true owner Henry Austria and that Augusto Sim, Jr. in whose name the checks were issued had the authority or right
to sell the same. After a few months, the vehicle sold was apprehended and impounded by police authorities for
being stolen or carnapped which resulted in pecuniary damage to private complainant who had demanded the
return of his money from petitioner and Elison.21 The evidence of the prosecution satisfactorily established the
fraudulent acts and representations which induced private complainant to part with his money for which he suffered

damage and loss when the vehicle sold to him by petitioner and Elison was recovered by its true owner through
operatives of the police anti-carnapping group.22
On the second assignment of error, petitioner contends that the evidence is not sufficient to prove petitioners guilt
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners contention is untenable.
While the trial court charged and convicted petitioner and his co-accused of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code, the appellate court modified the lower courts decision by convicting them of the same crime
under Art. 315, par. 2 (a).
Regardless of whether petitioner is charged or convicted under either par. 1 (b) or par. 2 (a) of Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, he would still be guilty of estafa because damage and deceit, which are essential elements of
the crime, have been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. False pretenses or fraudulent acts were
committed prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud by falsely pretending to possess property. In
this case, false pretenses or fraudulent acts were employed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud by falsely pretending to possess the 1997 Nissan Pathfinder, where damage and deceit have been
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions and
concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to
another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term embracing all
multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an
advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning,
dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated. Deceit is a species of fraud. 23
Swindling or estafa by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud is committed "[b]y using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by other similar deceits." 24
The elements of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) are: (1) There must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means; (2) Such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) The offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (4) As a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. 25
These four elements are present in the instant case: (1) False pretenses were employed by petitioner and his coaccused to deceive private complainant into purchasing the stolen Nissan Pathfinder; (2) False pretenses were
employed prior to, and simultaneously with, the fraudulent sale of the Nissan Pathfinder; (3) Private complainant
relied on false pretenses of petitioner and co-accused, inducing him to part with his money due to the
misrepresentation employed by the perpetrators of the fraud; and (4) As a result of false pretenses and
misrepresentations by petitioner and co-accused, private complainant suffered damages in the amount of
P480,000.00.
Furthermore, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court, which is in the best position to make
an assessment of the witnesses credibility and to appreciate complainants truthfulness, honesty and
candor.26 Factual findings of trial courts, as well as their assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are entitled to
great weight and respect by this Court more so when these are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 27 As against the
positive and categorical testimonies of the complainant, petitioners mere denial cannot prevail.
The proper imposable penalty for the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) is prisin correccional in its maximum
period to prisin mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed
P22,000.00, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding
one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
(20) years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed prisin mayor or reclusin temporal, as the case may be.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law,28 if the offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum
term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. The
penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering

any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is
left by law to the sound discretion of the court and can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower
without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered
only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.
In the present case, petitioner defrauded private complainant in the amount of P480,000.00. The fact that the
amount involved in the case at bar exceeds P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial determination of the
indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter should be so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the
imposition of the maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This legal interpretation accords with the rule
that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused.29
The maximum penalty to be imposed on petitioner should be taken from the maximum period of the penalty under
Art. 315, which is reclusin temporal, since the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00, adding one year for each
additional P10,000.00, but the total penalty which may be imposed should not exceed twenty (20) years.
Since the penalty prescribed by law for the crime of estafa under Art. 31530 is prisin mayor in its minimum period if
the amount of the fraud exceeds P22,000.00, the minimum term should be within the range of the penalty next lower
to that prescribed by the Code for the offense, which is prisin correccional in its maximum period. Hence, the
minimum period of the penalty should be from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. The
determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and can be anywhere within
the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided.
We are convinced that the appropriate penalty in accordance with law that can best serve the ends of justice in the
case at bar should range from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prisin correccional, as minimum, to
twenty years of reclusin temporal, as maximum, for the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised
Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the May 21, 2003 Decision and August 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMEDwith MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed. Appellant Augusto Sim, Jr. is sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prisin correccional, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years of reclusin temporal, as maximum, for the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a). He is further
ordered to indemnify the private complainant Jay Byron Ilagan, jointly and severally with Elison Villaflor, the sum of
P480,000.00 with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum until fully paid.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

G.R. No. 187044

Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

- versus -

RENATO LAGAT y GAWANa.k.a. RENAT

GAWAN andJAMES
PALALAY yVILLAROSA,
Accused-Appellants.

Promulgated:
September 14, 2011

x----------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This appeal was filed by accused-appellants Renato Lagat y Gawan (Lagat), also known as Renat
Gawan, and James Palalay y Villarosa (Palalay) to challenge the Court of Appeals October 8,
2008 Decision[1] in CA-G.R.

CR.-H.C.

No.

02869,

for

affirming

with

modification

[2]

the

March

19,

2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21, Santiago City, wherein they were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Carnapping in Criminal Case No. 21-4949.

Accused-appellants Lagat and Palalay were charged with the crime of Carnapping as defined under
Section 2 and penalized under Section 14[3] of Republic Act No. 6539.The accusatory portion of the
Information,[4] reads:
That on or about the 12th day of April 2005, at Santiago City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, conniving with each
other, and mutually helping one another and with intent to gain and without the consent of the
owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away
one (1) unit YASUKI tricycle bearing Engine No. 161FMJ41535420 and Motor No.
LX8PCK0034D002243 then driven and owned by JOSE BIAG, valued at 70,000.00, to the
damage and prejudice of the owner thereof.
That in the course of the commission of carnapping, or on occasion thereof, the above-named
accused, conspiring, conniving confederating and helping each other, and with intent to kill, did
then and there assault, attack and wound the said JOSE BIAG with sharp and pointed
instrument directing blows against the vital parts of the body of the latter thereby inflicting upon
him multiple stab and hacking wounds which directly caused the death of the said JOSE BIAG.

Lagat pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on June 16, 2005.[5] Palalay, on the other hand, did not enter
any plea; hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the RTC for him.[6]
On August 1, 2005, both accused proposed to plead guilty to a lesser offense.[7] In their plea-bargaining
proposal,[8] they asked that they be allowed to plead guilty to the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code and that the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and/or no intention to commit so
grave a wrong be considered in their favor. They also asked that damages be fixed at 120,000.00. This
proposal was rejected[9] by the prosecution; thus, the pre-trial conference proceeded. The pre-trial Order
contained the following facts as admitted by the parties:
1.
That the cadaver of Jose Biag was recovered along Angadanan and Sn. Guillermo
road by members of the police together with Barangay Captain Heherson Dulay and Chief
Tanod Rumbaoa, Sr.
2.
That the two accused were arrested in possession of palay allegedly stolen in
Alicia, Isabela.
3.
That the cause of death of Jose Biag was multiple stab and hack wounds as
described in the Autopsy Report and death certificate which shall be submitted during trial.[10]

After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution first presented Florida Biag (Florida), the wife of the victim Jose Biag (Biag), to testify
on the circumstances leading to Biags disappearance and the discovery of his body, the recovery of Biags
tricycle, and the expenses she incurred and the income she had lost as a result of her husbands death. Florida
testified that her husband was a farmer, a barangay tanod, and a tricycle driver.[11] On April 12, 2005, at around
two oclock in the morning, her husband left to operate his tricycle for public use.It was around 11:00 a.m. of
April 13, 2005, when news reached her that their tricycle was with the Philippine National Police (PNP) of the
Municipality of Alicia and that her husband had figured in an accident. After learning of the incident, Florida
sought the help of their Barangay (Brgy.) Captain, Heherson Dulay, who immediately left for Angadanan
without her. At around 2:00 p.m., Brgy. Captain Dulay informed[12] Florida of what had happened to her
husband.[13] Florida then presented in court the receipts [14] evidencing the expenses she had incurred for her
husbands wake and funeral and for the repair of their tricycle, which was recovered with missing parts. She
also testified as to the income Biag was earning as a farmer, a tanod, and a tricycle driver, and claimed that his
death had caused her sleepless nights.[15]

The second witness for the prosecution was the Chief Tanod of Barangay Rizal, Poe Rumbaoa, Sr.
(Rumbaoa). He testified that on April 13, 2005, after he and Brgy. Captain Dulay received Floridas report, they
immediately went to the Alicia Police Station, wherein they found Biags tricycle. The PNP of Alicia showed
them the identification card recovered in the tricycle and told them that the tricycle was used in
stealing palay from a store in Angadanan, Isabela that belonged to a certain Jimmy Esteban
(Esteban).Rumbaoa and Brgy. Captain Dulay were also told that the owner of the tricycle was killed and
dumped along the Angadanan and San Guillermo Road. They were thereafter shown the two suspects and the
place where Biags body was dumped. Rumbaoa said that he was able to identify the body as Biags, which was
almost unrecognizable because it was bloated all over, only because Biag had a mark on his right shoulder,
which Rumbaoa knew of.[16]
Police Officer 2 (PO2) Arthur Salvador, a member of the PNP in Alicia, took the witness stand next. He
testified that on April 13, 2005, he was on duty along with other colleagues at the Alicia PNP Station, when they
received a report from Esteban that the cavans of palay stolen from him were seen at Alice Palay Buying
Station in Alicia, Isabela, in a tricycle commandeered by two unidentified male persons. PO2 Salvador said that
upon receipt of this report, their Chief of Police composed a team, which included him, PO2 Bernard Ignacio,
and PO2 Nathan Abuan, to verify the veracity of the report. At Alice Palay Buying Station, they saw the tricycle
described to them by their chief, with the cavans of palay, and the two accused, Lagat and Palalay. PO2
Salvador averred that he and his team were about to approach the tricycle when the two accused
scampered[17]to different directions. After collaring the two accused, they brought them to the Alicia PNP Station
together with the tricycle and its contents. PO2 Salvador asseverated that when they reached the station, they
asked the two accused if they had any papers to show for both the tricycle and the palay, to which the two
accused did not answer. They allegedly kept silent even after they were informed of their rights not only to
remain as such, but also to have counsel, either of their own choosing, or to be assigned to them if they cannot
afford one. PO2 Salvador then continued that when they unloaded the tricycle, they discovered bloodstains
inside and outside the sidecar. He also personally found a wallet containing the tricycles Certificate of
Registration and Official Receipt [18] issued by the Land Transportation Office in the name of Jose Biag. When
they asked the two accused about their discoveries, Lagat and Palalay voluntarily answered that the name in
the papers is that of the owner of the tricycle, whom they killed and dumped along Angadanan and San
Guillermo Road, when they carnapped his tricyle. PO2 Salvador alleged that upon hearing this revelation, they
again informed Lagat and Palalay that anything they say would be used against them, and that they had a right
to counsel. Thereafter, they coordinated with the PNP of Angadanan Police Station, and together with the two
accused, they proceeded to Angadanan-San Guillermo Road, where they found Biags body in a ravine just
after the bridge near the road.[19]
The prosecutions last witness, PO2 Ignacio corroborated PO2 Salvadors testimony on the events that
led them to the tricycle, the palay, the two accused, and the body of Biag. He also confirmed PO2 Salvadors
claim that they had informed the two accused of their rights but the latter just ignored them; hence, they
continued with their investigation.[20] PO2 Ignacio added that the two accused also told them how they killed
Biag, to wit:
A-

They rented a tricycle from Santiago to Alicia but they proceeded to

Angadanan. And upon arrival at the site, they poked a knife to the driver and the driver
ran away. They chased him and stabbed him, sir.[21]

Upon cross-examination, PO2 Ignacio averred that they were not able to recover the murder weapon
despite diligent efforts to look for it and that they had questioned the people at Alice Palay Buying Station and

were told that the two accused had no other companion. PO2 Ignacio also admitted that while they informed
Lagat and Palalay of their constitutional rights, the two were never assisted by counsel at any time during the
custodial investigation.[22]
The prosecution also submitted the Post-Mortem Autopsy Report[23] on Biag of Dr. Edgar Romanchito P.
Bayang, the Assistant City Health and Medico-Legal Officer of Santiago City. The Report showed that Biag was
likely killed between 12:00 noon and 2:00 p.m. of April 12, 2004, and that he had sustained three stab wounds,
an incise wound, two hack wounds and an avulsion of the skin extending towards the abdomen.[24]
After the prosecution rested its case, the accused filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to
Evidence[25] without leave of court[26] on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Lagat and Palalay averred that their constitutional rights on custodial investigation were
grossly violated as they were interrogated for hours without counsel, relatives, or any disinterested third person
to assist them. Moreover, the admissions they allegedly made were not supported by documentary
evidence. Palalay further claimed that Rumbaoas testimony showed that he had a swelling above his right eye
and a knife wound in his left arm, which suggests that he was maltreated while under police custody.[27]
The accused also claimed that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was not
sufficient to convict them. They averred that aside from the alleged admissions they had made, the prosecution
had nothing else: they had no object evidence for the bloodstains allegedly found in the tricycle; the murder
weapon was never found; and no eyewitness aside from the police officers was presented to show that they
were in possession of the tricycle at the time they were arrested. Lagat and Palalay argued that the
prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of events that showed their guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
thus, they were entitled to enjoy the constitutional presumption of innocence absent proof that they were guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.[28]
As the accused filed their Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court, they in effect waived their right
to present evidence, and submitted the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.[29]
On March 19, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE in the light of the foregoing considerations the Court finds the accused
Renato Lagat y Gawan and James Palalay y Villarosa GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
qualified carnapping and hereby sentences each of them to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. They are also ORDERED TO PAY Florida Biag the sum of Twelve thousand three
hundred pesos (12,300.00) as actual damages plus Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00) for
death indemnity and another Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00) for moral damages.[30]

After evaluating the evidence the prosecution presented, the RTC agreed with the accused that their
rights were violated during their custodial investigation as they had no counsel to assist them. Thus, whatever
admissions they had made, whether voluntarily or not, could not be used against them and were inadmissible
in evidence.[31]
However, the RTC held that despite the absence of an eyewitness, the prosecution was able to
establish enough circumstantial evidence to prove that Lagat and Palalay committed the crime, to wit:
1.

The accused were caught by the Alicia PNP in possession of Biags tricycle, loaded with
stolen palay;

2.

The accused ran immediately when they saw the Alicia PNP approaching them;

3.

The Alicia PNP found bloodstains on the tricycle and Biags wallet with documents to prove that
Biag owned the tricycle;

4.

The Alicia PNP contacted the PNP of Santiago City to inquire about a Jose Biag, and this was how
the barangay officials of Santiago City and Florida found out that Biags tricycle was with the Alicia
PNP;

5.

Biag left early morning on April 12, 2005 and never returned home;

6.

The accused themselves led the Alicia PNP and Barangay Captain Dulay and Rumbaoa to where
they dumped Biags body.[32]

The RTC convicted Lagat and Palalay of the crime of carnapping, qualified by the killing of Biag, which,
according to the RTC, appeared to have been done in the course of the carnapping.[33]
Lagat and Palalay asked the RTC to reconsider its Decision on the grounds that it erred in giving full
credence to the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses and in relying on the circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution.[34]
On May 29, 2007, the RTC denied [35] this motion, holding that the testimonies of the witnesses were
credible and supported by the attending facts and circumstances, and that there was sufficient circumstantial
evidence to convict the accused.
Lagat and Palalay went[36] to the Court of Appeals, asserting that their guilt was not established beyond
reasonable doubt.[37] They averred that circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient for a judgment of conviction,
must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with innocence, [38] which was allegedly not the case in
their situation. They elaborated on why the circumstantial evidence the RTC enumerated could not be taken
against them:
1.

The accuseds possession of the tricycle cannot prove that they killed its owner;

2.

Their act of fleeing may be due to the stolen palay (which is not the subject of this case), and not
the tricycle;

3.

No evidence was given that would link the bloodstains found in the tricycle to Biag himself. They
could have easily been Palalays, who was shown to have a knife wound; and

4.

The accuseds act of pointing to the police and the barangay officials the ravine where Biags body
was dumped was part of their interrogation without counsel, which the RTC itself declared as
inadmissible in evidence.[39]

On October 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 19, 2007 of the RTC, Branch 21, Santiago
City, in Criminal Case No. 21-4949, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accusedappellants Renato Lagat y Gawan and James Palalay y Villarosa are ordered to pay to private
complainant the increased amount of 14,900.00 as actual damages.[40]
In affirming the conviction of the accused, the Court of Appeals held that the elements of carnapping
were all present in this case. The Court of Appeals pointed out that Lagat and Palalay were in possession of
the missing tricycle when they were apprehended by the Alicia PNP. Moreover, they failed to offer any
explanation as to how they came to be in possession of the tricycle. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the
RTC that whatever confession or admission the Alicia PNP extracted out of the accused could not be used in
evidence for having been done without the assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals nonetheless affirmed
the RTCs judgment as it was convinced that the following circumstantial evidence supported the conviction of
the accused for qualified carnapping:

1.

Biag and his tricycle went missing on April 12, 2005;

2.

Lagat and Palalay were found in unauthorized possession of the tricycle on April 13, 2005;

3.

The Alicia PNP, upon inspection of the tricycle, found traces of blood inside it, together with the
original receipt and certificate of registration of the vehicle in the name of Jose Biag;

4.

Palalay had a stab wound on his left arm when the Alicia PNP presented him and Lagat to Brgy.
Capt. Dulay and prosecution witness Rumbaoa;

5.

Biag bore five (5) hack wounds on his body when the Alicia PNP recovered his corpse in a ravine;
and

6.

Lagat and Palalay failed to account for their possession of the bloodstained tricycle immediately
after their arrest.[41]

The accused are now before us with the same lone assignment of error they posited before the Court of
Appeals, to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY
OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[42]
Ruling of the Court
Lagat and Palalay have been charged and convicted of the crime of qualified carnapping under
Republic Act. No. 6539[43] or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. Section 2 of the Act defines carnapping and
motor vehicle as follows:
Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latters consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things.
Motor vehicle is any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power using the public
highways, but excepting road rollers, trolley cars, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers,
bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts, amphibian trucks, and cranes if not used on public highways,
vehicles, which run only on rails or tracks, and tractors, trailers and traction engines of all kinds
used exclusively for agricultural purposes. Trailers having any number of wheels, when
propelled or intended to be propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall be classified as
separate motor vehicle with no power rating.[44]

The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 are the
following:
1.

That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;

2.

That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;

3.

That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; and

4.

That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle.[45]

The records of this case show that all the elements of carnapping are present and were proven during
trial.
The tricycle, which was definitively ascertained to belong to Biag, as evidenced by the registration
papers, was found in Lagat and Palalays possession. Aside from this, the prosecution was also able to
establish that Lagat and Palalay fled the scene when the Alicia PNP tried to approach them at the palay buying
station. To top it all, Lagat and Palalay failed to give any reason why they had Biags tricycle. Their unexplained

possession raises the presumption that they were responsible for the unlawful taking of the tricycle. Section
3(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states that:
[A] person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker
and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts
of ownership over, are owned by him.

In Litton Mills, Inc. v. Sales,[46] we said that for such presumption to arise, it must be proven that: (a) the
property was stolen; (b) it was committed recently; (c) that the stolen property was found in the possession of
the accused; and (d) the accused is unable to explain his possession satisfactorily. [47] As mentioned above, all
these were proven by the prosecution during trial. Thus, it is presumed that Lagat and Palalay had unlawfully
taken Biags tricycle. In People v. Bustinera,[48] this Court defined unlawful taking, as follows:
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent
of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even
if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.[49]
Lagat and Palalays intent to gain from the carnapped tricycle was also proven as they
were caught in a palay buying station, on board the stolen tricycle, which they obviously used to
transport the cavans of palay they had stolen and were going to sell at the
station. In Bustinera, we elucidated on the concept of intent to gain and said:
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of
the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to
gain.The term gain is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which
in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere
use of the thing which was taken without the owners consent constitutes gain.[50]

Having established that the elements of carnapping are present in this case, we now go to the
argument of the two accused that they cannot be convicted based on the circumstantial evidence presented by
the prosecution.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a)

There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime.

In People v. Mansueto,[51] we said:

Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from
which the facts in issue may be established by inference. Such evidence is founded on
experience and observed facts and coincidences establishing a connection between the known
and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved.[52]

Hence, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must
be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.[53]
A careful and exhaustive examination of the evidence presented, excluding those that are inadmissible,
show that the circumstantial evidence, when viewed as a whole, effectively establishes the guilt of Lagat and
Palalay beyond reasonable doubt. We considered the following pieces of evidence as convincing:

First, Lagat and Palalay were found in possession of the tricycle the same day that it, together with its
owner Biag, was reported missing.
Second, Lagat and Palalay were found at a palay buying station, with the stolen tricycle packed
with cavans of palay allegedly stolen in Alicia, Isabela.
Third, Lagat and Palalay who were then on board the tricycle, jumped and ran the moment they saw
the Alicia PNP approaching them.
Fourth, Lagat and Palalay could not explain to the Alicia PNP why they were in possession of Biags
tricycle.
Fifth, Biags wallet and his tricycles registration papers were found in the tricycle upon its inspection by
the Alicia PNP.
Sixth, Biags body bore hack wounds as evidenced by the post-mortem autopsy done on him, while his
tricycle had traces of blood in it.
The foregoing circumstantial evidence only leads to the conclusion that Lagat and Palalay conspired to
kill Biag in order to steal his tricycle. Direct proof that the two accused conspired is not essential as it may be
inferred from their conduct before, during, and after their commission of the crime that they acted with a
common purpose and design.[54] The pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution are consistent with one
another and the only rational proposition that can be drawn therefrom is that the accused are guilty of killing
Biag to carnap his tricycle.
When a person is killed or raped in the course of or on the occasion of the carnapping, the crime of
carnapping is qualified and the penalty is increased pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as
amended:
Section 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as
this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle
taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not
more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without
violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than
seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things;
and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver
or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (As amended by R.A. No.
7659.) (Emphasis ours)
As there was no aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime, the RTC properly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In conformity with prevailing jurisprudence, we affirm the award of 50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of Jose Biag and 50,000.00 as moral damages for the proven mental suffering of his wife
as a result of his untimely death. However, when actual damages proven by receipts during trial amount to less
than 25,000.00, as in this case, the award of temperate damages for 25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual
damages of a lesser amount.[55] Thus, an award of 25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of the amount of
14,900.00 that the Court of Appeals awarded as actual damages is proper in this case.

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider that under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the
accused are also jointly and severally liable for the loss of the earning capacity of Biag and such indemnity
should be paid to his heirs.[56] In People v. Jadap,[57] this Court said:
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for
loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be
awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed
and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case judicial notice
may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is
available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws. In this case, no documentary evidence was presented
to prove the claim of the victims heirs for damages by reason of loss of earning
capacity. However, the victims father testified that at the time of his sons death, he was only 20
years old and was working as a mason with a monthly income of 3,000.00. We find the fathers
testimony sufficient to justify the award of damages for loss of earning capacity.[58]

Biags widow, Florida, testified that Biag worked as a farmer, tanod, and tricycle driver, and that his
income amounted to 40,000.00 per cropping season as a farmer, 2,000.00 per month as a tanod, and
300.00 per day as a tricycle driver. However, since the prosecution failed to present any document pertaining
to Biags appointment as atanod, or that he actually worked as a farmer, we shall consider only his earnings as
a tricycle driver. According to the death certificate[59] submitted by the prosecution, Biag was 56 years old at the
time of his death.
The amount of damages recoverable for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased is based on two
factors: 1) the number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed; and 2) the rate at which
the losses sustained by the heirs of the deceased should be fixed. The first factor is based on the formula (2/3
x 80 age of the deceased at the time of his death = life expectancy) which is adopted from the American
Expectancy Table of Mortality.[60] Net income is computed by deducting from the amount of the victims gross
income the amount of his living expenses. As there is no proof of Biags living expenses, the net income is
estimated to be 50% of the gross annual income. [61]Thus, the loss of earning capacity of the deceased is
computed as follows:
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x [gross annual income living expenses][62]
= 2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross annual income - 50% of gross annual income]
= 2/3 [80-56] x [109,500.00 - 54,750.00]
= 16 x 54,750.00
= 876,000.00

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the October 8, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02869. Accused-appellantsRenato Lagat y Gawan and James Palalay y
Villarosa are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED CARNAPPING and are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of the
victim Jose Biag the following: (a) 50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) 50,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) 25,000.00 as temperate damages; (d) 876,000.00 as loss of earning capacity; and (e) interest on all
damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.