KABATAAN PARTY LIST et al. vs.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 221318 | December 16, 2016
Facts:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and

prohibition filed by herein petitioners, assailing the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. (RA) 10367,
entitled "An Act Providing for Mandatory Biometrics
Voter
Registration,"
as
well
as
respondent
Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) Resolution Nos.
9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto.
o
COMELEC Resolution No. (CRN) 9721: IRR of
RA 10367;
o
CRN 9863: Election Registration Board (ERB)
shall deactivate the voters' registration
records (VRRs) of those who "failed to
submit for validation despite notice on or
before October 31, 2015," and that the
"deactivation for cases falling under this
ground shall be made during the November
16, 2015 Board hearing."
o
CRN 10013: Provides for the "procedures in
the deactivation of VRRs who do not have
biometrics data in the Voters Registration
System (VRS) after the October 31, 2015
deadline of registration and validation."
Petitioners contentions:
o
biometrics validation rises to the level of an
additional, substantial qualification where
there is penalty of deactivation;
o
biometrics
deactivation
is
not
the
disqualification by law contemplated by the
1987 Constitution;
o
biometrics validation gravely violates the
Constitution, considering that, applying the
strict scrutiny test, it is not poised with a
compelling reason for state regulation and
hence, an unreasonable deprivation of the
right to suffrage;
o
voters to be deactivated are not afforded
due process; and
o
poor experience with biometrics should
serve
as
warning
against
exacting
adherence to the system.
Albeit already subject of a prior petition filed before
this Court, petitioners also raise herein the argument
that deactivation by November 16, 2015 would result
in the premature termination of the registration
period contrary to Section 8 of RA 8189.48
Ultimately, petitioners pray that this Court declare RA
10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721,
9863, and 10013, unconstitutional and that the
COMELEC be commanded to desist from deactivating
registered voters without biometric information, to
reinstate voters who are compliant with the
requisites of RA 8189 but have already been delisted,
and to extend the system of contihuing registration
and capture of biometric information of voters until
January 8, 2016.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to

institute the instant petition
Held: Yes

Citing Pabillo v. COMELEC, which cited Capalla v.

COMELEC and Guingona, Jr. v. COMELEC:
o
There can be no doubt that the coming 10
May 2010 in this case, the May
2016elections is a matter of great public
concern. On Election Day, the country's
registered voters will come out to
exercise the sacred right of suffrage.
Not only is it an exercise that ensures
the preservation of our democracy, the
coming elections also embodies our

people's last ounce of hope for a better

future. It is the final opportunity,
patiently awaited by our people, for
the peaceful transition of power to the
next chosen leaders of our country. If
there is anything capable of directly
affecting the lives of ordinary Filipinos
so as to come within the ambit of a
public concern, it is the coming
elections, xxx.
Thus, in view of the compelling significance
and transcending public importance of the
issues
raised
by
petitioners,
the
technicalities raised by respondents should
not be allowed to stand in the way, if the
ends of justice would not be subserved by a
rigid adherence to the rules of procedure.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Issue: Whether or not RA 10367, as well as COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto,
are unconstitutional
Held: No

As non-compliance with the same results in the

penalty of deactivation, petitioners posit that it has
risen to the level of an unconstitutional substantive
requirement in the exercise of the right of suffrage.
o
They submit that the statutory requirement
of biometric validation is no different from
the unconstitutional requirement of literacy
and property because mere non-validation
already absolutely curtails the exercise of
the right of suffrage through deactivation.
Further, they advance the argument that
deactivation is not the disqualification by
law contemplated as a valid limitation to the
exercise of suffrage under the 1987
Constitution.

The contestation is untenable.

As early as the 1936 case of The People of the

Philippine Islands v.

Corral, it has been recognized that "the right to

vote is not a natural right but is a right created
by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the
State to such persons or classes as are most
likely to exercise it for the public good.

Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution

delineates the current parameters for the exercise of
suffrage:
Section I. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of
the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who
are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall
have resided in the Philippines for at least one year
and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding the election.
No
literacy,
property, or
other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage.

Dissecting the provision, one must meet the

following qualifications in order to exercise the right
of suffrage:
o
first, he must be a Filipino citizen;
o
second, he must not be disqualified by law;
and
o
third, he must have resided in the
Philippines for at least one ( 1) year and in
the place wherein he proposes to vote for at
least six ( 6) months immediately preceding
the election.
The second item more prominently reflects the
franchised nature of the right of suffrage. The State

may therefore regulate said right by imposing

statutory disqualifications, with the restriction,
however, that the same do not amount to, as per the
second sentence of the provision, a "literacy,
property or other substantive requirement." Based on
its genesis, it may be gleaned that the limitation is
geared towards the elimination of irrelevant
standards that are purely based on socio-economic
considerations that have no bearing on the right of a
citizen to intelligently cast his vote and to further the
public good.
Properly speaking, the concept of a "qualification", at
least insofar as the discourse on suffrage is
concerned, should be distinguished from the concept
of "registration", which is jurisprudentially regarded
as only the means by which a person's qualifications
to vote is determined.
o
In Yra v. Abano, citing Meffert v. Brown, it
was stated that "the act of registering is
only one step towards voting, and it is not
one of the elements that makes the citizen a
qualified voter [and] one may be a qualified
voter without exercising the right to vote."
o
Thus, although one is deemed to be a
"qualified elector," he must nonetheless still
comply with the registration procedure in
order to vote.
Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the
Voters Registration Act of 1996, primarily governs the
process of registration.
o
It defines "registration" as "the act of
accomplishing and filing of a sworn
application for registration by a qualified
voter before the election officer of the city
or municipality wherein he resides and
including the same in the book of registered
voters upon approval by the [ERB]."
o
As stated in Section 2 thereof, RA 8189 was
passed in order "to systematize the present
method of registration in order to establish a
clean, complete, permanent and updated
list of voters."
To complement RA 8189 in light of the advances in
modern technology, RA 10367, or the assailed
Biometrics Law, was signed into law in February
2013. It built on the policy considerations behind RA
8189 as it institutionalized biometrics validation as
part of the registration process.
o
"Biometrics refers to a quantitative analysis
that provides a positive identification of an
individual such as voice, photograph,
fingerprint, signature, iris, and/or such other
identifiable features."
o
Sections 3 and 10 of RA 10367 respectively
require registered and new voters to submit
themselves for biometrics validation.
o
Under Section 2 (d) of RA 10367,
"validation" is defined as "the process of
taking the biometrics of registered voters
whose biometrics have not yet been
captured."
o
The consequence of non-compliance is
"deactivation," which "refers to the removal
of the registration record of the registered
voter from the corresponding precinct book
of voters for failure to comply with the
validation process as required by [RA
10367].
Notably, the penalty of deactivation, as well as
the requirement of validation, neutrally applies
to all voters. Thus, petitioners' argument that the
law creates artificial class of voters is more imagined
than real.
o
There is no favor accorded to an "obedient
group." If anything, non-compliance by the
"disobedient" only rightfully results into

prescribed consequences. Surely, this is

beyond the intended mantle of the equal
protection of the laws, which only works
"against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or
the oppression of inequality."
It should also be pointed out that deactivation is not
novel to RA 10367. RA 8189 already provides for
certain grounds for deactivation, of which not only
the disqualifications under the Constitution or the
Omnibus Election are listed.
With these considerations in mind, petitioners' claim
that biometrics validation imposed under RA 10367,
and implemented under COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9721, 9863, and 10013, must perforce fail. To
reiterate,
this
requirement
is
not
a
"qualification" to the exercise of the right of
suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration
procedure, of which the State has the right to
reasonably regulate. It was institutionalized
conformant to the limitations of the 1987
Constitution and is a mere complement to the
existing Voter's Registration Act of 1996.
Petitioners would do well to be reminded of this
Court's pronouncement in AKBAYAN-Youth, wherein it
was held that:
The act of registration is an indispensable
precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration
is part and parcel of the right to vote and an
indispensable element in the election process. Thus,
contrary to petitioners' argument, registration cannot
and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of
a mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from
the significance of registration as a necessary
requisite to the right to vote, the State
undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent
police power, may then enact laws to safeguard
and regulate the act of voter's registration for
the ultimate purpose of conducting honest,
orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental
yet generally important end, that even pre-election
activities could be performed by the duly constituted
authorities in a realistic and orderly manner - one
which is not indifferent and so far removed from the
pressing order of the day and the prevalent
circumstances of the times.
For another, petitioners assert that biometrics
validation
gravely
violates
the
Constitution,
considering that, applying the strict scrutiny test, it is
not poised with a compelling reason for state
regulation and hence, an unreasonable deprivation of
the right to suffrage.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the regulation
passes the strict scrutiny test.
o
In terms of judicial review of statutes or
ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the
standard for determining the quality and the
amount of governmental interest brought to
justify the regulation of fundamental
freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to
test the validity of laws dealing with the
regulation of speech, gender, or race as well
as other fundamental rights as expansion
from its earlier applications to equal
protection.
o
As pointed out by petitioners, the United
States Supreme Court has expanded the
scope of strict scrutiny to protect
fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial
access, and interstate travel.
o
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on
the presence of compelling, rather
than
substantial,
governmental
interest and on the absence of less
restrictive means for achieving that

interest, and the burden befalls upon the

State to prove the same.
In this case, respondents have shown that the
biometrics validation requirement under RA 10367
advances a compelling state interest. It was precisely
designed to facilitate the conduct of orderly, honest,
and credible elections by containing - if not
eliminating, the perennial problem of having flying
voters, as well as dead and multiple registrants.
According to the sponsorship speech of Senator
Aquilino L. Pimentel III, the objective of the law was
to cleanse the national voter registry so as to
eliminate electoral fraud and ensure that the results
of the elections were truly reflective of the genuine
will of the people. The foregoing consideration is
unquestionably a compelling state interest.

and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB

Cases).
Issue: Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction
over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
Held: Yes

The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of

subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition,
and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on
her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the
Ombudsman Act,118 which reads in full:
Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall
be issued by any court to delay an investigation
being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act,
unless there is a prima facie evidence that the
subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE

OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH
DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR.,
Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 217126-27 | November 10, 2015 (EB)
Facts:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and

prohibition filed by petitioner Conchita Carpio
Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman), through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), assailing:
o
the Resolution dated March 16, 2015 of
public respondent the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, which granted
private respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay,
Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) against
the implementation of the Joint Order of the
Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-15-0058 to 0063
(preventive suspension order) preventively
suspending him and several other public
officers and employees of the City
Government of Makati, for six (6) months
without pay; and
o
the Resolution dated March 20, 2015 of the
CA, ordering the Ombudsman to comment
on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt6 in CAG.R. SP No. 139504.
Background of the case:
o
A complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty.
Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso
VI before the Office of the Ombudsman
against Binay, Jr. and other public officers
and employees of the City Government of
Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of
Plunder and violation of Republic Act No.
(RA) 3019, otherwise known as "The AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act," in
connection with the five (5) phases of the
procurement and construction of the Makati
City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking
Building).
o
On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman
constituted a Special Panel of Investigators
to conduct a fact-finding investigation,
submit an investigation report, and file the
necessary complaint, if warranted (1st
Special Panel).
o
Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on
March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a
complaint (OMB Complaint) against Binay,
Jr., et al, charging them with six (6)
administrative cases for Grave Misconduct,
Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service, and six
(6) criminal cases for violation of Section 3
(e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds,

No court shall hear any appeal or application for

remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure
question of law.
Construing the second paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770:
o
As a general rule, the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range
of remedies against issuances of the
Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal
against any decision or finding of the
Ombudsman, and (b) "any application of
remedy" (subject to the exception below)
against the same.
o
The subject provision, however, crafts an
exception to the foregoing general rule.
While the specific procedural vehicle is not
explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible
that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 excepts, as the only allowable remedy
against "the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman," a Rule 45 appeal, for the
reason that it is the only remedy taken to
the Supreme Court on "pure questions of
law," whether under the 1964 Rules of Court
or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Validity of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770:
o
The second paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770's extremely limited restriction on
remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45
appeal -which is within the sphere of the
rules of procedure promulgated by this
Court - can only be taken against final
decisions or orders of lower courts, and not
against "findings" of quasi-judicial agencies.
o
By confining the remedy to a Rule 45
appeal, the provision takes away the
remedy of certiorari, grounded on
errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of
the judicial power constitutionally
vested in courts. In this light, the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also
increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction,
without a showing, however, that it gave its
consent to the same. The provision is, in
fact, very similar to the fourth paragraph of
Section 27, RA 6770, which was invalidated
in the case of Fabian v. Desiertoni.
o
In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth
paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 as
unconstitutional since it had the effect of
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court without its advice and concurrence in
violation of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.

Since the second paragraph of Section

14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against
"decision
or
findings"
of
the
Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and
thus - similar to the fourth paragraph
of Section 27, RA 6770142 - attempts
to effectively increase the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction without
its advice and concurrence, it is
therefore concluded that the former
provision is also unconstitutional and
perforce, invalid.
Consequence of invalidity:
o
With the unconstitutionality of the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the
Court,
consistent
with
existing
jurisprudence, concludes that the CA has
subject matter jurisdiction over the main
CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition.

based"; and

Issue: Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to

issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the implementation of a
preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman

(3) "[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the

Constitutional Commissions' need for independence.
In the deliberations of the 1973 Constitution, the
delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by
providing for a constitutionally-created Civil Service
Commission, instead of one created by law, on the
premise that the effectivity of this body is
dependent on its freedom from the tentacles of
politics. In a similar manner, the deliberations of the
1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit
highlighted
the
developments
in
the
past
Constitutions geared
towards
insulating the
Commission on Audit from political pressure.
At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III,
however, was that the independence of the Office of
the Ombudsman, as well as that of the foregoing
independent bodies, meant freedom from control or
supervision of the Executive Department
As may be deduced from the various discourses
in Gonzales III, the concept of Ombudsman's
independence
covers
three
(3)
things:

Held: Yes

The Ombudsman invokes the first paragraph of

Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's
independence under the 1987 Constitution. She
advances the idea that "in order to further ensure her
office's independence, RA 6770 likewise insulated it
from judicial intervention," particularly, "from
injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable from the
courts," claiming that said writs may work "just as
effectively as direct harassment or political pressure
would."

Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution

guarantees the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman:

First: creation by the Constitution, which means

that the office cannot be abolished, nor its
constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be
removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the
Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is
made;

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent

Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall
Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon,
Visayas[,] and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the
military establishment may likewise be appointed.
(Emphasis supplied)
Gonzales III v. Office of the President is the first case
which grappled with the meaning of the
Ombudsman's
independence
vis-a-vis
the
independence of the other constitutional bodies.
Pertinently, the Court observed:

Third: insulation from executive supervision

and control, which means that those within the
ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an
internal
authority.

(1) "[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the

Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions
shares certain characteristics - they do not owe
their existence to any act of Congress, but are
created by the Constitution itself; additionally,
they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general
terms, the framers of the Constitution intended
that these 'independent' bodies be insulated
from political pressure to the extent that the
absence of 'independence' would result in the
impairment of their core functions";
(2) "[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman must have the independence
and flexibility needed in the discharge of their
constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions
and constraints on the manner the independent
constitutional offices allocate and utilize the
funds appropriated for their operations is
anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not
only [of] the express mandate of the Constitution,
but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the
independence and separation of powers upon which
the entire fabric of our constitutional system is

Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the

office "may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to
use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to
[its] functions;168hence, its budget cannot be
strategically decreased by officials of the political
branches of government so as to impair said
functions;
and

Evidently, all three aspects

to protect the Office of
political harassment and
it from the "insidious

of independence intend
the Ombudsman from
pressure, so as to free
tentacles of politics."

That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman

independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate
the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally
vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies,
which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and
apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's
notion that it can be exempt from an incident of
judicial power - that is, a provisional writ of injunction
against a preventive suspension order - clearly strays
from the concept's rationale of insulating the office
from political harassment or pressure.
In Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of
2010, the Court instructed that "it is through the
Constitution that the fundamental powers of
government are established, limited and defined, and
by which these powers are distributed among the
several departments. The Constitution is the basic
and paramount law to which all other laws must
conform and to which all persons, including the
highest officials of the land, must defer." It would
then follow that laws that do not conform to the
Constitution shall be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.
However, despite the ostensible breach of the
separation of powers principle, the Court is not
oblivious to the policy considerations behind the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, as well as other

statutory provisions of similar import. Thus, pending

deliberation on whether or not to adopt the
same, the Court, under its sole prerogative and
authority over all matters of procedure, deems
it proper to declare as ineffective the
prohibition against courts other than the
Supreme Court from issuing provisional
injunctive writs
to enjoin investigations
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman,
until it is adopted as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular
duly issued therefor.
Hence, with Congress interfering with matters
of procedure (through passing the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the
Court's consent thereto, it remains that the CA
had the authority to issue the questioned
injunctive writs enjoining the implementation
of the preventive suspension order against
Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these
issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise of the
CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under
Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and
which it had already acquired over the main CA-G.R.
SP No. 139453 case.

Issue: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in

issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 enjoining the implementation of the preventive
suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation
doctrine
Held: No

The CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution which directed

the issuance of the assailed TRO was based on the
case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA, wherein the Court
emphasized that "if it were established in the CA that
the acts subject of the administrative complaint were
indeed committed during petitioner [Garcia's] prior
term, then, following settled jurisprudence, he can no
longer be administratively charged."
o
Thus,
the
Court,
contemplating
the
application of the condonation doctrine,
among others, cautioned, in the said case,
that "it would have been more prudent for
[the appellate court] to have, at the very
least, on account of the extreme urgency of
the matter and the seriousness of the issues
raised in the certiorari petition, issued a TRO
x x x"236 during the pendency of the
proceedings.

The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate

for the CA to have considered the condonation
doctrine since it was a matter of defense which
should have been raised and passed upon by her
office
during
the
administrative
disciplinary
proceedings.
o
The Court agrees with the CA that it was not
precluded from considering the same given
that it was material to the propriety of
according provisional injunctive relief in
conformity with the ruling in Governor
Garcia, Jr., which was the subsisting
jurisprudence at that time.
o
Thus, since condonation was duly raised by
Binay, Jr. in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453,244 the CA did not err in passing
upon the same. Note that although Binay, Jr.
secondarily argued that the evidence of
guilt against him was not strong in his
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,245 it
appears that the CA found that the
application of the condonation doctrine was
already
sufficient
to
enjoin
the
implementation
of
the
preventive
suspension order. Again, there is nothing

aberrant with this since, as remarked in the

same case of Governor Garcia, Jr., if it was
established that the acts subject of the
administrative complaint were indeed
committed during Binay, Jr.'s prior term,
then, following the condonation doctrine, he
can no longer be administratively charged.
In other words, with condonation having
been invoked by Binay, Jr. as an exculpatory
affirmative defense at the onset, the CA
deemed it unnecessary to determine if the
evidence of guilt against him was strong, at
least for the purpose of issuing the subject
injunctive writs.
With this, the ensuing course of action should have
been for the CA to resolve the main petition for
certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 on the merits.
However, considering that the Ombudsman, on
October 9, 2015, had already found Binay, Jr.
administratively liable and imposed upon him the
penalty of dismissal, which carries the accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding
public office, for the present administrative charges
against him, the said CA petition appears to have
been mooted. As initially intimated, the preventive
suspension order is only an ancillary issuance that, at
its core, serves the purpose of assisting the Office of
the Ombudsman in its investigation. It therefore has
no more purpose - and perforce, dissolves - upon the
termination of the office's process of investigation in
the instant administrative case.
This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to
clarify that the mootness of the issue regarding the
validity of the preventive suspension order subject of
this case does not preclude any of its foregoing
determinations, particularly, its abandonment of the
condonation doctrine. As explained in Belgica, '"the
moot and academic principle' is not a magical
formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in
resolving a case. The Court will decide cases,
otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of
the Constitution; second, the exceptional character
of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review."
In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is
wholly within the prerogative of the Court. As
mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential creation and
may therefore, pursuant to its mandate to uphold
and
defend
the
Constitution,
revoke
it
notwithstanding supervening events that render the
subject of discussion moot.

Issue: Whether or not the CA's Resolution dated March 20,

2015 directing the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s
petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 is improper
and illegal
Held: Premature issue

The sole premise of the Ombudsman's contention is

that, as an impeachable officer, she cannot be the
subject of a charge for indirect contempt because this
action is criminal in nature and the penalty therefor
would result in her effective removal from office.

However, a reading of the aforesaid March 20, 2015

Resolution does not show that she has already been
subjected to contempt proceedings. This issuance, in
fact, makes it clear that notwithstanding the directive
for the Ombudsman to comment, the CA has not
necessarily given due course to Binay, Jr.'s
contempt
petition:
Without necessarily giving due course to the
Petition for Contempt respondents [Hon. Conchita

Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman,

and the Department of Interior and Local
Government] are hereby DIRECTED to file Comment
on the Petition/Amended and Supplemental Petition
for Contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 139504) within an
inextendible period of three (3) days from receipt
hereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, even if the Ombudsman accedes to the CA's
directive by filing a comment, wherein she may
properly raise her objections to the contempt
proceedings by virtue of her being an impeachable
officer, the CA, in the exercise of its sound judicial
discretion, may still opt not to give due course to
Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition and accordingly,
dismiss the same. Simply put, absent any indication
that the contempt petition has been given due
course by the CA, it would then be premature for this
Court to rule on the issue. The submission of the
Ombudsman on this score is perforce denied.

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN

(THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents
G.R. No. 213847 | August 18, 2015 (EB)
The decision whether to detain or release an accused
before and during trial is ultimately an incident of the
judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case.
The strength of the Prosecutions case, albeit a good
measure of the accuseds propensity for flight or for
causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary
objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused
appears at trial.
Facts:

Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and annul the
resolutions dated July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014
issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case
No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged
with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists
that the resolutions, which respectively denied his
Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration,
were issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Background of the case:
o
On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile
was
charged
with
plunder
in
the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported
involvement in the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially,
Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to
post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied.
On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest
was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary
surrender.
o
Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in
a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a)
Prosecution had not yet established that the
evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that,
because of his advanced age and voluntary
surrender, the penalty would only be
reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail
and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age
and physical condition. Sandiganbayan
denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion
for Reconsideration was likewise denied.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner can properly be granted the

right to bail
Held: Yes

Bail as a matter of right due process and

presumption of innocence.

Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987

Constitution provides that in all criminal
prosecutions,
the
accused
shall
be
presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. This right is safeguarded by the
constitutional right to be released on bail.
o
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at trial and so
the amount of bail should be high enough to
assure the presence of the accused when so
required, but no higher than what may be
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.
Bail as a matter of discretion
o
Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of
the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
to wit:
o

Capital offense of an offense punishable by

reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of
guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.
The general rule: Any person, before conviction of
any criminal offense, shall be bailable.
o
Exception: Unless he is charged with an
offense punishable with reclusion perpetua
[or life imprisonment] and the evidence of
his guilt is strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has
been established that the evidence of guilt is strong.
Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be
granted according to the discretion of the court.
Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or
life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is subject to
judicial discretion.
In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: Such
discretion may be exercised only after the hearing
called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused
for the purpose of whether or not he should be
granted provisional liberty. Bail hearing with notice
is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing
should primarily determine whether the evidence of
guilt against the accused is strong.
The procedure for discretionary bail is described in
Cortes vs. Catral:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of
discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a
hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong

based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge
the accused upon the approval of the bailbond
(Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.
Enriles poor health justifies his admission to bail
o
The Court is guided by the earlier
mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is
to guarantee the appearance of the accused
at the trial, or whenever so required by the

court. The Court is further mindful of the

Philippines
responsibility
in
the
international community arising from the
national commitment under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights

as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person. This commitment is enshrined
in Section II, Article II of our Constitution
which provides: The State values the
dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.
The
Philippines,
therefore,
has
the
responsibility of protecting and promoting
the right of every person to liberty and due
process, ensuring that those detained or
arrested can participate in the proceedings
before a court, to enable it to decide without
delay on the legality of the detention and
order their release if justified. In other
words, the Philippine authorities are under
obligation to make available to every person
under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.
These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail.
This national commitment to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value
the worth and dignity of every person has
authorized the grant of bail not only to
those charged in criminal proceedings but
also to extraditees upon a clear and
convincing showing: (1) that the detainee
will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian
and
compelling
circumstances.
In our view, his social and political standing
and his having immediately surrendered to
the authorities upon his being charged in
court indicate that the risk of his flight or
escape from this jurisdiction is highly
unlikely. His personal disposition from the
onset of his indictment for plunder, formal
or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter
respect for the legal processes of this
country. We also do not ignore that at an
earlier time many years ago when he had
been charged with rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murder, he already
evinced a similar personal disposition of
respect for the legal processes, and was
granted bail during the pendency of his trial
because he was not seen as a flight risk.
With his solid reputation in both his public
and his private lives, his long years of public

service, and historys judgment of him being

at stake, he should be granted bail.
o
The currently fragile state of Enriles health
presents another compelling justification for
his admission to bail, but which the
Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
o
Bail for the provisional liberty of the
accused, regardless of the crime charged,
should be allowed independently of the
merits of the charge, provided his continued
incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious
to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed,
denying him bail despite imperiling his
health and life would not serve the true
objective of preventive incarceration during
the trial.
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional
liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his
medical condition be properly addressed and better
attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals
of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate
preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will
guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for
the trial to finish before a meaningful consideration
of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the
objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to
provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be
circumstances decisive of the issue of bail whose
existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is
properly the subject of judicial notice that the
courts can already consider in resolving the
application for bail without awaiting the trial to
finish.49 The Court thus balances the scales of
justice by protecting the interest of the People
through ensuring his personal appearance at the
trial, and at the same time realizing for him the
guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan
arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the trial; and
unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the
fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such,
the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
denying Enriles Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of
discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ
of certiorari, connotes whimsical and capricious
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or
lack of jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.