Kazuhiro Hasegawa vs Minoru Kitamura

FACTS: In March 1999, Nippon Engineering Consultants Co.,

Ltd, a Japanese firm, was contracted by the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) to supervise the
construction of the Southern Tagalog Access Road. In April
1999, Nippon entered into an independent contractor
agreement with Minoru Kitamura for the latter to head the said
project. The ICA was entered into in Japan and is effective for
a period of 1 year (so until April 2000). In January 2000,
DPWH awarded the Bongabon-Baler Road project to Nippon.
Nippon subsequently assigned Kitamura to head the road
project. But in February 2000, Kazuhiro Hasegawa, the
general manager of Nippon informed Kitamura that they are
pre-terminating his contract. Kitamura sought Nippon to
reconsider but Nippon refused to negotiate. Kitamura then filed
a complaint for specific performance and damages against
Nippon in the RTC of Lipa.
Hasegawa filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
contract was entered in Japan hence, applying the principle of
lex loci celebracionis, cases arising from the contract should
be cognizable only by Japanese courts. The trial court denied
the motion. Eventually, Nippon filed a petition for certiorari with
the Supreme Court.
Hasegawa, on appeal significantly changed its theory, this
time invoking forum non conveniens; that the RTC is an
inconvenient forum because the parties are Japanese
nationals who entered into a contract in Japan. Kitamura on
the other hand invokes the trial courts ruling which states that
matters connected with the performance of contracts are
regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance, so
since the obligations in the ICA are executed in the
Philippines, courts here have jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON the complaint against Nippon should be

dismissed.
HELD: No. The trial court did the proper thing in taking
cognizance of it.
RATIO: In the first place, the case filed by Kitamura is a
complaint for specific performance and damages. Such case is
incapable of pecuniary estimation; such cases are within the
jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
Hasegawa filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of forum
non conveniens. However, such ground is not one of those
provided for by the Rules as a ground for dismissing a civil
case.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the contention that
Japanese laws should apply is premature. In conflicts cases,
there are three phases and each next phase commences
when one is settled, to wit:
1. Jurisdiction Where should litigation be initiated? Court must
have jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties, the
issues, the property, the res. Also considers, whether it is fair
to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks
the further question whether the application of a substantive
law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both
parties.
2. Choice of Law Which law will the court apply? Once a local
court takes cognizance, it does not mean that the local laws
must automatically apply. The court must determine which
substantive law when applied to the merits will be fair to both
parties.

3. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgment Where can

the resulting judgment be enforced?
This case is not yet in the second phase because upon the
RTCs taking cognizance of the case, Hasegawa immediately
filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. He filed a motion
for reconsideration, which was also denied. Then he bypassed
the proper procedure by immediately filing a petition for
certiorari. The question of which law should be applied should
have been settled in the trial court had Hasegawa not
improperly appealed the interlocutory order denying his MFR.
De Joya vs. Judge Marquez
FACTS: This Court finds from the records of Criminal Case
No. 03-219952 the following documents to support the motion
of the prosecution for the issuance of a warrant of arrest:
1. The report of the NBI to Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo
as regards their investigation on the complaint filed by private
complainant Manuel Dy Awiten against Mina Tan Hao @ Ma. Gracia
Tan Hao and Victor Ngo y Tan for syndicated estafa.
The report shows that Hao induced Dy to invest more than a hundred
million pesos in State Resources Development Management
Corporation, but when the latters investments fell due, the checks
issued by Hao in favor of Dy as payment for his investments were
dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds or that the
account was closed.
2. Affidavit-Complaint of private complainant Manuel Dy Awiten.
3. Copies of the checks issued by private complainant in favor of
State Resources Corporation.
4. Copies of the checks issued to private complainant representing
the supposed return of his investments in State Resources.
5. Demand letter sent by private complainant to Ma. Gracia Tan Hao

6. Supplemental Affidavit of private complainant to include the

incorporators and members of the board of directors of State
Resources Development Management Corporation as participants in
the conspiracy to commit the crime of syndicated estafa. Among
7
those included was petitioner Chester De Joya.
7. Counter-Affidavits of Chester De Joya and the other accused, Ma.
Gracia Hao and Danny S. Hao.

Also included in the records are the resolution issued by State

Prosecutor Benny Nicdao finding probable cause to indict
petitioner and his other co-accused for syndicated estafa, and a
copy of the Articles of Incorporation of State Resources
Development Management Corporation naming petitioner as
incorporator and director of said corporation.

ISSUE: WON the court has acquired jurisdiction over the

accused; WON the documents support the issuance of a
warrant of arrest
HELD: YES; YES
RATIO: 1) In two cases, the court acquires jurisdiction to try
the case, even if it has not acquired jurisdiction over the
person of a nonresident defendant, as long as it has
jurisdiction over the res, as when the action involves the
personal status of the plaintiff or property in the Philippines in
which the defendant claims an interest. In such cases, the
service of summons by publication and notice to the defendant
is merely to comply with due process requirements. Under
Sec. 133 of the Corporation Code, while a foreign corporation
doing business in the Philippines without a license cannot sue
or intervene in any action here, it may be sued or proceeded
against before our courts or administrative tribunals.

(2) The documents are sufficient to establish the existence of

probable cause as required under Section 6, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Probable cause to issue
a warrant of arrest pertains to facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested. It bears remembering that "in
determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts
and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our
technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil.
Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all
reasonable men have an abundance." Thus, the standard
used for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is less stringent
than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused. As long
as the evidence presented shows a prima facie case against
the accused, the trial court judge has sufficient ground to issue
a warrant of arrest against him.
It need not be shown that the accused are indeed guilty of the
crime charged. That matter should be left to the trial. It should
be emphasized that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges
merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty,
of guilt of an accused. Hence, judges do not conduct a de
novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause.
They just personally review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence. In case of doubt on the existence of
probable cause, the Rules allow the judge to order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence. In the present case,
it is notable that the resolution issued by State Prosecutor
Benny Nicdao thoroughly explains the bases for his findings
that there is probable cause to charge all the accused with
violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to P.D. No. 1689.

Perkins vs. Roxas

FACTS: Respondent Eugene Perkins filed a complaint in the
CFI-Manila against the Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company for the recovery of a sum consisting of dividends
which have been declared and made payable on shares of
stock registered in his name, payment of which was being
withheld by the company, and for the recognition of his right to
the control and disposal of said shares to the exclusion of all
others.
The company alleged, by way of defense that the withholding
of plaintiffs right to the disposal and control of the shares was
due to certain demands made with respect to said shares by
the petitioner Idonah Perkins, and by one Engelhard. Eugene
Perkins included in his modified complaint as parties
defendants petitioner, Idonah Perkins, and Engelhard. Eugene
Perkins prayed that petitioner Idonah Perkins and H.
Engelhard be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock
in question and excluded from any claim they assert thereon.
Summons by publication were served upon the nonresident
defendants Idonah Perkins and Engelhard. Engelhard filed his
answer. Petitioner filed her answer with a crosscomplaint in
which she sets up a judgment allegedly obtained by her
against respondent Eugene Perkins, from the SC of the State
of New York, wherein it is declared that she is the sole legal
owner and entitled to the possession and control of the shares
of stock in question with all the cash dividends declared
thereon by the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company.
Idonah Perkins filed a demurrer thereto on the ground that the
court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action, because
the alleged judgment of the SC of the State of New York is res

judicata. Petitioners demurrer was overruled, thus this

petition.
ISSUE: WON in view of the alleged judgment entered in favor
of the petitioner by the SC of New York and which is claimed
by her to be res judicata on all questions raised by the
respondent, Eugene Perkins, the local court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action.
HELD: YES. CFI had jurisdiction to determine if NY Judgment
is indeed res judicata
RATIO: By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the
nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought, and this
is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the
court, and is to be sought for in general nature of its powers, or
in authority specially conferred.
In the present case, the amended complaint filed by the
respondent, Eugene Perkins alleged calls for the adjudication
of title to certain shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated
Mining Company and the granting of affirmative reliefs, which
fall within the general jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila. Similarly
CFI- Manila is empowered to adjudicate the several demands
contained in petitioners crosscomplaint. Idonah Perkins in her
crosscomplaint brought suit against Eugene Perkins and the
Benguet Consolidated Mining Company upon the alleged
judgment of the SC of the State of New York and asked the
court below to render judgment enforcing that New York
judgment, and to issue execution thereon. This is a form of
action recognized by section 309 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court) and
which falls within the general jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila, to
adjudicate, settle and determine. The petitioner expresses the

fear that the respondent judge may render judgment annulling

the final, subsisting, valid judgment rendered and entered in
this petitioners favor by the courts of the State of New York,
which decision is res judicata on all the questions constituting
the subject matter of civil case and argues on the assumption
that the respondent judge is without jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the cause.
Whether or not the respondent judge in the course of the
proceedings will give validity and efficacy to the New York
judgment set up by the petitioner in her cross-complaint is a
question that goes to the merits of the controversy and relates
to the rights of the parties as between each other, and not to
the jurisdiction or power of the court.
The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power
to enter upon the inquiry, not whether its conclusion in the
course of it is right or wrong. If its decision is erroneous, its
judgment can be reversed on appeal; but its determination of
the question, which the petitioner here anticipates and seeks
to prevent, is the exercise by that court and the rightful
exercise of its jurisdiction.
Reyes vs. Diaz
FACTS: NO FACTS INDICATED
ISSUE: WON trial court has jurisdiction over the case at bar
HELD: Still undeterminable
RATIO: Both parties agree that if the due filing of the
protestants certificate of candidacy is proven, the trial court

has jurisdiction, but that if such fact is not proven the trial court
has no jurisdiction except to dismiss the case. There is,
therefore, no question between the parties as to what the
jurisdiction of the trial court is according to law in either case.
The real question between them is one of fact WON the
protestants certificate of candidacy has been duly filed. And
not until this fact is proved can the question of jurisdiction be
determined.
The question, therefore, of whether a court has jurisdiction
over the subject-matter, calls for interpretation and application
of the law of jurisdiction which distributes the judicial power
among the different courts in the Philippines, and since the
ruling on the matter is of farreaching consequences, affecting,
as it may, the very life and structure of our judicial system, the
law has deemed it wise to place the power and authority to act
thereon in the highest court of the land. chanroblespublishi
In some instances it is said that the court should also have
jurisdiction over the issue meaning thereby that the issue
being tried and decided by the court be within the issues
raised in the pleadings. But this kind of jurisdiction should be
distinguished from jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the
latter being conferred by law and the former by the pleadings.
Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike jurisdiction over the subjectmatter, may be conferred by consent either express or implied
of the parties. Although an issue is not duly pleaded it may
validly be tried and decided if no timely objection is made
thereto by the parties. This cannot be done when jurisdiction
over the subject-matter is involved.
In truth, jurisdiction over the issue is an expression of a
principle that is involved in jurisdiction over the persons of the
parties. Where, for instance, an issue is not duly pleaded in

the complaint, the defendant cannot be said to have been

served with process as to that issue. At any rate, whether or
not the court has jurisdiction over a specific issue is a question
that requires nothing except an examination of the pleadings,
and this function is without such importance as to call for the
intervention of this Court.
Pantaleon vs Asuncion
Facts: Pantaleon instituted an action against Asuncion for
recovery of a sum of money. Summons was issued but was
returned since according to reliable information, Asuncion is
residing in B-24 Tala Estate, Caloocan, Rizal. Hence, alias
summons was issued. However, such summons was returned
unserved since the Sheriff found out that Asuncion was no
longer residing in that address and diligent effort served no
purpose. Upon Pantaleons motion, the court declared that
Asuncion shall be summoned by publication. Having failed to
appear, the court declared him in default and rendered a
decision against him. It was only 46 days after rendition of the
decision that Asuncion learned of the complaint as well as of
the adverse decision. Aggrieved, Asuncion filed a petition for
relief alleging that he had not been summoned or notified of
the hearing; no copy of the summons and publication were
sent since he had not received any; and his nonappearance is
excusable it being due to the mistake of the authorities.
ISSUE: WON the summons was served and thus conferred
jurisdiction upon the lower court.
WON Rule 7, Section 21, Rules of Court is applicable. If it is
indeed applicable, WON there was compliance of said rule.

HELD: NO. The summons was not served. Rue 7, Sec. 21 is

applicable but such was not complied.
RATIO: Section 21 is unqualified. It prescribes the proof of
service by publication, regardless of whether the defendant is
a resident of the Philippines or not. Section 16 must be read in
relation to section 21, which complements it. Then, too, there
is no reason why copy of the summons and of the order for its
publication should be mailed to non-resident defendants, but
not to resident defendants.
Considering that strict compliance with the terms of the statute
is necessary to confer jurisdiction through service by
publication the conclusion is inescapable that the lower court
had no authority whatsoever to issue the order declaring
Asuncion in default and to render decision against Asuncion,
and that both are null and void ad initio.
It is also constitutionally required that in action strictly in
personam, like the one at bar, personal service of summons,
within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, who does not voluntarily
submit himself to the authority of the court.
Gemperle vs. Schenker
FACTS: This case was the result of William Gemperles
retaliatory act when respondent spouses Paul and Helen
Schenker filed a case against him for the enforcement of
Schenker's allegedly initial subscription to the shares of stock
of the Philippines-Swiss Trading Co., Inc. and the exercise of
his alleged pre-emptive rights to the then unissued original
capital stock of said corporation and the increase thereof, as
well as for an accounting and damages.

Petitioner alleged that the said complaint tainted his name as a

businessman. He then filed a complaint for damages and
prays for the retraction of statements made by Helen
Schenker.
Summons was personally served to Helen Schenker but not to
Paul Schenker. Helen then filed an answer with a
counterclaim, but Paul Schenker filed a motion to dismiss
arguing that the court never acquired jurisdiction over his
person since admittedly, he is a Swiss citizen, residing in
Zurich, Switzerland, and has not been actually served with
summons in the Philippines.
ISSUE: WON the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
Paul Schenker.
HELD: YES
RATIO: Although as a rule, when the defendant is a nonresident and in an accion in personam, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant can be acquired only through
voluntary appearance or personal service of summons. But
this case is an exception to the said rule. The Supreme
ratiocinated: We hold that the lower court had acquired
jurisdiction over said defendant, through service of the
summons addressed to him upon Mrs. Schenker, it appearing
from said answer that she is the representative and attorneyin-fact of her husband aforementioned civil case No. Q-2796,
which apparently was filed at her behest, in her
aforementioned representative capacity. In other words, Mrs.
Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually sued on
behalf of her husband, so that she was, also, empowered to
represent him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case,

like the of the one at bar, which is consequence of the action

brought by her on his behalf.

Sequito vs. Letrondo

FACTS: On October 21, 1955, the complaint in this case was
filed in court and the summons was served by police sergeant
Borja upon defendant's daughter who was then 12 years old
and a fourth grade pupil (p. 4 appellant's brief). Defendant
failed to file an answer and so, upon plaintiffs' motion, he was
declared in default. Plaintiffs presented their evidence exparte; the same consists of the testimony of plaintiff Balbino
Sequito only. Upon this testimony the court on February 7,
1956 rendered the judgment appealed from.

Moreover, even if the summons was really served upon

defendant's daughter, still there was no valid substituted
service because she was only 12 years of age and a grade
four pupil, she could not have appreciated the importance of
the paper delivered to her. We can not say with certainty that
the daughter was at the time of a suitable age and discretion
to be entrusted with so important a document as a court
summons.
As there is no evidence to show that defendant ever came to
know about the case before he received the decision, the
irregularity in the service was not cured. Defendant's failure to
file his answer is, therefore, justified.

On March 13, 1956, the defendant, moved for new trial,

alleging that he did not receive of the summons and that he
came to know about the case only when he received a copy of
the decision on February 23, 1956. He attached to his motion
affidavits of merit and a copy of a deed of sale of the land. The
motion was denied, hence this appeal.

The record would also reveal that the defendant has a valid
defense, a deed of sale of the land executed by Francisco
Sequito, predecessor in-interest of the plaintiffs, in favor of
Vicente Capatay, who, in turn, sold it to the defendant.
Besides, the defendant claims to have been in possession of
the land from the date of purchase up to the present time.

ISSUE: WON there had been a valid substituted service of

summons in accordance with Section 8, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court.

Jaranilla vs. Gonzales

FACTS:

HELD: NO
RATIO: It was served by one police sergeant, Pacifico Borja,
who was not a sheriff or a court officer, and who was not
authorized by the court to deliver the summons. This violates
the provisions of Section 5, Rule 7, Rules of Court. The proof
of service is also not under oath as required by Section 20 of
said rule.

Philsec Investment et al vs. CA
FACTS: Private respondent Ducat obtained separate loans
from petitioners Ayala International Finance Limited (AYALA)
and Philsec Investment Corp (PHILSEC), secured by shares
of stock owned by Ducat.

In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, private

respondent 1488, Inc., through its president, private
respondent Daic, assumed Ducats obligation under an

Agreement, whereby 1488, Inc. executed a Warranty Deed

with Vendors Lien by which it sold to petitioner Athona
Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA) a parcel of land in Texas, U.S.A.,
while PHILSEC and AYALA extended a loan to ATHONA as
initial payment of the purchase price. The balance was to be
paid by means of a promissory note executed by ATHONA in
favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon their receipt of the
money from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat
from his indebtedness and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the
shares of stock in their possession belonging to Ducat.

the U.S., (2) forum non conveniens, and (3) failure of

petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a cause of action.

As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance, the

entire amount covered by the note became due and
demandable. Accordingly, private respondent 1488, Inc. sued
petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the United
States for payment of the balance and for damages for breach
of contract and for fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioners in
misrepresenting the marketability of the shares of stock
delivered to 1488, Inc. under the Agreement.

Petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that the trial court

erred in applying the principle of litis pendentia and forum non
conveniens.

While the Civil Case was pending in the United States,

petitioners filed a complaint For Sum of Money with Damages
and Writ of Preliminary Attachment against private
respondents in the RTC Makati. The complaint reiterated the
allegation of petitioners in their respective counterclaims in the
Civil Action in the United States District Court of Southern
Texas that private respondents committed fraud by selling the
property at a price 400 percent more than its true value.
Ducat moved to dismiss the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati on
the grounds of (1) litis pendentia, vis-a-vis the Civil Action in

The trial court granted Ducats MTD, stating that the

evidentiary requirements of the controversy may be more
suitably tried before the forum of the litis pendentia in the U.S.,
under the principle in private international law of forum non
conveniens, even as it noted that Ducat was not a party in the
U.S. case.

The CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case against Ducat,

1488, Inc., and Daic on the ground of litis pendentia.
ISSUE: is the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati barred by the
judgment of the U.S. court?
HELD: No. CA reversed. Case remanded to RTC-Makai
RATIO: While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to
foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the parties
opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to
repel them on grounds allowed under the law. This is because
in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as
distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of
a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. Rule
39, 50 provides: Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. The

effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having

jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is
conclusive
upon
the
title
to
the
thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the
judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given
the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as
basis for declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights of
private respondents. The proceedings in the trial court were
summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was
even furnished copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or
apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to assure a proper
determination of whether the issues then being litigated in the
U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in this case such that
the judgment that might be rendered would constitute res
judicata.
Second. Nor is the trial courts refusal to take cognizance of
the case justifiable under the principle of forum non
conveniens:
First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, sec.1,
which does not include forum non conveniens. The propriety of
dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual
determination, hence, it is more properly considered a matter
of defense. Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial

court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it

should do so only after vital facts are established, to
determine whether special circumstances require the courts
desistance.