United States vs.

Tan Teng [GR 7081, 7 September

1912]
First Division, Johnson (J): 5 concur
Facts: Oliva Pacomio, a girl 7 years of age, was, on 15 September 1910,
staying in the house of her sister, located on Ilang-Ilang Street, in the city
of Manila. On said day, a number of Chinamen were gambling in or near
the said house. Some of said Chinamen had been in the habit of visiting
the house of Oliva's sister. Oliva Pacomio, on said day, after having taken
a bath, returned to her room. Tan Teng followed her into her room and
asked her for some face powder, which she gave him. After using some of
the face powder upon his private parts, he threw Oliva upon the floor,
placing his private parts upon hers, and remained in the position for some
little time. Several days later, perhaps a week or two, the sister of Oliva
Pacomio discovered that the latter was suffering from a venereal disease
known as gonorrhea. It was at the time of this discovery that Oliva related
to her sister what had happened upon the morning of September 15. The
sister at once put on foot an investigation to find the Chinaman. A number
of Chinamen were collected together. Oliva was called upon to identify the
one who had abused her. The defendant was not present at first. Later he
arrived and Oliva identified him at once as the one who had attempted to
violate her. Upon this information, Tan Teng was arrested and taken to the
police station and stripped of his clothing and examined. The policeman
who examined Tan Teng swore that his body bore every sign of the fact
that he was suffering from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The
policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of Tan
Teng and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose of having
a scientific analysis made of the same. The result of the examination
showed that Tan Teng was suffering from gonorrhea. Tan Teng was charged
with the crime of rape. During trial, Tan Teng contended, among others,
that the result of the scientific examination made by the Bureau of
Science of the substance taken from his body, at or about the time he was
arrested, was not admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was
suffering from gonorrhea; as that to admit such evidence was to compel
the defendant to testify against himself. After hearing the evidence, the
Honorable Charles S. Lobingier, judge, found Tan Teng guilty of the offense
of abusos deshonestos, as defined and punished under article 439 of the
Penal Code, and sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of 4 years 6
months and 11 days of prison correccional, and to pay the costs. Tan Teng
appealed.
Issue: Whether the substance taken from Tan Teng, which indicates that
he has gonorrhea, cannot be used as evidence against Tan Teng on the
ground that it is violative of the constitutional injunction against selfincrimination.

Held: As held in Holt vs. US (218 US 245), the prohibition of compelling a

man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself, is a prohibition of
the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from
him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material.
The objection, in principle, would forbid a court to look at a person and
compare his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover the Court is not
considering how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit
himself, for when he is exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, even if
the order goes too far, the evidence if material, is competent. Verily, the
prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall
not be compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition
against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his
will, an admission of his guilt. The main purpose of the provision of the
Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners
before trial, or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling
confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime.
Herein, the substance was taken from the body of Tan Teng without his
objection, the examination was made by competent medical authority and
the result showed that Tan Teng was suffering from said disease. As was
suggested by Judge Lobingier, had Tan Teng been found with stolen
property upon his person, there certainly could have been no question had
the stolen property been taken for the purpose of using the same as
evidence against him. So also if the clothing which he wore, by reason of
blood stains or otherwise, had furnished evidence of the commission of a
crime, there certainly could have been no objection to taking such for the
purpose of using the same as proof. No one would think of even
suggesting that stolen property and the clothing in the case indicated,
taken from Tan Teng, could not be used against him as evidence, without
violating the rule that a person shall not be required to give testimony
against himself.

Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners [GR L-25018,

26 May 1969]
En Banc, Fernando (J): 6 concur, 2 took no part, 2 on
official leave
Facts: Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an
administrative case against Arsenio Pascual Jr. for alleged immorality. At
the initial hearing thereof, Gatbontons counsel announced that he would
present Pascual as his first witness. Thereupon, Pascual, through counsel,
made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be
exempt from being a witness against himself. The Board of Examiners,
took note of such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next
scheduled hearing, on 12 February 1965, Pascual would be called upon to

testify as such witness, unless in the meantime he could secure a

restraining order from a competent authority. Arsenio Pascual, Jr., filed on
1 February 1965 with the Court of First Instance of an action for
prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of
Medical Examiners. On 9 February 1965, the lower court ordered that a
writ of preliminary injunction issue against the Board commanding it to
refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative
case, to await the judicial disposition of the matter upon Pascual posting a
bond in the amount of P500.00. There was a motion for intervention by
Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, asking that they be allowed
to file an answer as intervenors. Such a motion was granted and an
answer in intervention was duly filed by them on 23 March 1965
sustaining the power of Board, which for them is limited to compelling the
witness to take the stand, to be distinguished from the power to compel a
witness to incriminate himself. A decision was rendered by the lower court
on 2 August 1965, finding the claim of Pascual to be well-founded and
prohibiting the Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as
a witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and
against himself." Hence, the Board and the Gatbontons appealed.
Issue: Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in
administrative case can avail of the constitutional guarantee not to be a
witness against himself.
Held: The constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is not limited
to allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to which could
lead to a penal liability being subsequently incurred. It is true that one
aspect of such a right, to follow the language of another American
decision, is the protection against "any disclosures which the witness may
reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which
could lead to other evidence that might be so used." If that were all there
is then it becomes diluted. The constitutional guarantee protects as well
the right to silence. As far back as 1905, the Court had occasion to
declare: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence
cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." Recently, in Chavez v. Court
of Appeals, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine anew that is the right of a
defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to
take the witness standwith undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free
genuine will." The constitutional guarantee, along with other rights
granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go
unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives
should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to
the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more
in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual
even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To
quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying
the privilege is the respect a government must accord to the dignity and

integrity of its citizens." Thus, in an administrative hearing against a

medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, the Board of Medical
Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel
the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his
consent.

Galman vs. Pamaran [GRs 71208-09, 30 August

1985], also People vs. Sandiganbayan [GRs 7121213]
En Banc, Cuevas (J): 1 concur, 1 on leave, 8 filed
separate concurring opinions, 3 filed separate
dissenting opinion, 1 voted to dismiss (thus concur)
before leaving for abroad
Facts: on 21 August 1983, former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was
gunned down to death inside the premises of the Manila International
Airport (MIA) in Pasay City. To determine the facts and circumstances
surrounding the killing and to allow a free, unlimited and exhaustive
investigation of all aspects of the tragedy, PD 1886 was promulgated
creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board which later became more popularly
known as the Agrava Board. Pursuant to the powers vested in it by PD
1886, the Board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses
appeared and testified and/or produced documentary and other evidence
either in obedience to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by
the Board. Among the witnesses who appeared, testified and produced
evidence before the Board were General Fabian C. Ver, Major General
Prospero Olivas, Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo
Mojica, Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt. Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido.
Upon termination of the investigation, 2 reports were submitted to
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. One, by its Chairman, the Hon. Justice
Corazon Juliano Agrava; and another one, jointly authored by the other
members of the Board namely: Hon. Luciano Salazar, Hon. Amado
Dizon, Hon. Dante Santos and Hon. Ernesto Herrera. The reports were
thereafter referred and turned over to the Tanodbayan for appropriate
action. After conducting the necessary preliminary investigation, the
Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan 2 Informations for murder
one for the killing of Sen. Benigno S. Aquino (Criminal Case 10010) and
another for the killing of Rolando Galman (Criminal Case 10011), who was
found dead on the airport tarmac not far from the prostrate body of Sen.
Aquino on that same fateful day. In both criminal cases, Ver, et. al. were
charged as accessories, along with several principals, and one accomplice.
Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. In the course of the
joint trial, the prosecution represented by the Office of the Tanodbayan,
marked and thereafter offered as part of its evidence, the individual

testimonies of Ver, et. al. before the Agrava Board. Ver, et. al., through
their respective counsel objected to the admission of said exhibits. Gen.
Ver filed a formal "Motion to Exclude Testimonies of Gen. Fabian C. Ver
before the Fact Finding Board as Evidence against him in the above-cases"
contending that its admission will be in derogation of his constitutional
right against self-incrimination and violative of the immunity granted by
PD 1886,a nd thus prayed that his testimony be rejected as evidence for
the prosecution. Major Gen. Olivas and the rest of the other accused
likewise filed separate motions to exclude their respective individual
testimonies invoking the same ground. The Tanodbayan opposed said
motions contending that the immunity relied upon by Ver, et. al. in
support of their motions to exclude their respective testimonies, was not
available to them because of their failure to invoke their right against
selfincrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board. On 30 May 1985,
The Tanodbayan having no further witnesses to present and having been
required to make its offer of evidence in writing, the Sandiganbayan,
without the pending motions for exclusion being resolved, issued a
Resolution directing that by agreement of the parties, the pending
motions for exclusion and the opposition thereto, together with the
memorandum in support thereof, as well as the legal issues and
arguments, raised therein are to be considered jointly in the Court's
Resolution on the prosecution's formal offer of exhibits and other
documentary evidences. On 3 June 1985, the prosecution made a written
"Formal Offer of Evidence" which includes, among others, the testimonies
of Ver, et. al. and other evidences produced by them before the Board, all
of which have been previously marked in the course of the trial. Ver, et. al.
objected to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence on the same ground
relied upon by them in their respective motion for exclusion. On 13 June
1985, The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, admitting all the evidences
offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or other evidence
produced by Ver, et. al. in view of the immunity granted by PD 1886. The
Tanodbayan, along with Saturnina and Reynaldo Galman moved for the
reconsideration of the said Resolution, but were denied. They filed two
separate petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the right against self-incrimination or to not to witness
against oneself applies also in the proceeding before the Agrava Board.
Held: Although referred to and designated as a mere Fact Finding Board,
the Board is in truth and in fact, and to all legal intents and purposes, an
entity charged, not only with the function of determining the facts and
circumstances surrounding the killing, but more importantly, the
determination of the person or persons criminally responsible therefor so
that they may be brought before the bar of justice. The investigation
therefor is also geared, as any other similar investigation of its sort, to the
ascertainment and/or determination of the culprit or culprits, their
consequent prosecution and ultimately, their conviction. And as

safeguard, the Presidential Decree guarantees "any person called to

testify before the Board the right to counsel at any stage of the
proceedings." Considering the foregoing environmental settings, it cannot
be denied that in the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned to
testify will include not merely plain witnesses but also those suspected as
authors and co-participants in the tragic killing. And when suspects are
summoned and called to testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is
one where the person testifying or producing evidence is undergoing
investigation for the commission of an offense and not merely in order to
shed light on the facts and surrounding circumstances of the
assassination, but more importantly, to determine the character and
extent of his participation therein. Among this class of witnesses were the
respondents, suspects in the said assassination, all of whom except
Generals Ver and Olivas, were detained (under technical arrest) at the
time they were summoned and gave their testimonies before the Agrava
Board. This notwithstanding, PD 1886 denied them the right to remain
silent. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses against themselves.
Section 5 of PD 1886 leave them no choice. They have to take the witness
stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or
refused to do so, The jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars even
before conviction dangled before their very eyes. Similarly, they cannot
invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves, both of which are
sacrosantly enshrined and protected by our fundamental law. Both these
constitutional rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a
witness against himself were right away totally foreclosed by PD 1886.
When they so testified and produced evidence as ordered, they were not
immune from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them. It
must be noted that initially the provision in our organic laws were similar
to the Constitution of the United States and was as follows "That no
person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against
himself." As now worded, Section 20 of Article IV reads: "No person shall
be compelled to be a witness against himself." The deletion of the phrase
"in a criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said
provision also applicable to cases other than criminal. Decidedly then, the
right "not to be compelled to testify against himself" applies to Ver, et. al.
notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in its
strictest sense, a criminal case. No doubt, Ver, et. al. were not merely
denied the said sacred constitutional rights, but also the right to "due
process" which is fundamental fairness. The review of the pleadings and
their annexes, together with the oral arguments, manifestations and
admissions of both counsel, failed to reveal adherence to and compliance
with due process. The manner in which the testimonies were taken from
Ver, et. al. fall short of the constitutional standards both under the "due
process clause" and under the "exclusionary rule" in Section 20, Article IV.
In the face of such grave constitutional infirmities, the individual
testimonies of Ver, et. al. cannot be admitted against them in any criminal

proceeding. This is true regardless of absence of claim of constitutional

privilege or of the presence of a grant of immunity by law.
Issue (2): Whether the right against self-incrimination need to be invoked
before the board in order to prevent use of any given statement against
the testifying witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
Held (2): Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one,
which grants "use immunity"; and the other, which grants what is known
as "transactional immunity." The distinction between the two is as follows:
"Use immunity" prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its
fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the
witness. On the other hand, "transactional immunity" grants immunity to
the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled
testimony relates. Presidential Decree 1886, more specifically Section 5
thereof, belongs to the first type of immunity statutes. It grants merely
immunity from use of any statement given before the Board, but not
immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely
testifying and/or producing evidence do not render the witness immuned
from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against selfincrimination. He is merely saved from the use against him of such
statement and nothing more. Stated otherwise, he still runs the risk of
being prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self-incrimination.
The dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of due process, demands
that Ver, et. al. should have been informed of their rights to remain silent
and warned that any and all statements to be given by them may be used
against them. This, they were denied, under the pretense that they are
not entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them.
Hence, the right against self-incrimination need not be invoked before the
Board in order to prevent use of any given statement against the
testifying witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution. A literal
interpretation is repugnant to Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution,
which is the first test of admissibility. Said provision renders inadmissible
any confession obtained in violation thereof. This exclusionary rule applies
not only to confessions but also to admissions, whether made by a witness
in any proceeding or by an accused in a criminal proceeding or any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense. In fine, in view of
the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to answer
questions under Sec. 4 of PD 1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are
deemed immunized under Section 5 of the same law. The applicability of
the immunity granted by PD 1886 cannot be made to depend on a claim
of the privilege against self-incrimination which the same law practically
strips away from the witness.

Acebedo vs. Sarmiento [GR L-28025, 16 December

1970]
First Division, Fernando (J): 7 concur. 3 on official
leave
Facts: It was shown that on 3 August 1959, the Provincial Fiscal filed in
the Court of First Instance of Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 36 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) Pampanga a criminal information for damage to property
through reckless imprudence against David Acebedo y Dalman and a
certain Chi Chan Tan. As there were no further proceedings in the
meantime, Acebedo on 19 May 1965 moved to dismiss the criminal
charge. Judge Malcolm G. Sarmient was not in agreement as shown by his
order of denial of 10 July 1965. Then, after two more years, came the trial
with the complainant having testified on direct examination but not
having as yet been fully cross-examined. At the continuation of the trial
set for 7 June 1967 such witness did not show up. The provincial fiscal
moved for postponement. Counsel for Acebedo, however, not only
objected but sought the dismissal of the case based on the right of the
accused to speedy trial. The Judge this time acceded, but would likewise
base his order of dismissal, orally given, on the cross-examination of
complainant not having started as yet. Later that same day, the Judge did
reconsider the order and reinstated the case, his action being due to its
being shown that the cross-examination of the complainant had already
started. Acebedo filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether Acebedo is entitled to have the case dismissed based on
the right ofteh accused to speedy trial.
Held: The right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure
that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a
court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration
of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose. The remedy in the
event of a non-observance of this right is by habeas corpus if the accused
were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus
for the final dismissal of the case. The right of the accused to have a
speedy trial is violated not only when unjustified postponements of the
trial are asked for and secured, but also when, without good cause or
justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without
having his case tried. An accused person is entitled to a trial at the
earliest opportunity. He cannot be oppressed by delaying the
commencement of trial for an unreasonable length of time. If the
proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily
delayed. It is not to be supposed, of course, that the Constitution intends
to remove from the prosecution every reasonable opportunity to prepare

for trial. Impossibilities cannot be expected or extraordinary efforts

required on the part of the prosecutor or the court. The Constitution does
not say that the right to a speedy trial may be availed of only where the
prosecution for crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does
not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private individuals.
Where once a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy
trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is
authorized to be commenced. More specifically, the Court has consistently
adhered to the view that a dismissal based on the denial of the right to a
speedy trial amounts to an acquittal. Necessarily, any further attempt at
continuing the prosecution or starting a new one would fall within the
prohibition against an accused being twice put in jeopardy. Herein,
Acebedo not once but twice did seek to have the prosecution for damage
to property against him terminated as the matter was pending for at least
6 years, the first time he sought to put an end to it. When at last, the trial
stage was reached, the complaining witness testified on direct
examination but made no appearance when his cross-examination was to
be continued. A clear case of a denial of the right to a speedy trial was
thus made out. There was an order of dismissal that amounted to an
acquittal. No reconsideration could therefore be had without offending the
provision on double jeopardy.

Olbes v Danilo Buemio

Garcia vs. Domingo [GR L-30104, 25 July 1973]
Resolution En Banc, Fernando (J): 5 concur, 1 took no
part, 1 on leave
Facts: In Branch I of the City Court of Manila presided over by Judge
Gregorio N. Garcia, there were commenced, by appropriate informations
all dated 16 January 1968, 8 criminal actions against Edgardo Calo, and
Simeon Carbonnel and Francisco Lorenzana, as follows: a. Against Edgardo
Calo (on complaint of Francisco Lorenzana) (1) Criminal Case F-109191,
for slight physical injuries; (2) Criminal Case F-109192, also for slight
physical injuries; and (3) Criminal Case F-109193, for maltreatment; b.
Against Simeon Carbonnel (id.) (1) Criminal Case F-109197, for
maltreatment; (2) Criminal Case F-109196, for slight physical injuries; and
(3) Criminal Case F-109198 for light threats; (c) Against Francisco
Lorenzana (on complaint of Calo and Carbonnel) (1) Criminal Case F109201, for violation of Sec. 887 of the Revised Ordinances of Manila
(resisting an officer); and (2) Criminal Case F-109200, for slander. The trial
of the cases was jointly held on March 4, 18, 23, and 30; April 17 and 20;
May 4 and 11; June 1, 15, 22, and 29; and August 3 and 10, 1968. All 14

trial dates except March 4 and 18, and April 17, 1968 fell on a
Saturday. This was arranged by the parties and the Court upon the
insistence of Calo and Carbonnel who, as police officers under suspension
because of the cases, desired the same to be terminated as soon as
possible and as there were many cases scheduled for trial on the usual
criminal trial days. The trial of the cases in question were held, with the
conformity of the accused and their counsel, in the chambers of Judge
Garcia. During all 14 days of trial, spanning a period of several months,
the accused were at all times represented by their respective counsel,
who acted not only in defense of their clients, but as prosecutors of the
accusations filed at their clients' instance. There was only 1 day when
Atty. Consengco, representing Calo and Carbonnel, was absent. This was
on 20 April 1968. But at the insistence of Pat. Carbonnel, the trial
proceeded, and Carbonnel cross-examined one of the witnesses presented
by the adverse party. At the conclusion of the hearings the accused, thru
counsel, asked for and were granted time to submit memoranda. Calo and
Carbonnel, thru counsel, Atty. Rafael Consengco, submitted a 14-page
memorandum with not less than 35 citations of relevant portions of the
transcript of stenographic notes in support of their prayer for exoneration,
and for the conviction of Lorenzana in respect of their countercharges
against the latter. The promulgation of judgment was first scheduled on 23
September 1968. This was postponed to 28 September 1968, at the
instance of Atty. Rafael Consengco, as counsel for respondents Calo and
Carbonnel, and again to 1 October 1968, this time at the instance of Atty.
Consengco and Atty. Francisco Koh who had, in the meantime, also
entered his appearance as counsel for Calo and Carbonnel. The
applications for postponement were not grounded upon and supposed
defect or irregularity of the proceedings. Early in the morning of 1 October
1968, Calo and Carbonnel, thru their counsel, Atty. Rafael S. Consengco,
filed with the Court of First Instance a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, with application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction, alleging jurisdictional defects. After proceedings duly had,
Judge Felix Domingo (CFI Manila) issued an order declaring that the
constitutional and statutory rights of the accused had been violated,
adversely affecting their right to a free and impartial trial noting that the
trial of these cases lasting several weeks were held exclusively in
chambers and not in the court room open to the public; and ordering the
city court Judge (Garcia) "to desist from reading or causing to be read or
promulgated the decisions he may have rendered already in the criminal
cases in question pending in his Court, until further orders of the CFI. A
motion for reconsideration proving unavailing, Garcia and Lorenzana on 28
January 1969, elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by means of a
suit for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue: Whether the conduct of the trial inside the Judges air-conditioned
chambers, rather than the usual open court, render the proceedings
violative of the constitutional mandate for public trial.
Held: The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the
antecedents of the petition explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial
to which an accused was entitled. Trial should also be public in order to
offset any danger of conducting it in an illegal and unjust manner, and
thus serve as a deterrence to arbitrariness. There is no ambiguity in the
words employed. The trial must be public. It possesses that character
when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the
proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such
attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No
relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind
this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further
protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not
tainted with any impropriety. It is understandable why such a right is
deemed embraced in procedural due process. Where a trial takes place,
as is quite usual, in the courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be
heard is posted, no problem arises. It is the usual course of events that
individuals desirous of being present are free to do so. There is the wellrecognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public
where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or
public morals." Still, herein, when the trial was held on Saturdays and in
the air-conditioned chambers of the City Judge for the convenience of the
parties and of the Judge, the proceedings were not violative of the right to
public trial. There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is
to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce
the number of those who could be present. Such a fact though is not
indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform
dimensions. Some are smaller than others. It suffices to satisfy the
requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends,
relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be
charged." Reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least 14
hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge, without
objection on the part of policemen. An objective appraisal of conditions in
municipal or city courts would have gone far in dispelling the
apprehension that there was an evasion of a constitutional command. The
crowded daily calendar, the nature of the cases handled, civil as well as
criminal, the relaxed attitude on procedural rules not being strictly
adhered to all make for a less tense atmosphere. As a result the
attendance of the general public is much more in evidence; nor is its
presence unwelcome. When it is remembered further that the occupants
of such courts are not chosen primarily for their legal acumen, but taken
from that portion of the bar more considerably attuned to the pulse of
public life, it is not to be rationally expected that an accused would be

denied whatever solace and comfort may come from the knowledge that a
judge, with the eyes of the persons in court alert to his demeanor and his
rulings, would run the risk of being unjust, unfair, or arbitrary. Nor does it
change matters, just because, it was in the air-conditioned chambers of a
city court judge rather than in the usual place that the trial took place.

Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the

Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases against the
Former President Joseph E. Estrada. Perez vs.
Estrada [AM 01-4-03-SC, 29 June 2001]
En Banc, Vitug (J): 4 concur, 1 on leave, 2 file
separate concurring opinions, 2 file separate
dissenting opinion, 1 joins separate opinion of one
concurring justice
Facts: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas
(KBP), an association representing duly franchised and authorized
television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter
requesting the Supreme Court to allow live media coverage of the
anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against
former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to
assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an
unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr.
Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 5 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still
later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On 17
April 2001, the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the
petition.
Issue: Whether the press should be allowed to air Estradas trial to the
public.
Held: The press is a mighty catalyst in awakening public consciousness,
and it has become an important instrument in the quest for truth. Recent
history exemplifies media's invigorating presence, and its contribution to
society is quite impressive. The Court, just recently, has taken judicial
notice of the enormous effect of media in stirring public sentience during
the impeachment trial, a partly judicial and partly political exercise,
indeed the most-watched program in the boob-tubes during those times,
that would soon culminate in EDSA II. The propriety of granting or denying
the petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand,
and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with
the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a
fair and impartial trial. When these rights race against one another, the
right of the accused must be preferred to win. With the possibility of losing

not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, it
behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict
solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that
would come only after the presentation of credible evidence testified to by
unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or
subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract
from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper influence,
and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running
emotions or passions. Due process guarantees the accused a presumption
of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above
its individual settings nor made an object of public's attention and where
the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence
but only by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting
dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. Thus, an accused has a right to
a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else,
where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims
to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned
and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago.
A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that
the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the
available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial
process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough
facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the
proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not
too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions,
who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during
the proceedings.

Tumey vs. Ohio [273 US 510, 7 March 1927]

Taft (CJ)
Facts: Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and was brought before Mayor
Pugh, of the village of North College Hill, charged with unlawfully
possessing intoxicating liquor. He moved for his dismissal because of the
disqualification of the mayor to try him under the 14th Amendment. The
mayor denied the motion, proceeded to the trial, convicted Tumey of
unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor within Hamilton county as
charged, fined him $100, and ordered that he be imprisoned until the fine
and costs were paid. Tumey obtained a bill of exceptions and carried the
case on error to the court of common pleas of Hamilton county. That court
heard the case and reversed the judgment, on the ground that the mayor
was disqualified as claimed. The state sought review by the Court of
Appeals of the First Appellate District of Ohio, which reversed the common
pleas and affirmed the judgment of the mayor. On 4 May 1926, the state

Supreme Court refused Tumey's application to require the Court of

Appeals to certify its record in the case. Tumey then filed a petition in
error in that court as of right, asking that the judgment of the mayor's
court and of the appellate court be reversed on constitutional grounds. On
11 May 1926, the Supreme Court adjudged that the petition be dismissed
for the reason that no debatable constitutional question was involved in
the cause. The judgment was then brought to the US Supreme Court upon
a writ of error allowed by the Chief Justice of the state Supreme Court, to
which it was rightly directed.
Issue: Whether the pecuniary interest of the Mayor and his village, and
the system of courts in prosecuting violations of the Prohibition Act,
renders the mayor disqualified from hearing the case.
Held: All questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional
validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of
interest would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative
discretion. But it certainly violates the 14th Amendment and deprives a
defendant in a criminal case of due process of law to subject his liberty or
property to the judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct,
personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against
him in his case. Herein, the mayor has authority, which he exercised in the
case, to order that the person sentenced to pay a fine shall remain in
prison until the fine and costs are paid. The mayor thus has a direct
personal pecuniary interest in convicting the defendant who came before
him for trial, in the $12 of costs imposed in his behalf, which he would not
have received if the defendant had been acquitted. This was not
exceptional, but was the result of the normal operation of the law and the
ordinance. The system by which an inferior judge is paid for his service
only when he convicts the defendant has not become so embedded by
custom in the general practice, either at common law or in this country,
that it can be regarded as due process of law, unless the costs usually
imposed are so small that they may be properly ignored as within the
maxim "de minimis non curat lex." The Court cannot regard the prospect
of receipt or loss of such an emolument in each case as a minute, remote,
trifling, or insignificant interest. It is certainly not fair to each defendant
brought before the mayor for the careful and judicial consideration of his
guilt or innocence that the prospect of such a prospective loss by the
mayor should weigh against his acquittal. But the pecuniary interest of the
mayor in the result of his judgment is not the only reason for holding that
due process of law is denied to the defendant here. The statutes were
drawn to stimulate small municipalities, in the country part of counties in
which there are large cities, to organize and maintain courts to try persons
accused of violations of the Prohibition Act everywhere in the county. The
inducement is offered of dividing between the state and the village the
large fines provided by the law for its violations. The trial is to be had
before a mayor without a jury, without opportunity for retrial, and with a

review confined to questions of law presented by a bill of exceptions, with

no opportunity by the reviewing court to set aside the judgment on the
weighing of evidence, unless it should appear to be so manifestly against
the evidence as to indicate mistake, bias, or willful disregard of duty by
the trial court. Thus, no matter what the evidence was against him, the
defendant had the right to have an impartial judge. He seasonably raised
the objection, and was entitled to halt the trial because of the
disqualification of the judge, which existed both because of his direct
pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because of his official motive to
convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the village.
There were thus presented at the outset both features of the
disqualification. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is reversed,
and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the
present opinion.

Soriano vs. Angeles [GR 109920, 31 August 2000]

Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4 concur
Facts: According to Soriano, Ruel Garcia and his uncle, Pedro Garcia, who
were members of the Caloocan police, barged into the barangay hall of
Barangay 56, Zone 5 in Caloocan City, shortly after midnight on 7
November 1991, looking for Ceferino A. Soriano, the barangay captain.
Ruel Garcia gave Soriano fist blows on the face 4 times with his left hand,
while he poked a gun at him with his right hand, at the same time cursing
him, "Putang ina mo cabeza" (You son of a bitch chief"). Although there
were 4 barangay tanods (Manuel Montoya, Arturo del Rosario, Ramiro
Samson, and Francisco Raton) in the barangay hall, they could not come
to the aid of Soriano because they were held at bay by Pedro Garcia. The
Garcias then left with their companions who had been waiting outside the
hall. Soriano was treated for his injuries in the hospital. On the other hand,
Ruel Garcia denied Soriano's allegation. He alleged that he went to the
barangay hall in the evening of 6 November 1991 because his younger
brother had been reportedly arrested for figuring in a brawl with Dennis
Mones and a certain Ocampo, and beaten up by Soriano. As Garcia saw
Soriano near the door of the barangay hall, he asked for the whereabouts
of his brother and the reason for the latter's arrest. Apparently thinking
that Garcia was trying to intervene in the case he was investigating,
Soriano angrily told Garcia to lay off: "Walang pulis pulis dito" (Your being
a policeman doesn't pull strings here"). When Garcia insisted on going
inside the barangay hall, Soriano blocked him and then pushed him on the
chest. Garcia also pushed Soriano, causing him to fall on a pile of
nightsticks and injure himself. All the time, Garcia claimed he had his gun
tucked at his waist. Private respondent's uncle, Pedro Garcia, then arrived

and took him home. Garcia was charged with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 121, Caloocan City, for direct assault (Criminal Case C- 40740). on
26 August 1992, before Garcia's arraignment, she called the parties and
their counsels to her chambers and urged them to settle the case, and, to
which Soriano refused. The hearing on 15 September 1992 was postponed
to September 16 to allow Garcias counsel to prepare for the case. On 15
March 1993, the trial court acquitted Garcia. In acquitting Garcia, Judge
Adoracion C. Angeles found it incredible that Soriano did not resist or even
say anything when Garcia allegedly assaulted him and that none of the
four barangay tanods who were near him came to his aid. She thought
that if Soriano had indeed been attacked, he would have suffered more
serious injuries than a contusion on the forehead, erythema on the chest,
and a lacerated wound on the lower lip. The judge also excluded from the
evidence the testimonies of Soriano and barangay tanod Manuel Montoya
on the ground that their testimonies had not been formally offered in
evidence as required by Rule 132, 534 to 35 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. Soriano filed a petition for certiorari, alleging that the decision is
void because it was not rendered by an impartial tribunal.
Issue: Whether the judge was biased in trying to make the parties arrive
at an amicable settlement, and allowing Garcias counsel to postpone the
hearing on the 16 September 1992 instead of 15 September 1992.
Held: It is settled that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the
parties is not enough evidence to prove the charge. Bias and prejudice
cannot be presumed, especially weighed against a judge's sacred
allegation under oath of office to administer justice without respect to any
person and do equal right to the poor and the rich. There must be a
showing of bias and prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source
resulting in an opinion in the merits on some basis other than what the
judge learned from his participation in the case. Herein, the judge's efforts
to have the parties arrive at an amicable settlement is not evidence of
partiality for Garcia. She could have been motivated by factors other than
a desire to clear Garcia of criminal liability, i.e., the clearing of her court
docket or in setting a good example considering that Soriano and Garcia
were neighbors occupying public offices charged with the maintenance of
peace and order in the community. As for the allegation that the trial was
not held until after 3 weeks to give Garcia more time to persuade Soriano
to amicably settle the case, it has been shown that it was not judge but
court personnel in charge of scheduling cases who assigned the dates of
trial taking into account the court calendar. The cancellation of the 15
September 1992 hearing, on the other hand, was made to give Garcia's
counsel, Atty. Maria Lelibet Sampaga, time to study the case and prepare
for trial. Although Atty. Sampaga had once appeared in behalf of Garcia, it
was for the purpose of assisting the latter at the arraignment because the
regular counsel was absent. As new counsel, Atty. Sampaga needed to
study the case. A postponement to the next day, 16 September 1992, was

not an unreasonable request. Indeed, this did not involve resetting the
case since 16 September 1992 had been originally designated as one of
the initial trial dates. Nor is there any showing that the judge decided the
criminal case on grounds other than its merits. A reading of her decision
acquitting Garcia shows that the same was made on the basis of her
evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution and of the defense. Because
of the conflicting versions of the parties as to what really happened, her
decision was necessarily based on her appreciation of the eligibility of the
witnesses for the prosecution and the defense.

United States vs. Javier [GR L-12990, 21 January

1918]
First Division, Malcolm (J): 7 concur
Facts: Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of 22 October 1915, fastened
his carabao valued at P150 in his corral situated in the barrio of Trapiche,
municipality of Tananuan, Province of Batangas. On the following morning
when he went to look after the animal, he found the gate to the corral
open and that the carabao had disappeared. He reported the matter to
the Constabulary, and a patrol of the Constabulary under the leadership of
sergeant Presa (+) on November 20, encountered Lazaro Javier, Apolinario
Mendoza, and Placido de Chavez leading a carabao. When the ladrones
saw the Constabulary, they scattered in all directions. On the following
day, the Constabulary found the carabao tied in front of the house of one
Pedro Monterola in the barrio of Santa Clara, municipality of San Pablo.
The carabao was identified by Doroteo Natividad as the one which had
been taken from his corral on the night of 22 October 1915, and by the
Constabulary as the one seen in the possession of Javier. Javier was
charged for stealing the carabao before the justice of the peace of the
municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas. During trial, the sworn
statement of sergeant Presca, now deceased, was presented in court by
the prosecution. Presca's signature in the statement was identified. Javier
alleged that the lower court erred in admitting said sworn statement as
evidence.
Issue: Whether the sworn statement, which was executed by a person
now deceased, is inadmissible inasmuch as the accused is not given the
opportunity to cross-examine the author thereof.
Held: The Philippine Bill of Rights provides "That in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to meet the witnesses face
to face," and the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15
(5), states taht "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be
entitled: to be confronted at the trial by and to cross-examine the
witnesses against him." With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights, it

"intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts

provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him
face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his presence, and give
to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to
prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex parte
affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the
recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right of crossexamination." In other words, confrontation is essential because crossexamination is essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a
tribunal may have before it the deportment and appearance of the
witness while testifying. The sworn statement of Presa was not made by
question and answer under circumstances which gave the defense an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The proviso of the Code of
Criminal Procedure as to confrontation is therefore inapplicable. Presa's
statement again is not the testimony of a witness deceased, given in a
former action between the same relating to the same matter.
Consequently, the exception provided by section 298, No. 8, of the Code
of Civil Procedure and relied upon by the prosecution in the lower court is
also inapplicable. Nor is the statement of Presca a dying declaration or a
deposition in a former trial or shown to be a part of the preliminary
examination. Under these circumstances, the sworn statement was
improperly received in evidence in the lower court. Still, although the
Court could find this to be reversible error and, ordinarily, should remand
the case for a new trial. The Court however is convinced that this would
gain the accused nothing except delay for the testimony of the owner of
the carabao and of the two Constabulary soldiers, rebutted by no
reasonable evidence on behalf of the accused, is deemed sufficient to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

JBL Reyes v Bagatsing

Burgos v Chief of Staf