Philosophical Psychology

Vol. 24, No. 4, August 2011, 517536

The riddle of dreams

Nadav Matalon
In The interpretation of dreams Freud famously claimed to have finally solved the
riddle of dreams. Yet amidst all the heated debates and intense controversies that ensued
in the wake of this groundbreaking work, one fundamental question has been entirely
overlooked, namely: in what sense, exactly, are dreams analogous to riddles? It will be the
burden of this paper to show that a critical investigation of this seemingly simple question
reveals a fundamental and hereto unnoticed discrepancy between Freuds rhetoric on his
method of dream interpretation and its application in practice. More specifically,
whereas Freud argues that the psychoanalytic method can effectively solve the riddles
of dreams by uncovering their pre-existing solutions, careful examination reveals that
dream interpretations of this kind are the product of a very different solving technique,
one that proceeds along a retroactive timeline rather than a linear one. Drawing on
Wittgensteins distinction between two kinds of riddles and the manner in which they are
solved, I expound on the nature of retroactive riddle-solving, thus generating a distinctly
different picture of psychoanalytic dream interpretation than the one envisioned and
advocated by Freud.
Keywords: Dream Interpretation; Freud; Psychoanalysis; Retroactivity; Riddle;
Wittgenstein
In my youth I felt an overpowering need to understand something of the riddles of
the world in which we live and perhaps even to contribute something to their
solution. (Freud, 1926, p. 253)
The riddle does not exist. (Wittgenstein, 1922/1963, section 6.5)

1. Introduction
Echoing young Freuds aspirations, The interpretation of dreams (Freud, 1900) aims
to unravel one of the most formidable and enduring mysteries of the human mind.
Freud named it the riddle of dreams, and rendered its solution the sine qua non of
Nadav Matalon is a Doctoral Researcher at the Department of Philosophy, Kings College London, UK.
Correspondence to: Nadav Matalon, Department of Philosophy, Kings College London, Strand, London WC2R
2LS, UK. Email: Nadav.Matalon@kcl.ac.uk
ISSN 0951-5089 (print)/ISSN 1465-394X (online)/11/040517-20 2011 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2011.556605

518 N. Matalon

accurate diagnosis and effective treatment of mental pathologies. Anyone who has
failed to explain the origin of dream-images, he exclaimed unequivocally in the
preface to his magnum opus, can scarcely hope to understand phobias, obsessions or
delusions or to bring a therapeutic influence to bear on them (Freud, 1900, p. xxiii).
The doctrine from which this bold assertion derives has been met with a rainbow of
reactions, spanning from avid enthusiasm to acerbic criticism and everything
in between.1 Yet amidst all the heated debates and intense controversies that ensued
in Interpretations wake, one fundamental question has been entirely overlooked,
namely: in what sense, exactly, are dreams analogous to riddles? It will be the burden of
this paper to show that a critical investigation of this seemingly simple question bears
unexpected insights, as well as far-reaching implications, with regard to the Freudian
method of dream interpretation.
I begin this paper with a brief exegesis of the dream-riddle analogy and its unique
status within the Freudian theory of dreams (section 2). I then proceed to examine
the conceptual underpinnings of Freuds method of dream interpretation, including
its core tenets and tacit assumptions (section 3). Subsequently, in a (seemingly) sharp
transition, I turn to draw on Wittgensteins philosophy in order to develop an
important distinction between two kinds of riddles and the manner in which they are
solved (section 4). On the basis of this distinction, I expound on the nature of
retroactive riddle-solving, thereby revealing an important and hereto unnoticed
discrepancy between Freuds rhetoric on his method of dream interpretation and its
application in practice. Consequently, an entirely new picture of psychoanalytic
dream interpretation emerges, one that significantly diverges from that which was
envisioned and advocated by Freud (section 5). I end the discussion with a number of
concluding remarks (section 6).

2. Dreams as Riddles of the Psyche

What is it that hangs on the wall and that one can dry ones hands on? It would be
a stupid riddle if the answer were a hand-towel. But that answer is rejected.No,
a herring.But for heavens sake, comes the infuriated protest, a herring doesnt
hang on the wall.You can hang it there.But who in the world is going to dry
his hands on a herring?Well, is the soothing reply, you dont have to. (Freud,
1905b, p. 215)

The analogy between dreams and riddles, like some letter in cipher (Freud, 1900,
p. 135), a rebus (p. 277), or hieroglyphic script (p. 321), recurs time and again
in The interpretation of dreams. Addressing the works of his predecessors, Freud
maintains that in their writings one finds, little or nothing that touches upon the
essential nature of dreams or that offers a final solution of any of their enigmas
(1900, p. 1). Elsewhere he asserts that, dreams really have a secret meaning (Freud,
1900, p. 146), and that in the absence of an appropriate solving-method, all the
conundrums which the authorities [i.e., Freuds predecessors] have observed in
dreams would remain unsolved (p. 146). At a later stage, Freud suggests that,
a dream is a picture-puzzle (1900, p. 278), and in a similar vein, upon recounting

Philosophical Psychology

519

one of his personal dreams, he proceeds to declare in near exasperation that, this
dream exhibits so many . . . puzzling features, indeed, that I would give a great deal to
be able to present the complete solution of its conundrums (p. 422).2
Many similar remarks on the cryptic nature of dreams and the importance of
discovering their solution can be found throughout the Freudian corpus.3 It is
therefore rather surprising to learn that Freud offers no explanation with regard to
the exact nature of his dream-riddle simile, nor does he make any attempt to justify it
in any of his writings.4 Could this be merely an oversight on the part of the great
Unriddler of Riddles?5 I highly doubt that it is. Ranked among the most gifted
writers of his time, Freud exercised both precision and care in the application of
rhetorical devices, and his treatment of analogies is no exception to this rule. Having
drawn a comparison between the analysts task and that of the chemist or
archeologist, for example, he immediately proceeds to qualify these parallels so as to
clarify their exact explanatory function and avoid unnecessary obfuscation of his
views.6 Evidence of this cautious approach is also available in the form of more
general caveats. Hence, on one occasion Freud himself warns that, analogies never
carry one more than a certain distance; a point is soon reached at which the subjects
of the comparison take divergent paths (1926, p. 254); whereas in another he
stipulates that, the two objects compared need only coincide at a single point and
may be entirely different from each other in everything else (1919, p. 161). It would
seem quite unlikely that Freuds emphatic silence on the analogy between dreams and
riddles has been the result of mere carelessness or unintentional omission.
Is there another possible way by which to account for this striking anomaly? As a
starting point, I would like to suggest the following thesis. Rather than associating
two distinct entities so as to generate an analogy in the conventional sense, Freud
employs the dream-riddle idiom heuristically. That is, for him, the notion of dreams
qua riddles functions as a meta-theoretical hub which grounds his entire theory of
dreams. Thus construed, the dream-riddle analogy is not merely a convenient
metaphorical idiolect aimed at highlighting certain similarities between two disparate
thingsit is a pivotal axiom upon which Freud proceeds to develop his intricate
interpretive method. In short, for Freud, dreams are not like riddles, they are riddles.
These considerations bring us to the heart of the matter. Completely engrossed in
his quest to discover the most satisfactory solution of the riddle of dreams (Freud,
1910, p. 34), Freud glosses over the antecedent issue of providing cogent
underpinnings for this particular analogy. Moreover, as I will show in the following
sections, critical perusal of precisely this issue leads to the unavoidable conclusion
that Freuds account of dream interpretation and the actual application of his
method are ultimately incongruous.

3. The Psychoanalytic Method of Dream Interpretation

The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. (Wittgenstein, 1953/1999,
section 308)

520 N. Matalon

So far our discussion has focused on the meta-theoretical status of the dream-riddle
idiom in Freuds conception of dreams. But what makes this simile so natural and
compelling? Why, that is, did it go entirely unnoticed for more than a hundred years?
Taking a closer look at our intuitive attitude toward dreams may help clarify the
reasons for this peculiar anomaly. To begin with, conventional wisdom holds that
our dreams are capable of exerting a profound and powerful effect on us (cf.,
Wittgenstein, 1966/1994, pp. 4546). On occasion, such phenomenal experiences
may even produce the uncanny impression that they were meant to tell us
somethingto convey an important message perhapsyet what that message is and
where it came from often remains shrouded in mystery. Seen in this light, Freuds
first ingenious move has been to tap into this intuitive source by developing an
elaborate ontology of dreams, one that effectively incorporates their everyday
conception within a sophisticated model of the human psyche.
Broadly speaking, the psychoanalytic theory of dream interpretation is built on the
core assumption that all dreams consist of two distinct, yet closely related,
components. In Freuds terminology, these are the manifest content and latent content
of the dream. The former denotes the dream-narrative which is consciously
experienced by the dreamer during sleep; whereas the latter designates the real
meaning of the dream, i.e., that which lies hidden (or, more precisely, repressed)
within the unconscious region of the dreamers psyche.7 According to Freud, the
relation between these two components is one of disguised representation, that is, the
manifest content of the dream constitutes a distorted reconstruction of its latent
content. Freud calls the process by which the latent content becomes manifest dream
work, and proceeds to explicate its rationale as follows:
For the dream is one of the roads along which consciousness can be reached by the
psychical material which, on account of the opposition aroused by its content, has
been cut off from consciousness and repressed, and has thus become pathogenic.
The dream, in short, is one of the detours by which repression can be evaded; it is one
of the principal means employed by what is known as the indirect method of
representation in the mind. (Freud, 1905a, p. 15)

On Freuds psychogenic model, dreaming constitutes an indirect channel by which

disagreeable and/or distressing materials can bypass the psyches defenses and rise
from the dreamers unconscious toward her conscious awareness.8 However, en route
to becoming manifest content, the latent content of dreams undergoes a process of
substantial transformation or dream work so as to keep their true meaning hidden.
Hence, according to Freud, dreams can only convey their real meaning indirectly and
it is that particular mode of presentation which effectively renders them riddles of
the psyche.
Websters Dictionary (1994) defines a riddle as a question or statement so framed
as to exercise ones ingenuity in answering it or discovering its meaning. This
seemingly plain definition corresponds well with the psychoanalytic approach to
dreams and their inherent aptness for interpretation. Dreams, says Freud, are always
constructed by the psyche with the specific aim of concealing their true significance.

Philosophical Psychology

521

Considerable effort and resilience are therefore required in order to penetrate their
perplexing facades and uncover the real meaning which presumably lies underneath.
This picture, however, is still very vague: it tells us what we are looking for, but not
how to find it. Seen from this perspective, Freuds second ingenious move has been to
devise a systematic procedure for solving the riddle of dreams, or as he himself put it,
a method by which the unintelligible content of a dream might be replaced by one
that was comprehensible and significant (1900, p. 4). Let us briefly consider what
this procedure involves.
Designed to uncover the dreams latent content, Freuds dream interpretation
technique may be broadly described as advancing in three successive steps.9 First, the
manifest content of the dream is dismantled into discrete elements (e.g., people or
objects that appeared in the dream, distinct features of the general scenery, etc.; cf.,
Freud, 1900, pp. 103104, 449). Second, the dreamer is encouraged to consider each
of these elements and report whatever comes into her mind, regardless of how
embarrassing, irrelevant or unintelligible these free associations might strike her
upon reflection.10 And third, with the dreamers free associations in hand, the
analyst is then able to construct the solution to the dreams riddle by putting together
the discordant pieces into a coherent and intelligible interpretation (cf., Freud, 1937,
pp. 255258).
In The interpretation of dreams, Freud likens the psychoanalytic procedure of
dream interpretation to that of solving a rebus (1900, pp. 277278).11 This parallel is
highly instructive as it points to an important presupposition built into the Freudian
conception of dreams. Presented with a rebus, one naturally assumes that it already
has an appropriate solution even if the latter is presently unknown. If it turns out that
it doesnt, one may plausibly argue that the so-called riddle is really nothing more
than a frivolous jest or a hoax. To state this intuition counterfactually: a riddle with
no solution is no riddle at all.
Concurrently, from a psychoanalytic perspective, no matter how obscure, confused
or nonsensical the manifest content of a dream appears to be, it must nevertheless
contain a hidden layer of meaning which is already present within the dreamers
unconscious prior to the act of dreaming.12 For Freud, then, it would be impossible to
interpret a dream that has no latent meaning just as it would be impossible to solve a
riddle that has no solution. A dream with no solution, Freud might have said, is no
riddle at all.

4. Two Kinds of Riddles

A puzzle picture. What does it amount to to say that after the solution the picture
means something to us, whereas it meant nothing before? (Wittgenstein, 1974/
1993, p. 27, section 125)

The dream-riddle analogy, then, does not reflect an idiosyncratic figure of speech
used by Freud for rhetorical purposes, but a deeply held conviction concerning their
nature and etiological origins. As riddles, Freud tells us, dreams necessarily have

522 N. Matalon

hidden solutions and it is one of the main tasks of psychoanalysis to bring these
solutions to light. But is the relation between riddles and their solutions always as
simple and straight-forward as we tend to believe? Our intuitive notion of riddles
clearly endorses a positive response to this question. Yet, as philosophers are painfully
aware, intuitions can be highly misleading, especially when language comes into play.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, a contemporary of Freuds and arguably the greatest
philosopher in the 20th century, had an exceptional talent for disrupting
conventional views and standard conceptions. In this respect, his remarks on
riddlesthough relatively rare and characteristically opaqueare no different. For
our purpose here, I would like to focus on a particularly useful distinction
Wittgenstein draws between two different kinds of riddles.13 On the one hand are
riddles for which a pre-established solving-method is already in place. This means
that, though one may not know what the correct solution to the riddle might be, one
does know (or at least, one is in a position to learn) how to go about finding it in
a systematic way. Here are two relatively easy examples:
A snail falls to the bottom of a 30 feet well and wants to get out. If it crawls 3 feet
up each day, but slips 2 feet down each night, how many days will it take it to get
out of the well?
What English word can have 4 of its 5 letters removed and still retain its original
pronunciation?

Discovering the correct solution to these riddles, then, is only a matter of applying
the appropriate method in the correct manner (this is perhaps less obvious in the
second example, but true nonetheless).14 Hence, while the relevant method may vary
significantly from one riddle to the next, its systematic application serves to
effectively preclude disputes over the identity of the correct solution in each
particular case.
On the other hand, as the preceding discussion suggests, there are also riddles of a
very different kind, namely: those for which no predefined solving-method currently
exists. Trying to solve such riddles is like trying to move ones ears when one has
never done so, like trying to unravel a knot which one does not even know is actually
a knot (Diamond, 1995, p. 267). One is literally groping in the dark, as
Wittgenstein (1974/1993, p. 175) once put it, since one is not only searching for the
correct solution, but also for the route by which that solution might actually be
obtained. Riddles of this kind, Wittgenstein explains, are:
Like the problem set by the king in the fairy tale who told the princess to come
neither naked nor dressed, and she came wearing fishnet. That might have been
called not naked and yet not dressed either. He didnt really know what he wanted
her to do, but when she came thus he was forced to accept it. It was of the form
Do something that I shall be inclined to call neither naked nor dressed . . . [that
is,] some-thing which I shall be inclined to accept as a solution, though I dont
know now what it will be like. (Cited in Diamond, 1995, p. 267)15

Prima facie, it certainly appears as if the king has presented the princess with a
straight-forward riddle. However, as Wittgenstein points out in the above-quoted

Philosophical Psychology

523

remark, when the king commands the princess to come before him neither naked
nor dressed, not only does he not know how this particular feat might be
accomplisheda fortiori, he has good reasons to assume that it is virtually an
impossible task.16 Two questions immediately suggest themselves in this context:
(a) if the kings riddle was deliberately designed so as to have no solution, what (if
anything) makes it into a riddle? And (b) in the absence of a pre-established solvingmethod for this riddle how did the princess achieve the seemingly impossible feat of
actually solving it? On Wittgensteins view, these perplexing questions arise from our
erroneous tendency to conflate riddles of the first and second kinds by subsuming all
riddles under the former while overlooking the latter. Simply put, we intuitively
presuppose that for every riddle there must already be a legitimate solution, as well as
an appropriate solving-method, even if they are presently unknown to us.
From a philosophical perspective, the intuitive inclination to regard all riddles as
riddles of the first kind bears significant implications. To see why this is so, let us
return to the fairytale once more. To begin with, recall that when he first presented
his riddle, the king had neither a solution nor solving-method to accommodate his
unconventional demand. This point is crucial because it enables us to recognize that
the original paradoxical utteranceneither naked nor dressedhas actually
become meaningful only in retrospect. That is to say, rather than discovering the
so-called hidden meaning of the kings riddle, the princess has effectively
transformed it, ex post facto, from an essentially nonsensical utterance into a
meaningful one via her solution. As Cora Diamond aptly puts it, the princess . . . does not find something satisfying a description [put forward by the king],
but a way of making the kings words into a description [italics added] (1995,
p. 270).17 And to that, it is important to add, she does so retroactively.
But if the kings original utterance has gained its sense only in retrospect, why are
we predisposed to treat it as meaningful right from the start? More explicitly stated:
why does the expression neither naked nor dressed seem to convey a meaningful
indirect description even before one is able to say what exactly it is that this expression
purports to describe? The root of the problem, says Wittgenstein, can be traced back
to the structural similarity between language-games of the particular kind discussed
here (i.e., the kings riddle) and other, more familiar language-games commonly used
in everyday discourse.18
Consider, for illustration, a person who asks her friend: come neither before nor
after the scheduled time. It is safe to assume that, in this colloquial context, both
interlocutors already know what sort of action would comply with the speakers
request. As such, the said utterance conveys a meaningful indirect description precisely
because the criteria for its legitimate employment have been previously defined by
shared linguistic and behavioral standards. (In this case, the expectation that one
would come precisely on time.) Now, although the kings riddle portrays a similar
neither-nor syntactic structure, it is important to notice that the meaning of the
kings original utterance (i.e., its appropriate discursive application) has not been
specified by pre-established criteria prior to its presentation. Hence, despite its
misleading appearance, the kings utterance and the princesss solution work jointly

524 N. Matalon

to create a completely different language-game, one that cannot be considered an

indirect description of anything prior to its successful completion.
At this juncture, the following objection would seem highly plausible: even if the
relevant criteria for solving a particular riddle have not been predefined, why should
this prevent us from trying to solve it anyway? Surely one is entitled to claim: I shall
know the correct solution if I see it (cf., Wittgenstein, 1976, p. 84), even if one has
no idea how to go about looking for it. This may seem like a legitimate claim;
however, it is very misleading. The assertion that one would be able to recognize the
correct solution if the latter was made available to her rests on the presupposition
that the correct solution has already been determined prior to, or in tandem with, the
presentation of the riddle. And yet, while this assumption is completely justified with
relation to riddles of the first kind, it is essentially unwarranted when it comes to
riddles of the second kind. The argument which merits this claim runs as follows. To
begin with, note that the identity of the correct solution can only be determined on
the basis of some criterion or other. Hence, in the absence of any criterion by which
to evaluate putative solutions, the question of their correctness (or incorrectness)
cannot even be raised. That is, as long as what would be considered an appropriate
criterion has not been established, there is simply no sense in talking about correct
(or incorrect) solutions at all.
Reviewing the possibility of using guesswork as means for finding the correct
solution would help clarify this point. Presented with either kind of riddle, one can
obviously try and guess what the solution should be. Nevertheless, once again our
indiscriminate use of language is liable to obscure an important distinction between
the two cases. In the context of riddles of the first kind, determining whether or not
a haphazard guess has been successful in hitting its mark constitutes a relatively
straight-forward affair given that the relevant criteria for evaluation are already in
place. In contrast, speculation over the correctness of a solution to riddles of the
second kind involves a markedly different procedure. The basic argument that
underlies this contention is very similar to the one presented in the previous
paragraph. And so, to avoid unnecessary repetition, I would like to further explore
this issue by offering a concrete illustration instead.
Consider the Sphinxs riddle to Oedipus: what walks upon four feet in the
morning, upon two at noon, and upon three at night? Our intuition tells us that it
must be possible to rule-out putative solutions in advance. But is this really the case?
Let us assume that, weighing his options, Oedipus ponders whether a human being
might be the correct response. But then, as soon as this idea crosses his mind, he is
forced to reject it since arguably humans typically walk on two feet, or in some cases,
just one, but never on three. Thus, in the absence of a pre-established criterion for the
evaluation of tentative solutions, Oedipus finds himself compelled to use an ad hoc
criterion (on how many feet do humans ordinarily walk?) in order to discard what,
in retrospect, will turn out to be the correct solution.
Moreover, we can easily imagine someone who has been told the solution to the
Sphinxs riddle and yet still struggles to understand what qualifies it as the correct
solution. Alternatively, that person may insist that the proposed solution is wrong

Philosophical Psychology

525

and proceed to offer an alternative solution in its stead. In all these cases the
proposed solution and the criteria for its correctness go hand in hand. And in all
these cases, they jointly work to give meaning to the original utterance in retrospect.
It thus becomes apparent that, despite the temptation to view the Sphinxs riddle
as a meaningful indirect description of something hidden or unknown, the
monsters enigmatic utterance actually remains meaningless so long as an acceptable
solutionand, concurrently, the criteria for its correctnesshave not been
determined (cf., Wittgenstein, 1974/1993, p. 377).
Here, however, another objection may be forthcoming. Why, it may be asked,
should we regard the Sphinxs riddle (or that of the king) as meaningless prior to its
solution? After all, are we not able to understand riddles of this kind regardless of
whether or not an appropriate solution has been found? Reasonable and intuitive as
this objection may appear, it cannot be coherently upheld for the following reasons.
Imagine someone who has been presented with the kings riddle for the first time
and subsequently proceeds to insist that she understands the utterance neither
naked nor dressed perfectly well despite the fact that she does not have a clue as to
what it is meant to describe. The question is what would such understanding
consist in? To assert that the kings utterance is indeed a description without being
able to specify what it is a description of clearly begs the question. Likewise, that
one understands, and can therefore explain, the meaning of each particular word in
that utterance is of no help either. It is the utterance as a whole that requires making
sense of, not each of its distinct constituents, and to accomplish that, one would have
to put the entire utterance into some kind of context. That is, the person in question
would have to find one or more conventionally accepted language-games in which
the utterance may be legitimately used. Yet, any attempt to do just that means that
one has perforce assumed the role of the princess, i.e., one is already engaged in the
process of generating her own solution to the kings riddle by specifying the criteria
that will retroactively turn it into a meaningful description.
Another way of explicating this counterintuitive point may be as follows. As noted
above, we naturally assume that all riddles constitute an obscure or indirect
description of something which is not yet known. This picture certainly works well
with riddles of the first kind wherein it is possible to employ pre-established criteria
in order to determine the identity of correct solutions. However, in the case of riddles
of the second kind the situation is markedly different since there are no criteria by
which to distinguish between correct and incorrect solutions before the riddle has
actually been solved. Consequently, it turns out that, although riddles of the second
kind are typically taken to convey ambiguous or indirect descriptions, the fact of
the matter is that they only create the grammatical illusion of fulfilling this role.
To see this, ask yourself what ought to be considered the equivalent, direct
description of the kings utterance before the riddle was solved? As there are no
generally accepted criteria by which to perform this judgment, the question itself
turns out to be meaningless (cf., Wittgenstein, 1976, pp. 6465, 1974/1993, pp. 363
364). Hence, rather than constituting an indirect description whose meaning has
been fixed in advance, the kings utterance actually consists in what may be called a

526 N. Matalon

provisional description, namely: a meaningless utterance that may be converted into a

meaningful description by the provision of a solution that will retroactively specify the
appropriate criterion for its own legitimacy.
To recapitulate the foregoing discussion, two key points should be borne in mind:
(a) unlike riddles of the first kind, in the case of riddles of the second kind, on top of
not knowing what the correct solution should be, we do not even know how to go
about looking for it. Thus, the only criterion serving to guide our attempts at solving
riddles of the latter kind is captured by the counterintuitive dictum: show me
something I can accept as fulfilling the terms of the riddle; and, (b) despite their
misleading appearance, riddles of the second kind are not meaningful indirect
descriptions whose meaning has been determined in advance. Rather, they consist of
provisional descriptions that may be transformed into meaningful descriptions by the
espousal of solutions that retroactively specify the appropriate criteria for their
acceptance.

5. Turning Dreams into Riddles

A writer is someone who can make a riddle out of an answer. (Karl Kraus)

If we apply the above analysis to dreams, it becomes patently clear that Freud takes
their manifest content to be riddles of the first kind. Nevertheless, whereas riddles
of this kind require pre-established criteria for the purpose of judging the correctness
of putative solutions, Freud does not place similar restrictions on his dream
interpretation technique. More explicitly stated, throughout the course of formulating the dreams interpretation, the psychoanalytic procedure is methodologically
unbound by any constraint whatsoever. Consequently, the psychoanalytic method
may indeed yield fascinating dream interpretations, but it does not determine their
correctness (or otherwise) in advance. To circumvent this methodological discrepancy,
Freud resorts to different criteria at different times: from the patients espousal of the
proposed interpretation, to the coherence of the interpretation per se, to the
authoritative verdict of the analyst. Neither sufficient nor necessary in themselves,
these disparate criteria are employed ad hoc so as to determine, in retrospect, what the
correct interpretation should be (cf., Wittgenstein, 1966/1994, p. 42).19
Pinpointing Freuds failure to supply definitive criteria by which to judge the
correctness of dream interpretations prior to their actual formulation is of vital
importance since it allows us to recognize psychoanalytic dream interpretations for
what they really are, namely: solutions to riddles of the second kind. That is to say,
rather than revealing the latent content of dreams, Freuds interpretive procedure
works in the opposite direction: it is the psychoanalytic interpretation that serves to
retroactively convert the manifest content of a dream into the riddle it is purporting
to solve.20
In the terminology developed here, when the analysand discusses the manifest
content of her dream with the analyst, she is not putting forth a meaningful indirect
description whose meaning has already been settled by commonly accepted criteria.

Philosophical Psychology

527

Instead, she may be seen as presenting the analyst with a provisional description,
i.e., a collection of utterances which may be turned into a riddle after its solution has
been duly constructed and accepted. The analysand and analyst thus find themselves
in the same position as the king and the princess only in reversed roles: the analysand
is the one who asks the analyst: show me something that I can accept as the solution
to the riddle of my dream, to which the analyst then responds by constructing
an interpretation that will strike the analysand as the correct one. Hence, it may be
said that Freud does not solve the riddle of the analysands dream, but rather,
he retroactively renders her dream into a riddle by means of synthesizing her free
associations into a highly persuasive interpretive narrative.21
The main upshot of the retroactive ascription of meaning to the dreams manifest
content is clear: no latent or hereto unknown etiological structure in the dreamers
psyche was necessarily discovered by means of the psychoanalytic interpretation.22
Strange and counterintuitive as it may sound, the fact that dreams are somehow
caused (presumably as a result of complex neural processes in the brain) is entirely
beside the point.23 Nor is the high level of creativity which Freud often exhibits in
formulating some of his more ingenious dream interpretations relevant to these
considerations.24 What is crucial to recognize is that as convincing solutions,
psychoanalytic dream interpretations can retroactively convert the manifest content
of dreams into riddles of the second kind, that is, they are capable of turning
inexplicable phenomenal experiences into riddles that may actually be solved.
This picture of psychoanalytic dream interpretation sheds light on another
controversial aspect of the Freudian modus operandi. One of Freuds primary
assumptions is that every dream has only one correct interpretation. To justify this
tenet, Freud evokes the jigsaw puzzle metaphor, stating that:
What makes him [the analyst] certain [that the correct solution has been
found] . . . is precisely the complication of the problem before him, which is like the
solution of a jig-saw puzzle . . . . If one succeeds in arranging the confused heap of
fragments, each of which bears upon it an unintelligible piece of drawing, so that
the picture acquires a meaning, so that there is no gap anywhere in the design and
so that the whole fits into the frame . . . then one knows that one has solved the
puzzle and that there is no alternative solution [italics added]. (Freud, 1923, p. 116)

Following the rationale of riddles of the first kind, the motivation behind Freuds
analogy can be easily identified. If every dream constitutes the disguised representation of a particular tacit wish, then only the correct interpretation will be able to
point back to that wish. Hence, if Freud is right, a dream can only have one correct
solution. On the other hand, construed as riddles of the second kind, dreams may
have anything from none to infinite legitimate solutions, seeing as their correctness
is not determined in advance, but rather, in retrospect. To illustrate this point, let us
revisit the kings riddle one last time.
Recall that in the fairytale, the princesss solution consisted of shrouding herself in
a fishermans net. Nevertheless, it is certainly possible to imagine the princess coming
up with different yet equally legitimate solutions. For example, she could have come
to the king wrapped only in her long hair. The point is that, in contrast with riddles

528 N. Matalon

of the first kind, the specific character of putative solutions to riddles of the second
kind does not influence their legitimacy. The only thing which really matters is that
the interlocutor (the king in the fairytale or the analysand in Freuds care) would be
willing to espouse the proposed solution and as a result retroactively convert the
original utterance or image-narrative into a meaningful indirect description that
appears to have been concealing its true identity from the start.25 As Wallerstein
correctly observes:
Skilled psychoanalytic clinicians can construct differing, but often equally compelling, formulations of psychoanalytic case material and . . . no ready method to
establish the truth claims of alternative formulations has yet come to win wide
acceptance within the clinical psychoanalytic world. (Wallerstein, 2006, p. 304)26

At first glance it may appear as if the above analysis leads to the unpalatable
conclusion that as far as psychoanalytic dream interpretations are concerned
anything goes. In other words, it may be tempting to conclude that the retroactive
model effectively reduces Freuds dream interpretations to arbitrary constructions
forced on the analysand by the analyst in an act of brute persuasion. However, closer
examination shows that this conclusion is ultimately unjustified. In the first place, we
should keep in mind that neither dreams nor their psychoanalytic interpretations can
be detached from the analysands life (cf., Freud, 1900, pp. 98100, 105; Lear, 2005,
pp. 9092). As such, the particular life-circumstances of the latter constitute a general
referential framework which imposes significant restraints on the retroactive
evaluation of putative interpretations. Simply put, psychoanalytic dream interpretations are typically formulated within the wider and idiosyncratic context of the
analysands world and it is precisely this context which provides the backdrop against
which their correctness is retrospectively assessed.
Furthermore, we should also take into account that the analyst does not introduce
dream interpretations for their own sake but as a catalyst for pushing the analysis
forward. More specifically, via dream interpretations the analyst aims to enable the
analysand to explore new ways of self-understanding. As already noted above, from
Freuds perspective, this goal may be actualized only if the analysand can be brought
to overcome the barriers of repression and recognize the so-called true meaning of
her dreams. However, if dream interpretations represent solutions to riddles of the
second kind, then the question of their correctness cannot be determined in advance.
In other words, any attempt to impose restrictions on what would be considered the
correct solution prior to its formulation will inevitably founder since the solution
itself serves to define the criteria for its own legitimacy in retrospect. But if this is
indeed the case, how can we counter the claim that anything goes? The answer lies
in the realization that, as we are dealing here with an inverse time-line wherein
meaning is ascribed retroactively, restrictions on the legitimacy of dream interpretations need not (and, in fact, cannot) be imposed in advance.27 However, they can
be imposed retroactively provided one is willing to relinquish absolute conceptions of
pre-determined correctness and truth in favor of relative and time-dependent
notions like efficacy and consequence. By taking dream interpretations to be

Philosophical Psychology

529

tools for self-examination and development within the analytic setting, the real
question becomes whether or not they actually succeed in serving their purpose,
i.e., whether, and to what extent, they enable the analysand to engage withor,
as Freud liked to say, work-throughnew possibilities of self-understanding
(cf., Freud, 1914b, 1937). Somewhat ironically, Freud himself made precisely this
point in Constructions in Analysis, when he wrote,
Only the further course of the analysis enables us to decide whether our
constructions are correct or unserviceable. We do not pretend that an individual
construction is anything more than a conjecture which awaits examination,
confirmation or rejection. We claim no authority for it, we require no direct
agreement from the patient, nor do we argue with him if at first he denies it. In
short, we conduct ourselves on the model of a familiar figure in one of Nestroys
farcesthe manservant who has a single answer on his lips to every question or
objection: It will all become clear in the course of future developments [italics
added]. (1937, p. 265).

Hence, as Freud himself openly concedes in the passage just quoted, it is only by
examining the actual effects that the dream interpretation has on the analysand that
one is able to evaluate its correctness. In other words, there are indeed no preestablished criteria by which the correctness of the psychoanalytic interpretation may
be asserted prior to its formulation, and whilst particular restrictions (e.g., the
correspondence of the interpretation to the analysands life) may certainly be applied,
their application as means for evaluating the correctness of a given dream
interpretation is always carried out in retrospect.

6. Concluding Remarks
If you are led by psycho-analysis to say that really you thought so and so or that
really your motive was so and so, this is not a matter of discovery, but of
persuasion . . . . One thinks of certain results of psycho-analysis as a discovery Freud
made, as apart from something persuaded to you by a psycho-analyst, and I wish
to say this is not the case. (Wittgenstein, 1966/1994, p. 27)

The argument presented in this paper endeavored to show that a fundamental

discrepancy exists between Freuds rhetoric on his method of dream interpretation
and its application in practice. Taking dreams to be riddles of the first kind, Freud
claims to have formulated an efficient solving-method by which their correct
solutions can be found. Hence, on Freuds account, psychoanalytic interpretations
chart the real and therefore the only possible route from a dreams manifest content
to the tacit wish it presumably conceals.28 Nevertheless, for all its intuitive appeal,
this conception cannot be reconciled with the retroactive mode of operation Freud
actually employs in order to determine what ought to be considered the correct
interpretation of a particular dream.29 The absence of pre-established criteria for the
evaluation of putative solutions prior to their formulation suggests that Freuds
dream interpretation technique actually represents a solving-method to riddles of the
second kind. Thus construed, Freuds methodology effectively transforms provisional

530 N. Matalon

descriptions of dream-narratives into indirect meaningful descriptions of latent wishes

via the construction of persuasive dream interpretations. These interpretations, in
turn, gain verisimilitude and potential efficacy not because they necessarily reveal
latent or unconscious materials, but rather, because they are accepted as such. At
bottom line, Freud does not simply solve the riddle of dreams; he retroactively turns
dreams into riddles by producing highly convincing solutions to them.

Acknowledgements
Special thanks to Daniele Moyal-Sharrock and two anonymous reviewers at
Philosophical Psychology for extensive commentaries and discussions on previous
versions of this paper. I am also grateful to Frank Cioffi, Jim Hopkins, Derek Bolton,
Rai Gaita, and Eran Guter for valuable suggestions and critique. The preparation of
this paper has benefited from the generous support of the AVI Fellowships program.

Notes
[1]

[2]
[3]

[4]

[5]
[6]
[7]

[8]

Although there has certainly been a steady decline in the status and practice of
psychoanalysis in the past sixty years or so (Kandel, 1999; Wallerstein, 2006), heated
debates over Freuds theory of dreams are still very much alive among contemporary
researchers. One prominent example consists of the vigorous controversy in the field of
neuropsychology between pro-Freudian commentators (Kandel, 1999; Shevrin & Eister,
2000; Solms, 2000, 2001; Solms & Turnbull, 2002, 2007) and their opponents (Hobson,
2005, 2007; Hobson & Pace-Schott, 2002; Hobson, Pace-Schott, & Stickgold, 2000) on the
genesis and nature of dreams.
For further examples, see Freud, 1900, pp. 40, 94, 158, 163, 267, 515, 565, 590.
See, e.g., Freuds comments on the subject of finding, a simple and satisfactory solution of
the riddle of dreams (Freud, 1901, p. 646), or even more ambitiously, the most
satisfactory solution of the riddle of dreams (Freud, 1910, p. 34). Remarks of a similar
nature also appear in many other works by Freud (1901, pp. 633, 635, 640, 643, 651, 658,
680, 1911a, p. 93, 19161917, pp. 101, 201, 233234, 1918, p. 70, 1923, p. 116, 1925b,
pp. 127, 135).
Freuds comparison between the solution of dreams and that of jigsaw puzzles (1923, p. 116)
might be construed as an exception to this general claim. However, as I will show in section
5, Freuds discussion in this context appears to enhance rather than resolve the discrepancy
between his rhetoric on dream interpretation and its actual application.
This perceptive epithet was originally attributed to Freud by Schorske (1973) in his Politics
and practice in Freuds Interpretation of dreams.
These analogies appear in Freud (1919, pp. 159161) and Freud (1937, pp. 259260),
respectively.
According to Freuds theory of dreams, the said hidden meaning ordinarily consists of a
repressed wish that the dreamer is unwilling or unable to fulfil in the course of waking life
due to its disagreeable or distressing nature (cf., Freud, 1900, p. 122, 1901, p. 641, 1910,
pp. 3435, 1940, pp. 165166).
On Freuds early topographical model, the psyches defense mechanism (Zensur) functions
as a kind of partition (Schrim) that prevents repressed materials from gaining access to
consciousness. However, under certain conditions (e.g., sleep or hypnosis) the mechanisms
control is diminished, thereby allowing some repressed content to pass, albeit in disguised

Philosophical Psychology

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

531

form. Later on, during the transition to his later structural model, Freud revised this notion
by shifting from an abstract mechanism to a more structured aspect of the super-ego (cf.,
Freud, 1900, pp. 141144, 466468, 505506, 1914a, pp. 9798, 1923, p. 112).
I shall restrict the following presentation to a very rudimentary sketch of Freuds dream
interpretation technique since it is all that is needed to make my case here. However, it is
important to note that this schema should be construed as pedagogical rather than
diachronic given that in actual practice the particular steps involved in this technique
often interrelate and coalesce with one another throughout the analysis (cf., Freud, 1937,
pp. 260261).
Freud has famously taken the free associations (Freier Einfall) technique to represent the
fundamental rule of psycho-analysis (1910, p. 39, 1913, pp. 134135, 1925a, p. 40).
Notice, however, that the English translation of this term is rather misleading since, as Freud
himself notes, we must bear in mind . . . that free association is not really free (1925a,
p. 40). The reason for this, according to Freud, is that even though the dreamers train of
thought may appear to proceed spontaneously (i.e., without conscious control or intentional
guidance), it is nevertheless deterministically guided by her unconscious (e.g., Freud, 1900,
p. 101, 1919, p. 160).
The point may be easily illustrated by a simple example. Consider the puzzling expression:
CUL8ER. At first glance, this odd string of signs would probably strike most of us as
utterly meaningless. However, by concentrating our attention on each discrete sign, while
concurrently keeping an eye on its immediate interrelations with the other signs, sooner or
later this procedure will (hopefully) yield the realization that the key to this riddle lies in
reading the signs phonetically rather than semantically, thereby revealing the colloquial
expression see you later.
In his later writings, Freud qualified his original claim about the hidden meaning of dreams
by stipulating that there are two types of dreams which do not represent latent wishes,
namely: dreams that occur in traumatic neurosis and so-called punishment dreams (cf.,
Freud, 1923, p. 118). Notice, however, that in these cases, the psychoanalytic procedure of
dream interpretation becomes redundant as the meaning of the dream is assumed to be
directly perceivable.
Wittgensteins remarks on what is generally referred to here as riddles typically appear
within the broader context of his discussions on the nature of mathematical problems
(cf., Wittgenstein, 1953/1999, sections 334338 & 352, 1956/1998, p. 370, 1967/1998, p. 120,
1974/1993, pp. 361365, 1975/1998, pp. 184191, 1976, pp. 6468 & 8386). However,
the core distinction which these remarks serve to delineate can be easily extended to
other domains as Wittgenstein himself indicates in his 1956/1998 (p. 370) and 1974/1993
(pp. 363364). An extrapolation of this kind appears in Diamond (1995).
The solutions to these riddles are 28 days and queue respectively. As to the first riddle,
basic arithmetic is all that is really required in order to calculate the correct solution
(provided one does not fail to notice that by the 28th day the snail has only 3 feet left to
cover and therefore arrives to the edge of the well). The second riddle requires a more
sophisticated approach. The key is to notice that after 4 of the words 5 letters have been
removed only one remains. At this point, one can simply recite the letters of the ABC out
loud whilst keeping a vigilant ear for legitimate English words. After rejecting inadmissible
possibilities like bee and see on the basis of having an insufficient number of letters,
the correct solution is inevitably reached.
This quote originally appeared in Margaret Macdonalds notes to Wittgensteins lectures in
1935 which have not been published yet. The fairytale to which Wittgenstein is alluding in
his above-quoted remark is most likely The Clever Farmers Daughter. A common version
of this fairytale appears in Grimm & Grimm (1987, pp. 347349). Wittgensteins remark is
discussed, inter alia, in Diamond & Gerrard (1999, p. 142), Floyd (1995, p. 394), and
Putnam (2000, pp. 224225).

532 N. Matalon
[16]

[17]

[18]

[19]

[20]

[21]

[22]

That the king has formulated his challenge with the deliberate intention of failing the
princess is made evident by the explicitly paradoxical nature of his riddle. It is, as Putnam
puts it, a command impossible of fulfillment (2000, p. 224), whose explicit aim was to
annul the possibility of producing a legitimate solution (or so the king initially believed).
Putnam makes the same point by saying: we are able to give the [kings] words a sense only
after [italics added] we know the solution; the solution bestows sense on the riddlequestion (2000, p. 224).
In Wittgensteins memorable words, we remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity of
all the everyday language-games because the clothing of our language makes everything
alike (1953/1999, p. 224). Furthermore, following Reads (2005) well-argued caveat against
the off-handed deployment of so-called Wittgensteinian magic words, note that I do not
employ the term language-game in some sort of highly specialized technical sense
allegedly specified by the great philosopher (it was not, as section 65 in his 1953/1999 makes
patently clear), but rather in the widest and most mundane possible sense, that is, as a
convenient abbreviation for denoting any kind of linguistic activity (including paralinguistic
features and extralinguistic markers) taking place between two or more interlocutors for the
purpose of communication.
It is important to note in this context that the issue here is not that Freuds criteria are
vague or ambiguous in themselves. The fact that a particular criterion is vague does not
imply that one cannot employ it effectively. Rather, the point is that for Freud the question
of which criterion should be used remains open until after an acceptable solution has
been presented. It is a different kind of ambiguity similar to the one with which the
princess was faced when contemplating the kings riddle. The difficulty in that case was
not how or to what degree should a pre-defined criterion be applied, but rather, the
challenge of generating a solution that will retroactively define the criterion for its own
correctness.
It is important to emphasize that the current analysis is strictly descriptive and not
prescriptive, i.e., it should not be taken to suggest that the Freudian doctrine requires some
kind of correction or reform. As I shall explicate later on, construed as solutions to
riddles of the second kind, the efficacy of psychoanalytic dream interpretations need not
depend on their particular character, but rather on the analysands willingness to accept
them as correct and work through their implications.
It is noteworthy that Freud was not only familiar with the notion of retroactive processes,
but actually coined the German term Nachtraglichkeit to denote their manifestation in the
psychological domain. Typically translated as deferred action and featuring, inter alia,
in the case studies of Emma (Freud, 1895) and the Wolf-man (Freud, 1918),
Nachtraglichkeit is thus used by Freud to portray an inverse and counterintuitive timestructure wherein earlier events in the analysands life gain new significance in light of later
events. Despite its striking similarity to the psychoanalytic procedure of dream interpretation as explicated here, it is clear why Freud would not have been willing to apply the logic
of this retroactive model to his entire modus operandi. To do so, he would have had to
relinquish the foundational axioms of his theory of dreams, most central of which is the
assumption that the solution of a dream (i.e., its latent meaning) exists prior to and
independently of the acts of dreaming and/or interpretation. Furthermore, as in the case of
free associations, here too the English translation is somewhat misleading inasmuch as the
term deferred action completely obfuscates the most important aspect of these
psychological processes, namely: their retroactive mode of functioning. The term retroactivity, suggested by Puhl (2004), thus appears to be a more suitable translation in this
context. Also on this topic, see Laplanche and Pontalis (1973, pp. 111114).
In his recent work on Freud, Lear endeavors to show that this tenet is actually consonant
with later developments in Freuds conception of dream interpretation (cf., Lear, 2005,
pp. 101104, 133135).

Philosophical Psychology
[23]

[24]

[25]

[26]

[27]
[28]

533

This claim is more modest than it may appear. The realization that psychoanalytic
interpretations constitute solutions to riddles of the second kind does not preclude the
possibility that they could actually succeed in hitting upon the so-called psychological
etiology of the dream. On the contrary, it is conceivable, in principle at least, that the
analysts interpretation may perfectly coincide with the genuine cognitive processes from
which a dream originated (assuming, of course, that these processes are taken to be
recognizable and definable). The point is that, as it stands, there is nothing in the
psychoanalytic procedure that can be used to show whether or not that is indeed the case.
Hence, we can certainly speculate what might have been the underlying reasons which
brought forth the dream, and we may even become utterly convinced that we have found the
right ones, but all this is still a far cry from being able to guarantee that our speculations are
necessarily true as Freud purports to do.
This is not to say that the formulation of solutions to riddles of the second kind in general,
or psychoanalytic dream interpretations in particular, has nothing to do with creative
thinking. In fact, it is probably safe to assume that imagination and creativity play a pivotal
role in the construction of such solutions. Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that,
regardless of how inspired a particular solution may be, it cannot be considered a solution at
all prior to its recognition as such. Put in a slightly different way, though there is certainly
room for disagreement on whether or not a particular solution is adequate, it is important to
notice that debates of this kind can only take place after the putative solution has been
actually posited. Hence, for example, one could surely criticize the king for lack of
imagination had he refused to accept the creative solution offered by the princess. Yet,
polemics of this kind already presuppose that what the princess has done indeed represents a
solution.
We are agreed on this route, Wittgenstein says in this context, but hastens to add, and
yet, it is obvious here that there may easily be different routes, on each of which we can be in
agreement, each of which we might call consistent (1956/1998, p. 370). Furthermore,
spelling out the far-reaching implications this model entails with respect to the potential
efficacy of psychoanalytic interpretations is a complicated issue I intend to develop in a
future publication. For the moment, I can therefore only hint at these implications by saying
that the ability of psychoanalytic interpretations to retroactively transform incomprehensible symptoms into meaningfuland thus fully intelligible and solublepsychological
accounts may have a profound effect on analysands who are haunted by feelings of
frustration and helplessness deriving from their hereto inexplicable condition.
For concrete instances of this diagnostic Rashomon Effect, compare, e.g., Freud (1918)
with Abraham and Torok (1986), and Freud (1911b) with Macalpine and Hunter (1953).
Also see in this context Wittgenstein (1953/1999, sections 139141).
The impossibility of using ad hoc criteria so as to determine in advance what would be
considered the correct solution to riddles of the second kind is discussed in section 4.
Readers acquainted with emergent trends in psychoanalytic research during the second half
of the 20th century may recognize certain affinities between my account of Freudian dream
interpretation and that of the so-called hermeneutic movement in psychoanalysis
(Wallerstein, 2006, pp. 308309). Particularly pertinent in this context is the controversial
conception developed by Donald P. Spence in a long series of books and articles (cf., Spence,
1981, 1982, 1983a, 1983b, 1986, 1991, 2001). Briefly, on Spences view, psychoanalytic
interpretations do not represent historical truths, that is, faithful reconstructions of actual
past events in the analysands life, but rather, narrative truths, i.e., creative constructions
of compelling hypothetical stories that the analysand may be persuaded to accept.
Nevertheless, it is important to notice that, despite his bold attempt to break from more
traditional conceptions, Spences position remains well entrenched within the boundaries
of conventional psychoanalytic wisdom since he continues to adhere to the Freudian axiom
according to which dreams are essentially riddles of the first kind, viz. enigmatic

534 N. Matalon

[29]

phenomenal experiences whose hidden meanings exist prior to and independently of the acts
of either dreaming or interpretation. Though much more can and should be said about the
hermeneutic approach to psychoanalytic interpretations and the manner in which it relates
to the thesis presented here, a comprehensive explication of these issues would be the task of
another occasion.
I would like to emphasize that my aim in this paper is not to disparage psychoanalysis, nor is
it to engage in what Jonathan Lear calls Freud-bashing (1998, pp. 17, 5455). As Lear and
other commentators have shown, there is still much to be said about Freuds invaluable
contributions to, and lasting impact on, the study of human psychology. This, however,
should not detract us from challenging deep-seated assumptions and commonly held beliefs
about dreams and the psychoanalytic method of their interpretations.

References
Abraham, N., & Torok, M. (1986). The Wolfmans magic word: A cryptonymy. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Diamond, C. (1995). Riddles and Anselms riddle. The realistic spirit: Wittgenstein, philosophy, and
the mind (pp. 267289). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Diamond, C., & Gerrard, S. (1999). How old are these bones? Putnam, Wittgenstein and
verification. Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 73, 99150.
Floyd, J. (1995). On saying what you really want to say: Wittgenstein, Godel, and the trisection of
the angle. In J. Hintikka (Ed.), From Dedekind to Godel: Essays on the development of the
foundations of mathematics (pp. 373425). The Netherlands: Kluwer.
Freud, S. (1895). Project for a scientific psychology. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The standard
edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 1, pp. 347357). London:
Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1900). The interpretation of dreams. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The standard edition of
the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vols. 45, pp. 1627). London: Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1901). On dreams. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The standard edition of the complete
psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 5, pp. 629714). London: Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1905a). Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The
standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 7, pp. 7122).
London: Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1905b). Jokes and their relation to the unconscious. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The
standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 8, pp. 1247).
London: Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1910). Five lectures on psycho-analysis. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The standard
edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 11, pp. 155). London:
Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1911a). The handling of dream-interpretation in psycho-analysis. In J. Strachey
(Ed. & Trans.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud
(Vol. 12, pp. 8996). London: Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1911b). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia
(dementia paranoides). In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The standard edition of the complete
psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 12, pp. 382). London: Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1913). On beginning the treatment (Further recommendations on the technique of
psycho-analysis I). In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The standard edition of the complete
psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 12, pp. 121144). London: Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1914a). On narcissism: An introduction. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The standard
edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 14, pp. 73102). London:
Hogarth.

Philosophical Psychology

535

Freud, S. (1914b). Remembering, repeating and working-through. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.),
The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 12, pp. 147156).
London: Hogarth.
Freud, S. (19161917). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.),
The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vols. 1516,
pp. 1463). London: Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1918). From the history of an infantile neurosis. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.),
The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 17, pp. 1122).
London: Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1919). Lines of advance in psycho-analytic therapy. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The
standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 17, pp. 157168).
London: Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1923). Remarks on the theory and practice of dreaminterpretation. In J. Strachey
(Ed. & Trans.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud
(Vol. 19, pp. 107121). London: Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1925a). An autobiographical study. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The standard edition of
the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 20, pp. 574). London: Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1925b). Some additional notes on dream-interpretation as a whole. In J. Strachey
(Ed. & Trans.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud
(Vol. 19, pp. 125138). London: Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1926). The question of lay analysis. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The standard
edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 20, pp. 183258). London:
Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1937). Constructions in analysis. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The standard edition of the
complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 23, pp. 255269). London: Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1940). An outline of psycho-analysis. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The standard edition
of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 23, pp. 141208). London: Hogarth.
Grimm, J., & Grimm, W. (1987). The complete fairy tails of the brothers Grimm. Toronto &
New York: Bantam.
Hobson, J. A. (2005). Sleep is of the brain, by the brain and for the brain. Nature, 437, 12541256.
Hobson, J. A. (2007). Wake up or dream on? Six questions for Turnbull and Solms. Cortex, 43,
11131115.
Hobson, J. A., & Pace-Schott, E. F. (2002). The cognitive neuroscience of sleep: Neuronal systems,
consciousness and learning. Neuroscience, 3, 679693.
Hobson, J. A., Pace-Schott, E. F., & Stickgold, R. (2000). Dreaming and the brain: Toward a
cognitive neuroscience of conscious states. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 7931121.
Kandel, E. R. (1999). Biology and the future of psychoanalysis: A new intellectual framework for
psychiatry revisited. American Journal of Psychiatry, 156, 505524.
Laplanche, J., & Pontalis, J. B. (1973). The language of psychoanalysis. New York: Norton.
Lear, J. (1998). Open minded. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Lear, J. (2005). Freud. New York: Routledge.
Macalpine, I., & Hunter, R. A. (1953). The Schreber case: A contribution to schizophrenia,
hypochondria and psychosomatic symptom-formation. The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 22,
328371.
Puhl, K. (2004). Rule-following: Difference and repetition. In T. Demeter (Ed.), Essays on
Wittgenstein and Austrian Philosophy (pp. 155166). Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Putnam, H. (2000). Rethinking mathematical necessity. In A. Crary & R. Read (Eds.), The new
Wittgenstein (pp. 218231). London: Routledge.
Read, R. (2005). Throwing away the bedrock. Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society, 105, 8198.
Schorske, C. E. (1973). Politics and practice in Freuds Interpretation of dreams. American Historical
Review, 78, 328347.

536 N. Matalon
Shevrin, H., & Eister, A. S. (2000). Continued vitality of the Freudian theory of dreaming.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 10041006.
Solms, M. (2000). Dreaming and REM sleep are controlled by different brain mechanisms.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 843850.
Solms, M. (2001). The interpretation of dreams and the neurosciences. Psychoanalysis and History,
3, 7991.
Solms, M., & Turnbull, O. (2002). The brain and the inner world: An introduction to the neuroscience
of subjective experience. New York: Other Press.
Solms, M., & Turnbull, O. (2007). Awareness, desire, and false beliefs: Freud in the light of modern
neuropsychology. Cortex, 43, 10831090.
Spence, D. P. (1981). Toward a theory of dream interpretation. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary
Thought, 4, 383405.
Spence, D. P. (1982). Narrative truth and historical truth: Meaning and interpretation in
psychoanalysis. London: Norton.
Spence, D. P. (1983a). Narrative persuasion. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 6, 457481.
Spence, D. P. (1983b). Narrative truth and theoretical truth. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 51, 4369.
Spence, D. P. (1986). When interpretation masquerades as explanation. Journal of the American
Psychoanalytic Association, 34, 322.
Spence, D. P. (1991). Saying good-bye to historical truth. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 21,
245252.
Spence, D. P. (2001). Filling the gap. Psychological Inquiry, 12, 148150.
Wallerstein, R. S. (2006). The relevance of Freuds psychoanalysis in the 21st century: Its science
and its research. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 23, 302326.
Websters Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (1994). New York: Gramercy.
Wittgenstein, L. (1963). Tractatus logico-philosophicus. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Original
work published 1922.)
Wittgenstein, L. (1976). Wittgensteins lectures on the foundations of mathematics: Cambridge 1939.
Hassocks: Harvard University Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (1993). Philosophical grammar. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Original work published
1974.)
Wittgenstein, L. (1994). Lectures and conversations on aesthetics, psychology, and religious belief.
Oxford: Blackwell. (Original work published 1966.)
Wittgenstein, L. (1998). Philosophical remarks. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Original work published
1975.)
Wittgenstein, L. (1998). Remarks on the foundations of mathematics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
(Original work published 1956.)
Wittgenstein, L. (1998). Zettel. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Original work published 1967.)
Wittgenstein, L. (1999). Philosophical investigations (2nd ed.). Oxford: Blackwell. (Original work
published 1953.)

Copyright of Philosophical Psychology is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or
emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission.
However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.