MONOGRAPHS OF THE

SOCIETY FOR RESEARCH IN

CHILD DEVELOPMENT
SERIAL NO. 189, VOL. 46, NO. 2

DEVELOPMENTAL SEQUENCES
WITHIN AND BETWEEN
CONCEPTS

ROBERT S. SIEGLER
CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIVERSITY

WITH CO/AMENTARY BY
SIDNEY STRAUSS
AND IRIS LEVIN
AND REPLY BY THE AUTHOR

ABSTRACT

Developmental Sequences Within and Between Concepts. With Commentary by SIDNEY STRAUSS AND IRIS LEVIN; with

SIEGLER, ROBERT S.

Reply by the author. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Devel-

opment, 1981, 46(2, Serial No. 189).

The purpose of this Monograph is to describe and illustrate a new research
strategy for studying developmental sequences, the rule-assessment approach.
The approach begins with a distinction between two types of developmental
sequences: within-concept sequences, involving the series of knowledge states
leading to mastery of particular concepts; and between-concept sequences,
involving the order in which different concepts are understood. In its assumptions concerning within-concept sequences the approach resembles
traditional stage models, but in its assumptions concerning between-concept
sequences it differs from them. Specifically, like the stage approaches, it assumes that children progress through a series of discrete knowledge states on
their way to full understanding of any particular concept, but, unlike them,
it does not assume great consistency of reasoning across different concepts.
The rule-assessment strategy also differs in its reliance on patterns of nonverbal responses as the primary index of children's knowledge.
Four experiments were performed to illustrate the utility of the ruleassessment approach for studying developmental sequences across a variety
of concepts and over a wide range of ages. In experiments 1 and 2, it was
applied to three formal operational proportionality tasks: the balance scale,
projection of shadows, and probability tasks. In experiments 3 and 4, it was
applied to three concrete operational conservation tasks: conservation of
liquid quantity, solid quantity, and number. On all six tasks, the approach
was successful in revealing the contents of children's knowledge at different
points in their development. On four of the six, the progression of knowledge
states proved to be quite different from the traditional Piagetian accounts.
The rule-assessment approach also allowed comparisons of the structure of
children's knowledge across the six tasks. Finally, the data obtained in
experiments 3 and 4 were sufficiently different from any collected previously
to suggest a new theory of conservation acquisition.

I. INTRODUCTION

Piaget's theory of cognitive development has been the dominant one in

the field for the past 2 decades, but it has not been without its critics. Among
the most controversial positions taken by the theory are those concerning
developmental sequences. In order to elucidate the issues involved in the
controversy, it is necessary first to draw a distinction between two types of
developmental sequences: within-concept sequences and between-concept
sequences. "Developmental sequences within concepts" refers to the series of
partial understandings preceding mastery of any particular idea. For example, cbildren might think of liquid quantity conservation first in terms of
the taller liquid column always possessing more water, then in terms of perceptual estimates based on both height and width dimensions, and finally in
terms of transformations. "Developmental sequences between concepts," on
the other hand, refers to the order of acquisition of different ideas. For example, conservation might be mastered after transitivity but before class
inclusion.
At some risk of oversimplification, Piaget's position regarding withinand between-concept sequences can be described as follows. First consider
within-concept sequences. On their way to mastering each of a variety of
ideas, children are said to progress through a series of discrete knowledge
states that refiect their general level of reasoning: first they reason in manner
A, then in manner B, then in manner C. Piaget recognizes that there are also
changes in the range of situations in which the reasoning strategies are
brought to bear and in tbe skill with which children execute them (Flavell's
This research was supported in part by PHS grant MH-07722, by NICHHD grant
HD-12055, and by a Spencer Foundation grant. Thanks are due to the principals and
teachers of the Carnegie-Mellon Children's School, the Carriage House School, the Grady
Day School, and the Falk, Fulton, and Shadyside Elementary Schools. Also deserving
considerable gratitude are Renee Dennis, who was the experimenter in the first two
studies, and Elaine Shelton, who was the experimenter in the last two. Finally, a number
of colleagues read and commented on earlier versions of the manuscript: James Greeno,
Dan Keating, David Klahr, Dean Richards, ElHn Scholnick, Herbert Simon, and Tom
Trabasso. Their comments were greatly appreciated.

MONOGRAPHS

[1971] evocability and utilizability categories), but his major emphasis is

on the distinctiveness of the knowledge states within each concept. The
existence of these distinct knowledge states and the invariant order of their
occurrence are among the basic predictions of Piagetian theory (Piaget 1970,
1972; Pinard & Laurendeau 1969).
Now consider between-concept sequences. Piaget postulates a great deal
of similarity in reasoning across groups of concepts which he believed require
the same mental operations. Not only are many ideas such as conservation,
sedation, transitivity, and class inclusion hypothesized to be mastered at
about the same time, but early forms of reasoning about them are also
thought to be similar. For example, on a large number of concrete operational concepts, 5-year-olds are described as displaying Stage I (preoperational) reasoning, 6-year-olds Stage II (transitional) reasoning, and 7- and
8-year-olds Stage III (concrete operational) reasoning. The existence of
horizontal decalages, asynchronies in reasoning, is recognized, but the emphasis is on the parallels in thought across the different notions.
The reasons why Piaget's positions have been controversial are different
for the two types of developmental sequences. For the between-concept
sequences, the source of controversy lies in empirical findings. Several recent
reviews and theoretical papers indicate that children's reasoning across
different concepts is far less consistent than might have been expected on
the basis of Piagetian theory (Brainerd 1978; Flavell 1971; Keating 1980;
Neimark 1975). Wide variation in the age of mastery of concepts that are
theoretically within the same stage has been the rule rather than the exception. This has led to the serious question of whether there is any generality
in the way that children of particular ages approach different problems and
to the rather unsettling possibility that there might be none.
For the within-concept sequences, the controversy has focused more on
methodological issues. Piaget and his followers have relied heavily on verbal
explanation data to support their claim that children progress through
qualitatively discrete knowledge states on their way to mastering concepts
(e.g., Dodwell 1961, 1962; Feigenbaum 1963; Hood 1962; Lovell 1961;
Pinard & Laurendeau 1969). This practice has been criticized for a variety
of reasons: it has been said to entail overly great risk of type II error
(Brainerd 1977), to be insensitive to early forms of reasoning competence
(Braine 1959), to be inapplicable to very young children (Bryant 1974), and
to be generally unreliable (Keating 1980; Neimark 1975).
On the other hand, no alternative proposals for obtaining comparable
information about within-concept sequences have been forthcoming. This
statement may require some elaboration. Considerable progress has been
made in the past few years in creating parallel techniques for measuring
different concepts (e.g., Brainerd 1973, 1974; Inhelder, Sinclair, & Bovet
1974; Keller & Hunter 1973). Substantial gains have also been made in

ROBERT S. SIEGLER

creating means for revealing very young children's competence; it has been
discovered that surprisingly young children can, under certain circumstances, succeed on class inclusion, conservation, seriation, and transitivity
problems (Gelman 1972, 1978; Greenfield, Nelson, & Salzman 1972; Markman 1973; Trabasso, Riley, & Wilson 1975). Along with this progress, however, there has been a movement away from studying one of the original
phenomena of greatest interest, that of early, error-prone forms of reasoning.
Many of Piaget's most important insights were derived from examining
children's erroneous statements; these frequently revealed the type of changes
in reasoning that occur with age. Yet in our efforts to make knowledgeassessment techniques more reliable and more applicable to very young
children, we have moved away from this emphasis on erroneous reasoning
and also away from detailed analyses of individual children's reasoning.
Instead, the focus has shifted to analyses of group mean percentages of correct answers (or, alternatively, to analyses of group mean reaction times).
The result may have been a loss of valuable information about the acquisition process.
The basic hypothesis of this paper is that we might be able to increase
considerably our understanding of cognitive growth by devoting more attention to individual children's early, error-prone reasoning. This hypothesis is
examined using a new approach to studying developmental sequences, the
rule-assessment approach. The first chapter of the Monograph includes, in
addition to these introductory comments, a detailed description of the ruleassessment approach. The second chapter describes a series of four experiments using it. Finally, the third chapter involves a discussion of some general implications of the research for the study of developmental sequences.
THE RULE-ASSESSMENT APPROACH

The basic assumption underlying the rule-assessment a.pproach is that

cognitive development can be characterized in large part as the acquisition
of increasingly powerful rules for solving problems. In this respect, the approach resembles the Piagetian one. It differs from the Piagetian approach,
however, in not presuming any necessary similarity in children's reasoning
across different concepts. It also differs in relying on nonverbal patterns of
correct answers and errors as the basic data for revealing children's knowledge.
The first step in using the rule-assessment approach is generating a series
of alternative rules that children might use to solve a problem. Rational task
analyses, general cognitive-developmental theories, and previous empirical
work are the usual sources of the hypothesized rules. Next, a set of problem
types is formulated that yields distinctive patterns of correct answers and
errors for children following each of the rules. Finally, if there are two or

MONOGRAPHS

more tasks for which comparable problem types can be formulated, and if
there is a theoretical prediction either of developmental synchrony or of an
invariant developmental ordering, the between-concept sequence may be
studied.
The way in which the approach works can be illustrated by using it to
analyze Piaget's statements concerning the typical within- and betweenconcept developmental sequence for concrete operational and formal operational tasks. Consider Piaget's description of the within-concept developmental sequence for the liquid quantity conservation problem (Piaget 1952).
In Stage I, the child is said to be "unable to reckon simultaneously with the
height and cross section of the liquids . . . he takes into account only the
heights" (p. 12). In Stage II, "a second relation, that of the width, is explicitly brought into the picture . . . [but] when he is concerned with the unequal levels he forgets the width, and when he notices the difference in
width, he forgets what he has just said about the relation between the levels"
(p. 16). In Stage III, "children state immediately, or almost immediately,
that the quantities of liquid are conserved, and this irrespective of the number
and nature of the changes made" (p. 17),
Now consider the developmental sequence postulated for the formal
operations level balance scale problem (Inhelder & Piaget 1958). In Stage I,
"the child understands that weight is needed on both sides to achieve a
balance and even that the weights should be approximately equal but there
are as yet no systematic correspondences of the type 'further = heavier' "
(pp. 168-169). In Stage II, "weight is equalized and added exactly, while
distances are added and made symmetrical. But coordination between
weight and distances as yet goes no further than intuitive regulations" (p.
169). In Stage III, "the subjects proceed from the same conception to a
search for an explanation in the strict sense of the term. . . . The general
eqviilibrium schema is differentiated in the present case by constructing the
proportions W/Wi = U/V' (pp. 174-175).
These descriptions of beginning, intermediate, and final competence are
quite similar. This is no coincidence; across a great many cognitive-developmental concepts, there seems to be a modal form, both in the tasks and in the
types of within-concept sequences that Piaget says children pass through.
The tasks typically have two important perceptual dimensions: height and
cross-sectional area on the liquid quantity conservation task, weight and
distance on the balance scale task, length of the row and density of the
objects on the number conservation task, numerousness of the majority subclass and numerousness of the minority subclass on the class inclusion task,
and so on. The descriptions of the within-concept sequences also have a
modal form: children are said to focus first solely on one dimension, then
they enter a transitional phase where they at times consider either or both
dimensions but do not know how to combine them, and finally they always

ROBERT S. SIEGLER
consider both important dimensions and know how to solve all problems.
These verbal descriptions can be formally represented as the set of tree
diagrams shown in figure 1. Rule I corresponds to Piaget's Stage I, Rules II
and III correspond to his Stage II, and Rule IV corresponds to his Stage III.
Children using Rule I base judgments totally on a single "dominant" dimension.^ If values on it are different, they say that the alternative with the
greater value will be greater on the outcome measure; if values on it are
equal, they say that the two alternatives will be equal. Those using Rule II
base judgments on the values of the dominant dimension whenever those
values are unequal, but when the values are equal they also consider the
"subordinate" dimension. Children using Rule III always consider both
dominant and subordinate dimensions, but when one alternative has the
greater value on the dominant dimension and the other on the subordinate
dimension, they have no consistent formula for resolving the conflict; they
therefore "muddle through" or guess. Finally, children using Rule IV always
consider both dimensions and know the appropriate quantitative or qualitative formula for combining them.^
An example may help illustrate how this representation translates into
the particulars of a child's performance on a task. Consider the balance scale
task shown in figure 2A. As mentioned above, the balance scale has two
important perceptual dimensions: the amount of weight on each side of the
fulcrum (the dominant dimension), and the distance of the weights from the
fulcrum (the subordinate dimension). Children using Rule I consider only
the amount of weight on each side: if the amounts are unequal, they predict
that the side with the greater weight will go down; if the amounts are equal,
they predict that the balance will remain level. Children using Rule II also
consistently predict that the side with the greater weight will go down if the
weights are unequal, but if they are equal, these children expand their field
of consideration to include values on the distance dimension. Those using
Rule III always consider both weight and distance, but if one side has more
^The phrase "dominant dimension" is not intended to indicate that there is anything inherent in one dimension that makes it more important than the other. Rather, it is
used simply to characterize the dimension that young children usually rely on in these
situations and that adults usually rejjort as being more salient. Given very discrepant
stimulus configurations, it might be possible to reverse which dimension is dominant and
which is subordinate.
^ Rule III is clearly an oversimplification, masking a host of idiosyncratic strategies
that subjects use. For an analysis of some of these idiosyncratic strategies, see Klahr and
Siegler (1978). Also note that the degree of parallelism in the rules is greater at the premastery levels (Rules I-III) than at the level of mastery (Rule IV); the Rule IV phrase
"combine dimensions appropriately" turns out to mask considerable diversity. This is a
necessary concomitant of mastery level rules, by definition, adhering closely to the particularities of concepts. The point will become important in later discussions of where we
might and might not expect to find parallels in children's reasoning across different
concepts.

MONOGRAPHS

Rule II

RuU I

lues of
dominant diaanalon
aualT

/V\

Ye
Altmtlvi
equal

Greater aubordlnate
dlaenslon value -* wore

Rule III

Values of
subordinate dlnenslon
equal?
No
Muddle through

value

Rule
Values of
dominant dimension
eaual ?
Yes

Yes

Volues of

subordinate dimension

equal ?

equoi ?

Yes/^
/
Alternatives
equal

Value of

subordinate dimension

Greater sub-

Greater domi-

ordinate

nant dimension

No
\
Combine dominant
and subordinate

dimension

value-

dimensions appropriately

fflore

vatue-

FIGURE

1.Modal rule models

ROBERT S. SIEGLER

weight and the other side has its weights further from the fulcrum, the children muddle through or guess. Finally, children using Rule IV always consider both dimensions and compute the torques on each side if such a
computation is necessary. Thus, if there are three weights on the third peg to
the left of the fulcrum and two weights on the fourth peg to the right, then
3 X 3 = 9 and 2 X 4 = 8; 9 > 8; so the left side would go down.
How general are these four modal Piagetian rules? At a theoretical level,
at least, they can be applied to a broad range of tasks studied by Piaget and
other investigators. Table 1 illustrates how the formulation can be applied to

11
A.

B.

Balance Scale Apparatus

Projection of Shadows Apparatus

o
o
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C.
FIGURE

Frobabirity Apparatus

2.Apparatus for balance scale, projection of shadows, and probability tasks

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10 cognitive-developmental tasks; empirical results testing the fit of the

models to six of these will be presented later in this Monograph.
The structural similarity of the rule models across the diflerent tasks, at
least at the three premastery levels, suggested that it would be revealing to
study the between-concept sequence among them. In order to do this, however, it was first necessary to devise a standard experimental situation. The
criteria that were adopted in designing this situation were generality, so that
it could be used with many diflerent concepts, and simplicity, so that it
could be used to study conceptual development across a broad age range.
The basic experimental arrangement that was eventually selected involved
a series of three-choice items in which children needed to decide whether
choice A was greater on some outcome measure, whether choice B was
greater, or whether the two were equal. On the balance scale, this involved
predicting whether the left side would go down, the right side would go
down, or the two would balance. On the number conservation problem, it
involved deciding whether the top row had more objects, whether the bottom row did, or whether the numbers were equal. One advantage of this
approach is that it requires almost no verbalization on the part of the subjects; children can simply say "that one" or "same." Another advantage is
that having the problems involve three choices rather than two oflers the
opportunity not only of investigating which problems children solve and
which they err on, but also of studying the particular errors that they make.
As will become evident below, this last property is very important for
determining whether children in fact adhere to the hypothesized rules.
With the modal Piagetian rules in mind, six modal problem types were
designed.
1. Equal problems, with the same values on both dominant and subordinate dimensions for the two choices.
2. Dominant problems, with unequal values on the dominant dimension
and equal values on the subordinate dimension.
3. Subordinate problems, with unequal values on the subordinate dimension and equal values on the dominant one.
4. Conflict-dominant problems, with one choice greater on the dominant
dimension, the other choice greater on the subordinate dimension,
and the one that is greater on the dominant dimension being the
correct answer.
5. Conflict-subordinate problems, with one choice greater on the dominant
dimension, the other choice greater on the subordinate dimension,
and the one that is greater on the subordinate dimension being the
correct answer.
6. Conflict-equal problems, with the usual conflict, and the two choices
being equal on the outcome measure.
We can again consider the balance scale to illustrate how these six
problem types are realized on a particular task (fig. 3). On equal problems.

MONOGRAPHS

Problew type

Rulea
II

III

IV

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

Equal

Dominant

Subordinate
0

100

100

100

100

33

100

(should
say
"Equal")
Confllct-Dominane
100

(chance
responding)
Conflict-Subordinate
0

(should

(should

choose

choose

right

right

side)

side)

33

100

33

100

Coaflict-Equal
0

(should

(should

(chance

choose

choose

responding)

right

right

side)

side)

FIGURE 3.Predictions of percentage of correct answers and error patterns for children using Rules I-IV on balance scale task.

10

ROBERT S. SIEGLER
there are the same number of weights on each side of the fulcrum and the
weights on each side are equidistant from the fulcrum. On dominant problems, there are unequal numbers of weights equal distances from the fulcrum.
On subordinate problems, there are equal number of weights unequal distances from the fulcrum. The three types of conflict problems all involve one
side having the greater amount of weight and the other having the greater
distance from the fulcrum. On conflict-dominant problems, the side with the
greater amount of weight goes down; on conflict-subordinate problems, the
side with the weight further from the fulcrum goes down; and on conflictequal problems the two sides balance.
Children who used the diflerent rules would produce dramatically
different response patterns on these problems (fig. 3). Those using Rule I
would always predict correctly on equal, dominant, and conflict-dominant
problems, and they would never predict correctly on the other three problem
types. Children using Rule II would behave similarly except that they would
also solve subordinate problems. Those adopting Rule III would invariably
be correct on all three nonconflict problem types and would perform at a
chance level on the three types of conflict problems. Those using Rule IV
would solve all problems of all types.
To the extent that age correlates with the sophistication of the rules that
children adopt, these descriptions imply distinct developmental patterns for
each of the six problem types. Most interesting is the predicted developmental
decrement in performance on conflict-dominant problems. Younger children,
using Rules I and II, should consistently get these problems right, while
older children, using Rule III, should muddle through them and be correct
only one-third of the time (to the extent that yet older children adopt Rule
IV, a U-shaped pattern should be produced). Another prediction is that
performance on subordinate problems should show the most dramatic
developmental increment, from below chance for children using Rule I to
perfect performance for children using the other three rules. For equal and
dominant problems, the rule models predict consistently correct responding
for children using all rules. For conflict-subordinate and conflict-equal problems, they predict a progression from below chance performance at Rules I
and II to chance performance at Rule III to perfect performance at Rule IV.
The rule models also allow unambiguous prediction of individual performance. That is, saying that a child uses Rule I or Rule II or Rule IV
indicates which of the three possible responses he should make on each item:
"choice A," "choice B," or "equal." Given the 24-item posttest (four items
from each of the six problem types) that I have usually used, this means that
there are 3^^ distinct possible patterns of responses; of these, less than onemillionth fit the criterion for rule usage that I have adopted (20 of 24 responses conforming to a rule). Thus, the likelihood that a random responder
would be misclassified as using a rule is very small.
11

MONOGRAPHS

As mentioned earlier, this methodology can be applied to a wide variety

of concepts, at least in theory. A previous investigation (Siegler 1976, exp)eriment 1) illustrated empirically its applicability to at least one task, the
balance scale problem. In this study, 5-, 9-, 13-, and 17-year-olds were
presented the balance scale task. It was found that the rule models accurately
characterized the performance of 107 of the 120 children88%. The percentages ranged from 80% of the 5-year-olds to 100% of the 17-year-olds.
The predicted developmental patterns for the difl"erent problem types also
emerged. Performance on conflict-dominant problems declined from 89%
correct for 5-year-olds to 5 1 % correct for 17-year-olds; 17-year-olds did less
well than 5-year-olds on every one of the conflict-dominant items on the test,
but not on any other test item. Performance on subordinate problems improved from 9% correct for 5-year-olds to 78% correct for 9-year-olds and
95% correct for 17-year-olds; the developmental increments from ages 5 to
17 on each subordinate item were greater than on any item of the other five
problem types. Finally, performance was consistently correct on equal and
dominant problems, ranging from 88% to 100% correct, and improved
from below chance to somewhat above chance for conflict-subordinate and
conflict-equal problems (7%-40% and l l % - 5 0 % , respectively). Thus,
performance on each type of problem showed the predicted developmental
pattern.
It may be useful to compare the rule-assessment approach to other
strategies that have been employed to study cognitive development. Perhaps
the most direct precursor of the present approach is Levine's blank-trials
procedure (e.g., Gholson, Levine, & Phillips 1972; Levine 1963, 1966). This
procedure resembles the rule-assessment approach in two basic assumptions:
that people follow rules (hypotheses) in solving problems, and that patterns
of responding can reveal the nature of these hypotheses. The two approaches
are also consistent in some of their basic findingsfor example, that children
as young as 5 years employ systematic strategies. The largest diflerence
between them is in generality. Levine did not extend his analysis beyond
discrimination-learning tasks and did not develop any scheme for classifying
problem types; both of these are important goals of the present approach.
The rule-assessment strategy is also related to the production-system
approach used by Klahr and Wallace (1973, 1976). The types of conditionaction pairings that are the basic unit of production-system analyses are also
basic to the rule models. More generally, both may be viewed as examples of
the discrimination net approach embodied in such computer simulation
programs as EPAM (Feigenbaum 1961). Production systems are more explicit
about the momentary contents of short-term memory during task performance; rule models are more parsimonious and more easily testable; a wide
variety of substantive statements about children's rules can be made equally
clearly in either format. Klahr and Siegler (1978) discussed in some detail
12

ROBERT S. SIEGLER

the relative merits of the two approaches; the above conclusions are developed at greater length there.
In a more general sense, the rule-assessment approach may be seen as
an outgrowth of the psychometric notions of convergent and discriminant
validity (Campbell & Fiske 1959). The crucial predictions in each case concern patterns of similar and dissimilar performance. In the traditional multitrait-multimethod matrix, we expect tests of the same trait to correlate
highly and tests of different traits to correlate less highly. In the rule X
problem type matrix, we expect performance on some problem types to be
similar across ages and performance on others to be difl'erent. The greatest
innovations of the rule-assessment approach relative to past uses of the
multitrait-multimethod technique are its emphasis on premastery levels of
performance and its finer level of detail in describing what people are doing
on particular tasks. On the other hand, the rule-assessment approach does
not yet match some of the past psychometric applications in the amount of
attention given to issues of generality over time, tests, and assessment
methods. The present Monograph may be seen in part as a first step in this
direction.

13

II. FOUR EXPERIMENTS O N DEVELOPMENTAL

SEQUENCES

The developmental sequence studies reported in this section share

several goals. One is to determine whether the rule-assessment method is
applicable to a variety of cognitive-developmental concepts and over a wide
age range. Another is to determine how well the particular modal rules that
have been postulated characterize the within-concept sequence on each of
six Piagetian tasks, A third is to determine the degree to which children adopt
similar rules across these tasks. A fourth is to determine whether the level of
competence that we focus upon substantially influences the developmental
sequence across concepts that we find.
This last issue is suggested directly by the within- versus between-concept distinction and may require some explanation. Usually, when children's understanding of different concepts is compared, the comparisons are
performed solely at the level of mastery; for example, when investigators
study whether conservation of liquid and solid quantity are understood
simultaneously, they are in general only concerned with when problems of
each type are consistently solved. The rule-assessment approach allows comparison at earlier levels of understanding as well; for example, do children
adopt initial systematic rules (the Rule I approach) on both types of conservation simultaneously? It seemed at least possible that there might be
greater consistency in early forms of reasoning than in more mature forms,
for reasons that will be discussed later in the Monograph.
In experiment 1, children of six ages3-, 4-, 5-, 8-, and 12-year-olds
and college studentswere presented three formal operational tasks
Inhelder and Piaget's (1958) balance scale task, their projection of shadows
task, and Piaget and Inhelder's (1951) probability taskon each of two
occasions, 1 month apart. This design allowed examination of the applicability of the rule-assessment approach to three distinct but conceptually similar
tasksall three were related to the concept of proportionality. It also allowed
examination of the usefulness of the approach over a wide age span, from 3
years to adulthood. Finally, it allowed examination of the consistency of
14

ROBERT S. SIEGLER

performance both over time and across tasks. Based on the assumptions
underlying the rule-assessment approach, it was expected that children
would progress through a series of discrete knowledge states on their way to
mastering each of the three concepts. On the basis of past empirical findings
(Siegler 1976, 1978), it was expected that the contents of the knowledge
states on each task would approximate the modal Piagetian rules illustrated
in figure 1. With regard to the between-concept sequence, though, no clear
prediction could be derived. Past results were sufficiently conflicting and the
present approach sufficiently different from previous ones that the degree
of consistency in the children's reasoning could not be foretold, especially at
the levels preceding conceptual mastery.
EXPERIMENT 1
Mefhod

Participants.Ten subjects of each of the following ages participated in

the experiment: 3-year-olds (CA = 41 months, SD = 2.91), 4-year-olds
(CA = 52 months, SD = 3.63), 5-year-olds (CA = 63 months, SD =
3.62), 8-year-olds (CA = 104 months, SD = 4.42), 12-year-olds (CA =
153 months, SD = 3.68), and college students (CA = 248 months, SD =
20.32). The three youngest groups were from a university preschool, the
8- and 12-year-olds were from a predominantly middle-class public school,
and the college students were subject pool members at Carnegie-Mellon
University. Within each age group, half of the subjects were male and half
were female. The experimenter was a 23-year-old, white, female research
assistant.
Tasks.The balance scale apparatus was the same one described in
Siegler (1976) and depicted in figure 2A. Each balance scale item involved
putting between one and six metal disks on one of the pegs on each side of
the fulcrum and asking, "What would happen if I lifted this lever [which
subjects had been shown held the balance scale motionless]? Would this
side go down, would this side go down, or would it stay the same as it is now
[balance]?"
The projection of shadows apparatus (fig. 2B) involved two 25-watt
point light sources, two wooden bases each having eight holes spaced at
2-inch intervals, a projection screen, and a number of T-shaped bars. These
bars had identical vertical components (4 inches high), but their horizontal
portions varied in length from 1 to 8 inches. The horizontal span was denoted by alternating 1 -inch segments of red and blue tape wrapped around
the metal bar; thus, a four-unit bar would have a blue segment, a red segment, another blue segment, and another red segment (or the reverse). On
each item, children saw a T-bar in a hole in each of the two bases and were
asked, "If I turned on these lights, which side would cast a longer shadow
15

MONOGRAPHS

[motioning to indicate that the question referred to the horizontal span]

this side, this side, or would the shadows be just as long?"
The probability apparatus involved two piles of marbles, some red ones
and some blue ones in each pile (fig. 2C). The total number of marbles in a
pile never exceeded 10. On each item, children were asked, "Which pile
would you want to choose from if you wanted a red (blue) marble and had
to choose with your eyes closedwould you rather choose from this pile,
from this pile, or wouldn't it matter?"
Rule models.^The rule models for the balance scale were described
above. The dominant dimension was weight, the subordinate dimension was
distance from the fulcrum. A child using Rule I would base judgments solely
on relative weight; one using Rule II would in addition consider distance
whenever the number of weights was equal; one using Rule III would
always consider both weight and distance but would not know how to resolve
conflicts; and one using Rule IV would always consider both weight and
distance and would compute the torques when necessary.
The projection of shadows rule models were very similar. The dominant
dimension was the span of the bar, while the subordinate was the distance
of the bar from the light source.^ Children using Rule I would base predictions solely on the relative spans of the bars; those using Rule II would also
consider distance from the light source if the spans were equal; those adhering
to Rule III would always consider both dimensions but would not know how
to resolve conflicts; and those using Rule IV would, if necessary, compute
the ratios of span to distance from the light source and choose the alternative
with the larger ratio.
As conceptualized in this experiment (though not later), the probability
task rule models were somewhat different. Like the balance scale and
shadows tasks, the probability task was thought of as having two important
dimensionsthe number of marbles of the desired color was the dominant
dimension and the number of marbles of the undesired color was the subordinate one. Also like them. Rule I involved sole reliance on one dimension,
the number of desired-color marbles; Rule II involved reliance on that
dimension unless values on it were equal, in which case the number of
undesired-color marbles would also be considered; and Rule IV involved
' Formally, this latter dimension would be represented as the ratio:
Distance of the bar from the light source
Total distance from the light source to the screen"
However, since the light source and the screen were in fixed places, thinking of the dimensions simply as span and distance from the light source yielded equivalent solutions to all
pcssible problems. Children's explanations of their reasoning suggested that they thought
of the distance dimension as distance from the light source (or sometimes as distance from
the screen), but rarely as a ratio in itself.

16

ROBERT S. SIEGLER
computation of a proportion, in this case the proportion of desired-color
marbles in each pile.
The difference resided in the hypothesized Rule III for the probability
task. The previous observations of Fischbein, Pampu, and Manzat (1970)
and of Chapman (1975) suggested that many children would use a rule on
this task in which they subtracted the number of undesired-color marbles
from the number of desired-color ones and then chose the pile with the
greater algebraic value. This subtraction formula, rather than the standard
"muddle through" approach, was the hypothesized Rule III for the probability task.
Problem types.The problem types used to assess children's knowledge of
the balance scale were of the modal form. There were equal, dominant,
subordinate, conflict-dominant, conflict-subordinate, and conflict-equal
problems. These balance scale problems were described above and are
illustrated in figure 3.
The problem types used to assess knowledge of the shadows problem
also followed the modal form (fig. 4). There were equal problems, with
equal span bars equal distances from the light source; dominant problems,
with different span bars equal distances from the light source; subordinate
problems, with equal span bars different distances from the light source;
conflict-dominant problems, with one bar longer, the other bar closer to
the light, and the longer bar casting the longer shadow; conflict-subordinate
problems, with one bar longer, the other bar closer, and the closer bar casting the longer shadow; and conflict-equal problems, with the usual conflict
and the two bars casting equal length shadows.
On the probability task, the atypical Rule III made it necessary to
adopt problem types somewhat different from the modal ones (fig. 5). It is
easiest to simply label these A, B, C, D, E, and F and to discuss them in
terms of the expected patterns of solutions for children using different rules.
Children using Rule I would always solve problem types A and C and would
always err on B, D, E, and F. Those using Rule II would always solve
problem types A, B, and C and would always err on D, E, and F. Users of
Rule III would solve problem types A, B, C, and D and would err on E and
F. Finally, children using Rule IV would solve all types of problems.
Assessment instruments.Children were presented parallel assessment instruments for the balance scale, shadows, and probability problems. On each
test there were 24 items, four each of the six problem types. The items were
ordered by means of stratified random sampling, so that one item of each
type was included in the first six items, one in the next six, and so on. The
tests were also similar in the sense that all items on them could be answered
in one of three ways: side A is the correct answer, side B is correct, or sides
A and B sire equivalent.
In order to be classified as using one of the four postulated rules, a child

17

MONOGRAPHS

needed to answer 20 of the 24 items in accord with the predictions of the rule.
This made it very unlikely that a child proceeding unsystematically would
be said to be using a rule. Additional safeguards were introduced to assure
that a child said to be using one rule was not actually using a different one.
For example, only performance on the subordinate problems separated Rule
I from Rule II patterns; therefore, the child needed to answer at least three
of the four three-choice items in the direction predicted by one or the other
rule to be classified as using that rule. The simplicity of the three possible
responses and the specificity of the scoring criteria minimized problems of
scoring reliability.
Procedure.Children were brought individually by the experimenter
from their classrooms to a vacant room in their school on each of 3 successive
Problem type

Equal

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

33

100

M
/\
Oominant
/\

Subordinate

(Should
say
"Balance")

Liiili

100

ConflictOominant

(Chance
Responding)

Ml I
A

11

ConflictEqual

ill

33

ConflictSubordinate

(Should
say
"Right
Oown")

(Should
say
"Right
Oown")

(Chance
Responding)

0
(Shouid
say
"Right
Oown")

33

(Should
say
"Right
Oown")

100

100

(Chance
Responding)

FIGURE 4.Predictions of percentage of correct answers and error patterns for chil*
dren using Rules I-IV on projection of shadows task.

18

ROBERT S. SIEGLER

school days. Each time, they were told they would be playing a game and
given instructions such as the following (for the projection of shadows):
Today we're going to be playing a game with these pieces of wood, these
colored bars, this screen, and these lights. I'm going to be putting the
colored bars in these holes in different ways, and I'm going to ask you
whether you think the bar on this side would have a longer shadow if
the light were on [indicating horizontal length], or whether the bar on
this side would have a longer shadow, or whether the two shadows
would be just as long as each other. Now the light is not really going to

Rule

Problem type

nz
(Subtraction
Rule)
100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

o
B

o#o
oo

(Should
say
Same")

100

O
O#

Q
OO

om

ooo*

0
0
(Should (Should
say
say
"Right")

100

oo

o
o

(Should (Should
ay
say
"Right") -Right")

(Should
ay
"Right")

0
0
(Should (Should
say
My
"Laft") "Laft")

0
(Should
My
'Laft')

100

FIGURE 5.Predictions of percentage of correct answers and error patterns for children using Rules I-IV on probability task.

19

MONOGRAPHS

be on, but I want you to tell me what would happen if we turned the
light on.
At this point, the experimenter turned on one of the point light sources so
that the child could see that it indeed worked.
Next, the 24-item test was presented. On each item, the experimenter
would set up the problem and ask the child what would happen, and the
child would make a prediction. At no time was feedback provided; if a child
ever asked how he was doing, he was simply told "fine." After all 24 problems
were completed, the child was asked, "How did you do these problems? How
did you know which answer was right?"
The next day the child was presented one of the two remaining tasks;
the third day he was presented the final one. Order of presentation was
randomized within age so that three children of each age did each task first,
three did it second, and three did it third. The tenth child of each age was
arbitrarily assigned to orders, so that, for the sample as a whole, task order
was balanced.
A month later the experimenter returned to the school and repeated the
procedure, again testing each child on the three tasks on 3 successive days.
Results

There were two possible approaches to analyzing the data. One was to
use standard parametric techniques such as univariate or multivariate
analysis of variance. A number of such analyses were performed, and they
almost always yielded highly significant effects. For example, a 6 (age) X
6 (problem type) analysis of variance on the number of correct answers on
the balance scale task (first occasion) revealed significant effects for age,
F(5,54) = 26.60; problem type, F(5,270) = 47.33; and the age X problem
type interaction, F(25,270) = 5.35. The parallel analysis for the projection
of shadows task also yielded effects for age, F(5,54) = 23.87; problem type,
F(5,270) = 99.47; and the interaction, F(25,270) = 7.92. Similarly, for the
probability task, there were significant effects for age, F(5,54) = 21.18;
problem type, F(5,270) = 10.90; and the interaction, F(25,270) = 2.13.
All nine of these values were significant beyond the .001 level.
Although a considerable amount could be learned from these and other,
more specific, parametric analyses, a second approachnamely, viewing
the data in terms of adherence to the proposed rule modelsseemed more
revealing. A particular advantage of this approach is that it allows us to
discern the knowledge states of individual children, rather than just the
number of correct answers produced by a composite "average" child of a
given age. Therefore, this latter mode of analysis will be relied on almost
exclusively throughout the rest of this Monograph.
20

ROBERT S. SIEGLER
Fit of the Rule Models to Individual Performance

I claimed earlier that saying a child used one or another of the hypothesized rules was a very strong statement about his or her behavior. This can
now be illustrated graphically. Figure 6 demonstrates the degree to which
the performance of children who met the criterion for using a particular rule
conformed to the predictions of that rule. Simple inspection indicates that
the fit was close in all cases.
It should be noted that this figure represents the large majority of protocols produced by 5-20-year-olds80% of the kindergartners' protocols,
88% of the third graders', 90% of the seventh graders', and 100% of the
college students' (the very young children's performance will be discussed
below). Among the 5-20-year-olds, 96% of balance scale protocols, 94% of
shadows protocols, and 79% of probability protocols conformed to a rule.
Thus, the applicability of the rule models was not idiosyncratic to any particular age group or to any particular task.

20

D
S
CD
Probltfn typ*

CS

Ideal Rul* Parformanc*

-x-Balanca Scala, Exp. 1

CE

S
CD
Problem type

CS

D Shadows. Exparlmant 1

OShadowa, Expcrimant 2

Aaalanca Scala. Exp. 2

* Probability, Exp. 2

CE

FIGURE 6.Adherence to rules on proportionality tasks. (Note: Due to the variability

inherent in estimating parameters on the basis of small numbers of data points, only cases
in which at least five children used a rule on a task in an experiment are included in this
figure. For example, only three children used Rule IV on the shadows task in experiment
2; therefore, their performance is not graphed.)

21

MONOGRAPHS

Examination of the explanations data revealed considerable consistency

between them and the predictions data (table 2).^ The rule assessments
yielded by predictions and explanations measures were the same for between
70% and 80% of the subjects on each of the three tasks. There were two
main points of difference between the two measures. A number of children
who gave Rule I level explanations did not consistently adhere to any of the
four rules in their predictions. These were most often 3- and 4-year-olds who
may have had an idea of what to do but were not very adept at doing it. The
second point of difference was that very few children gave Rule II explanations, though quite a few used the rule in their predictions. Typically, these
children simply stated that both the dominant and subordinate dimensions
were important, without indicating the conditions under which they would
rely on each. Thus, the predictions and explanations data yielded similar,
but not identical, pictures.
TABLE 2
RULE CLASSIFICATIONS ON PREDICTIONS AND
EXPLANATIONS MEASURES
PREDICTIONS
EXPLANATIONS

No Rule

Rule I

Rule II

Rule III Rule IV

Balance Scale
No rule...
Rule I
Rule II
Rule III
Rule IV

13
2

1
14

1
2
4

15

...

2
4

Projection of Shadows
No rule
Rule I
Rule II . .
Rule III
Rule IV

9
9

13
3

17

Probability
No rule
Rule I
Rule II
Rule III
Rule IV.

18
7
1
1

1
2

4
2

13

* The criteria used to score children's explanations were derived from the hypothesized rule systems. A child who referred only to a single dimension in explaining his
reasoning was classified as using Rule I. A child who said he used the second dimension
when values on the first were equal was said to use Rule II. A child who referred to both
dimensions as generally important but who did not supply the correct quantitative relationship linking them was said to use Rule III. Finally, children who did cite the correct
quantitative relationship were classified as Rule IV.

22

ROBERT S. SIEGLER

The data also allowed assessment of the stability of rule usage over time.
Table 3 illustrates the degree to which children who used a rule on a task on
the first occasion used that same rule the second time, 1 month later. More
than three-fourths of the children (77%) followed the same rule on both
occasions. Of those whose rule classification changed, there was a definite
bias in the upward direction; 7 1 % of the children whose classifications
changed used more advanced rules on the second occasion, versus 29%
using less advanced rules (x^ = "7-71,/> < .01). This suggests that at least
some of the changes that occurred reflected cognitive growth in the 1 -month
period rather than measurement error. In terms of test-retest reliability, the
correlations between the number of correct answers on the first and second
occasions were r = .89, r = .83, and r = .89 for the balance scale, shadows,
and probability tasks, respectively.
Developmental Sequence within Concepts

Balance scale.As indicated in table 4, children were found to pass

through a consistent, age-related sequence on the balance scale task. At age
3, none of the children used any apparent rule; by age 4, approximately
one-half had adopted Rule I and one-half did not use any rule; by age 5,
almost all children used Rule I. The effects of this on their handling of the
TABLE 3
CONSISTENCY OF RULE CLASSIFICATIONS OVER
TIMEEXPERIMENT 1
FIRST EXPERIENCE
SECOND
EXPERIENCE

No Rule

Rule I

Rule II Rule III Rule IV

]Balance

No rule
Rule I
Rule II
Rule III
Rule I V . . .

12
2

15

Scale

1
2
4

13
1

Projection of Shadows
No rule . .
Rule I
Rule II
Rule III
Rule IV

11
8

2
11

7
3

16

Probability
No rule
Rule I
Rule II
Rule III
Rule I V . . .

23
2

1
8

1
1

14

23

MONOGRAPHS

different problem types are illustrated in figure 7; initially, all typ)es of

problems were solved with roughly equal frequency, but by age 5, there was
sharp differentiation.
Older children increasingly adopted the intermediate level rules (Rules
II and III). Even by college age, however, only a minority used the most
sophisticated approach (Rule IV). This last finding differed from Inhelder
and Piaget's (1958) claim that children generally solve balance scale problems by age 13 or 14, but replicated Lee's (1971), Martorano's (1977), and
Siegler's (1976) previously reported findings.
The one portion of the data that could not be characterized in terms of
the rule models was the performance of the 3-year-olds. Therefore, additional
analyses were performed to try to determine their approaches. First, rules
other than the hypothesized Rule I were examined. It was found that no
TABLE 4
RULE USAGE ON THREE PROPORTIONALITY TASKSEXPERIMENT 1

Task

No Rule

Rule I

Rule II

Rule III Rule IV

3-Year-Olds
Balance scale
Shadows
Probability

...

18
20
20

4-Year-Olds
Balance scale
Shadows
Probability

...

6
9
15

14
11
5
5-Year-Olds

Balance scale. . .
Shadows
Probability

1
2
9

17
16
10

1
2
1

8-Year-Olds
Balance scale. . .
Shadows
Probability

2
5

2
2
5

7
11

12
19
7

io

13
14
4

16

12-Year-Olds
Balance scale. . .
Shadows
Probability

2
1
3

Adults
Balance scale. ..
Shadows
Probability
Combined over both occasions.

24

1
6

ROBERT S. SIEGLER

3-year-old consistently chose the side with less weight, the side with the
weights further from the fulcrum, the side with the weights closer to the
fulcrum, the left side or the right side, the side with a particular number of
weights, or the side with the weights on a particular peg. In addition, none
of the children used alternation strategies. Adjusting the criterion for rule
usage had little effect; the greatest number of responses conforming to Rule I
among any of the 3-year-olds was 14 (of 24), and no other rules were consistently followed either. The 3-year-olds' explanations were similarly unrevealing; their most common justifications were that they chose the side
they liked, the one that was special, or the one that was right.
Since these analyses of the individual children's performance failed to
reveal regularities, group level analyses were performed. The results of a
t test indicated that the 3-year-olds' number of correct answers was no
greater than would be expected by the 33% chance likelihood of being
correct {t < 1). The results of a one-way analysis of variance indicated that
there were no significant differences in their number of correct answers on
the different problem types (F < 1). Next, a regression analysis was performed, in which the ability of several alternative rules to predict the number
of errors the children made on each of the 24 items was tested. The predictor
100

100

Rulci
5 Yr-Olds
4 Yr-Otds
3 Yr-Olds

~ 80

Rulai
5 Yr-Olds

80

U 60

SO
1

c 40
o

40

D
S
CD
CS
Probtom-typs
A. Balwics seal*: first occasion
100

CE

D
S
CD
CS
CE
Problsm-typ*
B. Projection of shadows: first occasion
Rule 1
5 Yr-Olds
4 Yr-Olds
3 Yr-Olds

~ 80

I 40
* 20

Probtam typ*
C. ProbabHity: First occasion

FIGURE 7.Three-, 4-, and 5-year-olds' performance on different problem types

experiment 1, first testing.

25

MONOGRAPHS

formulas were the standard Rule I, a distance formula analogous to Rule I

except that distance rather than weight was the predictor dimension, a
qualitative solution formula in which the nonconfiict problems would be
solved and the confiict ones would not, and a Rule I' formula which was
similar to Rule I except that it would not solve balance problems. This
regression analysis indicated that the Rule I formula was a significant predictor of the 3-year-olds' number of errors on each item, I^ = .15, F{1,22)
= 3.97. The percentage of variance accounted for was small compared with
that found in the comparable analysis of 5-year-olds' performance, R^ =
.95, F(l,22) = 458.47, but it did suggest a beginning of understanding in
3-year-olds' performance.*
Projection of shadows.The developmental sequence on the projection of
shadows task was very similar to that on the balance scale (table 4). At age
3, none of the children used any apparent rule; by age 4, roughly one-half
were using Rule I; by age 5, a large majority were using Rule I. Implications of this trend for the children's handling of the different problem types
are illustrated in figure 7B.
After age 5, children increasingly shifted to the intermediate rules, first
to Rule II and then to Rule III. As on the balance scale, though, use of
Rule IV was rare at even college age.
Analyses of the 3-year-olds' performance failed to reveal any evidence
of systematic responding. The closest adherence to Rule I was 14 of 24
responses. The percentage of items answered correctly was no greater than
chance {t < 1). In addition, neither the analysis of variance nor the regression analysis revealed any systematic response patterns at the group level of
performance (F's < 2); the most accurate predictor of errors was the Rule I
formula, and this accounted for only 6% of the variance. The same formula
accounted for 96% of the variance in the 5-year-olds' errors, F(l,22) =
495.90.
Probability.^The sequence of rules that children adopted on the probability task was similar in some ways to the sequence observed on the other
two tasks, but differed in important respects. The developmental trend from
use of no obvious rule at age 3 to use of Rule I by age 5 was present here, as
on the balance scale and shadows problems (table 4 and fig. 7). This trend
was slower to begin and took longer to complete, though. At age 5, half of the
children used Rule I and the other half did not use any rule, and even by age
8, substantial numbers of children were still using Rule I.
Most striking, however, was what happened after children had acquired
Rule I. Most 8-year-olds who did not use Rule I used Rule IV. This trend
continued through age 12, and by college age, the large majority of students
' In the reporting of the results of the regression analyses, only the first significant
variable to emerge (the one accounting for the most variance) is mentioned. This was
done to save space and to provide the measure most comparable to the rule assessments.

26

ROBERT S. SIEGLER
were using Rule IV on the probability task. There was little use of Rules II
and III at any age. All of these findings were evident on both the predictions
and the explanations measures.
As with the shadows projection task, detailed analyses of 3-year-olds'
performance on the probability task did not reveal any obvious regularities.
No child conformed to Rule I on more than 15 of the 24 items, nor did any
alternative rule closely fit any individual child's performance. At the group
level, neither the analysis of variance nor the regression analysis indicated
any consistent pattern. For example, the Rule I model accounted for the
most variance in the regression analysis of the 3-year-olds' performance; it
accounted for only 6% {F < 2). By contrast. Rule I accounted for 90% of
the variance in 5-year-olds' performance, F(l,22) = 190.58.^
Developmental Sequence between Concepts

Tables 4 and 5 illustrate why it is vital to consider different levels of

knowledge in investigating the order in which tasks are mastered. There is a
sharp reversal in the developmental sequence of the three problems, depending on the degree of understanding being considered. Rule I, representing
initial competence, is attained earlier on the balance scale and shadows tasks
than on the probability task. Similarly, Rules II and III, representing
intermediate competence, are acquired on the balance scale and shadows
tasks when many children are still using Rule I on the probability task. By
contrast. Rule IV is acquired much earlier on the probability task than on
the other two.
The data can also be used to examine the degree of developmental
synchrony across the three problems. Recall that these three problems were
chosen because they all were related to proportionality. This would seem to
offer a favorable circumstance for behavioral consistencies to manifest
themselves, especially in light of the similarities of the testing procedures,
types of problems, and hypothesized rules. In spite of this, only 19 of 60
children were classified at the same level on all three tasks on the first testing,
and only 20 of 60 on the second testing. Even using the less stringent criterion
of percentage of rule classifications agreeing between pairs of tasks, the
agreement rate was only 53%. What synchrony there was occurred primarily
at young ages: among the three youngest groups there was agreement on
* Three-year-olds' performance on the probability task hovered around 50% rather
than the expected 3 3 % correct on each of the six problem types. This appeared to be quite
fortuitous: the children were reluctant to say "same" on the task, and "same" turned out
never to be the correct answer. Thus, the task was effectively converted from a three-choice
to a two-choice problem with a chance likelihood of 50% rather than 33% correct. This
interpretation was supported by the results of experiment 2; presented probability task
items on which "same" was the correct answer on one-third of the trials, the youngest
subjects again rarely answered "same," and the overall percentage correct of those classified as not using a rule (36 %) was very close to the three-choice chance level.

27

MONOGRAPHS

72% of rule classifications across the pairs of tasks, while among the three
older groups there was agreement on only 34%, x^(l) = 25.74,/> < .01.
Discussion

Experiment 1 yielded a number of findings relevant to the issues it was

intended to address. The rule-assessment method proved applicable to all
three tasks; the behavior of almost 90% of children aged 5 years and older
could be characterized in terms of the rule models. This allowed specification of the within-concept developmental sequence on each of the three tasks.
In all cases, the dominant trend from ages 3 to 5 was a movement from use
of no apparent rule to use of Rule I. Thereafter, the trends diverged. On the
balance scale and shadows tasks, performance changed gradually to Rules
II and III; even by college age, only a minority of the children adopted Rule
IV. By contrast, on the probability task there was a much more abrupt
change from Rule I to Rule IV, and there was little evidence of use of the
intermediate rules at any age.
Perhaps the most striking finding of the experiment, however, concerned
the effects of examining the developmental sequence across tasks at different
TABLE 5
BETWEEN-CONCEPT SEQUENCE ON THREE PROPORTIONALITY
TASKSEXPERIMENT 1

No Rule

Rule I

Rule II

Rule III Rule IV

Balance Scale
Probability:
No rule. . .
Rule I
Rule I I . . .
Rule I I I . .
Rule IV...

27
1

18
14
1

2
1

5
2

1
8

8
20

3
6

4
8

8
27

Probability
Shadows:
No rule .. .
Rule I . . . .
Rule I I . . .
Rule I I I . .
Rule IV...

29

19

11

Balance Scale

Combined over both occasions.

28

7
26

1
7
4

to
UlOO-

23
4
1
1

3
8

Shadows:
No rule. . .
Rule I
...
Rule I I . . .
Rule I I I . .
Rule I V . . .

ROBERT S. SIEGLER
levels of competence. In terms of initial and intermediate knowledge states,
performance was more advanced on the balance scale and shadows tasks
than on the probability task; in terms of later competence, the ordering was
exactly reversed. There was considerable similarity in reasoning across the
three tasks at early ages, but much less at later ages.
Two methodological complications prevented complete confidence in
these conclusions, however. One involved the nonstandard problem types
that were used on the probability task. Because of the atypical hypothesized
Rule III, somewhat atypical types of problems were used to assess knowledge
on the probability task. It is possible that some unspecified intermediate
strategy that was insufficient to consistently solve the balance scale and
shadows problems might have solved these types of problems. This seemed
especially plausible given our relative lack of knowledge about the nature of
the Rule III "muddle through" strategy (cf. Klahr & Siegler 1978).
The other possible difficulty concerned the particular items that were
used on each task. The items used in experiment 1 were generated separately
and arbitrarily for each task in order to demonstrate that the utility of the
rule-assessment method did not depend on any particular set of item values.
While this strategy was useful in demonstrating generality, it left open the
possibility of an item X strategy interaction in which the particular items
chosen on one task might have been easier for children using fairly sophisticated strategies but as or more difficult for children using simple ones than
items chosen on the other tasks. For example, if differences on the dominant
and subordinate dimensions of an item almost canceled out, this might produce difficulty for children attempting to use Rule III but not for those
using Rule I (who would only attend to the dominant dimension values in
any case).
Fortunately, both of these potential difficulties were easily remediable.
The same six problem types could be generated for the probability task as
for the balance scale and shadows tasks; very few children seemed to use the
subtraction rule on the probability task in any case. Beyond this, it was possible to create parallel individual items on the three tasks. The first step was
to consider each of the problems in terms of the ratio comparisons that would
lead to solution:
JV desired-color marblesi
Probability:

N undesired-color marblesi

Shadows:

N desired-color marbles2
R

R
Distance from light sourcei
Weight!

Balance:

N undesired-color marbles2

Distance from light source2

R
Distance2

Distancei
29

MONOGRAPHS

Considered within the context of the dominant/subordinate dimension distinction, these formulas allowed direct translation of values of items on one
task into values of items on the others. For example, a confiict-equal problem
on the probability task might involve four desired- and two undesired-color
marbles in pile 1 and two desired- and one undesired-color marbles in pile 2.
The values on the dominant dimension would be four and two, while those
on the subordinate dimension would be two and one. The parallel item on
the shadows task would have a bar of span four placed two units from the
light source and a bar of span two placed one unit from the light. Similarly,
the parallel balance scale problem would have four weights placed one peg
from the fulcrum on one side and two weights two units from the fulcrum
on the other. Such matching was possible for all items on all tasks.
In experiment 2 as in experiment 1, then, children were presented the
balance scale, shadows, and probability tasks. The goals were to replicate
the previous findings and to rule out the possibility that they were due either
to differences in the problem types or to differences in the individual item
values on the three tasks.
EXPERIMENT 2
Method

Participants.Children were chosen from the same grades as in the

previous experiment. Because the investigation was conducted at the end of
the school year rather than the beginning, however, the 10 children in each
grade were on the average half a year older than those in experiment 1.
Thus, there were 3-4-year-olds (CA = 48 months, SD = 4.60), 4-5-yearolds (CA = 61 months, SD = 4.01), 5-6-year-olds (CA = 73 months, SD
= 2.32), 8-9-year-olds (CA = 107 months, SD = 1.73), 12-13-year-olds
(CA = 157 months, SD = 4.86), and college students (CA = 235 months,
SD = 7.66). The 3-13-year-olds were chosen randomly, within grade, from
among the students at a local private school. College students were subject
pool members at Carnegie-Mellon University. The experimenter was the
same research assistant as in experiment 1.
Assessment instruments and procedure.All tests involved 24 items, four

items of each of six problem types: equal, dominant, subordinate, conflictdominant, confiict-subordinate, and confiict-equal. As described above, the
values of individual items were also matched; an arbitrary decision was made
to use the experiment 1 balance scale values as the standard ones, and the
new shadows and probability test items were derived froni them. In all other
respects, the procedure was the same as that used in experiment 1.

30

ROBERT S. SIEGLER
Results
Fit of the Rule Models

Children's performance was again clearly describable in terms of the rule

models. As shown in table 6, 80% of the 5-6-year-olds, 93% of the 8-9-yearolds, 97% of the 12-13-year-olds, and 100% of the college students behaved
in a rule-governed fashion. The pattern held over all three tasks: on the
balance scale task, 100% of subjects aged 5 years to college age adhered to
a rule; on the shadows task, 95% of subjects did; and on the probability task,
83% did. There was again fairly high agreement between predictions and
explanations measures: 82% of the protocols on the balance scale task, 75%
on the shadows task, and 80% on the probability task received the same rule
classification by predictions and explanations measures. Thus, as in experiTABLE 6
RULE USAGE ON PARALLEL PROBLEMSEXPERIMENT 2

Task

No Rule

Rule I

Rule II

Rule III Rule IV

3-4-Year-Olds
Balance scale
Shadows
Probability

6
4
8

4
6
2
4-5-Year-Olds

Balance scale
Shadows
Probability

4
2
8

6
8
2
5-6-Year-Olds

Balance scale. . .
Shadows
Probability

1
5

10
7
5

2
8-9-Year-Olds

Balance scale. . .
Shadows
Probability

5
3
6

2
5
1

3
2

12-13-Year-Olds
Balance scale. . . ,
Shadows
Probability

3
5

6
3
2

1
1
8

5
7
1

4
2
8

Adults
Balance scale. . . .
Shadows
Probability

1
1
1

31

MONOGRAPHS

ment 1, the rule models seemed to characterize accurately children's response patterns across a broad age span and across all three problems.
Developmental Sequence within Concepts

The developmental sequence within each of the three problems was also
quite similar to that observed in experiment 1 (table 6). On the balance scale
task, children progressed from some use of Rule I at age 3-4 to unanimous
use of Rule I by age 5-6. Thereafter, children increasingly adopted Rules II
and III, with 40% of college students adopting Rule IV. The progression
was very similar on the projection of shadows task; again, between ages 3-4
and 5-6 there was a shift from some use to consistent use of Rule I, and at
older ages there was a shift first to Rule II and then to Rule III. The probability task sequence again differed, and in much the same way as in experiment 1. Children acquired Rule I at later ages than on the other tasks and
shifted away from it at later ages also. When they did, however, they progressed rapidly to Rule IV; 80% of 12-13-year-olds and 80% of college
students used this most advanced rule on the probability task.
Deveiopmentol Sequence between Concepts

The developmental sequence across the three problems also replicated

that found in experiment 1. In terms of initial understanding, children were
more advanced on the balance scale and shadows tasks than on the probability task; in terms of intermediate understanding, the ordering was the same;
but in terms of advanced understanding, it was exactly reversed. A similar
pattern emerged when the results were considered in terms of age trends.
Children 9 years and younger were much more advanced on the balance
scale and shadows tasks than on the probability task, but the opposite was
the case with the early adolescents and with the college students. Once again,
there was greater similarity in reasoning among younger than older children;
among the three younger groups there was agreement on 59% of the rule
classifications across the pairs of tasks, while among the three older groups
there was agreement on only 32%, x^(l) = 12.90, p < .01.
Discussion

The results of this experiment demonstrated that neither differences in

the problem types nor differences in the individual items accounted for the
divergent developmental paths on the three tasks. In terms of the frequency
of rule usage, the sequence of rules leading to adult understanding, and the
developmental ordering of knowledge states across tasks, the results were
closely comparable to those of experiment 1. Thus, the findings reemphasized
the importance of considering particular levels of understanding in comparing developmental progressions.
Taken together, the results of experiments 1 and 2 provided considerable
32

ROBERT S. SIEGLER
evidence of the rule-assessment approach's usefulness for studying developmental sequences. It was found that the approach could be used to study
children's knowledge on all three problems over a very wide age range. The
hypothesized within-concept sequences proved to characterize accurately
children's performance on the balance scale and shadows tasks but not on the
probability task. Knowledge appeared to be neither totally disorganized nor
organized in a lockstep stagelike fashion; there was considerable homogeneity
of performance across the three tasks at early ages, but much less in later
childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. Finally, it appeared that the developmental sequence across the three concepts depended heavily on what
standards of understanding were adopted. If understanding was defined as
appreciation of the role of both variables, then the balance scale and shadows tasks would be said to be understood first; but if it was defined as ability
to solve problems consistently, then the probability task would be said to be
understood earlier than the others.
EXPERIMENT 3
In experiment 3, three concrete operational concepts were examined:
conservation of liquid quantity, conservation of solid quantity, and conservation of number. As in the earlier experiments, the primary goals were to
establish the sequence of understandings leading to mastery of each concept
and to establish the order in which these understandings were achieved
across the different concepts.
Since the publication of Piaget's (1952) pioneering work, an enormous
amount of research has been done to determine how and when children
master conservation problems; conservatively, well over 200 studies have
been published. These studies have been concentrated in two areas. The
largest concentration is in training studies, intended to determine whether
and under what conditions young children can learn conservation skills.
These investigations consistently have indicated that it is possible to teach
4- and 5-year-olds such skills and that an incredibly diverse array of training
procedures can be effective (for reviews of this literature, see Beilin [1971,
1977] and Brainerd & Allen [1971]).
The second largest concentration is in normative investigations, seeking
to determine when children first understand conservation. Findings here are
much less consistent, as the case of conservation of number illustrates. In his
initial work, Piaget (1952) reported that children did not understand number
conservation until they were 6 or 7. Since then, a number of researchers have
claimed that children understand the concept at much younger ages, as
young as 2 or 3 (Bever, Mehler, & Epstein 1968; Bryant 1972, 1974; Gelman
1972; Mehler & Bever 1967). Other investigators have challenged this
claim, however, and have tended to adopt age norms similar to Piaget's
33

MONOGRAPHS

original ones (Beilin 1968; Katz & Beilin 1976; Miller 1976; Rothenberg &
Courtney 1969; Siegel & Goldstein 1969). The studies differ along so many
dimensions (number of objects in the array, relatedness of objects in the
array, type of response required to demonstrate mastery, pretraining procedures, etc.) that it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions.
Even more striking than this lack of agreement about age norms, however, is the almost total absence of information available about the withinconcept developmental sequence. Our only source of information about
initial and intermediate competence is the verbal explanation data provided
by the Genevans and by a few early replication studies (e.g., Dodwell 1961,
1962; Feigenbaum 1963; Hood 1962). As discussed earlier, numerous welltaken criticisms have been made of these investigators' reliance on verbal
justificationsunreliability, infiated likelihood of type II error, underestimation of young children's knowledgebut no proposals of substitute methods
for obtaining this type of qualitative information have been forthcoming.
The result has been a move away from studying within-concept sequences.
Given the extent of current uncertainty over age norms and the withinconcept developmental sequence, it seemed that a fresh analysis of the conservation concept itself might be in order. In particular, it seemed worthwhile to inquire into what features conservation problems have in common,
how conservation problems differ from other Piagetian problems, and what
an understanding of conservation might imply.
One feature that all conservation problems share is a common procedural framework. Each can be thought of as having three phases. In the first,
children are presented two or more identical objects or sets of objectstwo
identical rows of checkers, two identical glasses of water, two identical clay
cylinders, etc.and are asked to agree that the objects are equal on some
dimension, such as number or quantity. Once they agree, the second phase
begins. Here, one of the objects or sets of objects is transformed in some way
that changes its appearance but does not affect the dimension of interest
the row is lengthened, the water is poured into a differently shaped glass, the
cylinder is remolded, etc. Finally, in the third phase, children are asked
whether the dimension of interest, which they earlier had said was equal for
the two choices, remains equal following the transformation.
Nonconservers almost always answer "no." This can be interpreted
within the dominant/subordinate dimension framework. Conservation tasks
generally have two relevant perceptual dimensions, one dominant and one
subordinate. For example, on the number conservation problem, the dimensions are length of the row and density of the objects within the row; on the
liquid conservation problem, they are height and cross-sectional area of the
liquid; on the solid quantity problem, they are length and cross-sectional
area of the clay cylinder. Reliance on either of these perceptual dimensions
alone will lead to incorrect answers because, while values on them are un34

ROBERT S. SIEGLER

equal for the two alternatives, the correct answer is that the two alternatives
have "the same" amount. Thus, differences between conservers and nonconservers are highlighted.
Another commonality among conservation problems resides in the
developmental progression that Piaget (e.g., Piaget 1957) postulated. In
Stage I, children are said to base conservation judgments exclusively on a
single perceptual dimension. They usually focus on the height of the liquid
column or the length of the row of objects or clay cylinder, but late in the
stage may shift to reliance on the opposite dimensionthe width of the
liquid column or clay cylinder or density of objects within the row. In Stage
II, they are said to consider the second dimension when values on the first
are equal or almost equal, but to vacillate when one choice is clearly greater
on one dimension and the other choice clearly greater on the other. Finally,
in Stage III, they are said to shift their mode of responding; rather than
relying on the height and width, the length and width, or the length and
density, they focus on the type of transformation. Thus, they come to realize
that, even though pouring, reshaping, and moving objects may alter their
appearances, they do not affect quantity or number.
This hypothesized stage progression is very similar to the progression
described earlier on the proportionality problems. Rules and problem types
can be formulated that also closely parallel the ones used previously. In Rule
I, children concentrate on the dominant dimension; in Rule II, they also
consider the subordinate dimension when values on the dominant one are
equal; in Rule III, they always consider both dimensions but do not know
how to resolve conflicts between them; and in Rule IV they solve all problems. Also as previously, six problem types can be presented to indicate what
rules children are using (fig. 8): equal problems, with values on both dimensions equal; dominant problems, with values on the dominant dimension
unequal and values on the subordinate dimension equal; subordinate problems, with the reverse arrangement; and the three types of conflict problems.
These are the similarities. There are also some crucial differences,
particularly regarding the Rule IV strategies. These differences stem from
the special status of transformations in conservation problems.
Recall that, on the three proportionality problems. Rule IV involved
algebraically combining the values of the relevant dimensions; on the balance scale problem, it involved combining weight and distance; on the
shadows problem, it involved combining the span of the bar and the distance
from the light source; on the probability problem, it involved combining the
number of desired- and undesired-color marbles. It is possible to imagine
children solving conservation problems by similar means. For example, on
the conservation of liquid quantity problem, they could multiply the height
and cross-sectional area of each beaker of water and compare the products
35

MONOGRAPHS

Probtem type
Initial
Configuration
oo

Operation

Finai
Configuration

Bacic
and forth

OOOO

O O oo

Add or
subtract

ooooo

oo oo

Add or
subtract

ooo

ConfictDominant

oo oo

Add or
subtract

ooo

ConfiictSubordinate

oo oo

Add or
subtract

OOCXX)

ConfiictEquai

oo oo

Lengthen
or shorten

Equai

Dominant

Subordinate

OO

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100 100

100

100

100

33

100

aa

inn

33

100

100

FIGURE 8.Predictions of percentage of correct answers and error patterns for children using Rules I-IV on number conservation task. (Note: For dominant, subordinate,
confiict-dominant, and conflict-subordinate problems, either addition or subtraction could
be performed. In the actual problem set, two addition and two subtraction items were
used on each problem type. The operation used in each exzimple is underlined. The pile
of coins from which coins were added is not shown in the illustration.)

(cf. Anderson & Cuneo 1978). There are strong reasons for doubting, however, whether they actually proceed in this fashion.
One reason for doubt is suggested by a thought experiment. Imagine
that two glasses had the same amount of water and that the contents of one
were poured into a differently shaped container. You do not need to know
anything about the particular heights and cross-sectional areas of the liquids
to know that the quantities would remain the same. Thus, information about
physical dimensions is not necessary for solving conservation problems.
An empirical experiment was conducted to determine whether information about the physical dimensions was sufficient to solve such problems. A
group of college students was presented the end states of the conservation
problems that 3-9-year-olds would later be presented in experiment 3. That
is, they were shown two glasses of water, two clay cylinders, or two rows of
coins as they would appear after the conservation transformations were performed. They were not told about initial equalities or inequalities and were
not shown any transformation. The task was to answer the usual conservation question: Do the two alternatives have the same amount or does one of
them have more?
Not surprisingly, the 12 subjects were invariably correct on the number
problems; here they could simply count the number of objects in each row.
36

ROBERT S. SIEGLER

On the liquid and solid quantity problems, however, the situation was very
different. The adults were correct on only 60% of solid quantity conflict
problems and 6 1 % of liquid quantity confiict problems. The situation was
even more dramatic when just the traditional conservation problems were
considered (the bottom row of fig. 8the conflict-equal problems); here, the
adults were correct on only 46% of the solid quantity and 54% of the liquid
quantity problems. Using the standard criterion for conservation mastery of
three of four correct answers (75%), only one of 12 adults would have been
said to be a conserver of solid quantity, two of 12 of liquid quantity.
Taken together, the thought experiment and the empirical experiment
indicate that information about the physical dimensions of conservation
problems is neither necessary nor sufficient for conservation mastery. By contrast, information about the type of transformation (in conjunction with
information about the initial equality or inequality relationship) is clearly
sufficient and may often be necessary for successful solutions.
When one thinks of conservation in terms of transformations, a surprising asymmetry in conservation research becomes evident. Transformations can be divided into two general categories: those that affect quantity
and those that do not. Piaget's attention and that of almost all subsequent
conservation researchers has focused exclusively on transformations that do
not affect quantitypouring water, molding clay, moving objects apart, and
so on. It would seem, however, that transformations that do affect quantity
addition and subtractionare of at least equal importance. A conserver
should understand not only that simply spreading out a row of coins leaves
the number unchanged, but also that spreading the row and adding a coin
means that the row now has more coins than before and that spreading the
row and taking away a coin means that it now has less. At present, we have
no idea whether children classified as "conservers" do in fact understand the
effects of such transformations or whether they acquire such understanding
before, after, or concurrently with the traditionally studied transformation.'^
Thus, learning about children's knowledge of quantity-relevant transformations was a major objective in experiment 3.
Method

Participants.The experiment included 12 children at each of seven

ages: 3-year-olds (CA = 43 months, SD = 2.98), 4-year-olds (CA = 55
^ Some research on children's knowledge of addition and subtraction has been conducted in nonconservation contexts; two examples are Brush (1969) and Smedslund
(1966). These studies showed that, when there are no distracting cues, quite young children
understand many ofthe effects of addition and subtraction; they are similar in this way to
Bruner's (1964) demonstration that very young children understand the effects of .simply
pouring water when there are no distracting cues. The present study differed in assessing
children's understanding of the effects of addition and subtraction in the presence of conflicting perceptual cues, the typical conservation context.

37

MONOGRAPHS

months, SD = 2.21), 5-year-olds (CA = 64 months, SD = 3.50), 6-yearolds (CA = 76 months, SD = 2.90), 7-year-olds (CA = 91 months, SD =
2.42), 8-year-olds (CA = 101 months, SD = 3.17), and 9-year-olds (CA =
113 months, SD = 3.36). The three youngest groups were from a university
preschool; the four older groups were from a middle-class urban public
school. In all age groups, one-half of the subjects were male and one-half
were female. The experimenter was a 22-year-old female research assistant.
Tasks and materials.The tasks and materials used in the present experiment were similar to the traditional Piagetian ones, but not identical with
them. On the conservation of number problem (fig. 8), children were initially
shown two identical rows of dimes and asked if they agreed that the two
rows were equally numerous. Once they did, one of the rows was transformed; this involved lengthening the row, shortening it, or leaving it the
same length, and also involved adding one or two coins (from a pile of coins
on the side), subtracting one or two coins, or leaving the number of coins in
the row unchanged. For example, on one conservation of number problem,
a row of coins was expanded from 5 to 7 inches while the number of coins
in the row was reduced from five to three.
After viewing the transformation, children were asked, "Does this new
row of coins have the same number of coins as this old row [pointing], or
does one of them have more coins?" or the same question in the inverse order.
Each child heard each version on one-half of the trials for each problem
type. If the child answered that one row had more, the experimenter asked
him or her to point to the one with more. Each row had no less than three
and no more than seven coins both before and after the transformations.
The solid quantity conservation task was designed to be similar. Children were initially shown two clay cylinders and asked if they agreed that
the two had the same amount of clay. Once they did, one cylinder was remolded, which involved making it longer, shorter, or leaving it the same
length, and which also involved adding some clay (from a pile of clay on the
side), taking some away, or neither adding nor removing any. Each of the
24 items on the number conservation test had a parallel item on the solid
quantity conservation test (matched for values on the dominant dimension
and the type of transformation). For example, on the item corresponding to
the number conservation problem described above, a clay cylinder was
lengthened from 5 inches to 7 inches, while some of its clay was removed.
After viewing the transformation, children were asked, "Does this new
piece of clay have the same amount of clay as this old piece [pointing], or
does one of them have more?" or the inverse question. Again, if children
answered that one had more, they were asked to point to that one.
On the liquid quantity task, children were initially shown two identical
glasses filled with identical amounts of water and one empty glass which
could be either taller and thinner, shorter and wider, or identical with the
38

ROBERT S. SIEGLER
others. After agreeing that the two glasses had the same amount of water,
children witnessed either all of the water being poured from one filled glass
to the previously empty one, all of the water from one glass and some more
from a beaker of water on the side being poured into the previously empty
glass, or only some of the water from one glass being poured into the glass
that had been empty. This resulted in a situation in which the previously
empty glass had either a taller liquid column, a shorter liquid column, or one
of equal height to the untouched comparison glass, and in which it had more
water, less water, or the same amount. Again, each of the 24 items had
counterparts on the other two conservation tasks. On our exemplar problem,
only some of the water would be poured from the first filled glass to the previously empty one, but the liquid column would rise from 5 to 7 inches in
height.
Following the transformation, children were asked, "Does this new glass
of water have the same amount of water as the old glass [pointing], or does
one of them have more?" or the inverse question. The latter response drew
the usual request to point to the one with more.
Problem types.As in experiments 1 and 2, there were six types of problems: equal, dominant, subordinate, conflict-dominant, conflict-subordinate,
and conflict-equal. The classification of problems was based on their perceptual appearance following the transformation. Thus, a subordinate
problem on the number conservation task would be one where, after the
transformation, the two rows of coins were equally long but the coins in one
were more densely distributed.
In addition to the final perceptual appearances, however, the items also
differed in what type of transformation had been performed to produce the
appearance. Examination of figure 8 reveals the combinations of perceptual
and quantitative transformations that were used. As can be seen, one-third
of the items on the test involved addition to the manipulated row, one-third
involved subtraction from it, and one-third did not involve any quantitatively
relevant transformation. One-third involved increasing the value on the
dominant dimension, one-third involved decreasing it, and one-third involved leaving the value on the dimension unchanged. Symmetrically, onethird of the items involved increasing the value of the subordinate dimension,
one-third involved decreasing it, and one-third involved leaving the subordinate dimension value unchanged.
Assessment instruments.The assessment instruments closely resembled the
ones used in the previous experiments. There were 24 items, four each of the
usual six problem types. The items within each test were ordered by means
oi a stratified random sampling procedure so that one item of each type was
included in the first six, one in the next six, and so on. Each test took approximately 20 min to administer.
Procedure.^AU aspects of the procedure except the instructions were
39

MONOGRAPHS

identical with those that children received in the prior experiments. The
instructions were as follows (for the solid quantity task):
Hello. Today we are going to play a game with this clay. First, I'll start
with these two clay sausages that have the same amount of clay in
them. Then, I'll do something to one of them that may or may not
change the amount of clay. Your job is to tell me whether it has the
same or a different amount of clay as before.
Now, there are three things that I can do with the clay. I can add
some more clay to it and change its shape; I can take some clay away
from it and change its shape; or I can just change its shape and not add
any clay or take any away. Now watch what I do. These two pieces of
clay have the same amount of clay in them, right? I am going to (add
some clay and change the shape) (take away some clay and change the
shape) (change the shape of the clay). Now, does this new piece of clay
have the same amount of clay as this old one, or does one of them have
more clay? (If necessary, "Point to the piece that has more.")
On the solid quantity and number conservation tasks, the experimenter
worked with the piece of clay or row of coins closer to the child on one-half
of the items and with the one that was further away on the other half (counterbalanced within problem types); on the liquid quantity task, the experimenter always poured water from the filled glass next to the empty one. As in
experiments 1 and 2, the tasks were presented on 3 consecutive school days
and children performed them in counterbalanced order.
Results
Fit of the Rule Models

The large majority of children aged 4 years and older behaved in a rulegoverned fashion on the three conservation tasks: 89% of the 4-year-olds'
protocols, 89% of the 5-year-olds', 97% of the 6-year-olds', 94% of the 7year-olds', 92% of the 8-year-olds', and 92% of the 9-year-olds' met the
standards for using a rule. The pattern was consistent across all three conservation tasks: 86% of the 4-9-year-olds performed in a rule-governed
fashion on the liquid quantity task, 94% on the solid quantity task, and 94%
on the number task. These results were closely comparable to those obtained
in experiments 1 and 2.
It also proved possible to classify many of the 3-year-olds' protocols
within the rule-assessment framework. Twelve of the 36 protocols on the
three tasks could be classified as either Rule I (six protocols) or Rule I'
(six protocols). As mentioned above. Rule I' was identical with Rule I
except that, when values on the dominant dimension were equal, the child
would guess one choice or the other rather than say "same."*
* The criteria for saying that a child used Rule I' were at least 13 of 16 answers in
accord with the dominant dimension values on the items where the dominant dimension

ROBERT S. SIEGLER

The explanations data provided an interesting additional confirmation

of a feature of the rule models, the Rule IV emphasis on transformations.
In the standard conservation testing situation, where there is only one type
of transformation to observe, children are typically said to explain their
reasoning in terms of such factors as reversibility ("You could pour the water
hack and have the same amount"), compensation ("The water is taller but
it's thinner"), or identity ("It's the same water as before"). By contrast, in
the present experiment, where three different types of transformations were
observed, every child who used Rule IV on the liquid quantity and solid
quantity tasks justified his reasoning solely in terms of transformations; not
one of them referred to reversibility, compensation, or identity. In the
standard situation, the transformational explanation ("You just poured the
water so it's the same as before") may seem insufficient to children, and they
may therefore justify their reasoning on other grounds. However, in the
present situation, where a variety of transformations were performed and
could be contrasted, children cited only the type of transformation and its
link to the amount of material.
Developmental Sequence within Concepts

Conservation of liquid quantity.^The developmental sequence on the conservation of liquid quantity task can be characterized quite simply (table
7A). One-third of the 3-year-olds used Rule I or I'; the others did not use
any easily discernible rule, though the regression analysis revealed that their
performance tended toward Rule I, R^ = .59, F(l,22) = 31.20. Four-, 5-,
and 6-year-olds relied heavily on Rule I. Thereafter, use of Rule I declined
and use of Rule IV increased; by age 9, two-thirds of the children were
using Rule IV.
The most striking feature of this sequence was the absence of evidence
for transition rules between Rule I and Rule IV. Among 4-9-year-olds, 56%
used Rule I, 28% used Rule IV, 13% could not be classified, and only 3 %
(two children) used Rules II or III. This seemed quite surprising in light of
the above-cited Piagetian account. One possible explanation was that some
children who were classified as using Rule I, Rule IV, or no rule were in
fact using transitional strategies, but that the rule-assessment method was not
detecting them. Each of the strategies suggested by Piaget (1957), as well as
several other plausible alternatives, was therefore considered from this
perspective.
First to be examined was the possibility that children switched at some
point from sole reliance on height to sole reliance on width. Each approach
would be classified as a Rule I (unidimensional) strategy, but the latter
values were unequal, and no more than one of eight "same" responses on problems where
the dominant dimension values were equal.

41

MONOGRAPHS

might be thought of as constituting a transition rule since it focused on a new

dimension. Both predictions and explanations data indicated, however, that
every one of the 43 children who used Rule I or I' relied on height.
Another possibility was that some children who were described as using
Rule I were in fact moving toward an understanding of the importance of
cross-sectional area. Performance on subordinate problems seemed particularly useful for examining this possibility. Recall that, on these problems, the
liquid columns were of identical heights but different widths; if children
were ever going to consider width, this would seem to be the most propitious occasion. In fact, among the 43 children classified as using Rule I or
I', the percentage of correct answers on such problems was only 3. Thus,
there was no evidence that children classified as using Rule I were in fact
transitional.
What of the 20 children using Rule IV? These children could solve as
few as 83% ofthe problems and still be classified as using the most advanced
rule; such a percentage might suggest that there were still some aspects ofthe
task that they did not understand. In fact, the Rule IV children solved 95%
TABLE 7
RULE USAGE ON THREE CONSERVATION TASKSEXPERIMENT 3

Age
(in Years)

No Rule

Rule I

Rule I'

Rule II Rule III Rule III' Rule IV

A. Conservation of Liquid Quantity

3

4
5. . .
6

2
2

2
1
3

8. . . .
9

1
9
9
11
5
5
1

1
1

..[

'..'.

1
1
4
6
8

1
1
5
5
8

B. Conservation of Solid Quantity

3.
4

5
6

5
1
1

8
9

4
10
10
11
4
4
3

3
1

'.'.'.

'.'.'.

"i

1
C. Conservation of Number

3
4.
5
6.. .
7
8
9

8
1
2
1

1
2
1

...

1
3
1

2
5
5

1
4
4
6
11
12
12

ROBERT S. SIEGLER
of the problems. Their errors were not concentrated on any particular items.
All of them gave Rule IV explanations. Therefore, these children's knowledge also did not seem to be transitional.
This left the 10 children who did not use any apparent rule on the liquid
quantity task. Four of the children were 4- and 5-year-olds; they tended to
give Rule I level explanations, and their predictions most often missed falling
within the Rule I category by only one or two responses. The six older children tended to give Rule IV level explanations, but their predictive performance fell from one to four responses short of meeting the Rule IV criterion. For example, one 7-year-old said, "If you pour all of the water, there
is the same amount. If you pour some and some is left, that's how I know
there's less in the new glass. If you pour all of one and some of another, the
new glass has more." Yet, in her predictions, this same child answered incorrectly on two of the four subordinate problems, one of the four conflictdominant problems, three of the four confiict-subordinate problems, and
one of the four confiict-equal problems.
This pattern of good explanations and less good predictions characterized four of the six older children. Only two of them gave explanations that
seemed truly transitional; one indicated that "if one glass was skinny and
the other fat, there was the same amount of water in both," while the other
indicated that pouring all of the water meant there was the same amount as
before, but also said that the tall skinny glass always had more.
Conservation of solid quantity.The developmental sequence on the solid
quantity task was almost identical with that on the liquid quantity task.
Among the 3-year-olds, half used Rule I or Rule V; the others tended toward
Rule r , /?2 = ,26, F(l,22) = 7.55. The large majority of 4-, 5-, and 6-yearolds used Rule I. Seven-, 8-, and 9-year-olds moved away from Rule I and
toward Rule IV (table 7B). As on the liquid quantity task, the trend was not
complete even by age 9; only two-thirds of the 9-year-olds used Rule IV.
Most striking again, though, was the very limited use of transition rules.
Among 4-9-year-olds, 58% used Rule I, 28% used Rule IV, 8% used a
transition rule, and 6% used no apparent rule. All 50 children using Rule I
relied on the lengths of the clay cylinders. Their percentage of correct
answers on the subordinate problems was only 4. All but seven of them gave
Rule I or I' explanations. The 20 children using Rule IV solved almost all
problems that were presented (95%). All of them explained their reasoning
in terms of transformations. Thus, on conservation of solid quantity as on
conservation of liquid quantity, it appeared that children move very quickly
from reliance on the dominant perceptual dimension to reliance on the type
of transformation.
Conservation of number.The developmental sequence on the number conservation task bore little resemblance to those observed on the other two
conservation problems or to those observed on the three proportionality
43

MONOGRAPHS

problems (table 7C). Two-thirds of the 3-year-olds could not be classified as

using any rule, though there was a strong tendency among these children
toward Rule I', R" = .64, F(l,22) = 38.45. A few 4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds
used the typical Rule I, but more used either Rule IV or Rule I I I ' (a type
of transitional rule that will be described below). Finally, almost all 7-, 8-,
and 9-year-olds used Rule IV.
Rule I I I ' was of considerable interest because it represented a transition
in the mode as well as the complexity of reasoning. Whereas Rule I children
based judgments solely on the lengths of the rows and Rule IV children
based them on the type of transformation performed. Rule I I I ' children
appeared to do some of each, depending on the situation. If anything was
added to one of the rows, they would say that that row had more objects
regardless of whether it was longer, shorter, or the same length as the other
row. Similarly, if anything was subtracted from a row, that row would be
said to have fewer objects regardless of its length. If nothing was added or
subtracted, however, the mode of responding was different; the child would
choose solely on the basis of relative length, always saying that the longer
row had more.
To be said to be using Rule III', a child needed to meet three criteria:
at least 16 of 20 correct responses on the five problem types where the rule
led to correct responses, no more than one of four correct responses on the
confiict-equal items where it led to incorrect responses, and at least 20 of the
total 24 responses in accord with the rule. Twelve children met this criterion
two 4-year-olds, five 5-year-olds, and five 6-year-olds. These children's
percentage of correct answers on the five problem types solvable by Rule III'
ranged from 83 to 100; their percentage correct on the sixth was 14.
The discovery of Rule I I I ' on the number conservation task prompted
a reexamination of the data on the liquid quantity and solid quantity tasks
to see if any children had used it on them. It turned out that very few had;
one child could be classified as using the rule on the liquid quantity task and
two on the solid quantity task. Another possibility suggested by Rule III'
was that there might be some tendency toward earlier mastery of the addition and subtraction transformations on these tasks that was not being
picked up in the rule analyses. Therefore, 3 (type of transformation: addition, subtraction, or neither) X 6 (age: 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 years old) analyses
of variance were performed for each of the three tasks. On the number task,
significant effects were found for type of transformation, F(2,132) = 8.04;
age, F(5,66) = 16.03; and the age X transformation interaction, F(10,132)
= 3.48. Newman-Keuls tests revealed that the interaction was due to 5- and
6-year-olds performing significantly better on addition and subtraction transformations than on no addition/no subtraction problems. By contrast, the
parallel analyses of variance for the conservation of liquid and solid quantity
tasks revealed no significant main effects for the type of transformation and
44

ROBERT S. SIEGLER

no significant age X transformation interactions; only the age effects were

significant. Thus, it appeared that addition and subtraction transformations
are mastered earlier on number conservation but not on conservation of
liquid or solid quantity.*
Developmental Sequence between Concepts

Table 7 also illustrates the developmental sequence across the three

conservation tasks. At least after age 4, performance on the number task
was always more advanced than performance on the other two problems.
The same 46-year-olds who consistently used Rule I on the liquid and solid
quantity tasks used Rules III' and IV on the number task. While essentially
all 7-9-year-olds used Rule IV on the number task, many children were
slower in applying the rule to liquid and solid quantity. In all, 64% of the
4-9-year-olds performed at a higher level on number than on solid quantity
versus only 4% doing the reverse; the comparable figures for number and
liquid quantity were 64% versus 3%. A similar pattern was found within
every age group.
In contrast, there was a very close relationship between performance on
conservation of liquid and solid quantity. More than 70% of children used
the same rule on both tasks, with no trend toward either of them being easier
among the remaining children. The correlation between the number of correct answers on the two tasks was quite high (r = .83). In addition, the few
children who used rules very uncommon for their age group tended to do so
in both situations. For example, only one 5-year-old used Rule IV on the
liquid quantity task, and only one 5-year-old used Rule IV on the solid
quantity task; it was the same child. Only one 6-year-old used Rule IV on
' Several alternative interpretations of the data were considered before drawing this
conclusion. One alternative was that these children failed on the conflict-equal problems
simply because they did not like to answer "same." However, the fact that the Rule III'
children correctly answered 98% of equal problems, also requiring a "same" response,
argued against this view. Another possibility was that the Rule H I ' children might be
responding through a perceptual estimation process rather than through knowledge of
transformations. Here, however, internal analyses of the data revealed that children using
Rule III' were no more successful on dominant and subordinate problems, problems
involving addition and subtraction where perceptual estimation would be extremely
easy, than on conflict-dominant and conflict-subordinate problems, where perceptual
estimation would be much more difficult (94% vs. 90% correct). Moreover, if the perceptual estimation interpretation were correct, one would expect a high negative correlation between the ratio of items in the more numerous to the less numerous row and the
number of errors made; the higher the ratio, the easier it would be to estimate which row
had more. In fact, partialUng out the effects of set size, the correlation was fairly low
for the 24 items, r(12.3) = .31. By contrast. Rule I I I ' produced a biserial correlation of
''(12.3) = .99 between whether an item was solvable by the rule and the number of
errors made on it (also partialUng out the effects of set size). Thus, the interpretation that
these children understood some but not all transformations seemed the most reasonable
one.

45

MONOGRAPHS

each task, and again it was the same child who did so. Only one 9-year-old
used Rule I on the solid quantity task; he also used it on the liquid quantity
task.
These findings raised a question: What might be responsible for such a
close relationship between performance on the liquid and solid quantity tasks
yet such a weak one between j^erformance on them and on the number conservation task? One possible explanation derived from the types of strategies
that could be used to solve each problem. On number conservation, there
are at least three workable strategies: a child could count the number of
objects in the two rows and compare the totals, could pair up individual
members of the rows and see if anything was left over, or could rely on the
type of transformation that had been performed. By contrast, only the last of
these alternatives, relying on the type of transformation, was available on
the liquid and solid quantity tasks.
Analyses of children's explanations revealed a clear relationship between what they said they did on the number task and their predictions and
explanations on the other two tasks. As shown in table 8, among children
who consistently solved number conservation problems, those who said they
counted or paired were most often classified at the Rule I level on the other
two tasks. By contrast, those who said they relied on the type of transformation most frequently performed at the Rule IV level on liquid and solid
quantity conservation. Thus, the greater variety of strategies that solve the
number conservation problem may explain why it is generally mastered
before liquid or solid quantity.
TABLE 8
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXPLANATIONS ON NUMBER CONSERVATION TASK AND PERFORMANCE ON LIQUID AND SOLID
QUANTITY CONSERVATION TASKS AMONG CHILDREN WHO
PREDICTED AT THE RULE IV LEVEL ON NUMBER CONSERVATION
NUMBER CONSERVATION
EXPLANATION

Counting Pairing
Liquid quantity predictions:
Rule 1
Rule II
Rule III
Rule IV
Solid quantity predictions:
Rule 1
Rule II
Rule III
Rule IV

46

Transformations

...
2

1
14

...
2

2
13

ROBERT S. SIEGLER

Discussion
Both rational task analyses and Piagetian theory suggested that a particular developmental sequence would be observed on each of the three conservation problems. Children would first focus on a single perceptual
dimension, then would consider the second dimension in limited cases, then
would always consider both dimensions but not know how to resolve conflicts between them, and finally would shift their basis of judgment to the
type of transformation performed. This model, while seemingly reasonable,
did not fit the data very well on any of the three tasks. The particular points
of difference between model and data called into question current theories
of conservation acquisition as well as their specific predictions concerning
the within- and between-concept developmental sequences.
One unanticipated finding was the lack of evidence of transition rules
on the liquid and solid quantity tasks. Results on both the predictions and
explanations measures indicated that more than 85% of the children used
Rule I or Rule IV on these problems. Internal analyses of the data failed to
yield any indication that these children were transitional. Most of the remaining 15% of subjects could not be classified as using any rule. Their performance most closely approximated Rule I or Rule IV. This latter group of
children could be said to be transitional in the sense of being in the process of
mastering the basic Rule I or Rule IV approach, but not in the sense of
using some distinct alternative rule.
Of course, it remained possible that many children might use the previously hypothesized transition rules at some time in their development, but
too briefiy to be easily detected in the present study. Arguing against this
interpretation, however, was the relatively dense sampling of age groups in
the experimentchildren of each age level from 3 to 9 years were systematically sampled, which meant that any widely used transition rule would
have had to come and go very quickly indeed not to be picked up in more
of the 84 children. While the possibility of such ephemeral transition rules
can never be totally excluded, at some point the burden of proof must shift
to those who believe in them.
The notion that children progress directly from Rule I to Rule IV
appears very strange at first impression, but perhaps it is less strange than it
seems. There is simply no need for children to develop increasingly sophisticated perceptual strategies, given that the ultimate solution to the problem
is transformational. Unlike the proportionality problems, where specific
quantitative information about both relevant dimensions is necessary to
solve the problems, such information is simply irrelevant to the solution of
conservation problems. We are used to thinking of within-concept developmental sequences in terms of the Piagetian framework of three or four discrete knowledge states on each concept, but there is really no obvious reason
why on a given concept there should not be 2 or 5 or 10.
47

MONOGRAPHS

The other main unanticipated finding in experiment 3 was the discovery

of Rule I i r on the number conservation task. Rule III' describes just the
type of transition that would be expected from a transformational perspective (if any transition rule was going to be present), for it incorjx)rates both
transformational and perceptual elements. If something is added to a row,
Rule III' children choose that row as having more regardless of whether it is
longer or shorter; if something is taken away, they invariably say it has less;
but if nothing is added or subtracted, the same children rely on the relative
lengths of the rows. Given the view that understanding of conservation is
based on an understanding of the transformations, it seems eminently
reasonable that a transitional rule might involve an understanding of some
but not all transformations.
By definition, children using Rule III' did not solve many conflict-equal
problems. If they solved any of them, however, they almost always solved a
particular one. The 12 children using Rule III' solved a total of seven conflict-equal problems; six of the solutions were of a single problem. The most
obvious diflerence between this item and the other three was in the numbers
involved; while the rarely solved items included five, six, and seven coins per
row, respectively, the frequently solved item included only three coins per
row.
This finding was consistent with several previous studies indicating that
children's understanding of small numbers is often more advanced than their
understanding of larger ones (Gelman 1972, 1978; Winer 1974, 1975;
Zimiles 1966). It also suggested an intriguing possibilitythat the same
child might shift back and forth between diflerent rules for performing
conservation tasks with small and large numbers. For example, a child
might always choose the longer row on large number problems, but might
rely on the type of transformation on small number ones. Klahr and Wallace
(1973, 1976) suggested exactly this possibility, but did not provide any evidence for whether it in fact occurred. The purpose of experiment 4 was to
obtain the relevant empirical data.
EXPERIMENT 4
Method
Participants.The children were 12 3-year-oIds (CA = 43 months, SD
= 3.42), 12 4-year-olds (CA = 56 months, SD = 2.49), and 12 5-year-olds
(CA = 68 months, SD = 2.08). All were from a middle-class day-care
center. The exjjerimenter was the same one who conducted experiment 3.
Task and materials.^The task and materials were very similar to those
used on the number conservation task in the previous experiment. There was
only one important diflerence, the number of objects in the rows. Where
previously intermediate-size sets were used, now parallel sets of small number
48

ROBERT S. SIEGLER
problems (two to four items) and large number problems (seven to nine
items) were constructed. Small and large number items were paired so that
each of the 24 items in the small number set had a "twin" in the large number set with exactly flve more items in each row, the same density of items
per unit of space, and the same transformation.
To illustrate, a small number item might initially have two rows of three
items, with each row spread over 3 inches; then one item would be added to
the top row and it would be contracted so that the four items would cover 2
inches. The corresponding large number item would initially have eight
items in each row spread over 8 inches; then one item would be added to the
top row and it would be contracted to 4.5 inches. Small plastic flowers, each
I inch in diameter, were used as the stimulus objects for both large and small
collections in this experiment.
Assessment instrument.Children were presented a total of 48 items. These
included 24 large number items and 24 small number ones. Within each
size set, there were four items of each of the six problem types. Small and
large number items were presented in alternating blocks of 12; other than
this, the individual items were ordered through stratified random sampling
as previously. The 48 items were presented over 2 consecutive days, one
large and one small number block (order counterbalanced within age and
sex) presented each day.
Results and Discussion

The primary purpose of experiment 4 was to illuminate the relationship

between performance on small and large number problems. Table 9 illustrates this relationship. As shown, more than 80% of the children used one
of four combinations of rules. One group, almost all 3-year-olds, did not use
any apparent rule on either task; regression analyses revealed some tendency
in these children's performance toward use of Rule I' on both the large
number (I^ = .16, F[l,22] = 4.33) and the small number {R^ = .45,
F[l,22] = 18.08) tasks. A second group, all but one of them 4-year-olds,
used Rule H I ' on small number problems and Rule I on large number ones.
TABLE 9
RULE USAGE ON LARGE AND SMALL NUMBER
PROBLEMSEXPERIMENT 4
RULE USAGE
WITH SMALL
COLLECTIONS

No rule
Rule I
Rule II
Rulelir
Rule IV

RULE USAGE WITH LARGE COLLECTIONS

NO

Rule

Rule I

11

1
6
6

Rule II Rule III' Rule IV

MONOGRAPHS

A third group, half 4-year-olds and half 5-year-olds, used Rule IV on small
number problems and Rule I on large number ones. The fourth group,
almost all 5-year-olds, used Rule IV on both types of problems.
These findings were consistent with those of previous studies in showing
that children generally perform at more advanced levels on small sets than
on large ones. They went beyond the previous findings, though, in illustrating how distinct rules for performing the same basic task can coexist within
a single child. The diflerence seems especially striking when one considers
that the children were presented the small and large number problems in
alternating blocks. This meant that large numbers of 4- and 5-year-olds
were willing to switch back and forth between perceptual and transformational strategies depending on the size of the set as well as on the type of
transformation, a finding with several theoretical implications.
A Transformational Theory of Conservation Acquisition

The developmental sequence data from experiments 3 and 4, together

with the prior task analysis, suggest a transformational theory of conservation
acquisition. The basic theme of this account is the step-by-step subordination
of perceptual to transformational approaches. This process can be illustrated
in greatest detail on the number conservation task. As shown in figure 9A,
at first children rely on their perceptions of which row is longer in almost all
caseswhenever there is a large number of items, and even for small arrays
when nothing has been added or subtracted. In the limited case where the
number of items is small and something has been added or subtracted, however, they rely on the type of transformation.
At the next step (fig. 9B), children simplify their approach. If there are
only a few items, they always decide on the basis of the type of transformation; if there are many, they always use the perceptual approach. Thus, if the
rows have four or fewer items, adding items to one of them means that it will
have more, subtracting items means that it will have fewer, and just expanding or contracting the row means that it will have the same number. If the
rows have seven or more items, however, the longer row always is considered
to have more, regardless of whether anything has been added or subtracted.
At the third step (flg. 9C), children extend the transformational approach one step further. Now, either if the rows have few items, regardless
of the transformation, or if they have many and something has been added
to or subtracted from one of them, the transformational approach will be
used. If the rows have many items and nothing has been added or subtracted,
however, children still choose the longer row as having more. Interestingly,
this last holdout from the transformational approach is exactly the traditional
conservation of number problem.
Eventually, children come to use Rule IV on both small and large sets;
they answer all types of number conservation problems correctly (fig. 9D).
50

ROBERT S. SIEGLER
This does not conclude the development of the concept, however. At first,
children solve number conservation problems by counting or pairing the
objects in the two rows; only later do they realize even without counting or
pairing that adding something means that the row necessarily has more,
that subtracting something means that it necessarily has fewer, and that
doing nether means that it necessarily has the same number of objects as
before. Such abstract understanding completes the development of the
number conservation concept as measured here.
During the period in which understanding of number conservation is
shifting to a transformational basis, understanding of liquid and solid quantity conservation remains constant; children continue to utilize a unidimensional perceptual approach to these problems. Soon after the children fully
comprehend the role of transformations in number conservation, however,
they shift to the transformational approach on the liquid and solid quantity
tasks as well.
The major sources of evidence supporting this description are the table 9
data on children's rule usage on large and small number problems and the
table 8 data linking explanations of number conservation to predictions on
the other two conservation tasks. There is one part of the account that is not
supported by these data, howeverthe hypothesized third knowledge state
(fig. 9C) in which children are said to use Rule IV on small number problems
and Rule I I I ' on large ones. Not one child in experiment 4 used this combination of rules; in fact, examining table 9, there was no evidence that anyone
ever used Rule I I I ' with large sets.
This seemed quite surprising given the experiment 4 evidence that children used it on small sets and the experiment 3 evidence that they used it on
intermediate-size ones. In addition, a new experiment suggested that, under
slightly diflerent circumstances, children do indeed use the postulated combination of rules. A new group of 20 kindergartners was presented the 24
large number items from experiment 4 on an initial day and the 24 small
number items on a second day. Using this procedure, five of the 20 children,
25%, used Rule I I I ' on the large sets. Four of these five used Rule IV the
next day on the small sets. This finding, together with previous ones that
experience with small number problems can improve performance on large
number ones (Winer 1974; Zimiles 1966) and with the experiment 4 observations that children who were initially given a block of small number problems did unusually well on subsequent large number items, suggested that
children do indeed pass through the hypothesized third knowledge state,
though it may be quite unstable and susceptible to improvement.
This description of the developmental sequence raises a number of
theoretical issues. One of the most basic involves why number conservation
is mastered before liquid and solid quantity. From the present perspective,
the reason resides in the variety of means by which number conservation
51

MONOGRAPHS

a:

c
o

I
I
u

ei

OC

52

ROBERT S. SiEGLER

H
a:

B
"3

a:

53

MONOGRAPHS

problems can be solved. As described earlier, they can be solved in at least

three ways: by pairing, by counting, or by relying on the type of transformation.
Counting and pairing may be thought of as providing outside referents
for verifying whether conservation obtains in any particular situation. Such
outside means of verification may be crucial in allowing rapid progress. As
soon as children suspect that adding objects to a collection or taking them
away may aflect their number, they can simply count or pair the collections
before and after the transformation. Eventually, they come to realize that
these tests always indicate that when something has been added there are
more objects than before and that when something has been subtracted there
are fewer; at this point they stop seeking such confirmation since it is redundant (cf. Klahr & Wallace's [1976] redundancy elimination principle).
By contrast, no such outside means of verification are available on the
liquid and solid quantity conservation tasks. Even if children suspect that
adding or subtracting water and clay may have some efl"ect on quantity,
they are unable to confirm their suspicions.
This interpretation suggests a reason why there were no apparent transition rules on the liquid and solid quantity conservation tasks. If children
were increasingly suspicious that transformations were important, but were
unsure exactly how they worked and had no direct way of finding out, they
might have elected to continue performing in accord with their initial perceptual strategy. Once they fully understood the effects of transformations
on any one task (in this case, number), however, they would be quickly
ready to transfer their knowledge to other problems. Thus, the knowledge
states preceding full understanding of the number conservation concept may
also function as transitions toward understanding of the liquid and solid
quantity concepts.
The above account implies that, for several years at least, children's
understanding of transformations is not an all-or-none understanding.
Rather, it seems to pass through at least two phases. In the flrst, children
realize that certain transformations may have eflects but are unsure of the
exact nature of the eflects and perhaps of whether there are any eflects at all.
Under such circumstances, it seems most prudent to checkto count or pair
or subitize. Only in the second phase do children understand the eflects of
transformations in the deeper sense that allows them to dispense with any
means of verification.
This may seem a rather untidy dichotomy, but the data almost demand
the distinction. Consider 4-year-olds' performance on small number sets.
They solved 9 1 % of conflict problems in which something was added or
subtracted, but only 42% of those where nothing was added or subtracted.
This finding is not explainable in terms of counting, pairing, or subitizing,
as a graphic example will illustrate. On some addition and some subtraction
54

ROBERT S. SIEGLER

problems, the final configuration involved four objects in one row and three
in the other. On some no addition/no subtraction problems, the final configuration involved two rows of three objects each. Certainly, 4-year-olds
should be at least as able to count or pair or subitize two rows of three objects
each as a row of three and a row of four.^** Yet 4-year-olds in experiment 4
solved 38% of the former and 90% of the latter type of problem.
One explanation for such data would involve children believing that it
was worthwhile to quantify and to make quantitative comparisons in some
situations but not in others. Well before children fully understand the eflects
of addition and subtraction, they may suspect that such transformations
make a diflerence and that it is worthwhile to check whether they do. The
same children may not entertain similar suspicions about the role of the null
transformation until somewhat later. Such provisional acceptance of new
modes of thought may well be a common occurrence in cognitive development; as such, it would seem to merit serious study.
1" To verify the claim that 4-year-olds could accurately quantify and compare sets of
these sizes, the children in experiment 4 were revisited 1 month after the initial experiment
and asked to count rows arranged as those in experiment 4 had been. They were also
asked to answer comparison questions such as, "Which has more, a row with four flowers
or a row with three flowers?" The 4-year-olds performed virtually flawlessly on these
quantification and quantitative comparison tasks.

55

III. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

A DISCUSSION OF DEVELOPMENTAL SEQUENCES

The experiments reported above provide a basis for examining a number

of issues surrounding the study of developmental sequences. Discussion of
these issues will be organized in terms of three goals of developmental
sequence studies: to describe the course of development, to identify functional relationships among acquisitions, and to test theories.
Developmental Sequence Studies as a Means of Description

The most basic reason for studying developmental sequences is simply

to describe development. Until we are quite sure that the acquisition of
concept A always precedes that of concept B, there is no point to investigating
why the ordering occurs. Achieving the goal of accurate, agreed-upon
description turns out to be surprisingly diflicult, however. The greatest
problems involve issues of definition and of measurement.
The definitional issue.What do we mean when we say that children
understand a concept? Do we mean that they can solve at least one task corresponding to it, that they can solve any task corresponding to it, or that
they can solve some "average" or representative task (cf. Flavell 1971)? Two
types of factors contribute to the definitional difliculty: the variety of tasks
that might reasonably be used as measures of understanding, and the variety
of strategies that might reasonably be said to indicate understanding.
With regard to the first point, seemingly small variations in tasks often
produce large variations in children's performance. Consider the case of
class inclusion. Trabasso (1978) listed some of the variables that have been
found to substantially influence performance: typicality of subordinate class
exemplars, presence of contrasting subordinate classes along with the two
basic ones, description of stimuli as class or collection nouns, ratio of majority
to minority subordinate class members, physical presence of the members of
the sets, and whether the subordinate classes are quantified before or after
the class inclusion question is asked. Given the large eflects of many of these
56

ROBERT S. SIEGLER
variables, there is no obvious way to decide which task is optimally suited
for assessing understanding.
With regard to the second point, even on a given task, it is far from clear
what children need to do to indicate conceptual mastery. Consider the
balance scale problem. Does a child understand balance scales when he
knows that both weight and distance aflect the balance's behavior? Does he
also need to know simple proportionality relationships, such as that one
weight three units from the fulcrum balances three weights one unit away?
Or must he be able to solve any possible balance scale problem and perhaps
be able to explain the torque principle as well? Again, there is no obvious
way of deciding.
One of the main contributions of the rule-assessment approach to the
study of developmental sequences may lie in its providing a framework for
investigation even while these definitional issues remain unresolved. Within
the present analysis, there is no compelling basis on which to choose any
particular level of knowledgeinitial, intermediate, or advancedas the
true index of understanding. The rule-assessment approach obviates the
need to make such a choice, since it emphasizes identification of multiple
understandings that children attain at difl'erent points in development.
This approach can allow investigators to agree on what children are doing,
even while continuing to debate whether what the children are doing constitutes understanding.
The experiments involving the number conservation task illustrate why
it is important to consider alternative criteria of understanding in investigating within-concept sequences. If understanding were defined as "in at least
some situations, relying on the type of transformation despite opposing
perceptual cues," then Rule I in fig. 8 would seem to be the level of understanding. If it were defined as "ability to consistently solve conservation
problems," then Rule IV would be chosen. If it were defined as "an abstract
understanding of transformations that does not depend upon counting or
pairing," then Rule IV level performance and an acceptable explanation
might be required.
A similar point can be made with regard to between-concept sequences.
Flavell (1971) described hypothetically the problems that could arise in
establishing a between-concept sequence if understanding of two concepts
began synchronously but then diverged, or if understanding began at diflerent times but then converged. The present experiments on proportionality
provide examples of an even more complex casea crisscrossing pattern,
where conceptual development appears to begin first on one concept (the
balance scale) but reaches advanced levels first on another (the probability
task). If understanding were defined as knowledge of which variables have
effects, the balance scale would be said to be understood first; if consistently
solving problems was the criterion, the probability problem would be.
57

MONOGRAPHS

The experiment 4 findings indicate that a large variety of tasks and

rules may need to be considered to define understanding of even a single
concept. Figure 8 illustrates that the number of objects in the arrays and the
type of transformation are two variables that influence children's approaches
to number conservation problems. A truly detailed model of number conservation development might also specify the relatedness of the objects in
the rows, how the objects are arranged, whether the objects are described in
terms of class or collection nouns, and whether the objects are visible during
the transformation.
Constructing such models and obtaining empirical evidence for which
approach individual children use may seem to be imposing undertakings;
however, there are two somewhat encouraging points that can be made.
First, it has been shown that the rule-assessment approach can include as
many as seven dimensions of variation within a single analysis (Siegler &
Richards 1979b). There is no in-principle reason why it could not handle
more. Thus, such complex assessments of children's knowledge are possible.
The second point is that we may have no choice. The above analysis of
number conservation suggests that mastering even a single concept can be an
extremely complex process. The knowledge states leading to mastery of one
concept may bear little resemblance to those leading to mastery of other,
seemingly closely related concepts. This may seem disappointing from the
point of view of the broad generality promised by Piaget's mental operations,
but an increasing range of investigators seem to agree that such difl"erentiation is characteristic of much of human cognition (e.g., Fischer 1980; Gibson
1966; Klahr & Wallace 1976; Newell & Simon 1972; Sharp, Cole, & Lave
1979; Trabasso 1978). Thus, our best hope for investigating conceptual
development may lie in formulating and testing models of multiple alternative levels of understanding and multiple task circumstances within which
understanding might be displayed.
The measurement issue.Even if some consensus were reached on what it
means to understand a concept, there still would be methodological difliculties in establishing whether understanding of one concept preceded understanding of another in any particular case. As Flavell (1971, fig. 3) illustrated,
even in situations where there is no conceptual uncertainty that A precedes
B, differentially sensitive measurement instruments can make it appear that
A precedes B, that B precedes A, or that A and B emerge synchronously.
This is no worst-case scenario, potentially disastrous but unlikely. To
cite just one example, Brainerd (1973) derived from the Piagetian and neoPiagetian literatures three diflerent predictions concerning the order of
acquisition of conservation, transitivity, and class inclusion. His own findings,
obtained with tasks intended to be more closely parallel than those previously
used, indicated yet a fourth order.
The rule-assessment approach was designed in part to deal with these
58

ROBERT S. SIEGLER

problems by providing measurement across tasks and over ages that was as
comparable as possible. Tasks were similar in their basic three-choice format,
in the questions that children were asked, in the stimulus values on the
dominant and subordinate dimensions, and in many of the rules that could
be applied. The same assessment procedure was followed for 3-year-olds as
for adults. These con.sistencies eliminated many sources of uncertainty in
establishing between-concept sequences.
The experiments revealed that some dimensions that could not be
matched across tasks were also important, however. For example, it was
found that performance on the number conservation task was substantially
influenced by the number of objects in the arrays. It is diflicult to imagine
any way in which this feature could be equated for on the liquid and solid
quantity tasks; there is no reason to think that variations in the amounts of
liquid or clay would exert comparable influence (inspection of the experiment 3 data supported this view). Nor could number conservation problems
be designed to eliminate the numerousness dimension; some number of
objects must always be used.
A more subtle example of the difliculties inherent in trying to equate
between-concept measurement procedures is provided by the proportionality
data. Many children explained their strategies on the probability task in
terms of baseball percentages: a batter who had three hits in five at bats was
better than one who had two hits in four at bats. Others compared the task
to simple division. By contrast, no such analogies were forthcoming on the
balance scale or shadows tasks. Thus, while the three tasks were similar in
their stimulus characteristics, response formats, and modes of presentation,
they diflered in the ease with which analogies to other tasks could be drawn.
This last feature appears to have made the difl"erence between the ability to
solve problems consistently at age 8 and the inability to solve them at age 18.
Whether these diflerences among tasks are seen as departures from
parallel presentations depends in large part on one's theory of the tasks.
Within the standard Piagetian approach, efl'orts are made to minimize the
use of subitizing and counting strategies that are not applicable to other
conservation problems; the intent is to assess abstract knowledge of transformations (i.e., knowledge that can only be justified in terms of identity,
reversibility, compensation, or the type of transformation). Other approaches
to conservation (e.g., Bryant 1972; Gelman 1972) focus on small number
problems; the intent is to provide the simplest possible task consistent with
the stipulation that a transformation is performed that changes the length of
the row but not the number of objects in it. If we accept the Piagetian emphasis on abstract understanding of transformations as defining conservation
knowledge, only number problems with too many items for children to
count would be considered parallel to the liquid and solid quantity tasks.
If we accept the alternative emphasis, both small and large number prob59

MONOGRAPHS

lems would be acceptable. Thus, what constitutes comparable measurement

procedures for establishing the between-concept sequence is not purely a
methodological issue; it also depends on the theory of what is being studied.
Seen within the context of these definitional and measurement complexities,
the difificulty of achieving accurate, agreed-upon descriptions of developmental sequences may seem less surprising.
Developmental Sequence as a Means of Establishing
Functional Relationships

A second reason for studying developmental sequences stems from the

hope that careful description of them will uncover functional relationships.
Flavell and Wohlwill expressed this viewpoint as follows: "Sequential variance or invariance should be regarded as only a symptom or indicator of
something far more important, namely the kind of functional relation that
holds among the acquisitions in question. If it turns out that A precedes B
in everyone's development, there must be a reason for it, and this reason
may be found in the kind of connection obtaining between A and B, or
between each of these and other developmental events" (1969, p. 83).
Within this view, consistent synchronies across two or more items may indicate some common underlying structure or stage, while consistent asynchronies may indicate that one item is necessary for the other to develop.
Flavell (1972) developed what is probably the most sophisticated
taxonomy to date of the functional relationships that can obtain among
cognitive items. He enumerated five relationships: addition, substitution,
modification, inclusion, and mediation. Flavell noted that these categories
are not mutually exclusive and that more than one type of functional relationship might at times hold between two cognitive items. The present data
allow a stronger claim: examples of all five functional relationships can be
found within the knowledge states leading to mastery of a single task, the
balance scale. Examples of almost all of them can be found in the progressions leading to mastery of the conservation tasks as well.
Flavell's first category is addition. Addition relationships are those
where two approaches can serve as alternative means to an end, with
neither ever totally replacing the other in the person's cognitive repertoire.
On the balance scale task, people using Rule IV could solve equal, dominant,
and subordinate problems either by computing torques or by performing
the types of qualitative comparisons envisioned in the present Rule IV.
Evidence has been found that Rule IV users ordinarily employ the latter
approach (Siegler & Atlas 1979), but the former could certainly be executed
if there were any need. Within the conservation domain, two approaches to
executing Rule IV on the number task exemplify an addition relationship.
Adults would generally rely on transformations on such tasks, but could
60

ROBERT S. SIEGLER

certainly count if they needed to or if they were uncertain about the eflects
of some complex transformation.
Flavell's second category, substitution, also involves two alternative
means to an end; it differs from addition in that one acquisition is replaced
by the other rather than coexisting with it. On both the proportionality and
the conservation tasks, a comparison of Rule I with Rule IV reveals a substitution relationship. Educated adults would rarely if ever judge which side
of a balance scale would go down solely on the basis of weight or judge
number solely on the basis of length. As Flavell pointed out, no cognitive
item once acquired may ever totally disappear, but these initial strategies
seem to come fairly close.
Modification, Flavell's third category, involves a relationship in which
"Z2 strikes one as being some sort of improved, perfected, or matured version
of Zi" (p. 298). There are three subcategories of modification: difl'erentiation, generalization, and stabilization. In cases of diflerentiation, people
learn to discriminate among situations that previously elicited similar responses. One example emerges on the balance scale task: in moving from
Rule I to Rule II, children change from in all cases only considering the
dominant dimension to also considering the subordinate dimension when
dominant dimension values are equal. A second example can be found on
the number conservation task. In progressing from Rule II to Rule III,
children move from treating all large arrays similarly to responding diflerently, depending on the type of transformation that is performed.
In cases of generalization, the change between Xi and Xi involves a
broadening of the domain of applicability of the original item. One example
involves the change between Rules II and III on the balance scale task;
children move from considering distances only when weights are equal to
always considering them. A second involves children extending their reliance
upon the type of transformation from small sets to both small and large sets
on the number conservation task.
The third subcategory of modification, stabilization, involves a strategy
coming to be used more consistently or more skillfully. On the balance scale
and on all of the conservation tasks, the change from 3-year-olds' group level
tendency toward use of Rules I and I' to 4- and 5-year-olds' consistent use
of the same formulas would seem to qualify as instances within this category.
Flavell's fourth category, inclusion, involves cases where in order to
execute X^ it is first necessary to execute Xi. On the balance scale task, the
Rule I tests of the values of the dominant dimension are included within
Rule II, the Rule II tests of the dominant and subordinate dimension values
are included within Rule III, and the Rule III tests are included within Rule
IV. The conservation concept diflers in this respect: the perceptual tests
used in early conservation rules are not incorporated into the transformational tests that are later utilized.
61

MONOGRAPHS

Mediation, the final category, involves cases in which one item acts as
a bridge toward the attainment of another. An example of such a mediation
relationship is the role of conservation of number vis-a-vis liquid and solid
quantity conservation. Children seem to use their knowledge about the
eflects of transformations on number to learn about the transformations'
eflects on liquid and solid quantities. The balance-scale relationship between
the Rule III muddling-through approach and the Rule IV torque computation would also seem to qualify as an instance of mediation. People who
know how to perform the torque computation no longer muddle through,
but the muddling-through process was probably useful in helping them learn
about torques.
What are the implications of such a variety of functional relationships
being present within the development of a single concept? One implication
is that analyzing within-concept sequences may be at least as important a
means for revealing functional relationships as analyzing between-concept
ones. A large majority of the examples of functional relationships from the
balance scale and conservation data were drawn from within-concept analyses. This is not entirely surprising; a child's current understanding of a concept would seem likely to exert at least as strong an influence on his later
understanding of it as his current understanding of other concepts would.
Experimental data demonstrating that children's current rules strongly
influence the lessons that they derive from feedback problems (Siegler &
Richards 1979a) support this view. The present examples also suggest that
the importance of analyzing within-concept sequences may be especially
great for Flavell's inclusion, modification, and substitution categories; all of
the above-listed examples of these relationships were from the within-concept
data.
A second implication is that, in speaking of functional influences on
conceptual growth, we must specify the level of conceptual growth to which
we are referring. This can be illustrated with regard to the balance scale
task. The very early change from use of no consistent rule to use of Rule I
was characterized above as an instance of stabilization, that from Rule I to
Rule II as one of differentiation, that from Rule II to III as one of generalization, and that from Rule III to Rule IV as one of mediation. All of the
relationships were also characterized as examples of inclusion. The point is:
just as we must specify the level of knowledge before we can say that understanding of one concept precedes understanding of another, so we also must
specify the level of knowledge in discussing functional relationships.
For categories such as mediation, where one concept is said to play an
active role in the acquisition of another, more than developmental sequence
data are needed to assure that the hypothesized functional relationship is
present. Consider the linkage between number conservation and liquid and
solid quantity conservation. From the present developmental sequence data,
62

ROBERT S. SIEGLER
we know that (1) use of Rule III on number conservation problems precedes
use of Rule IV on liquid and solid quantity conservation problems, (2) children who justify their number conservation responses in terms of transformations are more likely to solve the other two tasks than those who justify
their number responses on the basis of pairing or counting, and (3) performance on liquid and solid quantity conservation problems is very closely
linked.
Two other types of studies might be especially useful in adding to this
evidence. One involves investigation of the types of existing knowledge that
predict ability to learn. If the mediation relationship holds, children who
already know about the efl^ects of transformations on number tasks should be
better able to learn about their efl"ects on liquid and solid quantity tasks
than peers without such knowledge. The second type of study involves contrasting alternative number training procedures. Training emphasizing
transformations should produce greater generalization to the other two tasks
than training emphasizing other rationales. This should be especially evident in terms of savings eflects; knowing about the effects of transformations
on one task does not tell us directly about their role on others, but does provide a framework for learning about that role. To summarize, detailed
analyses of developmental sequences can suggest a large variety of functional
connections within even a single concept, but studies focusing more directly
on acquisition processes may be necessary to verify some of the more active
relationships that are hypothesized.
Developmental Sequence Studies as a Means of Testing Theories

A third motivation for studying developmental sequences is to test the

predictions of developmental theories, most notably stage theories. For
example, with reference to Piaget's theory, Wohlwill wrote: "What then are
the empirical questions which are at the core of this system? At least two
readily testable questions suggest themselves: (1) Do the steps marking the
development of a concept appear according to a fixed orderly progression?
(2) Do responses to tasks which difler but which, according to the system,
are based on the same mental operations, develop simultaneously?" (1963,
p. 254). The present studies of developmental sequences provide data relevant to each of these theoretical questions.
First, consider whether the steps of the within-concept sequence appear
in a fixed orderly progression. While only longitudinal studies conducted
over a very long period would yield entirely conclusive data on this issue, the
present age-norm data are at least consistent with the view that children
attained the rules in invariant orders on all six tasks. If, in fact, the orders
were invariant, however, the reasons were probably diflerent for the proportionality than for the conservation problems.
On all three proportionality tasks, the orders appear to be products of
63

MONOGRAPHS

the structure of the rules (Brainerd 1978). As discussed above, each proportionality rule is linked by an inclusion relationship to its successors. By the
nature of such relationships, it is diflicult to imagine how these rules could
be ordered diflerently than they are.
The conservation problems present a diflerent case. It seems clear empirically that, on the liquid and solid quantity tasks, children first rely on
perceptual appearances and then on transformations. This is not in any
simple way attributable to the structure of the rules, however. The transformational rules do not include the perceptual rules. The tests required by the
transformational rules are no more complex, the mathematical computations are no more demanding, and the branching structure is no more
elaborate. Thus, for the conservation problems, the reasons for the apparently invariant order must lie elsewhere.
One possible explanation for why children rely on perceptual cues before
transformations relates to the previously noted difficulty of empirically verifying the transformations' eflects. Informal questioning, as well as the results
of Bruner (1964), reveals that even 5-year-olds believe hypothetically that
adding water should result in more water than before and that taking away
water should result in less. In the standard conservation situation, however,
young children rely on the apparent perceptual evidence rather than on
these beliefs. This may occur because they have no direct means of testing
whether their beliefs about transformations are true. Such testing is diflicult
at all ages on the liquid and solid quantity tasks, and it may also be beyond
the capabilities of young children on large-array number problems (cf.
Gelman & Gallistel 1978).
Three sources of evidence support this argument. First, Osherson and
Markman (1975) found that 7-year-olds do not accept even simple tautologies as true or contradictions as false without requesting empirical tests; thus,
young children generally seem heavily dependent on empirical means of
verification. Second, on the experiment 3 and 4 conservation tasks, the order
in which children switched from relying on perceptual cues to relying on
transformations matched exactly the order of difficulty of empirically testing
the results: first small number arrays, then large number arrays, then liquid
and solid quantities. Third, Bearison (1969) demonstrated that training
children to rely on outside means of verification (measurement instruments)
was an unusually eflective means of teaching conservation concepts. Thus,
young children may rely on perceptual cues before transformations because
the evidence for the perceptual cues is directly before their eyes, while the
evidence for the transformations is indirect or unknown.
The second theoretical issue identified by Wohlwill involves similarity
of reasoning across diflerent concepts. The present experiments yield a
mixed picture on this dimension. The data indicate considerable similarity
of reasoning at early ages. Figure 10 illustrates just how great this was for
64

ROBERT S. SIEGLER
Bolance Scale

Projection of Shadows

Probability

100
80
60
40
20
0
E D S CD CS CE

Liquid Quantity
Conservation

E D S CD CS CE
Solid Quantity
Conservation

E D S CD CS CE
Number Conservation

100
a.

80
60
40
20
0
E D S CD CS CE

E D S CD CS CE
Problem Type

E D S CD CS CE

FIGURE 10.Performance of 5-year-olds on six tasksexperiments 2 and 3

the 5-year-olds who were studied. On four of the six tasks, almost all 5-yearolds used the Rule I approach, and on a fifth task many of them did; only
on the number conservation problem was it not the modal approach. Thus,
there seems to be a strong propensity for young children to reason in a
unidimensional fashion across a variety of problems.
By contrast, relatively little consistency in reasoning was evident across
the tasks at later ages. On the probability task, many children used the
correct quantitative formula by age 8; on the shadows task, few used it even
by college age. Number conservation was mastered long before liquid or
solid quantity conservation, and large numbers of children used a transition
rule on it that they did not use on the other two tasks. There was considerable
similarity in the way that older children performed on some pairs of tasks
(conservation of liquid and solid quantity, balance scale, and shadows), but
the overall results revealed far less consistency in older children's reasoning
than in younger children's.
Why might this be the case? A possible explanation, admittedly speculative at this point, involves the notion of "fallback rules." The basic idea is
that people may have certain standard forms of reasoning that they rely on
when they lack particular information about a problem. In the present
situation, 5-year-olds may have utilized a fallback rule that, lacking direct
information about a task, it is best to rely solely on the values of the single,
seemingly most important dimension.
This account resembles structuralist ones in its emphasis on young children responding unidimensionally in unfamiliar contexts, but differs from
65

MONOGRAPHS

them in predicting more sophisticated responding in familiar contexts. One

of its implications concerns performance in artificial situations that, unlike
the present ones, would definitely be novel; in such new situations, young
children would be expected to adopt unidimensional strategies. A second
implication is that assessments of reasoning below the level of mastery may
yield more information about commonalities in people's reasoning than
assessments of the ages at which they master concepts. At the mastery level,
reasoning must conform to the structure of the concept, while at lower levels
people are more free to display their own approaches. Viewed from a
developmental perspective, children may begin by reasoning about diverse
concepts in similar ways, but their reasoning may become increasingly
differentiated as they acquire specific information about particular concepts.
A DISCUSSION OF THE RULE-ASSESSMENT APPROACH

The experiments reported in this Monograph also provide a basis for

examining the rule-assessment approach's generality as a method for studying
cognitive development. The discussion will focus on two dimensions of generality: applicability over tasks, and applicability over ages.
Applicability over Tasks

One of the goals of this research was to demonstrate that the ruleassessment approach could be employed to study children's understanding
of a variety of tasks. The approach was found to be useful in revealing children's knowledge of all six of the tasks that were studied. Previous research
has indicated the approach's utility for studying children's knowledge of four
other problems: time, speed, distance, and fullness (Siegler & Richards
1979b; Siegler & Vago 1978). It seems worthwhile at this point to inquire
more generally into the conditions under which the approach will and will
not prove useful.
There seem to be only two prerequisites for using the rule-assessment
approach. First, the investigator must have sufficiently clear hypotheses
about people's knowledge to specify two or more distinct strategies that they
might bring to the task. The sense in which the strategies must be distinct
is that they must yield different patterns of performance on specifiable types
of problems.
The second prerequisite is that the problem types used to assess people's
rules must allow simple application of these rules. That is, the problem
types must be designed so that, if someone is trying to use a rule, his pattern
of predictions will reflect it. The reasons for this stricture become most clear
when it is violated. Siegler and Vago (1978, experiment 1) were unable to
classify the performance of the large majority of 10-year-olds they tested,
despite the fact that the children explained what they did in terms of the
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ROBERT S. SIEGLER

anticipated "volume rule." Inspection of the data revealed that almost all
of the exceptions to the volume rule came on problem types on which the
judgment of which glass was fuller involved two glasses with equal quantities
of water. This suggested a possible explanation: recognizing that two glasses
of different heights and cross-sectional areas contained equal amounts of
water would surely be very difficult, even for someone trying to compare
volumes. In a second experiment, with items on which volumes could be
more easily compared, 80% of 10-year-olds were classified as using the
volume rule (Siegier & Vago 1978, experiment 2). Thus, the fact that a child
is using a systematic approach does not guarantee that it will show up in his
performance protocol. The problem types must be such that they allow
straightforward application of the rule.
Several characteristics that do not seem essential to the rule-assessment
approach are also shared by the 10 tasks that have been studied to date. All
of the tasks are Piagetian in origin. All employ the relatively closed-ended
three-choice format described in this paper. All use patterns of correct
answers and errors as the basic dependent measure. However, each of these
seems to be an incidental feature of the present research program. Approaches that are similar to the present one in their attempt to discern
children's rules by examining their performance patterns have been used to
study at least two non-Piagetian tasks: elementary arithmetic (Brown &
Burton 1975), and the Tower of Hanoi (Klahr 1978). Brown and Burton's
study used an open-ended format. Finally, a recent study of my own relied
on reaction time patterns rather than patterns of correct answers and errors
to examine noncomputational understanding of arithmetic (Siegler 1979).
Thus, the rule-assessment approach should prove applicable to a range of
tasks extending well beyond those examined in this Monograph.
Applicability over Age

Another goal of this research was to demonstrate the rule-assessment

approach's applicability over a wide age range. It seems clear from the
results of the experiments that the approach can be useful in assessing children's strategies from age 4 onward. The approach's utility in examining
the knowledge of children below age 4 is less clear, however; on each of the
six tasks, the approaches of large numbers of 3-year-olds could not be classified. This suggested either that the rule-assessment approach was not detecting consistencies that were present in young children's performance, or that
their performance was not as systematic as that of older children (or both).
There were several reasons why the rule-assessment approach might fail
to detect consistencies that were in fact present. One p)ossibility was that the
3-year-olds who were not classified as using a rule might be using some
alternative formula that the investigator failed to consider. Examining this
possibility was made easier by the tasks being constructed so that there were
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MONOGRAPHS

not a huge number of conceptually relevant rules that could be used. For
example, on the conservation of liquid quantity tcisk, there were only three
basic approaches that were related to the quantity concept: a child could
consistently choose on the basis of the height of the liquid column, on the
basis of the width of the liquid column, or on the basis of the type of transformation that was performed. Combinations of these basic rules were also
possible; for example, a child could rely on the heights of the liquid columns
except when the heights were equal, in which case the type of transformation
would dictate the answer.
Use of these conceptually relevant strategies could be checked relatively
easily. On the conservation tasks, one-third of the 3-year-olds were found to
use formulas based on the values of the dominant dimension (Rule I or I').
On the proportionality tasks, almost no 3-year-olds could be described as
using any conceptually relevant rule.
Another possibility was that the 3-year-olds chose their approaches from
among the much larger set of conceptually irrelevant rules that could be
used on each task. Some of these could be checked within the children's protocols: side preferences and alternation strategies are two examples. None of
the 3-year-oIds was found to use these strategies on any task. Other conceptually irrelevant strategies, however, could not be so easily checked. For
example, on the balance scale task, children might have always chosen the
side that had a black disk on top; there would have been no way to check
retrospectively whether this happened because the critical data were not
recorded. Thus, the statement that children did not use rules is necessarily
limited to the conceptually relevant rules plus the conceptually irrelevant
rules that could be checked.
Even among conceptually relevant rules, however, it is always f)ossible
for some complex or unexpected formula to slip by undetected by the investigator. This is especially the case when only one child uses a particular
approach. For example, if, on the probability task, a single child used the
formula "multiply the number of desired-color and undesired-color marbles
in each pile and choose the side with the greater product," the likelihood of
detecting the rule would be very low. Even when a few children use a particular rule, it may be missed if the children's errors in applying it are very
different from each other's. On the other hand. Rules 1' and I I I ' on the
conservation experiments of the present study, Siegler and Vago's (1978)
"empty space rule" on the fullness task, and Siegler and Richards's (1979b)
"distance rule" on the time task were discovered by this method of analyzing
overlapping patterns of correct answers and errors and searching for a formula that would generate such patterns.
The relatively stringent standards for rule usage may have been another
reason that the performance of many 3-year-olds could not be classified.
It seems possible that at least some 3-year-olds tried to use a rule, but failed
68

ROBERT S. SIEGLER
to execute it correctly with consistency. The data from the regression analyses
supported this conjecture as it pertained to the conservation tasks. On all
three of them, the unclassified children tended toward the Rule I or I'
approach. By contrast, among the proportionality tasks, such regression
analyses revealed order only on the balance scale; even there, the best predictor. Rule I, accounted for only 15% of the variance. These findings concerning the performance of unclassified children converged with the results
of the rule analyses in indicating more advanced performance on the conservation than on the proportionality problems. One-third of the children
could be classified as using Rule I or I ' on the conservation problems, but
almost none on the proportionality ones.
The rule-assessment approach is designed to determine what rules children use when they perform various tasks. Determining what rules they do
not use is a poor substitute. Nonetheless, the possibility must at least be considered that, at the outset of development on some concepts, responding
may not follow any systematic formula. For example, nuclear physics problems would probably elicit unsystematic responding from many adults.
Considerable evidence, derived from a variety of methodologies, suggests that very young children may fail to follow systematic approaches in a
greater variety of situations than older children and adults. Evidence to this
effect has been provided by Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, and Boyes-Braem
(1976) for classification tasks; by Reese (1966) for middle-size problems; by
Pufall and Shaw (1972) for conservation problems; by Weir (1964) for
probability learning problems; and by Shepp (1978) for perceptual learning
problems (cf. Siegler [1978, pp. 145-147] for a detailed discussion of these
studies). Several reasons why such young children might less often follow
systematic strategies seem plausible: they might not know the relevant dimensions of variation on many problems, they might not accurately encode the
relevant dimensions, or they might not place a high value on being consistent, to name but three possibilities. Thus, although it is difficult to provide
positive evidence for the position, it may be the case that the use of systematic
strategies as such increases substantially in early childhood.
A CONCLUDING COMMENT

If there is one basic conclusion to be drawn from this Monograph, it is

the value of focusing on premastery as well as mastery level knowledge states.
Almost all of the most provocative experimental findings depended critically
upon the information obtained about early forms of understanding. Consider
the following:
1. In terms of initial and intermediate level understanding, performance was more advanced on the balance scale and shadows tasks
69

MONOGRAPHS

than on the probability task; in terms of mastery of Rule IV, the order
was reversed.
2. Transformations as well as perceptual appearances played a role
from very early in children's performance on number conservation
tasks, but not in their performance on liquid and solid quantity ones.
3. On the liquid and solid quantity conservation tasks, the usually
assumed transition formulas were not apparent; instead, it appeared
that knowledge about the effects of transformations on number mediated learning about their effects on liquid and solid quantities.
4. Systematic adherence to conceptually relevant rules increased
substantially on all tasks between ages 3 and 5.
5. Five-year-olds used Rule I on almost all of the tasks studied;
much less consistency of reasoning across tasks was evident at more
advanced levels.
These findings, while often differing in detail from Piaget's, are clearly
congruent with his underlying assumption that children progress through a
series of alternative understandings before mastering concepts. They promise
that increasing our attention to premastery level understandings may greatly
enhance our knowledge of cognitive development.

70

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