Bursting Disks for Shell & Tube Heat Exchanger

Overpressure Protection
Proposal for JIP managed by the Energy Institute
Prepared by Colin Deddis
Rev. 3
February 2011

1.0 Background
Bursting disks have been used extensively in the past 10-15 years to protect the low
pressure side of shell and tube heat exchangers (STHE) from overpressure in the event of a
tube rupture (guillotine fracture). This practice has primarily been driven by the results of a
joint industry project (JIP) [1] which looked at the dynamic pressure response of a tube
rupture and concluded that bursting disks located on the shell (if low pressure side) are
required to handle the fast transient pressure wave to avoid overpressure. Prior to this,
standard practice was to use conventional spring loaded relief valves on the low pressure
piping downstream of the exchanger.
Whilst bursting disks have advantages in the speed of response to overpressure they have
several disadvantages over conventional relief valves:

Once opened, they maintain an open flow path from the process system to the relief
system until they are manually isolated and changed out.
A sufficient margin (~30%) must be maintained between operating and set pressure
to avoid rupture. In STHE applications, they are often located on cooling medium
systems which are susceptible to pressure surges.
They are susceptible to other failure mechanisms such as corrosion, which results in
leakage.
They can fail in the reverse direction due to superimposed backpressures from the
relief system.

These disadvantages have featured in a number of incidents over recent years. Reverse
rupture of bursting disks protecting STHEs due to flare system backpressures have caused
several events to escalate as the reverse rupture has led to gas releases to atmosphere
through cooling water systems. Rupture of bursting disks in the absence of a tube break has
also resulted in an influx of cooling medium/seawater to the relief system consequently
overfilling the flare knock out drum and flare stack. Some research by BP has revealed
seven incidents in the past 13 years resulting in either gas releases or relief system
impairment in offshore facilities. It hasnt been possible to establish the exact number of
genuine tube ruptures which have occurred in the same time period but the author is only
aware of one. One published rate for tube rupture is 9 x 10-4 per unit per year [1]. By
inspection, the failure rate of the bursting disks is several orders of magnitude more frequent
than a genuine tube rupture.
Some of the consequences of these failures can be accommodated to some extent through
improved process design such as:

Segregation of relief streams to prevent high back pressures on bursting disks.

Designing cooling water systems to handle surge loads due to gas ingress.

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Bursting Disks for Shell & Tube Heat Exchanger Overpressure Protection
Proposal for JIP managed by the Energy Institute

However, other aspects are difficult to accommodate such as the potential to discharge large
quantities of liquid into the relief system.
The frequency and consequences of bursting disk failures have raised concerns over how
they are being applied to protect STHEs.
This paper outlines proposals to develop clearer design practice to reduce the number of
bursting disk installations whilst maintaining or improving the inherent safety of STHEs.

2.0 Findings supporting change

Several means of changing design practice have been identified that would result in a
reduced number of bursting disk installations and hence eliminate the potential for further
incidents. These are outlined in 2.1-2.3.

2.1

Relief system design

A primary reason why several incidents have escalated has been the interconnection of the
relief system to utility systems through the open path created by the bursting disk rupture.
Improved design practices such as the following have been identified as potential solutions:

2.2

Uprating the design and test pressure of the low pressure side of the exchanger to
eliminate the relief case.
Specifying bursting disks to withstand the maximum backpressure from the relief
system.
Segregation of bursting disk discharge lines up to the flare knock out drum.
Routing of bursting disk discharges to the appropriate relief system considering that
significant liquid volumes could be relieved if the bursting disk opens spuriously.

Heat exchanger design

Evidence within the industry is generally that guillotine fractures are now a very rare
occurrence. Guillotine tube failures are caused by fluid elastic instability: these fractures are
most likely to result from flow induced vibration when velocities in the shell flowing across
the tubes are very high. Vibration in STHEs has been extensively studied to the point that
current methods of predicting and mitigating vibration are well established and robust.
Hence, heat exchanger design software can accurately predict when this condition is likely to
occur. Consequently, if STHEs are designed with the appropriate rigour, it is possible that
guillotine fracture could be discounted as an overpressure design case for some
exchangers. This means that the lesser overpressure case of gradual leakage from a tube
would become the design case and this can be accommodated with a conventional relief
valve.

2.3

Relief device selection

Conventional spring-loaded relief valves have been considered to be too slow acting to
provide protection against the fast transient surge pressures resulting from guillotine fracture
of tubes. Consequently, common design practice is to specify bursting disks due to their
rapid speed of response.
The University of Sheffield tested the speed of response of various relief devices on behalf
of the Health and Safety Executive (UK) after the Institute of Petroleum published the
guidelines on designing for tube rupture: these results were published in HSE Offshore
Technology Report OTO 2000/130 [2].

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Bursting Disks for Shell & Tube Heat Exchanger Overpressure Protection
Proposal for JIP managed by the Energy Institute

There were two series of work, the second being to confirm some of the earlier results which
were published by the HSE. The general conclusions were that the speed of opening of the
relief valves for the test conditions was of the order of a few msec. This contrasted with
manufacturers' suggested figures of several tens of msec.
It was concluded from this work that because the drive pressures were often 200-500%
above the relief pressure of the valve, this greatly reduced the response time. The work
focused on the high pressure tube rupture problem within low pressure shells. The results in
the HSE OTO report were confirmed in the subsequent work and if the significant
overpressure case is the concern, then the University of Sheffield would stand by the
response times of a few msec for these cases.
This work was carried out using a 4 diameter shock tube which is smaller than many
realistic applications.
By extending this work, it should be possible to develop a rule-set that would allow selection
of conventional relief valves rather than bursting disks for some applications, thereby,
reducing the number of bursting disk installations. Its also possible that existing bursting
disk installations could be retrofitted with conventional relief valves.

3.0 Objectives
With the ultimate aim of improving the inherent safety of STHEs, the following scope of work
is proposed to be undertaken by a JIP. The overall objectives of the work are to produce a
revised set of design guidelines for overpressure protection of STHEs principally to address:

3.1

Heat exchanger design.

Relief device selection.

Proposed scope of work

For the purposes of this proposal, the scope of work is divided into two components essential and optional. The essential scope is considered to be the minimum required to
meet the objectives of the work. The optional scope is additional work that if undertaken
would enhance the final design guidelines.
It is envisaged that three major scopes of work will be followed:

Heat exchanger design.

Relief device selection.
Design guidelines.

The first two can probably be executed in parallel and once complete, the experimental and
analytical output can be used to define the design guidelines.

3.2

Heat exchanger design Essential scope of work

This scope of work is aimed at:

Establishing credibility of guillotine fracture of tubes.

Determining when the design of the overpressure protection needs to consider
dynamic (transient) effects in addition to the steady-state analysis.
Establishing design criteria for connected piping if fast-acting pressure relief devices
are not warranted on the heat exchanger.

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Bursting Disks for Shell & Tube Heat Exchanger Overpressure Protection
Proposal for JIP managed by the Energy Institute

The following work items need to be carried out to develop guidance on how tube rupture
should be catered for as an overpressure design case:
HE 1. Establish design criteria and engineering analysis requirements to assess if guillotine
fracture is credible based on the following:
o The mechanical properties of the materials of construction used in heat
exchanger tubes, baffles, etc.
o Degradation of the materials through corrosion or erosion.
o Minimum tube thickness specification required to prevent guillotine fracture.
o Vibration analysis to ensure that the likelihood of guillotine fracture is
minimised.
o Sensitivity analysis of process variations which should be carried out as part
of the engineering analysis to ensure that the design is robust, e.g. flow,
pressure, temperature etc.
o Gathering industry heat exchanger data.
HE 2. Establish design criteria that determine when transient effects need to be considered
for overpressure protection of STHEs:
o Determine if differential pressure limits can be established below which
transient effects from a tube rupture can be ignored.
o Determine the maximum allowable transient overpressures (peak pressure
and duration) in the shell, under tube rupture conditions, below which fast
acting pressure relief is not required. Extend the University of Sheffield work
on heat exchanger stress distribution.
HE 3. Determine the impact of transient loads on the piping systems if bursting disks are
not applied for overpressure and develop appropriate design guidelines to ensure
that the piping design is robust but not overly conservative.

3.3

Heat exchanger design Optional scope of work

In addition to the essential scope of work in 3.2, the following items may also be worth
pursuing:

3.4

Establish design criteria for tube side overpressure protection if the high pressure
fluids are on the shell side.

Relief device selection - Essential scope of work

In order to develop a rule-set for relief device selection to accommodate the tube rupture
case, further work needs to be carried out at the University of Sheffield on the following
areas:
RD 1. Conduct shock tube tests at the same scale as typical relief device sizes
encountered in real applications to establish the response times under a range of
overpressures (150-400%).
RD 2. Establish mechanical integrity criteria for relief valves for use in tube rupture service.
RD 3. Establish the range of process conditions for which conventional relief valves could
be utilised to protect against tube rupture and those for which bursting disks are
required. This needs to consider aspects such as differential design pressure
between low and high pressure side of exchanger, relief device speed of response
etc. Alternate relief valve types and manufacturers products will be taken into
account.

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Bursting Disks for Shell & Tube Heat Exchanger Overpressure Protection
Proposal for JIP managed by the Energy Institute

3.5

Relief device selection Optional scope of work

Additional scope of work that is considered beneficial but not essential is as follows:

3.6

Establish selection criteria for relief device set-points.

Design guidelines - Essential scope of work

The design guidelines for overpressure protection of STHEs will be revised to incorporate
the following essential items:
DG 1. A design decision flowchart that takes designers through the engineering analysis
required to develop the overpressure protection design for a shell and tube heat
exchanger.
DG 2. Relief device selection criteria for tube rupture.
DG 3. Relief device set-point selection criteria.
DG 4. Design criteria for overpressure protection of piping connected to heat exchangers.
DG 5. Design criteria for the interface between the relief devices and the relief disposal
(flare) system.
DG 6. Lessons learned from operating experience of STHEs.
DG 7. Instrumentation requirements for detection of tube rupture and bursting disk rupture.

3.7

Design guidelines - Optional scope of work

The following additional guidance is considered to be of value but would be taken forward as
an option:

Embody the design guidelines and selection criteria in a software package.

Provide guidance on HAZOP guidewords that should be used when assessing
overpressure design of STHEs.
Maintenance, testing and inspection guidance for relief devices protecting STHEs.

4.0 Cost and schedule

The preliminary estimates for the work packages have been based on:

Providing a full time researcher at the University of Sheffield to undertake the

experimental programme (120,000) for one year.
A commercial proposal to undertake the analysis and prepare the revised design
guidelines (150,000).
A contingency of 30,000.
A project management fee for the Energy Institute to cover contract handling,
publishing costs and a final workshop of 30,000 (i.e. 10%).

The total cost for the work programme is estimated to be 330,000.

The time required to complete the research is expected to be circa 18 months, commencing
at start Q3 2011 and concluding by end Q4 2012. The second deliverable would be
published by end Q1 2013.

5.0 Structure of proposed JIP

It is proposed that a project manager will be appointed by the Energy Institute to manage the
overall scope of work.

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Bursting Disks for Shell & Tube Heat Exchanger Overpressure Protection
Proposal for JIP managed by the Energy Institute

A Steering Committee will be established with representatives from sponsors and

participants, including end users, research establishments and specialist service providers to
integrate the various work packages and ensure that the final deliverables meet stated
objectives.
It is anticipated that there will be varying levels of sponsorship providing direct financial
support and/or relevant in-kind support to the JIP:
The fee for operating companies or safety regulators sponsors is 30,000, of which
10,000 would be invoiced in Q3 2011 following contract signature and 20,000
would be invoiced in Q1 2012.
The fee for other participants (e.g. design houses) is 15,000, of which 5,000 would
be invoiced in Q3 2011 following contract signature and 10,000 would be invoiced in
Q1 2012.
Relevant in-kind contributions may be accepted from other participants, such as from
relief valve manufacturers, heat exchanger design software specialists, etc.

6.0 Deliverables
1. A summary report will be prepared for each work package and made available to the
JIP sponsors and participants.
2. Revised Guidelines for the design and safe operation of shell and tube heat
exchangers to withstand the impact of tube failure, which would be published by EI.

7.0 References
1. Guidelines for the design and safe operation of shell and tube heat exchangers to
withstand the impact of tube failure, The Institute of Petroleum, August 2000,
http://www.energyinstpubs.org.uk/cgi-bin/moreinfo/moreinfo.cgi?articleid=545.
2. Examination of the effect of relief device opening times on the transient pressures
developed within liquid filled shells, Health & Safety Executive; OTO 2000/130 (2001)
http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/otohtm/2000/oto00130.htm.

8.0 Next steps

To register interest in the proposed JIP contact Dr Mark Scanlon, Energy Institute
e: mscanlon@energyinst.org
t: +44 (0)20 7467 7129, +44 (0)20 7467 7100 (switchboard), m: +44 (0)7795 272934.

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