DENR VS DENR EMPLOYEES

G.R. No. 149724

Doctrine: Alter ego of the President, Qualified Political Agency Doctrine
FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued by the
Regional Exec. Director of DENR, directing the immediate transfer of the DENR 12 Regional
Offices from Cotabato to Koronadal City. The memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR
Executive Order issued by the DENR Secretary.
Issue:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12 Office.
RULING: The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations
are adjuncts of the Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. It is
corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987
Constitution: "The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer
of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The
exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of
the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.

Cario vs. CHR

204 SCRA 483 (1991)
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher,
among them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School
Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook mass
concerted actions to dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from the alleged failure of
the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latters
attention.
The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained
to CHR.
ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations
RULING: No.

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character
of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the
Secretary of Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as
aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said matter,
if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so;
whether or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or
adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and determine, certain specific
type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much
less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying
the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to investigate, cannot and not try and
resolve on the merits (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90775, as it has announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the
administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted
by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.

JOSE C. TECSON, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
HON. RAFAEL SALAS Executive Secretary, respondent-appellees
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the presidential elections for having
allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poes) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he
is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the

petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the
Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino
citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding qualification of a candidate
for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution, refers to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
"President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take
cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondents birth,
provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines."
Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters death
certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870. In
the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzos place of residence upon his death in 1954 was
presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being
so, Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondents father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though an American citizen,
was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondents birth
certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that
respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondents
citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents
presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor

enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
CORONA VS UNITED HARBOUR PILOT GR NO 127980 CASE DIGEST
FACTS: IN ISSUING ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 04-92 (PPA-AO NO. 04-92),
LIMITING THE TERM OF APPOINTMENT OF HARBOR PILOTS TO ONE YEAR
SUBJECT TO YEARLY RENEWAL OR CANCELLATION
ON AUGUST 12, 1992, RESPONDENTS UNITED HARBOUR PILOTS ASSOCIATION
AND THE MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, THROUGH CAPT. ALBERTO C. COMPAS,
QUESTIONED PPA-AO NO. 04-92.
ON DECEMBER 23, 1992, THE OP ISSUED AN ORDER DIRECTING THE PPA TO HOLD
IN ABEYANCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PPA-AO NO. 04-92
ONMARCH 17, 1993, THE OP, THROUGH THEN ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS RENATO C. CORONA, DISMISSED THE APPEAL/PETITION AND
LIFTED THE RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED EARLIER.
RESPONDENTS FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND
INJUNCTION WITH PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER AND DAMAGES, BEFORE BRANCH 6 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.
ISSUE: WON PPA-AO-04-92 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
HELD: THE COURT IS CONVINCED THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 WAS ISSUED IN STARK
DISREGARD OF RESPONDENTS' RIGHT AGAINST DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. THE SUPREME COURT SAID THAT IN ORDER TO
FALL WITHIN THE AEGIS OF THIS PROVISION, TWO CONDITIONS MUST CONCUR,
NAMELY, THAT THERE IS A DEPRIVATION AND THAT SUCH DEPRIVATION IS DONE
WITHOUT PROPER OBSERVANCE OF DUE PROCESS. AS A GENERAL RULE, NOTICE
AND HEARING, AS THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS, ARE ESSENTIAL ONLY WHEN AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY EXERCISES
ITS QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION. IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS EXECUTIVE OR
LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS, SUCH AS ISSUING RULES AND REGULATIONS, AN
ADMINISTRATIVE BODY NEED NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF
NOTICE AND HEARING.
THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT PILOTAGE AS A PROFESSION HAS TAKEN ON THE
NATURE OF A PROPERTY RIGHT. IT IS READILY APPARENT THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92

UNDULY RESTRICTS THE RIGHT OF HARBOR PILOTS TO ENJOY THEIR

PROFESSION BEFORE THEIR COMPULSORY RETIREMENT.

YNOT vs. IAC

148 SCRA 659
Facts:
Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these wer confiscated by
the station commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A which prohibits transportation
of a carabao or carabeef from one province to another. Confiscation will be a result of this.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of
replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the
case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be
produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also
for its presumed validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court.
In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the E.O. due to the
outright confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard before an impartial court as
guaranteed by due process. He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative power by the
former president under Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given
emergency powers to issue letters of instruction that had the force of law.
Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?
Held: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.
The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality of a law.
Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.
Justice Laurel's said, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming
the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue
more deeply, to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law due to the grant of
legislative authority over the president under Amendment number 6.
Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language to avoid controvery. In the due
process clause, however, the wording was ambiguous so it would remain resilient. This was due

to the avoidance of an iron rule laying down a stiff command for all circumstances. There was
flexibility to allow it to adapt to every situation with varying degrees at protection for the
changing conditions.
Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due processlest they be confined to
its interpretation like a straitjacket.
There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a safeguard against arbitrariness.
There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which bars omission of contrary evidence
as long as such presumption is based on human experience or rational connection between facts
proved and fact presumed. An examples is a passport of a person with a criminal
offense cancelled without hearing.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police power which both
restrains and is restrained by due process. This power was invoked in 626-A, in addition to 626
which prohibits slaughter of carabos with an exception.
While 626-A has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, it cant be said that it
complies with the existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition and the purpose sought
has a gap.
Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings as procedural due process is not
juridical only due to the urgency needed to correct it.
There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a court of
justice with the accused acquired the rights in the constitution.
The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police power because the method to
confiscate carabos was oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owner was denied the right to be heard or his defense and
punished immediately.

RUFINO O. ESLAO vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Rufino O. Eslao in his capacity as President of the Pangasinan State University ("PSU"). On 9
December 1988, PSU entered into a Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") 1 with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR") for the evaluation of eleven (11)
government reforestation operations in Pangasinan. 2 The evaluation project was part of the
commitment of the Asian Development Bank ("ADB") under the ADB/OECF Forestry Sector
Program Loan to the Republic of the Philippines and was one among identical project
agreements entered into by the DENR with sixteen (16) other state universities.

On 16 January 1989, per advice of the PSU Auditor-in-Charge with respect to the payment
of honoraria and per diems of PSU personnel engaged in the review and evaluation project, PSU
Vice President for Research and Extension and Assistant Project Director Victorino P. Espero
requested the Office of the President, PSU, to have the University's Board of Regents ("BOR")
confirm the appointments or designations of involved PSU personnel including the rates
of honoraria and per diems corresponding to their specific roles and functions.
Examination of the definition in CPG No. 80-4 of a "special project" reveals that definition has
two (2) components: firstly, there should be an inter-agency or inter-committee activity or
undertaking by a group of officials or employees who are drawn from various agencies; and
secondly, the activity or undertaking involved is not part of the "regular or primary" functions of
the participating agencies. Examination of the MOA and its annexes reveals that two (2) groups
were actually created. The first group consisted of the coordinating committee, the membership
of which was drawn from officials of the DENR and of the PSU; and the second, the evaluation
project team itself which was, in contrast, composed exclusively of PSU personnel. 18 We believe
that the first component of the CPU No. 80-4's definition of "special project" is applicable in
respect of the group which is charged with the actual carrying out of the project itself, rather than
to the body or group which coordinates the task of the operating or implementing group. To
construe the administrative definition of "special project" otherwise would create a situation,
which we deem to be impractical and possibly even absurd, under which any undertaking entered
into between the senior officials of government agencies would have to be considered an "interagency or inter-committee activity," even though the actual undertaking or operation would be
carried out not by the coordinating body but rather by an separate group which might not (as in
the present case) be drawn from the agencies represented in the coordinating group. In other
words, an "inter-agency or inter-committee activity or . . . undertaking" must be one which is
actually carried out by a composite group of officials and employees from the two (2) or more
participating agencies.
ISSUE: WON Eslao is guilty of gross neglect of duty.

HELD: the petition is hereby GRANTED, The CA decision affirming the Ombudsmans
dismissal of petitioner Rufino Eslao from office is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioners
REINSTATEMENT to her position with back pay and without loss of seniority rights is hereby
ordered.

NO. In order to ascertain if there had been gross neglect of duty, we have to look at the lawfully
prescribed duties of petitioner. Unfortunately, DENR regulations are silent on the specific duties

of a senior environmental management specialist. Internal regulations merely speak of the

functions of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) to which
petitioner directly reports.
The monitoring duties of the PENRO mainly deal with broad environmental concerns,
particularly pollution abatement. This general monitoring duty is applicable to all types of
physical developments that may adversely impact on the environment, whether housing projects,
industrial sites, recreational facilities, or scientific undertakings.
However, a more specific monitoring duty is imposed on the HLURB as the sole regulatory body
for housing and land development.
P.D. No. 1586 prescribes the following duties on the HLURB (then Ministry of Human
Settlements) in connection with environmentally critical projects requiring an ECC:
SECTION 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects. The
President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon recommendation of the National
Environment Protection Council, by proclamation declare certain projects, undertakings or areas
in the country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or corporation shall undertake
or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized
representative. For the proper management of said critical project or area, the President may by
his proclamation reorganize such government offices, agencies, institutions, corporations or
instrumentalities including the re-alignment of government personnel, and their specific
functions and responsibilities.
For the same purpose as above, the Ministry of Human Settlements [now HLURB] shall:
(a) prepare the proper land or water use pattern for said critical project(s) or area(s);
(b) establish ambient environmental quality standards;
(c) develop a program of environmental enhancement or protective measures against
calamitous factors such as earthquake, floods, water erosion and others; and
(d) perform such other functions as may be directed by the President from time to time.
The legal duty to monitor housing projects, like the CHP, against calamities such as landslides
due to continuous rain, is clearly placed on the HLURB, not on the petitioner as PENRO
senior environmental management specialist. In fact, the law imposes no clear and direct duty
on petitioner to perform such narrowly defined monitoring function.

TOLEDO vs. CSC

202 SCRA 507

Facts:
Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by then Comelec Chairman Ramon Felipe as Manager of
the Education and Information Department of the Comelec on May 1986, at which time Toledo
was already more than 57 years old. Toledos appointment papers and his oath of office were
endorsed by the Comelec to the CSC on June 1986 for approval and attestation. However, no
prior request for exemption from the provisions of Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAPwhich
prohibits the appointment of persons 57 years old or above into government service without prior
CSC approvalwas secured. Petitioner then reported for work.
Comelec, upon discovery of the lack of authority required under CSRPAP, and CSC Memo
Circular 5 issued Resolution No. 2066, which declared void from the beginning Toledos
appointment. Petitioner appealed to CSC, which considered him a de facto officer and his
appointment voidable, and moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence the present petition
for certiorari.

Issue: W/N CSRPAP provision is valid

Held:
No. The Civil Service Act of 959 (RA 2260), which established the CSC, contained no provision
prohibiting appointment or reinstatement into government service of any person already 57 years
old. Sec 5 Rule 6 of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which prohibits such, was purely the
creation of CSC.

Marcoss PD 807 (Civil Service Decree), which established a new CSC and superseded RA
2260, also provided that rules and regulations shall become effective only 30 days after
publication in the OG or in any newspaper of general circulation. The new CSC adopted the

CSRPAP . No provision re prohibition of appointment of 57 year old made in PD 807;

prohibition was purely created by CSC.

The provision cannot be valid, being entirely a CSC creation, it has no basis in the law which it
was meant to implement. It cannot be justified as a valid exercise of its function of promulgating
rules and regulations for that function, to repeat, may legitimately be exercised only for the
purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect; and since there is no prohibition or
restriction on the employment of 57-year old persons in the statuteor any provision respecting
age as a factor in employmentthere was nothing to carry into effect through an implementing
rule on the matter. The power vested in the CSC was to implement the law or put it into effect,
not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply perceived omissions in it.
Additionally, the CSRPAP cannot be considered effective as of the time of the application to
Toledo of a provision thereof, for the reason that said rules were never published as required by
both RA 2260 and PD 807. The argument that it was a mere reiteration of existing law and
circularized cannot stand as formerly discussed.
Also, Toledos separation from service was through no fault of his own. Petition granted.