Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The third incident of rape (Criminal Case No. 02-550) happened two (2) weeks after
the second incident, which was sometime in the month of August 2001. While the
fourth incident of rape (Criminal Case No. 02-551) happened three (3) weeks after
the third incident which was sometime in the month of September 2001. The fifth
and last incident of rape happened according to the victim sometime in the 20 th of
November 2001. All the 3rd, 4th and 5th incidents of rape happened in the same
coconut farm although in the different places of the farm. The same pattern of
execution was adopted by the accused. He would ask the victim to go with him to
the coconut farm to gather coconut leaves, and once they reached the place the
accused would undress the victim then undress himself also and have sexual
intercourse with her against her will. The victim could not refuse or disobey the
command of the accused (her father) because he will scold and threaten her with
punishment if she would not go with him. She could not also tell her mother about it
because of fear. At the time of the first and second rapes the victim was only 12
years old. She was already 13 years old when the third, fourth, and fifth incidents of
rape happened. Her date of birth was January 3, 1989.
During the fifth incident of rape (Criminal Case No. 02-552) on November
20, 2001 the accused and the victim [were] again in the same coconut farm in order
to get coconut leaves. Both of them were already naked and the accused was about
to mount the victim when they were seen by prosecution eyewitness [CCC] who
shouted at them, thats why the accused fled leaving the victim behind. Because of
what happened the victim was able to gain enough courage to tell her mother and to
report the incident to the barangay captain of their place, thus leading to the
apprehension of the accused.
In its Decision, the RTC found Domingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of
qualified rape in Criminal Case Nos. 02-549, 02-550 and 02-551, and two counts of attempted rape
in Criminal Case Nos. 02-548 and 02-552.
Domingo interposed his appeal from the judgment of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. He
asserted his innocence and asked for his acquittal from all the charges.
On the two counts of attempted rape, Domingo claimed that the prosecution failed to show
any overt act which would prove his intent to rape AAA. AAAs claims during her testimony that he
was about to rape her or about to go on top of her were it not for the timely arrival of her mother,
BBB, in Criminal Case No. 02-548, or were it not for the fortunate appearance of a relative, CCC, in
Criminal Case No. 02-552, were allegedly so vague that one cannot make a clear conclusion whether
the he really intended to rape AAA.
Domingo also noted that should his conviction for the crime of attempted rape be sustained,
the trial court committed an error in the imposition of the proper penalty. With the abrogation of
the death penalty, the imposable penalty for the crime of rape committed in the attempted stage,
which must be two degrees lower than that of the penalty imposed for the crime intended to be
committed, should be prision mayor.
Anent the three counts of qualified rape, Domingo denied the accusations and questioned
the motive of AAA in charging him with said crime. He pointed out that it was implausible that AAA
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When the team reached the place at around 4:00 p.m., they alighted from their vehicles and
surrounded Milans house. Henry Milan, Restituto Carandang and Jackman Chua were all inside the
room of Milan when the team of Policemen arrived. The door of the room was open but was
suddenly closed by Milan when they were alerted of the presence of the police officers. When the
police officers were finally able to break open said door, Carandang peppered them with bullets.
PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red died instantly as a result while SPO1 Montecalvo was mortally wounded.
Then, upon seeing their victims helplessly lying on the floor and seriously wounded, Chua ordered
Milan to attack the police officers. Following the order, Milan rushed towards Montecalvo but the
latter, however, was able to shoot him.
The Trial court found Carandang, Milan and Chua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of two counts of murder for the killing of SPO2 Wilfredo Pilar Red and PO2 Dionisio Alonzo
and one count of frustrated murder qualified by treachery and acting in conspiracy with each other.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs ruling that Carandang, Milan and Chua acted in
conspiracy in the commission of the crimes charged. Thus, despite the established fact that it was
Carandang who fired the gun which hit SPO2 Red, PO2 Alonzo and SPO1 Montecalvo, all three
accused were held equally criminally responsible therefor. The trial court explained that
Carandang, Milan and Chuas actuations showed that they acted in concert against the police
officers. Milan and Chua argued that theres no direct evidence showing that they conspired with
Carandang during the latters act of shooting the three victims.
Issue:
Can conspiracy exist even if there is no full opportunity for meditation and reflection at the
time the crime was committed.
Ruling:
Yes, there can be conspiracy even if at the time the crime was committed, there is no full
opportunity for meditation and reflection.
In People v. Sumalpong, the Court held that conspiracy may also be proven by other means:
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Evidence need not establish the actual agreement among the
conspirators showing a preconceived plan or motive for the commission of the crime. Proof of
concerted action before, during and after the crime, which demonstrates their unity of design and
objective, is sufficient. When conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all regardless of
the degree of participation of each.
The conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with Carandang was established by their acts
(1) before Carandang shot the victims (Milans closing the door when the police officers introduced
themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the shooting (Chuas directive to
Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and Milans following such instruction). Contrary to the
suppositions of appellants, these facts are not meant to prove that Chua is a principal by
inducement or that Milans act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was what made him a principal by
direct participation. Instead, these facts are convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of
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By Ramons own account, after he was shot, he hit the victim at the back of the latters head
and he continued hitting the victim who retreated backward. From that moment, the inceptive
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ceased to exist and the continuation of the offensive
stance of Ramon put him in the place of an aggressor. There was clearly no longer any danger, but
still Ramon went beyond the call of self-preservation. In People v. Cajurao, we held:
The settled rule in jurisprudence is that when unlawful aggression ceases, the
defender no longer has the right to kill or even wound the former
aggressor. Retaliation is not a justifying circumstance. Upon the cessation of the
unlawful aggression and the danger or risk to life and limb, the necessity for the
person invoking self-defense to attack his adversary ceases. If he persists in
attacking his adversary, he can no longer invoke the justifying circumstance of selfdefense. Self-defense does not justify the unnecessary killing of an aggressor
who is retreating from the fray.
Ramons claim of self-defense is further belied by the presence of two (2) stab wounds on
the neck, four (4) lacerated wounds on the head, as well as multiple abrasions and contusions on
different parts of the victims body, as shown in the Medico-Legal Report. Dr. Mario Cerillo who
conducted the post-mortem examination on the victim revealed that the victims lacerated wounds
could have been caused by a blunt instrument like a hard stick, a stone or an iron bar; his stab
wounds by a sharp-edged instrument or knife; his contusions and hematoma by a fist blow or
through contact with a blunt instrument. Indeed, even if it were true that the victim fired a gun at
Ramon, the number, nature and severity of the injuries suffered by the victim indicated that the
force used against him by Ramon and his co-accused was not only to disarm the victim or prevent
him from doing harm to others.
2. Yes. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found, for
criminals do not write down their lawless plans and plots. The agreement to commit a crime,
however, may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred
from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of intent. It
does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as the act of one is the act of all, and each incurs
the same criminal liability.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EFREN LAURIO Y ROSALES
G.R No. 182523, September 13, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro
A person who invokes self-defense has the burden of proof. He must prove all the elements of
self-defense. However, the most important of all the elements is unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim.
Moreover, factual findings of the trial court as regards its assessment of the witnesses
credibility are entitled to great weight and respect particularly when the Court of Appeals affirms the
said findings, and will not be disturbed absent any showing that the trial court overlooked certain
facts and circumstances which could substantially affect the outcome of the case. It is the trial judge
who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses demeanor and deportment on the stand, and the
manner in which they gave their testimonies. The trial judge therefore is in a better position to
determine the veracity of the witnesses testimony.
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Moreover, whether or not Punzalan acted in avoidance of greater evil or injury is a question
of fact. It is an issue which concerns doubt or difference arising as to the truth or the falsehood of
alleged facts. This Court has combed through the records of this case and found no reason to
deviate from the findings of the trial and appellate courts. There is nothing that would indicate that
the RTC and the Court of Appeals ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent
facts and circumstances of substance, which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the case.
Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, to successfully invoke avoidance of
greater evil as a justifying circumstance, the following requisites should be complied with: (1) the
evil sought to be avoided actually exists (2) the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it
and (3) there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals rejected Punzalans s self-serving and uncorroborated
claim of avoidance of greater evil. The trial and appellate courts noted that even Punzalans own
witness who was in the van with appellant at the time of the incident contradicted appellants claim.
Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals concluded that the evil Punzalan claimed to avoid did not
actually exist. This Court agrees.
Moreover, Punzalan failed to satisfy the third requisite that there be no other practical and
less harmful means of preventing it. Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code,
infliction of damage or injury to another so that a greater evil or injury may not befall ones self may
be justified only if it is taken as a last resort and with the least possible prejudice to another. If there
is another way to avoid the injury without causing damage or injury to another or, if there is no
such other way but the damage to another may be minimized while avoiding an evil or injury to
ones self, then such course should be taken.
In this case, the road where the incident happened was wide, some 6 to 7 meters in width,
and the place was well-lighted. Both sides of the road were unobstructed by trees, plants or
structures. Punzalan was a driver by occupation. However, Punzalan himself testified that when he
shifted to the second gear and immediately stepped on the accelerator upon seeing the four navy
personnel approaching from in front of him, he did not make any attempt to avoid hitting the
approaching navy personnel even though he had enough space to do so. He simply sped away
straight ahead, meeting the approaching navy personnel head on, totally unmindful if he might run
them over. He therefore miserably failed to resort to other practical and less harmful available
means of preventing the evil or injury he claimed to be avoiding.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GARY VERGARA y ORIEL and JOSEPH INOCENCIO y PAULINO
G.R. No. 177763, July 3, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro
A person who invokes self-defense has the burden of proof. He must prove all the elements of
self-defense. However, the most important of all the elements is unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim. Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded,
whether complete or incomplete.
Facts:
At around midnight of February 10, 2001, Gary Vergara (Vergara) and Joseph Inocencio
(Inocencio) were causing a ruckus on Libertad Colayco Streets, Pasay City by throwing water
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In the evening of February 20, 2001, Robert Alisbo (Alisbo), the victim, together with his
friends were in a drinking spree at Raagas Beach Resort. The group were in a spot lighted by a
fluorescent light approximately 2.5 meters away from them. Around 9:30 p.m., Dante Jadap (Jadap)
suddenly appeared from nowhere behind Robert Alisbo and Rollie Arciso. Without provocation
from the latters group, Jadap took out a .38 caliber revolver and shot Alisbo, hitting him on the
right side of his body which caused his death. Then, he pointed the gun at the friends of Alisbo and
fired it twice, causing them to immediately scamper away. However, Rollie Arciso, Lenderico
Sabanal, and Ferlin Alberca stayed, taking cover under the cottages table. He hit Ferlin Alberca and
Lenderico Sabanal who was injured on his left leg. Thereafter, accused-appellant casually walked
away towards Bayabas, a nearby barangay. On July 3, 2001, an Information was filed against Jadap
charging him with the crime of murder. Eventually, the trial court rendered a decision finding him
guilty of murder qualified by treachery with the aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed
firearm. The appellate court affirmed the said decision with modification only as to the penalty
imposed. As he was ordered to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH by lethal injection, the entire
record of the case was forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: 1) Alisbo's friends who were
eyewitnesses to the said crime; and 2) Dr. Ryan R. Mortiz who operated on the victim. The latter
testified that the wound was considered fatal because the bullet entered the chest area through the
right side of the body, about 6" below the nipple with no exit wound, the slug was found on and
damaged the spinal cord, including the right lung and chest cavity. They also presented proof that
Jadap was not a licensed firearm holder.
Accused Jadap, a former police officer who was discharged from the service due to absence
without leave, contended that he stayed at Bayabas, Cagayan de Oro which is about a kilometer
away from Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro, with his children as he was separated de facto from his wife.
He only goes to the latter place whenever his wife calls him to fetch their children. On the night
when the crime was committed, he argued that he was at home attending to his two children and
that he never knew that he was charged of murder until the time his wife turned him over to the
police due to a misunderstanding.
Issue:
Whether or not Jadap was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified
by treachery with the aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm.
Ruling:
The guilt beyond reasonable doubt of Jadap was established by the following:
1) It has been settled that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the
highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal considering that the trial court was in a better
position to decide thereon, having personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying during the trial. Its findings on the credibility of witnesses and the facts
must be given great weight on appeal, unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. Here, there is no reason to deviate from the
trial courts assessment of the witnesses testimonies which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
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Accused-appellant Gerry Sabangan was charged with murder for the death of Barangay
Captain Abe Felonia together with his co-accused, Noli Bornasal. Both accused pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged against them.
Prosecution presented the testimonies of 2 witnesses who saw Sabangan shoot the victim to
death; another witness who saw both accused running away from the vicinity immediately after the
shooting incident; the Chief of Police of Kidapawan City who investigated the shooting incident; and
the daughter of the victim who testified on the damages suffered by Felonias heirs.
According to the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses, on December 27, 1999, the
victim (Abe Felonia) who was the barangay captain of Duroloman, Arakan, Cotabato, was gunned
down at Mega Market in Kidapawan City. Eden Allado and Flora Navales testified that they were
inside a store at Mega Market with the victim when the accused went inside the store and shot the
victim three times at the back of the head of Felonia.
Roberto Badian, the Chief of Polcie of Kidapawan said he conducted an investigation right
after the shooting incident and came up with the information from bystanders and witnesses that
Gerry Sabangan who had a pending robbery case in Kidapawan but out on bail, was one of the
suspects. Thereafter, when Gerry Sabangan was spotted in Antipaz, he was invited to the police
safehouse where the 3 witnesses positively identified and pointed the accused as the man who shot
the victim. Sabangan was arrested and locked up in jail and a case for murder against him was
initiated by the police. Accused Noli Bornasal was subsequently apprehended based on the account
of one witness who testified that he saw him running away from the vicinity with Sabangan
immediately after the shooting incident.
Sabangan denied the accusations against him and put up the defense that he was at
Barangay Luhong, Antipas, Cotabato at the time of the incident, helping in the preparation of a
wedding ceremony of a relative. He argued that it was physically impossible for him, on the date of
the shooting incident, to be in Kidapawan City when Felonia was killed considering that Kidapawan
City was approximately 40 kilometers away from Antipaz, Cotabato. Sabangan also complained of
the irregularity in the conduct of the investigating police officers during the out-of-court
identification of Sabangan by the witnesses.
Bornasal argued, on the other hand that no other circumstantial evidence was presented by
the prosecution to establish the alleged conspiracy between him and Sabangan to kill Felonia.
The RTC found both Sabangan and Bornasal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the murder
of Felonia. On appeal, both accused asserted that the award of actual damages in the total sum of
P234,080.00 was excessive, contrary to what was sufficiently proven during trial.
The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of Sabangan but acquitted Bornasal on the
ground of reasonable doubt, and modified the award of damages. Hence the instant petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not accused Sabangan is guilty for the crime of murder?
2. Was there convincing proof of evident premeditation in the case at bar?
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Yes. We cannot agree with the CAs conclusion that the accused-appellant cannot be deemed
a minor at the time of the commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code. When accused
appellant testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24 years old, which means that in
1996, he was 18 years of age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident could have taken place in
any month and date in the year 1996. Since the prosecution was not able to prove the exact date
and time when the rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was committed on or
after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance
of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the
latter. In fact, in several cases, this Court has appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone
declaration of the accused regarding his age.
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years,
the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with.
Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.
PAROLE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTE CANDELLADA
G.R. No. 189293, July 10, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro
No jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses,
for it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove, and for which reason it is generally rejected.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 provides that persons convicted of offenses punished with
reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, shall not be eligible for
parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended
Facts:
[AAA] was the second of three daughters of Candellada and his deceased first wife. [AAA]
lived with Candellada and the latters second wife, while [AAA]s two sisters lived with Candelladas
mother. While they were still living in Davao, Candellada impregnated [AAA]. When [AAA] was
already five months pregnant, Candellada brought her with him to Lanao del Norte. Candellada and
[AAA] arrived in Lanao del Norte on May 30, 2004.
While they were staying at Geminas (the owner of the house in Lanao del Norte where
Candellada and [AAA] lived) old house, Candellada had intercourse with [AAA] many times, but
[AAA] could only remember eight specific dates.
On December 28, 2004, Candellada again made amorous advances on [AAA]. [AAA] refused
so Candellada became violently angry. He mauled [AAA] and hit her head with a piece of wood,
which rendered her unconscious. Gemina, who saw what happened, asked help from the Barangay
Captain. The Barangay Captain and civilian volunteers arrested Candellada.
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Fundamental is the principle that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and
which involve the credibility of witnesses are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross
misapprehension of facts; and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered
from such findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the
credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner
of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings
are sustained by the Court of Appeals.
For the successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs under Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the
buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus
delicti.
Here, the records bear out that all the elements of the offense have been established beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court finds the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible,
straightforward and corroborative of each other. Their testimonies sufficiently proved that a
legitimate buy-bust operation took place wherein the accused-appellants were apprehended.
Moreover, the shabu subject of the sale was brought to, and properly identified in, court. Accusedappellants were likewise positively identified as the persons who sold the sachet containing the
crystalline substance which was later confirmed to be shabu according to the Chemistry Report of
the forensic chemist.
With respect to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165 against ANTHONY, we also find that the elements of the offense have
been established by the evidence of the prosecution. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, most notably that of the arresting officer, PO3
Luna, showed that four sachets containing white crystalline substance were recovered from
ANTHONY when the latter was told to empty his pockets upon his apprehension. As a result of a
chemical analysis thereof, the substance in the plastic sachets was confirmed to be shabu.
In view of the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the denials
of the accused-appellants must, perforce, fail. Mere denial cannot prevail over the positive
testimony of a witness; it is self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater
evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As
between the categorical testimony that rings of truth, on one hand, and a bare denial, on the other,
the former is generally held to prevail.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ESTELA TUAN y BALUDDA,
G.R. No. 176066 August 11, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Tuan was charged with illegal possession of prohibited drugs and contended that he should
not be convicted to such crime due to discrepancies and testimony of the witnesses. The court ruled
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Issue:
Whether or not both the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in convicting Amansec for
violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
Ruling:
No, there was no error on the part of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals in convicting
Amansec for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
We have been consistent in our ruling that prior surveillance is not required for a valid buybust operation, especially if the buy-bust team is accompanied to the target area by their informant.
In People v. Eugenio,we held:
There is no requirement that prior surveillance should be conducted before a buy-bust
operation can be undertaken especially when, as in this case, the policemen are accompanied to the
scene by their civilian informant. Prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an
entrapment or a buy-bust operation, there being no fixed or textbook method for conducting one. We
have held that when time is of the essence, the police may dispense with the need for prior surveillance.
The failure of the police officers to use ultraviolet powder on the buy-bust money is not an
indication that the buy-bust operation was a sham. The use of initials to mark the money used in a
buy-bust operation has been accepted by this Court.
In People v. Rivera, we declared:
It was x x x the prerogative of the prosecution to choose the manner of marking the money to
be used in the buy-bust operation, and the fact that it was not dusted with fluorescent powder did not
render the exhibit inadmissible. Indeed, the use of initials to mark the money used in the buy-bust
operation has been accepted by this Court in numerous cases
Ideally, the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken. However a
testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard as it is almost always impossible to
obtain an unbroken chain.
Thus, even though the prosecution failed to submit in evidence the physical inventory and
photograph of the seized drugs as required under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, this will not
render Amansecs arrest illegal or the items seized from him as inadmissible in evidence.
This Court has consistently held that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, because the same will be utilized in
ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence seized had been preserved. Both the prosecution witnesses were categorical and
consistent that Amansec offered three plastic sachets containing shabu to Mabutol and Pintis. These
were later recovered from Amansec, Pintis, and Mabutol himself. As soon as the police officers,
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Whether or not Alejandro must be convicted of illegal sale and possession of dangerous
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and ruled that the
accused is guilty of the crime charged.
Appellant rightly argues that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty by law enforcement agents should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence. In
fact it is on this premise that we have laid down the objective test in scrutinizing buy-bust
operations. In People v. Doria, we said:
We therefore stress that the objective test in buy-bust operations demands that the details
of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial
contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of
the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of
the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant,
the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal
drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by
courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.
In consonance with the above-stated "objective test," the testimony of PO2 Memoracion
duly established that the members of the SAID-SOTF of the Taguig City Police Station properly
performed their duties in the conduct of the buy-bust operation on April 14, 2005. The testimony of
PO2 Memoracion, which was corroborated by the testimony of PO3 Arago. Consequently, the
accused-appellants claim of frame-up cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony and the
positive identification made by the witnesses for the prosecution. Hence, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties on the part of the police officers in this case stands.
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While it is true that in many cases this Court has overlooked the non-compliance with the
requirements under the foregoing provisions, it did so only when the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items had been preserved. While it is admitted that the police officers failed to
conduct an inventory and to photograph the seized shabu in Del Rosarios presence immediately
after he was apprehended, as required under the above provisions, what creates a cloud on the
admissibility of the evidence seized, the plastic sachet of shabu in particular, is the failure of the
prosecution to prove that the sachet of shabu they presented in court was the very same one they
confiscated from Del Rosario.
It must be remembered that to successfully prosecute a case of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, it is not enough that the buyer, seller, and consideration for the transaction are identified. It
is equally important that the object of the case is identified with certainty. The prosecution must be
able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the shabu, from the moment it was seized
from Del Rosario, up to the time it was presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti, i.e., the
body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been committed, as shown
by presenting the object of the illegal transaction.
The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the very corpus delicti of the
offense and in sustaining a conviction under Republic Act No. 9165, the identity and integrity of the
corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have been preserved. This requirement necessarily
arises from the illegal drugs unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable,
and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise. Thus, to
remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must
definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered
from the accused-appellant otherwise, the prosecution for possession under Republic Act No. 9165
fail.
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way
that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it
was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in
the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the
same.
This Court has reviewed and scrutinized in detail the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses and found glaring inconsistencies that relate to the identity of the prohibited drug
allegedly confiscated from Del Rosario. The patent inconsistency between the testimonies of PO2
Mendoza and PO3 Besmonte necessarily leads us to doubt that the plastic sachet of shabu identified
in court is the same one allegedly seized from Del Rosario. In light of the foregoing, we find merit in
Del Rosarios claim that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The prosecution was not able to salvage the above inconsistencies with a logical and rational
explanation. Moreover, it offered no explanation as to how PO3 Besmonte was able to identify
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Issue:
2. Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming his conviction.
Ruling:
No. The appellate court did not err in affirming Lapasarans conviction.
The appeal must be dismissed for lack of merit.
For prosecution for both illegal sale and illegal possession of a dangerous drug, the corpus
delicti of the offenses is the dangerous drug itself, in this case shabu. In People v. Alcuizar, 647 SCRA
431 (2011), this Court stated that: The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the
very corpus delicti of the offense and in sustaining a conviction under Republic Act No. 9165, the
identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have been preserved. This
requirement necessarily arises from the illegal drugs unique characteristic that renders it
indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by
accident or otherwise. Thus, to remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the
seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same
illegal drug actually recovered from the accusedappellant otherwise, the prosecution for
possession under Republic Act No. 9165 fails.
It may be gleaned that to establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation is as follows:
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination and fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
We agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals. A perusal of the records of the case
revealed that after the dangerous drugs were seized from Lapasaran, the same were marked RML
and RML1 by the buy-bust team. PO1 Saez and PO2 Maglana then turned over RML and RML1
to investigating officer P/SInsp. Obong, who in turn, delivered the same to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination. Based on the Physical Science Report timed, dated and signed by
Forensic Chemist
Bonifacio, RML and RML1 tested positive for the presence of shabu. Lastly, both sachets were
then presented and turned over by P/SInsp. Bonifacio to the court. The Certificate of Inventory,
request for laboratory examination and the consequent testimonies in Court leaves no doubt in the
Courts mind that the chain of custody rule was duly followed.
Moreover, this Court has often said that the prosecution of cases involving illegal drugs
depends largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. It is
fundamental that the factual findings of the trial courts and those involving credibility of witnesses
are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts, or speculative,
arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The trial court is in a
better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed
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Yes, they are liable for violation of RA 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.
Jurisprudence has identified the elements that must be established for the successful
prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, viz: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the same. What
is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and
the receipt of the marked money consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping
officers and the accused. In other words, the commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, like shabu, merely requires the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the
moment the exchange of money and drugs between the buyer and the seller takes place.
The RTC found, and the Court of Appeals eventually affirmed, that all these elements have
been amply proven by the prosecution. The prosecution, through the detailed testimonies of PO2
Ibasco and SPO4 Reburiano, established that there was a consummated sale of shabu by Linda and
Elizabeth to PO2 Ibasco during the buy-bust operation.
Charges of extortion and frame-up are frequently made in this jurisdiction. Courts are, thus,
cautious in dealing with such accusations, which are quite difficult to prove in light of the
presumption of regularity in the performance of the police officers duties. To substantiate such
defense, which can be easily concocted, the evidence must be clear and convincing and should show
that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly
performing their duty. Otherwise, the police officers testimonies on the operation deserve full faith
and credit.
In this case, there is absolute lack of evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were
stirred by illicit motive or had improperly performed their duties in arresting Linda and Elizabeth.
Both Linda and Elizabeth admitted that they did not know the police officers prior to their arrest.
Hence, there could not have been any bad blood between them and said police officers.
As a result of the finding that a buy-bust operation actually took place and that Linda and
Elizabeth were apprehended in flagrante delicto, the evidence gathered and presented by the
prosecution on the occasion of their lawful arrest without warrant cannot be deemed as the "fruits
of a poisonous tree," but are admissible and competent proof of their guilt. Indeed, in a prosecution
for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the proof that the accused peddled illicit
drugs, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, both of which were satisfactorily
complied with by the prosecution in this case.
Article II, Section 21, paragraph 1 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides: Sec. 21. Custody and
Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
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The court recognizes instigation as a valid defense that can be raised by the accused.
However, for this defense to prosper, the accused must prove, with sufficient evidence, that the
government induced him or her to commit the offense.36 Aguilar claims that she was instigated by
the informant to sell shabu to PO2 Medrano. Her only evidence to support this claim was her
interpretation of PO2 Medranos testimony. The Court finds Aguilars defense of instigation
unworthy of belief. It has been established that when the accused is charged with the sale of illicit
drugs, the following defenses cannot be set up: (1) that facilities for the commission of the crime
were intentionally placed in his way or (2) that the criminal act was done at the solicitation of the
decoy or poseurbuyer seeking to expose his criminal act or (3) that police authorities feigning
complicity in the act were present and apparently assisted in its commission. The Court agreed with
the Court of Appeals pronouncement that [t]here was no showing that the informant employed
any act of inducement such as repeated requests for the sale of prohibited drugs or offers of
exorbitant prices. Aguilar was never forced or coerced to sell the prohibited drug to PO2 Medrano.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANTE L. DUMALAG
G.R. No. 180514, April 17, 2013, J. Leonardo- De Castro
Marking of the seized items immediately after seizure and confiscation may be undertaken
at the police station rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of an
accused in illegal drugs cases.
Facts:
After a buy bust operation, two separate informations were filed charging accusedappellant Dante Dumalang of violating Article II, Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both
charges when he was arraigned on June 14, 2005. Thereafter, trial ensued. Upon trial, the defense
averred that the police officers framed accused-appellant after failing to extort money from him. On
November 16, 2005, the RTC promulgated its Decision finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the felonies charged.
On appeal, accused-appellant argued that the police officers who arrested him and purportedly
confiscated the sachets of shabu from his possession failed to strictly comply with the mandated
procedure under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The said provision of the law and
jurisprudence on the matter require that the marking of the drugs be done immediately after they
are seized from the accused otherwise, reasonable doubt arises as to the authenticity of the seized
drugs. Accused-appellant claimed that the sachets of shabu supposedly seized from his possession
were marked when he was already at the police station and not at the place of his arrest. In its
Decision dated July 3, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC judgment of conviction.
Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
1. Whether the prosecution failed to comply with the procedures in the custody of seized
prohibited and regulated drugs as embodied in Section 21 of Republic Act 9165 by the
failure of the police to mark the seized items immediately upon their confiscation
2. Whether the accused-appellant is guilty of illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous
drugs
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Ruling:
1. No. Accusedappellants insistence that the police officers broke the chain of custody rule when
they failed to mark the seized items immediately upon their confiscation at the place where he was
apprehended lacks legal basis. It has already been settled that the failure of police officers to mark
the items seized from an accused in illegal drugs cases immediately upon its confiscation at the
place of arrest does not automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody and render the
confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. In People v. Resurreccion, the Court explained that
marking of the seized items immediately after seizure and confiscation may be undertaken at
the police station rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of an
accused in illegal drugs cases. It was further emphasized that what is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The Court elaborated in this
wise:
Jurisprudence tells us that the failure to immediately mark seized drugs will not
automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody. The failure to strictly comply with
Sec. 21(1), Art. II of RA 9165 does not necessarily render an accuseds arrest illegal or the
items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
2. For a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug to prosper, it must be shown that (a)
the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated
drug (b) such possession is not authorized by law and (c) the accused was freely and consciously
aware of being in possession of the drug. In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of
prohibited drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller,
object, and consideration and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof. What is
material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually occurred, coupled with the presentation in court of the substance seized as evidence.
In this case, prosecution witnesses, PO3 Albano and PO2 Valdez, categorically stated under oath
that as members of the buy-bust team, they caught accused- appellant in flagrante delicto selling
and possessing shabu. The prosecution was able to establish that (a) accused-appellant had no
authority to sell or to possess any dangerous drugs (b) during the buybust operation conducted by
the police on January 5, 2005 at the Sexy Beach Resort in Barangay Estancia, Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte,
accused-appellant sold and delivered to PO3 Albano, acting as a poseur-buyer, for the price of Two
Hundred Pesos (P200.00), one heat-sealed plastic sachet containing 0.023 grams of white
crystalline substance, chemically confirmed to be shabu and (c) as a result of a search incidental to
the valid warrantless arrest of accused-appellant, he was caught in possession of three more
heat-sealed plastic sachets containing 0.01, 0.015, and 0.04 grams of white crystalline substance, all
chemically confirmed also to be shabu.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARTURO ENRIQUEZ y DELOS REYES
G.R. No. 197550, 25 September 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro
When, of all the individuals who came into direct contact with or had physical possession of
the shabu allegedly seized from the accused, only the arresting officer testified for the specific purpose
of identifying the evidence, and his testimony miserably failed to demonstrate an unbroken chain as it
ended with his identification of the money and seized items he marked and documents he signed, then
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1. Were the testimonies of the police officers inconsistent to such extent as to warrant
acquittal for Santos and Valrea?
2. Did the police officers violate the chain of custody rule?
Ruling:
1. No. The testimonies of PO2 Aninias and SPO2 Male, stating that the same corroborated
each other on material points and established beyond reasonable doubt that the crime
of illegal sale of dangerous drugs was indeed consummated.
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential elements must be
established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof. People v. Nicolas adds that [w]hat
is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
In handing down its judgment of conviction against appellants, the RTC gave more credence
to the testimonies of PO2 Aninias and SPO2 Male that appellants were caught in flagrante delicto of
selling illegal drugs in a buy-bust operation. The RTC ruled that the inconsistencies pointed out by
appellants did not destroy the credibility of the police officers testimonies. The inconsistencies
merely involved peripheral matters that did not totally cause damage to the declarations of the
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Issues:
Whether or not the failure to take photographs and to make an inventory of the seized
evidence, and the lack of participation of the representatives from the media, the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official in the operation will render the evidence seized as
inadmissible.
Ruling:
No, the evidence will not be rendered inadmissible because of such failure.
Non-compliance with Section 21 does not necessarily render the arrest illegal or the items
seized inadmissible because what is essential is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are preserved which would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
Moreover, despite the seemingly mandatory language used in the procedural rule at issue, a
perusal of Section 21, Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165
reveals the existence of a clause which may render non-compliance with said procedural rule nonprejudicial to the prosecution of drug offenses: that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.
Essentially, Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 ensures that the chain of custody of the
seized drugs to be used in evidence must be complete and unbroken. We have defined "chain of
custody" as the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping
to presentation in court for destruction.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost
always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential
when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its
condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its
uniqueness The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration,
tampering, contamination and even substation and exchange. In other words, the exhibits level of
susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering without regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise not dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody
rule.
In the case at bar, we concur with appellants assertion that the arresting officers involved
were not able to strictly comply with the procedural guidelines stated in Section 21(1), Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165. However, our affinity with appellants argument does not sway us towards
granting her absolution because, notwithstanding the procedural error, the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the illegal drugs used in this case were duly preserved and the chain of custody
of said evidence was shown to be unbroken.
At the outset, it should be noted that appellant did not raise the issue of the alleged noncompliance with the aforementioned procedural rule when the case was still being heard in the trial
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Issues:
1. Whether or not there was indeed a buy-bust operation.
2. May the accused interpose the defense of denial and frame-up in the case at bar?
Rulings:
1. Yes.
The issue of whether or not there was indeed a buy-bust operation primarily boils down to
one of credibility. In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, a case becomes a
contest of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. When it comes to credibility, the trial
courts assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is
obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses deportment and manner of
testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial
evidence properly. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings are
sustained by the Court of Appeals.
What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is
proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor, which the prosecution has satisfactorily established. The prosecution satisfactorily proved
the illegal sale of dangerous drugs and presented in court the evidence of corpus delicti.
On the other hand, for an accused to be convicted of illegal possession of prohibited or
regulated drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug.
With respect to the charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the police officer positively
identified the appellant as the person who sold to him one plastic sachet of shabu worth P100.00 in
a buy-bust operation. The police officer also identified in court the plastic sachet of shabu he bought
from the appellant. The testimony of the police officer was in turn corroborated by the testimony of
a member of the buy-bust team who also categorically pointed to the appellant as the person whom
he saw the police officer who bought illegal drugs from. To further prove that a buy-bust operation
was actually conducted, the prosecution also presented the testimony of a forensic chemist
assigned to the case.
On the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the police officer testified that when
he bought shabu from the appellant, the latter took out from his pocket four plastic sachets. The
appellant gave one sachet to the police officer and put the rest back in his left pocket. After the
arrest of the appellant, the police officer relayed this information to another police officer and the
latter ordered the appellant to empty the contents of his pocket. The appellant then brought out the
three remaining plastic sachets of shabu, which the police officer marked accordingly.
3. No.
IMPOSABLE PENALTY
prision correccional
prision mayor
reclusion temporal
reclusion perpetua
Given that the additional 12 plastic sachets of shabu found in the possession of the appellant
amounted to 4.03 grams, the imposable penalty for the crime is prision correccional. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in this case, the
imposable penalty on the appellant should be the indeterminate sentence of six months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four years and two months of prision correccional, as maximum. The
penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, thus, falls within the range of the proper imposable
penalty. In Criminal Case No. 98-164175, no fine is imposable considering that in Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, a fine can be imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death.
Incidentally, the Court notes that both parties in this case admitted that the appellant was a
regular employee of the NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. Such fact, however, cannot be taken into
consideration to increase the penalties in this case to the maximum, in accordance with Section 24
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. Such a special aggravating circumstance, i.e., one that which
arises under special conditions to increase the penalty for the offense to its maximum period, was
not alleged and charged in the informations. Thus, the same was properly disregarded by the lower
courts.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSELITO MORATE Y TARNATE
G.R. No. 201156, January 29, 2014, J. LeonardoDe Castro
For there to be illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be present: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery to
the buyer of the thing sold and receipt by the seller of the payment therefor. Thus, upon delivery of the
illicit drug to the buyer and the receipt of the payment by the seller, illegal sale of dangerous drugs is
committed.
Facts:
On April 2006, the Philippine National Police in Tabaco City received a confidential
information that Palito of Cormidal, Tabaco City is engaged in the illegal sale of marijuana. Upon
investigation, it was later on confirmed that Palito, the accusedappellant Joselito Morate
(Morate), is indeed involved in the sale of illegal drugs. The police officers then planned for the buybust operation with PO1 Manamtam designated as poseur-buyer.
Morate was then arrested through the buy-bust operation and was brought to the police
station. Upon arrival at the police station, the items confiscated during the buybust were counted,
marked and inventoried. The marking and inventory of the seized items were witnessed by
Barangay Kagawad Julio Marbella of Cormidal, Tabaco City and Emmanuel Cea III, a local newsman,
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The two courts below correctly appreciated treachery, which qualified the killing of Jann
Michael Olivo to Murder. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an
aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself,
thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victim. Also, cruelty as an aggravating circumstance was also
considered when the accused inhumanly augmented the suffering of the victim through the
insertion of the toothbrush to the victims anus.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO TABARNERO and GARY TABARNERO
G.R. No. 168169, February 24, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non, without which there can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete.
Facts:
Late at night, Gary went to the house of the deceased Ernesto Canatoy, where the former
used to reside as the live-in partner of Mary Jane Acibar, Ernestos stepdaughter. Gary and Ernesto
had a confrontation during which the latter was stabbed nine times, causing his death.
Gary and his father, Alberto, were charged with the crime of Murder on March 3, 2000. On
March 27, warrants for their arrest were issued. On April 22, 2001, Gary surrendered to Barangay
Tanod Edilberto Alarma. During that time, Alberto remained at large. A pre-trial conference was
held wherein Gary admitted having killed Ernesto, but claimed that it was an act of self-defense. A
reverse trial ensued.
Gary testified that he stayed in Ernestos house from 1997 to 1999, as he and Mary Jane
were living together. However, Gary left the house because of a misunderstanding with Ernesto
when the latter allegedly stopped the planned marriage of Gary and Mary Jane, who was pregnant
at that time.
At the night in question, Gary was allegedly in his house at around 11:40 p.m. Overcome
with emotion over being separated from Mary Jane, Gary then went to Ernestos house, but was not
able to enter as no one went out of the house to let him in. He instead shouted his pleas from the
outside, asking Ernesto what he had done wrong that caused Ernesto to break him and Mary Jane
up, and voicing out several times that he loved Mary Jane and was ready to marry her. When Gary
was about to leave, the gate opened and Ernesto purportedly struck him with a lead pipe. Ernesto
was aiming at Garys head, but the latter blocked the blow with his hands, causing his left index
finger to be broken. Gary embraced Ernesto, but the latter strangled him. At that point, Gary felt
that there was a bladed weapon tucked at Ernestos back. Losing control of himself, Gary took the
bladed weapon and stabbed Ernesto, although he cannot recall how many times he did so.
According to Gary, Ernesto fell to the ground, and pleaded, saklolo, tulungan niyo po ako
three times. Gary was stunned, and did not notice his father, Alberto, coming. Alberto asked Gary,
anak, ano ang nangyari? To which Gary responded nasaksak ko po yata si Ka Erning, referring to
Ernesto. Gary and Alberto fled, allegedly out of fear.
The Court of Appeals noted that the only evidence presented by the defense to prove the
alleged unlawful aggression was Garys own testimony. Citing Casitas vs. People, the Court of
Appeals held that the nine stab wounds inflicted upon Ernesto indicate Garys intent to kill, and not
merely intent to defend himself. The number of wounds also negates the claim that the means used
by Gary to defend himself was reasonable.
The Court agreed. Unlawful aggression is an indispensable requirement of self-defense.
Garys own testimony is insufficient and self-serving. By invoking self-defense, Gary, in effect,
admitted killing Ernesto, and thus, shifting upon him the burden of evidence to prove the elements
of the said justifying circumstance. A plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated where it
is not only uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence, but also extremely doubtful in
itself.
The defense further argued he would nevertheless be entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense under Article 13(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court disagreed. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non, without which there
can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete. There is incomplete self-defense when the
element of unlawful aggression by the victim is present, and any of the other two essential
requisites for self-defense. Having failed to prove the indispensable element of unlawful aggression,
Gary is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance, even assuming the presence of the other two
elements of self-defense.
(2) No, Gary is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
In order that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be credited to the
accused, the following requisites should be present: (a) the offender has not actually been arrested;
(b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be
voluntary. A surrender, to be voluntary, must be spontaneous, i.e., there must be an intent to submit
oneself to authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them
the trouble and expenses in capturing him.
The surrender was made almost one year and six months from the incident, and almost one
year and one month from the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him. The Court ruled that the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be credited to Gary. A surrender to be
voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself
unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save
them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Voluntary surrender
presupposes repentance.
(3) Yes, Alberto is guilty as principal in the crime of murder
Conspiracy need not even be proven by the prosecution in this case, since Alberto was
categorically pointed by the eyewitness, Emerito, as one of the assailants who actively and directly
participated in the killing of Ernesto.
Even more persuasive is the statement of the victim himself, Ernesto, as testified to by SPO2
Morales, that it was the father and son, Gary and Alberto Tabarnero who stabbed him. As an
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Ruling:
No, the court a quo did not commit an error when it ruled that Rosendo is guilty for the
crime of murder and not homicide.
Basic is the rule that in order to affirm the conviction of an accused person, the prosecution
must establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A finding of guilt must rest on the strength of the
prosecutions own evidence, not on the weakness or even absence of evidence for the defense.
In the instant case, the evidence of the prosecution established the fact that the killings of
Felipe and Ranil were attended by treachery, thus qualifying the same to murder.
According to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, any person who shall kill
another shall be guilty of murder if the same was committed with the attendant circumstance of
treachery, among other things, and that the situation does not fall within the provisions of Article
246. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, offering an unarmed and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or to escape. There is treachery even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden
and unexpected, with the victims having no opportunity to repel it or defend themselves, for what is
decisive in treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to defend
themselves or to retaliate.
In the case at bar, the RTC gave more weight to the testimony of Carmela Tagpis in
establishing the presence of treachery in the manner with which the accused-appellant carried out
the violent killings of Felipe and Ranil.
Carmela categorically pointed to Rosendo as the person who entered the house of Felipe.
She clearly stated that the attack was not preceded by any fight between the accused-appellant and
Felipe. Without any provocation, Rosendo suddenly delivered fatal hacking blows to Felipe. The
abruptness of the unexpected assault rendered Felipe defenseless and deprived him of any
opportunity to repel the attack and retaliate. As Felipe was carrying his grandson Ranil, the child
unfortunately suffered the same fatal end as that of his grandfather. In the killing of Ranil, the trial
court likewise correctly appreciated the existence of treachery.
The said circumstance may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was
not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the
two persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack or become aware of it. The
killing of a child is characterized by treachery even if the manner of assault is not shown. For the
weakness of the victim due to his tender years results in the absence of any danger to the accused.
On the strength of the evidence of the prosecution, we sustain the ruling of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals that the circumstance of treachery qualified the killings of Felipe and Ranil to
murder.
The Court finds erroneous, however, the trial courts and the Court of Appeals appreciation
of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to aggravate a
Page 131 of 299
We agree with Cleofe and Leonardo that alibi is indeed a good defense and could certainly
exculpate a person accused of a crime. However, this is true only if the accuseds alibi strictly meets the
following requisites: 1. His presence at another place at the time of the commission of the crime; and 2.
The physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.
Facts:
Accused Lorenza Madeloso y Demecillo (Lorenza) and victim Nelson Madeloso (Nelson) are
spouses with five children. In 1994, accused Lorenza met accused Cleofe Baroquillo y Villanueva
(Cleofe) and nurtured a special friendship that culminated to an amorous relationship.
Accused Lorenza disclosed to her kumare Ellen Dajao (Ellen), her intimacy with accused
Cleofe. Accused Lorenza told Ellen that she wanted her husband killed because he no longer gives
her money.
Accused Lorenza went to her father-in-law Gregorio Madeloso (Gregorio), in Cotabato City
to get the P23,000.00 which the latter promised as financial assistance for her intended trip abroad.
On the same day, accused Lorenza went back to Iligan City with the money.
On 10 January 2001, at around twelve oclock noon, accused Lorenza met and had lunch with
accused Cleofe and accused Leonardo Mahilum (Leonardo) at Dados Lechon House.
At around 8:15 p.m., Lorenza, with one of her children, arrived home. Nelson flagged down
Meneleo, their neighbor driving his motorcycle. When the latter asked where he was headed,
Nelson responded, "Mamang(Lorenza) called for me."
At around nine oclock in the evening, in Bagong Silang, Nelson was shot dead by accused
Leonardo. The prosecution witness, Ricky Ramos (Ricky), saw the incident while walking on his
way home. He recounted that he saw Nelson sitting by the gutter of the road when two (2) men,
identified later on as accused Cleofe and Leonardo, crossed the street and approached Nelson.
Accused Cleofe pulled Nelson up towards him and held him, while Leonardo pulled out a gun from
his side and shot Nelson in the head several times.
Neighbors, then accompanied accused Lorenza to Bagong Silang. When accused Lorenza saw her
husbands lifeless body, she embraced him and cried but her cry allegedly x x x appeared feigned
and insincere.
When the police received the information of accused Lorenza and accused Cleofes extra-marital
affair, Lorenza was invited to the police station for questioning where she confessed her illicit
relation with accused Cleofe.
While at the police station, Lorenza received a phone call from Leonardo. Leonardo
instructed her to meet him at Dados Lechon House to which she agreed with the approval of the
police. Accused Lorenza, together with the police, arrived at Dados Lechon House. After thirty
minutes, accused Leonardo arrived and sat at the table occupied by accused Lorenza. The police
approached the two accused persons and invited accused Leonardo to the police station for
questioning.
Page 134 of 299
Cleofe and Leonardo, along with Lorenza, were charged with Murder under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code before the RTC. Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.
RTC convicted all three accused of Murder.
The Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the RTC in so far as it found accused Cleofe
Baroquillo y Villanueva and Leonardo Mahilum y Caete GUILTY of murder. While, accused Lorenza
Madeloso y Demecillo is ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.
The Court of Appeals agreed that Cleofe and Leonardo were guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the murder of Nelson, it found the evidence against Lorenza insufficient to convict her as a
principal by inducement.
The prosecution presented none of the percepto (command) or pacto (consideration)
required to establish the liability of accused Lorenza. It bears stressing that it is incumbent upon
the prosecution to prove that accused Lorenza had an influence over accused Cleofe and Leonardo
so great that such inducement would be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by
the material executor. We can only surmise, at the very least, the motive of the other accused, Cleofe
and Leonardo, in killing Nelson. But, our surmises and conjectures, no matter how strong, are no
substitute to proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Can the Court reverse the decision of the RTC and CA convicting accused Cleofe and
Leonardo of the crime of murder?
Ruling:
No, the Court cannot deviate from the decisions of the lower court.
Cleofe and Leonardo were charged and convicted of Murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code:
Art. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or
assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other
means involving great waste and ruin;
The other witness, Pedro Luzon, corroborates the testimony of Maria Liza Patricio.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals brushed aside the alleged inconsistencies in the
testimonies of Maria Liza and Pedro, these being relatively trivial and insignificant, neither
pertaining to the act constitutive of the crime committed nor to the identity of the assailant. Also,
these minor contradictions were expected from said witnesses as they differ in their impressions of
the incident and vantage point in relation to the victim and the accused-appellant.
In the observation of the Court, the accused is inconsistent and he talked unintelligibly. His
testimony is not credible and perceived to be flimsy excuses. If it is true that his wife was with him
at the time of the incident and he was not involved in the stabbing, why did he have to leave the
place and his wife and go to the house of his parents-in-law rather than their house? The accused
should have presented his wife to corroborate his testimony in that regard, and also his parents-inlaw so the latter can testify regarding the alleged visitors, the alleged parents of one Dodong
Danieles who came to their place when the accused was also there days after the incident, telling
him not to help the family of the victim.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant is guilty only of homicide in the
absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In a number of cases, surveyed in People v.
Rivera,we ruled that treachery cannot be appreciated simply because the attack was sudden and
unexpected:
[W]e agree with accused-appellant that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not
established. Surveying the leading decisions on this question, in People v. Romeo Magaro we
recently stated:
In People v. Magallanes, this Court held:
"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. Thus, for treachery or alevosia to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the
prosecution must establish the concurrence of two (2) conditions: (a) that at the time of the attack,
the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) that the offender consciously adopted the
particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. . . .
. . . where the meeting between the accused and the victim was casual and the attack was
done impulsively, there is no treachery even if the attack was sudden and unexpected. As has been
aptly observed the accused could not have made preparations for the attack, . . .; and the means,
method and form thereof could not therefore have been thought of by the accused, because the
attack was impulsively done.
Treachery cannot also be presumed from the mere suddenness of the attack. . . .
Applying these principles to the case at bar, we hold that the prosecution has not proven
that the killing was committed with treachery. Although accused-appellant shot the victim from
behind, the fact was that this was done during a heated argument. Accused-appellant, filled with
anger and rage, apparently had no time to reflect on his actions. It was not shown that he
Page 139 of 299
After a thorough review of the testimonies of all the witnesses and other evidence
presented, we find no reason to disturb the findings of fact of the trial court. As we have held time
and again, factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
generally conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record.
This Court observes that in the case at bar, counsels for both sides went the extra mile in
questioning the witnesses through in-depth cross-examinations, re-direct and re-cross
examinations, and even bringing them back as rebuttal and sur-rebuttal witnesses. The trial court,
for its part, was also very active in trying to ascertain the credibility of the witnesses. The trial court
thus had every opportunity to take advantage of observing the witnesses demeanor, conduct, and
attitude, as well as the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of their voices, as potent aids in
ascertaining which of them were telling the truth. As we find nothing material in the records which
the trial court seems to have ignored, misunderstood or misconstrued that could warrant the
reversal of its factual findings, said findings should be affirmed.
Gary hinges his defense mainly on discrediting Nestor Ardet, Antonio Ardets brother. The
testimony of Nestor Ardet, however, was clear and straightforward. The defenses contentions
against his ability to have seen the incident are likewise merely excessive nitpicking. Based on
experience, a three-inch opening of either a door or a window is certainly wide enough to give the
observer a full view of the outside if he peeps (peering with the eyes very close to the crevice)
through it, as Nestor said he did. The defense likewise failed to show how the barbed-wire fence,
the roof of the porch, and the elevation of Antonios house could have completely blocked Nestors
view of the house.
We are also more inclined to believe the testimony of Nestor Ardet over that of his sister,
Linda Alinao. While both are siblings of the deceased, Antonio Ardet, Linda Alinao is the wife of
Gary himself, and is naturally expected to be protective of him. Linda Alinaos testimony is likewise
hearsay as she was not present when Nestor Ardet was allegedly maltreated and forced to testify
against her husband. Furthermore, we cannot emphasize enough that Nestor Ardet and Linda
Alinao were recalled on the same trial date to refute each others testimonies. The trial court was
thus afforded an even better opportunity to observe their demeanor, conduct, attitude, gesture, and
inflection of their voices, and ultimately believed Nestor over Linda.
2. Evident premeditation must be considered.
For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must be proved:
a. the time when the accused determined to commit the crime;
b. an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and,
c. sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act.
The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during
a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.
In the case at bar, Gary, in razing Antonio Ardets house in order to drive him out and
shooting him the moment he appears at his front door, clearly had a previously and carefully crafted
plan to kill his victim. We are convinced that the time it took Gary and his son to device their plan,
plot where the gasoline should be poured, and procure the gasoline and the firearms, as well as the
Page 145 of 299
The Medico Legal Certificate indicated a presence of hymenal laceration. The old healed
hymenal laceration could have been inflicted on the victim a month or more prior to the date of the
examination, depending however on the healing process of the patient.
Sobusa testified that he only came to know about the filing of this case against him in May,
2000 and upon knowing this, he voluntarily surrendered to SPO1 Juanito Molinas, Jr. of San Miguel
PNP and he was placed in the lock up cell.
He denied having raped AAA because being employed as Security Guard of the PNB, Iloilo
Branch, his duty was always during night time, from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. or from 11 p.m. until 7 a.m. In
the months of March and April 2000, according to him, he was on night shift duty every day, and he
also had Daily Time Records showing the schedule of his duties as security guard.
He further stated that this case was only instigated by DDD, sister of his wife, their aunts and
cousins because according to them, he is a gambler, a drunkard and he had another family and they
wanted to separate them.
The testimony of the accused was corroborated by his aunt Margarita Sobusa. She testified
that the family of BBB was not in good terms with the family of Sobusa and she knew this fact
because Sobusa also shared his problem with her. According to her, the family of BBB does not
favor her marriage to the Sobusa because the latter had another family, and the money sent by BBB
to him was spent by the accused in his gambling activity.
The fact of Sobusas surrender to the police authorities was testified to by SPO1 Juanito
Molinos, a PNP member assigned at the San Miguel Police Station.
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented evidence to refute Sobusas claim that he was on
duty every night on the month of April of 2000 and to show that AAA was raped sometime on April
11 to 15, 2000.
The prosecution presented Severino Pago, Chief Security assigned at the PNB main branch.
Sobusa was under him since May, 1994, until this case was filed against him in the year 2000.
According to him accused Sobusa reported for day duty on April 10-16, 2000 and on April 15 he
was not on duty.
AAA testified that she was not very sure of the exact date when she was raped but as far as
she can remember, it was only a few days before the Holy Week. AAA stated that she was sure that
she was raped between the dates April 11 to 15, 2000.
Both trial court and appellate court found him guilty of qualified rape.
Issue:
Whether or not Sobusa is guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling:
Yes, the Court sustained his conviction of rape, qualified by AAAs minority and relationship
with him.
Page 165 of 299
There are three settled principles in reviewing evidence on rape cases: (1) an accusation for
rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused, though
innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Accused was convicted beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape on the basis
of the following: (1) AAAs credible testimony concerning the rape incident; (2) AAAs positive
identification of accused-appellant as the one who raped her; (3) physical evidence consistent with
AAAs assertion that she was raped; and (4) the absence of ill motive on AAAs part in filing the
charge.
Testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for when a woman or a girlchild says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
indeed committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
AAAs testimony that she was raped is highly trustworthy not only because of the fact that
she was merely a young lass below twelve years of age at the time she testified before the trial court
who would not concoct a sordid tale against his stepfather whom she endearingly calls papa but
more so because of her candid, positive, direct, and consistent narration of how her stepfather
sexually abused her.
Jurisprudence is likewise settled that when the rape victims testimony is corroborated by
the physicians finding of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the
essential requisite of carnal knowledge. Laceration, whether healed or fresh, is the best physical
evidence of forcible defloration.
The prosecution successfully established the qualifying circumstance of relationship of AAA
with Sobusa as well as her minority. AAA is the stepdaughter of the accused-appellant in view of the
marriage of AAAs mother with accused-appellant. The birth certificate of AAA, on the other hand,
proves that she was only 10 years old on the month of April of the year 2000 or at the time the rape
was committed.
Ill motive on the part of AAAs family in the filing of this case is bereft of convincing
evidence. The Court has consistently held that no family member would expose a fellow family
member to the ignominy of a rape trial or to the shame and scandal of having to undergo such a
debasing ordeal merely to satisfy their alleged motive if the charge is not true. The Court did not
believe that the relatives of AAA would subject the latter to the humiliating and agonizing
experience of a public trial just to falsely accuse a person of the commission of the crime of rape.
Aside from the fact that AAA positively testified that the accused-appellant was her
assailant and that she was raped a few days before the start of the Holy Week of the year 2000 or
sometime on April 11 to 15, 2000, the daily time records of the accused-appellant easily belie his
claim that he worked on the night shifts from April 10 to 16, 2000.
Jurisprudence requires that a surrender, to be voluntary, must be spontaneous and must
clearly indicate the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities. The
Page 166 of 299
AAAs mother, testified that AAA was ten years old when the incident happened since she
was born on July 18, 1987 as shown by her birth certificate. She was then troubled by the unusual
questions of her daughter such as: Mama, is my stomach getting bigger? and Mama, is my neck
beating faster? She then confronted AAA and asked her if somebody molested her. AAA confessed.
AAA underwent physical examination which was conducted by Dr. Maribel Lazo. Dr. Lazo
explained that the findings meant that the hymen had been ruptured and that the laceration took
place longer than two weeks before the day of the physical examination or that AAA was no longer
a virgin at that time.
Bagos denied swimming or bathing in the river near his house at that time, and claimed that
he only went near the river to gather coconuts. He has known AAAs parents for approximately ten
years because they were neighbors. AAAs grandmother and his father are also first cousins. He
insisted that he stayed at the river bank while gathering coconuts, but never went near AAA. He
denied that he raped AAA, much less squatted on the river while raping AAA since he has a physical
defect that renders him incapable of squatting down.
He recounted that when he went to their barangay hall, the barangay captain asked him if
he could afford to settle the case. He answered that he would not settle because he was innocent of
the crime charged against him. He speculated that AAAs family accused him of raping her due to a
family misunderstanding and boundary dispute.
Issue:
Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
Ruling:
Yes, the Court found Bagos guilty.
Accuseds contentions essentially assail the credibility of AAAs testimony. The Court held
that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the
finding of the trial court unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result of the case. This is so because the trial court is in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial.
The victim in the present case was only ten years old when the rape happened. Despite her
very young age, her narration of her ordeal on the witness stand was straightforward, spontaneous
and candid. Under rigid cross-examination, she was steadfast in the telling of the incident.
The prosecution has adequately established that the complainant was only 10 years old at
the time of the rape incident, as evidenced by her Certificate of Live Birth. Undeniably, the instant
case is one of statutory rape, the gravamen of which is the carnal knowledge of a woman below 12
years old. Sexual congress with a girl under 12 years is always rape. Thus, force, intimidation or
physical evidence of injury is immaterial.
Ruling:
No. The trial court did not erred in proving the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
Nelson is charged in Criminal Case No. 763-T with statutory rape considering that AAA
was then below 12 years old. The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape, as provided for in
Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is the carnal knowledge of a
woman below 12 years old. Sexual congress then with a girl under 12 years of age is always
rape. Thus, force, intimidation or physical evidence of injury are immaterial. To convict an accused
of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution must prove: first, the age of the complainant; second,
the identity of the accused; and last but not the least, the carnal knowledge between the accused
and the complainant As shown by AAAs Certificate of Live Birth, she was born on February 3,
1989. Hence, on April 24, 1999, when the rape charge in Criminal Case No. 763-T supposedly took
place, she was only 10 years and 2 months old. Inside the court room, AAA identified her first
cousin Nelson as her rapist. The remaining element of statutory rape which needed to be
established herein is carnal knowledge between Nelson and AAA.
The Court stresses that in the crime of rape, complete or full penetration of the
complainants private part is not at all necessary. Neither is the rupture of the hymen
essential. What is fundamental is that the entry or at least the introduction of the male organ into
the labia of the pudendum is proved. The mere introduction of the male organ into the labia majora
of the victims genitalia, even without the full penetration of the complainants vagina, consummates
the crime. Hence, the touching or entry of the penis into the labia majora or the labia minora of the
pudendum of the victims genitalia consummates rape.
The Court has carefully gone over the records of this case, particularly, the transcript of
stenographic notes to ferret out the truth and we find AAAs testimony on the incident that took
place on April 24, 1999 to be candid, straightforward, truthful, and convincing, consistent with the
finding of the RTC, which had the opportunity to closely observe AAA as she was giving her
testimony. AAA was able to describe with the simplicity of a child the ordeal that she suffered, even
vividly recounting the pain caused by Nelsons penetration of her female organ, AAA broke down
and cried while narrating on the witness stand how she was sexually abused by Nelson. Such
spontaneous emotional outburst strengthens her credibility. The crying of a victim during her
testimony bolstered her credibility with the verity borne out of human nature and experience. As
previously held, when a young girl like private complainant cries rape, she is saying in effect all that
is necessary to show that rape has indeed been committed. It is settled that when the victims
testimony is corroborated by the physicians finding of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to
conclude the existence of the essential requisite of carnal knowledge. Laceration, whether healed or
fresh, is the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.
Nelsons defense consisted mainly of denial and alibi. Mere denial without any strong
evidence to support it cannot prevail over AAAs categorical and positive identification of
Nelson. His alibi is likewise unavailing. We give scant consideration to Nelsons claim that he went to
Barangay Lallalayug, Tuao, Cagayan, with five companions from Barangay x x x to play basketball in
the morning of April 24, 1999, after which, they stayed at the house of a certain Fred Ocab until
4:00 oclock in the afternoon. Nelson did not present as corroborating witness any one of his
supposed five companions to Barangay Lallalayug in the morning of April 24, 1999 or Fred Ocab in
Page 174 of 299
The qualifying circumstances of age and relationship were not only properly alleged in the
information but were also duly established by the prosecution during the trial of the cases against
Ogarte. Records show that AAA submitted a certification from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of Labason, Zamboanga del Norte that her birth records appear in its Register of Births and that her
date of birth is listed as "June 24, 1980." Under the above guidelines in establishing the victims age,
this certification qualifies as an authentic document.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO MIRANDA y MICHAEL
G.R. No. 176634, April 5, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under the instances provided for
in the law. With the intrinsic nature of the said crime, only two parties, namely the victim and the
accused, are usually involved. As such, accuseds defense of denial will not stand as against the victims
positive identification and credible testimony. This is especially so when it is qualified by minority and
relationship and the victim has no improper motive in purporting the accused as the perpetrator.
Moreover, in rape committed by a father or a person recognized by the victim as her father, the
prosecution need not prove the elements of force and intimidation as the same was substituted by the
formers moral ascendancy and influence over the latter.
Facts:
About noontime of June 23, 2000, AAA, a seventeen year-old young lady, while fetching
water in a "poso" near their house, came to learn that the live-in partner of her father died, hence,
she went to her fathers house to condole. Her father then told her to look after her half-brother,
CCC, and half-sister, BBB. She stayed at his house, cooked food and washed the dishes. She slept that
night with her half-sister in the sala. On the following day, June 24, 2000, her father left in the
morning but returned at lunch time and stayed in the house for the rest of the day. She was,
however, not feeling well because of a high fever and headache accompanied by vomiting spills
which started at noontime of the same day. After having dinner and while she was washing the
dishes, her father came to know of her condition and he told his daughter, BBB to finish the dish
washing. She then went to the room and after wearing a pajama over her shorts and panty, she put
on the mosquito net. She then laid down and while preparing herself to rest and go to sleep, she
watched TV from 8:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. with a "Good Morning" towel stuck on her mouth to
prevent her from vomiting. When her father turned off the TV, she asked for the "Vicks Vaporub"
placed at the side of the TV set. Accused then entered the mosquito net and volunteered to massage
her head. While he was massaging her head, she felt that both his elbows were touching her breasts.
She tried to evade his elbows saying she would be the one to do the massaging but he refused. In an
attempt to forestall her fathers acts, she told him that she will tell her mother about it which made
him stop and instead, he massaged her hands. He then kissed her on her neck while slowly lifting
her T-shirt who thereafter sucked her breasts causing her to push him hard telling him not to do it
to her. Only his two children were inside the house but both were already asleep at that time. After
sucking her breasts, he used his left hand in slowly pulling down her pajama and thereafter her
short and panty. He then held both her arms and with his head going down, he licked her vagina.
She resisted and tried to kick the wall to create some noise to awaken her half-siblings but he did
not stop. Out of fear of being hurt by her father, whom as testified by AAA, she saw with red eyes for
the first time, she did not shout for help. Thereafter, he removed his shorts with a garter and his
brief and she turned her back to him but he embraced her to make her face him. Then and there, he
laid on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt an entry into her vagina which she
Page 180 of 299
The CA upheld the conviction of Arnel Manjares for all twenty-seven (27) counts of rape.
Are all the essential elements of rape present in the case at bar?
Ruling:
Whether or not the date of the commission of the rape is an essential element of the crime
Ruling:
No, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime of rape,
for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman.
In particular, Article 266-A(1)(d) spells out the definition of the crime of statutory rape, the
elements of which are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a
woman is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented. The provision came into existence by
virtue of Republic Act No. 8353, or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on October 22,
1997.
Prior to this date, the crime of rape was penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. The elements of statutory rape in Article 266-A and Art. 335 are essentially the same.
Thus, whether the first incident of rape charged in this case did occur in 1995, i.e., before
the amendment of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, or in 1998, after the effectivity of the AntiRape Law of 1997, the prosecution has the burden to establish the fact of carnal knowledge and the
age of AAA at the time of the commission of the rape.
Contrary to the posturing of the Juntilla, the date of the commission of the rape is not an
essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a
woman. Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the
crime are not grounds for acquittal.
As regards the first incident of rape, the RTC credited with veracity the substance of AAAs
testimony. In the instant case, we have thoroughly scrutinized the testimony of AAA and we found
no cogent reason to disturb the finding of the RTC that Juntilla indeed committed the first incident
of rape charged. AAA positively identified the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the dastardly
crimes. With tears in her eyes, she clearly and straightforwardly narrated the said incident of rape.
The testimony of AAA was also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Capungcol
and Dr. Gagala, who found old, healed, incomplete hymenal lacerations on the private part of AAA.
When the testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis
to conclude that there has been carnal knowledge.
2) Whether or not respondent should be convicted of statutory rape as ruled by the lower
3) Whether or not the Appellate Court erred in disregarding respondents defenses of denial
and alibi.
Ruling:
1. No, respondent should not be acquitted.
It is settled in jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted
solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things.
We affirm the lower courts in ruling that all the elements of rape are present in the case at
bar. The victims clear and credible testimony coupled with the corroboration made by the medical
findings of Dr. Pang points positively to the conclusion that appellant indeed committed the crime
of rape attributed to him. In her testimony, VEA was clear and straightforward, not to mention
consistent, in her recollection of the details of her sexual abuse in the hands of respondent.
Contrary to respondents assertions, Dr. Pangs medical findings support, rather than negate, VEAs
accusation of rape.
Appellant is grossly mistaken in his contention that no rape occurred because the
prosecution did not prove that his penis penetrated the vagina of the victim. Such an argument is of
little consequence in light of jurisprudence declaring that penetration of the penis, however slight,
of the labia minora constitutes consummated rape.
Following a long line of jurisprudence, full penetration of the female genital organ is not
indispensable. It suffices that there is proof of the entrance of the male organ into the labia of the
pudendum of the female organ. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ, however
slight, is sufficient. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without
rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify conviction for rape.
2. No, respondent is guilty of simple rape, not statutory rape.
Page 202 of 299
Although the Court is convinced that indeed rape had been committed by appellant, we find
that the prosecution failed to present VEAs birth certificate or to otherwise unequivocally prove
that VEA was indeed below 12 years of age at the time of the incident in question. In view of this
paucity in the prosecutions evidence on the matter of the victims age, jurisprudence compels us to
reclassify appellants offense as simple rape.
In appreciating age as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, the following
guidelines were formulated in response to the seemingly conflicting decisions regarding the
sufficiency of evidence of the victims age in rape cases:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of
the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims
mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided
that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of
the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
Measured against the jurisprudential guidelines that this Court has set forth, VEA and her
mothers testimonies cannot be given sufficient weight to establish her age with moral certainty, for
in the absence of relevant documentary evidence or an express admission from the accused, the
bare testimony of the victims mother or a member of the family would suffice only if the victim is
alleged to be below seven years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12
years old. In the present case, VEA was supposedly 10 years of age on the material date stated in the
Information.
Nevertheless, simple rape was proven to have been committed by appellant since he is the
common-law spouse of VEAs mother and, thus, exercises moral ascendancy over VEA. In a recent
case, we reiterated that the moral ascendancy of an accused over the victim renders it unnecessary
to show physical force and intimidation. Indeed, in rape committed by a close kin, such as the
victims father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that
actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence
or intimidation.
The elements of the crime charged against accused-appellant are: (a) the victim is a female
over 12 years but under 18 years of age; (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either
through force, threat, or intimidation.
There is no dispute that the first two elements exist in this case. Documentary and
testimonial evidence, including accused-appellants own admission, establish that AAA is the
daughter of accused-appellant and BBB and she was born on April 30, 1985. This means that AAA
was almost or already 13 years old when she was raped in April 1998.
As to the third element of the crime, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals ruled that it was
duly proven as well, giving weight and credence to AAAs testimony. AAA was able to describe in
detail how accused-appellant mounted her, undressed her, and successfully penetrated her against
her will, one night in April 1998.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO DELIGERO y BACASMOT
G.R. No. 189280, April 17, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro
In rape committed by close kin, such as the victims father, stepfather, uncle, or the
common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed.
Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.
The sweetheart theory, as a defense, necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first element of
rape.
Facts:
Accused-appellant was charged with qualified rape in an Information dated December 16,
2002. On September 9, 2003, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented complainant AAA and Medico-Legal Officer Dr.
Edgar S. Savella. AAA was already seventeen (17) years old at the time of her testimony before the
court a quo. She was barely thirteen (13) years old when appellant allegedly raped her. Appellant is
AAAs granduncle, being the brother of her paternal grandfather. Appellant had eight (8) children
from his estranged wife who lived in another barangay. AAA fondly calls appellant Papa. In the
early part of 2000, appellant resided with AAAs family for about four (4) months. After building his
own house, appellant moved in to his new house. AAA also transferred to appellants new house.
AAAs parents were promised by appellant that he would send AAA to school. AAA recalled that she
lived with appellant for about three (3) years and during those years, AAA claimed to have been
raped by appellant many times. Dr. Edgar S. Savella, medico-legal officer of NBI Caraga Regional
Office testified that when he examined AAA, the latter was already pregnant. He found no laceration
in AAAs hymen.
For the defense, appellant testified that AAAs father is his nephew, being the son of his
brother. Appellant disclosed AAA became his lover. Appellant further testified that when he moved
in to his new house, AAA moved in with him as well. Appellant claimed that from that time on, he
and AAA were already living together as husband and wife. The alleged amorous relationship
between him and AAA was known to the public, particularly their neighbors.
Accused appellant Moises Caoile, in two separate Amended Informations filed before the
RTC on January 5, 2006, was charged with two separate counts of Rape of a Demented Person
under Article 266A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code. Caoile pleaded not guilty to both
charges upon his arraignment for both cases on March 1, 2006. The antecedents of this case, as
narrated by the prosecution, are as follows: [AAA], the herein victim, was left in the care of her
Page 218 of 299
Can the lack of knowledge of the accused that the victim suffers from mental retardation
sufficient to absolve him of the crime of rape?
Ruling:
No. Article 266A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides for two
circumstances when having carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental disability is considered
rape: 1. Paragraph 1(b): when the offended party is deprived of reason x x x and 2. Paragraph 1(d):
when the offended party is x x x demented. Caoile was charged in the Amended Informations with
rape of a demented person under paragraph 1(d). The term demented refers to a person who has
dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from the
individuals former intellectual level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the
other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1(b) has been interpreted to include
those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. Thus, AAA, who was clinically
diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person who is deprived of
reason, and not one who is demented.
Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under Article 266A,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. This is because a mentally deficient person
is automatically considered incapable of giving consent to a sexual act. Thus, what needs to be
proven are the facts of sexual intercourse between the accused and the victim, and the victims
mental retardation. Verily, the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish that AAA is a mental
retardate. Anent the fact of sexual congress, it is worthy to note that aside from the prosecutions
own testimonial and documentary evidence, Caoile never denied being physically intimate with
AAA. In fact, he has confirmed such fact, and even claimed that he and AAA often had sex, they being
sweethearts.
Based on the foregoing provision, the elements of rape under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code are:
(1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and
(2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under 12 years of age.
The records of this case reveal that the prosecution has sufficiently demonstrated that there
is ample evidence to prove that Espenilla had carnal knowledge of the then minor victim through
the use of force and intimidation. The testimony of AAA pertaining to the rape incident at issue
articulates in blunt detail her horrific experience at the hands of Espenilla.
It is a settled doctrine in our jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may
be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. It is likewise elementary that the
issue of credibility of witnesses is resolved primarily by the trial court since it is in a better position
to decide the same after having heard the witnesses and observed their conduct, deportment and
manner of testifying; accordingly, the findings of the trial court are entitled to the highest degree of
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that it overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which would
otherwise affect the result of the case. In other words, as we have repeatedly declared in the past,
the trial judges evaluation, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, binds the Court, leaving to the
accused the burden to bring to the Courts attention facts or circumstances of weight that were
overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted by the lower courts but would materially affect the
disposition of the case differently if duly considered. Unfortunately, Epenilla failed to discharge this
burden.
We find that the testimony of AAA was indeed delivered in a clear and straightforward
manner; thus, the same is worthy of the belief that was bestowed upon it by the trial court and later
by the Court of Appeals.
Lastly, we declare that the Affidavit of Recantation executed by BBB, AAAs father, fails to
convince considering that the said document, which seeks to exculpate appellant from the charge of
rape, was unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
Courts have long been skeptical of recantations of testimonies for they can easily be
obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary consideration. A retraction does not
necessarily negate an earlier declaration.
In rape cases particularly, the conviction or acquittal of the accused often depends almost
entirely on the credibility of the complainants testimony. By the very nature of this crime, it is
generally unwitnessed and usually the victim is left to testify for herself. When a rape victims
testimony is straightforward and marked with consistency despite grueling examination, it
deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be discarded. If such testimony is clear, consistent
and credible to establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt, a conviction may be based on it,
Page 230 of 299
d) In the event that both the birth certificate or other authentic documents and testimonies
of the victims mother or other qualified relative are unavailable, the testimony of the victim
may be admitted in evidence provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the
accused.
It is prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of
the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. The
trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
In this case, the victims mother testified that her daughter (AAA) was born on February 9,
2001 and was eight years old at the time of the rape. The victim herself categorically stated in her
Sworn Statement and Supplemental Sworn Statement that she was eight years old. Even accusedappellant, in his testimony before the trial court, confirmed that the victim was 8 years old in March
2011.
Therefore, since the rape of victim was qualified by AAAs minority and the accuseds
paternity, the Court of Appeals was correct in determining the proper penalty that can be imposed
upon the accused which is reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERVIN GAHI
G.R. No. 202976, February 19, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
It is jurisprudentially settled that when a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that she has been raped and her testimony alone is sufficient if it satisfies the
exacting standard of credibility needed to convict the accused. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the fate of the
accused in a rape case, ultimately and oftentimes, hinges on the credibility of the victims testimony. In
this regard, the Court defers to the trial courts assessment of the credibility of victims testimony, most
especially, when it is affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Furthermore, it is not absurd nor contrary to human experience that AAA gave birth ten (10)
months after the alleged sexual assault as there may be cases of long gestations.
Facts:
AAA is sixteen years old and a resident of x x x, Leyte. She testified that she knows accused
Mervin Gahi (Mervin), the latter being the husband of her aunt DDD. Mervin was charged of two
instances of rape against AAA.
On the first instance of rape, AAA recounted that on March 11, 2002 at about 11:30 in the
morning, she was in her grandmothers house, who was then out of the house to collect money from
debtors. While she was in the living room mopping the floor, Mervin arrived in the house. AAA
recounted that Mervin came near her and instructed her to "Lie down, lie down". Fearful upon
hearing Mervins orders, AAA stopped mopping the floor. Mervin, with his right hand, then held
AAAs right arm. He pushed AAA, causing her to lose her balance and fall on the floor. Mervin raised
AAAs skirt and proceeded to take off her underwear. Mervin was holding a knife poking it at AAAs
right breast. Fearful for her life, AAA did not resist Mervins initial advances. After taking off AAAs
underwear, Mervin went on top of her and while in that position, he took off his shorts, inserted his
penis inside her vagina and ejaculated. AAAs efforts to free herself from Mervins hold were
Page 245 of 299
Whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of appellant Jastiva beyond reasonable
doubt on the basis of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the documentary evidence
presented.
Ruling:
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of rape, viz:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation.
From the above-quoted provision of law, the elements of rape (under paragraph 1,
subparagraph a) are as follows: (1) that the offender is a man; (2) that the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and (3) that such act is accomplished by using force, (threat) or
intimidation.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals were one in finding that appellant Jastiva had carnal
knowledge of AAA against the latters will through force and intimidation. Despite his vigorous
protestations, this Court agrees in the finding that the crime of rape committed by appellant Jastiva
against AAA was proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the following:
a) AAAs credible, positive and categorical testimony relative to the circumstances
surrounding her rape;
b) AAAs positive identification of appellant Jastiva as the one who raped her;
c) The physical evidence consistent with AAAs assertion that she was raped; and
d) The absence of ill motive on the part of AAA in filing the complaint against
appellant Jastiva.
Firstly, the appeal of appellant Jastiva centers on the credibility of AAA, the main
prosecution witness. But credibility of a witness is the sole province of the RTC being the trial court
in this case. Basic is the rule that the findings of fact of the trial court on matters of credibility of
witnesses are generally conclusive on this Court, which is not a trier of facts. Such conclusiveness
derives from the trial courts having the first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor and
manner of the victim when he/she testified at the trial. 42 Undeniably, the calibration of the
testimony of a witness, and the assessment of the probative weight thereof, are virtually left, almost
entirely, to the trial court which has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness at the
stand. Unless there are substantial matters that might have been overlooked or discarded,
generally, the findings of the trial court as to the credibility of a witness will not be disturbed on
appeal.
It is worthy to recall the three guiding principles in rape prosecutions: (1) an accusation of
rape is easy to make, and difficult to prove, but it is even more difficult to disprove; (2) bearing in
mind the intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
utmost care and caution; and (3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits; and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. So, when a woman says that
she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that the crime of rape was
Page 253 of 299
Ruling:
The appeal is denied.
Basic in the prosecution of statutory rape is that there must be concurrence of the following
elements:
1. the victim is a female under 12 years of age or is demented; and
2. the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim.
Thus, to successfully convict an accused for said crime, it is imperative for the prosecution to prove
that the age of the woman is under 12 years and carnal knowledge took place.
In this case, Besmonte was charged with two counts of statutory rape. The RTC and the
Court of Appeals were one in finding that he twice had carnal knowledge of AAA, a child of tender
years at the time of the commission of the two counts of rape. Despite his vigorous protestations,
Time and again, this Court has recognized that different people react differently to a given situation
involving a startling occurrence. The workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress
are unpredictable, and people react differently - some may shout, others may faint, and still others
may be shocked into insensibility even if there may be a few who may openly welcome the
intrusion. More to the point, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman
involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO
G.R. No. 196315, October 22, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
We differentiated the terms "deprived of reason" and "demented," as follows, the term
demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated mentality,
characterized by marked decline from the individual's former intellectual level and often by emotional
apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1 (b)
has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation.
Thus, AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified as a
person who is "deprived of reason," and not one who is "demented."
Facts:
BBB (AAAs mother) testified that she knew accused-appellant Cataytay as her neighbor in
their compound in Mandaluyong City. Accused appellant was a shoe repairman who had a shop six
houses away from BBBs house. Thirty minutes later, her neighbor, Lito, told her that there was a
problem, and brought her to the barangay outpost. AAA and the accused appellant were already at
the outpost. When BBB saw AAA, the latter told her, "Mommy, ni-rape po ako." BBB asked her who
raped her. AAA responded by pointing to accused-appellant.
During the interviews made by the barangay officials, AAA narrated how she was raped by
accused appellant, which ended when a certain "Mimi" knocked at the door. When Cataytay
answered the knock, Mimi told the former that she will shout if he does not leave the house. AAA
went out of the house and sought help from their neighbors. One of their neighbors, Amelita
Morante, called the barangay officials at the outpost.
BBB identified a Psychological Evaluation Report from the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD), which was conducted in connection with another rape case. The report
stated that AAA had the mental capacity of an eight-year-old child. BBB also identified AAAs birth
certificate which showed that she was biologically 19 years old at the time of the incident.
On cross-examination, BBB confirmed that AAA was the victim in a rape case in 1999
against a certain Norberto Lerit. BBB admitted that she did not personally witness the alleged rape
committed by the accused appellant. Cataytay countered such allegation by defense of denial and
alibi.
RTC rendered its Judgment finding accused Cataytay liable for crime of rape which was
affirmed by CA.
Issue:
Page 265 of 299
In the case at bar, the allegation that AAA was accused-appellant Roxass niece in each
Information is therefore insufficient to constitute the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship. Instead, the applicable qualifying circumstance is that of the use of a deadly weapon,
for which the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Since there was no other aggravating
circumstance alleged in the Information and proven during the trial, the imposed penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count of rape is nonetheless proper even as we overturn the lower
courts appreciation of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.
KIDNAPPING
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AIDA MARQUEZ
G.R. No. 181440, April 13, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro
While one of the essential elements of this crime (Art 270 - Kidnapping and failure to return a
minor) is that the offender was entrusted with the custody of the minor, what is actually being
punished is not the kidnapping but the deliberate failure of that person to restore the minor to his
parents or guardians.
Facts:
On December 28, 1998, Respondent Marquez was charged with Kidnapping under Article
270 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 18, before the RTC. Respondent
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
According to the complainant, Carolina Cunanan Merano (Merano), she met Marquez at the
beauty parlor where she was working as a beautician. On September 6, 1998, Marquez allegedly
borrowed Meranos then three-month old daughter Justine Bernadette C. Merano (Justine) to buy
her some clothes, milk and food. Merano said she agreed because it was not unusual for Marquez to
bring Justine some things whenever she came to the parlor. When Marquez failed to return Justine
in the afternoon as promised, Merano went to her employers house to ask them for Marquezs
address. However, Merano said that her employers just assured her that Justine will be returned to
her soon.
Merano averred that she searched for her daughter but her efforts were unsuccessful until
she received a call from Marquez. During that call, Marquez allegedly told Merano that she will
return Justine to Merano the following day and that she was not able to do so because her own son
was sick and was confined at the hospital. When the supposed return of Justine did not happen,
Merano claimed that she went to Marquezs house, using the sketch that she got from her
employers driver, but Marquez was not home.
On February 11, 1999, Marquez allegedly called Merano up again to tell her to pick up her
daughter at Modesto Castillos (Castillo) house. The following day, Merano, accompanied by SPO2
Fernandez and SPO4 Rapal, went to the house of Castillo. Merano claimed that Castillo told her that
Marquez sold Justine to him and that they gave Marquez Sixty Thousand Pesos supposedly for
Merano who was asking for money. The Castillos asked Merano not to take Justine as they had
grown to love her but Merano refused. However, she was still not able to take Justine home with her
because the police advised her to go through the proper process. Merano then learned from Castillo
that in an effort to legalize the adoption of Justine, the Castillos turned over custody of Justine to the
Reception and Study Center for Children of the DSWD.
Page 268 of 299
On the 25th day, the kidnappers called but she was not around. On the following day, the
kidnappers again called her and instructed her to buy a cellular phone and advised her not to
withdraw money in the bank and wait for further instructions. Few days later, a policeman
informed her that her husband was released by the kidnappers. All of these was denied by the
respondents and questioned the inherent incredibilities and irrevocable inconsistencies of the
witnesses.
RTC found all the accused guilty of Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of
Persons by a Band and Kidnapping (for ransom) and Serious Illegal Detention which was affirmed
by the appellate court with modification as to penalty and damages.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents should be acquitted due to alleged inherent incredibilities and
irrevocable inconsistencies of the witnesses.
Ruling:
No, respondents are all guilty of the crimes of Robbery with Violence Against or
Intimidation of Persons by a Band and Kidnapping (for ransom) and Serious Illegal Detention.
As consistently adhered to by this Court, the matter of assigning values to declarations on
the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge, who had the
unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various
indicia available but not reflected on the record. Consequently, the settled rule is that when the
credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This is
more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is settled that when the trial
courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon
this Court. Without any clear showing that the trial court and the appellate court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance, the rule should
not be disturbed.
The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb, and is, therefore, conclusively bound by the
findings of fact and judgments of conviction rendered by the RTC, subsequently affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. The testimonies of Emelie and Crisologo established beyond reasonable doubt the
commission by accused-appellants of the crimes of robbery by a band and kidnapping for ransom.
The crime of robbery under Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code has the following
elements: (a) intent to gain, (b) unlawful taking, (c) personal property belonging to another, and (d)
violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things. Under Article 296 of the same Code,
when more than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of robbery, it shall be
deemed to have been committed by a band. It further provides that [a]ny member of a band who
is present at the commission of a robbery by the band, shall be punished as principal of any of the
assaults committed by the band, unless it be shown that he attempted to prevent the same.
Issue:
Whether or not Diu and Dayaon are guilty for the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Ruling:
Yes. They are guilty for the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
confluence of the following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit
robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to
commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during
or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to
be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless
imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery and
homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of
homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that aside
from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason
or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of
the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or
on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies
committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible
felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus,
includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.
Intent to rob is an internal act but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of
personal property. When the fact of asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt,
conviction of the accused is justified even if the property subject of the robbery is not presented in
court. After all, the property stolen may have been abandoned or thrown away and destroyed by
the robber or recovered by the owner. The prosecution is not burdened to prove the actual value of
the property stolen or amount stolen from the victim. Whether the robber knew the actual amount
in the possession of the victim is of no moment because the motive for robbery can exist regardless
of the exact amount or value involved.
When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took
part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible
felony of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it
clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same.
Ruling:
Yes. The elements of Estafa by means of deceit, whether committed by false pretenses or
concealment, are the following (a) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means; (b) That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed
prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; (c) That the offended party must have
relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with
his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (d) That
as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
In the prosecution for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, it is
indispensable that the element of deceit, consisting in the false statement or fraudulent
representation of the accused, be made prior to, or at least simultaneously with, the delivery of the
thing by the complainant.
The false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud, it being essential that such false statement or representation constitutes
the very cause or the only motive which induces the offended party to part with his money. In the
absence of such requisite, any subsequent act of the accused, however fraudulent and suspicious it
might appear, cannot serve as basis for prosecution for estafa under the said provision.
In the case at bar, the records would show that PSI was given assurance by petitioners that
they will pay the unpaid balance of their purchases from PSI when the CCTDs with petitioners
banks, the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. (RBBI) and/or the Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. (RBLI), and issued
under the name of PSI, would be presented for payment to RBBI and RBLI which, in turn, will pay
the amount of deposit stated thereon. The amounts stated in the CCTDs correspond to the purchase
cost of the machineries and equipment that co-petitioner Basilio Ambito bought from PSI as
evidenced by the Sales Invoices presented during the trial. It is uncontroverted that PSI did not
apply for and secure loans from RBBI and RBLI. In fine, PSI and co-petitioner Basilio Ambito were
engaged in a vendor-purchaser business relationship while PSI and RBBI/RBLI were connected as
depositor-depository. It is likewise established that petitioners employed deceit when they were
able to persuade PSI to allow them to pay the aforementioned machineries and equipment through
down payments paid either in cash or in the form of checks or through the CCTDs with RBBI and
RBLI issued in PSIs name with interest thereon. It was later found out that petitioners never made
any deposits in the said Banks under the name of PSI. In fact, the issuance of CCTDs to PSI was not
recorded in the books of RBBI and RBLI and the Deputy Liquidator appointed by the Central Bank
of the Philippines even corroborated this finding of anomalous bank transactions in her testimony
during the trial.
The pronouncement by the appeals court that a complex crime had been committed by
petitioners is proper because, whenever a person carries out on a public, official or commercial
document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC as a necessary means
to perpetrate another crime, like Estafa, Theft, or Malversation, a complex crime is formed by the
two crimes.
Under Article 48 of the RPC, a complex crime refers to (1) the commission of at least two
grave or less grave felonies that must both (or all) be the result of a single act, or (2) one offense
must be a necessary means for committing the other (or others). Negatively put, there is no
Page 281 of 299
Facts:
Sometime in 1998, Lourdes Lo persuaded private complainants to apply for a job in Italy through
the services of accused-appellants Grace Calimon and Aida Camila. Lo introduced them to accusedappellant Calimon who represented herself as a sub-agent of Axil International Services and
Consultancy (AISC), a legitimate recruitment agency. Calimon showed a job order of factory
workers purportedly issued by an Italian firm. Devanadera called up AISC to verify Calimons
representation. The person who answered the phone readily confirmed accused-appellant
Calimons claim. Thus, when accused Calimon asked P10,000.00 from each of the private
complainants to cover expenses for medical examination and processing fees for travel documents,
both Devanadera and Agramon readily parted with their money, as evidenced by receipts duly
signed by Calimon. They likewise gave their respective passports, birth certificates, NBI clearances,
resumes and other documents. Thereafter, Calimon brought them to St. Martins Clinic for medical
examination. Complainants also paid recruitment fees.
At one time, in the course of following up the status of her overseas employment
application, Calimon introduced complainant Devanadera to accused-appellant Comila who showed
her file and informed her of the need to secure a visa with the Italian Embassy. Calimon then asked
for more money to secure the visa, but Devanadera refused to pay. Private complainants follow ups
with Calimon were just met by repeated assurance that they will be deployed immediately once
their papers are completely processed. Finally, in January 1999, Calimon gave private complainants
their supposed individual employment contracts as factory workers in Italy. However, the contracts
did not indicate an employer. The three proceeded to the POEA to verify the status of their contract
where they discovered that while AISC was a licensed recruitment agency, Lo and accusedappellants Calimon and Comila were not among its registered employees. An information was filed
with the RTC, charging Lo and accused-appellants with illegal recruitment in large scale and
estafa. The RTC rendered a decision convicting the appellants of the crimes charged. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the decision with modifications.
Issues:
1. Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty of illegal recruitment;
2. Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty of estafa
Ruling:
1. The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 8042 state:
SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when
undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines:
Provided, that any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. x x x
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3)
or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. x x x
Page 287 of 299
In a litany of cases, we held that to constitute illegal recruitment in large scale three (3)
elements must concur: (a) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable
him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of
the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Art. 13, par. (b), of the
Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the same Code (now
Sec. 6, RA 8042); and, (c) the offender committed the same against three (3) or more persons,
individually or as a group.
Here, we are convinced that the three elements were sufficiently proved beyond reasonable
doubt. First, accused-appellants, undoubtedly, did not have any license to recruit persons for
overseas work. This is substantiated by the POEA, Licensing Branch which issued a Certification to
this effect and the testimony of an employee of the POEA, Corazon Cristobal. Second, accusedappellants engaged in illegal recruitment activities, offering overseas employment for a fee. This is
supported by the testimonies of the private complainants, particularly Devanadera who
categorically testified that accused-appellants promised private complainants employment and
assured them of placement overseas. Third, accused-appellant Calimon committed illegal
recruitment activities involving at least three persons, i.e., the three private complainants herein.
On the part of Comila, this third element was not proved and thus, she was properly convicted of
simple illegal recruitment only.
2. This Court is likewise convinced that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-appellants are guilty of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). .
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by
means of other similar deceits.
There are three ways of committing estafa under the above-quoted provision: (1) by using a
fictitious name; (2) by falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; and (3) by means of other similar deceits. Under
this class of estafa, the element of deceit is indispensable. In the present case, the deceit consists of
accused-appellants false statement or fraudulent representation which was made prior to, or at
least simultaneously with, the delivery of the money by the complainants. To convict for this type of
crime, it is essential that the false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause
or the only motive which induces the complainant to part with the thing of value. Accusedappellants led private complainants to believe that they possessed the power, means and legal
qualifications to provide the latter with work in Italy, when in fact they did not. Private
complainants parted with their hard-earned money and suffered damage by reason of accusedappellants deceitful and illegal acts. The elements of deceit and damage for this form of estafa are
indisputably present, hence their conviction for estafa was proper.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOLORES OCDEN
G.R. No. 173198, June 1, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Page 288 of 299
The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the
accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the
accused is crucial for conviction.
Facts:
Dolores Ocden was charged of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and six (6) counts of estafa.
All seven cases were consolidated. Ocden pleaded not guilty in all the cases.
Jeffries C. Golidan, Howard C. Golidan, Karen M. Simeon, Jean S. Maximo, Norma Pedro,
Marylyn Mana-a, Rizalina Ferrer and Milan Darling are the private complainants in these cases.
They alleged that they were recruited by Dolores Ocden to work as overseas factory workers in a
stuffed toy factory in Italy. They were required to submit bio-datas, their passports and pay
70,000.00 pesos as placement fee. They were also obliged to undergo medical examination in
Zamora Medical Clinic in Manila where they paid 3,500.00 pesos as their fee.
Ferrer, Jennilyn, and Alipio were supposed to be included in the first batch of workers to be
sent to Italy. In preparation for their flight to Italy, the three proceeded to Manila. In Manila, they
were introduced by Ocden to Erlinda Ramos (Ramos). Ocden and Ramos then accompanied Ferrer,
Jennilyn, and Alipio to the airport where they took a flight to Zamboanga. Ocden explained to
Ferrer, Jennilyn, and Alipio that they would be transported to Malaysia where their visa application
for Italy would be processed.
Sensing that they were being fooled, Ferrer and Jennilyn decided to get a refund of their
money, but Ocden was nowhere to be found. Ferrer would later learn from the Baguio office of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) that Ocden was not a licensed recruiter.
Ocden denied recruiting private complainants and claimed that she was also an applicant
for an overseas job in Italy, just like them. Ocden identified Ramos as the recruiter. Ramos held a
seminar in St. Theresas Compound, Navy Base, Baguio City. As many applicants were not able to
attend the seminar, Ocden asked Ramos to conduct a seminar at her house. After said seminars,
Ramos designated Ocden as leader of the applicants. As such, Ocden received her co-applicants
applications and documents; accompanied her co-applicants to Manila for medical examination
because she knew the location of Zamora Medical Clinic; and accepted placement fees in the
amount of P70,000.00 each from Mana-a and Ferrer and from Golidan, the amount of P140,000.00
(for Jeffries and Howard).
On July 2, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Ocden guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale and three counts of estafa. On appeal, the appellate
court affirmed Ocdens conviction but modifying the penalties imposed upon her for the three
counts of estafa.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Ocden is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in a
large scale
2. Whether or not Ocden may be held liable for both Illegal Recruitment and Estafa for the same act
Page 289 of 299
Ruling:
1. Yes. There is nothing in the records that warrant a reversal of the rulings of the RTC and CA.
It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave
complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send complainants abroad
for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed.
It is not necessary for the prosecution to present a certification that Ocden is a non-licensee
or non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. Section
6 of Republic Act No. 8042 enumerates particular acts which would constitute illegal recruitment
"whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of
authority." Among such acts, under Section 6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, is the "[f]ailure to
reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing
for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without
the workers fault."
Since illegal recruitment under Section 6(m) can be committed by any person, even by a
licensed recruiter, a certification on whether Ocden had a license to recruit or not, is
inconsequential. Ocden committed illegal recruitment as described in said provision by receiving
placement fees from Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans two sons, Jeffries and Howard, evidenced by
receipts Ocden herself issued; and failing to reimburse/refund to Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans two
sons the amounts they had paid when they were not able to leave for Italy, through no fault of their
own.
In People v. Hu, we held that a conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based
on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons, whether individually or as
a group. While it is true that the law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial,
nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense was
committed against three or more persons. In this case, there is conclusive evidence that Ocden
recruited Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans sons, Jeffries and Howard, for purported employment as
factory workers in Italy.
2. Yes. The very same evidence proving Ocdens liability for illegal recruitment also established her
liability for estafa.
It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment
under Republic Act No. 8042 in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
It is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted
separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal
intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal
intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does
not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under
par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment
Private Complainant
Cesar Aquino
Amount Collected
P19.000.00
Page 291 of 299
Junior Agustin
P32,000.00
As prayed for by the State Prosecutor, all four criminal cases against Ochoa before the RTC were
consolidated.
Ochoa stated that she was employed by AXIL International Services and Consultant (AXIL)
as recruiter and was paid on a commission basis. AXIL had a temporary license to recruit Filipino
workers for overseas employment. She admitted recruiting private complainants and receiving
from them substantial amounts as placement and medical fees. Ochoa claimed though that she
remitted private complainants money to a person named Mercy, the manager of AXIL, but AXIL
failed to issue receipts because the private complainants did not pay in full.
On April 17, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Ochoa guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. 98-77300) and three
counts of estafa (Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, 98-77303).
The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming the appealed RTC decision. Ochoa
filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the People opposed for being bereft of merit.
In its Resolution dated August 6, 2003, the Court of Appeals declared that it had no
jurisdiction over Ochoas appeal, ratiocinating thus:
While neither the accused-appellant nor the Office of the Solicitor General representing the people
ever raised the issue of jurisdiction, our second look at the suit proved worthwhile because we
came to realize that we mistakenly assumed jurisdiction over this case where it does not obtain.
It was error to consider accused-appellants appeal from a trial court judgment imposing
life imprisonment in Criminal Case No. Q-98-77300 for illegal recruitment in a large scale.
Consequently, the judgment we rendered is null and void.
Despite its lack of jurisdiction over Ochoas appeal, the Court of Appeals did not dismiss the
same and merely ordered its transfer to us: While the Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 directs the
dismissal of appeals filed before the wrong court, the Supreme Court has in practice allowed the
transfer of records from this Court to the highest court. In which case, we shall subscribe to this
practice in the interest of substantial justice.
Issue:
Can the court a quo erred when it ruled that Ochoa is guilty of illegal recruitment in large
scale and estafa?
Ruling:
No, We find no reversible error in the assailed Court of Appeals decision.
Illegal recruitment in large scale
Page 292 of 299
Ochoa was charged with violation of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042. Said provision
broadens the concept of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and provides stiffer penalties,
especially for those that constitute economic sabotage, i.e., illegal recruitment in large scale and
illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 defines illegal recruitment as follows:
SEC. 6. Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when
undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines:
Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a
fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise
include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder,
licensee or holder of authority:
xxxx
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation
and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take
place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large
scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3)
or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave
complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send complainants abroad
for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. All
eight private complainants herein consistently declared that Ochoa offered and promised them
employment overseas. Ochoa required private complainants to submit their bio-data, birth
certificates, and passports, which private complainants did. Private complainants also gave various
amounts to Ochoa as payment for placement and medical fees as evidenced by the receipts Ochoa
issued to Gubat, Cesar, and Agustin. Despite private complainants compliance with all the
requirements Ochoa specified, they were not able to leave for work abroad. Private complainants
pleaded that Ochoa return their hard-earned money, but Ochoa failed to do so.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 clearly provides that any person, whether a non-licensee,
non-holder, licensee or holder of authority may be held liable for illegal recruitment for certain acts
as enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (m) thereof. Among such acts, under Section 6(m) of Republic
Act No. 8042, is the "failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does
not actually take place without the workers fault." Ochoa committed illegal recruitment as
described in the said provision by receiving placement and medical fees from private complainants,
evidenced by the receipts issued by her, and failing to reimburse the private complainants the