2 - Moberg

Organization Studies
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Ethics Blind Spots in Organizations: How Systematic Errors in Person Perception

Undermine Moral Agency
Dennis J. Moberg
Organization Studies 2006; 27; 413
DOI: 10.1177/0170840606062429
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Authors name
Ethics Blind Spots in Organizations: How

Systematic Errors in Person Perception
Undermine Moral Agency
Dennis J. Moberg
Abstract
Dennis J. Moberg
Santa Clara
University, USA
Moral agency in work organizations is vulnerable to systematic patterns of person

perception. Employing cognitive structuralism and drawing upon cases of corporate
wrongdoing, it is argued that common perceptual frames create ethics blind spots that
undermine moral agency. By focusing on the possibility of others moral transgressions, employees overlook virtuous acts and morally admirable propensities.
Their frame makes them especially critical of the morality of organizational officials.
Exacerbating this tendency are the blind spots evident among officials who disregard
the need to communicate their moral priorities and who pay little attention to the
moral actions of their subordinates. Since perceptual frames are shaped in part by
volition, ethics blind spots can be corrected by a self-improvement regimen.
Keywords: organizational ethics, moral agency, ethics blind spots, moral person
perception, morality versus competence
Organization
Studies
27(3):413428
ISSN 01708406
Copyright 2006
SAGE Publications
(London,
Thousand Oaks,
CA & New Delhi)
www.egosnet.org/os
The corporate scandals of the early 21st century surfaced both vice and virtue.
Scores of scoundrels went to prison, and three whistle-blowers were lionized
as persons of the year by Time magazine. Business ethicists and social
scientists have pored over the stories of these moral catastrophes and have
come to varying conclusions about their causes. One observation is common
there was a breakdown in moral agency. However, it was not simply the
wrongdoers who miscalculated and set off on a course of action without
understanding the entire picture. Their bosses also fell victim to blind spots
that undermined their moral capabilities. Indeed, I will demonstrate that both
parts of the supervisory dyad failed in many cases. The wrongdoers supervisor did not exercise public moral leadership and adequate control, and the
wrongdoer himself failed to grasp his own behavior in moral terms until it
was too late.
The approach I take in this paper is cognitive structuralism. I show how
the mental processes used by the individual actors in actual ethics calamities
helped create the conditions in which they could occur. My intention is not
to overly reduce the particularities of the events or trivialize the human drama
that unfolded. Rather, it is to point out patterns of perception that undercut
the moral capabilities of the actors. Key to understanding these patterns are
two fundamental ideas: a frame and a blind spot.
DOI: 10.1177/0170840606062429
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Organization Studies 27(3)
A frame is a personal perspective of a situation, comprising well-learned

sets of associations that focus peoples attention on and label some aspects
of a situation to the exclusion of others (Bateson 1972; Minsky 1974; Goffman
1974). Frames are fundamentally interpretive they process the raw material
of perception and deduce certain actions that the person should take in a given
situation (Benford and Snow 2000). As such, most frames create blind spots,
those defects in ones perceptual field that can cloud ones judgment, lead
one to erroneous conclusions, or provide insufficient triggers to appropriate
action. For example, if people frame an interpersonal conflict situation as a
fundamentally competitive one in which benefits can only be distributed in
inflexible parcels, they are blinded to the possibilities of collaborative action
(Sheppard et al.1994).
Psychologists tell us that frames are more malleable than other cognitive
structures that involve moral behavior (cf. Rest et al.1969; Myyry and
Helkama 2002). As such, blind spots are similar to those that afflict drivers
of motor vehicles. Once one is aware that they exist, it is possible to develop
alternative interpretive and action strategies. Put differently, blind spots
constitute manageable deficiencies in agency.
The focus of this paper is with a type of blind spot that is common in person
perception. When people perceive one another, they separate judgments they
make into two frames, one concerning the others competence and one about
the other persons moral character (Wojciszke 1994). This frame-partitioning
is critical because accurate person perception is critical to moral agency.
When we misperceive others, we base our actions on an inaccurate view of
the situation. This is particularly true if the relevant category of person
perception involves moral character.
In this paper, I examine how modern-day tendencies in person perception
impede the moral agency of employees in work organizations. First, I examine
the division between moral and competence categories of person perception
and how they create different frames and blind spots. Second, I discuss three
different types of blind spots that arise in an organizational context, and make
specific reference to how these may have contributed to the ethics debacles
that occurred within the last decade. Finally, I speculate about how these blind
spots can be corrected through a self-improvement regimen.
Competence and Moral Categories of Person Perception
A number of empirical studies have shown that persons are perceived with
one of two frames: a moral frame (M) or a competence frame (C). These two
frames are processed in different ways and have different affective reactions
(e.g. Rosenberg et al.1968). Traits within the M frame include honest,
generous, altruistic, and kind; and C frame traits include capable, smart,
efficient, creative, and strong. For example, M and C traits constitute two
separate clusters of traits in the perception of organizational leaders (the
familiar task- and relation-orientation) (Hunt 1991). Additionally, these two
frames are salient when individuals assess the trustworthiness of colleagues
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Moberg: Ethics Blind Spots in Organizations
Table 1.
Categories of Person
Perception
Competence assessment
Morality assessment
Positive
Negative
Positive
Virtuous and able
Unethical but able
Negative
Virtuous but inept
Unethical and inept
(Reina and Reina 1999). A program of research by Wojciszke and his

colleagues in Poland has demonstrated that not only are the M and C
categories separate but, together, almost exhaustive of the overall assessment
of a person (Wojciszke 1994; 2005; Wojciszke et al. 1998).
The independence of these categories implies the 2x2 classification of
persons according to their central traits, as shown in Table 1. The first type is
a virtuous and able person whose actions are expected to be both ethical and
effective. Included here would be persons known both for their performance
successes and for their integrity. The second type is a virtuous but inept person.
Employees in this category are expected to be well-meaning and upstanding
but not prepared for the challenges of their assigned responsibilities. Third,
are those persons judged to be competent but immoral. This is the category
filled by the smart but unethical characters many think were involved in the
recent corporate scandals (McLeen and Elkind 2003; Lowenstein 2001).
Finally, there is the ignominious category of incompetent and immoral persons
that one hopes is not often found in organizational life.
Ethics blind spots exist when people fall victim to common but defective
or incomplete perceptions of moral attributes. In the sections following,
I discuss three specific manifestations of ethics blind spots: interpersonal,
personal, and managerial. Potentially, all of these blind spots hamper moral
agency.
The Interpersonal Ethics Blind spot
In perceiving others, there is a great deal of empirical evidence that M traits

dominate over C traits, meaning that when individuals interact, they assess
each other more on the basis of moral traits than competence ones (Wojciszke
1994). From all the information available when people meet, it is data
about the moral attributes of ones counterpart that are perceptually selected
and processed. Alternative explanations have been proposed for this M
Dominance Effect (Wojciszke 2005). Most persuasive is the notion that other
persons are much more vulnerable to an individuals negative moral qualities
than any deficiency in their competence, everything else being the same.
A coworker, a person sharing a seat on a bus, a fellow student, or someone
at a dinner party is threatening more for their potential moral transgressions
than for any deficiencies they have in ability. Accordingly, one seeks moral
information about others out of self-interest and as a defense against being
victimized by moral misbehavior.
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The main problem with the M Dominance Effect is not in its emphasis on
the assessment of moral qualities; it is with the relative emphasis on negative
moral traits. When others are perceived, negative assessments are more salient
than positive ones (Baumeister et al. 2001). So, if another person is perceived
to be dishonest, untrustworthy, or overly self-centered, this assessment takes
precedence over any positive traits they might possess. Because of the interpersonal blind spot, positive moral qualities of others tend to be overlooked,
and negative qualities are sometimes more perceptually prominent than
warranted.
Applied in the workplace, the M Dominance Effect means that employees
are vigilant to evidence concerning anothers moral qualities, especially
negative ones (Bazinska and Wojciszke 1996). This tendency supports the
formation of moral communities in which information about character traits
has value. At the same time, the interpersonal ethics blind spot makes positive
elements of character less salient than negative ones. This implies that
demonstrations of organizational virtue frequently go unnoticed (Konovsky
and Organ 1996; Holmes et al. 2002). Employees whose morality goes above
and beyond the call of duty are unlikely to receive the attention and accolades
their actions deserve. This blind spot may also impede positive role modeling
as a tool for the cultivation of anothers moral character (Moberg 2000). Less
aware of others virtues, employees are unlikely to learn from and be inspired
by them.
The M Dominance Effect also influences the relationships between
organizational officials and stakeholders (McVey and Freeman 2005). In
social encounters, both parties can be expected to be particularly sensitive to
negative moral traits. This natural social wariness may create organizationstakeholder institutional relationships that, if personalized, are prone to
disintegration. For example, a regulator may be particularly watchful for signs
that an organizational official is not trustworthy, honest, or straightforward.
Similarly, finance professionals may be particularly guarded concerning new
customers asking for credit lines. While caution of this type is not in itself
problematic, it does add to transaction costs.
During the recent spate of corporate scandals in the USA, the negative effects
of the interpersonal ethics blind spot were evident in the treatment of Cynthia
Cooper, the celebrated whistle-blower at WorldCom. Her skill and courage
brought to light the financial improprieties of CFO Scott Sullivan and CEO
Bernard Ebbers who were both ultimately convicted of securities violations.
However, after the two left the company, Cooper was treated less positively
than her virtuous acts warranted. In an interview with her on 11 May 2005, she
indicated that, for two years following their departure, her salary was frozen,
her auditing position authority was circumscribed, and her budget was cut.
Even though she was, by most accounts, more responsible for the recovery of
MCI (the successor to WorldCom) than anyone else, she was treated poorly.
Sadly, this is not uncommon for whistle-blowers who remain as part of the
organization they have sought to uplift (Near and Micelli 1996). Since negative
traits of character are more salient than positive ones, whistle-blowing is seen
by insiders more as an emblem of betrayal than a sign of virtue.
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Taken alone, the M Dominance Effect does not appear to represent a

serious threat to moral agency. The associated blind spot does diminish virtue,
but it does not undermine the identification of moral qualities altogether.
In fact, it makes the moral qualities of organizational members more salient.
A more serious threat to moral agency exists when individuals act on an
incomplete assessment of their own personal qualities.
The Personal Ethics Blind Spot
Everyone believes themselves to be moral even known liars and convicted

felons (Baumeister 1998; Allison et al. 1989). Consequently, when it comes
to self-perception, the relative emphasis between C and M is exactly opposite
from that found in ones perception of others (Wojciszke 1994). It is
the competence frame rather than the morality frame that dominates selfperceptions (Drucker 2005). When we assess our own attributes, we are much
more prone to do so with terms like clever, efficient, energetic, logical, and
knowledgeable than fair, honest, loyal, sincere, and selfless (Wojciszke
2005). This makes self-esteem much more dependent upon C than M. When
people commit an immoral act, their level of emotional arousal (i.e. guilt and
shame) is less pronounced than when their action constitutes a performance
failure (Wojciszke and Dowhyluk 2003).
Moral agency is threatened by this intrapsychic tendency. Persons can be
assumed to be engaged in the project of constructing a coherent self (Van
Halen and Janssen 2004; Gubrium and Holstein 2000). If people define
themselves predominantly in competence (as opposed to moral) terms, they
may experience conflicts when situational demands do not correspond to this
project. And it is through the resolution to such conflicts that we find evidence
of the personal ethics blind spot.
One such conflict arises when a person is explicitly assigned a moral task.
For example, ethics training of one kind or another is now a common feature
in organizational life. When employees are assigned to complete such
training, they may psychologically disengage if they do not see the training
as relevant to a competent self. The key question then becomes: can a person
be expected to display genuine moral agency when they are occupied in an
intrapsychic process (i.e. the construction of a competent self) that distracts
them from the process of being or becoming moral?
A similar conflict arises when peoples assigned tasks call for them to
exhibit both competence and morality. In such situations, their focus on selfconstruction may lead them to emphasize competence at the expense of
morality. For example, if Bob values cleverness (a form of intellectual
competence) as a central feature of his self-concept, he may be prone to
exemplify cleverness even when it is morally inappropriate (Sternberg 2002).
Again, this may help explain why so many immoral acts are committed by
individuals driven to master some form of competence (such as the ability to
be a world-class CEO or financial wizard).
Conflict also arises when employees have required interaction with others.
Under the moral scrutiny of others, they may be distracted from their personal
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project of constructing a competent self. The resultant interaction may involve

parallel messages in which moral information is sought but competence
information is sent. It is difficult to imagine that moral agency would be
served by such noisy interactions (Tazelaar et al. 2004).
Finally, there may be conflicts between the messages sent by various role
senders in each employees personal and professional life. In social interaction,
one is expected to appear moral, and this is reinforced by parental messages
that one receives in childhood (Wojciszke and Mikiewicz 2003). In contrast,
professional messages (and those involved in the construction of the self)
emphasize competence. The dissonance in this situation may be the basis for
remarks like I learned all the ethics I need from my parents, or You cant
teach ethics at work; youre either brought up to be ethical or not. In fact, the
common but incorrect idea that morality is immutable justifies the bracketing
of moral development in adulthood in favor of competence development.
Jayson Blair and Stephen Glass were both journalists caught up in the
recent spate of American business ethics scandals. Blair was a columnist for
the New York Times and Glass wrote for The New Republic. Both were highly
successful men in their twenties when they began to cut corners on journalistic
sources and to embellish their stories. As their fame as investigative
journalists grew, their indiscretions turned into clear cases of plagiarism and
fraud. While it would be reductionistic to explain their moral downfall in
wholly psychological terms, it is interesting that Blair and Glass were both
proud, and highly protective, of their image as accomplished journalists. The
question is, whether the dominance of their competence frame caused them
to misapprehend the severity of their ever-deepening moral turpitude. It
certainly appears so, as both have admitted that they did what they did to be
admired for their competence: Blair in his autobiography (Blair 2004), and
Glass in an interview on a television news program (http://www.cbsnews.
com/stories/2003/05/07/60minutes/main552819.shtml).
In summary, the personal ethics blind spot exists when persons are so keen
on developing a competent self that they overlook the substance and
expression of their moral selves. This can be bolstered by quasi-theories that
assume that morality is distributed in a bifurcated fashion (people are either
honest or they arent) or that make reference to competence-based reward
systems that ignore morality (the key is to perform). Indeed, those are the
messages one often hears from managers and other top officials in an
organization and these messages are themselves a product of the next type
of blind spot that we will examine.
Managerial Ethics Blind Spot
Most work organizations are hierarchical, and that introduces an important

consideration in the selection of frames used in perceiving individuals with
more or less power. One frame is used when perceiving people who have
greater power, and a quite different frame is used in perceiving people with
lesser power.
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The Failure to Exercise Public Moral Leadership
The M Dominance Effect clearly holds when the target of perception is a

more powerful figure (Emler and Cook 2000; Cook and Emler 1999). When
subordinates perceive their superiors in work organizations, the moral frame
is highly salient (Kouzes et al. 2002). Officials are apparently scrutinized
more for their moral characteristics than their competence (Wojciszke 1997).
Although nearly everyone desires a competent boss, information about a
superiors performance may be more difficult to obtain (Caplow 1976) than
information about their moral attributes. The moral frame dominates when
perceiving organizational superiors.
Once again, this conflicts with an officials need to attend to the project of
developing a competent self. Indeed, Trevio and her colleagues have found
that organizational officials underestimate the importance of appearing as
well as merely being moral (Trevio et al. 2000). For a host of reasons,
officials apparently avoid public displays of their moral traits, leaving
their subordinates without the information about morality that they seek. In
addition, because communications from officials have a profound effect on
the cultural themes extant in the organization, this tendency undermines the
development of a viable moral community (OReilly 1989; Davis 1984).
Moreover, without publicly salient moral role models, moral development
opportunities are squandered. The net effect of this conflict is that employees
are left without adequate direction or encouragement concerning moral issues
that arise in the workplace. This probably does more to undermine moral
community than thwart moral agency, but it certainly does not enable
employees to be the moral best they could possibly be in their work context.
A major turning point in the decline of the firm Arthur Andersen occurred
when Joseph Berardino, the executive to whom the partner in charge of the
Enron account (David Duncan) reported, failed to exercise public ethics
leadership. By the 1980s, Andersen had branched out beyond its traditional
lines of business, offering consulting services to complement its auditing
services. Once that began, the climate of the firm became viciously competitive, as consulting-unit partners matched wits with one another to curry
favor with the customer. The trouble was, satisfying the customer at all costs
compromised professionalism.
In August 1998, a meeting was called to develop a unified plan about how
to deal with the risk that the rampant fraud at some of Andersens clients would
overwhelm the firm. The intention was to discuss the various risks Andersen
faced at the time, so partners would have an action plan for managing the
impending crisis. Andersens chief ethics officer urged that the plan should be
communicated in an attention-grabbing form, and that the plan should go
beyond the symptoms of the problem. Instead, Berardino authorized sending
out a low-key, band-aid memo framed in competence terms, which came to
be known as the cooking-the-books memo. In the words of Andersens ethics
officer:
this was a critical juncture for the firm, a point at which great leadership could truly
have made a difference [Andersens] leaders did what, unfortunately, many leaders

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do when times are tough they essentially crossed their fingers and hoped everything
would work out. (Toffler 2003: 167)
Through a competence frame, this is not necessarily a bad strategy

(Tykocinski and Pittman 1998). However, when inaction is not accompanied
by a reminder that morality remains critically important, it invites crossing
the line and then justifying misdeeds as merely cooking the books.
The Failure to Notice Subordinate Character Flaws
The most serious threat to moral agency from the managerial ethics blind spot
occurs when the person perceived has less power than the perceiver. When
this occurs, the M Dominance Effect is totally reversed. Officials focus on
competence traits, not morality traits, among their subordinates (Cook and
Emler 1999; Emler and Cook 2000). This is precisely the opposite of the
prominence of morality in both self-perception and the perception of equals.
This perceptual anomaly sets up several problematic effects.
First, this tendency impedes officials from identifying employees who are
prone to moral lapses. Focusing, instead, on their competence, officials either
miss potentially destructive tendencies on the one hand or attribute them to
deficits in ability (Morgan 1993). For example, it is common to hear executives describe a subordinates moral misdeed as a screw-up or sign of a lack
of judgment, as though it were simply a miscalculation (Bellizzi and Hasty
2003; Bellizzi and Hite 1989) or a competence issue.
Second, this tendency helps explain the official unresponsiveness toward
whistle-blowers. By definition, whistle-blowers are lower-level officials who
bring reports of the moral misdeeds of others to higher officials (Glazer and
Glazer 1989; Near and Miceli 1996). That whistle-blowers notice moral
transgressions is not surprising; it is predicted by the M Dominance Effect.
However, the official recipients of their messages are unlikely to appreciate
their point of view or the information contained in their complaints (Mathews
1987). Indeed, the success of whistle-blowers in stimulating some sort of
organizational response is in direct proportion to their appreciating the
competence-based frame of the officials to whom they report the wrongdoing.
Indeed, if whistle-blowers frame their messages more as a competence and
business issue rather than a moral and ethical one, some research indicates that
they are more likely to motivate a corrective response (e.g. Hornstein 1986).
This certainly fits the facts concerning the case of Nick Leeson, the former
investment officer in the Singapore branch of Barings Bank. In 1993, his
personal trading profits amounted to 10% of Barings earnings, making him
a rising star (Leeson et al. 1996). By cleverly hiding his losses in an obscure
account, this rising star ultimately built up $1.3 billion in losses, without
detection. Apparently, his bosses never questioned his moral fitness. Not
surprisingly, his coworkers were not blinded in the same way. Viewing
Leeson through an M Dominance frame, they were much more sensitive to
his vices. In fact, they warned officials of his unethical shenanigans. In an
internal e-mail, one Barings peer stated: Awaiting breakdown from my
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buddy Nick once [he] creatively allocates the numbers (http://www.

riskglossary.com/articles/baringsdebacle.htm). His bosses apparently saw this
as a criticism of Leesons competence rather than whistle-blowing about his
moral flaws.
Carried to an extreme, it is obvious that managerial blind spots can create
the conditions in which employee cynicism about ethics in the workplace
flourishes (Abraham 2000). Subordinates worry more about the immorality
of their peers than their superiors do. When subordinates see their coworkers
behaving unethically and report it upward, they are greeted by bosses that are
resistant to framing it in moral terms and therefore indifferent to the need for
corrective action. Such resistance and indifference can be apprehended by
subordinates who report others ethical infractions as a sign that ethics is
simply not a priority in the organization. This is reinforced by leaders failure
to exercise ethics leadership in a public way.
A Caveat on Individual Differences
So far, this paper has focused on general tendencies in person perception. One
might argue that certain types of people are more or less immune to these
common inclinations. Interestingly, studies have revealed no age or gender
effects to these framing inclinations (Wojciszke and Mikiewicz 2003; Ybarra
et al. 2001). However, one type of individual difference has been found
significant whether people hold individualistic versus collectivistic values.
Specifically, individuals who are more individualistically inclined prefer
competence traits, and those who are more collectivistic prefer morality traits.
This finding parallels the work of Aquino and Reed (2002), who propose a
trait-based conceptualization of moral identity. Individuals with strong moral
identity, like collectivists in other studies, see themselves not with the
emphasis that others have on competence traits but, instead, as moral beings
with thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that are moral. Not surprisingly, Reed
and Aquino (2003) found that persons high in moral identity are more apt to
be morally inclusive of out-groups. Additionally, Caldwell and Moberg
(2005) found that individuals low in moral identity are prone to moral
behavior only when situational influences endorse them.
Correcting the Blind Spots
As I indicated earlier, blind spots are both psychologically flexible and personally manageable. They arise from perceptual frames that can be changed
through self-management bolstered by social guidance and encouragement
(Miller and Osmunson 1989). Technically, the process is known as reframing, and it is the basis for a great deal of self-improvement (Watzlawick
et al. 1980). Bartunek (1988) identifies four major preconditions for reframing:
(a) the target phenomenon can be understood in multiple ways; (b) at least
two qualitatively different frames can be described that fit the experience;
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(c) the person presently uses one particular perspective (frame) on the
phenomenon; and (d) reframing requires significant and enduring dissatisfaction with the present frame and significant and enduring satisfaction with
the new frame. Psychologists and counselors have long used reframing as a
therapeutic tool with their clients (Barker 1994). In addition, almost all forms
of self-improvement draw upon reframing in one form or another (Libby
et al. 2005).
Employee Self-Improvement
The analysis in this paper suggests a self-improvement regimen for any

employee bent on advancing his or her moral agency. Fundamentally, the
employee must sustain three new frames. One concerns an answer to
the question: why be moral? A second concerns who it is that one chooses as
ones moral role model. And the third new frame concerns who it is that one
obtains feedback from about ones actions.
Why be moral?
This question has been raised in the abstract by philosophers, behavioral

scientists, and business ethicists (e.g. Williamson 1991; Bergman 2002;
Hosmer 1994). In light of the frames and blind spots that are common among
employees, this question becomes especially important for each employee
to answer. The reason is that employees receive different and potentially
conflicting messages from others in the workplace. As we have seen, their
superiors are likely to emphasize competence over morality as desirable
traits, and their peers and subordinates are likely to emphasize morality.
Additionally, if they desire extrinsic rewards for their efforts, concentrating
on enacting those behaviors associated with competence is probably more
rewarding than enacting behaviors associated with morality (England 1975;
Thomas 1997). To correct potential blind spots, a new frame is required
moral agency ultimately requires intrinsic motivation. Employees expecting
approval for their exemplary moral acts will be disappointed, and those
expecting formal rewards for their moral performance will be frustrated.
Philosophers will note that this is precisely the frame consistent with virtue
ethics.
Who are your role models?
Role models are important factors in the development and refinement of moral
behavior (Colby and Damon 1992). However, employees drawn to officials
as their role models may not find them salutary, as their own blind spots make
officials negative moral traits salient (e.g. hypocrisy, untrustworthiness, selfabsorption). In addition, since officials blind spots keep them from publicly
revealing their moral priorities, employees are faced with the difficult task of
attributing moral reasoning to concrete acts that may be devoid of meaningful
moral content. An approach that is more supportive of moral agency is to
choose role models from a broader spectrum of societal roles. For example,
Mother Teresa, Gandhi, or Mohammed may be more inspirational than
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anyone chosen from the contemporary executive ranks. More accessible,

contemporary administrators outside the organization may also be admirable
for their moral qualities (Bollier 1996; Kenney et al. 1996).
How well is your moral behavior calibrated to your moral community?
Obtaining meaningful feedback about ones integrity or moral character is

also problematic given the blind spots extant in modern work organizations.
Direct supervisors may emphasize performance issues in the feedback they
give, so they tend not to be effective sources of feedback about ones moral
traits. However, peers and even subordinates are in a better position to provide
feedback on moral behavior since that is the frame within which they perceive
actions.
Managerial Self-Improvement
As we have seen, blind spots apply to managers and supervisors as well as

other employees. Should such individuals desire to advance their subordinates moral agency, several additional corrective actions are necessary.
First, managers should make a special effort to communicate their moral
standards publicly and indicate how these standards factor into the choices
they make. Some managers probably do this without self-prompting, but other
managers may have to make a special effort to do so (Turner et al. 2002).
While communicating ones moral standards may not be necessary for the
managers own moral agency, it enables the managers subordinates to realize
that there are community moral standards that the manager endorses, and to
understand what those moral standards are.
Employee moral agency is also facilitated when they are able to accurately
discern socially laudable forms of moral behavior. As we have seen,
unacceptable moral behavior is more salient than virtuous behavior, so moral
agents typically lack guidance to determine how best to be morally good. For
example, some moral communities especially value courage over temperance,
forgiveness over empathy, or wisdom over kindness. Managers can provide
such guidance not only through their statements, policies, and actions, but
also by publicly recognizing morally desirable employee behaviors.
Clearly, moral agency is undermined if a community ignores moral abuses,
and this implies a collective responsibility to identify and speak out against
actions that violate the moral standards of the work community. Unfortunately,
managers have a blind spot that often keeps them from doing that. As we have
seen, managerial vigilance is much stronger for deviations from performance
standards than from moral norms. Accordingly, managers must make a
special effort to gather information about the moral behavior of those below
them in the chain of command and to deal with those who violate moral
standards.

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A Caveat on Organizational Context
The analysis in this paper is incomplete without acknowledgment of the

effects of broader sociopolitical and organizational contexts on ethics blind
spots. As MacIntyre reminds us, no practices can survive for any length
of time unsustained by institutions (1981: 255). Certainly, the institutional
environment of an organization can exacerbate or attenuate ethics blind spots.
Exacerbating Influences
Institutional structures that place incentives on officials to focus on short-term

performance to the satisfaction of one stakeholder group (e.g. stockholders)
would certainly reinforce the competence over the morality frame. This would
lead not only to competence-based self-definitions on the part of officials, but
also perhaps to their insensitivity to the moral behavior of subordinates.
Similarly, if the broader normative environment defined success solely in
performance terms, by equating the heroic leader with the competent individual, ethics blind spots will be reinforced. Imagine the effect, for example,
when the board of directors of US eye care manufacturer Bausch & Lomb,
refused to terminate CEO Ronald Zarrella, citing his competence as a leader,
when they discovered that he had lied on his CV. (http://www.globalethics.
org/newsline/members/issue.tmpl?articleid=11040216313676).
Attenuating Influences
In contrast, institutional structures that hold officials responsible for the moral
performance as well as competence of their employees lessen the impact
of the ethics blind spots. For example, SarbannesOxley regulations in the
USA require officials to assume responsibility for the veracity of financial
documents prepared by their subordinates. In a similar vein, institutional
recognition and rewards for virtuous behavior that are given by various ethics
interests groups ameliorate blind spots by providing accessible role models
and vivid moral exemplars.
Conclusion Explanation, not Excuse
Moral responsibility is determined in part by intentionality. However, it is

common to hold people responsible when events have occurred in spite of
good intentions, if due care was not exercised. This is certainly the case with
drivers who neglect to check their blind spots before changing lanes.
Essentially, this paper constitutes an explanation but not an excuse for the
misjudgments that occur because of ethics blind spots. For all the talk of
the need for executives to have vision, it is surprising that there has not been
more focus on the accuracy of their viewpoint. Clearly, power privileges their
perspective, but in doing so, it diminishes the moral agency of themselves
and others in the organization (Marshall and Rollinson 2004). Drowned out
by voices from above and by voices from within, the contemporary employee
has many reasons for not being moral, but no excuses for it.
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425
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Dennis J. Moberg, DBA, is the Gerald and Bonita Wilkinson Professor of Management and Ethics, Leavey School of Business and Administration, Santa Clara
University. He is presently serving as Executive Director of the Ignatian Center for
Jesuit Education at SCU, and as President of the Society of Business Ethics.
Address: Leavey School of Business and Administration, Santa Clara University, 500
El Camio Real Santa Clara, CA 95053, USA.
Email: dmoberg@scu.edu


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Organization Studies

Ethics Blind Spots in Organizations: How Systematic Errors in Person Perception

European Group for Organizational Studies

Downloaded from http://oss.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on December 5, 2007

Ethics Blind Spots in Organizations: How

Moral agency in work organizations is vulnerable to systematic patterns of person

Organization Studies 27(3)

A frame is a personal perspective of a situation, comprising well-learned

Competence and Moral Categories of Person Perception

Moberg: Ethics Blind Spots in Organizations

Virtuous and able

Unethical but able

Virtuous but inept

Unethical and inept

(Reina and Reina 1999). A program of research by Wojciszke and his

The Interpersonal Ethics Blind spot

In perceiving others, there is a great deal of empirical evidence that M traits

Organization Studies 27(3)

Moberg: Ethics Blind Spots in Organizations

Taken alone, the M Dominance Effect does not appear to represent a

Everyone believes themselves to be moral even known liars and convicted

Organization Studies 27(3)

project of constructing a competent self. The resultant interaction may involve

Managerial Ethics Blind Spot

Most work organizations are hierarchical, and that introduces an important

Moberg: Ethics Blind Spots in Organizations

The Failure to Exercise Public Moral Leadership

The M Dominance Effect clearly holds when the target of perception is a

Downloaded from http://oss.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on December 5, 2007

Organization Studies 27(3)

Through a competence frame, this is not necessarily a bad strategy

Moberg: Ethics Blind Spots in Organizations

buddy Nick once [he] creatively allocates the numbers (http://www.

A Caveat on Individual Differences

Correcting the Blind Spots

Organization Studies 27(3)

The analysis in this paper suggests a self-improvement regimen for any

This question has been raised in the abstract by philosophers, behavioral

Moberg: Ethics Blind Spots in Organizations

anyone chosen from the contemporary executive ranks. More accessible,

Obtaining meaningful feedback about ones integrity or moral character is

As we have seen, blind spots apply to managers and supervisors as well as

Downloaded from http://oss.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on December 5, 2007

Organization Studies 27(3)

A Caveat on Organizational Context

The analysis in this paper is incomplete without acknowledgment of the

Institutional structures that place incentives on officials to focus on short-term

Moral responsibility is determined in part by intentionality. However, it is

Moberg: Ethics Blind Spots in Organizations

Bellizzi, J. A., and R. E. Hite

Caldwell, D. F., and D. Moberg

Colby, A., and W. Damon

Baumeister, R. F., E. Bratslavsky,

Cook, T., and N. Emler

Downloaded from http://oss.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on December 5, 2007

Organization Studies 27(3)

Emler, N., and T. Cook

Konovsky, M. A., and D. W. Organ

Downloaded from http://oss.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on December 5, 2007

Moberg: Ethics Blind Spots in Organizations

Sheppard, B. H., K. Blumenfeld-Jones,

Downloaded from http://oss.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on December 5, 2007

Organization Studies 27(3)