Professional Documents
Culture Documents
overruled contentions of the defense that the penalty of fine or imprisonment authorized by the
statute involved is cruel and degrading.
Case:
(89.) Chavez v. CA, 24 SCRA 663 (1968)
Facts:
Petitioner herein was charged of qualified theft of a motor vehicle, one Thunderbird car, with
accessories amounting to P22,000. That this theft was committed when the petitioner with the
help of one, Asistio have completed a deed of sale of Thunderbird which belongs to Johnson
Lee. Chavez telephoned Lee and made an appointment for the sale of Thunderbird with
Sumilang as a introduced buyer. As payment was made to Eugenes restaurant in Quezon City,
all of them then drove to the place. Chavez and Sumilang, pretending to get the money for the
perfection of sale of the Thunderbird car, left the two Chinese alone, Johnson Lee and his
brother. When the two Chinese went outside to look for Chavez and Sumilang, they could no
longer locate the former and the Thunderbird car was also from the parking lot. Nevertheless
the Thunderbird was impounded however, it was already been repainted. During the trial, the
Fiscal Grecia presented Chavez as a witness. And despite of Chavezs objection being aware
that the latter would be self incriminated, the Court sustained the stand of the Fiscal saying.
What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.
And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness
stand including the accused.
Doctirnes:
Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an
admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly
or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which
is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain
silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his
own free, genuine will.
Section 18 Political beliefs and aspirations
Section 19 Cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
(90.) Lim v. People, G.R. No. 149276, 27 September, 2002
Facts:
Sps Lim issued check to Cham, which bounced. Later Cham filed Estafa case agains Sps Lim.
Husband Lim was detained and not given bail. Sps Lim filed the instant petition for certiorari
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court and the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Q, arguing that PD 818 violates the constitutional provisions on due process,
bail and imposition of cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. SC later granted them bail. SC
also held that PD 818 is constitutional.
Doctrine:
Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading or
disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and
wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. Based on this principle, the Court has consistently
Doctrine:
As we stressed in Lozano, it is precisely during trying times that there exists a most
compelling reason to strengthen faith and confidence in the financial system and any practice
tending to destroy confidence in checks as currency substitutes should be deterred, to prevent
havoc in the trading and financial communities. Further, while indeed the metropolitan trial
courts may be burdened immensely by bouncing checks cases now, that fact is immaterial to
the alleged invalidity of the law being assailed. The solution to the clogging of dockets in
lower courts lies elsewhere.
Simply put, what is punished in BP 22, as laid down in the case of Lozano, is the act of issuing
a bouncing check and not the non-payment of a debt. This is to protect the normal day-to-day
activities of the countrys financial system and avoid the deceitful conduct of defrauding
others by issuing worthless checks.
Section 21 Double jeopardy
(92.) Vincoy v. CA, 423 SCRA 605 (2004)
Facts:
George Vicoy allegedly defrauded Cimafranca and Flores. For P600,000, Vincoy promised 20
dump trucks and 2 payloaders but instead only sent 1 dump truck. Cimafranca first filed
Estafa cases in RTC Pasay, but was dismissed by prosecutor. Later Cimaranca joined Flores in
filing in RTC Pasig and successfully got a favourable decisions convicting VINCOY with
Estafa. CA affirmed. Now, Vincoy contends that he be freed, because charging hi in RTC
Pasig, violates double Jeopardy from Pasay.
Doctrine:
It is settled that the dismissal of a case during its preliminary investigation does not constitute
double jeopardy since a preliminary investigation is not part of the trial and is not the occasion
for the full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence but only such as may engender a
well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and accused is probably guilty
thereof. For this reason, it cannot be considered equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of
acquittal.
i)
Prosecution for supervening death even after earlier
conviction for physical injuries
(93.) People v. City Court of Manila, Br. XI, 121 SCRA 637 (1983)
Facts:
The incident occurred on October 17, 1971. The following day, an information for serious
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against private respondent, driver of the
truck. On the same day, the victim Diolito de la Cruz died.
On October 20, 1972, private respondent was arraigned on the charge of serious physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty, was sentenced to one (1) month and one
(1) day of arresto mayor, and commenced serving sentence.
On October 24, 1972, an information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed against
private respondent.
On November 17, 1972, the City Court of Manila, upon motion of private respondent, issued
an order dismissing the homicide thru reckless imprudence case on the ground of double
jeopardy. (WON Double Jeopardy YES)
Doctrine:
According to Melo v. People, yes. But the trial court held that the doctrine of Melo vs. People
does not apply in the case at bar in view of this Court's ruling in People vs. Buan. The trial
court concluded that once prosecuted for and convicted of negligence, the accused cannot
again be prosecuted for the same negligence although for a different resulting injury.
ii)
The lower court granted the motion to quash. The prosecutor then, after the motion was
granted, filed another charge against the respondent company owner, on ground of theft. That
according to the prosecutor, illegal installation which is punishable under the municipal
ordinance and theft of electricity punishable under the RPC are different.
Doctrine;
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second
prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior
prosecution, although both the first and second offenses ma be based upon the same act or set
of facts.
But the protection against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged
under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently udner a national
statude, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of facts.
iv)
v)
iii)
The Court held that respondent Judge Mogol erred in dismissing the case for serious physical
injuries to give way to the filing of a complaint for frustrated murder. For it is the duty of the
respondent Judge to render the decision as the evidence presented warrant under the
information as filed for serious physical injuries and not to dismiss the case on his idea or
belief that thee was evidence of intent to kill the intented victim. The judge committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to ecess of jurisdiction thereby rendering his Order null
and void.
Since the order of dismissal was without authority and therefore, null and void, the
proceedings before the MTC have not not been lawfully terminated. Accordingly, there is no
second proceeding to speak of and no double jeopardy.
vi)