Mind Association

Mathematics and Its Foundations

Author(s): A. G. D. Watson
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 47, No. 188 (Oct., 1938), pp. 440-451
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
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II.-MATHEMATICS

AND ITS FOUNDATIONS.

-BYA. G. D.

WATSON.

THE subjectknownas the Foundationsof Mathematicshas been

created with the purpose of explainingthe success of certain
argumentswhich are used in mathematics,and the failureof
others; and, in general,to give an account of the relationsof
mathematicalmethodsto those of logic and so on. The object
of this paper is to raise the questionwhetherthe investigations
whichhave been carriedon underthistitlehave in factprovided
the justificationof valid mathematicalarguments,or described
correctlythe status of mathematics. It will suggestthat the
traditionalphilosophicalproblems,raised fromthe time of the
Greeksto that of Kant, are stillto be attacked.
It cannot, of course, be denied that real improvementsin
mattersof detail have been made; that we can improveon
Euclid in our expositionsof Geometry,on Newtonand Leibnitz
in our expositionsof the calculus: nor are improvementsin
detailofsmallimportance,
since,amongotherthings,theyshould
enable us to see the fundamentalquestionsmoreclearly. Moreover,in studyingthe foundationsof mathematics,writershave
beenled to producea vast massofmaterial-ofexampleson which
our theoriescan be tested; they have tried puttingthingsin
all sortsof different
ways; and all this workmay lateron be of
greatvalue.
Again,it is not maintainedthat all the schoolsof thoughton
thissubjectare mistakenin all the basic philosophicalstatements
theymake; on the contrary,
thereis certainlya lot in what each
ofthemsays. But theirpositions,in so faras theyhave proved
tenable,makeno advance overlong-known
philosophicaltheories,
and do not providea solutionof the ancientproblems.
We may approachtheseproblemsmosteasilyby settingout in
skeletonformthe argumentthroughwhichthe advanced mathematical stuidentis led, in orderto explain to him the necessity
fora theoryof the foundationsof mathematics.
The Greeks,we know,had no algebra, and consideredtheir
geometryto be an a priori study,thoughnecessarilyapplying

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A-. G.

D.

WATSON:

MATHEMATICS

AND

ITS

FOUNDATIONS.

441

to the real world. In their geometrythey came up against

magnitudes,lines, areas and volumes,whichwere incapable of
rationalexpression,the diagonal of a square,the circumference
and area of a circle,and so on. But theirapproachto the problemswhichthisraisedwas purelyintuitive,and theywerenever
able to ask themselvesthe question: What is meantby saying
that a circlehas an area ?
In the seventeenthcenturythe matter came up again, but
in a new form,fornow algebrahad been developed. In dealing
with irrationalquantities infinitealgebraic processeswere applied-infiniteseriesand the calculus. But no adequate account
was given of the principleson which these processesrest,and
people soon got into difficulties.
rigour
The firststep in puttingthingsright,and introducing
intomathematicalproofs,was takenin Cauchy'stheoryof limits,
whichshowedthat an investigationof the validityof the processes was necessary,and began the work of giving criteria
forit. Yet therewas stilla lacuna, forCauchy'scriteriainvolve
the assertionof the existenceof real numberssatisfyingcertain
conditions,and no one had explainedwhat a real numberwas
in any case. Thus the researchesof Dedekind and Cantorinto
the natureof the arithmetical
continuumwerenecessitated.
The wholeof thisdevelopmentwas knownas the Arithmetisation of Mathematics. When it was completedit was considered
thatmathematicswas nowfinallyfreeofany elementofintuition.
entitiesto whichthis
The questionofthe existenceofgeometrical
purifiedmathematicsmight apply could be taken as being a
purelyempiricalone.
However,when this great success came to be codified,unexin the shape of the paradoxes of the theory
pected difficulties,
of aggregates,came to light. Hence the necessityforPrincipia
Mathematica,whichnot only claimedto solve these paradoxes,
but also carriedthe analysisof mathematicsa furtherstep back,
fromarithmetic
to logic.
It is not possiblehere to enteron even a small part of the
questionsinvolvedin the systemof PrincipiaMathematica. It
may be observed,however,that the importanceof the formal
analysis of the notionsof numberinto the traditionallylogical
notionsof " some", " not ", and so on,has graduallyfadedaway.
The Formalistlogicianshave concentratedon discussionsof the
arisingafterthe knownones
contradictions
possibilityof further
have been eliminated. For this purposetheyhave still further
formalisedthe expressionof mathematicallogic. Now Russell's
collection
analysisof numberproceedsby the use of an indefinite

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442

A. G. D. WATSON:

of symbolsas variables,x, y, etc. The formalistshave found

themselvescompelledto replace this collectionby an orderly
assemblyof symbols,x1, x2, etc.- They thereforeusually take
numericalsymbolsas basic in theirsystems.
We nowreturnto the questionofthe natureofthe continuum.
Let us take as an examplein the argumentbeforeoutlined,the
square root of 2. The searchforsuch a square root arisesfrom
the fact that the processesof Euclidean geometryallow us to
the
constructtwolinessuchas thelinesAB and AE in the figure,
square on one of whichis twice the area of the square on the
other. Thus if the lengthsof thesetwo linescould be expressed
as multiplesof a commonunit,the square of one of the numbers
expressingthemwould have to be twicethe square of the other.
As two numbershaving this relationshipcannot be found,it
followsthat thereis no commonunit in termsof whichthe two
lines can be expressed-whichis what is meant by sayingthat

Fig. 1.

they are incommensurable. It is evidentthat the existenceof

lines havingtheserelationsdependson the Euclidean definitions
which
magnitudes,
ofequality,addition,and so on, ofgeometrical
are idealisationsof,or abstractionsfrom,physicaloperationswith
rigidfigures. I may remarkthat thisrecourseto Euclid in order
to explain the genesis of irrationalnumberis not a merejeu
d'esprit,but is used, forexample,in Prof.Hardy's Pure Mathematics,pp. 4 and 5.
Now althoughI cannotfinda ratio to expressthe line AB in
termsof the line AE, yet I can findratios whichwill give me
lengthseithersmaller or larger than AB. And, in fact,it is
possible to give a methodwhich will supply closer and closer
exapproximationsto the lengthof this line. Arithmetically
pressed,we can findfractionswhose squares differless and less
from2. A uniformprocessfordoingthisis the standardprocess
for calculatingthe square root of 2 as a decimal. This is the
kindof processwhichwas used freelyby the seventeenth-century

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MATHEMATICS

AND

ITS

FOUNDATIONS.

443

mathematicians,who said that the value of the square root of

2 is givenby thisprocesscarriedto infinity.
When we considerprocessesof this kind in general,however,
we findthat it is necessary,in orderto avoid contradiction,
to
investigatewhetherthe processconverges,that is to say really
does get us nearer and nearer to something. This phrase is
moreexactlyexplainedin thefollowing
way. An infinite
sequence
or successionof numbersis said to converge
to a limit,if there
existsa number(namelythe limititself),such that the difference
betweenthetermsof the sequenceand thisnumbermay be made
as small as you please by goingfar enoughalong the sequence.
Thusin connection
withthesequenceofnumbers1/n,thesequence
of reciprocalsof the positive integers,Prof. Hardy writes: 1
" The readershouldimaginehimselfconfronted
by an opponent
who questionsthe truthof the statement[that the limitof the
sequenceis zero]. He would name a seriesof numbersgrowing
smallerand smaller. He mightbegin with 001. The reader
wouldreplythat 1/n< *001 as soonas n > 1000. The opponent
would be bound to admit this, but would try again with some
smaller number,such as 0000001. The reader would reply
that 1/n < 0000001 as soon as n > 10000000: and so on. In
this simplecase it is evidentthat the readerwould always have
the betterof the argument." We shall meet this kind of competitionagain.
Thus, in order to be able to say that a certainsequence of
numbersconvergesto the square root of 2, we have to be able
to say that the square root of 2 exists, and here the trouble
begins. In the geometricalaccount which we gave before,
it was lines which approached a constructedline in length;
but nowwe wishto be able to dispensewithgeometry,
and define
a numberwhichwillbe the limitof the decimal,and willhave its
square equal to 2. We are then providedwith the Dedekind
of a real numberas a sectionof the rationals.
definition
It is worthwhileremarkingthat thereis somethingveryodd
about this search fora definitionof the square root of 2, and
otherirrationalnumbers. For it is not onlythe wordnumberto
whichwe are goingto give a new meaning,but also inevitably
the words which describerelationsbetweenand operationson
numbers,suchas greaterthan,addition,multiplication,
and so on.
For whichreason it is utterlyindifferent
whatdefinitionof the
squarerootof2 we give,forwe can arrangead hocthatmultiplying
it by itselfwill give 2. Thus we may,if we like,define1 penny
1

Loc. cit., p. 114.

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444

A. G. D.

WATSON:

= the square root of 2, by arrangingto use the word " multiply ", not onlyin its usual sense,but also in a new sensein which
ld. x ld. = 2. A closerinvestigationshowsthat the orthodox
theoryof real numbersis in essentialagreementwiththis view,
and that the point about its so-calleddefinition
is that it is not
at all, but a statementthat no definition
a definition
is required.
It is notnecessaryforus hereto go intothequestionofsections
of the rational numbersas such. We observe that to every
suchsectionan infinite
decimalcorresponds,
and so forsimplicity
we can confineourselvesto decimals as representatives
of the
real numbers.
Infinitedecimals are a particularcase of infinitesequences,
and one of the essentialstepsin the processof arithmetisation
of
mathematicswas that by whichit was shownthat it is unnecessary,as well as unjustified,
to speak of infinity
as a number,and
of infinitesequencesas if theywerean infinitenumberof things
in a row. Instead ofthis,we have to thinkofan infinite
sequence
as a functionof a variable whose values are cardinalnumbers
(or positiveintegers).
The notionof a functionof a variableof this kind in general,
by whichto everycardinalnumbertherecorrespondssomething,
a proposition,or a numberor anotherfunction,accordingto the
natureofthe functionin question,thusbecomesthe fundamental
notionofmathematics. All mathematicalstatements,
it appears,
can be expressedin termsof propositionalfunctionsof thiskind.
There is a special methodof proofappropriateto these functions,the methodof mathematicalinduction,whichrepresents
the intuitiveidea that something
is true of all cardinalnumbers,
if it is true of 0 and also of the successorof any numberof
whichit is true. In the usual notationof mathematicallogic
this is embodiedin the formula:
/

f(O) : (n) .f(n) nf(n + 1):

*(n)f(n)Sincethe end ofthesystemofPrincipiaMathematica,
a greatdeal
ofworkhas been done in elaboratingaxiomatictheoriesin which
thisprincipleof mathematicalinductionis the operativeaxiom.
One questionwhicharises about these functionsof a cardinal
variable is: Whetherthey are to be taken as functionsin extensionor in intension? I thinkthat it is now prettygenerally
agreedthatto take themas functionsin extension,as forexample
Ramsey wished to do, is merelyto reintroducethe actual or
extendedinfinite
whichwe have just takenthetroubleto extrude.
Ramsey maintained,'that althoughwe can only give functions
.

1 F.

P. Ramsey,FoundationsofMathematics,
pp. 22, 23.

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MATHEMATICS

AND

ITS

FOUNDATIONS.

445

by means of an expression,that is to say an intension,yet there

may be ones whichwe cannot mentionbut whichwill come in
whenwe speak of all functions. Thereis a truthconcealedhere
whichI shall try to elucidatelater. For the presentwe may
observethat whatevermay be the relevanceof the factthat our
facultiesare finite,this is hardly a contingentfact, like our
havingfivefingers. From thepracticalpoint of view,Ramsey's
attitude makes it necessaryto accept as intuitivelyobvious
certainformulas,
such as the multiplicative
axiom,whichcannot,
apparently,be formallyprovedfromtheusually acceptedprimitive propositions.
of functionsof a cardinal
Followingon fromthe introduction
variable,let us now considera resultwhichhas been obtained
by investigatingaxiomatic systemsof the kind we mentioned,
The interpretation
whichI shall give of the famousexample of
Gddel,1owesmuchto lengthydiscussionswitha numberofpeople,
of Cambridge.
especiallyMr. Turingand Dr. Wittgenstein
Godel's example belongsto the fieldof investigationsof the
em. This problemis to discoverwhetherthe
Entscheidungsprobl
accepted primitivepropositionsand rulesof inferenceof mathematical logic allow us to concludeeitherthe truthor the falsehood of everypropositionalformula,and if so to give a general
methodby whichthis can be done. It is well knownthat for
formulaeof the " propositionalcalculus", in which no propositional functionsappear, the method of tables of " truthvalues", given by Wittgensteinin TractatusLogico-Philosophicus,providesthe solution. Godelappearsto have shownthat
thereis no solutionforthe case of formulhe
involvingfunctions
of a cardinalvariable.
It was the original intentionof the formalistlogicians in
studyingthe Entscheidungsproblem
and the problemof consistencybeforereferred
to, to restrictthemselvesin theirarguments
to such as must be absolutelyindisputable; which, since the
subject of theirstudywas simplythe manipulationof symbols
on a page, appeared to be readily attainable,2 For greater
accuracy, however,they were led to put their argumentsin
symbolicform. Now finallyit appears that the naturalformof
expressionforsuch arguments,whichhave to be able to speak
of " any finitecollectionof symbolsof such-and-sucha kind",
is the very calculus of propositionalfunctionsof a cardinal
1 Monatshefte
u.
f. Mathematik

Physik,(1931),38, p. 173.
Cf. the accountin M. Black's The NatureofMathematics,
Supplement
A, esp. p. 149.
2

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446

A. G. D. WATSON:

variable,whosepropertieswe mostwish to elucidate.1 Here lie

both the possibilityof constructingGodel's example, and the
of interpreting
it whenconstructed.
difficulty
The axiomaticsystemwithwhichGodel is concernedcontains
the usual sort of rules of formalmanipulationof propositions,
and also the principleof inductionas an axiom. Moreover,in
a provedformulaof the type (n)f(n), that is to say, one which
says thatf(n) is trueforall n, we may substituteany particular
cardinalnumber,as forexample 0, givingf(O) as proved. By
substitutingnumbersfor the symbols used in this calculus,
of and relationsbetweenthe
Godelis able to showthatproperties
in it correspondto arithmetical
formulae
propertiesand relations
of the corresponding
numbers. These latter can be stated in
the originalsymbolism,if it is supposedto be, what it was inof the principlesof arithtendedto be, a correctformalisation
metic. In thisway Godel is able to constructa formulawhich,
in arithmeticalterms,states that the numberwhich
interpreted
to itselfas a set of signshas not got the arithmetical
corresponds
propertywhich correspondsto the propertyof being provable
fromthe axioms of the system. In otherwords,it states, indirectly,that it itselfis not provable.
If we assume forthe momentthat this axiomatic systemis
we shallhave to concludethat
indeeda good basis forarithmetic,
the formulais not provable,and therefore,
sincethisis just what
it says, that it is true. For if it were provable,it would be
false,and the systemwould be incorrect.
This method of putting the argument,however, obscures
rather than illuminatesthe point. Suppose we assume the
falsityof the formula,we cannot, of course,derive a contradiction,forthis would amount to a proofof the formula. Instead, we reach the followingpeculiarsituation,whichis called
by Godel an -contradiction
(c is the " ordinalnumber" of a
sequence). We findthat thereis a functionof a cardinalvariable, say f(n), such that (all on the basis of the falsehoodof
Godel's formula)(n)f(n) can be disproved,and yet we can convince ourselvesthat we can provein turnf(O),f(l), f(2) and so
on. In otherwords,we apply mathematicalinductionto the
proofsof the system,and obtainf(O), and froma proofof f(n)
forany particularvalue of n, a proofforn + 1.
? Whyshouldwe
Whyshouldwe objectto an c-contradiction
not stillsay that Godel's formulamay be false? The answeris
Cf.
- Poincare,Scienceand Method,p. 152, quoted by Black, loc cit.,
pp. 177,178.

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MATHEMATICS

AND

ITS

FOUNDATIONS.

447

that if we do thiswe shallfeelcompelledto say that the cardinal

numberscannot be all the values of the variable n, iff(n) can
be trueforeach particularvalue of n, and yet (n)f(n) be false.
Let us now state this resultin still anotherway. It means
that the rules that nothingbut cardinal numberscan be subofn are subjectto mathematical
stitutedforn, and thatfunctions
induction,are still not enough to ensure that n is a cardinal
variable. Thus the notionofa cardinalvariable,i.e. ofa number
in the everydaysense, is somethingthat cannot be completely
expressedin the axiomaticsystem,and is essentiallynon-formal.
It should be borne in mind that we do not know that the
axiomaticsystemwhichis the best we can constructas a formal
mathematicallogic is actually free fromc-contradictions,or
even from contradictions. The attempt to investigatethese
which
questionsby formalistmethodsleads us again to formulae
are unentscheidbar.1
2 of the
We may observein passingthat Russell's definition
of numbersby the principleof inductionis shownby
finiteness
Godel's resultto be inadequate.
We cannot concludeforcertainthat our axiomaticsystemis
actually incompletein the sense that there are questions of
arithmeticwhich cannot be decided by it, but what we can
say is this: ifwe accept as conclusivethe argumentsof a certain
axiomaticsystem,thenwe shallalso acceptargumentswhichproovertheproofsofthissystem. Such arguments
ceedbyinductionl
are in fact commonin elementaryarithmeticand algebra.
As soon as we have seen that the embodimentof the principle
of mathematicalinduction in the axioms of our arithmetic
does not achieveall that we want,it seemsto me that we should
be rathersuspiciousof the claim that this is the sole valid principle for provingpropertiesof cardinals. In ordinarymathematics we oftenmake use of what are sometimescalled " inforexamplein provingthebinomialtheorem
tuitive" arguments,
series. It is usuallysaid that these
or summingan arithmetical
argumentsare eitherfallacious,or mere approximationsto the
real proofs,which proceed by induction. But these proofs
reach the rightanswer,and they convinceeverybody; theyare
called intuitivebecause no one has given a rationaleof them.
It may be truethat the same resultscan also be reachedby induction,but it is hard to see whywe shouldhave to accept that
196.
two senses of " finite" whichhe is unable to
Russell distinguishes
axiom. See PrincipiaMathematica,
reconcilewithoutthe multiplicative
Vol. II., chap. 124
1 G6del,loc.cit.,? 4, p.
2

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448

A. G. D.

WATSON:

of valid proofsof probeinginductiveis the specificdifferentia

positionsabout cardinals.
that a greatpartof the business
Moreover,it is oftenforgotten
modes of exof mathematicsconsistsin showingthat different
pressioncan be applied,and in particularthat the so-calledstrict
proofsby inductiondo reallylead to the resultswhichwe have
alreadyacceptedon othergrounds.
ambiguityin the idea of a cardinalvariable,
Thereis a further
whichis of greatimportanceas being the sourceof the puzzles
transfinite
numbers. It is connectedwith
about the different
the questionof functionsin extension,whichwe mentionedbefore,and withthe multiplicativeaxiom. We said, in discussing
G6del'sexample,thatifwe wereto assumethefalsityofa formula
which could be proved in each particularcase, we should be
drivento say that therewere othervalues whichthe variable
couldtake,althoughwe had not specifiedany. Thisis something
like what happensin the case of a real variable,that is to say,
a variable whose values are sequences such as decimals. The
particulardecimalswe can substituteforsucha variableare given
by functions,that is to say, by formule,which are of finite
complexity. Thus they can be arrangedin a sequence, each
given a number,and so they forman enumerablecollection.
Nevertheless,althoughthese are the only values which can be
involving
givento thisvariable,we cannotprovegeneralformulae
it by inductionoverthe sequenceof values,and so it mightseem
values.
that thereare otherhidden,unmentionable
In orderto elucidate this situation,let us considerCantor's
proofthat the real numbersare not enumerable,in connection
withanotherrecentexamplewhichhas been providedby Turing.'
Turing'stheoryof computablenumbersis essentiallythat of
mathematicalexpressions,but he has put it in a ratherstriking
way in termsof machines,which would calculate decimals in
to different
mathematical
accordancewithruleswhichcorrespond
expressionsfor sequences of this kind. He shows how each
foreach machine,
suchmachinecan be givena number,different
and so concludesthat the machinesand thereforethe numbers
calculatedby themforman enumerableset. He thenasks why
of all decimalsdoes not
Cantor'sproofof the non-enumerability
apply here,forit seems to give a methodby which,fromany
sequenceof decimals,a new one not belongingto the sequence
can be assigned.
1 Proceedings
of theLondonMathematicalSociety(2nd. Ser.), Vol. 42,
(1936-37),p. 230. See also A. Church,AmericanJournalof Mathematics,
Vol. 58 (1936),p. 345. Church'spaperis earlier,butTuring'smorereadily
intelligible.

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MATHEMATICS AND ITS FOUNDATIONS.

449

Cantor'sproofrunsas follows: If we are givenany sequenceof

decimals,forminga doublyinfinitearrayof digits,we can take
the diagonalof this array,and, by alteringeach digitaccording
fromeach of the
to a fixedrule,obtain a decimalwhichdiffers
fromall.
givensequencein at least one place, and so differs
is this.
what
happens
machines
Turing's
of
case
in
the
Now
Althoughwe can give everymachinea number,it is impossible
to give a mechanicalmethodby whichwe can ascertainwhether
any particularmachineis reallya good one,that it actuallygoes
on calculatingdecimals,and does not get stuck. And if we try
to constructthe diagonalmachinewhichis to calculateCantor's
new decimal,thiswill certainlyget stuck. For it itselfwillhave
to its
a number,and when it comes to the place corresponding
will
for
they
it
to
do
anything,
tell
not
will
its
rules
number,
own
else.
tellit to findoutwhatit is goingto do, and thendo something
thingto enumerate
This exampleshowsthat it is a different
a collectionof thingsin the sense of givinga numberto each of
themin the sense of givingone of them
them,and enumerating
to each number. It is the latterof these processeswhichgives
a functionof a cardinalvariable,or sequence,and the formeris
not sufficient.
Returningto Cantor'sproof,we see that thereis an ambiguity
in the idea of someone giving a sequence of decimals which
can take place, like that
vitiatesthe proof. No real competition
of a sequence. The
convergence
the
defining
in
occurred
which
man challengedmay attemptto constructhis sequence of decimals in extension,in which case he never bringsanythinginfiniteinto play; or he may give an expressionfor a double
sequence,that is to say a functionof two cardinalvariables,as
f(m,n); or a sequenceofnumbersofTuringmachines,and so on.
From the second case it is possible to concludethat functions
of two variablesmay be made to yieldfunctionsof one variable
forone of the variables,as
ways-by substituting
in twodifferent
thevariables,as f(m,in); and
f(M, 0) and so on,or by identifying
we can obtainfromthe lattera sequence
that by transformation
whichis not obtainableby the formermethod. In no way can
number.
we arriveat anythingin the way of a transfinite
We have spokenofthe confusionrevealedby Turing'sexample
fromthat shownby G6del's, but the two are
as being different
of applyingthe
in fact very closelyrelated. The impossibility
diagonal argumentto Turing's machinesdepends on the nonexistenceof a machinewhich will determinethe 'goodness '1
1"

Good" is myownterm; Turinguses " circle-free."

30

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450

A. G. D. WATSON:

of each machinein turn. Such a machinemightbe supposedto

be one whichwouldwrite0 in the nthplace ifn is the numberof
a good machine,and otherwisewrite1. But thismachinewould
types of criteria
have to have embodiedin its rules different
for the goodnessof machines. It would have to recogniseas
proofsofgoodnessnot onlysuchproofsas wouldbe givenby the
applicationof some axiomatic systemof the kind treated by
G6del,but also such as proceedby inductionover the proofsof
this system,and proofsproceedingby induction over these,
and so on, and, ifwe distinguishtheseas proofsof types0, 1, 2,
say, it mustrecogniseproofsproceedingby inductionoverproofs
type.1 We shouldthus be involvedin a conof ever-increasing
tradictioncloselyparallel to the well-known" contradictionof
the greatestordinal."
It may seem strangethat we should be able to give so very
detailedan accountof what cannothappen,but this accountis,
of course,reallymodelledon what does happen. For, if we are
givensomeprinciple,suchas an axiomaticsystem,on thebasis of
whichthe goodnessor' otherwiseof some class of machinescan
be decided, we can use the diagonal argumentto construct
furtherexamplesof machines,not includedin the originalclass,
whose goodnesscan be decided by an inductiveargument,and
extendedin the way we have
this process can be indefinitely
providethe methodby which
described. Godel's investigations
the diagonal argumentis to be applied. Yet at each stage of
this processof widening,the decisionsmade have all been made
rules,whichcouldbe embodiedin a machine,
accordingto definite
or expressedin termsof an axiomaticsystem. And, in fact,the
originalaxiomaticsystemwithwhichwe startedwillbe sufficient
forthe purpose,if its termsare suitablyinterpreted.
Followingup thiskind of argument,we can, I think,convince
ourselvesthat all the remarkableproblemsand discoveriesof
the Foundationsof Mathematics,the paradoxesof the theoryof
Russell'stheoryoftypes,withitsaxiomofreducibility,
aggregates,
Cantor's arithmeticof transfinitenumbers,with its insoluble
problemssuch as the " continuumproblem", the problemsconaxiomin extensionand themultiplicative
nectedwithfunctions
all thesemerelyexpressin one way or anotherthe well-known
process
whicharisewhenwe attemptto treatan infinite
difficulties
as completed.
Let us nowreturnto ourearliestquestion,and see whatbearing
all this has on the problemof irrationalnumber. We must
1 Cf.G6del,loccit.,p.

191,n. 48a.

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MATHEMATICS

AND

ITS

FOUNDATIONS.

451

surelyconcludethat in the whole argumentwe have never got

beyondthe bare fact,well knownto the Greeks,that no rational
numberhas its squareequal to 2, and thatin dealingwithquantities whichare incommensurable
we do not assignto themsingle
numbers,but insteadwe have processesforcalculatingnumbers
whichwill representthemwithincreasingaccuracy. We do not
need to postulateany mysteriousentity,an irrationalnumber,
to whichthesenumbersmightapproach,forthe entitywithwhich
we are concernedis, in the firstplace, some physicalquantity,
and the problemwhicharises in connectionwiththe processof
calculatingis: Whetherit is the kind of processwhichwe wish
to use here? In decidingthis que.tion we make use of the
generalrules of our algebra and mathematicalanalysis,which
are of the same kindas the rulesforaddinglengthsand areas in
Greekgeometry,
thoughhavinga moreextendeduse; and like
these they are abstractedfromoperationswithphysicalquantities.
The attemptswhich have been made in the subject of the
FoundationsofMathematicsto justifyor condemnmathematical
argumentstaken in the abstract,'have given rise to a host of
confusions,fromwhich it has taken the most immenselabour
to escape. At the same timewe have been leftwithoutany hope
ofmotion,timeand
of solvingthe problemsabout the continuity
space, such as wereraised by Zeno and Kant. The idea of the
collectionofnumbersmakesthese
continuumas a non-enumerable
thingstotallyunintelligible. It seems to requirean answerto
the question: What happenedat -a o'clockto-day? Thenthere
is the mysterythat whenI drewthe line AB in figure1, I had
to pass throughthe point H such that AHl AE, and through
all the otherpointsat everyotherdistancefromA less than AB.
How did I achieve this task of non-enumerablecomplexity?
This theory,too, has given countenanceto views such as those
of Prof.Eddington,2
that space-timeis actually an arrangement
of collectionsof four numbers-views which fatally confuse
physical phenomena,the processesof measurementwhich we
apply to them,and the knowledgewe therebygain. I suggest
of the natureof actual conthat in respectof our understanding
tinuityin experiencewe have scarcelyadvanced beyondKant.
1 What is said heremay be takenas beingdirectedagainstDedekind's
to " measurablequantities" is requiredin the
thesisthat no reference
foundationsof mathematicalanalysis. See Was sind u. was sollendie
Zahlen,p. 10.
u. irrationale
Zahlen? p. xii,Stetigkeit
2And also apparentlyof Prof. Carnap, Logical Syntaxof Language,
? 40, pp. 149ff.

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