PLAINTIFFS RESPONSIVE BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION.2

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND CASE OVERVIEW..3

III.

ARGUMENT, EVIDENCE & CITATIONS OF AUTHORITY5

A. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.5
B. HISTORIC ABUSE OF PROCESS..11
C. KNOWINGLY DISHONEST ANSWER..13
D. BOILERPLATE OBJECTIONS, DELAY TACTICS....16
E. BAD CHARACTER- UNTRUTHFULNESS..18
F. AFFIDAVITS MADE IN BAD FAITH.20

V.

APPENDIX A.24

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF DEKALB COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA
DYLAN GOLDMAN
Plaintiff,
v.
ALLISON EBERLY
Defendant.

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Civil Action File

No.: 16CV1860-7

PLAINTIFFS RESPONSIVE BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pursuant to Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. Rule 6.2, Plaintiff Dylan Goldman
hereby files this Responsive Brief in Opposition to Defendants Motion for
Summary Judgment, and pursuant to O.C.G.A. 9-11-56(d), (e), submits to this
Court his entire evidentiary record supporting the existence of a genuine issue
for trial.
I.

INTRODUCTION
The original complaint in this case was filed by Dylan Goldman (Plaintiff,

Goldman) against Allison Eberly (Defendant, Eberly) on January 29, 2016,

pursuant to O.C.G.A. 51-5-4(a)(1)1. The Plaintiffs intent in filing this lawsuit is to
recover damages suffered from the slanderous statements that Eberly maliciously

O.C.G.A. 51-5-4: (a) Slander or oral defamation consists in:

(1) Imputing to another a crime punishable by law.

made under oath about Goldman, and to challenge the truthfulness of those statements
in open court. (A duplicate2 copy of the Plaintiffs original Complaint is attached
hereto as Exhibit A)
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND CASE OVERVIEW

On January 16th, 2016, Goldman ceased all communication attempts with

Eberly. (A certified copy of Goldmans phone records from 11/13/16 - 2/13/16 is

attached hereto as Exhibit B).
On January 19, 2016, Eberly applied for a warrant for the Plaintiffs arrest for
stalking, three days after Goldman had ceased all communication.
On January 29, 2016, at 11:24 a.m., Goldman filed the present complaint
against Eberly. (See Exhibit A)
On January 29, 2016, at 12:49 p.m., Eberly filed a petition for a Temporary
Protective Order against Goldman. (See Exhibit E)
On February 29, 2016, the original complaint was amended and recast to
include pleadings that challenge the truthfulness of Eberlys allegations within her
TPO Petition. (A duplicate of the Plaintiffs Amended and Recast Complaint for
Damages are attached hereto as Exhibit C.) However, according to O.C.G.A.
9-11-15(C):
2

A duplicate shall be admissible to the same extent as an original unless:

(1) A genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original; or
(2) A circumstance exists where it would be unfair to admit
the duplicate in lieu of the original. O.C.G.A. 24-10-1003.

Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading

arises out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment
relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment
changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back to
the date of the original pleadings if the foregoing provisions are
satisfied, and if within the period provided by law for commencing the
action against him the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has
received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be
prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or
should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of
the proper party, the action would have been brought against him.
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. 51-5-43, Plaintiff brought this action against the
Defendant for knowingly and maliciously making slanderous statements against him
under oath, to (1) fraudulently obtain a warrant against the Plaintiff for stalking, for
which he is currently facing criminal charges; (2) fraudulently obtain a Protective
Order and (3) tarnish his name and character by communicating her false allegations
to multiple third parties within their community. (A certified copy of Affidavit of
Maggie Selmser, supporting the latter, is attached hereto as Exhibit D.)
Defendants entire defensive argument to negate the validity of the Plaintiffs
claim sits upon two documents which did not exist at the time the Plaintiff initially

(a) Slander or oral defamation consists in:

(1) Imputing to another a crime punishable by law;
(2) Charging a person with having some contagious disorder or with being guilty of some debasing act which may
exclude him from society;
(3) Making charges against another in reference to his trade, office, or profession, calculated to injure him therein; or
(4) Uttering any disparaging words productive of special damage which flows naturally therefrom.
(b) In the situation described in paragraph (4) of subsection (a) of this Code section, special damage is essential to
support an action; in the situations described in paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (a) of this Code section, damage
is inferred.

filed this action- the Defendants Petition for Temporary Protective Order (TPO
petition) and the resulting Consent Family Violence Twelve Month Protective Order
(Consent Order). (Duplicates of the TPO petition and Consent Order attached hereto
as Exhibits E and F, respectively.)
Although both filed with the Clerk of Superior Court4 on January 29, 2016, the
Courts official stamp affixed to the Plaintiffs original complaint shows that this civil
action (16CV1860-7) was filed at 11:24 a.m., a little more than one hour before that of
the Defendants TPO (16CV1861-9), on which the official stamp reads 12:47 p.m.
(Please see evidentiary exhibits A and E)
III.

ARGUMENT, SUPPORTING EVIDENCE AND CITATIONS OF

AUTHORITY
A. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary Judgment, under Georgias Civil Practice Act, may be granted if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. O.C.G.A.
9-11-56(c)
On the second page of the Defendants Brief in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment Against Plaintiff, Defendant cites Cowart, 287 Ga. at 623, 697 S.E.2d at
4

Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. Rule 36.9

782 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986), to say that a
Plaintiff may not defeat a defendants properly supported motion for summary
judgmentwithout offering concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could
return a verdict in [his] favor It is with regard to this citation that the Plaintiff has
hereto attached his entire evidentiary record, with all evidence properly authenticated
pursuant to O.C.G.A. 24-9-901(b)(10). Because there is a genuine issue of material
fact and because the Defendant has failed to meet her burden of showing she is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, her Motion must be denied.
Perhaps the most compelling argument opposing summary judgment can be
found within the Defendants answers to the pleadings, which she filed with this Court
on March 9, 2016. (See Exhibit G)
City of Douglas v. Hudson, 315 Ga. App. 20, 726 S.E.2d 496 (2012), quoting
Strength v. Lovell, 311 Ga. App. 35, 39,714 S.E.2d 723 (2011). To prevail on a
motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is no genuine
dispute as to a specific material fact and that this specific fact is enough, regardless of
any other facts in the case, to entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.
Also, O.C.G.A. 9-11-56 states:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported
as provided in this Code section, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Code

section, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.
The Defendant has provided no actual evidence to negate the claims forged in
this action; instead the Defendant and her counsel repeatedly point to the TPO and
Consent Order, which again, did not exist at the time this action was filed. See also
F.R.E. Rule 56(c)(1)(b): A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely
disputed must support the assertion byshowing that the materials cited do not
establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot
produce admissible evidence to support the fact; and F.R.E. 56(c)(2): A party may
object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form
that would be admissible in evidence.
Defendants TPO Petition and the claims and subsequent documents therein
cannot be cited by the Defendant in support of the truthfulness of her claims against
Goldman or for any other reason other than to support their existence within the
record. TPO petitions are based upon an ex parte decision, which does not require all
of the parties to the controversy to be present, does not verify the validity of the
Petitioners claims, and brings no judgment upon the Respondent in question.
The presumption of innocence rarely applies to civil cases, unless they are
considered to be quasi-criminal cases, such as Stalking and Family Violence Orders.
Plaintiff maintains he consented per the pending criminal matter raised by the

Defendants initial warrant application. In reference to the pending criminal stalking

charge, the Plaintiff is presumed innocent until proven guilty, to which every State
in this Country is bound under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth (14th)
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America5.
Since the TPO and resulting Consent Order were filed under the stalking6
statute, if the Plaintiff were to be acquitted of the charge, the Court should be
compelled to revisit Eberlys need for a Family Violence Order.
Since Eberlys TPO petition and the resulting Consent Order, were filed after
this civil action, they cannot be incorporated by reference, nor used to argue or
defend against any of the Plaintiffs allegations brought forth in this action, as neither
existed when this civil action was filed.
McKee v. City of Geneva, 280 Ga. 411, 412413, 627 S.E.2d 555 (2006) holds
that one cannot incorporate a document by reference that has yet to be filed or made a
public record. As a general rule, the adoption of documents through the principle of
incorporation by reference is valid where the document is sufficiently identified and is
made a part of the public record. [See Friedman v. Goodman, 219 Ga. 152, 159(3)(b),
132 S.E.2d 60 (1963)] (ed.).[Defendant] does not cite any authority for the
proposition that the principle of incorporation by reference can apply prospectively to

nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
6

Under O.C.G.A. 16-5-90

a document which has yet to be filed or made a public record because [such a law] is
non-existent.
The record shows that both this case and the Defendants Petition for a
Temporary Protective Order (TPO), out of which ultimately resulted a Consent
Family Violence Twelve Month Protective Order (Consent Order) were filed on
January 29, 2016. However, the C.A. File Numbers of both complaints show that the
Plaintiffs complaint (C.A.F.N.#16CV1860-7), although not served upon the
Defendant until February 12, 2016, was filed before the Defendants TPO. (C.A.F.N.
#16CV1861-9)
O.C.G.A. 9-11-15(c) states that whenever the claim or defense asserted in
the amended pleading arises out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth
or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to
the date of the original pleading.
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. 50-18-70, under Georgias Open Records Act,
Protective Orders are matters of public record. Supporting caselaw from Newton
County v. East Georgia Land and Development Company affirms the inadmissibility
of the TPO and/or Consent Order as evidence, since at the time that this action was
filed, and its complaints forged hereto, neither the TPO nor Consent Order were in
existence. Therefore, the Plaintiff must raise question as to the validity of any defense

citing the TPO or Consent Order, when neither were in existence until after this
complaint was initially filed.
However, a map not yet in existence cannot have been made a public record
and was not accessible to members of the public7 who are, or may be, affected by
it. East Georgia Land & Dev. Co. v. Newton County, 290 Ga. 732, 737(2), 723 S.E.
2d 909 (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Furthermore, the Defense asserts that the signing of a Consent Order was an
admission by the Plaintiff (as the Respondent in that case) to the allegations made
within by the Defendant (as the Petitioner in that case). However, no admission of
guilt was made by the Plaintiff (as the Respondent) to the allegations within such
Order upon his signing, as he agreed to a consent to the order without admissions8
per the pending criminal charge raised by the Defendants false allegations.
Additionally, Goldman arrived to court fully prepared to argue his case, and
brought with him the Powerpoint Presentation he created to present his evidence
refuting Eberlys claims. (A computer-printout of an email Plaintiff sent himself on
February 16, 2016, the day of the TPO hearing, listing the Evidentiary Timeline within
its attachments to certify its existence on and before the date of the hearing is attached

(Georgia Domestic Violence Benchbook; 3.3.1(c))

hereto as Exhibit H; a computer-printout of the entire evidentiary timeline with

evidence refuting Eberlys allegations is attached hereto as Exhibit I.)
Section 3.3.1(c) of the Georgia Domestic Violence Benchbook (Benchbook)
explains that a consent without admissions provides, that the respondent has made no
admissions of fact with respect to the underlying events as to reduce the risk that
prosecution might successfully admit the order on the issue of abuse in the later
criminal case. While, as asserted by Defendants counsel Andrew Becker within a
letter to the Plaintiff, the Benchbook is not controlling law, it is a guide to
procedure. Within the Benchbooks introduction, Hon. Robert W. Adamson, who sits
on the Council of Superior Court Judges, writes:
The shortcomings in our present system coupled with
our negative response to it have resulted in victims who
are not served, cases, which have fallen through the
cracks, respondents who are harmed by abuse of the
process and judges who are more prone to fight the
problem rather than to seek ways to improve the
systemIt is the hope that this Domestic Violence
Benchbook will serve as a cornerstone to help us
understand, address and, in time, discover more complete
solutions to this profound problem.
B. HISTORIC ABUSE OF PROCESS
Dating back to December of 2000, the Defendant has filed a total of four TPO
petitions.

On December 5, 2000, Eberly filed a TPO with Gwinnett County, Case #00A-11185-0, against Kimberly A. Jones, with whom she had been in a long-term
romantic relationship, resulting in a 1600/hr. Family Violence Order. (An official
printout9 of the record is attached hereto as Exhibit J). In February, 2014, Plaintiff
had several phone calls with Jones, during which she confirmed that Eberly had lied to
and cheated on her (Jones) countless times, and had abused the system to file an
unjustified Protective Order against her. (Copies of Plaintiffs phone records from
February 2014, calls with Jones @ (678) 509-4926 highlighted, are hereto attached as
Exhibit K)
On June 7, 2004, Eberly filed a TPO with Gwinnett County, Case #04A-06132-0, against Ann L. Font, with whom she had been in a long-term romantic
relationship with, which appears to have resulted in a Family Violence Order. (An
official printout10 of the record is attached hereto as Exhibit L) The record shows
that Eberly filed Motions for Contempt on June 21, 2004 and August 6, 2004,
dismissing her motion on August 20, 2004.
On February 7, 2011, Eberly filed a TPO with DeKalb County against the
Plaintiff under his former name11, which she subsequently dismissed at the hearing on

From the Gwinnett County Clerk of Courts website

10

From Odyssey; http://ody.dekalbcountyga.gov.

1111/15/2013-

Dekalb County Superior Court, Petition for Name Change, CAFN#13CV11795

February 22, 2011. (An official copy of the 2011 TPO petition is attached hereto as
Exhibit M) Later that same day, the parties rekindled their relationship.
C. KNOWINGLY DISHONEST ANSWER
Defendant, who was still acting Pro Se at the time she filed her answer on
March 9, 2016, used the Answer (Non-Specific) form provided by this Court.
therefore certifying its legal legitimacy. Within her answer, the Defendant denies as
untrue several pleadings that, in reality, she knew to be true, and of which Plaintiff
has evidence to corroborate.
As it is her tendency to deny and deflect any responsibility she has in situations
or any wrongdoing that might have done real damage by either playing the victim, or
playing dumb, the Plaintiff cites Taylor v. State, 233 Ga.App. 221, 222(1), 504 S.E.
2d 57 (1998)- [F]ailure to give a charge on mistake of fact is not error where the
evidence shows that a party has made a mistake of law. It is axiomatic that everyone is
presumed to know the law and ignorance thereof is not an excuse for its
violation." (Punctuation omitted.)
The following is a list of the specific pleadings, by paragraph number and
herein quoted verbatim from Plaintiffs Amended and Recast Complaint for
Damages (Pleadings), to which the Defendants answer was dishonest, followed
immediately by Defendants Answer to each respective pleading in question, listed by

paragraph number and herein quoted verbatim from Defendants Answer (Answer).
Refuting evidence is introduced immediately after each allegedly dishonest answer.
Pleadings, 7: The Defendant has made, and continues to make false and
malicious statements about the Plaintiff, claiming the Plaintiff to be emotionally and
physically abusive and to be stalking the Defendant, subsequently causing the
Plaintiff undue psychological harm, humiliation, isolation and ridicule within his
community.
Answer, 7 : The allegations of Paragraph Seven are denied as untrue.
Refuting Evidence: 1) Sworn affidavit of Maggie Selmser, Defendants coworker of six years, in which she certifies that the Defendant falsely referred to the
Plaintiff as her stalker to multiple third parties while in a committed relationship
with the Plaintiff. (See Exhibit D)
2) Facebook chat communication12 between Plaintiff and Ayden Layne Johnson
(Johnson) from 2014, with whom Eberly conducted a secret online relationship, in
which Johnson tells Plaintiff, Looking back there were a lot of things that were
suspicious and when I confronted her, she always had an excuse or story that honestly

12

The admissibility of this evidence can be supported in Ford v. State, 617 S.E.2d 262 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005), cert. denied,
No. S05C1921, 2005: we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to admit the transcript from the realtime chat session between Ford and Keller. Although we are aware of no Georgia case directly on point, we find this
situation analogous to the admission of a videotape, which is admissible where the operator of the machine which
produced it, or one who personally witnessed the events recorded[,] testifies that the videotape accurately portrayed what
the witness saw take place at the time the events occurred. Here, Keller personally witnessed the real-time chat recorded
in Transcript B as it was taking place, and he testified that the transcript accurately represented the on-line conversation.
Under these circumstances, Keller's testimony was tantamount to that of a witness to an event and was sufficient to
authenticate the transcript.

didnt feel legit. Like posing with [the Plaintiff] in picture[s] she was tagged in on FB
even though she said [the Plaintiff] were her stalker. Stuff like that. Kept happening
though, so I knew in my gut something didnt add up. (A computer print-out of the
chat transcript between Goldman and Johnson is attached hereto as Exhibit N)
Pleadings 9: The Plaintiff discovered several Facebook posts by former mutual
friends referencing abusive relationships and stalking in which the Defendant was
tagged. Considering that the Plaintiff is her ex, and that the Defendant has made
claims of the same nature against him, it can be deduced that these posts are regarding
the Plaintiff.
Answer 9: The allegations of Paragraph Nine are denied as untrue.
Refuting Evidence: 1) Screen shot of a Facebook post made by Bryon Noel on
February 9, 2016, of a photo meme that read, If youre going to call the cops every
time you spot me in your bushes, I dont think this relationship is going to work to
which she, on February 10 at 6:47 a.m., replied I love you you are such an ass hole.
2) Screen shot of a Facebook post made by Defendants girlfriend, Tracy Anderson, on
February 22, 2016, of a photo meme that read, remember when stalkers called
themselves secret admirers?, to which Kathryn Nee, who used to be the Plaintiffs
friend (on Facebook and in real life) but then suddenly blocked the Plaintiff without
explanation, and subsequently became friends with the Defendant, replied,
HAHAHAAAAA on February 22, 2016 at 5:25pm. (Computer-printouts of both

screenshots are attached hereto as Exhibit O) 3) Screen shot of a Facebook post

made by Defendants girlfriend, Tracy Anderson, on March 19, 2016, of a photo
meme that read, When a toxic person can no longer control you, they will try to
control how others see you. The misinformation will feel unfair, but stay above it,
trusting that other people will eventually see the truth, just like you did. (A computerprintout of screenshot is attached hereto as Exhibit P)
Pleadings 13: The Defendant has a history of accusing the Plaintiff of stalking, both
while the parties were broken up as well as in a relationship.
Answer 13: The allegations of Paragraph Thirteen are denied as untrue.
Refuting Evidence: 1) Affidavit of Maggie Selmser (See Exhibit D); 2) Chat
transcript between Plaintiff and Johnson (See Exhibit N)

D. BOILERPLATE OBJECTIONS, DELAY TACTICS

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have made it clear, through supporting
case law, that boilerplate and generalized objections are unacceptable responses to
properly forged discovery requests, and are viewed by the Court as if the party never
objected in the first place:
Boilerplate, generalized objections are inadequate and tantamount to
not making any objection at all. Walker v. Lakewood Condo. Owners
Assn, 186 F.R.D. 584, 587 (C.D. Cal. 1999); accord Adelman v. Boy
Scouts of Am., 276 F.R.D. 681, 688 (S.D. Fla. 2011) ([J]udges in this
district typically condemn boilerplate objections as legally inadequate

or meaningless.); accord Ritacca v. Abbott Laboratories, 203 F.R.D.

332, 335 n.4 (N.D.Ill. 2001) (As courts have repeatedly pointed out,
blanket objections are patently improper, . . . [and] we treat [the]
general objections as if they were never made.)
On March 14, Plaintiff served his first set of generalized Interrogatories upon
the Defendant by U.S. Mail. (A duplicate of Plaintiffs First Interrogatories Directed
at Defendant is attached hereto as Exhibit Q.) Several days later, on March 21,
Plaintiff served his second set of Interrogatories, pursuant to O.C.G.A. 9-11-26(b)(1),
as well as an official request for the production of documents, pursuant to 9-11-26(b)
(1), upon the Defendant via Certified Mail. (Duplicate of Plaintiffs Second
Interrogatories Directed at Defendant and Plaintiffs First Request for the Production
of Documents and Notice to Produce are attached hereto as Exhibits R and S,
respectively.)
On or around April 18, 2016, Plaintiff received Defendants Responses to
Plaintiffs First Interrogatories (Duplicate attached hereto as Exhibit T),
Defendants Responses to Plaintiffs Second Interrogatories (Attached hereto as
Exhibit U) and Defendants Responses to Plaintiffs First Request for Production of
Documents. (Attached hereto as Exhibit V)
Defendant objects to this interrogatory as interposed solely for the basis of
harassing the Defendant through civil litigation after he admitted to stalking her in a
prior criminal action.

The Defendant provided boilerplate objections within all three responses.

We Care Transportation, Inc. et al. v. Branch Banking and Trust Company et al.,
[Boilerplate objections] put an undue burden on the courts and on opposing counsel.
And they offer no possible benefit to his clients, other than the illicit benefit of delay
and harassment.
Below is a table showing each boilerplate objection used within the Defendants
responses to the Plaintiffs Second Interrogatories, the Plaintiffs oppositional
response, and a count, including paragraph number, where the boilerplate objection
was used.
Boilerplate Objection

Opposition

Defendant objects to this interrogatory as interposed solely for

the basis of harassing the Defendant through civil litigation after
he admitted to stalking her in a prior criminal action.

False. The whole purpose in bringing the present civil action against the
Defendant is because the Plaintiff did not stalk the Defendant, nor did he
do anything that should have resulted in the judge signing a TPO. She is
the one guilty of breaking the law (perjury, lying under oath, bringing
false claims, vextigious litigation, malicious prosecution), not the
Plaintiff.
False. There is an open criminal investigation (#16W001667) for the
charge of stalking due to Defendants egregious lies, but there has never
been any such prior criminal action in which the Plaintiff admitted to
stalking her, as the Defense incorrectly asserts in an attempt to cast a
negative light onto the Plaintiff. The arraignment date, originally
scheduled for May 2, 2016, has been pushed back (at the request of the
Solicitors Office) to August 1, 2016. The Defendant has misused the
legal and judicial systems as a power play of sorts, to regain control
and power over the other person

Used 16 times. s: 11 - 28 (all s)

Defendant objects to this interrogatory as not reasonably

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

False. The Second Interrogatories were custom-tailored to shine light on

the dishonesty of the Defendant (if she were to honestly answer them all,
she could have saved herself from being an impeachable witness.)

Used 16 times. s: 11 - 28 (all s)

Further, Defendant objects that, including subparts, Plaintiff has
exceeded the number of permissible interrogatories pursuant to
O.C.G.A. 9-11-33.

Used 5 times. s: 23 - 28

False. Including subparts, there are 47 interrogatories. Subparts each

count as their own independent question. However, True/False questions,
or questions regarding the sequence of events have only one answer, and
are, in fact, only one question.. O.C.G.A. 9-11-33: no party may
serve interrogatories containing more than 50 interrogatories, including
subparts, upon any other party without leave of court upon a showing of
complex litigation or undue hardship incurred if such additional
interrogatories are not permitted."

E. BAD CHARACTER - UNTRUTHFULNESS

No evidence of general bad character or prior convictions shall be admissible
unless and until the defendant shall have first put his character in issue. O.C.G.A.
24-9-20(b).
The Defendant put her character in issue the moment she chose to assert false
denials to the Plaintiffs pleadings within her official Answer, the proof for which the
Plaintiff provided within this document, on pages 13 - 16, and via Exhibits D, N,
O and P.
The importance of the character of the Defendant, in terms of untruthfulness13,
is implied in this action, as the question of truth is essential to determine the
legitimacy of the claims therein. O.C.G.A. 51-5-6: The truth of the charge made
may always be proved in justification of an alleged libel or slander.
The Defendants character is questionable in terms of truthfulness, as she has a
reputation within our community for being a liar.
"Reputation for character, good or bad, may be proved by showing what people
generally say." Powell v. State, 101 Ga. 9 (29 SE 309) (1897).

13

O.C.G.A. 24-9-84.1, F.R. 608, F.R. 609

A second Affidavit of Maggie Selmser in which she states the things the
Defendant has told her personally, and/or she has personally heard Eberly tell
coworkers and/or clients is hereto attached as Exhibit W.
When admissible, a persons character, may be proved by testimony about
the persons reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On crossexamination of the character witness, the court may allow an inquiry into relevant
specific instances of the persons conduct. F.R.E. Rule 405(a)
Affidavit of Hollin Gammage, former girlfriend of the Defendant, containing
things she has been told personally by the Defendant that she knows to be false, as
well as personal accounts from interactions with the Defendant that are exemplary of
her character is hereto attached as Exhibit X.

F. AFFIDAVITS MADE IN BAD FAITH

An affidavit in support of a motion must set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence [OCGA 9-11-56 (e) (Code Ann.
81A-156)], and to the extent that it contains material which would not
be admissible in evidence it is subject to a motion to strike. Vaughn
& Co. v. Saul, 143 Ga. App. 74, 78 (237 S.E.2d 622) (1977).
O.C.G.A. 9-11-56(g) explains, should it appear to the satisfaction of the
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this Code section are
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith

order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable
expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable
attorney's fees, and any offending party may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
The Defendant, citing Tetrault v. Shelton,. 179 Ga App. 746 (1986), which found
that statements contained in an affidavit supporting a warrant were privileged,
argues that the same applies to the statements she made against the Plaintiff within her
warrant application.
Tetrault v. Shelton,. 179 Ga App. 746 (1986), found that statements contained
in an affidavit supporting a warrant are privileged under absolute privilege - if made
in good faith. Affidavits made in bad faith14 are not privileged.
This opens the door to Hawkins v. Travelers Ins. Co., 162 Ga. App. 231, 237 (3)
(290 SE2d 348) (1982):
Nevertheless, the trial court's action was fully warranted
based upon appellant's presentation of an affidavit
containing a statement she knew to be false and other
statements she knew to be based upon other than
personal knowledge. The sanctions imposed did not
exceed what is authorized by the statute.
Within her warrant application, the Defendant asserted the following: Placed a
GPS on my vehicle without my knowledge. My mechanic found it when Dylan chased
him down to retrieve it.
14

To make an affidavit made in bad faith means that the Affiant knowingly and willingly was misleading or dishonest in
his sworn statement, usually for the purpose of delaying a case.

This statement stems directly from the false testimony provided to police within
an incident report that was created the day following Fairway Motors on January 6,
2016. at which time the Defendant was at work, rendering the statement hearsay
regardless of its fictitious basis. Further discovery would be necessary to determine
whom the officer spoke with, to subpoena the mechanic German Hernandez for a
disposition to determine if his statement was coerced or if he simply committed a
crime voluntarily in lying to a police officer.
The Defendant made the false statement in bad faith, casting a negative light
(malicious intent) on the Plaintiff with her claim that he, chased [her mechanic] down
to retrieve it. An attached affidavit containing a statement from the Plaintiff telling
the events as they actually occurred that day is hereto attached as Exhibit Y.)
Also, Dearing v. State of Ga., 243 Ga. App. 195, 201 (1) (532 SE2d 751)
LAWSKILLS (2000) holds that a false verification by oath constitutes perjury.

OCGA 24-9-81 (Code Ann. 38-1801) allows a party in a civil case to call
the adverse party or an agent of an adverse party for cross-examination. It provides in
material part that "in the trial of all civil cases, either plaintiff or defendant shall be
permitted to make the opposite party ... or officer or agent of a corporation when a
corporation is such party ... a witness, with the privilege of subjecting such witness to

a thorough and sifting examination and with the further privilege of impeachment, as
if the witness had testified in his own behalf and were being cross-examined.

Respectfully submitted this 11 day of May, 2016.

__________________________
Dylan Goldman, Plaintiff, Pro Se
3106 Summit Lake Drive
Stone Mountain, GA 30083
(404) 989-3868