Metro Transit LRT Accident Reports

METRO TRANSIT SAFETY DEPARTMENT
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

Grade Crossing Accident at 26th St. on
April 25, 2005
INTRODUCTION
At 8:13 p.m. on Monday, April 25. 2005, a northbound Light Rail Vehicle (LRV)
operated by Metro Transit struck a pedestrian at its grade crossing with 26th St. in
Minneapolis, MN. The pedestrian was pronounced dead at the scene. The student
operator of the LRV, his instructor. a second non-operating student and passengers
aboard reported no injuries and the LR V was operable from the scene with a broken
windshield and some body damage on the leading nose. Service on the rail line between
downtown Minneapolis and Mall of America was interrupted for approximately 2 hours
while investigation and clean-up operations were underway.
Metro Transit began operating the Hiawatha Light Rail line in revenue service on June
26. 2004, and this accident was the second fatality experienced by the system,
INVESTIGATION METHODOLOGY
The Safoty Department is responsible to conduct an investigation of rail accidents and
relies heavily on the expertise of law enforcement and emergency services personnel. rail
operations and maintenance staff: as well as its own experience. This report is
fonnulated on observations at the crash scene. interviews with appropriate personnel.
review of other agency and internal reports, and follow-up analysis. The involved
agencies. personnel, and applicable reports are summarized below.
Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) was on the scene and conducted an
investigation of the accident. including interviews with the train operator and collection
of witness data. Evidence collected was documented. Additionally. responding officers
completed reports and submitted them with the required vehicle accident report.
Minneapolis Police Department also responded and their traffic department performed
mapping of the intersection and the placement of the body and the LR V in conjunction
with MTPD. This information was included in the reconstruction report developed by
MTPD.
Minneapolis Fire Department and Hennepin County Medical Center EMS personnel
responded to the initial call.
The Hennepin County Medical Examiner was involved in the on scene death
investigation and disposition of the deceased.
Pg. I of6
Metro Transit staff was present at the accident scene representing transportation, traction
power. signals, executive staff, marketing & customer service. risk management. and
safety.
Immediately after the accident, and prior to an)' further train movements, the Manager of
Signals performed signal component downloads on the Vital Process Interlocking (VP!)
components at both Lake Street and Franklin Ave., as well as the crossing gate house at
26th St. These are the controlling units that would activate, control. and report the
activities of the grade crossing equipment at the 26th St. crossing, The results of these
tests and reports were shared with the safety department and summarized. indicating that
the crossing functioned properly and as designed prior to the passage of the train.
The car was returned to the O&M Facility and secured and the LRV event recorder was
downloaded the following morning. This device records train speed. master controller
position (the position of the throttle/brake controller, which controls train acceleration
and braking), br.1king performance. and other related infonnation. This downloaded
infonnation for the period immediately before and subsequent to the collision was
analyzed and reviewed by the Rail Maintenance Oversight Manager and the ManagerTransportation, and subsequently provided to the safety department for review.
The responding supervisor from field operations prepared a written report of his activities
and observations at the crash site. The safety department took photographs at the crash
scene, made some applicable calculations and measurements regarding braking of the
train, observed the police interview of the Train Operator and Instructor post accident and
reviewed the required Metro Transit vehicle .accident report with the Operator, Instructor.
and their supervisor. Supporting documentation, including photographs and available
reports. is on file with the Rail Safety Officer.
Safety requested that the signals and communication department provide a copy of all
train and RCC radio and phone transmissions for the period beginning with the first
report of the accident until approximately one hour after. In processing this request. that
department discovered that radio and phone conversations have not been recording since
December 14, 2004, and thus the information was not available. Since the accident was
recent, the radio conversations could be reconstructed from downloading the individual
RCC radio consoles, but all phone conversations were unavailable. due to the
unmonitored system failure.
Metro Transit Police downloaded the onboard video recorders on the LRV and reviewed
the contents, along with the list of onboard witnesses with Risk Management
Two debriefings were conducted following the accident, one for executive staff and one
for operating staff. Non-contributory response and investigation refinements were
handled therein.
Pg. 2of6
DISCUSSION OF EVENTS AND ANALYSES

Hiawatha Line Operating Characteristics
Metro Transit's Hiawatha Light rail line currently operates from Warehouse station in
downtown Minneapolis to the Mall tif America station, a distance of approximately 12
miles. Operations are governed by the Metro Transit Rules for Light Rail (Third EditionFebruary 2005), the Metro Transit Hiawatha Light Rail Line Revenue Service Timetable
(effective February 28; 2005 at 000 I hours CST), and the current Rail Bulletin 2005-17
(effective Monday, April 25, 2005, at 0001 hours). The line section that includes the 261h
Street grade crossing is operated under ABS rules and current of traffic, wherein trains
operate by signal indication, southward on main track 2 (MT2) and northward on (MTl).
The 26th Street grade crossing is located at Milepost (MP) HlA 2. 76, measured from the
north end of the Hiawatha corridor at MP HIA 0.3 at Warehouse station. The northbound
approach trackage comes off a left side curve approximately 0.125 miles south of the
crossing and is downgrade to the crossing itself, entering another very gentle left side
curve immediately north of the crossing. The 26th St. grade crossing is protected by
automatic crossing warning devices consisting of crossbucks with bells. flashers and gate
am1s on the westbound and eastbound lanes and has 'Second Train'' signs that light up
when multiple trains are approaching the crossing. The crosswalks each have a yellow
painted stripe across thewalk in line with the crossing gate ann (or second train sign on
the side opposite} and a solid yellow line painted across the tracks parallel to the sidewalk
at the point it meets the ballast. Metro Transit Timetable Special Instructions require all
trains approaching this grade crossing to sound two blasts ot'the horn as an additional
warning.
Train speed in the affected area is 55 MPH on northbound approach to the 26th St. grade
crossing, increasing from 35MPH at a poil)t approximately 0.1 miles south of the
crossing near the bottom of the Lake Street overpass. These speed limits and restrictions
are prescribed by Timetable, posted speed limit signs on the right of way (ROW). and rail
bulletin.
Facts Surrounding the Accident and Initial Response
On the evening of Monday, April 25, 2005. the weather was dark and a light rain was
falling,
Pg. 3 of6
Immediately preceding the grade crossing collision, the involved train was operating
northbound with the "A end of LRV 12 l leading its single car consists on MTI. The
train had departed Lake St. Station with the 3 crew members and 42 passengers aboard.
As the operator approached the 26th St. grade crossing, be sounded the required 2 horn
blasts approaching the crossing and noticed a pedestrian standing next to the westbound
crossing gate on the northeast comer of the crossing. The interview revealed that the
train operator sounded a third horn blast because he noticed the man near the crossing.
As the train was occupying the crossing, the individual looked at the train and then ran
directly in front of the train us it approached. The train o erator immediate! sounded the
horn and laced the master controller into full brakin .
However, the LRV
event recorder confirmed that the train was placed in emergency brake mode and was
traveling at a speed of 5 I MPH at the point the brake was applied.) The train operator
was unable to stop short of striking the pedestrian and the train stopped with its head end
approximately 504 feet north of the crossing. The body of the victim came to rest
between main track 1 and 2 approximately 125 feet north of the crossing.
The emergency was reported immediately to the RCC, who contacted the Transit Control
Center (TCC) for MTPD and EMS response, the Transit Supervisor on duty for response,
Signal Department and Tmction Power on-duty for response. as well as other Metro
Transit staff, as appropriate.
Subsequent to all involved parties completing their necessary investigations at the site,
the train was released. the body removed from the right-of-way, and rrain movement
through the area was resumed shortly after I O:OOpm.
Analysis of the facts
The accident occurred at 8: l 3pm on Monday, April 25, 2005. when a 45 year old male
apparently ignored the warning devices and stepped in front of the approaching train at
the grade crossing of the Hiawatha Light Rail line and 26th St. By the testimony of all
three crew members, the individual was observed standing next to the lowered gate arm
counterweights al the northeast quadrant of the crossing and ran in front of the train as it
occupied the crossing operaling at slightly under the posted speed limit of 55 MPH. The
student operator had sounded the hom as prescribed by rule in approach to the Ct'ossing
and was accelerating at the time of the accident. The interview revealed that the train
o rator ound d a thir horn b st because he oticed the man near the crossing. As the train was occupying the crossing,
the individual looke at the tram and then ran directly in front of the train as it
Pg. 4 of6
approached, The train operator immediately sounded the horn and placed the master
controller into full emergency brake.
The body of the victim was at rest approximately 125 feet north of the north edge of the
sidewalk crossing. The head end of the train came to rest approximately 504 feet north of
that same point. (Exact measurements were not taken by Safety Staff due to the Medical
Examiner activities on the right of way and the hazards presented by the darkness and
uneven footing; The 504' distance was calculated by counting line side fence posts;
spaced at approximately 12' centers and calculating that distance based on the nose of the
LR V being 42 posts north of the crossing.) It appears that the victim may have been
thrown ahead and to the left of the northbound train at impact; landing at the left of the
train and rolled and dragged by the stopping train to the point of rest. This is consistent
with damage noted after the accident to the retaining clip on the "A'' car truck skirt on the
operators left side and blood splattered behind the l st access door on that same side of the
LR V and testimony of one of the witnesses.
According to information from MTPD, post-mortem toxicology reports indicated the
victim's blood alcohol content of 0.276, almost 3 times the legal limit for an operator of a
motor vehicle. This would have indicated severely impaired judgment at the time of the
accident. Cause of death was detennined to be multiple blunt force injuries. Post~
accident interviews with the victim's spouse indicated a history of alcoholism, but no
known suicidal issues.
The instructor on the northbound train immediately radioed the RCC of the collision,
following appropriate radio procedure, announcing "Emergency" three times and stating
the location and the nature of the accident.
A southbound LR V was operating south of the 24th St. pedestrian crossing and passed the
scene at approximately the same time as the fatal impact, but did not see anything. This
would be consistent with oncoming bright lights from the approaching northbound train
and the fact that given such lights. the other train operator would have focused his
attention ahead and to his right in approach of26m SL That operator had just entered the
main~line from the yard and had not yet changed his radio channel from "Yard" to
';Operations;' frequency. thus did not hear the 'Emergency" call from the northbound
train.
Observations at the scene, corroborated by signal department downloads of the applicable
grade crossing and VPT appliances and witness testimony indicated that all crossing
appliances were operating properly and fully functional at the time of the accident The
crossing appliance inspection records indicate regular inspection and no reported
anomalies. (The crossing appliance records also indicate that the 'Second Train"
warning sign at the crossing was activated at the time of impact, triggered by the passage
of both the affected northbound train and the approaching southbound train to the 26th St.
crossing.)
Pg. 5 of 6
The download of the LRV on-board event recorder indicates that the train was
accelerating and had reached 51 MPH at the point of impact, at which time the train
operator applied the ''Emergency Brake'' with the master controller. All vehicle
propulsion and brake systems were functioning properly and all three headlights were
working. Vehicle specifications indicate that at 51 MPH. the. driver would react in 56. I
feet and the stopping distance from that point would be 416.6 feet, for a total stopping
distance of 472.56 feet. These specifications assume an instantaneous and flat
deceleration rate. Our calculation of 504 feet is supported by these parameters, given a
slight descending grade, wet rail, brake pressure buildup, and human variables in the
reaction time and distance of the operator.
Post accident dru and alcohol tests of the train operator and instructor
A preliminary police report was received from MTPD after the accident, and the final
collision reconstruction report was received on May 26, 2005.
CONCLUSIONS
The pedestTian failed to heed the operating warning devices at the 26 11I St. grade crossing
and for unknown reasons stepped in front of the approaching train. The train operator
was operating his train within the parameters of rule and timetable instructions and
reacted promptly and properly, but had no chance to avoid impacting the pedestrian at the
crossing, resulting in fatal impact.
There is no evidence that any operating practices of Metro Transit light rail contributed to
the unfortunate accident of April 25, 2005.
Pg. 6 of6
RAIL ACCIDENT FINAL REPORT

The purpose of this report is to provide a final report of the investigation
Basic Information on the Collision or Customer Accident
Date & Time: 7:42am 12/9/05
Location: VA Station-N Ped XWALK
Accident Description: LRV struck pedestrian
LRV:
112
Operator:-
Other Vehicle: N/A

Facts Surrounding the Collision or Customer Accident
At 7:42am, SB LRV 112, operating from B cab, approaching VA station struck a pedestrian at the
north pedestrian crosswalk. The pedestrian was walking southbound on the pedestrian pathway
to the west of the tracks and outside the steel fence separating that walkway frorn the track.
When she reached the north crosswalk, she turned and walked toward the center platfonn as the
southbound train was entering the crosswalk and was struck, knocking her to the ground
immediately to the west of the track. The train operator immediately stopped his train, notified
the RCC, and MTPD and St. Paul Fire EMS responded. The pedestrian was transported to
Regions Hospital for treatment. A bus bridge was initiated and passengers aboard the train were
provided with courtesy cards and held until MTPD arrived. {The train was actually released
before the first bus arrived at VA.)
Final Investigation Finding~

The female pedestrian was wearing a hooded coat with the hood up and was intent on boarding a
northbound train at the station. She indicated to MTPD that she heard the southbound train. but
never actually looked for its location prior to entering the crosswalk. The on-board event
recorder from the LR V shows that the train was operating at the posted speed limit (30 MPH)
Event recorder
approaching the statio,
data indicates that the Operator applied immediate Emergency Brake to stop the train. Field
observations and the VPJ download indicated that all warning devices were functioning properly.
The exact point of impact with the train is uncertain, but indications are that the pedestrian
walked into the side of the cab at the leading end of the southbound train.
Page 1 of2
lnvesti ation Follow*u And Action Taken

MTPD and St. Paul EMS were notified and responded; the pedestrian was transported for
treatment.
Rail Operations and Rail Safety responded.
A Bus bridge was initiated, and train service resumed in approx. 45 minutes.
Vehicle maintenance downloaded the on board LRV event recorder data and Signals &
Communications downloaded the VP! data to confirm that the warning devices functioned
properly. A copy of the LRV download is on file with Rail Safety Officer. Manager of Signals
& Communication confinns that the pedestrian crossing warning devices functioned properly per
VPI download and will forward a written summary to the Rail Safety Officer.
The MTPD also investigated this incident. A copy of the report is on file at MTPD and with the
Rail Safety Officer.
Final Report Information
Date Report Prepared:
12/14/05
Report Prepared by: John MacQueen, Rail Safety Officer
Page 2 of2

August 7, 2006
INTRODUCTION
At 4:56 pm on Monday, August 7, 2006, a southbound train departing the 46th St. station
entered the grade crossing at 46 1h St. and noted a bicyclist riding southbound parallel to
the train suddenly enter the tracks toward the south edge of the crossing. The operator
applied brakes, but was unable to avoid fatally hitting the cyclist. There were no reported
h\juries aboard the train.
Service on the rail line between Franklin station and Mall of America was interrupted for
approximately 2 hours while investigation and cleanup operations were underway.
26, 2004.
The Safety Department is responsible for conducting an investigation of rail accidents
and relies on the expertise oflaw enforcement and emergency services personnel, rail
operations and maintenance stafl: as well as its own experience. This report is
formulated on observations at the crash scene, interviews with appropriate personnel,
review of other agency and internal reports. and follow-up analysis. The involved
agencies, personnel, and applicable reports are summarized below.
investigation of the accident, including interviews with the train operator and collection
of witness data. Evidence collected was documented. Additionally, responding officers
completed reports and submitted them with the re-quired vehicle accident report.
Minneapolis Police Department also responded and assisted with traffic control at the
intersection. The Minnesota State Patrol (Department of Public Safety) Metro Crash
Reconstruction Team performed mapping of the intersection for reconstruction purposes.
This information was included in the reconstruction report provided to MTPD.
There was initial response from Minneapolis Fire Department and Hennepin County
Medical Center ambulance personnel. Inasmuch as the injuries were fatal, the Hennepin
County Medical Examiner responded to investigate and take custody of the deceased.
Metro Transit staff responded to the accident scene representing transportation. signals,
marketing & customer service, and safety.
Safety Department Accident Report

Grade Crossing Accident at 46lli Street on August 7, 2006
Page 2
The train was returned to the O&M Facility and secured until the LRV event recorder
was downloaded. This device records train speed, master controller position (the position
of the throttle/brake controller, which controls train acceleration and braking), braking
perforn1ance, and other related information. This downloaded information for the period
immediately before and subsequent to the collision was provided to the safety department
for review.
The responding supervisors from field operations prepared written reports of their
activities and observations at the crash site. The safety department took photographs at
the crash scene, interviewed the train operator. and reviewed the required Metro Transit
vehicle accident report. Supporting documentation, including photographs and available
reports, is on file with the Rail Safety Officer.
the contents, forwarding this and the list of on~board witnesses to Risk Management.

Metro Transit's Hiawatha Light rail line operates from Warehouse station in downtown
Minneapolis to the Mall of America station, a distance of approximately 12 miles.
Operations are governed by the Metro Transit Rules for Light Rail (Fourth Edition- July
I0, 2006). The line segment that includes the 461h St. grade crossing is governed by
automatic block signals (ABS) and trains operate according to an established current of
traffic.
The 461h Street grade crossing is located at Milepost (MP) HIA 5.5 L measured from the
north end of the Hiawatha corridor at MP HIA 0.3 at Warehouse station. The trackage is
tangent southbound approaching this grade crossing, with a very slight curve toward the
east beginning just north of the grade crossing. Trackage is parallel to Hiawatha Avenue
(which is directly east of the tracks). The 46th St. grade crossing is protected by
automatic grade crossing warning devices consisting of crossbucks with bells, flashers
and gate arms on the westbound, eastbound, and southbound right tum lane from
Hiawatha Ave. to westbound 46th St. All gates are of sufficient length to fully extend
across appropriate lanes of tratlic at the crossing. Additionally, each grade crossing gate
mm is equipped with three4" flashers, plus a pair of I 2 flashers that provide the grade
crossing warning for a motorist traveling the wrong direction. Bells on the crossing
appliances sou11d while the gates are in a state of travel downward, but do not sound once
the gate is fully deployed.
The traffic signals for the intersection of Hiawatha Avenue and 46th St. are
interconnected with the crossing warning devices for several phases of preemption:
I. A clearing signal phase is activated whereby motorists on the tracks are given
priority to clear from the intersection.

Grade Crossing Accident at 46th Street on August 7, 2006
Page 3
2. Grade crossing warning devices activate to prohibit vehicles from entering the grade
crossing via the legally prescribed routes.
3. Motor vehicles approaching from all directions are kept in the proper lanes and the
traffic system displays signals prohibiting motor vehicles from proceeding into the
area with gates down.
The grade crossing also features a raised curb median in the center of 461h St on both
sides of the crossing, separating the eastbound and westbound lanes and a curbed median
separating the eastbound lane of 46th St and the southbound right tum lane off Hiawatha
Ave on the east side of the crossing. The purpose of this median is to define traffic lanes
and to discourage drivers from driving around grade crossing protection. There are curb
cuts to allow mobility device movement within the marked crosswalks (described
below).
The grade crossing is marked with standard pavement markings in accordance with the
Manual of Unifonn Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). These markings delineate a safe
pathway to cross 461h and to cross the tracks to the ped/bike path, including:
I. A crosswalk parallel to the tracks on the east side of the crossing between
Hiawatha Avenue and the LRT tracks and outside the crossing gates.
2. Crossing the tracks at the sidewalks located on the north and south side of 46th St.
Warning devices in addition to the standard crossing appliances include illuminated
Walk/Don't Walk'' devices for the segment parnllel to the tracks and a yellow diamond
shaped sign that has "Look" (with a two headed arrow} on both sides of the tracks. The
latter also has an illuminated "Second Train'' feature to warn if multiple trains are
approaching the crossing. (The second train feature would not have functioned in the
accident scenario, as there was only the southbound train approaching the crossing at the
time of this incident.) Due to the wide nature of the north side crosswalk, an additional
passive device (Crossbucks with a "LOOK" sign) is in place, but would not have been
involved in this incident,~ it occurred at the south side of the grade crossing.
A southbound train "pre-empts" the traffic signals at 46th St. while at the 461h St. rail
station (MP HIA 5.4) and the grade crossing flashers/gates activate and fully deploy
before a southbound train receives a permissive rail signal to depart the station.
Train speed in the vicinity of 46 111 St. grade crossing is 35MPH southbound. These speed
limits and restrictions are prescribed by Timetable, posted speed limit signs on the right
of way (ROW), and rail bulletin.
On the afternoon of Monday, August 7, 2006, the weather was dry and clear.

Grade Crossing Accident at 461h Street on August 7, 2006
Page4
southbound with the "A'' end of LR V l 03 leading the train consist on MT2. The train
had departed 461h St. Station with the operator and 196 passengers aboard (95 passengers
in the lead LR V and JO I in the trailing LR V).
As the train operator approached the 46th St. grade crossing, he sounded the bell, as
required b)' rule. Minneapolis has a ''whistle ban" and the horn is sounded only in the
case of an emergency, or when meeting another train on a crossing. As the operator
noted the bicyclist nearing the eastbound hme of 461h St., he sounded the high horn as an
additional warning and reduced propulsion.
At the point where the train was approximately at the center of the crossing
a roximatelv even with the center medians , the operator noted
At the point of impact with the lower (operator's) left comer of the lead LRV. the cyclist
was propelled toward the track center. The bicycle came to rest on the northward track
(MTI) and cyclist struck the catenary pole, located between the tracks immediately to the
south of the crossing, with the body coming to rest just south of that catenary pole
between Lhe two main tracks. The train stopped at a point approximately 243 feet from
the point of impact with the cyclist.
Center (TCC) for MTPD and EMS response. the Transit Supervisor on duty for response,
Signal Department and Traction Power on duty for response. as well as other Metro
Transit staff, as appropriate.
the deceased was removed from the right of way by the Medical Examiner, the train was
released and removed from the scene, and nonnal train movement through the area was
resumed shortly after 7: 15 pm.

Grade Crossing Accident at 461~ Street on August 7, 2006
Page 5
The accident occurred at 4:56 pm on Monday, August 7, 2006, when a southbound

bicyclist riding parallel to the tracks on the sidewalk/bike path through the pedestrian
crossing. located between Hiawatha Avenue and the LRT tracks made an improper right
tum, proceeding westbound into the eastbound lane at 46th St. Despite warning devices
and a properly marked crosswalk, the bicyclist entered the path of and was struck by a
southbound train. These facts are substantiated by witness testimony reflected in the
MTPD investigation reports. There were no other trains in the vicinity of the crossing at
the time of the collision.
The Hennepin County Medical Examiner (ME) report, and associated post-accident
toxicology report, indicated that the cyclist's death was the result of multiple blunt force
injuries resulting from a bicycle-light rail train crash. with time of death listed as 4:56 pm
on August 7, 2006. Blood and urine toxicology rests were negative tor prohibited
substances.
The Accident Reconstruction Report received via MTPD from the Minnesota
State Patrol concluded that the bicycle operator was riding his bicycle inattentive to
surrounding real and potential hazard."
Observations at the scene, corroborated by signal department downloads of the applicable
grade crossing and VPI appliances and witness testimony, indicated that all crossing
equipment was operating properly and fully functional at the time of the accident. The
crossing appliance inspection records indicate regular inspection and no reported
anomalies.
All vehicle propulsion and brake systems were functioning properly and all three
headlights were working. The LRV event recorder continued that the train had
accelerated to a speed of29.8 MPH after departing the station; and then reduced
propulsion to 25 MPH, followed with an application of track brake, which shows
deployment at 21.7 MPH. The track brake was applied for 4. I seconds, reducing speed
from 21.7 MPH to 4.7 MPH, then shows release. Full service brake continued to be
applied, stopping the train completely J.7 seconds later. The entire stopping time from
application of track brake was 5.8 seconds.
No clear markings could be identified on the rail surface to pinpoint a location for initial
application of the track brake. Absent such additional physical evidence, the
investigation is solely dependant on the event recorder to provide detail of the braking
time and function. Using a series of calculations involving distance traveled per si.'Cond

Grade Crossing Accident at 46'" Street on August 7, 2006
Page6
and the speeds indicated on the tabular event recorder download, the Safety Department
calculates that the train operator actually achieved track brake application at a point 65
-------= ----~-=="'-=~-~-~-.,,-~- ~ - - -
y p
speed every full second, so these calculations should be considered reliable, yet not exact.
They do, however lead to the conclusion that the events transpired rapidly and given the
variables in human reaction as well as mechanical a liances,
train operators have believed they had pushed the master

control forward sufficient to achieve an emergency brake application, while actually
achieving only a recoverable track brake application or even full service application.
Despite efforts by the training department to stress the proper techniques for use of the
master controller in achieving emergency brake application, it is still apparent from these
incidents that there is an ongoing issue. either in terms of training or with the mechanics
of the master controller, which needs to be addressed to ensure that a train operator can
effectively achieve a non-recoverable stopping mode that offers the maximum braking
potential available in the event of an impending collision.
A preliminary police report was received from MTPD on August 30, 3006. and the
Minnesota State Patrol (Department of Public Safety) Crash Reconstruction Report (Case
Number 06980076) was received from MTPD on November '27, 2006.
CONCLUSIONS
The cyclist ignored operating warning devices, departed a marked traffic path for
pedestrians and cyclists, entered a lane of traffic a ainstthe le al direction of traffic and
was struck b a southbound train.
the unfortunate accident of August 7. 2006,
METRO TRANSIT SAFETY DEPARTMKNT

Pedestrian Fatality at Franklin Avenue LRT Station on June 8, 2007
INTRODUCTION
At approximately I :29 pm on Friday. June 8. 2007, a northbound train had stopped at the
Franklin Avenue station and was departing the station when a passenger on the platform
moved toward the moving train and fell between the first and second LRV sustaining
fatal injuries.
The incident was not evident to Metro Transit personnel until the arrival of the
next southbound train at Franklin station, when passengers on the platform informed the
operator of that train of the body lying on the other track. That operator reported the
emergency to the Rail Control Center (RCC).
Service on the rail line between Lake Street and Cedar Riverside stations was interrupted
for approximately 2 hours, 50 minutes while investigation and clean-up operations were
underway. Substitute bus bridge service was instituted between Downtown East
(Metrodome} station and the Lake Street station during the rail interruption.
26, 2004.
The Safety Department is responsible for conducting an investigation of rail accidents
and relies on the expertise oflaw enforcement and emergency services personnel, rail
operations and maintenance staff, as well as its own experience. This report is
Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) Was on the scene and conducted an
investigation of the accident. including interviews with both train operators (the incident
train and the first arriving train at Franklin Avenue subsequent to the accident) and
collection of witness data. Evidence collected was documented. Additionally,
responding officers completed reports and submitted them.
Minneapolis Police Department also responded to investigate the possibility of foul play.
Their investigation quickly concluded that the fall was accidental and not a homicide.
There was initial response from Minneapolis Fire Department paramedics. Inasmuch as
the injuries were fatal, the Hennepin County Medical Examiner responded to investigate
and take custody of the deceased.

Page 2
Metro Transit staff responded to the accident scene representing transportation,

marketing & customer service, safety, risk management, and facilities maintenance.
The train was returned to the O&M Facility and secured until the LR V event recorder
was downloaded and the exterior could be properly cleaned and inspected for any
damage. The event recorder records train speed, master controller position (the position
of the throttle/brake controller, which controls train acceleration and braking), braking
perfotmance, and other related information. This downloaded information for the period
immediately before and subsequent to the accident was provided to the safety department
for review.
The responding supervisors from field operations prepared written reports of their
activities and observations at the crash site. The safety department took photographs at
the crash scene, interviewed the train operator, and reviewed the required Metro Transit
accident reports and available video recordings from the Franklin Avenue station.
Supporting documentation, including photographs, video, and available reports, is on file
with the Rail Safety Officer.
the contents, forwarding this to Risk Management. Courtesy cards were not collected
from passengers aboard the train as the operator was unaware of what had occurred until
some time after the actual accident.
Subsequent to removal of the deceased, Minneapolis Fire Department and the Metro
Transit facilities maintenance staff cleaned the platform area prior to resumption of
service.

Operations are governed by the Metro Transit Rules for Light Rail (Fourth Edition- July,
2006). The line segment that includes the Franklin Avenue Station is govemed by
automatic block signals (ABS) and trains operate according to an established current of
traffic.
The franklin Avenue station is located at Milepost (MP) HIA 2.21, measured from the
north end of the Hiawatha corridor at MP HIA 0.3 at Warehouse station. The trackage is
tangent in the station and enters a gentle curve toward the west immediately north of the
station area. The station platform is located between the northbound track (Main Track
l) and the southbound track (Main Track 2), The platform surface is brick with a 24"
yellow tactile warning strip at both trackside edges of the platform. There is a pedestrian
crosswalk at both the north and south end of the platform and warning bells at those
crossings sound continuously upon arrival and until after departure of trains.

Page 3
Train speed for northbound trains departing Franklin Avenue station is 35MPH
northbound. These speed limits and restrictions are prescribed by Rule Book Subdivision
Special Instructions, posted speed limit signs on the right of way (ROW), General Orders,
Operational Notices. and Track Warrants.
On the afternoon of Friday, June 8, 2007 the weather was dry and clear.
Immediately preceding the incident, the involved train was operating northbound with the
LRV IOJ leading. Upon arrival at the Franklin Avene station (northbound on MTl ), the
operator made his station stop and prior to departure, closed his doors and checked his
mirrors. There was no one immediately adjacent to the side of the train. The operator
then focused his attention on the track ahead, including an interlocking signal, pedestrian
crossing, and the upcoming Cedar South interlocking. The operator departed the station.
As the train departed, the victim moved toward the moving train and appeared to lose her
balance falling between the first and second LRV. Review of the video and testimony of
witnesses to police officers substantiate this fact and do not appear to indicate that she
tripped over any obstacle or obstruction. As the train continued northbound, the victim
was caught between the second LRV (LR V I 17) and the station latfonn with resultin
fatal in uries.
The emergency was reported to the RCC, by the next arriving train at Franklin Avenue
station (approximately 3 minutes later). Upon arrival southbound on MT2, Operator
9933 was notified by a patron on the platform that there was a body on the opposite track.
Operator 9933 left her operating cab with a portable radio and upon finding the deceased,
notified the RCC and was provided a blanket by an unidentified passenger from her train,
with which she covered the body. The RCC contacted the Transit Control Center (TCC)

Page4
for MTPD and EMS response, the Transit Supervisor on duty for response, as well as
other appropriate Metro Transit staff.
Subsequent to al! involved parties completing their necessary investigations at the site,
the deceased was removed from the right of way by the Medical Examiner, the train was
released and removed from the scene, and normal train movement through the area was
resumed shortly after 4:20 pm.
Metro Transit safety department notified the State Safety Oversight Agency (Minnesota
State Patrol), the National Response Center (NRC-NTSB ), and recorded the incident as a
National Transit Database (NTD) "Major'' incident.
The accident occurred at 1:29 pm on Friday, June 8, 2007, when a passenger lost her
balance and fell between the LR Vs of a northbound train departing Franklin Avenue
station. These facts are substantiated by witness testimony reflected in the MTPD
investigation reports as well as review of station platform video camera footage. There
were no other trains in the vicinity of the station at the time of the accident.
As initial review of the station video indicated other patrons near the deceased. the
possibility of foul play needed to be ruled out. Minneapolis Police Department homicide
investigators were summoned by MTPO and, along with MTPD investigators, reviewed
the video and interviewed witnesses. They concluded that there was no foul play
involved and that the death was the result of an accidental fall by the deceased (a 79 year
old female).
According to MTPD investigators, the Hennepin County Medical Examiner (ME) ruled
the fatality to be an ''accidental death'' caused by ''blunt force trauma;' and the toxicology
reports showed no abnormal levels. MTPD was unable to obtain a fit1al report from the
ME that would give a detailed explanation of the victim's prior medical conditions, any
medical diagnosis, or sudden medical problem that may have caused her to fall.
While not directly involved in the immediate accident location, Metro Transit signal
department employees downloaded the pedestrian crossing warning devices at the north
end of the station platform as well as the Vital Process interlocking {VPI) controlling the
Cedar South Interlocking. These downloads show that the northbound train had a
permissive rail signal upon departure from Franklin Avenue station and that the
pedestrian crossing warning devices (bells and "Do Not Walk" light,;) were functioning
properly,

Page 5
lllllllliiiiiint
drug and alcohol test of the train operato
A preliminary police report was received from MTPD on June 12, 2007. MTPD notified
the Rail Safety Officer on June 15, 2007, that the Hennepin County Medical Examiner
had ruled the death to be accidental and that any criminal investigation was closed. The
Limited Reconstruction Report was received from MTPD on August 28, 2007. That
report concluded that there did not appear to be any factors relating to the scene
(obstructed vision, uneven surface, placement of warning signs) or vehicle operation
contributing to the accident. That report concluded that the incident was not a suicide
and that because it appears that the victim loses her balance and falls into the train, a
possible contributing factor may have been the victim's physical and/or medical
condition.
CONCLUSIONS
There is no evidence that any

operating practices of Metro Transit light rail contributed to the unfortunate accident of
June 8, 2007.
Minnesota Rail Oversight Program Accident/Incident Checklist
Caller Name; John MacQueen. Rail Safety Officer

Time and Date of notification: 16:50 hrs 9/8/07 (via e-mail)
MN Rail Safety Oversight Program Representative: Tim Rogotzke
Location of Accident/Incident: Direction transit vehicle was traveling: 11th Avenue
{Minneapolis); Train travelling SB (ped walking EB)
Transit Vehicles Involved (Vehicle Number): 122/103
Date and Time of Accident/Incident: 9/8/07 13:28 hrs
Number of Injuries, (number requiring medical treatment away from the scene): l
Other Vehicles Involved: Q
Type of Incident (collision, derailment, bomb threat, assault, Etc.): "Collision"

Number of Fatalities: Q
Which Agencies are investigating? MTPD; MT Rail Safety/Operations
Estimated Property Damage (if available): Q
Incident Description: Pedestrian (intoxicated or otherwise chemically impaired) walked
into side of train @ 11th Ave. today while talking on a cell phone. Abrasisions to right
arm. Transported to HCMC. MTPD investigating.
Any Preliminary Cause: Inattention of pedestrian (despite train horn, wamingdevices
functioning, etc.), possibly resulting from intoxication or other substance abuse issue.

LRV Collision with Pedestrian at 46th Street on November 21, 2007
INTRODUCTION
At approximately 2:42 pm on Wednesday, November 21 2007, a northbound train
crossing the 46 1h Street grade crossing in Minneapolis struck a westbound pedestrian at
the north side crosswalk. The pedestrian was fatally injured and rail service was
interrupted for less than two hours. Metro Transit began operating the Hiawatha Light
Rail line in revenue service on June 26, 2004.
INVESTlGATION METHODOLOGY
The Safety Department is responsible for conducting an investigation of rail accident'>
and relies on the expertise of law enforcement and emergency services personnel, rail
investigation of the accident, including interviews with both the train operator and the
witnesses. Evidence collected was documented. Additionally, responding officers
completed reports and submitted them.
There was initial response from Minneapolis Fire Department paramedics and Hennepin
County Medical Center ambulance personnel. The Hennepin County Medical Examiner
was summoned and investigated the scene as well as taking custody of the deceased.
Metro Transit transportation and safety staff responded to the accident scene, along with
the Assistant General Manager- Admin responded to the accident, to carry out
investigative. restoration, and PIO tasks as appropriate.
The train was returned to the O&M Facility and secured until the LRY event recorder
was downloaded and damage assessed. The event recorder records train speed, master
controller position (the position of the throttle/brake controller, which controls train
acceleration and braking), braking performance, and other related information. This
downloaded information for the period immediately before and subsequent to the
accident was provided to the safety department for review. The operating cab (LRV
I06B) was equipped with a forward facing camera, but the camera was not functional at
the time of the accident and thus offered no evidence.
Metro Transit Signal and Communication staff downloaded event recorders for the
adjacent warning devices to ensure proper function.

LR V Collision with Pedestrian at 46 1h St on November 21, 2007
Page 2
n,e responding supervisor from field operations prepared written reports of his activities
and observations at the crash site;
The safety department reviewed the required Metro Transit accident reports and available
video recordings from the CCTV equipment located at 461h St. station. Supporting
documentation. including video and available reports, is on file with the Rail Safety
Officer.
The train operator submitted to the required post accident drug and alcohol tests required
under FTA regulations. The Operator also prepared the required Metro Transit rail
accident incident report and was interviewed by Metro Transit Safety and Rail Operations
management.
Courtesy cards were collected at the scene.

Hiawatha Linc Operating Characteristics
Operations are governed by the Metro Transit Rules for Light Rail (Fourth Edition- July,
2006).
The 46th Street grade crossing is located at Milepost (MP) HlA 5.51, measured from the
north end of the Hiawatha corridor at MP HlA 0.3 at Warehouse station. Trackage is
parallel to Hiawatha Avenue (which is directly east of the tracks) and there is clear
visibility of the crossing to a northbound train. The accident location was at the
pedestrian sidewalk crossing immediately adjacent to the north side of the 461h Street
grade crossing. The adjacent traffic lanes are protected by active warning devices
including crossbucks, flashers, gate. and bell as well as a second train sign with the word
"LOOK" visiblellt all times. One of the bells rings continuously and was an
enhancement installed subsequent to an earlier collision at the same grade crossing in an
effort to draw the attention of inattentive pedestrians. Additionally, there is a passive
crossbuck in the middle of the pedestrian sidewalk crossing, along with red ''Danger Moving Trains" signs on the fence adjacent to the crosswalk.
Train speed for northbound trains at 461h Street is 45 MPH approaching the grade
crossing and drops to 35 MPH at the grade crossing. This speed limit is prescribed by
Rule Book Subdivision Special Instructions and posted speed limit signs on the right of
way (ROW). Minneapolis city ordinance prohibits use of train horn except in case of
emergency, thus normal operating practice is to sound the bell approaching this grade
crossing,

LR V Collision with Pede~tritm at 46th St on November 21, 2007
Page 3
On the afternoon of Wednesday, November 21, 2007, the weather was cloudy, 35 degrees
F, with light snow and no accumulation.
from the LRV I06 B cab at the point of the accident,
train was unable to stop short of striking the pedestrian, who continued onto the track in
front of the train (despite functioning active warning devices) and the train horn
sounding, TI1e pedestrian was killed by the impact.
The emergency was reported to the RCC by the train operator. The RCC contacted the
Transit Control Center (TCC) for MTPD and EMS response, the transit supervisor on
duty for response, as well as other appropriate Metro Transit staff.
The pedestrian was immediately attended to by paramedics and the body left in place for
the Hennepin County Medical Examiner, who removed it subsequent to its on site
investigation.
'
Records indicate 64 passengers aboard the train at the time of the collision and no
immediate reports of injury.
Metro Transit safety department notified the State Safety Oversight Agency (Minnesota
State Patrol) and recorded the incident as a National Transit Database (NTD) 'Major"
incident. Additionally, the incident was reported to the National Response Center (NRCNTSB).
Analysis of the Facts
The accident occurred at 2:42 pm on Wednesday. November 21, 2007. when a

northbound train crossing the 461h Street grade crossing in Minneapolis struck a
westbound pedestrian at the north side crosswalk. The pedestrian was fatally injured and
rail service was interrupted for less than two hours.
LRV Collision with Pedestrian at 4611> St on November 21, 2007

Page 4
It is also possible to view the accident event (albeit it from some distance) on the Metro
Transit CCTV camera located at 46th St. Station plarfonn, The video showed the
involved pedestrian crossing Hiawatha Avenue outside of the marked crosswalks and
against the trnffic Iight. He continued to step in front of the northbound train at the
pedestrian crosswalk on the north side of 46th Street. being struck by the front of the train
and the body propelled towards the chain link fence along the east side of the tracks. The
train comes to a stop a short distance past the crosswalk. Witnesses interviewed by
MTPD corroborated the victim crossing Hiawatha Avenue outside of the marked
crosswalk and in th!.! midst of conflicting traffic.
Metro Transit signal department employees downloaded the grade crossing warning
devices at the 46 1h St grade crossing and found all devices were functioning properly.
Witnesses interviewed by MTPD also indicated functional gates, lights, and bells at the
crossing at the time of the incident.
witnesses
interviewed by MTPD indicated hearing the train horn immediately prior to the impact.
The Hennepin County Medical Examiner identified the victim as a 48 year old white
male and stated immediate cause of death as multiple blunt force injuries due to, or as a
consequence of, pedestrian-light rail vehicle collision. Date and time of death was set at
November 2 I. 2007 at 2:43pm at the scene of the collision. According to MTPD reports,
one of the witnesses stated that the victim appeared to be intoxicated and that the witness
could smell alcohol when near the body. It is also noted that a partial bottle of whiskey
was found on the person of the deceased. However, the Medical Examiner's report
indicates that while Ethanol (alcohol) was present in the blood at a rate of 0.037 gm/di,
this is at a level where there would be no presumption of impairment under Minnesota
law as it would relate to driving a motor vehicle. Also, that same report indicates
evidence of Cocaine Metabolite in the urine screen, but not at a significant level.

LR V Collision with Pedestrian at 46'h St on November 21. 2007
Page 5
CONCLUSIONS
The westbound pedestrian stepped in front of the northbound train despite passive
warning devices, functioning active warning devices. and the train horn soundino, The
pedestrian's actions appeared to be the result of inattention and carelessness.
However, the train

was unable to stop short of fatal contact. There is no evidence that.any operating
practices of Metro Transit light rail contributed to the accident of November 21. 2007.
LRT Accident Investigation Report

For the 5-24-08 Accident at Hiawatha & 26 1h St
Page I
May 24, 2008
INTRODUCTION
At 11: 12 p.m. on Monday, May 24, 2008, a northbound Light Rail Vehicle (LRY)
operated by Metro Transit struck a pedestrian at its grade crossing with 26 1h St. in
Minneapolis, MN. The pedestrian \Vas transported from the scene \.Vith serious injuries.
Service on the rail line between downtown Minneapolis and Mall of America was
interrupted for approximately I hour white investigation and clean-up operations were
underway.
26, 2004.
The Safety Department is responsible to conduct an investigation of rail accidents and
relies heavily on the expertise of law enforcement and emergency services personnel, rail
investigation of the accident, including interviews with the train operator and collection
of witness data. Evidence collected was documented. Additionally, responding officers
completed reports and submitted them with the required vehicle accident report. The
MTPD Accident Reconstruction Specialist issued a Collision Reconstruction Report.
Minneapolis Police Department responded, as one of their patrol cars was at the adjacent
intersection of Hiawatha Ave. and 261h St. at the time of the collision.
Minneapolis Fire Department and Hennepin County Medical Center EMS personnel
responded to the initial call to aid the victim.
Metro Transit staff was present at the accident scene representing transportation, risk
management. media relations. and safety.
Immediately after the accident, signal department personnel downloaded the 261h St
Highway Crossing Appliance and the Franklin VPl. which are the controlling units that
would activate, control, and report the activities of the grade crossing equipment at the
261h St. crossing. The results of these tests and reports were shared with the safety
Pg. 1 of 4
LIU Accident Investigation Report

For the 5-24-08 Accident at Hiawatha & 26th St
Page 2
department and summarized. indicating that the crossing functioned properly and as
designed prior to the passage of the train.
The train was returned to the O&M Facility and secured and the LRV event recorder was
downloaded. This device records train speed. master controller position (the position of
the throttle/brake controller, which controls train acceleration and braking), braking
perfbnnance, and other related infonnation. This downloaded infonilation for the period
immediately before and subsequent to the collision was subsequently provided to the
safety department for review.
The responding supervisor from licld operations prepared a written report of his activities
and observations at the crash site. The safety department reviewed the required Metro
Transit vehicle accident report with the Operator. Supporting documentation is on file
with the Rail Safety Officer.
the contents; along with the list of on-board witnesses with Risk Management.

Metro Transit's Hiawatha Light rail line currently operates from Warehouse station in
downtown Minneapolis to the Mall of America station. a distance of approximately 12
miles. Operations are governed by the Metro Transit Rules for Light Rail (Fourth
Edition-July 2006). The line section that includes the 261" Street grade crossing is
operated under ABS rules and current of tramc, wherein trains operate by signal
indication, southward on main track 2 (MT2) and northward on (MT I).
The 26th Street grade crossing is located at Milepost (MP) HlA 2.76, measured from the
north end of the Hiawatha corridor at MP HlA 0.3 at Warehouse station. The northbound
approach trackage comes off a lel1 side curve approximately 0.125 miles south of the
crossing and is downgrade to the crossing itself. entering another very gentle le!l side
curve immediately north of the crossing. The 26th St. grade crossing is protected by
automatic crossing warning devices consisting of crossbucks with bells. flashers and gate
arms on the westbound and eastbound lanes and has "Second Train'' signs that light up
when multiple trains are approaching the crossing. The crosswalks each have a yellow
painted stripe across the walk in line with the crossing gate am1 (or second train sign on
the side opposite) and a solid yellow line painted across the tracks parallel to the sidewalk
at the point it meets the ballast. There is a conventional octagonal "STOP'' sign at each
of the sidewalk crossings. Metro Transit rules require all trains approaching this grade
crossing to sound two blasts of the horn as an additional warning.
Train speed in the affected area is 55 MPH on northbound approach to the 26th St. grade
crossing, increasing from 3SMPH at a point approximately 0.1 miles south of the
Pg. 2 of4
LRT Accident Investigation Report

FQr the 5-24-08 Accident at Hiawatha & 261h St
Page 3
crossing near the bottom of the Lake Street overpass. These speed limits and restrictions
are prescribed by rule and posted speed limit signs on the right of way (ROW).
On the evening of Monday, May 24, 2008, the weather was dark and it had rained.
northbound with the LR V 112 leading its consist on MT l.
As the operator approached the 26th St. grade crossing, he sounded the required 2 horn
blasts approaching the crossing and noticed two bicyclists and a pedestrian approaching
the eastbound crossing gate on the southwest comer of the crossing. The interview
revealed that the train operator continued sounding the horn blast as one of the bicycles
crossed in front of the train. but the remaining bicycle and pedestrian appeared to be
stopping. As the train was occupying the crossing, the pedestrian darted toward the train
and ran into the operator's left (west) side of the train. The train operator immediately
placed the master controller into full service brake to stop the train. The body of the
victim came to rest between main track I and 2 in the roadway.
Center (TCC) for MTPD and EMS response, the Transit Supervisor on duty for response,
Signal Department for response, as well as other Metro Transit staff', as appropriate,
The victim was removed from the right-of~way and transported to the hospital.
the train was released and train movement through the area was resumed.
The accident occurred at 11: 12 pm on Saturday, May 24, 2008, when a 20 year old male
pedestrian apparently ignQred the warning devices and stepped into the side of the
approaching train at the grade crossing of the Hiawatha Light Rail line and 26th St. By
the testimony of the operator, the individual was one of three individuals (two on bicycles
in addition to the pedestrian) observed approaching the crossing on the pedestriim
sidewalk at the southwest quadrant of the crossing. One of'the bicycles crossed in front
Pg, 3 of 4
LRT Accidenl Investigation Report

For the 5-24-08 Accident at Hiawatha & 26 1h St
Page4
()f the train, while the remaining two individuals appeared to stop. The operator
continued to sound the horn for a longer period than usual and as he occupied the
intersection, the pedestrian ran into the west side of the train at the front comer and was
struck at a speed of approximately 54. 7 MPH. The train operator immediately placed the
master controller into full service brake.
The pedestrian was transported to Hennepin County medical Center for treatment of
serious injuries. The accompanying bicyclists (both minors) were interviewed by
responding police officers and indicated that they had been drinking with the victim prior
to the collision.
According to information from MTPD. toxicology reports indicated the victim is blood
alcohol content of 0.24 l, over 3 times the legal limit for an operator of a motor vehicle.
This would have indicated severe!, impaired judgment at the time of the accident.
Witnesses at the scene (including a motorist and two Minneapolis Police Officers located
in vehicles at the adjacent intersection) and review of available on board and adjacent
video, corroborated by signal department downloads of the applicable grade crossing and
VPI appliances, indicated that all crossing appliances were operating properly and fully
functional at the time of the accident.
The download of the LRV on-board event recorder indicates that the train was
accelerating and had reached 54. 7 MPH at the point of impact. at which time the train
operator applied the Full Service Brake" with the master controller. All vehicle
propulsion and brake systems were functioning properly. The maximum authorized
speed for northbound trains at this location is 55 MPH.
Post accident drug and alcohol tests of the train operator

A preliminaty police report was received from MTPD at\er the accident. and the final
collision reconstruction report was received on July 31, 2008.
CONCLUSIONS
The pedestrian failed to heed the operating warning devices at the 261h St. grade crossing
and for unknown reasons stepped into the side of the approaching train. It is presumed
that the pedestrian's high level of intoxication contributed to the collision. The train
operator was operating his train within the parameters of rule and timetable instructions
and reacled promptly, but had no chance to avoid impacting the pedestrian at the
crossing, resulting in the impact.
the accident of May 24. 2008.
Pg. 4 of4
Minnesota Rail Oversight Program Accident/Incident Checklist
Caller Name:
J. MacQueen. Rail Safety Officer
Time and Date of notification: 6/25/08 8:00am

MN Rail Safety Oversight Program Representative: Lt. Tim Rogotzke
Location of Accident/Incident: Direction transit vehicle was traveling:,SB @38th St.
station - north crosswalk
Transit Vehicles Involved (Vehicle Number): l 04/122
Date and Time of Accident/Incident: 6/11/0815:27 hours
Number of Injuries, (number requiring medical treatment away from the scene): Q
Other Vehicles Involved: Q
Type of Incident (collision, derailment, bomb threat, assault, Etc.): collision
Number of Fatalities: Q
Which Agencies are investigating? MTPD: MT Rail Operations & Safety
Estimated Property Damage (if available): Q
Incident Description: Pedestrian walked in front oftrain@north crosswalk from bus
loading area toward platform and was brushed aside by train (no injury)
Any Preliminary Cause: Ignored train horn and audible/visible active warning devices

Basic Information on the Collision
Location: MP IBA 3.6 (South of
Date & Time: Sep. 6, 200910:36pm
32nd St.)
Accident Description: Southbound train struck trespasser on main track 2
LRV: 123 (& 116)
Operator:-
Other Vehicle: None
Facts Surroundin the Collision
SB train struck male trespasser south of 32nd Street grade crossing. Dark at time of
accident and trespasser dressed in dark clothing. The trespasser was transported
for treatment of injuries. There was a service interruption of I 'l'2 hours, with bus
bridge instituted immediately.
Prelimina
Review of front facing camera indicated person squatting on west rail
a roximatel ust over two catenarv oles south of 32d St. Train operator stated
Trespasser was transporte for

treatment of injuries. There was evidence of emergency brake application (sand
and rail abrasion) found on both rails.
Final Accident Report

LR V 123 vs. Ped Accident of Sept. 6, 2009
lssued September 9. 2009
Page I of3
Investi ation Follow-u and Actions Taken

MTPD and Rail Safety/Rail Operations investigated the accident.
Operator completed required reports, was interviewed b MTPD and Rail
Safety/Operations Management 1
MTPD and Safety Department obtained copies of LRV event recorder download
and front facing camera download.
MTPD requested download of 32d St. grade crossing appliances, however, Safety
I Department did not require same, as it was a trespasser incident not occurring at or
involving a grade crossing.
Safety Department notified SSOA via e-mail and reported NTD incident.
The LRV event recorder indicated a speed of 40.3 MPH (less than the 45 MPH
track speed limit) at the time of emergency brake application (also confinned by
the event recorder), and the train stopped in 8.3 seconds (which is consistent with
the markings observed on the rail at the site and the brak.ino table rovided b
Knorr brake.)
camera supports the operator's statement.

As the accident occurred at other than a public grade crossing and significant
evidence to conclude the investigation is available to the Safety Department (in the
form of event recorder and camera data), the final report is issued without delay for
MTPD final report.
LRV 123 vs. Ped Accident of Sept. 6. 2009

Issued September 9, 2009
Page 2 of 3
Conclusion: The accident resulted from a trespasser occupying the track

under cover of darkness at a location other than a ublic rade crossin .

1----------------------------------l
Date Report Prepared: September 9, 2009
Report Prepared by: John MacQueen, Rail System Safety Manager

LRV 123 vs. Ped Accident of Sept. 6. 2009
Issued September 9, 2009
Page 3 of 3
RAIL ACCIDENT FINAL Report

Location: Main track (MD 2 Southbound
Date & Time: 9:42 pm l 0/17/09
at 2nd Ave N.
Accident Description: South bound train strikes a jaywalking pedetrian.
LRV:
115 X 124
Operator: -
Facts Surrounding the Collision or Customer Accident
At 9:42 pm on 10/17/09, Train Operatotlllllll was operating LRV 115 X 124, a

two car train, on run 9268. The train was traveling southbound at 14.2 MPH in a
15 MPH zone on MT 2.
As it crosses 2nd Avenue North, the track way shifts from the RR west side of the
street to the RR east side of the street. Three pedestrians walked from the 5th Street
Transit Garage towards a night club on the east side of the street. There is a traffic
island adjacent to the tracks at this point. (See Figure l) The jaywalkers walked
across the traffic island and two of them stopped and made eye contact with the
train operator. The victim continued to walk and stepped directly into the path of
the train. The victim struck the train at the right front headlight and rolled out of
the way. The train applied emergency brake and stopped almost immediately.
The victim suffered abrasions to the face and head. These injuries were caused by
contact with the ground. He was transported by HCMC for treatment of minor
injuries.
There was no damage to the LRV.
Page I of3
Seo e of the Jnvesti ation:
The Operator's accident / incident report was reviewed by Rail Operations

Management and Safety.
The front facing video from LRV115 was reviewed at MTPD. Video evidence
indicates that the jay walker stepped off of the traffic island directly into the path of
theLRV.
The LRV event recorder download was reviewed.
The accident was witnessed by two Minnea olis
that the train was clearly visible and
The Train Operator's post accident drug test

Rail Safety notified State Safety Oversight and reported incident to NID.
Conclusion:
Primary factor: The pedestrian crossed the tracks (and street) outside of the
marked crosswalks and failed to heed the traffic control devices or the audible
warning (bells) from the train and stepped directly into the path of the train.
Contributing factors: The pedestrian had been drinking and may have been
distracted by activities outside of the club.
Other Issues for After Action Discussion

Copies of the camera and event recorder downloads are not finding their way to
Safety or Operations in a timely manner. We need to review procedures for
downloading and copying these materials.
Page 2 of3
I ...
i~.
-.i---
Figure 1
Date Report Prepared: 10/21/09

Report Prepared by: Brad Cummings, Rail Safety Officer
Page 3 of3

Date & Time:
01/27/10 11:29 am
Location: VA Station- North
Crosswalk (Minneapolis, MN)
-
Accident Description: SB LRV struck pedestrian entering crosswalk as train

passed
LRV:
114 x 105
Other Vehicle: None
Operator:-
Facts Surroundin the Collision or Customer Accident

At 11 :29am, southbound train called RCC and reported striking a pedestrian at
north pedestrian crosswalk VA station. Rail Transit Supervisor responded to scene
in approximately3 minutes and found the female victim sitting in the sidewalk
area near the crosswalk with facial injuries. MTPD responded and the victim was
transported to Hennepin County Medical Center for treatment. Rail Safety
Manager and Assistant Transportation Manager (Rail) responded to the scene.
Service interruption was approximately 30 minutes southbound.
Downloads of the LRV event recorder and crossing warning devices for the north
crosswalk were requested. The Train Operator was tested for prohibited
substances in accordance with FTA post accident regulations. The Train Operator
and responding Rail Transit Supervisor submitted written reports.
Investi ation Follow-u and Action Taken

MTPD, Veterans Administration PD, HCMC. MT Rail Ops, Safety, and Signals
staff responded to the scene.
MTPD and Rail Operations collected courtesy cards from on board passengers.
The Train Operator was tested for prohibited substances in accordance with FTA
guidelines, interviewed by Rail Operations and Safety,
The LRV event recorder was downloaded by vehicle maintenance (with MTPD
present) for evidence. The infom1ation was also analyzed by Rail Ops. and Safety.
Metro Transit signals and communication staff downloaded the crossing warning
devices at the north crosswalk to evaluate their proper function at the time of the
accident.
The lead LRV is equipped with a forward facing camera that was downloaded by
MTPD. Rail Operations and Safety obtained a copy of this video and reviewed it.
Page I of 3
Additionally, a northbound train entering and stopping at the VA station on the

other track also had a front facing camera, and its video was reviewed by Safety
and Rail Operations.
Northbound service was provided and southbound service was restored in
a roximatel 30 minutes.
FINAL lnvesti ation Findin s
The forward facing camera on LRV 114 shows 3 pedestrians moving south on the
adjacent sidewalk to the west side of the tracks. The sidewalk is separated from the
track and right of way by a fence except at the north crosswalk to the center
platform VA station. These persons are not grouped together, but spread out and
being overtaken by the train. The first of the 3 persons crosses the track in front of,
although some distance ahead of, the train. The second person is approaching the
crosswalk as the train passes. The collision is not visible on the camera, consistent
with the operator's statement that the impact was at the side of the train near the
front
----
The forward facing camera on the northbound train entering the station captured
the first person crossing the tracks at the crosswalk in front of the other train. The
second person is not visible after the train passed her and entered the crosswalk
ahead of her.
Event recorder download data for LRV 114( A cab) for the period surrounding the
above referenced collision was reviewed. The download data shows a speed of
24.4 MPH at the point the emergency brake was applied. The posted speed limit at
this location is 35 MPH, with speed reduced as trains enter and stop at VA station.
Proper use of the emergency brake is documented as well. Use of horn was not
recorded on the event recorder.
Metro Transit signal technician downloaded the event recorder for the north
pedestrian crosswalk at the VA immediately following the accident and stated that
everything was working properly, including bells, Walk-Do Not Walk, and Second
Train warning devices.
The responding supervisor noted a pair of headphones lying adjacent to the pool of
blood next to the injured pedestrian. These were taken with the pedestrian when
leaving for treatment. There is suspicion that the person was wearing the
Page 2 of 3
headphones at the time of the collision, possibly distracting her from the devices
and approaching train.
JoT
T'o StA&.t
CONCLUSION:
This investigation is considered closed by the Safety Department in light of the

above evidence. It is evident that the pedestrian entered the crosswalk despite the
active warning devices and presence of a moving train. No Metro Transit
operating practices or system malfunctions contributed to the collision on January
27, 2010.
FINAL Report Information
1/28/10
Report Prepared by: John MacQueen, Rail System Safety Manager
Page 3 of3

01/29/10 I l: 10 am Location: Warehouse Station Date & Time:
Southbound Platform/Main Track 2 (Minneapolis, MN)
Accident Description: SB LRV struck pedestrian stepping off platform immediately
in front of train
LRV:
105 X 114
Operator:-
Other Vehicle: None

At 11 :lOam, southbound train called RCC and reported striking a person stepping off
the platform immediately in front of his train. Minneapolis Fire Department and
MTPD responded and the victim was transported to Hennepin County Medical Center
for treatment. Assistant Transportation Manager (Rail) responded to the scene.
Service interruption was approximately 30 minutes.
Downloads of the LRV event recorder was requested. Operations and Safety staff
were able to clearly view the accident through the recorded video from one of the
platform security cameras. The Train Operator was tested for prohibited substances in
accordance with FTA post accident regulations. The Train Operator submitted a
written report.
Investi ation Follow-u aild Action Taken
MTPD, Minneapolis Fire Department, HCMC, and MT Rail Ops, staff responded to
the scene.
The Train Operator was tested for prohibited substances in accordance with FTA
guidelines, interviewed by Rail Operations and Safety, and
The LRV event recorder was downloaded by vehicle maintenance (with MTPD
present) for evidence. The information was also analyzed by Rail Ops. and Safety.
The lead LRV is equipped with a forward facing camera that was downloaded by
MTPD. The platform camera (#4) shows the entire event occurring and Rail
Operations and Safety vie\ved this video.
Service was interru ted for a roximatel 30 minutes.
FINAL Investi ation Findin s
Station video from camera #4 clearly shows the southbound train entering WARE
station on Main Track 2 when person steps across southbound platform and in front of
train. No one is on the tactile strip at platform edge or even close to that side of the
platform as the train approaches until the victim steps rapidly across and onto the
track. The victim would be considered a trespasser1 as the marked and intended routes
Page I of2
to and from the platfonn are via crosswalks at ends of the platfom1 at marked
intersections.
Event recorder download data for LRV 105(A cab) for the period surrounding the
above referenced collision was reviewed. The download data shows a speed of 17.4
MPH at the point the emergency brake was applied. The posted speed limit at this
location is 15 MPH. Proper use of the emergency brake is documented as well, with
the train stopping in 3.5 seconds. Use of horn was not recorded on the event recorder
althou h the o erator states
CONCLUS10N:
This investigation is considered closed by the Safety Department in light of the above
evidence. It is evident that the pedestrian stepped across the platfonn and onto the
track in front of the approaching train. Initial police investigation indicates that the
individual was intoxicated and that the action was intentional. No Metro Transit
operating practices or system malfunctions contributed to the collision on January 29.
2010.
2/1/10
Report Prepared by: John MacQueen. Rail System Safety Manager
Page 2 of:!

04/23/10 05:04 am
Location: HHH Station Date & Time:
North Crosswalk (Bloomington MN) Main Track 2
Accident Description: SB LRV struck pedestrian entering crosswalk as

train passed
LRV:
l 10xl08
Operator:-
Other Vehicle: None

At 05:03 am) southbound train called RCC and reported striking a pedestrian
at north pedestrian crosswalk HHH station. At 5:04am RCC contacted
Airport Emergency Services who already knew aboutthe incident. Airport

police were the first responders and took the lead in the incident they arrived
at 05:09 am. They found a 70 year old male victim who was up and alert.
Allina responded and the person was transported to United Hospital. He was
able to walk to the ambulance and they were even considering not
transporting him. Train was cleared to move at 05:52 am
Downloads of the LRV event recorder and crossing warning devices for the
north crosswalk were requested and received. The Train Operator was
tested for prohibited substances in accordance with FTA post accident
regulations. The Train Operator and responding Rail Transit Supervisor
submitted written reports.
Investi ation Follow-u and Action Taken
MTPD, MSP Airport PD and FD, Allina Ambulance, MT Rail Ops, and
Signals staff responded to the scene.
The Train Operator was tested for prohibited substances in accordance with
FTA uidelines, interviewed b Rail erations and Safe ,
The LRV event recorder was downloaded and entered into evidence. The
infonnation was also analyzed by Rail Operations and Safety departments.
Page I of 3
The video from the HHH platfonn cameras were reviewed by Safety
department.
Metro Transit signals and communication staff downloaded the crossing
warning devices at the north crosswalk to evaluate their proper function at
the time of the accident.
The lead LRV is equipped with a forward facing camera that was
downloaded by MTPD and entered into evidence. Rail Operations and
Safety departments obtained a copy #3 of this video and reviewed it.
Service was provided on main track land southbound service was restored
on main track 2 in approximately 50 minutes.
FINAL lnvestieation Findin2s
The forward facing camera on LRV 110 shows a pedestrian standing at the
entrance to the "Z gate,, atthe I-Il-IH North pedestrian crossing. The vi.ctirn
walks around the standing person and proceeds to walk towards. the
crosswalk. He disappears from view and the trains stops moments later.
The train operator reports that he "was southbound on main (track) 2 corning
into Humphrey Station and sounding the horn for the crosswalk. I saw a
woman waiting at the crossing and a man was running on her right side. I
stayed on the horn and when he didn't turn my way, I went into emergency
braking. He hit the side of the train by the triangle window of the cab)\
Event recorder download data for LRV l IO(A cab) for the period
surrounding the above referenced collision was reviewed. The download
data shows a speed of 21 .4 MPH at the point the emergency brake was
applied. The train came to rest in 5.6 seconds after the application of
Emergency brake. The posted speed limit at this location is 25 MPH. Proper
use of the emergency brake is documented as well. Use of horn was not
recorded on the event recorder.
A Metro Transit signal technician downloaded the event recorder for the
north pedestrian crosswalk at the HHH station immediately following the
accident and found that the "Walk-Do Not Walk", and "'Second Train"
warning devices and bells were activated.
Page 2 of3
HHH is a center platform station and main track l and two are separated by
40 feet. The bell on main track 1 side of the HHH North Pedestrian
Crossing was found to be inoperative during the post accident investigation.
This defect was not a contributing factor to this accident as sound levels
were verified from the operational bell on the main track 2 side at the site of
the accident Signal technicians also measured the bells at main track 2 at
level of 87 db with the main track 1 bells inactive. After the main track 1
bells were repaired, the volume of the audible warning devices measured
from main track 2 location remained unchanged at 87 db with both sets of
bells functioning.
The train operator's drug and alcohol test
CONCLUSION:
This investigation is considered closed by the Safety Department in light of
the above evidence. It is evident that the pedestrian entered the crosswalk
despite the active warning devices and presence ofa moving train. No
Metro Transit operating practices or system malfunctions contributed to the
collision on April 23 1 2010.
5/3/10
Report Prepal"~d by: ~rad Cummings, Rail ~afety 9fficc_r_ _ _ _ _~
Page 3 of 3
METRO TRANSIT RAIL SAFETY - RAIL

ACCIDENT FINAL REPORT
INTRODUCTION
Oate & Time: 02/20/11 6:38pm

Location:
Main track 1 Northbound at VAMC station
LRV:
115x110
OPERATOR:1111111
At 6:38 pm on February 20, 2011, a Northbound light rail train struck and killed a 74 yr old male lying in the
gauge of the track at Veterans Administration Medical Center (VAMC) station. The train operator did not see
the individual in the track. Blizzard conditions were experienced at the time of the Incident. There were no
other vehicles Involved.
The Safety Department is responsible to conduct an investigation of rail accidents and relies heavily on the
expertise of law enforcement and emergency services personnel (where appropriate), rail operations and
maintenance staff, as well as its own experience. This report is formulated on observations at the incident
scene, interviews with appropriate personnel, review of other agency and internal reports, and follow-up
analysis. The involved agencies, personnel, and applicable reports are summarized below.

INCIDENT SITE OPERATING CHARACTER/ST/CS:
The line section that includes the VAMC station is exclusive ROW at grade level with conventional track structure
(rail on concrete cross ties}. Movement is controlled by automatic block signals and the weather conditions
were heavy and blowing snow (bli:aard conditions) at the time of the accident (and for $everal hours prior).
Track speed is 35 MPH approaching and at the station on Main Track 1. Block signal operations were not a
factor in this incident. Although there are active warning devices at both ends of the station platform (Including
the Veteran's Drive street crossing at the south end of the platform}, the incident occurred mid-platform and
active warning devices were not a factor.
FACTS SURROUNDING THE ACCIDENT AND INITIAL RESPONSE:

The temperature at the time of the accident was approximately 28 degrees F, with a strong ENE wind and heavy
blowing snow. In fact, this accident occurred during blizzard conditions. The primary difference between a
heavy snowstorm and a blizzard is the strength of the wind. Wind speeds greater than 35 mph during heavy
snow qualify that storm as a blizzard. The National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration noted that
wind velocity at times exceeded 40 mph during this huge Midwest storm.
Page
1 of6
St. Paul Fire Department paramedics responded along with Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD), VA Police
Department, and the Hennepin County Medical Examiner's office. A MTPD Reconstructionist was called in to
investigate accident.
Metro Transit staff responded tothe accident scene representing operations, public information officer, risk
management, and rail safety.
Related Interlocking and adjacent active warning devices and traffic signals were working properly and the traln
had a permissive signal leaving Ft. Snelling station, its last northbound governing signal.
Metro Transit Rail Safety made the required reports of the incident to State Safety Oversight, The National
Response Center, and the National Transit Database, although reporting was later than normal due to the severe
weather and difficulty relocating to and from the accident scene.
INVESTIGATION:
The following reports were reviewed by Rall Operations Management and Safety.
Metro Transit Hiawatha Line Accident/ Incident report submitted by Train operator
Police Special Situation Report (SSR) #314927
Rail SSR #314929
MTPD LRV/Pedestrian Fatality Reconstruction Report for 2/20/11 Fatality@ VAMC.

The Rail System Safety Manager responded to the accident scene and interviewed the operator (along with Rail
Operations and Risk Management staff).
MTPD coordinated the gathering of measurements at the scene.
The train operator received
a post accident drug test. The test results were
The LRV 115 event recorder was downloaded and $howed that the train had operated within posted speed
limits from Ft. Snelling to its stop at the VAMC station. Normal braking was applied for the station stop. Vehicle
Maintenance indicated that there were no malfunctions with any operating systems.
Video from the platform cameras at the VAMC station and the forward facing camera on LRV 115 were reviewed
for the time frame immediately preceding and through the incident occurrence.
ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS:
Platform cameras at the VAMC station show a northbound train (LRV 123/125) arriving at the station on main
track 1 at approximately 6:36pm. A person can be seen departing that train and walking southward on the same
side of the platform as the train departs. As the person nears the south end of the platform, a southbound train
arrives on the other side of the platform (main track 2). This walking individual seems to turn his head toward
the other side of the platform as the train approached and stumbled off the platform and fell onto main track 1.
There was a significant accumulation of snow on the station platform (at feast 6") and it was snowing and
blowing atthe time of the incident, so walking and visibility would have been compromised. The person
appears to stagger throughout his walk down the platform until his fall, but that may have been attributable to
the aforementioned walking conditions.
Page2of6
Because of station structures at the center of the platform (an information kiosk and shelters), visibility for the
southbound train operator and alighting passengers across the platform to where the individual fell would have
been at least partially obscured. No one appeared to notice the victim lying on main track 1 as the train
departed southbound on main track 2 and the small number of persons who exited it departed the south end of
the platform. Video shows the person only slightly moving and over the course of the next minute or so, he
seems to settle himself between the rails facing down.
At 6:38pm, another northbound train (LRV 115/110) arrived at the VAMC station on main track 1. After arriving
at the station, Operator 61414 notified the RCC by radio that
Upon reviewing cameras after this call, the RCC staff saw a person lying in the gauge of main track l a few feet
behind the train. The train entering the station traveled over the person stopping atthe normal stop position.
He was directed to return to his cab and await a supervisor's arrival. The two persons on the platform did
not stay to interact with the operator or authorities, but disappeared.
MTPD was notified, as well as Minneapolis 911, and VA Police. A responding manager arrived as the On Scene
Coordinator (OSC) at 6:43pm, with the arrival of the MTPD at 6:52pm. The Train was cleared to move back to
the O&M at 10:10pm, after MTPD accident reconstruction staff and the Hennepin County Medical Examiner had
completed their onsite investigations and removed the deceased.
After the incident, passengers on the affected train were held on board until a substitute bus service could be
established. Rail service resumed at 10:18pm and the substitute bus service between Ft. Snelling station and
45th St. station was cancelled.
Video from three of the four platform cameras @ VAMC shows the incident unfold as described above.
Although the victim is visible on the tracks as a dark shape, the incident occurred during winter storm blizzard
conditions. Video from the front facing camera of the train shows the same dark shape visible in the gauge of
the tracks shortly after the train crosses Veteran's Drive at the south end of the station and confirms heavy
blowing snow at the same time. Despite the darkness and snow, the platform area of the station is well lit, but
the track itself appears to be shaded somewhat in some areas.
train,
Thus, the rule was ineffective in preventing the accident.
Page 3of6
The existing weather conditions began at approximately 10:30am and Metro Transit Facility Maintenance
employees were mobillzed to remove snow from station platforms beginning at about Noon. Due to the
intensity of the storm, that cleanup effort began in the downtown area and personnel had not yet reached the
VAMC station at the time of the incident. Walking conditions on the station platform were difficult at best, but
were poor even in other areas that had been recently cleared due to the rapid and ongoing accumulation.
The MTPD Reconstruction Report included information received from the Hennepin County Medical Examiner's
office. Cause of death was determined to be multiple blunt force injuries. Toxicology reports indicated no
Impairment as the result of drugs or alcohol. There is no indication of any pre-existent medical conditions or
precipitating events that might have led to the victim's fall.
The MTPD Reconstruction Report indicates that due to poor weather conditions, an exact polnt of impact could
not be determined. Rather, an area of impact was determined by viewing video and using known landmarks in
relationship to where the victim fell. Attachments 1 and 2 (which are taken from the Reconstruction Report}
offer schematic views of the accident location and the area of impact are indicated by the circle on the track in
these maps. The Reconstruction Report postulates that even had the operator seen the victim in the tracks,
emergency braking would have been unable to stop the train short of the victim'$ location given the impaired
visibility and the snow in the track on the south side of the victim.
CONCLUSIONS
Primary cause:
74 year old male stumbled off platform and fell into the gauge of the northbound track (main track 1)
and did not move from the tracks after the fall, placing himself in the path of a train arriving at the
station approximately two minutes later.
Contributing factors:
Blizzard conditions resulted in heavy snow accumulations on platform surfaces and right of way, causing
poor footing for the victim and limited visibility for everyone, including the train operator.
FINAL REPORT INFORMATION
PREPARED BY: J.C. MacQueen, Rail System Safety Manager
DATE: March 29, 2011
REVIEWED BY: M. J. Conlon, Director-Rail & Bus Safety
DATE: March 29, 2011
Page4of6
Attachment 1 - Overall Schematic showing position of train and area of Impact post accident
11-002104
02/20/2011
1B45 Hours
VA Light ~nil Plaiforrr
5504 ~fifln~tu,1hd Av& S.
pt
_k
--1'--
Mlnneapolls, MN
P f ~ by.
Lt. Michael W, Jonn$on

Metro Transit Ponce
Crash Reconslructlonist
Forensic MoppFng Soecioli:st
Page 5of6
Attachment 2 - Close up of schematic location showing area of impact and point of rest of victim behind
train post accident
11-002104
02/20/2011
1843 Hours
VA Li9M Rail Platform
5604 Mlt'mehoh<l Ave S.
Mlr1net,;;1poU~ MN
,,
0
N
Page 6of6
Final Report 07 /21/11 Pedestrian Bump

Caller Name: Brad Cummings
Time and Date of notification: 07 /22/201112:SO pm
MN Rail Safety Program Oversight Representative: Tim Rogotzke

location of Accident/Incident: Main track two at third Ave. N
Direction Vehicle was traveling: LRV was Southbound
Transit vehicle involved: number: LRV 104 X 103
Time and date of Accident/Incident: 07 /21/11 22:41 Due to the minor nature of this accident the
initial internal report categorized this incident as an emergency brake application. Safety was not
notified at the time of the accident. Safety caught the error while reviewing the emergency brake
applications and reported the incident as soon as we became aware that it had occurred.
Number of injuries requiring medical treatment away from the scene: No injury
Other Vehicles Involved: None

Type of incident: Collision, derailment: Collision
Which other agencies are investigating: Metro Transit Operations, Metro Transit Safety
Estimated property damage: No damage

Initial Incident description:
Operator reported using emergency brake in an attempt to avoid contact with a pedestrian that
crossed ih front of his train. Contact was made, and the individual was bounced dear. Police were at
the corner when the situation occurred and were speaking with the pedestrian.
as the individual was on their feet and moving around.
Operator indicated he was able to proceed on his route after an approximately 2 minute delay.
Supervisor Behlim was at Target Field and was sent to the location of this incident. He was unable to
locate the pedestrian or the police officer on his arrival at 2246.
Final Report: Safety reviewed the reports from the train operator as well as the front facing camera on
the train. The pedestrian is never visible in the camera. The train was stopped at 3(d Ave. N. waiting
for a permissive bar signal. After receiving the signal the train moves less than S feet and stops again.
According to the train operators report a pedestrian stepped into the side of the train near the front
causing the Train Operator to apply emergency braking. There were no injuries of property damage.
This incident is not reportable to the NTD.
The incident was causltld by the pedestrian's failure to obey the traffic signal.
Brad Cummings
Rail Safety Officer
7/25/11

INTRODUCTION
Date & Time:
03/29/2012 5:48pm
Location:
Main Track 1 northbound at 46th St. Grade Crossing
LRV:
106X 111 X 115
At around 20:00 on 03/29/2012, the Transit Control Center contacted the Rail Control Center and indicated that
they had received a transferred 911 call from an individual claiming that he had ridden his bike into the side of a
train nearly two hours earlier at 17:48. Although he claims bumps and bruises and damage to his bike, he was
not transported for treatment and as such does not meet the threshold for reporting Injury.
The Safety Department ls responsible for conducting an investigation of rail accidents and relies heavily on the
expertise of law enforcement and emergency services personnel (where appropriate), transportation and
maintenance
staff, as well as its own experience.
This report is formulated on observations of the incident
scene, statements made by the train operator, review of other agency and internal reports, and follow-up

INCIDENT SITE OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS
The line section that includes the accident site is ballasted track on an exclusive ROW at grade that parallels
Hiawatha Avenue and crosses 46th St. at grade. The grade crossing ls governed by conventional railroad
crossing warning devices (crossbucks, flashers, and gates). Slgnage, lane markings, and traffic signals are also in
place to govern appropriate pedestrian and vehicle movements at the location.
Metro Transit Safety Dept Rail Accident Investigation Report

For the lncldent of March 29, 2012 at 46th Street
Page 2
Event Recorder Data: Since emergency braking was not applied and other evidence showed no evidence
of operating rules infractions, no event recorder download was requested.
FTA Drug and Alcohol Test: The incident did not meet any threshold for required drug and alcohol
testing.
Metro Transit Rail Safety made timely reports of the incident to the State Safety Oversight Agency once
the incident could be confirmed, Due to the delay in reporting and the subsequent inability of the
police to make contact with the complainant the initial report did not seem credible. The accident was
not reportable to NTD because there were no injuries requiring immediate medical treatment away
from the scene and damage of less than $25,000.
Forward Facing Camera: On 03/30/2012, Safety and Operations were able to view the video download
from the LRV front and rear cameras and did find evidence that a bicycle riding the wrong way on 46th
Street may have ridden into the side of the train. The front facing video never shows the bicyclist in
view at any tlme. While unable to verify impact on the video he may have struck near the C car on the
lead LRV ld6. The trailing LRV Rear facing camera does show the bicyclist. He was still standing
straddling his bike as the train departed. It does appear that his front wheel was bent.
The Signal Department downloaded the data from the event recorders for the appropriate warning
devices to verify proper function at the time of the accident. Qualified Signal Department staff
inspected the data and determined that crossing warning devices appeared to be operating normally.
A site visit by Rail Safety staff confirmed that at any time the crossing gates at this location are deployed,
two of the three crossing appliance bells ring continuously.
INVESTIGATION:
The following reports were reviewed by Rail Operations Management and Safety.
Metro Transit Hiawatha Line Accident/ Incident report submitted by Train Operate
Metro Transit Hiawatha Line Accident/ Incident report submitted by Train Operato
Metro Transit SSR 382103.

Information provided by the Signals Department regarding proper function of the grade crossing
warning devices at 46th St.
Facing camera recording from LRV 106 at MTPD and rear facing camera from LRV 115 @ the Rail O&M ..
MTPD Incident Report (ICR#12004291).
Page2of4
Metro Transit Safety Dept Rall Accident Investigation Report

For the Incident of March 29, 2012 at 46th Street
Page3
The train was operating in accordance with Metro Tran$it operating rules. Near the crossing, the train operator
spotted a westbound bicyclist crossing Hiawatha through traffic and sounded the horn. The bicycle did not pass
in front of the train, but may well have struck the side of the first car approximately 14 way back. The operator
reports that
There
is no evidence that the active warning devices at the crossing functioned improperly. The police interview with
the cyclist indicates that he had departed Burger King (across Hlawatha to the east), was westbound on the
south side (eastbound lane) of 46th Street (there is no crosswalk at this location); according to the cyclist, "there
was a good chance (the light) may not have been green"; and he suddenly was aware of the approaching train
and grabbed his brakes but fell into the side of the train. He also stated that, "It was not the driver's fault", and
that, "He was pretty sure that the crossing arm was not down, and he was pretty sure there were no bells that
he usually hears when the train ls coming to an Intersection." (As stated above, site verification and signal
appliance downloads confirm proper activation of the warning devices, which include two continuously
operating bells, at the location at the time of the incident. Additionally, when crossing on the wrong side of the
street, the gates and flashers are on the opposite side of the track for street traffic and there is a "STOP" sign on
the sidewalk crossing on the south side of this location.)
The satellite photo is shown to give an indication of the locations of the two involved vehicles. The large blue
Arrow represents the train and the red arrow represents the bicycle. Disregard all other traffic as they are part
of the file photo (obtained via Google Map) and not representative of the incident. Burger King's location is
visible at lower right of the drawing (see yellow highlight) as a point of reference. Also, note the pedestrian
crosswalks, as they are clearly visible in the photo.
;?<
Page 3of4

For the Incident of March 29, 2012 at 46th Street
Page4
CONCLUSIONS:
Primary cause:
The accident was caused by the bicyclist who crossed Hiawatha Avenue against a red light, on the wrong
side of 45th Avenue (westbound on the eastbound side), and did not anticipate the second train
(northbound) approaching from the south (which accounts for the gates remaining down subsequent to
the passage of the southbound train). The speed of approach and inattention to the approaching train
caused the cyclist to be unable to stop his bicycle short of the tracks, resulting in his collision with the
side of the passing train.
There were no known contributing factors on the part of Metro Transit.
AGREED UPON ACTION PLAN/
Our review of the accident found that no policy or procedures of Metro Transit contributed to this accident.
Metro Transit Safety considers this incident closed with this report. Should any additional information surface
that would alter or change any of the above conclusions, Metro Transit Safety reserves the right to amend this
report and forward any such revision to the State Safety Oversight Agency (Minnesota Department of Public
Safety).

DATE REPORT PREPARED: 4/4/12
REPORT PREPARED BY: John MacQueen, Rail System Safety Manager
REPORT REVIEWED BY: Michael Conlon, Director of Rail and Bus Safety
Page4of4

INTRODUCTION
Date & Time:
04/13/2012 10:23pm
location:
Main Track 2 southbound at American Boulevard Station
LRV:
102 X 104 X 105
OPERATOR. . .
At approximately 10:22 pm, southbound train 9290, a three car post~Twins extra train, made a normal station
stop at American Boulevard statiOn and several passengers alighted the second LRV. Before the train moved, all
passengers were clear of the train. The group of passengers first started toward the south end of the platform,
then changed direction and was walking northward. As the train was departing frorn the station, the victim
engaged in horseplay on the station platform with another male in the group. In the process, he Jost his balance,
and stepped backward onto the tactile strip and off the platform, falling between the second and third lRVs in
the consist as they passed his location. He was struck by the front end of LRV 105. He fell forward onto the
platform with his leg apparently pinned between the front of the LRV and the platform edge. He was dragged
approximately 2/3 of the platform length before striking a pole at the end of the platform and being dislodged
from the train.
The train continued southbound and the operator was initially unaware of the situation. The train operator was
contacted by passenger intercom. The passengers stated that a person had struck the side of the train. None of
them saw the victim being dragged so they were unable to share this information with the train operator. The
train operator reported the incident to the Rail Control Center and proceeded into Bloomington Central station
where he spoke with onboard witnesses and walked around the train looking for signs of trouble. Seeing none,
he asked for and received permission to proceed into Mall of America station.
Initial reports to the RCCcame from a northbound train that reported a person down In the right of way. The
victim was transported for non.life threatening injuries.
The Safety Department is responsible for conducting an investigation of rail accidents and relies heavily on the
expertise of law enforcement and emergency services personnel (where appropriate), transportation and
maintenance staff, as well as its own experience. This report is formulated on observations of the incident
scene, statements made by the train operator, review of other agency and internal reports, and follow-up
analysis. The involved agencies, personnel, and applicable reports are summarized below:.

For the Incident of April 13, 2012 at American Boulevard Station
Page 2

INCIDENT SITE OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS
The line section that includes the accident site includes a split far side station with embedded track on an
exclusive ROW at grade level with adjacent traffic lanes on both sides of the ROW.
Approximately 200 feet south of the station the train operator must negotiate Appletree Lane, a grade crossing
that is governed by bar signals. Just beyond Appletree Lane the alignment makes a 90 degree turn to the west
and leaves 34 1h Avenue, crossing the southbound lanes of 34th Avenue. The intersection and crossing are
governed by conventional traffic signals with bar signal indications governing train movements. Signage, lane
markings, and traffic signals are in place to govern appropriate motor vehicle movements at the location. These
non-railroad signs, markings, and signals are the responsibility of Minnesota Department of Transportation
(MnDOT).
The satellite photo is shown to give an indication of the locations of the two Involved vehicles. The large red
Arrow represents the train and the star represents location where the pedestrian stepped between the second
and third LRV. Disregard all other traffic including the train as they are part of the file photo (obtained via
MapQuest) and not representative ofthe incident.
Page2of5

Page 3
The platform was wet but it was not raining at the time of the accident.
Supervisor Mario Leon indicated that he interacted with the victim's party when they boarded the train
at Target Field Station. Mario indicates that he told the group "to stop playing around, a train was
coming into the station and (he) didn't want to see anyone get hurt".
The police report indicates that the victim's blood alcohol was .17, more than twice the legal limit to
drive. The Target Field station video shows the victim appearing to stagger as he walks toward the train
at Target Field station,
Metro Transit training instructs train operators to look back in the mirrors just b e ~
to ascertain whether passengers are clear of the train. The train operator stated. . . . . . . . . .
and platform video substantiates this statement.
Metro Transit Light Rail Operating rules require sounding the bell before moving a trafn. Trains sound
bells from all 6 cabs of a three LRV train insuring that the bell warning is clearly audible to persons along
the full length of the train.
Platform cameras show that the passengers were clear of the train at the time it started moving. The
platform cameras also clearly show that the victim and one of his companions were striking each other
with rolled up paper tubes immediately prior to the incident. The victim steps off of the platform but
did not slip.
The barn service report, as well as a subsequent inspection by LRV maintenance staff, indicates that the
train bells were working properly at the time of the accident.
FTA Drug and Alcohol Test: The train operator received a post accident drug test. The test results were
Metro Transit platforms are ADA compliant low platforms. Platform edges are marked with a high
contrast yellow tactile warning strip.
Metro Transit Rail Safety made timely reports of the incideht to the State Safety Oversight Agency. The
accidentwas reportable to National Transit Database on an S&S40 report.
Event Recorder Data: Event recorder data was downloaded in accordance with Metro Transit Accident
investigation procedures. The event recorder corroborated the train operator's s t a t e m e n t -

Page 4
INVEST/GA TION:
The following reports and downloads were reviewed by Rail Operations Management and Safety.
Metro Transit Hiawatha Line Accident/Incident report submitted by Train Operator-
Metro Transit SSR 384708.
Rear facing camera recording from LRV 105.
Onboard Cameras from LRV 104 & 105.
Platform cameras from American Boulevard station.
Platform cameras from Target field station.
MTPD Incident Report (ICR/#12005101).
Metro Transit Barn Service Report from 04/13no12.
Rail Transit Supervisor Incident reports from three separate supervisors.
Audio recordings of communications between the incident train and the RCC.
The train was operating in accordance with Metro Transit operating rules. After the passenger.stop at American
Boulevard station, all of the passengers moved away from the side of the train. The train operator sounded his
bell per usual policy and began moving. He looked back using his mirrors just before moving. It was only after
the train started to move that the victim stepped towards the train. The train operator would have had no
opportunity to see that the passenger was in harm's way. Once moving, the train operator's attention must be
focused forward toward the intersections that he must navigate.
While the platform was wet, the cameras clearly show that the victim did not slip. The platform is an ADA
compliant low platform, the edge of which is properly marked with a high contrast tactile warning strip.
Platform design and maintenance did
not contribute to this accident.
Platform video shows the victim engaging in horseplay with others in his party as the train departs, culminating
in his stepping backward between the second and third LRV as the train departs. Moreover, transit supervisor
reports indicate that the victim had been cautioned about his risky behavior approximately 30 minutes prior to
the incident. Apparently the victim had disregarded the warnings.
Page4of5

For the lnc:ident of April 13, 2012 at American Boulevard Station
Page 5
CONCLUSIONS:
Primary cause:
The accident was caused by the pedestrian who lost situational awareness while engaged in horseplay
and stepped off of the platform between the second and third LRV of a moving train,
The victim was highly intoxicated at the time of the accident.
The horseplay engaged in by the victim and his companions led to his loss of situational awareness.
AGREED UPON ACTION PLAN:
An after action review will be conducted to review this report, Metro Transit policies and procedures, and
system configuration related to this accident. The initial review of the accident found that no policy or
procedures of Metro Transit contributed to this accident. Should any additional information surface that would
alter or change any of the above conclusions, the Metro Transit Safety department reserves the right to amend
this report and forward any such revision to the State Safety Oversight Agency {Minnesota Department of Public
Safety}.

DATE REPORT PREPARED: 4/24/12
REPORT PREPARED BY: Brad Cummings, Rail Safety Officer
REPORT REVIEWED BY: John MacQueen, Rail System Safety Manager and Michael Conlon, Director of Rail and
Bus
Safety
Page5of5

Date & Time: 03/21/13 l 0:58 am
Location: Main Track l northbound adjacent to
Hiawatha Ave at 241h Street E. pedestrian crossing. (Minneapolis, MN)
Accident Description: At 10:58 am, LRV 104 X 122 declared an emergency, reporting that he
hit the rear tire of a bike at 24th Pedestrian crossing NB main track (Figure 1). The bieye list
was eastbound at time of the incident and left the scene of the accident back in the direction
from which he came. Subsequently, a family member returned to the scene and alleged that the
cyclist's foot was. injured and advised that the victim had been transported to HCMC by a
family member for treatment. The train operator was relieved for FTA post-accident drug
testing.
LRV: 104 X 122
Operator:-
Other Vehicle: Bike

Facts Surroundin2 the Collision or Customer Accident
Metro Transit Police, Rail Operations and Metro Transit Signals responded to the scene. The
state accident report was completed by Metro Transit Police.
According to the MTPD report, police responded to Hennepin County Medical Center in order
to interview the victim. The victim stated that he went home and then to HCMC for his injured
leg. The bike rider stated that his lower left leg (calf) was in pain.
When police asked the bike rider what had happened, he advised that he was riding his bike
eastbound across the Hiawatha pedestrian bridge. Exiting the bridge requires travel down a
circular ramp. The bike rider advised that as he was traveling down the ramp when he observed
the train approaching. Once at the bottom of the ramp, the cyclist advised he had picked up
speed and thought he could cross the rail crossing, beating the Light Rail Train.
The bike rider told the police that as he was crossing the rail tracks, the light rail train struck the
rear tire of his bicycle, throwing him from his bike. Once he was thrown from his bike his Jeft
leg struck a nearby yellow pole causing his injuries. The bike rider also infom1ed the police
that at no time did the train strike his body.
The cyclist told the police that he did not see the flashing rail crossing lights. He also advised
tha:t he did not hear the bells from the rail crossing or the horn from the train. Police asked him
if he was wearing headphones and he admitted that he was wearing his headphones at the time.
The accident is reportable to the NTD because the bike rider proceeded directly to the hospital
for treatment of injuries received in the crash. The accident is not reportable to the NTSB.
Page I of 3
Methodolo
of the Investi ation:
The Operator's accident/incident report, the three responding Supervisor's accident/incident

reports, and the Special Situation Reports (SSR) were reviewed by Safety staff.
The front facing video from LRV104 was viewed.
The LRV event recorder download was reviewed and indicated a speed of 54.5 MPH when
Emergency braking was applied. The train stopped in 12.7 seconds. The speed limit in this line
section is 55 MPH.
The grade crossing data from the Highway Crossing Analyzer (HCA) was downloaded. The
data indicated that the crossing lights were activated and cycling on and off as expected, but they
could not be time synced with the movement of the train due to a clock problem.
Video from the LRVl 04 forward facing camera was taken into evidence by MTPD. Safety staff
reviewed the video and can confirm that the crossing warning lights were active as the LRV
approached.
The State Accident Report was reviewed. This report found that the cyclist contributed to the
accident through "Failure to yield right of way" (Factor 1). There were no contributing factors
listed for the train operator.
The Train Operator completed a post accident drug test.
both vehicles were drivable and no one was injured.
Rail Safety notified State Safety Oversight at 11 :23 am on the morning of the accident.
Page 2 of3
Conclusion:
Probable Cause: The accident resulted from the bike rider's failure to stop for the active
warning lights and attempting to beat the train.
Contributing factors: No contributing factors were identified.
Comments: Rail Safety has expressed concern to the Signal Department Manager that the
HCA data could not be used as definitive evidence due to the time differential. Resolution of
this concern will be tracked via the Consolidated Hazard Matrix.
Fi!unl
Red arrow represents the bike.
Date Report Prepared: 3/26/13

Report Prepared by: Brad Cummings, Rail Safety Officer
Reviewed By: John MacQueen, Rail System Safety Manager and Mike Conlon Director of
Rail and Bus Safety
Page 3 of3

INTRODUCTION
Date & Time: 05/17/13 11:11pm
Location: Main Track One Northbound departing Warehouse Station.
LRV: 124X127X105
OPERATOR:
Brief Description: At 11 :11pm on 5/17/13, NB LRV 124 X 127 X 105 was departing Warehouse
station northbound on Main Track 1. Operator reported having a permissive traffic signal for his
movement and checking in both directions before moving train. As the train departed, a male
pedestrian ran into the lead coupler and fell down in front of the train. The operator applied emergency
brake and the pedestrian got up and ran off down 1st Avenue to the west (timetable direction) of the
train. There were no reported injuries and no damage to the train.
The Safety Department is responsible to conduct an investigation of rail accidents and reties heavily on
the expertise of law enforcement and emergency services personnel (where appropriate), rail
operations and maintenance staff, as well as its own experience. This report is formulated on
observations at the incident scene, interviews with appropriate personnel, review of other agency and
internal reports, and follow-up analysis. The involved agencies. personnel, and applicable reports are
summarized below.

At 11:11pm on 5/17/13, NBLRV 124 X 127 X 105 was departing Warehouse station northbound on
Main Track 1. Operator reported having a permissive traffic signal for his movement and checking in
both directions before moving train. As the train departed, a male pedestrian ran from the operator's
right side and into the lead coupler, falling down in front of the train. The operator applied emergency
brake and the pedestrian got up and ran off down 1st Avenue to the west (timetable direction) of the
train. There were no reported injuries and no damage to the train. There was no reported delay to
service.
Page 1 of 3
INITIAL REPORTING:
Brad Cummings and John MacQueen both received notification by voice mail within one half hour of
the incident Notification was made by E-Mail to SSOA at 6:53am on 5/18/13. Notification was delayed
because the voice mail had not yet come through when Cummings checked his call and the phone call
was not heard by MacQueen.
INVESTIGATION:
Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) responded to the initial call and responding officers
completed a report. Both the train operator and the responding Rail Transit Supervisor completed
reports. The Safety Department reviewed all submitted reports and ancillary data as summarized
below.
REPORTS REVIEWED:
Operator's Accident/Incident Report

Responding Supervisor's Report
SSR #461880
MTPD ICR #13006845
EVENT RECORDER DATA REVIEWED:
Due to the nature of the incident. no download was performed on the LRV. Download capability is not
available for the traffic control devices.
VIDEO REVIEWED:
Operations management reviewed the station camera video and no views of the incident are
available.
LRV104 cameras were not indexing, thus unable to retrieve specific video from the event.
INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED:
Rail Safety staff interviewed the train operator on 5/22/13. He confirmed the details as presented in his
report and clarified that the individual approached from his right side as he was entering the crosswalk
DRUG/ALCOHOL TEST RESUL rs:
Not applicable - Did not meet FT A threshold.

OTHER:
None
ANAL YSfS OF THE FACTS:
Based on the available evldence and reports submitted, it appears that the pedestrian failed to comply
with pedestrian traffic control devices and lacked situational awareness to comprehend the movement
of the train into the intersection. The pedestrian was apparently uninjured in his encounter with the
train and fled the scene
Page 2 of 3
CONCLUSIONS
Primary cause:
Pedestrian failed to observe traffic control device (Don't Walk sign} and ran into moving train.
Contributing Factors:
None determined based on the evidence.
Other findings/ Comments:
Should any additional information surface that would alter or change any of the above
conclusions, the Metro Transit Safety department reserves the right to amend this report and
forward any such revision to the State Safety Oversight Agency (Minnesota Department of
Public Safety).
Prepared By: John MacQueen
Date: 5/22/13
Reviewed Sy: MIKE CONLON
Date: 5/22/13
Page 3 of l

INTRODUCTION
Date & Time: 06/15/2013 at 07:28 pm
Location:
Main Track 1 and 35th Street.
LRV: 202X204X206
OPERATOR:-
Brief Description: Bike was traveling westbound, crossed Hiawatha Avenue, drove around the
lowered gate arm and made contact with the right front corner of northbound LRV 202x204x205. The
blcyclist refused to be transported to the hospital. He had no serious injuries but did have some minor
scratches observed on his arms. The bike sustained minimal damage to the front wheel and was
walked home by its owner following the accident (Bike pictured post accident in Figure 1 below),
The Safety Department is responsible for conducting investigations of rail accidents and relies heavily
on the expertise of law enforcement and emergency services personnel (where appropriate), rail
internal reports, and follow-up analysis. The involved agencies, personnel, and applicable reports are
summarized below.

FACTS SURROUNDING THE ACCtDENT AND INlTtAL RESPONSE:
The bike rider was issued a citation for failure to obey a traffic control device.
In his interviews with the police officers, the bike rider acknowledged that he was looking north towards
an approaching southbound train and never thought to look south before he was struck by the
northbound train. The bike rider also acknowledged that he was listening to headphones at the time of
the accident.
Video establishes that the gate down indicator light was active as the train approached 35th street.
Video establishes that the bicyclist was proceeding westbound across Hiawatha Ave. As the train
entered the grade crossing, the bicyclist proceeded around the lowered gate arm. The bicyclist
appears to be looking to the right (away from LRV 202) until just before the impact. The interior camera
shows the rider on the right side of the train, establishing that the bike rider never crossed in front of the
train.
Page 1 of 4
On 6/17/13, Safety staff wentto the scene of the accident to clarify the operation of the traffic lights. By
observing northbound and southbound train movement through the grade crossing it has been
confirmed that there is no permissive traffic signal for westbound moves across Hiawatha at any point
after the train's clear out phase has started.
INITIAL REPORTING:
B. Cummings received notification of the accident from J. McGuire on 06/15/13. At 21:00, telephonic
notification was made to SSOA representative Lieutenant Reu, and Email notification was made to the
SSOA accident/ incident notification group.
INVESTIGATION:
Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD} responded to the initial call and responding officers
completed a report. The train operator and the two responding Rail Transit Supervisors completed
reports. The Safety Department reviewed all submitted reports and ancillary data as summarized
below.
REPORTS REVIEWED:

Supervisor 9039 Incident Report
Supervisor 7210 Incident Report
SSR #467532
MTPD Incident report for ICR#13008414
The LRV 202 event recorder hard drive was downloaded and the data reviewed. The speed limit in the
affected line segment is 45 MPH. The event recorder establishes that the train was traveling at 44. 7
MPH at the point that the train operator began to apply braking. The event recorder shows that at
18:28:22.8 the train operator applied emergency braking. 8.2 seconds later at 18:28:31.0 the train
comes to rest. The Stopping Distance Table Indicates that the stopping time at 45 MPH should be 9.57
seconds (including reaction time).
Hom use is not required by rule at this tocatlon except in case of emergency, Unlike the original fleet of
Bombardier LRVs, Siemens LRVs (such as this one) now offer a download feature to capture bell and
horn usage. This being the first accident where a Siemens vehicle was involved, we were able to
confirm that the operator did sound high horn immediately prior to the collision. (Added Revision
6/26/13 jcm)
VIDEO REVIEWED:
At 11 :OO am on 6/17/13, Safety Staff reported to MTPD and reviewed the forward video facing exterior
camera and the and the northern most forward facing interior camera from LRV 202.
Bike rider -interviewed ~t scene by police

Train Operator- Interviewed by police
DRUG/ALCOHOL TEST RESULTS:
The train Operatorwas Drug tested.

Page 2 of4
OTHER:
The Signal Department Manager ofTechnical Services reviewed the Highway Crossing Analyzer and
determined that it established that "all gates were down at time of incident". No anomalies were
reported.
Based on the video, the gate down indicator light was active as the train approached 35th street. We
could see that the bicyclist was proceeding slowly westbound across Hiawatha Ave. As the train
entered the grade crossing, the bicyclist proceeded around the lowered gate arm. The bicycllst
appears to be looking to the right (away from LRV 202) until just before the impact. The interior camera
clearly shows the head of the rider passing the window on the right side of the train. This proves that
the bike never actually crossed in front of the train.
Photos taken at the scene indicate that the train came to rest approximately one and one half car length
(135') after the point of impact (figure 1 below). The Stopping Distance Table indicates that we should
expect a stopping distance of 365' at 45 MPH. This Indicates that the train operator reacted nearly 230'
before the point of Impact.
In his interviews with the police officers, the bike rider acknowledged that he was looking north towards
an approaching southbound train and never thought to look south before he was struck by the
northboun.d train. The bike rider also acknowledged that he was listening to headphones at the time of
the accident.
On 6/17 /13, Safety staff went to the scene of the accident to clarify the operation of the traffic lights.
After watching both northbound and southbound trains pass, we can confirm that the bike rider would
not get a permissive traffic signal for a westbound move across Hiawatha at any point after the train's
clear out phase has begun. The bike rider was violating a stop traffic light when he crossed Hiawatha
Ave.
Page 3of4
FIGURE 1
CONCLUSIONS
Primary cause:
The accident was caused by the cyclist's failure to obey the grade crossing waming device.
The cyclist was listening to headphones.

The cyclist was focused on a southbound train and did not look for a second train.
Other findings / Comments:
There seemed to be some confusion about download requests. The signal department
employee downloaded the highway crossing analyzer, but did not download VPI data. While
VPI data was not critical in this case it was requested and was not available.
Public Safety).

Prepared By: Brad Cummings
Date:
6/24/13
Reviewed By: John MacQueen I Mike Conlon
Date:
6/25/13
Revised: John MacQuoon
Date: 6/27/13
Page 4of4

INTRODUCTION
Date & Time: 07/12/2013 at 05:09 pm
Location:
Main Track 1 and 2nd Ave N.
LRV: 109x119x127
OPERATOR: 69175
Brief Description: Train was traveling in southbound direction when it made contact with a bicycle taxi.
There were no injuries to personnel and no damage to either the bicycle taxi or train.
The Safety Department is responsible for conducting investigations of rail accidents and relies heavily
on the expertise of law enforcement and emergency services personnel (where appropriate), rail
summarized below.

When reviewing the LRV's front end cameras, the bicycle taxi can be observed fouling the dynamic
envelope of main Track 1, near the intersection on the south side of 2nd Ave North.
Train was operating in un-signaled territory, governed under the authority of street running rules in an
area that (per Ops Notice 01-13) requires restricted speed from Target Field Station to Warehouse
station. The posted governing speed, as dictated in the subdivision special instruction, from Target
Field Station to Nicollet Mall Station is 15MPH
On 7/15/13, Safety staff viewed the front end video camera from the accident train, as a result of
discrepancies between the operator's Accident/Incident Report and the SSR. The video confirmed that
the bike was fouling the Right of Way (ROW) prior to the train entering the 2nd Ave N. intersection.
See Figure 1 for a sketch of the accident location.
July 12, 2013 LRV vs Bicycle Cab

Page 1 of 5
INITIAL REPORTING:
Rail Safety Officer B. Cummings received notification of the accident from Assistant Transportation
Manager J. McGuire at 17:24 pm on 07/12/13. At 17:37, telephonic notification was made by B.
Cummings to SSOA representative Lieutenant Reu.
INVESTIGATION:
Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) was assisting with crowd control at 2"d ave N. and observed
the train stopping in the intersection of 2nd Ave N. The responding officers completed a report. The
train operator completed the Metro Transit Light Rail Accident / Incident Report, though there were
some errors as to what track and direction the train was traveling at the time of the accident. The
responding field supervisor also completed a Supervisor Accident/ Incident Report. The Safety
Department reviewed all submitted reports and ancillary data as summarized below.
REPORTS REVIEWED:

Supervisor 68313 Accident/Incident Report
SSR #473618
MTPD Incident report for ICR #13009830
The LRV 109 event recorder hard drive was downloaded and the data reviewed. The speed limit in the
affected line segment is Restricted Speed not to exceed 15 MPH. The event recorder shows that from
17:09:42.0 until 17:09:48.0, the operator maintained a speed of 17.7 MPH, 2.7 MPH above the allowed
maximum. Starting at 17:09:48.0, the train slows until it comes to a complete stop at 17:10:04.0. The
train operator reported applying emergency brake prior to making contact with the bicycle taxi, though
in reviewing the event recorder data, this claim cannot be confirmed.
VIDEO REVIEWED:
At 08:30 am on 7/15/13, Safety Staff met with an operations department assistant manager and
reviewed the forward facing exterior camera on LRV 109.
Bicycle Taxi Operator-interviewed at scene by police

Transit Supervisor 68313 - interviewed by safety
Train Operator- Interviewed by safety
In accordance with Metro Transit and FTA policy the Train operator was not Drug Tested because the
incident does not meet the threshold for testing.
OTHER:
N/A
July 12, 2013 LRV VS Bicycle Cab

Page 2 of S

Based on the forward facing camera video, the bicycle taxi can clearly be seen on main track 1 in the
dynamic envelope of the ROW between the outer rail and the curb. The train had a vertical bar signal
and was observed entering the intersection. Shortly after the bicycle taxi disappeared from the view of
the camera, the train is observed stopping. In viewing the internal LRV camera, the bicycle taxi can be
seen outside of the LRV left side window, remaining stationary until after the train comes to a complete
stop.
Ops Notice 01-13 dated 01/03/13 states: "All train movements between Warehouse Interlocking and
Target Field Station, on both MT #1 and MT #2, will be made at restricted speed." Restricted Speed is
defined as: "A speed that allows the train to come to a complete stop using good train handling, within
one-half range of vision, short of: a train, an obstruction, personnel or equipment fouling the track, a
derail or an improperly lined switch, and will not exceed 20MPH ... Train speed must not exceed a
lower governing speed limit." The posted operating speed for the section of track from Target Field
Station to Nicollet Mall Station is 15 MPH. Event recorder data indicates that the train operator violated
this speed in advance of the accident. At the time of the accident the train was observed southbound
on main track one at 2nd Ave N. This is within the area covered under Ops Notice 01-13 and requires
the operator to travel at restricted speed not to exceed 15MPH. From the front end camera, the bicycle
taxi can be clearly seen encroaching on the ROW prior to the train entering the intersection of 2ct Ave
North. Reviewing the LRV stopping distance table, at 15 MPH, a full service brake application should
stop the train in 71.50 feet. This should have allowed the train to come to a stop prior to striking the
bicycle taxi. Furthermore, in his accident report, the operator states that he used Emergency Brake
(EB) to stop. Under the definition of restricted speed, the speed must allow the train to stop within half
the range of vision using good train handling. Using EB when within the limits of a restricted zone with
an object fouling the tracks is not considered good train handling. The event recorder could not confirm
the EB application.
MTPD was in the area and met with the train and bicycle taxi operator. According to the Operator's
report, the responding officer " ... told me to move the train out of the intersection" as there was no
damage to either vehicle. The train operator then reported telling the officer, " ... the only one that I take
my orders from is the RCC or an RCC Supervisor." This interaction is not reflected in the police report.
Rule R4161 in the Metro Transit Rail Operations 6th edition rule book states: "Operators must operate
their train on public Right-of-Way according to the designated speed limits, traffic lights, and laws of the
Municipality and State." Unless there is a governing railroad signal or interlocking that would conflict
with his/her instructions, the operator must (as would any other motorist) comply with the instructions of
a sworn police officer. There appears to have been some confusion on the operator's part as to the
application of this rule.

Page 3 of 5
CONCLUSIONS
Primary Cause:
The primary cause of the accident was the bicycle taxi operator's failure to remain clear of the
ROW.
A contributing factor to the accident was the Train Operator's failure to comply with the
requirements of Restricted Speed.
There appears to be a need for further operator training and compliance testing as to the
requirements of Restricted Speed and lower governing track speed.
There appears to be a need for further operator training regarding the importance of rule R4161,
especially in anticipation of the Green Line addition, which will consist of expanded street
running.
Operator reports should be more closely reviewed prior to submission, For example, the track
number and direction submitted in this operator's report were inaccurate.
Public Safety).

Page4 of 5
FIGURE 1 - ACCIDENT LOCATION SKETCH (GOOGLE EARTH)

Prepared By: Eric Anderson
Date: 7/18/13
Reviewed By: John MacQueen
Date: 7/18/13

Pages of s

ACCIDENT -FINAL REPORT
INTRODUCTION
Date & Time: 01/12/14 18:01
Location:
MT 2 South side of 42nd Street
LRV: 213 X 203
OPERATOR:-
Brief Description: At 18:01, southbound operator 70181 struck a westbound trespasser at 42nd street
on MT2. The trespasser was pronounced dead at the scene. There were no other injuries. All grade
crossing appliances were observed to be working properly immediately following the accident.
Ffgure 1. (Image courtasy of Google Maps)
Page 1 of4
The Safety Department is responsible to conduct an investigation of rail accidents and relies heavily on
the expertise of law enforcement and emergency services personnel (where appropriate), rail
summarized below,

He stated that
The train struck the. party on
the front right side. There was damage o the ron ng t side o t e train. The train came to rest with
the rear of his two car consist approximately 30 ft south of the grade crossing. The crossing warning
devices were activated. The trespasser was pronounced dead at the scene. There were no other
injuries.
42d Street grade crossing has active warning devices. All grade crossing appliances were observed to
be working properly immediately following the accident.
LRV video as well as responders observations and statement confirm that it was very dark with light
only from the streetlights (which were functioning following the accident) and adjacent vehicles.
Wide yellow lines are installed across the 42"d street sidewalk marking the limits of the Right of Way.
The police report indicates that while there was snow in the surrounding area, 42nd street and its
sidewalks were completely clear of snow. Temperature was 41 F and sidewalks were wet
INITIAL REPORTING:
Rail Safety Officer Cummings called Lt. Reu's cell phone and left a message at 19:28, A follow up email was sent at 21:44.
The incident was reported to the National Response Center (NRC) at 8:00 pm using their internet
reporting service. At 20:08 they accepted the report and provided a report# 1070934,
INVESTIGATION:
REPORTS REVIEWED:
Train Operator Report
Police Report
The Supervisor's Report submitted by the On Scene Coordinator
Metro Transit Police Department incident report for CN#14000558
The Special Situation Report (SSR)
Statement from signal supervisor describing the VP! download.
Page 2 of 4
The event recorder data was downloaded and reviewed. The event recorder establishes that the speed
reached a top speed of 44. 7 MPH in the period leading up to the accident the train o erator had slowed
42
PH
h
. h
a Ii tr
. T
.
The event recorder confirms use of the horn during this incident.
The braking took place in two phases with the train operator initially applying track brake and later
applying Emergency braking.
17:59:45.4* Track brake applied.
17:59:49.7* Emergency brake.
17:59:55.0" Zero Speed.
The Knorr braking table predicts a stopping distance of 333 feet and a stopping time of 9.07 seconds
for a train traveling 43 MPH. The event recorder found that track brake was first applied at 17:59:45.4
and the train came to a stop at 17:59:55,0* which is 9.6 seconds later.
"'Note: Event recorder times are not synchronized to external sources.
VIDEO REVIEWED:
Rail Safety Staff reviewed the video at MTPD on 01/13/14. Overall quality of the video was fair with the
video somewhat out of focus and shot through a dirty windshield. As the train approached 42nd street
the lights from vehicles could be made out moving southbound on Hiawatha parallel to the train. The
trespasser could not be seen until the train was nearly into the intersection. The trespasser was
dressed in dark clothing and was very difficult to make out.
Rail Safety Officer interviewed the train operator on 01/12/14.
MTPD officer got a statement from the train operator on 01/12/14.

The train o erator received the re

OTHER:
The Hennepin County Medical Examiner reported to the media that the victim died as a result of
multiple blunt force injuries.
Several media outlets covered the incident
Page 3 of 4
ANALYSIS OF THJ:: FACTS:
Foiward facing cameras, witness statements, a VPI download, and observation of the scene
immediately following the accident establishes that the gate arms were down and working properly.
The highway crossing analyzer (HCA) had a corrupted time setting and did not return data. It has
subsequently been fixed and returned to service. While the exact reasons for the trespasser's behavior
may never be fully explained, it is clear that the crossing devices gave ample warning of the approach
of a train.
When the trespasser entered
the right of way, the train operator had only moments to react. Prior to seeing the trespasser, he had
placed the train into an aggressive track brake application and sounded the horn
the event recorder
download confirms that the braking was increased to emergency brake (applied via the emergency
brake push button) at or about the time of impact, bringing the front of the train to a stop approximately
200 feet past the point of impact. As stated above, the stopping distance is expected to be in excess of
330 feet.
CONCLUSIONS
Primary eause:
Pedestrian trespassed in the right of way disregarding properly functioning active warning
devices on the adjacent crossing as well as a stop sign and "look signn on the sidewalk.
There were no clear contributing factors to the accident.
Other findings I Comments:
MTPD is working on a reconstruction report that is expected to take several weeks to complete.
The reconstruction report will be reviewed and included in the accident file when it is issued.
Public Safety).
Prepared By: Brad Cummings
Date: 1/29/14
Reviewed By: John MacQueen
Oate: 1/29/14
Reviewed By: Mike Conlon
Date:
1/29/14
Page 4of 4
March 14, 2014 Pedestrian Collision @ 4th & Chicago

INTRODUCTION
Date & Time: 03/14/14 08:05 a.m.
Location:
MT 1 @ 4th Street and Chicago Avenue (Minneapolis)
LRV: 235 X 234 X 228
OPERATOR: 7628
Brief Description: A westbound (timetable northbound) train entered the intersection of 4th St. and
Chicago Avenue in downtown Minneapolis on a vertical bar signal indication. As the train was
completing its move through the intersection the lead LRV struck a pedestrian in the Right of Way
(ROW). The pedestrian left the scene and there was no damage to the LRV.
The Safety Department is responsible for conducting investigations of rail accidents as authorized by
and on behalf of the MN State Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA) as well as for Metro Transit internal
use. This activity relies heavily on the expertise of law enforcement and emergency services personnel
(where appropriate), rail operations and maintenance staff, as well as its own experience. This report is
formulated on observations at the incident scene, interviews with appropriate personnel, review of other
agency and internal reports, and follow-up analysis. The involved agencies, personnel, and applicable
reports are summarized below.

At 08:05 a.m., northbound operator 7628 made an emergency call to the Rail Control Center (RCC).
This call appears to have gone unanswered. When the RCC did call the accident train back the
operator reported having to make a "hard brake" application (note: this will be discussed further in the
operator interview section) when entering Downtown East Station (DTE) due to a pedestrian in the
ROW. The operator also reported that the side of her train may have made contact with the individual's
backpack. The RCC reported issues with radio communications from the train and instructed the
operator to contact them when she arrived at the end terminal (Target Field Station). The operator
spoke with the RCC supervisor via phone and the operator was relieved at Franklin Station on her
southbound trip to complete reports. There were no injuries reported as the struck party left the scene
prior to Metro Transit staff arriving and the LRV did not suffer any damage.
The intersection of 4t11 St. and Chicago Ave (LRT) is controlled by conventional traffic signals and train
movements are governed by the corresponding bar signal. The LRT tracks traverse the intersection on
Page lof 4
a curve in the middle of the street before entering DTE station (See figure 1 for diagram of accident
area).
INITIAL REPORTING:
Rail System Safety Manager J. MacQueen sent initial notification email to the SSOA email group at
10:27 a.m. upon receiving notification from the RCC of a possible incident. This was followed by Rail
Safety Officer E. Anderson sending a formal notification form to the SSOA group at 11 :28 a.m.
INVESTIGATION:
REPORTS REVIEWED:
Train Operator Report

The Supervisor's Report submitted by the responding field Supervisor
Report submitted by the Senior Supervisor on duty
Report submitted by RCC supervisor in training that answered radio calls
Report submitted by RCC supervisor charged with overseeing the training supervisor
Report submitted by RCC Green Line supervisor that was in the RCC at the time of the incident
The Special Situation Report (SSR) #526045
The event recorder data was downloaded and reviewed. The time table speed for this location is
20MPH. The event recorder establishes the train was stopped starting at 08:05:09, and began to move
again at 08:05:15 and at 08:05:21 reached a top speed of 16.1MPH. The Operator made an
emergency brake (EB) application at 08:05:23.7. At the time of this EB, the LRV was still traveling at
16.1 MPH. The event recorder data documented the train registered a zero speed 08:05:28.0. The
Knorr braking table indicates a stopping time of 3.20 seconds at 16 MPH. It appears that the brakes
operated as intended, since the stopping time was within one second of design standard.
In reviewing the time leading up to the incident, the event recorder revealed that the train operator
exceeded the maximum authorized speed between 15th and 11th Avenue. The speed ln this area is
governed by a temporary speed restriction of 20MPH. At 08:02:56.0 the LRV departed Cedar Riverside
Station and entered the limits of the temporary speed restriction. The LRV continued to accelerate and
exceeded the maximum allowable speed at 08:03:06.0. The train continued in excess of the speed,
(with a maximum speed of 26.9 MPH} limit for 52 seconds until the operator began to reduce speed for
a line1 (required stop) at 11 1h Ave. Although this information does not directly affect the accident, it
indicated a lack of rules compliance on the part of the operator prior to the incident.
VIDEO REVIEWED:
Rail Safety Staff reviewed the video of LRV 235 on 03/17/14. The front facing and on-board cameras
of the involved train had a clear view of the accident sequence. The front facing camera did confirm
that the train operated through the intersection on a permissive (vertical) bar signal. The individual
involved can be seen walking into the ROW prior to the train fully occupying the intersection. The
on board sound recorded the train operator sounding several blasts of the horn prior to the train making
contact. Internal cameras that record the passenger compartment of the LRV show the individual being
struck by the right side of the train and falling somewhere just outside the first door on the right side.
The Rail Safety Officer (RSO) E. Anderson interviewed the train operator on the day of the incident
after the operator completed the required reports. During the interview, the operator stated that she was
stopped at the intersection of 4111 and Chicago for a horizontal bar signal. When the bar signal changed
Page 2 of4
to vertical, she proceeded into the intersection observing two individuals near the ROW. The operator
reported that she sounded the bell and 2-3 blasts of the horn. When she realized the individual was not
moving, she applied emergency brake and heard a "thud" on the right side of her LRV. The train
operator stated thatwhen reporting the incident to the RCC, she told them she had made a "hard
brake". The train operator explained that she believed that hard brake meant the same as emergency
brake. Furthermore, she explained that she now realized the differences in terminology and she had
actually made an emergency brake application. The RSO asked if she recalled where the individuals
were prior to the collision, specifically whether the individual was on the side walk or down off the curb
in the ROW. The train operator reported that the individual was off the curb approximately 2-3 feet from
the outside rail of Main Track 1. Finally the train operator stated that after hearing the "thud" on the
side of the train, one of the individuals came up to the operator's window and gave her a "thumbs up"
sign. At this time the operator reported seeing the struck individual standing up on the side walk.
Initially, the operations department ordered a drug and alcohol test to be performed, but as information
developed, it was determined that the test would not be necessary and was subsequently cancelled.
The forward facing video showed the pedestrian was clearly visible prior to the train entering the
intersection. Furthermore, the train was stopped on the far side of the intersection giving the operator
ample time to recognize the pedestrians' movement into the ROW.
Rule R4122 in the Metro Transit Rail Operations Rule Book 6th Edition states:
"Operators must expect to find persons within the Right-of-Way, on the tracks at stations, station
crosswalks, and grade crossings, and must be prepared to stop."
Though the operator did sound several horn blasts in an attempt to generate awareness of the trains'
presence, there was no response from the pedestrian and no appearance of braking until a point where
a collision with the individual was inevitable. Using the LRV's horn as the sole means to avoid a
collision is not acceptable according to Metro Transit rules or procedures.
Reviewing the radio transcripts, there appears to be some lapse in protocol. The operator in question
calls in "Emergency, Emergency, Emergency'' at 08:05:32, but there is no recorded response. At
08:06:40, another operator calls the RCC and reported hearing an emergency call on the radio. The
accident operator called back in to the RCC and requested to speak on a different radio channel. The
RCC supervisor asked the operator to repeat her transmission as it wasn't clear. The operator again
requested to speak on a different radio channel, to which the RCC asked again what the issue was. At
this point the operator reported making a hard brake application due to a pedestrian in the ROW at 4th
and Chicago. The operator then stated that she might have " ... made contact with the guys back pack".
At 08:08:09, the RCC supervisor and the train operator initiated another radio conversation in which the
RCC asked the operator " ... confirming you went into a bard brake and not emergency ... correct over",
to which the train operator responded "everything on the train seems to be fine ... " The RCC then asked
again "but. .. did you go into emergency or not, over". The train operator finally responded to this call
with "yes I did, I thought I hit the guy over ... ah ... his friend ... his friend came back and gave me the
thumbs up". This call occurred at 08:09:26. It must be noted that the RCC supervisor working at the
console for Blue Line was training under the supervision of a qualified RCC supervisor. The training
supervisor had stepped into the adjacent lunchroom to get coffee at the time of the incident.
Page 3 of 4
March 14, 2014 Pedestrian Collision@ 4th & Chicago
CONCLUSIONS
Primary cause:
Pedestrian crossing the intersection against the "Don't Walk" signal infringing on the dynamic
envelope of the train.
The train operator failed to recognize the hazard the pedestrian presented and failed to take
preventive measures, until a point when collision was inevitable.
The RCC supervisor did not answer the emergency call in a timely manner, thus allowing critical
time to pass during the initial response phase of the incident.
Reviewing the event recorder download indicated that the involved operator had violated the
speed restriction in place between the previous station (Cedar Riverside) and 11th Avenue prior
to the incident.
Public Safety).
FIGURE 1 {COURTESY OF GOOGLE EARTH)
Prepared By: Eric Anderson, Rail Safety Officer
Date: 3/19/14
Reviewed By: John MacQueen, Rail System Safety Manager
Date: 3/19/14
Reviewed By: Mike Conlon, Director - Rail & Bus Safety
Date: 3/20/14
Page 4of4
METRO TRANSIT RAIL SAFETY RAIL ACCIDENT FINAL REPORT

INTRODUCTION
Date & Time:
06/20/14 2:48 p.m.
Location:
Blue Line Mile Post HIA3.95 Oust north of 35 St)
LRV:
119x102x121
Operator:
Brief Description:
Pedestrian trespassed into right of way and was fatally struck by southbound train.
maintenance staff, as well as its own expedence. This report is formulated on observations at the incident
scene, interviews with appropriate personnel, review of other agency and internal reports, ,.ind follow-up

Facts Surrounding the
Accident and Initial
Response:
Investigation:
Reports Reviewed:
The accident occurred north of the 35 1h St. grade crossing on Main Track 2 at
approximately Mile Post HIA3.95 on the Blue Line (see Figure 1}.
10
Witnesses
at 35 St grade crossing reported the crossing warning devices
were functioning and active in preparation for the train to pass.

The pedestrian sustained fatal injuries in the accident
The LRV was operable after the accident and returned to the O&M facility .
The accident was investigated by MTPD along with Rail Operations and Safety
Train operator's accident report.
MTPD internal accident report .
SSR #546890 .
Responding supervisor's report .
Pagel of 4
Event Recorder Data

Reviewed:
LRV 119 event recorder was downloaded. The download report revealed that the
train operator was traveling at 45.6 MPH prior to the collision. The posted track
speed for this section of track, as listed In the Metro Transit Rail Operations Rule Book
(7 1h Edition) is 45MPH. According to the event recorder download, the Operator
applied emergency brake (EB) at 14:48:15.8. At 14:48:27.0 (11.20 seconds later), the
train came to a complete stop. The Knorr braking table states that a train traveling at
46 MPH at the time of an EB application will stop in approximately 9.83 seconds. This
would indicate the train took approximately 1.37 seconds longer to stop than would
be expected. Furthermore, the event recorder download shows at 14:48:25.3, there
was an indication that sanding and track braking stopped. In his interview, the train
operator stated
. The Assistant Director of Vehicle Maintenance and a representative
of Siemens (familiar with the Knorr braklng systems in use on both Type I and Type II
LRVs at Metro Transit) were consulted by Rail Safety staff. 'They believed if EB was
applied using the master controller, and then the operator pressed the mushroom,
the LRVwould interpret the push button as a new command and recompute the
braking of the vehicle. This would cause a momentary release of the track brake, and
the sanders would shut off. This is believed to account for the longer stopping time
and there is no evidence that the braking system did not function as intended.
Rail Safety staff viewed the LRV forward facing camera at MTPD. The video shows the
LR.V passing the decision point marker north of 35th St. and as the train was
approaching the crossing, the pedestrian can be seen moving from the grassy area
north of 35th St. and stepping in front of the train.
Video Reviewed:
Interviews Conducted:
As the train
approached the pedestrian, it appeared that she "crouched down and let herself fall
on to the tracks" in front of the train. The operator applied the emergency brake
using the master controller and pressed the emergency brake (mushroom) button on
the dash. After the collision the operator radioed the emergency call into the RCC.
The o erator was post accident tested for drugs and alcohol.
Drug/Alcohol Test
Results:
Other:
This accident was reportable to State Safety Oversight Agency (initial reporting within
,____________
2 .hours o.f.th.e accident), the National Response. Center {NTSB. ), a

.. nd NTD. (. a..s a... security.
event, sin~!J!was determined to be a suicide.) _.__________________-----
Page 2 of 4
Analysis of the Facts:
CONCLUSIONS
Primary Cause:
Contributing Factors;
Other Findings/
The accident was initially listed as occurring at the 35 1" St. grade crossing. In actuality,
the collision occurred north of the 35tto St. crossing at approximately mile post 3.95. A
witness interview by MTPO reported that it appeared the pedestrian "dove" or
"jumped" in front of the train. While the accident did not occur immediately at the
grade crossing with 35th St., the police report indicated witness statements that the
active warning devices at that location were operating as the train approached. Horn
use cannot be confirmed since none of the witness statements confirmed nor denied
the horn use and the Type I LRV 1:1vent recorders do not track that function. On June
23, 2014 the Hennepin County Medical Examiner's Office confirmed to the Metro
Transit Rail System Safety Manager that the fatality was caused by an act.of suicide on
the part of the pedestrian. Though, the exact location of the pedestrian at impact
cannot be determined, it is our conclusion that the train operator would not have had
sufficient warning to stop his train prior to the collision.
Pedestrian illegally trespassed into the LRT right of way and entered the dynamic
envelope of an approaching train.
Medical Examiner concluded that the pedestrian intentionally entered the dynamic
envelope of the train (suicide).
None
Comments:
Should any additional information surface that would alter or change any of the above conclusions, the Metro
Transit Safety department reserves the right to amend this report and forward any such revision to the State
Safety Oversight Agency (Minnesota Department of Public Safety).

Prepared Sy
Reviewed By
Reviewed By
Eric Anderson
John MacQueen
Mike Conlon
Date
Date
Date
6/24/14
6/24/14
6/26/14
Page 3 of 4
FIGUR1
Page 4 of 4

INTRODUCTION
Date & Time:
06/28/14 8:17 a.rn.
loc:ation:
Green Line - Main Track 2 @ Hamline Station {Westbound Platform)
______
,__
LRV:
Operator:
Brief Description:
257x239
Passenger exited westbound 2 car train at Ham line station. He proceeded to walk around
the back of the train, stepped onto main track 1 mid-platform, and walked to the bollards
and chain fence. Apparently ignoring the approaching eastbound train on main track 2, he
ducked under the chains as the train passes and made contact with the eastbound train.
The eastbound train applied emergency brake as the events unfolded. The trespasser
ducked back under the chains, retraced his steps, and walked to the west end of the
westbound platform, where he again crossed under the chains to the other side of
University Avenue, rather than walking to the crosswalk (see Figures 1 and 2.)

Response:
See description above of actual incident .

Operations
management dispatched a field supervisor to the location to seek the
trespasser. (Those efforts were unsuccessful.)

MTPD was contacted, albeit over 2 X hours after the incident .
Operations management contacted rail safety staff in a timely manner. At the
time, it was inconclusive if there had actually been contact with the individual or if
It was a near miss. (On Monday, June 30, 2014, review of video concluded that
there was contact, hence the generation of this report.)
Rail supervision responded to the scene in an effort to locate the trespasser
(without success).
MTPD did not respond, as the TCC was not contacted for police response until
10;53 a.m. (over 2 JS hours after the incident).
SSR #548618
Responding supervisor's report.
RCC supervisor's report .
Train
operator's report .
Not requested.
Investigation:
Reports Reviewed:
Event Recorder Data

Reviewed:
Page 1 of 3
Video Reviewed:
Drug/Alcohol Test
Results:
Other:
Station video from the platform cameras were reviewed by operations staff at the
time of the incident and by safety staff on Monday, June 30, 2014.
None
N/A - Incident did not meet required thresholds.

Not reportable to any agency except SSOA. It was reported later than per Standards
and Procedures in order to confirm whether there was actually contact with
individual.
Rail safety and operations staff reviewed the platform camera video from the Hamline
Avenue westbound station. The passenger (a young white male carrying a backpack)
exited a westbound 2 car train at Hamllne station. He proceeded to walk around the
back of the train, stepped onto main track 1 mid-platform, and walked to the bollards
and chain fence. Apparently ignoring the approaching eastbound train on main track
2, he ducked under the chains as the train passed and was contacted by the train. The
eastbound train applied emergency brake as the events unfolded. The trespasser
ducked back under the chains, retraced his steps, and walked to the west end of the
westbound platform, where he again crossed under the chains to the other side of
University Avenue, rather than walking to the crosswalk.
The incident was not immediately reported on the date of occurrence (Saturday, June
28, 2014), as there was some confusion as to whether there was actual contact made
with the individual or if he simply lost his hat in the incident. Upon review of the
above referenced video on Monday, June 30, 2014, it appears conclusive that the
indlvidual was, in fact, struck by the passing train, knocking the hat from his head.
Obviously, the contact did not result in any appreciable injury, as the individual left
the scene in the manner described above.
The video shows the involved train stopping rapidly, thus no event recorder data was
requested as it is apparent that the train was firmly under control and would not have
had advanced warning of the approaching individual from behind the other train.
CONCLUSIONS
Primary Cause:
Other Findings /
Comments:
Trespasser disregarding mid track barrier (bollard and chain fence) and crossing mid
platform with no regard for approaching train.
None
Given the nature of the situation, it seems that a more immediate contact to the TCC
for a police response would have been warranted. (Operations management has
already counseled the involved supervisors.)

Prepared By_
Reviewed By
John MacQueen, Rail System Safety Manager

Eric Anderson, Rail Safety Officer
Date
Date
6/30/14
6/30/14
Page 2 of 3
FIGURE 1 {OVERVIEW OF SITE- NORTH TO TOP OF PHOTO)
FIGURE 2 (ORANGE ARROW REPRESENTS EB TRAIN; BLUE ARROW REPRESENTS we TRAIN Ai STATION; Rl!O ARROW REPRESENTS PATH OF TRESPASSER
EXmNG EB TRAIN ANO CROSSING TRACKS INTO CONTACT WITH WB TRAIN)
Page 3of3

INTRODUCTION
Date& Time:
07/02/14 at 12:50 p.m.
Location:
Blue Line : 34th Avenues. at Apple Tree Lane (Bloomington)
LRV:
205 X 242 X 208
Operator:
Brief Description:
A southbound Train was struck on the side by a bicyclist as it crossed the sidewalk on 341
Avenue. See Figure 1.
scene,. interviews with appropriate personnel, review of other agency and internal reports, and follow-up

Response:
Investigation:
Reports Reviewed:
This accident Was investigated by MTPD along with Rail Operations and Rail Safety.
Event Recorder Data

Reviewed:
Crosswalk ls protected by "Walk/ Don't Walk" signs and yellow ''LOOK" Signs.
The bicyclist scraped his knee; he was treated and released from the scene .
There were no injuries on the train .
The posted speed limit for the section of track is 15 MPH .
SSR549521
Operator's accident report
Supervisor's incident report
MTPD internal police report
The event recorder indicates that the train achieved a top speed of 14.8 MPH prior to
the collision. The posted speed limit is 15 MPH. It appears from the data that the
train was operating at approximately 13.8 MPH at the pointof braking abruptly for
the collision. The train stopped in 4.1 seconds using full service brake (FSB),
consistent with the Knorr braking table distance of 4.67 seconds at 14 MPH using FSB.
Pagel of3
Video Reviewed:
Drug/Alcohol Test
Results:
Other:
CONCLUSIONS
Primary Cause:
Other Findings /
Comments:
Rail Safety staff viewed the forward facing LRV footage. The bicyclist can be seen
crossing 34th Avenue in a westbound direction prior to the train departing American
Boulevard station. The bicyclist crossed 34th Avenue then turned south and rode
down the 34th Avenue side walk towards the LRV tracks. As the train rounded the
turn at Apple Tree Lane on a vertical bar signal Indication, one of the on board interior
cameras shows that the bicyclist rode toward the right side of the train. The cyclist
was never seen looking up (and can it be surmised that he did not observe the
presence of the train.) The cyclist struck the train adjacent to the ope(ator's cab. The
train had a permissive vertical bar signal as it crossed 34t" Avenue. The pedestrian
sidewalk (that the cyclist was riding on) had a "Don't Walk" sign lit.
None
This incident does not meet the threshold for post accident drug testing.
Reported within 2 hours to SSOA via E-Mail. No other reports required.
The cyclist crossed 34'n Avenue from the east at Appletree Lane. He could be seen in
the southbound 34th Avenue traffic lane when the train received a vertical bar to cross
Appletree Lane southbound. The cyclist crossed to the sidewalk on the west side of
34th Avenue and started riding his bike southward as the train slowly passed. The
train had a permissive bar signal for crossing southbound 341h Avenue and did so at a
slow rate of speed. The bicyclist ignored the "Don't Walk" sign and did not turn his
head toward the train and rode into the side of the train just behind the operators
cab. The train stopped almost immediately at the point of contact. The cyclist
admitted to MTPD officers that he had head phones on and did not respond to the
train.
Bicyclist failed to obey pedestrian traffic warning devices.

Bicyclist failed to recog;;ize the presence ofa train due to distractions (head phones).
None
Transit Safety department reserves the right to amend this report and forv.Jard any such revision to the State

Prepared By
Reviewed By

John MacQueen, Mgr. Rail System Safety
Date
Date
7/8/14
7/8/14
Page 2 of 3
Three CarTrain
Bike
FIGURE 1 {GOOGLE ~RTI-1)
Page 3 of 3

INTRODUCTION
Date & Time:
07/21/14 12:03 p.m.
Location:
LRV:
Operator:
Brief Description:
Blue Line - Main Track 2 at Nicollet Station ( Minneapolis)
205x226x232
Southbound Blue Line train with LRV 205 in the lead struck a pedestrian that was walking
on the Tactile strip along MT 2 at Nicollet station (NIC).

Response:
NIC station is a center platform station with tracks on the outside .

The station is bordered by 5th St. parallel with MT2 on the western side of the
platform, Nicollet Ave to the north, and Marquette Ave to the south.
An Individual walking southbound on the tactile strip along MT2 was struck by
the leading corner of the passing southbound LRV (see Figure l). After being
struck, the pedestrian was not observed falling, and continued walking
southbound towards Marquette Ave (and was seen crossing both 5th St and
Marquette Avenue against the pedestrian "Walk/Don't Walk" lights).
There was no further contact with the pedestrian .
The train operator called the accident in to the RCC and was subsequently
relieved to complete required paperwork.
This accident was investigated by Rall Operations and Safety staff.
SSR #553553
Train operator's incident report
LRV 205 event recorder was downloaded and a copy was provided to rail safety staff.
The event rec.order revealed that the LRV left Warehouse station and accelerated to a
maximum speed of 12.9 MPH (posted track speed for this section of track is 15 MPH)
before beginning to decelerate to enter NIC station. The event recorder shows that
the operator sounded both horn and bell When entering the station. The deceleration
of the LRV was consistent with a normal station stop; there is no indication that the
train operator made any abrupt or emergency braking prior to or after striking the
individual.
Investigation:
Reports Reviewed:
Event Recorder Data
Reviewed:
Pagel of 3
Video Reviewed:
Drug/Alcohol Test
Results:
Other:
Safety staff viewed the platform camera at NIC station. The pedestrian could be seen
walking along the tactile strip, leaning toward MT 2 prior to the train's arrival. As the
train approached, the individual did not move from his original path and as. the train
passes the pedestrian his right shoulder can be seen striking the train. The forward
facing camera was also reviewed. This camera showed the pedestrian clearly walking
on the tactile strip as the train approached. After the train passed the individual's
location and made the station stop at NIC, the pedestrian was observed leaving NIC
platform and then jay walking in traffic to cross Marquette Ave.
Rail Operations interviewed the train operator.
N/A- incident did not meet required threshold for post accident testing
This accident was reported to Rail Safety and SSOA within the required reporting
deadlines, and did not require reporting to any other agencies.
The pedestrian was observed walking on the tactile edge near MT 2 at NIC station. As
the train entered the station, the operator reported using the train horn in an attempt
to generate awareness. The pedestrian did not hear or chose to ignore the horn and
was struck on the right shoulder as the train passed him. The individual was seen
looking surprised but continuingto walk south and exited the platform onto
Marquette Ave.
Rule R4122 in the i" edition MetroTransit Light Rail Operatidns Rule book states:
"Operators must expect to find persons within the Rightof-Way, on the tracks at
stations, station crosswalks, and grade crossings, and must be prepared to stop."
CONCLUSIONS
Primary Cause:
rI c-o-n-t-ri_b_u-ti_n_g_F-ac_t_o_rs_:_
ii
Other Findings /
Comments:
While station platforms are public areas, the interface with patrons (as well as
employees performing maintenance activities) at or near the tactile edge of the
platforms is a critical safety concern. Instruction should create an outreach effort to
all operators reminding them of the importance of safe operation into stations when
anyone is on the tactile edges and using sound judgment in passing them.
Page 2 of 3

Prepared By
Reviewed By
Eric Anderson
John MacQueen
Date
Date
7/23/14
7/23/14
FIGUR 1-INCIOENT SCHEMATIC
Page 3 of3

INTRODUCTION
Date&Time:
7/26/2014 9:20 p.m.
location:
Green Line - Main Track 2 at Chatsworth St. {St. Paul)
LRV:
234x239x245
Eastbound Green Line train struck pedestrian that stepped backwards into the dynamic
envelope of the LRV at the intersection of University Ave and Chatsworth St.
maintenance staff, as well as Its own experience. This report is formulated on observations at the incident
analysis, The involved agencies, personnel, and applicable reports are summarized below.

Response:
Chatsworth St. is a North/South street that crosses the LRT track at grade in
the middle of University Ave.
A westbound train had stopped at Chatsworth after observing the pedestrian
in the ROW, the train operator attempted to motion to the pedestrian to
warn her of the approaching train.
The pedestrian told police that she was motioning for the westbound LRV to
proceed and stepped back to allow movement and placed herself in the
dynamic envelope of the approaching eastbound train (See Figure 1).
The pedestrian was subsequently struck and fell onto Main Track (MT) 1. She
can be seengetting up a few moments later and collecting her things.
St. Paul Police and MTPD met with the pedestrian who claimed that she was
not struck by the train but "fell due to the wind corning off the train."
The pedestrian sustained a scrape to her knee andwas treated at the scene .
The LRV was operable after the accident.
The accident was investigated by MTPD, along with Rail Operations and Safety
~-----
_Investigation:
--~-
Reports Reviewed:
SSR 11554804
Accident (eastbound) train operator's incident report
Westbound train operator's incident report
Field Supervisor's accident report
.....-
Pagel of 4
Event Recorder Data
Reviewed:
Video Reviewed:
Drug/Alcohol Test
Results:
Other:
The event recorder data was not requested at the time of the accident and was not
provided until requested by safety staff on 7/29/14. The event recorder indicated
application of emergency brake at a speed of 34.1 MPH. The train stopped in 6.8
seconds. This is consistent with the Knorr braking table, which would indicate a
stopping time of 6.9 seconds at a speed of 34 MPH. The speed at the crossing is 35
MPH, indicating that the train operator was operating at or below the posted speed
limit. The event recorder also indicated use of horn in advance of the incident.
From watching the eastbound train's forward facing camera (LRV 234), the pedestrian
was obscured from the train operator's view by a pole adjacent to the crossing (see
Figure 1) until the train is almost to the crossing, As the LRV closed in on the
intersection, the pedestrian was observed taking a step backward toward MT2. It
must be noted that the eastbound camera did not conclusively establish whether or
not the pedestrian was struck by the LRV. The westbound train's camera view (LRV
244), though somewhat blurry, established that the westbound train stopped for a
horizontal bar at Chatsworth St. The pedestrian was observed walking in the western
crosswalk heading northbound. The pedestrian made It as far as the area between
MTl and MT2 before the light changed and the LRV received a vertical bar. The LRV
began to move but then stopped as the pedestrian was observed walking toward
MTl. The pedestrian then stopped and took one step backward placing herself In the
dynamic envelope of the approaching eastbound train. The individual can be seen
being spun around partially and falling into MTl as the front corner of the eastbound
train passes her, consistent with being bumped by the passing train. The striking LRV
stops slightly over one car length (approximately 100') pastthe crosswalk. The
individual gets to her feet after a few seconds and begins to walk about.
The pedestrian and the train operator were intervlewed by MTPD and their
statements included 1n the police report.
N/A -incident did not meet threshold for post accident testing.
The event was reported via e"mail to SSOA within the 2 hour threshold. No other
notlficaUons were required.
---~---------~--
Page 2 of 4
When the accident occurred on 7/26/14, notifications were made in a timely manner.
Initially, there was doubt as to whether the pedestrian was actually struck by the LRV.
This was corroborated by the pedestrian who, when.speaking with police, originally
stated that she was struck by the train but then r;hanged her statement to indicate
that the wind from the passing train knocked her down. The MTPD police reports
concluded that the pedestrian was not struck and the report also stated a MTPD
sergeant opted to not have the video pulled and entered into evidence.
In their interview, MTPD concluded that the pedestrian probably did not have a
permissive pedestrian warning device when entering the intersection. During the
interview, the pedestrian demonstrated to MTPD how she crossed University Ave
prior to being struck. MTPD noted that the pedestrian claimed that the pedestrian
semaphore was not working properly. When asked to explain, the officer noted that
the pedestrian was looking at the traffic semaphore (which was permissive) and not at
the pedestrian warning device, which was displaying a red hand. The report indicates
that the pedestrian warning devices were functioning properly and provided a 30
second countdown from "Walka to "Don't Walk". Finally, the MTPD officer that
interviewed the pedestrian noted that the woman admitted to smoking marijuana
prior to the incident.
Rail safetv staff did view the forward facing camera from the eastbound lRV, but this
view was inconclusive in establishing if the pedestrian was struck. When attempting
to view the westboundtrain's camera, it was found that the wrong LRV's hard drive
had been pulled. The correct LRV had to be found and that hard drive retrieved.
When viewing lhis video, the Rail Safety department determined that, in fact, the
pedestrian wa~ struck by the eastbound train, While the outcome of incident is
unchanged, the fact was confirmed that contact was made by the eastbound passing
train.
It could be determined that the eastbound train had a permissive bar signal in
advance of and at the time of the incident The vi(:leo shows that the pedestrian was
not visible until a very short time prior to the crosswalk and the pedestrian could be
seen standing between the two tracks, looking loward the stopped westbound train,
and stepped back into the dynamic envelope of the eastbound train just before it
made contact. There is no evidence indicating that the eastbound train would have
had adequate opportunity to respond differently to avoid bumping the pedestrian.
CONCLUSIONS
Primary Cause:
I Contributing Factors:
The pedestrian entered the right. of way and was in the dynamic envelope of the
passing train in violation of the active pedestrian warmng devices, - - - - - The pedestrian's judgment may have been impaired based on her statement to police
that she had used marijuana earlier In the day.
Page 3 of 4
Other Findings /
Comments:
The operator of the westbound train (#70312) should be commended for her
judgment in stopping and not attempting to pass the pedestrian. This action
probably minimized the outcome of this incident by not trapping the
pedestrian between two passing trains.
Errors in initial reports led to confusion and delays in obtaining proper video
and event recorder data.

P ~ By ... --- Eric Anderson -------------------~------D_at_e_
7L31/14
_ReviewJ.~..By
John MacQueen
..----~ _l?_at_e _____
7/_3_1/_1_4_ __
Figure 1
Red arrow represents eastbound train (moving - stuck pedestrian at orange Icon); Blue arrow represents
stopped westbound train. (Note the pole adjacent to the left (west side) of the pedestrian. This is the mount for
one set of bar signals at this location.)
Page 4of 4

INTRODUCTION
location:
08/25/14 1:06 p.m.

Green Line Main Track 1 at Chatsworth Street (St. Paul)
LRV:
Operator:
Brief Description:
206x245x254
72196
Westbound Green Line train struck a trespasser that was walking in the right of way.
Date&Time:
The Safety Department is responsible to conduct an investigation of rail accidents and relles heavily on the
maintenance staff, as well as lts own experience. This report Is formulated on observations at the incident

Response:
Chatsworth St. is a north/south street that crosses the LRT tracks at grade in
the middle of University Avenue.
The LRV departed Victoria St. station and accelerated; the horn could be
heard sounding for a prolonged period prior to the collision.
The
trespasser crossed from the south side of University Ave to the right of
way at a location other than a crosswalk. He went between the tracks by

utilizing the space between a catenary pole and the inter-track fencing.
After crossing to Main Track 1, the trespasser walked westbound toward
Chatsworth St. prior to being struck (see figure 1).
The
trespasser admitted to police that he was wearing headphones and that
he saw but did not hear the train.

The trespasser sustained a,compound fracture to his left leg, a severed
Achilles tendon, and a large head laceration.
The
LRV was operable from the scene.
The accident was investigated by MTPD, along with Rail Operations and Safety staff.
SSR#S60904
Train Operator's accident report
Responding supervisor's report
MTPD internal accident report
Investigation:
Reports Reviewed:
Final Accident Report: 8/25/14 Green Line - Accident @ Chatsworth St.
Pagel of 4
Event Recorder Data

Reviewed:
Video Reviewed:
Drug/Alcohol Test
Results:
Other:
The LRV's event recorder was downloaded and reviewed. The download shows that
the train departed Victoria Station westbound and began to accelerate. The high horn
showed being sounded continuously from 13:07:44.2 until 13:07:54.0. !This is
conststent with the onboard audio recording of the horn being continuously sounded
for 9.8 seconds leading up to the accident.) The event recorder indicated that when
the horn was initially sounded, the LRV was operating at a speed of 33.8 MPH, but
continued to accelerate. The posted track speed for this section of track Is 35MPH.
The train continued to accelerate until reaching a top speed of 38.8 MPH. In total, the
train exceeded the posted speed limit for 7.8 seconds, all during the period of time
during which the horn was being sounded as a warning to the trespasser on the tracks
ahead. At 13:07:52.5 and at a speed of 35.8 MPH, the emergency brake was applied.
The train came to a stop at 13:07:59.0, for a total stopping time of 6.5 seconds.
According to the Knorr braking table, a train traveling at 36 MPH should take
approximately 7 .38 seconds to stop. The results were reviewed by a representative of
Siemens, the manufacturer of the LRV. The Siemens representative noted that at the
point the train exceeded the posted speed limit, the operator moved the master
controller handle into the first position of braking. This position is used as a form of
cruise control on these type LRVs and the train would not slow below that speed until
more braking was applied. The Siemens representative also noted that during the
time the horn was being sounded, the train made a more gradual application of the
brake (not consistent with an attempt to avoid an Imminent collision) until the last
moment.
The LRV's video was downloaded and reviewed. The train departed Victoria St.
station and accelerated. Shortly after leaving the station, the LRV could be heard
sounding the horn for over 9 seconds. It is difficult to determine exactly where the
trespasser came from, but a small dark area in the video can be seen moving from
Main Track 2 side to Main Track 1. It appeared this person might have used the space
between the catenary pole and inter-track fencing to cross through. As the train
approached Chatsworth St., the trespasser became clearly visible walking in the right
of way in a westbound direction (with his back to the train). The trespasser was never
obseived making any motions or indication of his awareness to the presence of the
LRV. A loud 1'thud" was recorded by the on board microphones as the pedestrian was
struck by the LRV. After impact, the LRV came to rest with the operating cab
occupying the western crosswalk of Chatsworth St. The interior cameras of the LRV
recorded the trespasser lying on the eastern end of the grade crossing on Main Track
2 side. The video also revealed passengers activating the emergency door releases
and exiting the train onto the right of way shortly after the collision. Those who
exited the train stayed on scene and told police that they exited the train to "lend
assistance" to the injured party.
The train operator was interviewed by MTPD and Rail Safety.
The operator was tested for drugs and alcohol post a c c i d e n t . - This accident was reported to SSOA within the two hour threshold and was reported
to the NTD.
Page2of 4
As the LRV accelerated westbound away from Victoria St. station the operator
reported to police that he observed an individual in the right of way and sounded the
horn and applied emergency brake.
Our investigation found that the train was sounding a warning all the while the
trespasser was in sight, while not applying sufficient braking to stop the train short of
the hazard. At the posted speed of 35 MPH, the Knorr braking table indicates a
stopping time of 7.14 seconds. Even at the maximum speed of 38.8 MPH shown by
this train, the Knorr table indicates a stopping time of 8.09 seconds. Instead, the
operator began sounding his horn at a speed of 32 MPH and continued to sound it for
9.8 seconds while accelerating to a higher speed, in fact a speed in excess of the
maximum allowed, resulting in insufficient time to stop short of the person on the
tracks ahead. When he determined that his warning attempts were going to be
unsuccessful in averting the collision, it was too late to stop the train. Had the
operator began more aggressive braking at the same time he began sounding his
horn, it ls likely that this accident would have been prevented.
Transportation management reviewed the operator's work history and determined
that over the previous three day period, the operator had worked in excess of 13
hours of overtime. The day prior to the accident, the operator reported that he was
off work for eight hours, though reviewing his HASTUS mark up, it was discovered that
the operator was only off for 6 hours and 58 minutes. Transportation management
also determined that on the day prior to the accident, the operator was on duty for
sixteen hours and ten minutes, which is in violation of Metro Transit's sixteen hour
maximum on duty time rule. On Monday 8/25/14, the operator checked in at 3:36
a.m. The video recording of the check could not be played but thE!.9Udi<l of the job
brief does not indicate any fatigue related issues. Though hours of service rules were
violated and this operator has a demonstrated pattern of working many hours, fatigue
could not be concluded to be a factor in this accident.
Ultimately, the trespasser has to be accountable for his actions, as the LRT right of
way is not intended as a place for a pedestrian to walk. However, the train operator
observed the person in the right of way and took no immediate action to prevent the
collision when there was enough time to stop and avoid. Rather, the operator merely
sounded the horn and went into emergency brake only at a point when the collision
was inevitable.
CONCLUSIONS
Primary Cause:
Pedestrian trespassed into the right of way, placing himself in the dynamic envelope
of the train
Operator failed to react to the hazard and control his train in a manner that could
have prevented the collision.
Page 3 of 4
Other Findings /
Comments:
This is the second consecutive accident investigated (and the fourth this year)
where speed in excess of the posted limits was found in the related
investigation. This could seem to imply a pattern of non-compliance with
basic rail rules and procedures that should be addressed.
So far in 2014, operator actions have been the primary cause or contributing
factor in seven of 26 collisions (27%). This is in stark contrast to the prior 9+
years, where operator actions contributed to or were the primary cause of
only 3 of 79 collisions (4%). Operator training and compliance seems to be a
factor that needs further attention.
While fatigue cannot be determined to be a factor in this incident, the
investigation process did reveal that the involved operator had violated the
company's policy on hours of service on the prior day. Metro Transit needs to
adhere to stricter compliance with its own policies to manage fatigue.
After the accident, several passengers left the train by activating the
emergency door releases and entered the right of way. This could have
caused additional problems with other train movements or the flow of traffic
itself on University Avenue.
All of the above items should be subjects for discussion at an After Action
Review to be scheduled in the near future.

Prepared By
Reviewed By
Reviewed By

John MacQueen, Rail System Safety Manager
Michael J. Conlon, Director- Rail & Bus Safety
Date
Date
Date
8/27/14
8/27/14
8/27/14
Fi8ur .. 1 61ue arrow represi'nls path of westbound train; red line appro~imates path of rmdes\rian; point of impact indicated
bv blast icon.
Page 4 of4

INTRODUCTION
Date & Time:
09/25/14 6:22 p.m.
location:
Green line MT2; University Avenue at Arundel Street (Saint Paul)
LRV:
219x242x209
Operator:
Brief Description:
An eastbound train and a pedestrian collided in the Arundel Street pedestrian crossing
resulting in injury to the pedestrian (see Figure 1).
maintenance staff, as well as its own experience. This report ls formulated on observations at the incident

Response:
Arundel Street is a north/south street that ls interrupted by University Avenue

and the Green line tracks. A midblock pedestrian crossing allows pedestrians
to cross the LRT tracks at gtade.
The crossing is equipped with flashing lights, an audible bell, and signs which
display the image of a train when a train ls approaching.
The only damage to the LRV was a scuff on the right front side of the
operators cab.
The event recorder shows that the train was traveling at 35 MPH
The pedestrian denied wearing headphones; however, the police report
stated that a witness was overheard saying that the pedestrian was wearing
headphones.
The police report stated that they fund drug paraphernalia near the victim .
The pedestrian sustained a broken leg
The LRV was operable from the scene.
The pedestrian was wearing a "hoodie" that may have obscured his peripheral
vision.
MTPD investigated this accident along with Rail Operations and Safety.
SSR #568142
MTPD preliminary incident report CN 14019339
Investigation:
Reports Reviewed:
Final Accident Report: 09/25/14 Green Line - Accident @ Arundel.
Pagel of 3
Event Recorder Data

Reviewed:
The posted train speed limit at this location is 35 MPH. The event recorder data
shows that the train reaches a top speed of 35.1 MPH as it approaches Arundel Street
and is traveling at 34.3 MPH when the emergency brake is applied. The train comes
to rest 7 .2 seconds later. The Knorr braking table predicts a stopping time of 7 .1
seconds at 35 MPH. This established that the brakes appeared to be working properly
at the time of the accident.
Safety staff had an opportunity to view the forward facing camera video at the police
Video Reviewed:
station. The pedestrian crosses the eastbound lanes of university and enters the
crosswalk
Interviews Conducted: MTPD made contact with the train o
indicated that
T e victim was
I interviewed by the police at the scene. The victim stated that he did not look and
therefore did not see the train.
1 HA mandated drug test results
Drug/Akohol Test
Results:
Other:
This accident was reported within the prescribed tlmeframe to SSOA and to the
National Transit Database. It did not meet thresholds for reporting to the NTSB.
The pedestrian walked up the ramp on the south side of the tracks toward the
1 pedestrian crossing, turned and looked across the tracks. The pedestrian was wearing
I a "hoodl.e" pulled far. enough forward to block the view of his eyes from the train. The
pedestrian did not respond to the active warning devices that were present at the
l crossing and stepped into the path of the train. By the time the pedestrian's
I
I
I
CONCLUSIONS
Primary cause:
Other Findings /
Comments:
The pedestrian failed to respond to active warning devices and stepped out in front of
the train.
None
In investigating this accident, it was difficult to determine the train speed limit due to
the number of modification to the time table speeds. A single Green Line speed table
that covers the whole alignment from 35W Junction to OMF should be included in the
rulebook.
Transit Safety department reserves the right to amend this (eport and forward any such revision to the State

Prepared By
Reviewed By
Brad Cummings
John MacQueen
Final Accident Report: 09/25/14 Green Line - Accident @ Arundel.
Date
Date
9/30/14
9/30/14
Page 2 of 3
Pedesttia11 . .
FIGURE 1 COURTESY OF GOOGLE MAPS
Final Accident Report: 09/25/14 Green Line -Accident @ Arundel.
Page 3 of3

INTRODUCTION
Date & Time:
10/9/14 8:48 a.m.
Location:
Blue line Main Track 1 at Franklin Avenue Station South pedestrian crossing (Minneapolis)
LRV:
Operator:
Brief Description;
104x125xl12
Northbound Blue Line train struck pedestrian that disobeyed active warning devices and
entered the right of wa at the South pedestrian crossin of Franklin Ave. Station.
scene, interviews with appropriate personnel, review of other agency and Internal reports, and follow.up

Response:
The South pedestrian crossing at Franklln station is equipped with pedestrian

walk/don't walk Illuminated signs, audible warning devices, and an
illuminated second train warning sign.
A southbound train was at the station during the accident.
Northbound Blue Line train struck pedestrian that disobeyed active warning
devices and entered the right of way at the South pedestrian crossing of
Franklin Ave. Station. {See Figure 1)
The pedestrian was transported to a local hospital with non life threatening
injuries.
The LRV sustained no damage.
The accident was investigated by MTPD, along with Rail Operations and Rall Safety.
Rail SSR #570998
Train operator's accident report
Supervisor's incident report
The event recorder for LRV 104 was downloaded and reviewed. The LRV was
traveling at 33.2 MPH at the time of emergency brake application. Posted track speed
at the pedestrian crossing is 35 MPH. The emergency brakes were applied at
08:47:55.4 and the train came to a stop 6.6 seconds later. This is consistent with the
Knorr Braking Table that shows a stopping time from 33 MPH at 6.68 seconds using
emergency brake. The type 1 LRV's event recorders do not record horn or bell use so
this Information could not be confirmed.
Investigation:
Reports Reviewed:
Event Recorder Data
Reviewed:
Final Accident Report; 10/09/14 Blue line - LRV 104 vs. Ped @ FKLN Station.
Page 1 of3
Video Reviewed:
Drug/Alcohol Test
Results:
Other:
Rail Safety staff viewed the LRV forward facing LRV video. The video shows the
pedestrian walking westbound from the area of a school adjacent to the bike path,
crossing the bike path then entering the dynamic envelope of the train. In the video,
it appears that the pedestrian never looked to see if there was an approaching
northbound train. There is no audio wlth this video.
The train operator was interviewed by MTPD and rail safety after the accident.
The operator was tested for drugs and alcohol post accident
The accident was reported to SSOA within the two hour mandated threshold, and was
reported to the NTD.
StatiOl'l cameras recorded the pedestrian walking westbound from the area of a
school that is just east of the pedestrian crossing. The pedestrian crossed the bike
path and entered into the path of the train, where she was struck and pushed out of
the ROW to the east. MTPD reported that a male companion was with the female but
left shortly after the collision before police or EMS could arrive. This is corroborated
on the video as a person can be observed walking a few feet behind her prior to the
collision and she may have been distracted talking to this individual. Metro Transit
Signals department staff verified at the time of the collision bath the audible and
visual warning devices were functioning properly.
CONCLUSIONS
Primary Cause:
Other Findings /
Comments:
The pedestrian disregarded active warning devices and was struck by the train.
None
None

Prepared By
Reviewed By
Eric Anderson
John MacQueen
Final Accident Report: 10/09/14 Blue Line - LRV 104 vs. Ped @ FKLN Station.
Date
Date
10/15/14
10/15/14
Page 2 of 3
Blue arrow indicates path of t'IOCthboond involved LRV.
White arrow indicates.~ tRV that was .stopped in the staoon at time of acci<lenl
Red arrow lildk:ates path o f ~ pedes1rian that walked iii front of train.
cormion 1ocaoon indicated by ye11ow "burst".
Final Accident Report: 10/09/14 Blue line - LRV 104 vs. Ped @ FKLN Station.
Page3 of 3

INTRODUCTION
Date& Time:
1/1/15 11:08 a.m.
Location:
Green Line Main Track 1 at Albert St. Pedestrian Crossing (St. Paul)
LRV:
Operator:
Brief Description:
230x254
A westbound Green Line train struck a pedestrian that disregarded active warning devices
at Albert St. edestrian crossing.
maintenance staff, as well as its own experience. Thts report is formulated on observations at the incident

Response:
Investigation:
Reports Reviewed:
Event Recorder Data

Reviewed:
Albert Street is a north/south street that is interrupted by University Avenue

and the Green Line tracks. A midblock pedestrian crossing allows pedestrians
to cross the LRT tracks at grade. This crossing also serves as the entrance/exit
for the Hamline Avenue westbound platform. (See figure 1)
The crossing is equipped with flashing lights, an audible bell, and signs which
display the image of a train when a train is approaching,
The LRV was operable from the scene .
The victim sustained non-life threatening injuries
-------
MTPD investigated this accident along with Rail Operations and Safety.
SSR # 587373
MTPD preliminary incident report CN15000037
The LRV event recorder was downloaded and reviewed by LRV vehicle maintenance
staff. The download establishes that at 11:09:1.2.5 the train departed Hamline Ave
Station and accelerated to a top speed of 21.4 MPH (posted speed in this area is 35
MPH.) At 11:09:21.8 The train operator applied emergency brake, and the train
comes to a stop 4.6 seconds later. The Knorr braking table indicates a stopping time
of 4.2 seconds from 21 MPH. High horn was sounded prior to and during the collision.
The LRV event recorder time clock was off by one hour, but LRV maintenance was still
able to locate the accident.
Final Accident Report: 01/01/15 Green Line - LRV 230 vs. Pedestrian @ Albert St.
Issued: 1/14/2015
Page 1 of 3
Video Reviewed:
Drug/Alcohol Test
Results:
Other:
Safety staff had an opportunity to view the forward facing camera video at the police
station. The video showed a group of approximately five ihclividuals exiting the
accident train at Haml!ne Ave Station, and beginning to walk westbound down the
ramp from the platform. Afterthe train departed the station and began to approach
Albert St. (a distance of approximately 217 feet), two of the pedestrians were
observed walking across the tracks in a southbound direction. As the train began to
cross Albert St,, the victim was observed turning and walking southbound with
intentions of also crossing the tracks. The individual can be heard, but not seen, being
struck by the train.
The train operator and victim were interviewed by MTPD.
FT A mandated drug test results
This accident was reported within the prescribed timeframe to SSOA and to the
National Transit Database. It did not meet thresholds for reporting to the NTSB.
The victim exited the train atHamllne Station with a group of approximately five
others. They could be observed walking westbound down the ramp off the platform.
As the train was departing the station two of the pedestrian were observed crossing
the tracks despite the presence of the active warning devices. As the train neared the
pedestrian crossing the victim was observed turning to cross the track and was struck
by the right side of the LRV off camera. The train operator did sound the horn and
apply emergency brake prior to the collision, and based of the LRV event recorder, it
does appear that the train operator applied emergency brake shortly after the first
two pedestrians crossed the tracks and before the victim entered the dynamic
envelope of the train. A Metro Transit signals department manager reviewed the VPI
download and verified that prior to and during the collision the active warning devices
were functioning properly.
CONCLUSIONS
Primary Cause:
Other findings/
Comments:
The pedestrian failed to obey to the active warning devices and stepped into the
dynamic envelope of the train.
None
None
Should any additional Information surface that would alter or change any of the above conclusions, the Metro
Safety Oversight Agency (Minnesota Department of Public Safety}.
Final Accident Report; 01/01/15 Green Line - LRV 230 vs. Pedestrian @ Albert St.
Issued: 1/14/2015
Page 2 of 3
FIGUREl
Graphic courtesy of Google Earth -vehicles shown are in pre-existing satellite photo and not representative of
actual incident.
Green arrow represents westbound lRV.
Red arrows represents approximate path of involved pedestrian westbound to point of impact (yellow blast).
Final Accident Report: 01/01/15 Green Line - LRV 230 vs. Pedestrian @ Albert St.
Issued: 1/14/2015
Page 3 of3

INTRODUCTION
Date & Time:
01/24/15 10:04 p.m.
Location:
Green Line Main Tracks 1&2 at Lexington Parkway
LRV:
1st train 233x201x203 (MT2)

2nd train 239x238x259 (MTl)
-------f-,--0 perator:
1st train
znd trai
Brief Description:
A westbound train on main trac 1 was stopped for a horizontal bar on the east side of
Lexington Avenue, after the westbound train received its permissive bar signal it began
moving. A trespasser crossed from the south east corner of University Avenue and
Lexington Parkway and proceeded onto the right,of~way and began walking westbound
next to the departing westbound train between main track 1 and main track 2(Figure 1).
The trespasser was foul of main track two. The train on eastbound main track 2 struck the
pedestrian and threw him into the side of the trailing car of the westbound train.
WQTr.ain
EIHfllln
Path of Pedestrian
Areaofimp.ict
FIGURE1
Final Accident Report: 01/24/15 Green Line - 233 vs. Pedestrian @ Lexington.
Issued: 01/30/201S
Page 1 of 4

Response:
The trespasser sustained nonlife threatening injuries and was transported

from the scene for treatment of injuries.
The eastbound consist was not damaged.
The trailing LRV ln the westbound consist sustained a broken window.
Both train operators had permissive bar signals and the parallel traffic on
University had a green traffic light.
The posted speed for trains crossing Lexington Parkway is 35 MPH.
Police report that that there was loud music coming from the victim when
they arrived to lend assistance.
The crosswalk at Lexington Parkway and University is governed by bar signals
for trains, traffic signals for street traffic and Walk/Don't Walk Signals for
pedestrians. Signal department staff responded to the accident scene and
informed the police that the city of Saint Paul controls the traffic signal
cabinets, and that no downloads were available. No defects were observed.
The westbound train operator
Investigation:
Reports Reviewed:
Event Recorder Data

Reviewed:
Rail safety staff conducted a site visit on 01/28/15 and ascertained that all
street lighting in the area is working as intended.
_
The accident was investigated by MTPD along with Rail Operations and Rail Safety.
SSR 592086.
, Eastbound Train Operator's accident report.
Westbound Train Operators accident report.
Supervisor's accident report.
Metro Transit Police Department preliminary report CN15001894.
State Accident Report.
The LRV 233 event recorder was downloaded and reviewed by LRV maintenance staff.
The eventrecord shows that the train was traveling at 28.4 MPH when the emergency
brake was deployed. The train came to rest 5,6 seconds after track brake was applied.
The Knorr braking table indicates that when emergency brake is applied the stopping
time will be 5.6 seconds at 28 MPH. Two short blasts of the high horn were recorded,
consistent with applicable rules for passing the vehicles in the adjacent left turn lane.
These ended approximately 1.7 seconds before the deployment of emergency
braking. An additional long blast of high horn was sounded 0.5 seconds prior to the
deployment of track brakes and 0.9 seconds prfor to the deployment of emergency
braking,
Issued: Ol/30/2015
Page 2 of 4
Video Reviewed:
Station Camera Lex Cam-201 viewed In Operations Mangers office. This

camera looked west across Lexington Parkway from the eastbound Lexington
station. The camera showed that the pedestrian first encroached on Main
Track 2 at 22:03:41. The pedestrian was struck at 22:03:50. The train came tb
rest at 22:03:55.
Station camera Lex Cam 106 was viewed in Operations Managers office. This
camera pointed east across Lexington Parkway from the westbound Lexington
platform. This camera does not show the accident because the westbound
train blocks the camera view.
The LRV 233 eastbound forward facing camera showed that the pedestrian
was not visible until after the head end of the westbound train had past.
When the trespasser came into view, he was walking directly toward the
eastbound train. He does not appear to respond to the approaching train.
LRV 259 Video of the inside of the westbound LRV showed very little reaction
to the event on the part of the passengers.
Safety staff reviewed the audio log of transmissions from the RCC for the
minutes immediately following the accident. RCC immediately stopped
approaching trains. There was no transmission to the westbound train.
Rail safety staff interviewed the train operator on 1/28/15. The train operator stated
Drug/Alcohol Test
A post accident drug test was administ r d to

FTA policy. The train operator tested
Results:
Other:
This accident was reportable to the National Transit Database on an S&S 40. The
website was not yet receiving reports for 2015. The event did not meet thresholds for
reporting to the National Response Center. This event was reported to State Safety
Oversight within the mandated two hour window.
Issued: 01/30/2015
Page 3 of 4
The accident was caused by the trespasser walking up the tracks toward the
oncoming eastbound train. This is not legal at any time. The train operator was
operating his train atan appropriate speed .. The train operator responded with horn
and emergency braking when the pedestrian came into view.
While the trespasser entered the Right-of Way several seconds before he was seen,
he was not visible from the camera mounted on the eastbound train. As the
eastbound train approached Lexington Parkway, the train operator was lookln
toward the Ii hts of the westbound train. The o erator stated that
The onboard vldeo from the westbound trailing car showed that none of the
passengers reacted strongly to the accident.
CONCLUSIONS
Primary Cause:
Other Findings /
Comments:
The pedestrian was trespassing on the ROW at the time of the accident.
------~--None
While they are recorded in the event recorder, the two $hort blasts of the horn were
difficult to hear in the video.
Issued: 01/30/2015
Page 4 of 4

INTRODUCTION
Date&Time:
04/30/15 07:30 am
Location (Include
Latitude/Longitude):
LRV:
Green Line Main Track @ Snelling Avenue. Latitude 44.955 Longitude 93.167
LRV 233x258x237
Operator:
Brief Description:
A westbound Green line train struck a pedestrian who was crossing University Avenue at
Snelling Avenue. The pedestrian was transported from the scene with critical injuries
and was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. There were no other injuries or
damage.
The Safety Department is responsible for conducting investigations of rail accidents, according to the LRT System
Safety Program Plan and the LRT Accident/Incident Investigation Plan. Metro Transit Safety is also authorized
;1nd responsible for conducting investigations for the MN State Safety Oversight Agency. These investigations
rely heavily on the expertise of law enforcement and emergency services personnel (where appropriate), rail
operations and maintenance staff, as well as Its own experience. This report is formulated on observations at
the Incident scene, interviews with appropriate personnel, review of other agency and internal reports, and
follow-up analysis. The involved agencies, personnel, and applicable reports are summarized below.

Response:
Investigation:
Reports Reviewed:
The east pedestrian crosswalk for Snelling Avenue at University Ave is

equipped with a walk/don't walk sign (See figure 1}.
An eastbound train was pulling into the eastbound platform moments before
the accident. (See figure 2).
The victim was fatally injured
The LRV sustained no damage .
The accident was reported to SSOA within the two hour time limit.
The accident was reported to the National Response Center (NRC}
The accident attracted substantial media interest.
The accident was investigated by Ramsey County Medical Examiner, MTPO, and Rail
Operations and Safety staff.
SSR #610910
MTPD initial accident report
Final Accident Report: 04/30/15 Green Line - Pedestrian Collision @ Snelling.

Issued: 05/6/2015
Page 1 of 5
Event Recorder Data

Reviewed:
The LRV 233 event recorder was downloaded and reviewed by maintenance staff.
They determined that the event recorder clock was 1 hour behind actual time. The
event recorder established that the LRV was traveling at 36.5 MPH when the train
operator applied emergency brake. While reviewing the event recorder with LRV
maintenance management lt was determined that the train operator had the master
controller in the Full Service Brake position (as the speed limit drops from 40MPH to
35MPH at the grade crossing). The event recorder indicated that the train was
operating at 35.1 MPH 6.2 seconds before coming to a complete stop. Applying this
time against the front facing video, the train had not yet entered the 35 MPH zone
(the speed limit sign and the victim were visible in the camera frame) when the train
reached the legal speed. The train came to rest 6.6 seconds after the deployment of
emergency brakes. The Knorr braking table predicts that it should take 7.3 seconds to
stop an LRV that is traveling at 36 MPH using emergency brake. The brakes
functioned as expected. The event recorder also showed that the train operator
sounded high horn prior to entering the grade crossing.
In reviewing the LRV event recorder, it was discovered that during the time leading up
to the collision; the LRV had operated in excess of the speed limit. Metro Transit LRT
Ops Notice 09-15 (issued April th 2015) sets the speed limit for westbound trains at
40MPH from Pascal St. to Snelling Avenue. The event recorder showed that during
the time that the LRV was operating in this area, the speed accelerated to a maximum
of 43MPH. Following the Metro Transit's Light Rail Compliance Testing Guidelines
. This information was passed

Revision 5,
onto LRT Transportation Management for their consideration.
Final Accident Report: 04/30/15 Green line - Pedestrian Collision @ Snelling.

Issued: 05/6/2015
Page 2 of S
Video Reviewed:
The LRV forward facing video and Snelling Avenue Station westbound platform
cameras were reviewed by Rail Safety Staff. The Snelling Avenue station westbound
platform camera showed in the time leading up to the collision that an eastbound
train stopped at Snelling Ave. to wait for a permissive bar signal. Upon receiving the
permissive vertical bar signal indication, the train began to proceed eastbound across
Snelling Ave and entered Snelling Avenue station's eastbound platform. At the same
time the eastbound train received a vertical bar signal, the through traffic lanes on
University Avenue could be observed also receiving a green traffic signal, and traffic
could be seen moving on University.
A short time later, with the east bound train !;till moving through the intersection and
no moving traffic observed in the westbound lanes of University Avenue, the accident
pedestrian is observed walking in the crosswalk southbound from the northeast
corner of University and Snelling Avenues. During the accident sequence, the bar
signal for trains is vertical and the traffic semaphore for east and westbound traffic on
University is green, indicating that the pedestrian crossed against the traffic signal.
The camera also showed that the westbound turn lane on University Ave (for vehicles
waiting to turn southbound onto Snelling Ave) was occupied by 2-3 vehicles, including
a commercial truck with a large high sided box on the back, thus potentially obscuring
a clear view of the intersection for the train operator and obstructing the view of the
approaching train for the pedestrian. The pedestrian was not observed looking in the
direction of the approaching westbound train during the accident sequence. Instead,
she appeared to be focused on the location of the eastbound train. It was noted that
the pedestrian increased her pace from a walk to a jog as the eastbound train was
clearing the intersection and coming to a stop in the station. Shortly after the
pedestrian began her jog, she stepped out in front of the westbound train and was
struck.
Drug/Alcohol Test
Results:
Other:
The LRV forward facing video from the involved westbound train showed that as the
train approached Snelling Avenue 1 a clear view of the entire intersection was
obscured by the large truck in the turn lane on University Avenue. tt was observed by
Rail Safety Staff that during replay of the video, the victim could be seen leaving the
corner and starting to walk across University Ave. Whether the train operator would
have been able to observe the victim in the brief amount of time she was visible prior
to becoming obscured by vehicles in the turn lane is inconclusive, as the train
operator most likely would be directing his attention to the approaching grade
crossing area immediately in front of his train. The train operator was heard sounding
the horn (as required by Metro Transit rule when a vehicle is in the adjacent turn
lane) moments prior to the collision. As the pedestrian stepped into the path of the
train, the track brake is heard applying, followed by the sound of the collision. The
pedestrian was wearing a hooded jacket with the hood pulled over her head and at no
time leading up to the collision was the woman observed looking in the direction of
the approaching westbound train.
The train operator was interviewed by MTPD and Rail Safety following the accident.
Theo era tor was tested for dru sand alcohol post aci;ldent
This accident was reported to SSOA within the two hour threshold and was reported
to the NTD and the NTSB (National Response Center).
Final Acddent Report: 04/30/15 Green Line - Pedestrian Collision @ Snelling.

Issued: 05/6/2015
Page 3 of 5
The pedestrian crossed University Avenue against the traffic control semaphore
indication. She appeared to be focused on the eastbound train entering the station
and may not have noticed the westbound train. The pedestrian was not observed at
any time while on camera looking in the direction of the approaching westbound train
to ensure her path was clear. One witness told MTPD that she observed the victim
udigging through her purse" as she was crossing the street, but this could not be
confirmed via video evidence. Hearing aids were found near the victim. The victim
was transported to a hospital where she was pronounced dead.
Prior to the collision, the bar signal indication changed from solid vertical to flashing
vertical, indicating that the signal was going to turn non-permissive. As the LRV was in
dose proximity to the intersection, the train operator (in accordance with Metro
Transit operating rules) continued through the intersection on the flashing indication.
It must be noted that the bar signal continued to flash after the collision and did not
turn horizontal until after the train had come to a stop.
CONCLUSIONS
Primary Cause:
The pedestrian disregarded the traffic semaphore indications and walked into the
path of a westbound train.
Other Findings /
Comments:
Final Accident Report: 04/30/15 Green Line - Pedestrian Collision

Issued: 05/6/2015
Page 4 of S
Snelling.
Green arrow indicates palh of westbound involved LRV.

Blue A.mYw fnditafes pain of eastbound LRV.
Red arrow irnfrcates path of pedestrian prior to colision.

Blaclnectangle Wil:hwhie outrme depicts approximate location o f ~ truck;
Collision tocafion indicated by yellow '1xnt'".
Final Accident Report: 04/30/15 Green Line - Pedestrian Collision @ Snelling.

Issued: 05/6/2015
Page 5 of s

INTRODUCTION
Date& Time:
5/27/15 5:33p.m,
location (Include
LRV:
Operator:
Brief Description:
Slue line Main Track 2 @ Cedar Riverside Station (Minneapolis)

Lat: 44.9686 Long: 93.2512
103xl18x104
As the southbound LRV entered the station, a male passenger on the platform jumped in
front of the train In an attempted suicide.
and responsible for conducting investigations for the
MN State Safety Oversight Agency. These investigations
operations and maintenance staff, as well as its own experience. This report is formulated on observations at
the incident scene, interviews with appropriate personnel, review of other agency and internal reports, and

Response:
Investigation:
Reports Reviewed:
Figure 1 shows the layout of the Cedar Riverside (CDRV) LRT Station, and the location
at which the person jumped in front of the train.
Though the front of the LRV did pass over top of the man, he was not injured and was
observed on camera removing himself from under the LRV a few minutes later.
MTPD caught up with the man and he admitted to them that he had intended to
commit suicide by train.
MTPD transported the man to HCMC for psychological evaluation.
The incident was investigated by MTPD along with Rail Operatlons and Rail Safety
$SR #616214
Operator accident report
Responding Senior Supervisors' incident report
Metro
Transit Police Department Incident Report
While reviewing the lRV event recorder, there were no anomalies noted in the time
leading up to the attempted suicide. As the LRV departed Downtown East station and
passed through the 35W Interlocking, the train accelerated to a top speed of 43.1
MPH (maximum authorized speed in this section of track is 45 MPH). The LRV then
began a steady deceleration and used varying degrees of braking, consistent with a
train entering and preparing to stop at a station, When the LRV was traveling at 133
MPH the master controller was placed In the full service brake position and did not
move again, the train came to a complete stop 4.2 seconds later. This time is
consistent with the Knorr braking table that list the stopping time for a LRV traveling
at 13 MPH of 4.33 seconds. The train operator did not apply EB.
Event Recorder Data

Reviewed:
Final Accident Report: 05/27/15 Blue Line - LRV 103 vs. Attempted Suicide @ Cedar Riverside Station
Issued: 06/09/2015
Page 1 of 3
Video Reviewed;
Both station cameras and the LRV onboard video were downloaded. The station
cameras showed that the individual walked onto the station platform approximately
one hour prior to the incident. The individual could be observed sitting in the
southernmost shelter facing MT2 for most of that time. As the southbound train
approached, the individual stood up, crossed the distance from the shelter to the
tracks, and leaped into the tracks directly in front of the train. The LRV stopped very
quickly, but the person was clearly underneath the vehicle. Patrons on the platform
gathered near the front of the train and looked toward the front of the train.
Approximately five minutes after being run over, the man pulled himself out from
under the vehicle and walked away from the scene in a northbound direction. As he
walked away, MTPD arrived and were directed by passengers on the platform as to
who they were looking for. MTPD spoke With the man before taking him into custody.
The LRV forward facing camera showed the view from the train as it entered CDRV
station. The male passenger was visible prior to the time he jumped, but there was
no indication that he intended to jump and he was well back of the yellow tact lie
warning stripe. At the point the male jumped from the platform he was no longer
visible on the LRV camera.
Drug/Alcohol Test
Results:
Other:
This accident did not meet the FTA threshold for post accident testing.
The accident was reported to SSOA within the two hour mandated threshold.
Damage was <$25,000 and there were no injuries. The accidentdoes not meet the
threshold for NTO reporting.
The collision was the result of the male passenger attempting to commit suicide by
jumping in front of the train. The train operator was able to stop his train quickly, but
not before the front of the LRV passed over the passenger.
This is not considered a contributing factor as the male jumped so
close to the train that EB would not have prevented the collision, and there are no
indications thatthe use of only full service brake worsened the outcome of the
collision. The passenger was seen exiting from underneath the train shortly after the
collision and did not appear to be injured. MTPO caught up with the male passenger
on the CDRV platform and placed him into custody.
CONCLUSIONS
Primary Cause:
Other Findings/
Comments:
The individual,3ttempted to commit suicide by being hit by LRV 103.

None
Recommend
Final Accident Report: 05/27/15 Blue Line - LRV 103 vs. Attempted Suicide @ Cedar River:;ide Station
Issued: 06/09/2015
Page 2 of3
'
Blue arrow indicates palh of souttllJot.lld iiwolved I.RV.

Red line. inclleates path of passenger that jumped in front of train.
Collision locaoon indicated by yello'IN "burst".
Orange line indicates path of passenger after the colrlSion until MTPD was able to catch him.
Final Accident Report: 05/27/15 Blue line - LRV 103 vs. Attempted Suicide@ Cedar Riverside Station
Issued: 06/09/2015
Page 3 of 3

INTRODUCTION
Date & Time:
08/13/15 3:54pm
Location (Include
LRV:
Main Track 1 at 461h Street Grade Crossing (Mile Post HIA 5.51)
latitude 44.919 Longitude -93.219
LRV 113 x 120 x 102
Operator:
Brief Description:
A northbound Blue Line train made contact with an eastbound bicyclist. The bicyclist
was transported from the scene for treatment of non-life threatening injuries. The bike
_. ... . ~ ~ -~ ... 'Nas dam31ged an<t there was_m_i_no_r_d_a_m_a~g~e_to_th_e_l_R_V_.- - ~ - - ~ - ~ ~ - - -
and responsible for conducting Investigations for the MN State Safety Oversight Agency. These investigations
rely heavily on the expertise of law enforcement and emergency services personnel (where appropriate}, rail
staff, as well as its own experience. This report is formulated on observations at

operations arid maintenance

Response:
The line section that included the accident site was ballasted track on an
exclusive ROW at grade that ran parallel to Hiawatha Avenue and crossed
46th St. at grade. (figure 1)

The grade crossing was governed by active railroad crossing warning devices
including gates, bells, and flashers; however, the bike path Joined 461h Street
behind some of these devices.
The bike trail was parallel to the tracks and entered 461h Street from a location
behind the crossing arms. The bikt! path was governed by Crossbucks, "Stop''
signs, "Look" signs, and "Danger Moving Trains" signs, (See figures 2-4)
461h Street crossing is equipped with a gate down indicator light that
confirmed lowered gates to the train operator,
Witnesses said that the bicyclist appeared to try to beat the train.
The bike stopped immediately prior to the accident but was not completely
de;,r of the dyn;;1mic envelope of the train.
)------------ . ~T~hlcycliRllved near the crossing. ----- - - - -
Investlgation:
SSR #636144.
Operator's accident report.
Responding Supervisor's accident report.
---~---- - Metro Transit Police Department Incident Re~rt CN15028462. ___ _
I Reports Reviewed:
Final Accident Report: 08/13/15 Blue line - LRV 113 vs Bike@ 46'" St.
Issued: 08/19/2015
Page 1 of 3
Event Recorder Data

Reviewed:
Video Reviewed:
The LRV 113 event recorder was downloaded and reviewed.

The posted train speed limit for northbound trains crossing 46th Street is 35 MPH. The
event recorder data shows that the train was traveling 34.9 MPH when the
emergency brake was applied. The train came to rest 7.0 seconds later. The Knorr
braking table predicts a stopping distance of 7.1 seconds at 35 MPH. The brakes
worked as intended.
Type one LRV event recorders do not record horn and bell usage.
Rail Safety Staff (along with SSOA and Rail Transportation) reviewed the forward
facing camera from LRV 113 at MTPD. We also reviewed platform cameras from the
501h Street and 461h Street stations.
The accident train met a southbound train about half a minute before the accident.
The gates were seen to be active and the gate down indicator was operative. The
bike appeared to turn off of the bike lane (although this was not absolutely conclusive
because the bike was not clearly visible until just before it entered the Right of Way.)
As the train approached 461h Street, a sound could be heard that was consistent with
the track brake being applied. The bicyclist stopped his bike and was visible In the last
two frames prior to the accident with one foot on the ground and wlth the back bike
wheel lifted about a foot in the air. A sound consistent with an impact was audible.
The train came to a stop before clearing the Intersection.
Subsequent to the accident, a camera at 461h Street Station was moved to look at the
aftermath of the accident. The bicyclist could be seen rolling around on the ground.
He was wearing a helmet. In this camera view, the front left headlight was out on LRV
113. The 5011' Street Station platform camera showed that the LRV 113 headlights
were properly functioning immediately prior to the accident
Police interviewed the victim in the ambulance. He had no recollection of the
accident. Police spoke with several witnesses at the scene of the accident. One
witness noted that the bicyclist appeared to be trying to beat the train, while another
confirmed that the crossing bells were active prior to the accident
Drug/Alcohol Test
Results:
Other:
The bicyclist lived near

the crossings so unfamiliarity with the crossing is unlikely to have contributed to the
accident. The bicyclist saw the train approaching and managed to get his bike
stopped prior to being struck. While he did not stop clear of the dynamic envelope of
the train, the severity of the accident was lessened. The accident was caused by the
bicyclist failing to obey passive and adjacent active warning devices, which include a
constant warning _bell whne thega_t_e_s_a_re_l_o_w_e_re_d_.~---~---------'
Final Accident Report: 08/13/15 Blue Line - lRV 113 vs Bike @ 46 1h St.
Issued: 08/19/2015
Page z of 3
CONCLUSIONS
Primary Cause:
Other Findings /
Comments:
The bicyclist failed to obey passive and adjacent active warning devices, which include
a constant warning bell while the gates are lowered.
None
None
Safety Oversight Agency (Minnesota Department of Public Safety)
Polnjoflmp.ct
FIGURE 1
FIGURE2
FIGURE3
Final Accident Report: 08/13/15 Blue Line - LRV 113 vs Bike @ 461h St.
Issued: 08/19/2015
Page 3 of 3
FIGURE4

INTRODUCTION
Date& Time:
09/03/15 9:03 pm
Location (Include
Main Track 1 on University Ave. at Rice
Latitude/longitude}: latitude
44.9557
Longitude -93.1048
LRV:
Operator:
Brief Description:
251 X 258 X 244

A westbound Green Line train made contact with a pedestrian in the crosswalk of Rice
Street. The pedestrian was knocked back but did not fall down. There were no injuries
.___ _ _ _ _ _ _..__:equlring transport.
The Safety Department is responsible
for conducting investigations of rail accidents, according to the LRT System
and responsible for conducting investigations for the MN State Safety Oversight Agency. These investigations
the Incident scene, interviews with appropriate personnel, review of other agency and internal reports, and

Response:
Investigation:
Reports Reviewed:
Figure 1 shows the layout of the intersection of Rice Street and University
Avenue.
The train sustained no damage.
The pedestrian received an ice pack for her elbow at the scene of the
accident. She refused medical transport.
There were no injuries to the occupants of the train.
The pedestrian crossing on the east side of Rice Street is controlled by a
Walk/ Don't Walk (WOW) traffic signal. Train movements are controlled by
bar signals.
SSR #641974
Operator's accident report
Responding Supervisor's accident report
Metro Transit Police Department Incident Report CN 15031479
State Accident Report 15031479
Final Accident Report: 09/03/15 Green Line - LRV 251 vs Ped @ Rice
Issued: 09/16/2015
Page l of 3
Event Recorder Data

Reviewed:
The event recorder for LRV 251 was downloaded and reviewed. The event recorder
established that the lRV was traveling at 7.7 MPH when the train operator applied the
emergency brake. The train came to a stop 2.5 seconds later. The Knorr braking table
indicates that a train traveling at 8 MPH will stop in 1.6 Seconds when emergency
braking ls applied. The train was accelerating out of a stop and the event recorder
documented a mechanical lag, whereby the train accelerated from 7. 7 MPH to 8.9
MPH after emergency brakes were applied. Rall Safety staff spoke with the Director
of Vehicle Maintenance. He stated that the displayed increase in speed was most
likely a result of the momentum of the train and the delay time in reporting, as the
operator moved the master controller from maximum propulsion to emergency
brake. The delay in stopping time did not have an effect on the outc me of the
collision. The event recorder also showed
Video Reviewed:
Rail Safety staff reviewed the platform video which provided an unobstructed view of
the incident. The involved party exited the train from the lead (western most) LRV
and walked off of the platform in a westward direction. She appeared to be talking on
a phone for the entire time she was walking. When she got to the crosswalk, she
turned as if to cross and stopped or nearly stopped in the area of the crosswalk tactile
warning strip. She briefly raised her right arm while appearing to hold a phone
against her ear in her left hand. She never looked back toward the train. The train
began to move and the female made contact with the side of the operating cab. The
cab is slightly tapered near the front and she was bumped back but did not fall. She
did drop an object (presumably her cell phone).
Rail Safety staff also viewed the forward facing camera from LRV 251. This camera
also recorded audio. The involved pedestrian was only momentarily visible in the
camera view, The audio recorded the use of horn as the tral.n was departing along
with a sound consistent with dropping of track brake after the collision. The collision
itself was not visible in this view.
Due to a strong halo effect around the lights on the forward facing camera, the bar
signal could not be identified. The platform camera picked up the green light for
westbound auto traffic on University. Westbound traffic operates In tandem with the
permissive phase for train movements. An eastbound train occupied the crossing
prior to the accident train departing westbound. These events support the belief that
the train was leaving on a permissive bar signal.
The police spoke with the involved pedestrian at the scene of the accident. She
reported that she was trying to flag a bus when she was struck. She declined medical
assistance.
The police spoke with the train operator at the scene of the accident. He indicated
Drug/Alcohol Test
Results:
This event did not meet the threshold for post accident drug testing.
Other:
This event was reported to the National Transit Database as an S&S 40. It did not
meet thresholds for National Response Center reporting. The accident was reported
to SSOA within the mandated two hour threshold.
Final Accident Report: 09/03/15 Green line - LRV 251 vs Ped@ Rice
Issued: 09/i6/201S
Page 2 of 3
The video showed that the pedestrian got off of the westbound train and proceeded
west on the platform and turned onto the crosswalk. The accident was caused by the
pedestrian's failure to obey the WOW signal. The pedestrian got to the crosswalk
rior to the arrival of the train,
The contact was between the pedestrian and the side of the LRV.
CONCLUSIONS
Primary Cause:
Other Findings l
Comments:
Safety Oversight Agency (Minnesota Department of Publlc Safety).
Train
2""Tratn~~~
Path of Pedestrian ........,

Area of Impact
:
,.
Final Accident Report: 09/03/15 Green Line - LRV 251 vs Ped @ Rice
Issued: 09/16/2015
Page 3 of 3
Map Courtesy ofGoogle Map4

INTRODUCTION
Date&Time:
10/17/15 1:23 pm
Location (Include
University Ave Main Track 2 at Hamllne Avenue

Latitude 44.9SS Longitude -93.156
LRV:
Operator:
Brief Description:
254 X 243 X 244

An eastbound train made contact with a pedestrian who was walking on the Right-OfWay between Hamllne Ave and Hamline Station. (See Figure 1)
rely heavily on the expertise of law enforcement and emergency services personnel {where appropriate), rail
operations and maintenance staff, as well as its own experience. This report ls formulated on observations at
the incident scene, interviews with appropriate personnel, review of other agency and internal reports. and

Response:
Investigation:
Reports Reviewed:
The victim indicated that she had been consuming alcohol earlier in the day .
Hamline Station is a split far side station with the eastbound station located
east of Hamline Avenue and the westbound platform located west of
Ham line Avenue. (See figure 1)
The timetable speed train is 45 MPH east of Hamline Ave and 35 MPH on
the grade crossing.
There were no injuries on board the train. The victim received non-life
threatening injuries to her head and left ankle. She was able to talk to the
police in the hospital.
There is no designated walking area immediately adjacent to the tracks
where they cross Hamline Avenue traffic lanes.
SSR 1#653293 & SSR 653279

Operator accident report .
Supervisor's accident report.
Metro Transit Police Department Incident Report #15037712,
State Accident Report .
Final Accident Report: 10/17/15 Green Line - LRV 254 vs Ped @ Ham line
Issued: 10/23/2015
Page 1 of 3
Event Recorder Data
The LRV event recorder from LRV 254 was downloaded and reviewed. The event
recorder established that the train was traveling at 21.7 MPH at the point of
emergency brake application (track speed on the grade crossing was 35 MPH and
45 MPH approaching the grade crossing). The train came to a stop 3.5 seconds
later. This is consistent with the Knorr Braking table, which states that the stopping
time for a train traveling at 22 MPH is 4.4 seconds.
Reviewed:
Video Reviewed:
Rail Safety Staff reviewed the platform camera video from Hamline Station, The
camera faced west toward the approaching train, and showed the victirn and a
group of pedestrians walking along Main Track 2 from the west side of Hamline
Avenue toward the eastbound Hamline station platform. The group of pedestrians
started walking east on Main Track 2, but as the train approached they moved
toward the south side of the tracks. (It should be noted that this is not an intended
walkway and as such all of this group were jaywalking). As the train entered the
grade crossing the group of pedestrians were all clear of the Right-Of-Way. At the
last moment the victim veered back into the path of the train.
The train stopped several feet past the point of impact. Indicating t
train was in emergency braking prior to the impact.
Rail Safety staff along with State Safety Oversight staff viewed the forward facing
camera at MTPD. The forward facing camera included an audio recording. The
train sounded its horn in accordance with policy. A sound consistent with
regenerative braking could be heard as the traln approached Harnline. The forward
facing camera confirmed that the train had a vertical bar signal.
MTPD spoke with the train operator at the scene. The train operator indicated
MTPO spoke with the victim at the hospital. The victim stated thats e
remembered walking along the tracks with her friend and that her knee gave out
She did not remember being hit by the train. She admitted that she had been
drinking earlier in the day and thought that she had passed out.
Drug/Alc:ohol Test
Results:
Other:
The accident was reported to the NTO on an S&S 40.

The video evidence showed that prior to the arrival of the train a group of
Jaywalkers occupied the track. The event recorder indicated that the approaching
train operator slowed to well below the posted speed. When the train neared the
crossing, all of the jaywalkers (including the victim) cleared the right of way and
walked toward the station. At the last moment the victim veered into the path of
the train and was struck.
, which
: reduced the impact with the pedestrian.
The collision was caused by the victim's stepping into the path of the train. The
victims admitted alcohol use likely contributed to the event.
Final Accident Report: 10/17/15 Green Line - LRV 254 vs Ped@ Hamlrne
Issued: 10/23/2015
Page 2 of 3
CONCLUSIONS
Primary Cause:
Other Findings/
Comments:
The victim stepped into the path of the train as it approached.

Alcohol use may have contributed.
None
Map Courtesy of Google Maps

P1>.-l.,.<:hri::1n 111111111111111
Area of Impact ~
FIGURE l
Final Accident Report: 10/17/15 Green Line- LRV 254 vs Ped@ Ham line
Issued: 10/23/2015
Page 3 of 3

INTRODUCTION
Date & Time:
12/4/15 2:00 p.m.
Location (Include
Latitude/Longitude);
Green Line Main Track 1 at Snelling Ave (St. Paul)

Lat: 44.9554 Long: -93,1670
230x238x206
LRV:
i--------0 perator:
Brief Description:
I A westbound Green Line Train struck a jaywalking pedestrian at Snelling Avenue who
' entered the Right of Way against the traffic control semaphore indication. The
pedestrian was transported from the scene with serious Injuries.

Response:
All pedestrian crosswalks for Snelling Avenue at University Ave are

equipped with a walk/don't walk sign (See figure l and 2).
An eastbound train was pulling into the eastbound platform moments
before the accident. (See figure 3).
The
victim was seen on camera running through traffic, in the intersection;
against the traffic control semaphore indication prior to the collision.

The LRV sustained no damage .
The accident was reported to SSOA within the two hour time limit.
The accident was reported to the National Response Center (NRC) .
The accident was investigated by MTl'D along with Rail Operations and Rail Safety.
SSR #664814
MTPD initial accident report
Investigation:
Reports Reviewed:
Event Recorder Data

Reviewed:
LRV 230 Event Recorder
Final Accident Report: 12/04/15 Green Line - LRV 230 vs Pedestrian @ Snelling Ave.
Issued: 12/23/2015
Page 1 of 6
Video Reviewed:
Drug/Alcohol Test
Results:
Other:
LRV 230
Snelling Avenue Station westbound platform
Snelling Avenue Station eastbound platform
City of St. Paul cameras located on opposite corners of Snelling Ave.
The train operator was interviewed by MTPD and Safety staff.
The train o erator received a ost-accident dru test.
This accident was reported to SSOA within the two hour threshold and was
reported to the NTO. Based on information received from MTPD Initially, this
accident was reported to the NTSS (NRC}. It has since been determined that this
accident did not meet the threshold for NRC reporting,
Final Accident Report: 12/04/15 Green Line - LRV 230 vs Pedestrian @.Snelling Ave.
Issued: 12/23/2015
Page 2 of 6
LRV 230's event recorder was downloaded andreviewed by maintenance staff. The
event recorder established that the LRV was traveling at 40.3 MPH when the
operator applied emergency brake (EB). While reviewing the event recorder with
LRV maintenance management it was determined that the train operator had the
master controller near the Full Service Brake position (as the speed limit drops from
40 MPH to 35 MPH at the grade crossing). The event recorder indicated that the
train was operating at 40.3 MPH 6.8 seconds before coming to a complete stop.
Applying this time against the front facing video, the train had not yet entered the
35 MPH zone (in the station video the eastern most painted bar of the crosswalk is
visible in the camera frame) when the train reached the legal speed for the
intersection. The train came to rest 6.3 seconds after the deployment of
emergency brakes. The Knorr braking table predicts that it should take 8.3 seconds
to stop an LRV that is traveling at 40 MPH using emergency brake. The brakes
functioned as expected. The event recorder also showed that the train operator
sounded high horn prior to entering the grade crossing.
passed onto lRT Transportation Management for thek consideration.

The LRV video and station cameras were reviewed by Rail Safety staff at MTPD. The
westbound Snelling Avenue station camera showed in the time le.iding up to the
collision an east bound train was passing through Snelling avenue and entering the
Snelling Ave. LRT station. The adjacent thru traffic lanes on University were also
observed with Green traffic semaphores. Multiple automobiles were observed
driving through the intersection in the time leading up to the collision.
A short time later with the eastbound train still moving through the intersection,
the two males (including the accident male) were observed leaving the CVS
Pharmacy on the northwest corner of Snelllng Ave. The two males began to run
eastbound in the crosswalk on Snelling Ave towards the northeast corner of the
intersection. While they are running through the cross walk the eastbound
walk/don't walk sign is counting down. Approximately, midway through the cross
walk the two males begin to run into University Ave in an attempt to catch the
eastbound train. During this time westbound traffic on University Ave. had a green
light, and automobiles are observed braking to avoid the palr. The westbound turn
lane on University Ave (for vehicles waiting to turn southbound onto Snelling Ave)
was occupied by several vehicles, including a Metro Transit bus, thus potentially
obscuring a clear view of the intersection for the train operator and obstructing the
view of the approaching train for the pedestrian. The two males are observed
holding their hands up to traffic as they were running, as if to motion traffic to stop.
When the pedestrian entered the Rightof-Way (ROW), In front of the approaching
train he was observed pausing momently and then beginning to run qukkly again to
Final Accident Report: 12/04/15 Green line - LRV 230 vs Pedestrian @ Snelling Ave.
Issued: 12/23/2015
Page 3 of 6
beat the train. When he was struck he was thrown ahead of the train in between
main track 1 and 2. After the collision several bystanders were observed leaving
their vehicles to render aid.
The LRV's forward facing camera was not functioning at the time of the accident.
Video of the accident was available from LRV 230's non-operating-cab's mirror
cameras. In the video captured by the cameras, it is confirmed that traffic on
University Ave. had a green traffic light while the LRV had a vertical bar signal. The
male pedestrian is only visible on camera for a couple of seconds prior to collision.
The LRV's on board microphones picked up the train operator sounding the horn as
he approached Snelling Ave. (this is in accordance with the LRT operating rule when
passing automobiles stopped ln the adjacent lane.) Approximately one second
before the collision the emergency brake could be heard applying.
When the train operator was interviewed by Rail Safety staff, he reported
The pedestrian crossed University Avenue againstthe traffic control semaphore

indication. He appeared to be focused on catching the eastbound train. As he
crossed University Ave the victim was observed facing westbound, but may have
not seen the train as he appeared to be focused on stopping vehicular traffic while
walking against the light. One witness told police that the victim was wearing
headphones at the time of collision. After the accident a pair of headphones were
found lying near the victim. The victim was transported to a local hospital where he
remains in critical condition.
CONCLUSIONS
Primary Cause:
The pedestrian disregarded the traffic semaphore Indications and walked into the
path of a westbound train.
Other Findings /
Comments:
An After Action Review of this accident will be held Iii January 2016 to
review any potential enhancements to existing warning devices and slgnage
at this location.
Issued: 12/23/2015
Page 4 of 6
Safety Oversight Agency (Minnesota Department of Public Safety}.
FIGURE 1 COUll'TESY Of GOOGLE MTH ~NORTH CRO$SWAI.J( ACIIOSS $NEWNG AVf.
FIGURE 2 COURTESY OF GOOGl.i! EARTH - EAST CROSSWAUC ACROSS UNMRSIJY AVE TO I.RT PlATI'ORM
Issued: 12/23/2015
Page 5 of6
Green arrow indicates path of westbound involved LRV.

Blue Arrow indicates path of eastbound LRV.
Red arrow indicates path of pedestrian poor to collsion.
Black ~ l e With white outfme depicts approximate location of Metro Transit Bus.
COiiision location indicatedby yellow "bursf'.
Final Accident Report: 12/04/15 Green Line- LRV 230 vs Pedestrian @ Snelling Ave.
Issued: 12/23/2015
Page 6 of 6

INTRODUCTION
12/10/15 11:11 a.m.
Date & Time:
location (Include
Green Line Main Track 2 @ N. Albert Pedestrian Crossing (St. Paul)
latitude/Longitude}: Lat: 44.9557 Long:93.1592
LRV:
--------Operator:
Brief Description:
206x253x218
An eastbound Green Line train strutk a pedestrian that ran across the N, Albert
i pedestrian crossing. At the time of the accident the active warning devices were
I operating, warning of the approaching train.

the incident scene, intervlews with appropriate personnel, review of other agency and internal reports, and

Response:
Investigation:
Reports Reviewed:
Albert Street is a north/south street that is interrupted by University

Avenue and the Green Line tracks. A midblock pedestrian crossing allows
pedestrians to cross the LRT tracks at grade. The crossing also serves as the
entrance/exit for the Hamline Avenue westbound platform. (See figure 1)
The crossing is protected by active warning devices that include a "Blank
out Sign", Flashing lights, Audible warnings, and an illuminated second train
sign.
A westbound train was at Hamline Station at the time of the accident .
The female pedestrian sustained fatal injuries .
The LRV sustained body damage to the anti-climber fairing and front head
light.
A pregnant female passenger on board the train complained of back pain
after the accident and was transported to the hospital for observation.
The accident was investigated by Ramsey County Medical Examiner, MTPD, and Rail
SSR It 666167 & 666153
MTPD Incident report# 15044882
Operator.accident report
Supervisor's accident report .
Final Accident Report 12/10/15 Green Line - LRV 206 vs Pedestrian@ N. Albert Pedestrian Crossing.
Issued: 12/31/2015
Page 1 of 4
Event Recorder Data

Reviewed:
Video Reviewed:
Drug/Alcohol Test
Results:
Other:
LRV 206
Albert St. Crossing VPI
LRV 206
LRV 246
Hamline Avenue Station westbound station
Train Operator
....
~,..,
.... .. .
..
This event was reported to the SSOA, the National Transit Database as an S&S 40,
and the National Response Center. All of the initial reports were on time.
The LRV event recorder from LRV 206 was downloaded and reviewed. The event
recorder established that the train was traveling at 41.7 MPH at the point of
emergency brake application (maximum authorized track speed in this area is 45
MPH), and that the train came to a stop 8.0 seconds later. This is consistent with
the Knorr Braking Table, which states that the stopping time for a train traveling at
41 MPH is 8.5 seconds. The event recorder also documented the use of high horn.
A signal department manager reviewed the event recorder download for the grade
cros.sing appliances at Albert St. Pedestrian crossing and confirmed that they were
functioning as intended prior to and during the accident.
Station configuration:
The mid-block pedestrian crossing at Albert St. seNes two functions;
As a means to access the westbound Hamline station platform, and
As a means to cross the LRTtracks and continue to cross the eastbound

lanes of University Ave.
There is no pedestrian access to Ham line Station on the south side of the tracks,
apart from the sidewal~ on the south side of the eastbound University Ave. general
purpose traffic lanes.
Video from the accident was viewed by Rail Safety staff at MTPD. The collision was
visible on the westbound platform camera of Ham line Ave. Station. Prior to the
accident, a westbound train stopped at Ham line station. At the same tirne, the
accident female was observed exiting a westbound bus on University Ave.,
subsequently crossing Albert St. and then University Ave at the mid-block crossing
(which also serves as a pedestrian access for the Ham line Ave. Station westbound
platform). An eastbound train was approaching the crossing while the pedestrlan
crossed University Avenue. During the time frame leading up to the collision, the
warning lights for the pedestrian crossing were observed flashing, even while the
individual occupied the safe clearance area provided for pedestrians at that
crossing. As the eastbound train neared the pedestrian crossing, the female
suddenly began to run across the tracks in a southbound direction where she was
struck by the train.
The forward facing LRV video from the accident train showed that as the train
i approached the grade crossing the accident female was seen running in front of the
Final Accident Report 12/10/15 Green line -LRV 206 vs Pedestrian @ N. Albert Pedestrian Crossing.
Issued: 12/31/2015
Page 2 of 4
LRV. At no time could she be observed turning her head in the direction of the
train. Prior to the collision, the on board microphones picked up the sound of the
high horn being sounded and the emergency brakes being applied.
The train operator was interviewed by MTPD and Rail Safety following the incident.
During the interview with Rall Safety Staff, the operator was asked to recall the
The pedestrian entered the crossing against the warning lights and audible bell
which were functioning prior to the collision. The female was wearing a burka and
It ls unknown If this contributed to her not seeing the approaching train. It is also
unknown why the female opted to suddenly run into the crossing; though there was
another pedestrian on the other side of the crossing, it did not appear they were
looking for each other.
CONCLUSIONS
Primary Cause:
Other Findings /
Comments:
The pedestrian did not respond to active pedestrian warning devices at the
crosswalk and ran into path of the approaching eastbound train.
None
None
Final Accident Report 12/10/15 Green line - LRV 206 vs Pedestrian @ N. Albert Pedestrian Crossing.
Issued: 12/31/2015
Page 3 of 4
Figure 1 Graphics courtesy of Google Earth.

Green arrow indicates path ofeastbound involved LRV.
Blue Arrow indicates path of westbound LRV stopped at station.
Black rectangle with white outline depicts approximate location of Metro Transit bus.
Red arrow indicates path of pedestrian prior to collision.
Orange dashed arrow indicates path of the pedestrian when running.
Collision location indicated by yellow bur$t".
Final Accident Report 12/10/15 Green Line -LRV 206 vs Pedestrian@ N:Albert Pedestrian Crossing.
Issued: 12/31/2015
Page 4 of 4

INTRODUCTION
Date & Time:
Location (Include
LRV:
Operator:
Brief Description:
6:37 a.m. 12/11/lS
I Blue Line Main Track 2 @ 461h St

I Latitude: 44.9197 Longitude; -93.2199
123x112xll4
j A southbound Blue Line train crossing 461h St. struck a bicyclist that turned and
Irode in front of the train on the Southside of the grade crossing. The bicyclist
1 was
transported to the hospital but has since died
The Safety Department is respon$ible for conducting investigations of rail accidents, according to the LRT System

Response:
The line section that included the accident site is ballasted track on an
exclusive ROW at grade that runs parallel to Hiawatha Avenue and crossed
46th St. at grade. (figure 1)
The grade crossing is governed by active railroad crossing warning devices
including gates, bells, and flashers, as well as numerous passive devices
(signs).
461h Street crossing is equipped with a gate down Indicator light that
confirmed lowered gates to the train operator.
A witness riding with the victim stated that he saw the gates were down
and a southbound train was approaching.
The
bicyclist sustained fatal injuries .
There were no injuries reported on the train .

The accident was investigated by Hennepin County Medical Exarriiner, MTPD, Rail
SSR #666332 & 666325 .
Train operators' accident report.
Responding supervisors' incident report .
MTPD Incident Report .
Investigation:
Reports Reviewed:
---
Final Accident Report: 12/11/15 Blue Line - LRV 123 vs bike @ 46th Street
Issued: 12/31/2015
Page 1 of 4
Event Recorder Data

Reviewed:
Video Reviewed:
Drug/Alcohol Test
Results:
Other:
LRV 123
Highway Crossing Analyzer (HCA)
Forwar_d facing camera LRV 123
Train operator
The train operator received a post-accident drug test.
This event was reported to the SSOA, the National Transit Database as an s&s 40,
and the National Response Center. All of the initial reports were made within
reporting deadlines.
The event recorder for LRV 123 was downloaded and reviewed. The event recorder
established that the LRV departed 46 1" St. Station and accelerated to 31.0 MPH
(maximum authorized track speed through the area is 35 MPH.),.before applying
emergency brake (EB). The tn,in came to a stop 7.0 seconds later; The Knorr
braking table stopping time for a traintraveling at 31 MPH is 6.22 seconds. The
difference in stopping time was reviewed with an LRV vehicle maintenance
manager. The manager explained that weather, track conditions, and event
recorder lag could all play a part in causing a longer stopping time. The
maintenance manager stated that while it is unknown why the train stopped 0.8
seconds longer, all indication are that the braking system functioned as intended,
The 45th St. grade crossing Highway Crossing Analyzer (HCA) was download by
Metro Transit Signals employees. A Signals department manager reviewed the
report and stated that the grade crossing was properly functioning at the time of
the accident.
Rail Safety staff viewed the LRV's Forward facing video at MTPD. The video showed
as the accident train was pulling lnto 461h St. station, two bicyclists could be seen
riding southbound on the bike trail along Hiawatha Avenue. Once the train's
station work was complete and a permissive tail signal was observed, the train
departed southbound towards 461h St. grade crossing. As the train neared the
grade crossing, the bicyclist could be seen crossing 46 111 St. eastbound traffic lanes
on the outside of the gate arms (riding parallel to the gate arms). When the two
bicyclists arrived at the westbound lanes of 45th St. the second individual was
observed stopping in the middle of the street. The accident bicyclist was seen
turning and riding westbound at an angle to the tracks; in the direction of the bike
path that is on the southwest corner of 46th St. grade crossing. As the individual
approached the right-ofway, the deployment of the emergency brakes could be
heard. The bicyclist was not visible on camera after being struck by the train.
The train operator was interviewed by MTPD and Rail Safety staff.
During the interview with rail safety staff the train operator was asked to recount
th~ events leading up to the collision.
Final Accident Report: 12/11/15 Blue Line - LRV 123 vs bike @ 46n' Street
Issued; 12/31/2015
Page 2 of 4
Forward facing cameras, witness statements, and observation of the scene

immediately following the accident established that the gate arms were down and
working properly at the time of the accident. The accident bicyclist's riding partner
told police that when they arrived at the LRT tracks, the gate arms were down with
lights flashing. The victim's riding partner when speaking about the gate arms
stated to police "I figured he saw what I saw" (referencing the down gate arms).
The partner told MTPD that he stopped at the gate arm but his friend "veered
right." After he was struck by the train the bicyclist's body came to rest under the
LRV in the ballasted track. The train operator was instructed to lower the
pantograph to isolate any electric shock hazard. A Minneapolis fire fighter was able
to climb under the LRV and extract the injured party. The bicyclist was transported
to the hospital where he was pronounced dead by medical staff.
CONCLUSIONS
Primary Cause:
Other Findings /
The bicydist failed to obey both active and passive warning devices, which include a
constant warning bell, flashing lights, and lowered gates that remained active
during the entire train movement.
None
None
Comments:
Safety Oversight Agency (Minne$ota Department of Public Safety).
Final Accident Report: 12/11/15 Blue Line - LRV 123 vs bike @ 461h Street
Issued: 12/31/2015
Page 3 of 4
Blue krow indieales pall of souihbound flWlved LRV.

Red a.n,w ~ padh of bicyclist prior to cclision.
Cdlision k>cation ~led by' yellow "burst".
Final Accident Report: 12/11/15 Slue line - LRV 123 vs bike @ 46 1h Street
Issued: 12/31/2015
Page 4 of 4

INTRODUCTION
Date & Time:
12/14/15 9:32 a.rn.
location (Include
46th Street Station South Pedestrian crosswalk
latitude/longitude : latitude: 44.9212 Longltude: -93.2202
Brief Description:
A northbound Blue Line train, that was entering 45th Street Station, struck a
pedestrian; who walked westbound across the south pedestrian crosswalk at

45th Street Station (See Figure 1).
for conducting investigations of rail accidents, according to the LRT System
The Safety Department is responsible
rely heavily on the expertise of law enforcement and emergency seivices personnel (where appropriate), rail
follow-up analysis. The involved agencies, personnel, and applicable reports
are summarized below.

Response:
Investigation:
The weather was cold, wihdy, and raining .

The pedestrian had a hooded jacket, with the hood up.
The pedestrian was transported to the hospital for non-life threatening injuries.
There were no injuries on the train .
A witness told police that the pedestrian was Wearing headphones .
Medical staff at the hospital told police that the pedestrian's phone was playing
music at a high volume, and that they suspected that he had been wearing
headphones.
There was no damage to the train .
The 45t11 Street Station south pedestrian crosswalk is equipped with "Walk/
Pon't Walk" signals, an audible warning bell, and a dynamic Second Train sign
that carries a static "Look" message when it is not lit for second trains.
The responding supervisor observed that all warning devices were working
properly.
After the accident, the train came to rest before the first set of doors cleared
the crosswalk.
Final Accident Report: 12/14/15 Blue Line - LRV 231 vs Ped @ 45th Street Station
Issued: 12/31/15
Page l of 3
Reports Reviewed:
Event Recorder Data

Reviewed:
The event recorder was downloaded by LRV maintenance staff, and reviewed by rail
SSR # 666990.
Train Operator accident report.
Supervisor Report
Metro Transit Police Department Incident Report #1504S458.
safety staff.
Grade crossing warning device event recorder data was downloaded and
interpreted by knowledgeable signals department staff
Video Reviewed:
Rail Safety staff along with the State Safety Oversight Program manager viewed the
video from LRV 231.
Drug/Alcohol Test
Results:
Other:
This event was reported to the SSOA and the National Transit Database as an S&S
40. All of the initial reports were on time,
The forward facing camera showed that the pedestrian walked slowly toward and
then across the tracks. He had his hood up and never turned his head toward the
train. In addition to the video, audio was recorded from inside the train. The horn
was audible as was a sound consistent with emer enc .brake a lication rlor to
the impact. The video evidence
an initial
warning (uslng the horn), followed by the application of the emergency brakes, only
0.2 seconds elapsed between these events.
The final point of rest for the train with the front doors not yet dear of the area of
impact established that brakes were applied wen before the impact. The
pedestrian never turned toward the train. The accident was caused by the failure
of the pedestrian to obey the "Walk/ Don't Walk" signal, heed the audible warning
devices, or to look prior to crossing.
Final Accident Report: 12/14/15 Blue line - LRV 231 vs Ped @ 46111 Street Station
Issued: 12/31/15
Page 2 of 3
The LRV event recorder from LRV 231 was downloaded and reviewed by LRV
Maintenance staff. The event recorder established that the train was traveling at
32.6 MPH when emergency braking was applied. The train came to a stop 5.4
seconds later. This is consistent with the Knorr Braking table, which states thatthe
stopping time for a train traveling at 33 MPH is 7.4 seconds. The brakes worked as
intended. The LRVevent recorder documented a long blast of the horn beginning
0.2 seconds prior to the application of emergency braking.
CONCLUSIONS
Primary Cause:
Other Findings/
Comments:
The pedestrian failed to obey active and passive warning devices and stepped into
the path of the train.
None
None
Train
Path of Pedestrian
Area of Impact I
..
FIGIJREl
Final Accident Report: 12/14/15 Blue Line - LRV 231 vs Ped @ 46th Street Station
Issued: 12/31/15
Page 3 of 3

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Metro Transit LRT Accident Reports

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METRO TRANSIT SAFETY DEPARTMENT

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

DISCUSSION OF EVENTS AND ANALYSES

RAIL ACCIDENT FINAL REPORT

Other Vehicle: N/A

Final Investigation Finding~

lnvesti ation Follow*u And Action Taken

Final Report Information

Date Report Prepared:

Report Prepared by: John MacQueen, Rail Safety Officer

METRO TRANSIT SAFETY DEPARTMENT

Safety Department Accident Report

Hiawatha Line Operating Characteristics

Safety Department Accident Report

Safety Department Accident Report

a roximatelv even with the center medians , the operator noted

Safety Department Accident Report

Analysis of the facts

The accident occurred at 4:56 pm on Monday, August 7, 2006, when a southbound

Safety Department Accident Report

train operators have believed they had pushed the master

METRO TRANSIT SAFETY DEPARTMKNT

Safety Department Accident Report

Metro Transit staff responded to the accident scene representing transportation,

DISCUSSION OF EVENTS AND ANALYSES

Safety Department Accident Report

Safety Department Accident Report

Safety Department Accident Report

drug and alcohol test of the train operato

There is no evidence that any

Minnesota Rail Oversight Program Accident/Incident Checklist

Caller Name; John MacQueen. Rail Safety Officer

Type of Incident (collision, derailment, bomb threat, assault, Etc.): "Collision"

METRO TRANSIT SAFETY DEPARTMENT

Safety Department Accident Report

DISCUSSION OF EVENTS AND ANALYSES

Safety Department Accident Report

from the LRV I06 B cab at the point of the accident,

The accident occurred at 2:42 pm on Wednesday. November 21, 2007. when a

Safety Department Accident Report

LRV Collision with Pedestrian at 4611> St on November 21, 2007

Safety Department Accident Report

However, the train

LRT Accident Investigation Report

LIU Accident Investigation Report

DISCUSSION OF EVENTS AND ANALYSES

LRT Accident Investigation Report

LRT Accidenl Investigation Report

Post accident drug and alcohol tests of the train operator

Minnesota Rail Oversight Program Accident/Incident Checklist

J. MacQueen. Rail Safety Officer

Time and Date of notification: 6/25/08 8:00am

RAIL ACCIDENT FINAL REPORT

Other Vehicle: None

Facts Surroundin the Collision

Trespasser was transporte for

Final Accident Report

Investi ation Follow-u and Actions Taken

camera supports the operator's statement.

Final Accident Report

LRV 123 vs. Ped Accident of Sept. 6. 2009

Conclusion: The accident resulted from a trespasser occupying the track

Final Report Information

Final Accident Report