Take On MeThatcher and Terrorism

You will not have any effect on us! We shall carry on! 1
Thatcher describes terrorism as: the calculated use of violence-and the threat
of it-to achieve political ends. 2 The IRA had battled against the British Government
for many years. War had been declared on the British by the IRA in 1969, after the
British Government had sent in the army. This had been to help the RUC regain
control after civil rights marches had erupted into days of violence. The occupation of
Northern Ireland by the British Army encouraged the IRA to increase its violent
attacks and helped galvanise Republican support against the British. Thatcher
inherited an extremely difficult situation as she entered government. Northern Ireland
was being directly ruled from Westminster; the economics of Britain in recession
meant Northern Ireland was being heavily subsidised by British tax payers; and
violent attacks by both the IRA and Loyalist paramilitaries meant the British Army
was not going to be withdrawn from Northern Ireland. Up to this point 1,852 people
had been killed in the troubles with 20,078 being injured. 3 Although the violence had
begun to decrease towards the end of the 1970s, it could be considered that the IRA
saw an opportunity in May 1979. The new British prime minister may be bombed into
surrendering to a withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland. Thatcher on the
1 Interview with Dianne Sawyer, CBS News, 12 February 1985; cited in Iain
Dale,(ed), Margaret Thatcher In Her Own Words, (London: Biteback Publishing,
2010), p.188.
2 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, (London: HarperCollins
Publishers, 1993), p.383.
3 Tom Wilson, Ulster: Conflict and Consent, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1989),
p.300-5.

other had could not be perceived by Northern Ireland or the rest of the world as a
weak Prime Minister and leader. She had shown resilience in combating the hunger
strikers in 1980-81 and needed to continue this hard-line approach. Thatcher needed
to change British tactics against terrorism to gain support for security policies; the
IRA needed to get Thatchers attention to show they were a serious force to be
reckoned with. This chapter will discuss: how events shaped Thatchers attitude to
security in Northern Ireland; how Republic of Ireland were not as cooperative as she
would have liked; and how the banning of broadcasting by organisations such as
Sinn Fin was perceived by the media. These issues could be considered as
contributing to Thatchers perceived hard-line on terrorism and Northern Ireland.
The Conservative Party General Election Manifesto of 1979 stated; Northern
Irelands, future still depends on the defeat of terrorism and the restoration of law
and orderThere will be no amnesty for convicted terrorists. 4 However, it could be
considered the manifesto did not match Thatchers own perception of how she
wanted to deal with the problems in Northern Ireland. Douglas Hurd, Northern
Ireland Secretary 1984-85, described her as having, no great enthusiasm for the
subject5

It could also be considered, she [gave] every indication of

wishing,...that the problem would just go away. 6

This indifference could be

considered as indecisiveness towards security in Northern Ireland, but this is not

4 Conservative General Election Manifesto 1979, Conservative Party, (April 11,

1979), http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/110858 [accessed
12/3/2012].
5 Douglas Hurd, Memoirs, (London: Abacus, 2004), p.335.
6 Frank Gaffikin and Mike Morrissey, Northern Ireland: The Thatcher Years,
(London: Zed Books Ltd, 1990), p.36.

indicated in the speeches and public perception she tried to portray in dealing with
Terrorism.
Arguably, Thatchers first direct contact with terrorism was a bomb that killed
her friend and master mind behind the Conservative re-election campaign in 1979,
Airey Neave, on 30 March 1979. He was widely tipped to become the new Secretary
of State for Northern Ireland and would have had a hard-line approach. This may
have been why he had been targeted by the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA).
Speaking on the day of the attack, looking visibly shaken Thatcher said, and now
we must carry on for the things he fought for and not let the people who got him
triumph.7 After her election as prime minister in May 1979, the next major terrorist
incident was 27 August 1979. Lord Mountbatten and some members of his family
were killed by an IRA bomb in Co. Sligo, in the Republic of Ireland. On the same day
eighteen soldiers were killed at Warrenpoint, Co. Down close to the border with the
Irish Republic, when the IRA detonated two bombs on their convoy. In a meeting
three days after the attacks, on 30 August, the cabinet meeting concluded that the
highest level of Irish government needed to collaborate more effectively with the
British in combating terrorism. More importantly: We must ask them to say publically
that they are doing this.8 These incidents led Thatcher to the conclusion that two
issues needed to be addressed; how could the security operations be more
effective? and how could relations and cooperation over security be improved with
the Republic of Ireland?9

It could be considered these incidents encouraged

7 Margaret Thatcher speaking to the press immediately after the assassination

of Airey Neave, 30 March 1979, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IAgMR_gC9IY
[accessed 10/4/2012].
8 Northern Ireland: Security, Cabinet Papers, 30 August 1979, CAB/129/207/4.

Thatchers hard-line approach to security measures, not only in Northern Ireland, but
to expect more attacks in England.
On 5 September, just over a week after the incidents in Northern Ireland and
the Irish Republic, Thatcher met with the Republic of Ireland taoiseach Jack Lynch at
Downing Street. The meeting had been arranged before the attacks, but the
conference was now increasingly important at this time, as further cooperation was
needed between the two countries to supress any further assaults. Thatcher began
the meeting by stating her proposals for further collaboration between the two
countries. These included: the ability for RUC to question suspects in the Republic;
British helicopters to be allowed to patrol fifteen kilometres inside the Republic
border; Garda liaison officer to be in RUC headquarters; training by the British given
to the Irish on how to combat terrorism; and extradition of suspected terrorists from
the Republic would be the top proposal. 10

Lynch replied to each proposal and

emphasised cooperation between the two countries had not been as successful
as [he] might have hoped. He stated an agreement to extradite prisoners from the
Republic would, be against the Irish Constitution. Allowing helicopters to fly over
the Republic without prior notice would, give rise to difficulties. and members of
the RUC in Garda stations would mean they would be exposed to physical
danger. When the meeting concluded Lynch asked for specific details of the meeting
not to be discussed in the press, but to emphasise: both Governments were
anxious to stamp out terrorism 11

It could be suggested this meeting meant

Thatcher could begin to put pressure on the Irish government into action, but that
9 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p.57.
10 Note of a plenary meeting between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach, Mr J.
Lynch, T.D., at No. 10 Downing Street on Wednesday 5 September 1979 at 1600,
PREM/19/79.

she was met with opposition from the Irish in her security policies towards the
Republic. She was unsuccessful in negotiating a hard-line security policy and more
cooperation with the Republic of Ireland at this time.
Thatchers resolution to increase security and defeat the terrorists in Northern
Ireland continued. In a speech on 5 March 1981 in Belfast, she stated: The
Government's first priority is to protect the people of Northern Ireland from the bullet
and the bomb. The terroristsare the enemies of us all. 12 By December of 1981,
Jim Prior who was now the new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland reported in a
cabinet meeting that operations against IRA were going well and a number of arms
had been ceased in both Northern Ireland and in the Irish Republic. This had
resulted in the capability of IRA being, considerably diminished as a
consequence.13 At this point it could be considered Thatcher was winning the war
on terror, although one hundred and one people had been killed and one hundred
and ninety had been injured in the troubles between 1979 and 1981. 14
On the 12 October 1984 Thatcher became directly involved in a terrorist
attack. It could be considered this was a catalyst in her escalating her policy toward
terrorism. The Conservative Party conference had begun on 7 October in Brighton
and had included speeches by all of the current cabinet members. Thatcher was up
11 Note of a plenary meeting between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach, Mr J.
Lynch, T.D., at No. 10 Downing Street on Wednesday 5 September 1979 at 1600,
PREM/19/79.
12 Margaret Thatcher, Speech in Belfast, March 5 1981,
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104589 [accessed 5/4/2012].
13 Conclusions of a meeting of the cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on
Thursday 3 December 1981 at 10:15am, CAB/128/71/19, p.6.
14 Wilson, Ulster: Conflict and Consent, pp.305-6.

late working on a speech for that day, when at 2:54am a bomb detonated at the
Grand Hotel in Brighton where she was staying. The bomb killed five people and
seriously injured several others including Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
Norman Tebbit and his wife was permanently disabled by the blast. Speaking from a
Brighton police station only hours after the explosion, Thatcher stated: The
conference will go on as usual.15 The next morning the conference began at 9:30am
as usual. Thatcher knowing she must appear hard-line against the assault opened
by stating;
The bomb attack on the Grand Hotel early this morning was first and foremost
an inhuman, undiscriminating attempt to massacre innocent men and
womenIt was an attempt not only to disrupt and terminate our Conference;
It

was

an

attempt

to

cripple

Her

Majestys

democratically-elected

Government.16
But it is arguably the next part of the speech that could be considered as defining her
policy on terrorism in Northern Ireland at this time, the fact that we are gathered
here now-shocked, but composed and determined-is a sign not only that this attack
has failed, but that all attempts to destroy democracy by terrorism will fail. 17
Thatcher was determined to appear as if everything was normal in an attempt to
show the terrorists she would not be bombed into submission. In a statement by the
IRA after the bomb, Today we were unlucky, but remember, we have only to be lucky

15 Dale, (ed)., In her Own Words, p.171.

16 Dale, In her Own Words, p.172.
17 Dale, In her Own Words, p.172

once.18 In an interview three days after the bombing, Thatcher was asked about
bringing back the death penalty considering what had happened in Brighton, she
stated; I believe that people who go out prepared to take the lives of other people
forfeit their own right to live.19 It could be considered these statements after the
bombing, helped to reinforce the public perception of Thatchers hard-line she was
taking on terrorists from Northern Ireland.
Although the Brighton bomb had the perceived effect on, the political
system [as having] absorbed the shock with great equanimity.20

Economic and

Political Weekly warned disproportionate security measures after the bomb may lead
to separation by MPs from the public. 21 Fortnight, the Northern Irish press, argued
the bomb did not only miss the target, but stimulated an opportunity for the
Conservatives to play the victim and gain support for their cause against the IRA. 22
Socialist Action commented how the Conservatives were killers themselves in the
way they had fought the Falklands War and that the bomb would now make the
Conservatives look like the casualty.23 Alternatively, much emphasis was placed on
the effects of IRA terrorism and the Conservative survival aspects of the bomb, but
18 Jonathan Bardon, A History of Ulster, (Belfast: The Blackstaff Press Limited,
1992), p.754.
19 TV Interview for Channel 4 A plus 4, Margaret Thatcher, Channel 4, October
15 1984, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/105764 [accessed
13/4/2012].
20 Terrorism and Reprisal: Beirut and Brighton, Economic and Political Weekly,
Vol. 19, No. 45 (Nov. 10, 1984), p. 1906.
21 Terrorism and Reprisal: Beirut and Brighton, Economic and Political Weekly,
p. 1906.
22 Kevin Toolis , The British Left after Brighton, Fortnight, No. 209 (Nov., 1984),
p. 10.

the prospects of those outside the situation that were injured during the attack was
not considered.24

It could be suggested the public saw Thatchers stance on

terrorism as one that would mean she would see terrorism defeated. On the other
hand, the bomb may have meant sympathy for the Republican cause was
diminished and compassion was now directed at the Conservative Party and
Thatcher.
By August of 1988, four hundred and forty six people had been killed in the
troubles since 1981. This brought the total of people killed during her premiership so
far to six hundred and thirty six. 25 After each atrocity security policy was reviewed
and tightened up if the British Government felt it necessary. Surprisingly, the amount
of British Army troops in Northern Ireland did not reflect the increase in security, as
numbers of troops fell during Thatchers premiership. In 1979 13,600 British army
personnel were in Northern Ireland, this fell to 9,700 in 1985, but increased to 11,200
by 1989.26 These numbers were bolstered by an average of 2,471 full time and
3,796 part time soldiers from the UDR. 27 These figures suggest although Thatchers
concern was security in Northern Ireland, this was not proportionate to the number of
23 Toolis , The British Left after Brighton, Fortnight, p.10.
24 Suzanne Breen, Who Are The Real Terrorists?, Fortnight, No. 400 (Nov.,
2001), p. 7.
25 Wilson, Ulster: Conflict and Consent, pp.305-8.
26 British Army personnel (number) in Northern Ireland, 1969 to 2004, Security
and Defence, CAIN Web Service, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/security.htm#03
[accessed 8/4/2012].
27 British Army personnel (number) in Northern Ireland, 1969 to 2004, Security
and Defence, CAIN Web Service, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/security.htm#03
[accessed 8/4/2012].

troops she sent. Hurd comments that Thatchers main anxieties were the security of
the troops and the cost of security in Northern Ireland on the British Taxpayer, 28
which was around 400 million per year.29 This may have been a contributory factor
to the number of troops Thatcher committed to Northern Ireland.
Now in her third term as Prime minister, Thatcher wanted to boost antiterrorist measures. One action which was seen as controversial was the banning of
broadcasting statements from terrorist, or political parties affiliated with terrorist
groups. This included Sinn Fin president Gerry Adams having his voice dubbed by
an actor in interviews. This was a form of censorship, by which Thatcher inflicted her
blinkered perceptions on society and the media. 30 Later Thatcher would reflect that
given the circumstances the policy had been both correct and successful. 31 Hurd
who had been promoted to Home Secretary, announced this policy in the House of
Commons 19 October 1988. In the debate that ensued Paddy Ashdown, Liberal
Democrat leader and MP for Yeovil, commented how this was a measure that would
give the IRA a propaganda coup. 32

Tony Benn, Labour MP for Chesterfield,

28 Hurd, Memoirs, p.335

29 Gillian Peele, The Changed Character of British Foreign and Security Policy,
International Security, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Spring, 1980), pp. 185-198, p.194.
30 Kevin McNamara, Drunk with Power and Arrogance, Fortnight, No. 263 (Jun.,
1988), pp. 6-7, p.6.
31 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 412.
32 Broadcasting and Terrorism, House of Commons Debate, 19 October 1988,
Col. 895,
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1988/oct/19/broadcasting-andterrorism [accessed 12/4/2012].

commented how this meant the Sinn Fin representatives such as Gerry Adams 33
were denied the freedom of speech. This was in direct contradiction to the right of
the elected person for the constituency to speak for the people. 34 The argument that
freedom of speech was affected by this policy and the impartiality of journalists was
being called into question was one the media felt was important.
The policy was not popular or received well in the media. This was not the first
time the Government had requested a ban by the media. The BBC documentary At
the Edge of the Union, had been withdrawn from broadcast in 1984. 35 The new
legislation in 1988 was to bully the media, into the servile reporting of its views. 36
Sinn Fin commented that the ban was imposed due to their success in gaining forty
per cent of the Nationalist vote in the electoral process. 37 Gerry Adams speaking in
2010 described the banning as 'absurd', but also suggested the banning was a hardline approach in public perceptions but this was not the full story;
Even when Thatcher was saying the most..er...definitive or even taking
actions like that action, she was authorising contact behind the scenes with
33 Gerry Adams was president of Sinn Fin and had been elected MP for West
Belfast since 1983, but had not taken his seat in the House of Commons due to
not wishing to swear allegiance to the Queen.
34 House of Commons Debate, Broadcasting and Terrorism, 19 October 1988,
Col. 899,
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1988/oct/19/broadcasting-andterrorism [accessed 12/4/2012].
35 See Michael Jacobs, BBC, Censorship and Northern Ireland, Economic and
Political Weekly, Vol. 20, No. 41 (Oct. 12, 1985), pp. 1732-1733.
36 McNamara, Drunk with Power and Arrogance, Fortnight, p.7.
37 Read Their Lips: Analysing the Ban, Fortnight, No. 293, (Mar., 1991), pp. 6-7,
p.7.

republicans. So just..just bare this in mind that...that...er her her administration

at different points was in contact with us or in contact with people who were in
contact with us.38
Although Thatchers public perception was one of under no circumstances would she
be negotiating with terrorists, she had in fact authorised talks between the British
Government and Sinn Fein. The talks were open, but arguably had no real impact on
reduction of terrorist threat. The media ban served to make Thatcher an authoritarian
figure in control of the media, yet Adams comment show her policy on security did
include some negotiations with Sinn Fin which were not publicly known about.
Thatchers tactic in dealing with terrorists was, in public, one of stern rhetoric.
Having been directly affected by losing Airey Neave in 1979 and the Brighton Bomb
in 1984, Thatchers public persona was one of hard-line towards the terrorists. When
Thatcher met with Lynch to discuss further cooperation between Britain and the
Republic of Ireland, she was met with opposition and assistance was not
immediately forthcoming. Her perception in the media had been affected by the
restrictions she had placed on reporting statements from organisations such as the
IRA and Sinn Fin. The Hard-line approach to terrorism was seen by the public as
her being proactive in the fight against terrorism. Arguably, the policy did not restrain
terrorist groups and their ability to attack targets in Northern Ireland and in England.
To defeat terrorism effectively, a greater cooperation between the Republic of Ireland
and Britain needed to be introduced and maintained.

38 Gerry Adams on Margaret Thatcher Banning His Voice On Television, The

Hudson Union Society, 25 March 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=cCKSiG4UqnE&feature=related [accessed 5/4/2012].