Case Digests

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Submitted by: Michelle A. Vale Cruz

Submitted to: Atty. Anthony Peralta

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Cruz v. Centron 442 SCRA 53 (2004)

FACTS:
1. Atty. Centron assisted a certain Gloria Logdat and Conchita de la Cruz in
consummating the sale of a parcel of land (OCT No. 2186) in the name of one
Joaquina Jabat. Such assistance consisted in preparing and notarizing the documents
of sale.
2. The said sale is illegal because the property covered by the sale is still the subject of
reconstitution and Extra-Judicial Settlement among the heirs. As a result of the illegal
sale, Logdat and de la Cruz are charged with estafa through falsification of public
documents. Atty. Centron took advantage of her being a lawyer to solicit the trust and
confidence of the buyers of the subject parcel of land.
3. Atty. Centron is involved in the disappearance of OCT No. 2186, and she refuses to
surrender the title which is in the possession of one of her relatives.
4. Hence this case of disbarment was filed by Logdat and De la Cruz against Atty.
Centron
5. In her Comment, Atty. Centron denied any involvement in the preparation of the
documents and in the consummation of the sale of the parcel of land covered by OCT
No. 2186. She claims that her only participation in the said sale is that she was the one
who notarized the deed of sale on because she was requested by the parties to notarize
the same.
6. The Office of the Court Administrator held that Atty. Centron violated the provisions
of Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code as well as Section G, Chapter VIII
of the Manual for Clerks of Court when she notarized a deed of conveyance, a
document which is not connected with the exercise of her official functions and duties
as Ex-Officio Notary Public. Accordingly, she be fined in the amount of P2,000.00
and sternly warned.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Centron should be held liable.
RULING: Yes. In the present case, we find that complainant failed to present clear and
preponderant evidence to show that respondent had direct and instrumental participation in
the preparation of documents and the subsequent sale of the subject parcel of land covered by
OCT No. 2186. Aside from the deed of sale covering the subject parcel of land which was
notarized by respondent, no competent evidence was shown that would directly link her to
the said sale.
While it may be logical to assume that Atty. Centron was the one who prepared the deed of
sale since she was the one who notarized it, we cannot give evidentiary weight to such a
supposition in the absence of any evidence to support it. Moreover, complainants allegation
that Atty. Centron influenced the buyers is contradicted by the sworn affidavit of Adelfa
Manes, one of the buyers of the land. Manes attested to the fact that respondent did not
convince nor influence them in buying the subject property. Likewise, we find no competent
evidence to prove that Atty. Centron is responsible for the alleged loss of the owners
duplicate copy of OCT No. 2186.
Nonetheless, we find that respondent is guilty of violating Section 41 (as amended by Section
2 of R. A. No. 6733) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code, in relation to
Sections G, M and N Chapter VIII of the Manual for Clerks of Court.

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Under these provisions, Clerks of Court are notaries public ex officio, and may thus notarize
documents or administer oaths but only when the matter is related to the exercise of their
official functions. In the present case, it is not within Atty. Centron competence, as it is not
part of her official function and duty, to notarize the subject deed of sale. Respondent is
guilty of abuse of authority.
In the present case, it appearing that this is respondents first offense of this nature and that
she has only notarized one document, we find the OCAs recommended penalty of a fine of
P2,000.00 commensurate to the offense committed.

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Tigno v. Spouses Aquino 444 SCRA 61 (2004)

FACTS:
1. Spouses Aquino filed a complaint against Isidro Bustria which sought to enforce an
alleged sale by Bustria to the Aquinos of a 120,000 square meter fishpond located in
Dasci, Pangasinan. The conveyance was covered by a Deed of Sale dated 2
September 1978.
2. A compromise agreement was entered into between them whereby Bustria agreed to
recognize the validity of the sale, and the Aquinos agreed to grant Bustria the right to
repurchase the same property after the lapse of seven 7 years.
3. Bustria died and was substituted by his daughter, Zenaida B. Tigno. On 1 December
1989, Tigno attempted to repurchase the property by filing a Motion for Consignation
and depositing 230,000 with the RTC, but this was opposed by the Aquinos arguing
that the right to repurchase was not yet demandable and that Tigno had failed to make
a tender of payment.
4. RTC denied the Motion for Consignation.
5. Tigno filed an action for Revival of Judgment. The Aquinos filed an answer wherein
they alleged that Bustria had sold his right to repurchase the property to them in a
deed of sale.
6. Among the witnesses presented by the Aquinos during trial were Jesus De Francia,
the instrumental witness to the deed of sale, and former Judge Cario, who notarized
the same. These two witnesses testified as to the occasion of the execution and
signing of the deed of sale by Bustria. Thereafter, in their Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence, the Aquinos offered for admission the deed of sale
purportedly executed by Bustria
7. The admission of the Deed of Sale was objected to by Tigno on the ground that it was
a false and fraudulent document which had not been acknowledged by Bustria as his
own; and that its existence was suspicious, considering that it had been previously
unknown, and not even presented by the Aquinos when they opposed Tigno's
previous Motion for Consignation.
8. RTC refused to admit the Deed of Sale in evidence. RTC then ruled in favor of Tigno.
The RTC therein expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the Deed of Sale,
characterizing the testimonies of De Francia and Cario as conflicting. The RTC
likewise observed that nowhere in the alleged deed of sale was there any statement
that it was acknowledged by Bustria; that it was suspicious that Bustria was not
assisted or represented by his counsel in connection with the preparation and
execution of the deed of sale or that Aquino had raised the matter of the deed of sale
in his previous Opposition to the Motion for Consignation.
9. CA reversed the decision of RTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Aquino. The appellate
court ratiocinated that there were no material or substantial inconsistencies between
the testimonies of Cario and De Francia that would taint the document with doubtful
authenticity; that the absence of the acknowledgment and substitution instead of a
jurat did not render the instrument invalid; and that the non-assistance or
representation of Bustria by counsel did not render the document null and ineffective.
It was noted that a notarized document carried in its favor the presumption of
regularity with respect to its due execution, and that there must be clear, convincing
and more than merely preponderant evidence to contradict the same.
ISSUE: W/N the deed of sale was notarized properly, hence admissible as evidence

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RULING: No. SC ruled in favor of Tigno. RTC decision is reinstated.

RATIO: The notarial certification of the Deed of Sale reads as follows:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN ) S.S.
MUNICIPALITY OF ALAMINOS )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 17th day of October 1985 at Alaminos, Pangasinan both
parties known to me to be the same parties who executed the foregoing instrument.
FRANKLIN CARIO
Ex-Officio Notary Public
Judge, M.T.C.
Alaminos, Pangasinan

There are palpable errors in this certification. Most glaringly, the document is certified by
way of a jurat instead of an acknowledgment. A jurat is a distinct creature from an
acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going
before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed; while a jurat is
that part of an affidavit where the officer certifies that the same was sworn before him.
But there is an even more substantial defect in the notarization, one which is determinative of
this petition. This pertains to the authority of Judge Franklin Cario to notarize the Deed of
Sale.
It is undisputed that Franklin Cario at the time of the notarization of the Deed of Sale, was a
sitting judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Alaminos. Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the functions of
notaries public ex officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise
known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code.
However, as far back as 1980 in Borre v. Moya, the Court explicitly declared that municipal
court judges such as Cario may notarize only documents connected with the exercise of their
official duties. The Deed of Sale was not connected with any official duties of Judge Cario,
and there was no reason for him to notarize it.
Most crucially for this case, we should deem the Deed of Sale as not having been notarized at
all. The validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives from the authority of the
notarial officer. If the notary public does not have the capacity to notarize a document, but
does so anyway, then the document should be treated as unnotarized.
What then is the effect on the Deed of Sale if it was not notarized? True enough, from a civil
law perspective, the absence of notarization of the Deed of Sale would not necessarily
invalidate the transaction evidenced therein. Article 1358 of the Civil Code requires that the
form of a contract that transmits or extinguishes real rights over immovable property should
be in a public document, yet it is also an accepted rule that the failure to observe the proper
form does not render the transaction invalid. Thus, it has been uniformly held that the form
required in Article 1358 is not essential to the validity or enforceability of the transaction, but
required merely for convenience.

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The Deed of Sale, invalidly notarized as it was, does not fall under the enumeration of public
documents; hence, it must be considered a private document. The nullity of the alleged or
attempted notarization performed by Judge Cario is sufficient to exclude the document in
question from the class of public documents. Even assuming that the Deed of Sale was
validly notarized, it would still be classified as a private document, since it was not properly
acknowledged, but merely subscribed and sworn to by way of jurat.
Being a private document, the Deed of Sale is now subject to the requirement that before any
private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved.
The Deed of Sale was offered in evidence by Aquinos, hence, the burden falls upon the
Aquinos to prove its authenticity and due execution. However, the SC observed that no
receipts were ever presented by the respondents to evidence actual payment of consideration
by them to Bustria, despite the allegation of the respondents that the amount was covered by
seven receipts. Also of note is the fact that there are glaring differences as to the alleged
signature of Bustria on the Deed of Sale and as it otherwise appears on the judicial record.

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Fuentes v. Buno 560 SCRA 22 (2008)

FACTS:
1. Geronimo Fuentes filed a complaint wherein he alleged that he is one of the nine
heirs of Bernardo Fuentes, their father, who owned an agricultural land located at San
Jose, Talibon, Bohol.
2. He also alleged that respondent judge prepared and notarized an "Extra-Judicial
Partition with Simultaneous Absolute Deed of Sale" of the said agricultural land,
executed by complainants mother Eulalia Credo Vda. de Fuentes, widow of Bernardo
Fuentes, and Alejandro Fuentes, on his own behalf and on behalf of his brothers and
sisters, including Geronimo Fuentes, as heirs/vendors and one Ma. Indira A. Auxtero,
as vendee.
3. In the aforesaid document, the aforementioned agricultural land was sold, transferred
and conveyed by the heirs/vendors to the vendee despite the fact that in his Special
Power of Attorney (SPA), he merely appointed his brother, Alejandro Fuentes to
mortgage said agricultural land but not to partition, much more to sell the same.
4. According to complainant Geronimo Fuentes respondent judge notarized said
document as ex-officio Notary Public, thereby abusing his discretion and authority as
well as committing graft and corruption.
5. In defense, respondent judge contended that he could not be charged of graft and
corruption, since in a municipality where a notary public is unavailable, a municipal
judge is allowed to notarize documents or deeds as ex-officio notary public.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge has authority to notarize the documents
RULING: No. While Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended, and Section 242 of
the Revised Administrative Code authorize MTC and MCTC judges to perform the functions
of notaries public ex officio, the Court laid down the scope of said authority.
SC Circular No. 1-90 prohibits judges from undertaking the preparation and acknowledgment
of private documents, contracts and other deeds of conveyances which have no direct relation
to the discharge of their official functions. In this case, respondent judge admitted that he
prepared both the document itself, entitled "Extra-judicial Partition with Simultaneous
Absolute Deed of Sale" and the acknowledgment of the said document, which had no relation
at all to the performance of his function as a judge. These acts of respondent judge are clearly
proscribed by the aforesaid Circular.
While it may be true that no notary public was available or residing within respondent
judges territorial jurisdiction, as shown by the certifications issued by the RTC Clerk of
Court and the Municipal Mayor of Talibon, Bohol, SC Circular No. 1-90 specifically requires
that a certification attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in the said municipality
or circuit be made in the notarized document. Here, no such certification was made in the
Extra-Judicial Partition with Simultaneous Deed of Sale. Respondent judge also failed to
indicate in his answer as to whether or not any notarial fee was charged for that transaction,
and if so, whether the same was turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of Talibon, Bohol.
Clearly, then, respondent judge, who was the sitting judge of the MCTC, Talibon-Getafe,
Bohol, failed to comply with the aforesaid conditions prescribed by SC Circular No. 1-90,
even if he could have acted as notary public ex-officio in the absence of any lawyer or notary
public in the municipality or circuit to which he was assigned.

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Vda. De Rosales v. Ramos 383 SCRA 498 (2002)

FACTS:
1. Manuel A. Bernardo, brother of complainant Rosalinda Bernardo Vda. de Rosales,
borrowed from Rosalinda the PCT of a lot in her name. The lot measures 112 square
meters and is located at the back of Manuel's house on Fabie Street, Paco, Metro
Manila.
2. Rosalinda sold this lot to one Alfredo P. Castro. When she asked her brother Manuel
to return her title he refused. Rosalinda then executed an Affidavit of Loss of her title
and presented the affidavit to the Register of Deeds of Manila.
3. Rosalinda was informed by the Register of Deeds that her title to the property was
already transferred to Manuel by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale she purportedly
executed in favor of Manuel. The document was notarized by respondent Atty. Mario
G. Ramos and entered in his Notarial Register. Rosalinda however denied having
signed any deed of sale over her property in favor of Manuel.
4. Atty. Ramos admitted in his Answer that he had affixed his signature on the purported
Deed of Absolute Sale but failed to enter the document in his Notarial Registry Book.
He also admitted executing before the NBI on an affidavit regarding the matter.
5. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the complaint since according to him he only
inadvertently signed the purported Deed of Absolute Sale and/or that his signature
was procured through mistake, fraud, undue influence or excusable negligence,
claiming that he simply relied on the assurances of Manuel that the document would
not be used for illegal purposes. The respondent further claims to have notarized the
document out of sympathy for his kababayan is not a legitimate excuse. It is appalling
that respondent did away with the basics of notarial procedure in order to
accommodate the alleged need of a friend and client.
ISSUE: Should the notarized documents be recorded in the notarial registry in order to be
considered as public document?
RULING: Yes. If it is not recorded in the notarial registry then the document is not
considered notarized.
The notary public is further enjoined to record in his notarial registry the necessary
information regarding the document or instrument notarized and retain a copy of the
document presented to him for acknowledgment and certification especially when it is a
contract. The notarial registry is a record of the notary public's official acts. Acknowledged
documents and instruments recorded in it are considered public documents. If the document
or instrument does not appear in the notarial records and there is no copy of it therein, doubt
is engendered that the document or instrument was not really notarized, so that it is not a
public document and cannot bolster any claim made based on this document. Considering
the evidentiary value given to notarized documents, the failure of the notary public to
record the document in his notarial registry is tantamount to falsely making it appear that the
document was notarized when in fact it was not.

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De La Cruz vs. Zabala 442 SCRA 407 (2004)

FACTS:
1. Complainant Atty. Miniano B. Dela Cruz charged respondent, Atty. Alejandro P.
Zabala, for violating his oath as a notary public. Complainant further alleged that
respondent notarized with unknown witnesses, a fake deed of sale allegedly executed
by two dead people, in gross violation of his oath as a Commissioned Notary Public in
Quezon City.
2. Complainant averred that he was retained by a certain Demetrio C. Marero to finance
and undertake the filing of a Petition for the Issuance of a Second Duplicate Original
of the Owners copy OCT in the names of Sps. Pedro Sumulong and Cirila Tapales.
However, complainant was not able to register the property because the property was
already registered in the name of Antipolo Properties, Inc.,
3. Mr. Marero filed a Complaint for Reconveyance of Title of the land, subject of the
Deed of Sale which was notarized by respondent, with damages against the
complainant and his wife. The Deed of Sale was the same document Marero used
when he filed a complaint for Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document and in a
disbarment case against complainant.
4. Purportedly, to clear his name, complainant filed this complaint for disbarment
against respondent. According to complainant, respondent notarized an irregular
document where one of the parties to the transaction was already dead, grossly
violating his oath as a notary public.
5. Respondent, in his Answer alleged that as a notary, he did not have to go beyond the
documents presented to him for notarization. In notarial law, he explains, the
minimum requirements to notarize a document are the presence of the parties and
their presentation of their community tax certificate. As long as these requirements
are met, the documents may be notarized. Furthermore, he adds, when he notarized
the Deed of Sale, he had no way of knowing whether the persons who appeared
before him were the real owners of the land or were merely poseurs.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Zabala was violated the Notarial Law?
RULING: Yes. It appears that there was negligence on respondents part which, in our view,
is quite serious. Thus, we cannot conclude that he did not violate the Notarial Law, and our
rules regarding Notarial Practice. Nor could we agree that, as recommended by the IBP, he
should only be reprimanded. At least his commission as Notary Public should be revoked and
for two years he should be disqualified from being commissioned as such.
The IBP noted that on its face, the Deed of Sale was not executed by the purported vendee
and that only Pedro Sumulong appeared and executed the deed even though the property was
co-owned by Pedro Sumulong and Cirila Tapales. In addition, a copy of the title was not
attached to the said Deed of Sale when it was presented for notarization. The aforementioned
circumstances should have alerted respondent. Given the ease with which community tax
certificates are obtained these days, respondent should have been more vigilant in
ascertaining the identity of the persons who appeared before him.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It is invested with substantive public
interest. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document, making that document admissible in evidence without
further proof of authenticity thereof. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and
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credit upon its face. For this reason, a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the confidence of the public in the
integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined

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Lee vs Tambago 544 SCRA 393 (2008)

FACTS:
1. Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B. Tambago, with
violation of Notarial Law and the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a wil.
2. The will was alleged to be spurious in nature in containing forged signatures of his
father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and two other witnesses, which were also
questioned for the absence of notation of the Residence Certificates that are known to
be a copy of their respective voter's affidavit.
3. In addition to such, the contested will was executed and acknowledged before
respondent on June 30, 1965 but bears a Residence Certificate by the Testator dated
January 5, 1962, which was never submitted for filing to the Archives Division of the
Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture
and Arts (NCAA).
4. Respondent refuted that all allegations were falsely given because he allegedly
exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due regards to the
provision of existing law and had complied with elementary formalities in the
performance of his duties and that the complaint was filed simply to harass him based
on the result of a criminal case against him filed by complainant in the Ombudsman
that did not prosper.
5. However, he did not deny the contention of non-filing a copy to the Archives Division
of NCAA.
6. In a resolution, the court referred the case to the IBP and the decision of which found
respondent guilty of violations of pertinent provisions of the old Notarial Law as
found in the Administrative Code. The violation constituted an infringement of legal
ethics, particularly Canon 1 and Rule 1.01of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).
7. Thus, the investigating commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
recommended the suspension of respondent for a period of three months.
8. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with modifications, the
recommendation of the CBD and ruled that Atty. Tambago is suspended from the
practice of law for one year and his notarial commission is Revoked and Disqualified
from reappointment as Notary Public for two years.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Tambago acted negligently in exercising his duties as Notary
Public.
RULING: No. Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the
elementary duties of his office. The Court finds that he acted very irresponsibly in notarizing
the will in question. Such recklessness warrants the less severe punishment of suspension
from the practice of law. It is, as well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his commission
and his perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.
The Civil Code requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses. The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it
was segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and embodied in a distinct and
separate provision.
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some
competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step
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undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or
her own free act and deed. The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1)
to safeguard the testators wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is
administered in the manner that he intends it to be done.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this
particular requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was
the conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses
Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testators old
residence certificate in the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These
omissions by respondent invalidated the will.
Notaries public must observe with utmost care and utmost fidelity the basic requirements in
the performance of their duties, otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of
notarized deeds will be undermined.
Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will invalid.
This carelessness cannot be taken lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of a
will, considering that the testator and the witnesses, as in this case, are no longer alive to
identify the instrument and to confirm its contents. Accordingly, respondent must be held
accountable for his acts. The validity of the will was seriously compromised as a
consequence of his breach of duty.
These gross violations of the law also made respondent liable for violation of his oath as a
lawyer and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01of the CPR.

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Dela Cruz v. Dimaano 565 SCRA 1 (2008)

FACTS:
1. In their complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Dimaano, complainants
alleged that on July 16, 2004, respondent notarized a document denominated as
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate with Waiver of Rights purportedly executed by
them and their sister, Zenaida V.L. Navarro.
2. According to complainants, respondent had made untruthful statements in the
acknowledgment portion of the notarized document when he made it appear, among
other things, that complainants "personally came and appeared before him" and that
they affixed their signatures on the document in his presence.
3. In the process, complainants added, respondent effectively enabled their sister,
Navarro, to assume full ownership of their deceased parents' property in and sell the
same to the Department of Public Works and Highways.
4. The respondent however argued that "he notarized the document in good faith relying
on the representation and assurance of Zenaida Navarro that the signatures and the
community tax certificates appearing in the document were true and correct." Navarro
would not, according to respondent, lie to him having known, and being neighbors of,
each other for 30 years.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent should be penalized for committing violations of his duties
as a notary public.
2. What is the effect of a Notarized Document as a Public Instrument
RULING:
1. Yes, lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity
the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed
with public interest.
2. It must be remembered that notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for
notarization converts a private document to a public instrument, making it admissible
in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due
execution. A notarized document is by law entitled to full credit upon its face and it is
for this reason that notaries public must observe the basic requirements in notarizing
documents. Otherwise, the confidence of the public on notarized documents will be
eroded.

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Heirs of Amparo del Rosario vs. Santos 565 SCRA 1 (2008)

FACTS:
1. Amparo del Rosario filed a complaint against the spouses Andres F. Santos and
Aurora O. Santos, for specific performance and damages allegedly for failure of the
latter to execute the Deed of Confirmation of Sale of an undivided 20,000 square
meters of land, in Tanay, Rizal, in malicious breach of a Deed of Sale
2. Amparo died and was substituted by the heirs named in her will. Andres also died and
was substituted by his heir
3. The Deed of Sale is drafted as: Andres Santos, xxx for and in consideration of 2,000,
do hereby sells, conveys, and transfers unto Amparo del Rosario, xxx that certain 20k
sq. m.
4. The parties agree that the vendor shall execute a Deed of Confirmation of Deed of
Sale in favour of the vendee as soon as the title has been released and the subdivision
plan of said lot 1 has been approved by the Land Registration Commissioner
5. Plaintiff claimed fulfillment of conditions for the execution of the Deed of
Confirmation of Sale
6. Defendants do not contest the words and figures in said deed except in the
acknowledgment portion thereof where certain words were allegedly cancelled and
changed without their knowledge and consent and where, apparently, they appeared
before Notary Public Florencio Landrito when, in fact, they claimed that they did not.
ISSUE: Whether or not the existence of an alleged false notarization of the deed of sale is
material
RULING: No. As correctly pointed out by the court a quo, the alleged false notarization of
the deed of sale is of no consequence. For a sale of real property or of an interest therein to be
enforceable under the Statute of Frauds, it is enough that it be in writing. It need not be
notarized. But the vendee may avail of the right under Article 1357 of the New Civil Code to
compel the vendor to observe the form required by law in order that the instrument may be
registered in the Registry of Deeds. Hence, the due execution and genuineness of the deed of
sale are not really in issue in this case. Accordingly, assigned error I is without merit.
While it is true, as appellants argue, that Article 1306 of the New Civil Code provides that
"the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient, provided that they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy" and that consequently, appellants and appellee could freely
enter into an agreement imposing as conditions thereof the following: that appellee secure the
written conformity of Erlinda Cortez and that she render an accounting of all collections from
her, said conditions may not be proved as they are not embodied in the deed of sale.
The only conditions imposed for the execution of the Deed of Confirmation of Sale by
appellants in favor of appellee are the release of the title and the approval of the subdivision
plan. Thus, appellants may not now introduce other conditions allegedly agreed upon by them
because when they reduced their agreement to writing, it is presumed that "they have made
the writing the only repository and memorial of truth, and whatever is not found in the
writing must be understood to have been waived and abandoned."
By the terms of the Deed of Sale itself, which We find genuine and not infirmed, appellants
declared themselves to be owners of one-half (1/2) interest thereof. But in order to avoid
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appellee's claim, they now contend that Plan Psu-206650 where said Lot I appears is in the
exclusive name of Teofilo Custodio as the sole and exclusive owner thereof and that the deed
of assignment of one-half (1/2) interest thereof executed by said Teofilo Custodio in their
favor is strictly personal between them. Notwithstanding the lack of any title to the said lot by
appellants at the time of the execution of the deed of sale in favor of appellee, the said sale
may be valid as there can be a sale of an expected thing, in accordance with Art. 1461, New
Civil Code

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Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. Velarde 439 SCRA 1 (2004)

FACTS:
1. In a complaint for sum of money filed before the RTC, petitioner Permanent Savings
and Loan Bank sought to recover from respondent Mariano Velarde, the sum of
P1,000,000.00 plus accrued interests and penalties, based on a loan obtained by
respondent from petitioner bank as evidence by promissory notes. Petitioner bank sent
a letter of demand to respondent on July 27, 1988, demanding full payment of the
loan. Despite receipt of said demand letter, respondent failed to settle his account.
2. Velarde contends that he caused the preparation of the complaint and that all the
allegations thereat are true and correct; that the promissory note sued upon, assuming
that it exists and bears the genuine signature of herein defendant, the same does not
bind him and that it did not truly express the real intention of the parties as stated in
the defenses
3. The Bank claims, that there is no need to prove the loan and its supporting papers as
Velarde has already admitted these. Velarde had in fact denied these in his responsive
pleading.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant has really executed the Promissory Note considering
the doubt as to the genuineness of the signature and as well as the non-receipt of the said
amount
RULING: No. The mere presentation of supposed documents regarding the loan, but absent
the testimony of a competent witness to the transaction and the documentary evidence,
coupled with the denial of liability by the defendant does not suffice to meet the requisite
preponderance of evidence in civil cases.
The documents, standing alone, unsupported by independent evidence of their existence, have
no legal basis to stand on. They are not competent evidence. Such failure leaves this Court
without ample basis to sustain the plaintiffs cause of action and other reliefs prayed for. The
loan document being challenged. Plaintiff did not exert additional effort to strengthen its case
by the required preponderance of evidence. On this score, the suit must be dismissed.
The bank should have presented at least a single witness qualified to testify on the existence
and execution of the documents it relied upon to prove the disputed loan obligations of
Velarde. This falls short of the requirement that (B)efore any private writing may be received
in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw
the writing executed; (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or
(c) By a subscribing witness. (Rule 132, Sec. 21, Rules of Court)

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Tigno vs. Spouses Aquino G.R. No. 129416 Nov. 25, 2004
FACTS:
1. Spouses Aquino filed a complaint against Isidro Bustria which sought to enforce an
alleged sale by Bustria to the Aquinos of a 120,000 square meter fishpond located in
Dasci, Pangasinan. The conveyance was covered by a Deed of Sale dated 2
September 1978.
2. A compromise agreement was entered into between them whereby Bustria agreed to
recognize the validity of the sale, and the Aquinos agreed to grant Bustria the right to
repurchase the same property after the lapse of seven 7 years.
3. Bustria died and was substituted by his daughter, Zenaida B. Tigno. On 1 December
1989, Tigno attempted to repurchase the property by filing a Motion for Consignation
and depositing 230,000 with the RTC, but this was opposed by the Aquinos arguing
that the right to repurchase was not yet demandable and that Tigno had failed to make
a tender of payment.
4. RTC denied the Motion for Consignation.
5. Tigno filed an action for Revival of Judgment. The Aquinos filed an answer wherein
they alleged that Bustria had sold his right to repurchase the property to them in a
deed of sale.
6. Among the witnesses presented by the Aquinos during trial were Jesus De Francia,
the instrumental witness to the deed of sale, and former Judge Cario, who notarized
the same. These two witnesses testified as to the occasion of the execution and
signing of the deed of sale by Bustria. Thereafter, in their Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence, the Aquinos offered for admission the deed of sale
purportedly executed by Bustria
7. The admission of the Deed of Sale was objected to by Tigno on the ground that it was
a false and fraudulent document which had not been acknowledged by Bustria as his
own; and that its existence was suspicious, considering that it had been previously
unknown, and not even presented by the Aquinos when they opposed Tigno's
previous Motion for Consignation.
8. RTC refused to admit the Deed of Sale in evidence. RTC then ruled in favor of Tigno.
The RTC therein expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the Deed of Sale,
characterizing the testimonies of De Francia and Cario as conflicting. The RTC
likewise observed that nowhere in the alleged deed of sale was there any statement
that it was acknowledged by Bustria; that it was suspicious that Bustria was not
assisted or represented by his counsel in connection with the preparation and
execution of the deed of sale or that Aquino had raised the matter of the deed of sale
in his previous Opposition to the Motion for Consignation.
9. CA reversed the decision of RTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Aquino. The appellate
court ratiocinated that there were no material or substantial inconsistencies between
the testimonies of Cario and De Francia that would taint the document with doubtful
authenticity; that the absence of the acknowledgment and substitution instead of a
jurat did not render the instrument invalid; and that the non-assistance or
representation of Bustria by counsel did not render the document null and ineffective.
It was noted that a notarized document carried in its favor the presumption of
regularity with respect to its due execution, and that there must be clear, convincing
and more than merely preponderant evidence to contradict the same.
ISSUE: W/N the deed of sale was notarized properly, hence admissible as evidence

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RULING: No. SC ruled in favor of Tigno. RTC decision is reinstated.

RATIO: The notarial certification of the Deed of Sale reads as follows:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN ) S.S.
MUNICIPALITY OF ALAMINOS )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 17th day of October 1985 at Alaminos, Pangasinan both
parties known to me to be the same parties who executed the foregoing instrument.
FRANKLIN CARIO
Ex-Officio Notary Public
Judge, M.T.C.
Alaminos, Pangasinan

There are palpable errors in this certification. Most glaringly, the document is certified by
way of a jurat instead of an acknowledgment. A jurat is a distinct creature from an
acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going
before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed; while a jurat is
that part of an affidavit where the officer certifies that the same was sworn before him.
But there is an even more substantial defect in the notarization, one which is determinative of
this petition. This pertains to the authority of Judge Franklin Cario to notarize the Deed of
Sale.
It is undisputed that Franklin Cario at the time of the notarization of the Deed of Sale, was a
sitting judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Alaminos. Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the functions of
notaries public ex officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise
known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code.
However, as far back as 1980 in Borre v. Moya, the Court explicitly declared that municipal
court judges such as Cario may notarize only documents connected with the exercise of their
official duties. The Deed of Sale was not connected with any official duties of Judge Cario,
and there was no reason for him to notarize it.
Most crucially for this case, we should deem the Deed of Sale as not having been notarized at
all. The validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives from the authority of the
notarial officer. If the notary public does not have the capacity to notarize a document, but
does so anyway, then the document should be treated as unnotarized.
What then is the effect on the Deed of Sale if it was not notarized? True enough, from a civil
law perspective, the absence of notarization of the Deed of Sale would not necessarily
invalidate the transaction evidenced therein. Article 1358 of the Civil Code requires that the
form of a contract that transmits or extinguishes real rights over immovable property should
be in a public document, yet it is also an accepted rule that the failure to observe the proper
form does not render the transaction invalid. Thus, it has been uniformly held that the form
required in Article 1358 is not essential to the validity or enforceability of the transaction, but
required merely for convenience.

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The Deed of Sale, invalidly notarized as it was, does not fall under the enumeration of public
documents; hence, it must be considered a private document. The nullity of the alleged or
attempted notarization performed by Judge Cario is sufficient to exclude the document in
question from the class of public documents. Even assuming that the Deed of Sale was
validly notarized, it would still be classified as a private document, since it was not properly
acknowledged, but merely subscribed and sworn to by way of jurat.
Being a private document, the Deed of Sale is now subject to the requirement that before any
private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved.
The Deed of Sale was offered in evidence by Aquinos, hence, the burden falls upon the
Aquinos to prove its authenticity and due execution. However, the SC observed that no
receipts were ever presented by the respondents to evidence actual payment of consideration
by them to Bustria, despite the allegation of the respondents that the amount was covered by
seven receipts. Also of note is the fact that there are glaring differences as to the alleged
signature of Bustria on the Deed of Sale and as it otherwise appears on the judicial record.

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Chong v CA GR 148280 (2007)

FACTS:
1. Loreta Agustin Chong filed a Complaint for annulment of contracts and recovery of
possession against respondent-spouses Pedro and Rosita de Guzman, and Fortune
Development Corporation before the RTC Manila.
2. Petitioner alleged that she is the common-law wife of Augusto Chong and that she
bought a parcel of land from respondent corporation as evidenced by Contract to Sell
3. By virtue of a SPA she executed in favor of Augusto, the latter sold the subject lot to
respondent-spouses allegedly for P80,884.95 which petitioner or Augusto never
received, thus, said sale is null and void for lack of consideration
4. Despite repeated demands, respondent-spouses refused to turn over the possession of
the subject lot to petitioner.
5. Loreta denied selling the house constructed on the subject lot to respondent-spouses
claiming that she could not have executed the Deed of Sale because at the time it was
allegedly notarized on February 24, 1987, she was working in Hong Kong as a
domestic helper. Thus, said sale is void for being a forgery.
6. Petitioner prayed that the Transfer of Rights and Assumption of Obligation as well as
the Deed of Sale be declared null and void; that respondent-spouses be ordered to turn
over the possession of the houses and lots in Paraaque and Singalong to petitioner;
and that respondents indemnify her for actual, moral and exemplary damages as well
as attorneys fees. MTD (ground: failure to state a COA) TC denied!
ISSUE: Whether the Transfer of Rights and Assumption of Obligation was void or, in the
alternative, unenforceable as against petitioner.
RULING: No. The parties voluntarily executed the Transfer of Rights and Assumption of
Obligation and that the same was supported by valuable consideration.
The clear and unmistakable tenor of the Special Power of Attorney reveals that petitioner
specifically authorized Augusto to sell the subject lot and to settle her obligations to third
persons. The Special Power of Attorney is a duly notarized document and, as such, is entitled,
by law, to full faith and credit upon its face. Notarization vests upon the document the
presumption of regularity unless it is impugned by strong, complete and conclusive proof.
Rather than challenging its validity, petitioner admitted in open court that she signed the
Special Power of Attorney with a full appreciation of its contents and without reservation.
The evidence on record sufficiently established that petitioners rights over the subject lot
were validly transferred to respondent-spouses in consideration of the latters payment of
petitioners debts to Rosario. When Augusto executed the Transfer of Rights and Assumption
of Obligations on behalf of petitioner, he was acting within his powers under the Special
Power of Attorney for valuable consideration. In a contract of agency, the agent acts in
representation or in behalf of another with the consent of the latter, and the principal is bound
by the acts of his agent for as long as the latter acts within the scope of his authority. Hence,
the Transfer of Rights and Assumption of Obligations is valid and binding between the
parties.
It was established that petitioner received valuable consideration for the sale of the house on
the subject lot. Concededly, the notarization of the deed was defective as respondent Pedro de
Guzman himself admitted that the deed was notarized only two days after petitioner had
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signed the deed and at which time she was already in Hong Kong. In short, petitioner did not
appear before the notary public in violation of the Notarial Law which requires that the party
acknowledging must appear before the notary public or any other person authorized to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents. Nevertheless, the defective notarization of
the deed does not affect the validity of the sale of the house. Although Article 1358 of the
Civil Code states that the sale of real property must appear in a public instrument, the
formalities required by this article is not essential for the validity of the contract but is simply
for its greater efficacy or convenience, or to bind third persons, and is merely a coercive
means granted to the contracting parties to enable them to reciprocally compel the observance
of the prescribed form. Consequently, the private conveyance of the house is valid between
the parties.
Based on the foregoing, the SC was satisfied that the sale of the subject lot and the house
built thereon was made for valuable consideration and with the consent of petitioner.
Consequently, we affirm the findings of the lower courts which upheld the validity of the
transfer of petitioners rights over the subject lot as well as the sale of the house built thereon
in favor of respondent-spouses.

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The President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. BTL Construction
Corporation G.R. No. 176439, February 26, 2007
FACTS:
1. COJCOLDS and BTL entered into a Construction Contract for the latters
construction of the formers meeting house facility. However, due to bad weather
conditions, power failures, and revisions in the construction, the completion date of
the Medina Project was extended.
2. BTL informed COJCOLDS that it suffered financial losses from another project and
thereby requested that it be allowed to: (a) bill COJCOLDS based on 95% and 100%
completion of the Medina Project; and (b) execute deeds of assignment in favor of its
suppliers so that they may collect any eventual payments directly from COJCOLDS.
COJCOLDS granted said request which BTL, in turn, acknowledged.
3. BTL ceased its operations in the Medina Project because of its lack of funds to
advance the cost of labor necessary to complete the said project, as well as the
supervening increase in the prices of materials and other items for construction.
Consequently, COJCOLDS terminated its Contract with BTL on August 17, 2001
and, thereafter, engaged the services of another contractor, Vigor Construction
(Vigor), to complete the Medina Project.
4. BTL filed a complaint against COJCOLDS for damages
ISSUE: What are their liabilities to each other?
HELD:
I. Liabilities of COJCOLDS to BTL.
a. The 10% Retention Money and the Unpaid Balance of the Contract Price: Because
the 10% retention money should not be treated as a separate and distinct liability of
COJCOLDS to BTL as it merely forms part of the contract price. While COJCOLDS
is bound to eventually return to BTL the amount of P1,248,179.87 as retention
money, the said amount should be automatically deducted from BTLs outstanding
billings. Ultimately, COJCOLDSs total liability to BTL should only be pegged at
P1,612,017.74, representing the unpaid balance of 98% of the contract price, inclusive
of the 10% retention money.
II. Liabilities of BTL to COJCOLDS.
a. Liquidated Damages Due to Delay: BTLs liability to COJCOLDS for liquidated
damages is a result of its delay in the performance of its obligations under the
Contract.
b. Cost Overrun: BTL should therefore reimburse COJCOLDS the said cost which the
latter incurred essentially because of BTLs failure to complete the project as agreed
upon.
c. Overpayments: Therefore obliged to return the same to COJCOLDS pursuant to
Article 2154 of the Civil Code which states that "[i]f something is received when
there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the
obligation to return it arises."
III. Mutual Liabilities: Attorneys Fees- NONE , because neither party was shown to have
acted in bad faith in pursuing their respective claims against each other. The existence of bad
faith is negated by the fact that the CIAC, the CA, and the Court have all found the parties
original claims to be partially meritorious.
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Quilala v. Alcantara 371 SCRA 311 (2001)

FACTS:
1. On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a Donation of Real Property Inter
Vivos" in favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila,
containing an area of 94 square meters, and registered in her name under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 17214 of the Register of Deeds for Manila.
2. The deed of donation was registered with the Register of Deeds and, in due course,
TCT No. 17214 was cancelled and TCT No. 143015 was issued in the name of
Violeta Quilala. On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala
likewise died on May 22, 1984.
3. Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala.
4. The trial court found that the deed of donation, although signed by both Catalina and
Violeta, was acknowledged before a notary public only by the donor, Catalina.
ISSUE: Whether or not the signing on the wrong side of the page of the document invalidates
it?
RULING: No. The lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does
not also render the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It
cannot be considered a private document in part and a public document in another part. The
fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its
entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the notary public
in the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance that should be
acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second page,
which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on
the first page of the notarized deed of donation, was made in a public instrument.

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Abellana v. Spouses Ponce 437 SCRA 531 (2004)

FACTS:
1. Felomina, the aunt of private respondent Lucila Ponce, purchased from the late Estela
Caldoza-Pacres an agricultural lot with the intention of giving said lot to her niece,
Lucila. Thus, in the deed of sale, the latter was designated as the buyer of the lot
covered by an OCT located at Los Angeles, Butuan City. The total consideration of
the sale was P16,500.00, but only P4,500.00 was stated in the deed upon the request
of the seller.
2. Subsequently, Felomina applied for the issuance of title in the name of her niece. TCT
over the subject lot was issued in the name of Lucila. Said title, however, remained in
the possession of Felomina who developed the lot through Juanario Torreon and paid
real property taxes thereon.
3. The relationship between Felomina and respondent spouses Romeo and Lucila Ponce,
however, turned sour. The latter allegedly became disrespectful and ungrateful to the
point of hurling her insults and even attempting to hurt her physically. Hence,
Felomina filed the instant case for revocation of implied trust to recover legal title
over the property.
4. Private respondent spouses Lucila and Romeo, on the other hand, claimed that the
purchase price of the lot was only P4,500.00 and that it was them who paid the same.
The payment and signing of the deed of sale allegedly took place in the office of Atty.
Teodoro Emboy in the presence of the seller and her siblings namely, Aquilino
Caldoza and the late Lilia Caldoza.
5. The trial court rendered a decision holding that an implied trust existed between
Felomina and Lucila, such that the latter is merely holding the lot for the benefit of
the former. It thus ordered the conveyance of the subject lot in favor of Felomina.
6. The Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the trial court ruling that Felomina
failed to prove the existence of an implied trust and upheld respondent spouses
ownership over the litigated lot.
ISSUE: Who, as between Felomina and respondent spouses, is the lawful owner of the
controverted lot?
RULING: It was Felomina and not Lucila who truly purchased the questioned lot from
Estela. The donation of immovable property by Felomina to Lucila is void.
Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, in order that the donation of an immovable property
may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated
and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. The acceptance may be made in
the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless
it is done during the lifetime of the donor. If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument,
the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both
instruments.
In the instant case, what transpired between Felomina and Lucila was a donation of an
immovable property which was not embodied in a public instrument as required by the
foregoing article. Being an oral donation, the transaction was void. Moreover, even if
Felomina enjoyed the fruits of the land with the intention of giving effect to the donation after
her demise, the conveyance is still a void donation mortis causa, for non-compliance with the
formalities of a will. No valid title passed regardless of the intention of Felomina to donate
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the property to Lucila, because the naked intent to convey without the required solemnities
does not suffice for gratuitous alienations, even as between the parties inter se. At any rate,
Felomina now seeks to recover title over the property because of the alleged ingratitude of
the respondent spouses.

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Garcia v. Gatchalian 21 SCRA 1056 (1967)

FACTS:
1. Gregorio Gatchalian, a widower of 71 years of age, died in the municipality of Pasig,
Province of Rizal, leaving no forced heirs.
2. In the same year, appellant filed a petition with the above named court for the probate
of said alleged will wherein he was instituted as sole heir.
3. Felipe Gatchalian, Aurora G. Camins, Angeles G. Cosca, Federico G. Tubog, Virginia
G. Talanay and Angeles G. Talanay, appellees herein, opposed the petition on the
ground, among others: - that the will was procured by fraud; that the deceased did not
intend the instrument signed by him to be as his will; - and that the deceased was
physically and mentally incapable of making a will at the time of the alleged
execution of said will.
4. After due trial, the court rendered the appealed decision finding the document to be
the authentic last will of the deceased but disallowing it for failure to comply with the
mandatory requirement of Article 806 of the New Civil Code that the will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will was executed in accordance of Art 806 of the New Civil
Code?
HELD: No. Article 806 of the New Civil Code reads as follows: Every will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and witnesses. The notary public shall
not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk of
Court.
We have held heretofore that compliance with the requirement contained in the above legal
provision to the effect that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and also by the witnesses is indispensable for its validity - As the document under
consideration does not comply with this requirement, it is obvious that the same may not be
probated.

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Azuela v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 122880 (2006)

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E.
Igsolo. However, this was opposed by Geralda Castillo, who was the attorney-in-fact
of the 12 legitimate heirs of the decedent. According to her, the will was forged,
and imbued with several fatal defects. Particularly, the issue relevant in this subject is
that the will was not properly acknowledged. The notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista,
only wrote Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa
Lungsod ng Maynila.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will is fatally defective as it was not properly acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses as required by Article 806 of the Civil
Code.
RULING: Yes, the will is fatally defective. By no manner of contemplation can those words
be construed as an acknowledgment.
An acknowledgement is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some
competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step
undertaken whereby the signore actually declares to the notary that the executor of a
document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.
It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the
usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that
before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would
nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be
acknowledged, and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any
textual proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses
executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will
provides for another all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made
beyond the free consent of the testator.

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Dy, Jr. v. Court of Appeals 198 SCRA 826 (1991)

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Perfecto Dy and Wilfredo Dy are brothers. Wilfredo Dy purchased a truck
and a farm tractor through financing extended by Libra Finance and Investment
Corporation (Libra). Both truck and tractor were mortgaged to Libra as security for
the loan. The petitioner wanted to buy the tractor from his brother so he wrote a letter
to Libra requesting that he be allowed to purchase from Wilfredo Dy the said tractor
and assume the mortgage debt of the latter. approved by Libra thru its manager
Ares.
2. Wilfredo executed a DAS in favor of Perfecto over the tractor in question. At this
time, the subject tractor was in the possession of Libra Finance due to Wilfredo Dy's
failure to pay the amortizations.
3. Despite the offer of full payment by the petitioner to Libra for the tractor, the
immediate release could not be effected because Wilfredo had obtained financing not
only for said tractor but also for a truck and Libra insisted on full payment for both.
4. The petitioner was able to convince his sister, Carol Dy-Seno, to purchase the truck so
that full payment could be made for both. A PNB check was issued in the amount of
P22k in favor of Libra, thus settling in full the indebtedness of Wilfredo with the
financing firm. Payment having been effected through an out-of-town check, Libra
insisted that it be cleared first before Libra could release the chattels in question.
5. Meanwhile, in another civil case, an alias writ of executionwas issued and the
provincial sheriff was able to seize and levy on the tractor which was in the premises
of Libra in Carmen, Cebu. The tractor was subsequently sold at public auction where
Gelac Trading was the lone bidder. Later, Gelac sold the tractor to one of its
stockholders, Antonio Gonzales.
6. It was only when the check was cleared on January 17, 1980 that the petitioner
learned about GELAC having already taken custody of the subject tractor.
Consequently, the petitioner filed an action to recover the subject tractor against
GELAC Trading with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
ISSUE: Whether at the time of the execution of the deed of sale, no constructive delivery was
effected since the consummation of the sale depended upon the clearance and encashment of
the check which was issued in payment of the subject tractor.
HELD/RATIO: NO. There was constructive delivery. The rule is settled that the chattel
mortgagor continues to be the owner of the property, and therefore, has the power to alienate
the same; however, he is obliged under pain of penal liability, to secure the written consent of
the mortgagee. Thus, the instruments of mortgage are binding, while they subsist, not only
upon the parties executing them but also upon those who later, by purchase or otherwise,
acquire the properties referred to therein. The absence of the written consent of the mortgagee
to the sale of the mortgaged property in favor of a third person, therefore, affects not the
validity of the sale but only the penal liability of the mortgagor under the RPC and the
binding effect of such sale on the mortgagee under the Deed of Chattel Mortgage.
While it is true that Wilfredo Dy was not in actual possession and control of the subject
tractor, his right of ownership was not divested from him upon his default. Neither could it be
said that Libra was the owner of the subject tractor because the mortgagee can not become
the owner of or convert and appropriate to himself the property mortgaged. Said property
continues to belong to the mortgagor. The only remedy given to the mortgagee is to have said
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property sold at public auction and the proceeds of the sale applied to the payment of the
obligation secured by the mortgagee. There is no showing that Libra Finance has already
foreclosed the mortgage and that it was the new owner of the subject tractor. Undeniably,
Libra gave its consent to the sale of the subject tractor to the petitioner. It was aware of the
transfer of rights to the petitioner.

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Santiago v. Pioneer Savings and Loan Bank 157 SCRA 100 (1968)
FACTS:
1. Santiago, is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Polo, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, with an area of approximately 39,007 square meters as the disputed
property.
2. She executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Construction Resources
Corporation of the Philippines (CRCP) to borrow money and make, execute, sign and
deliver mortgages of real estate now owned by me and standing in my name and to
make, sign, execute and deliver any and all promissory notes necessary in the
premises.
3. CRCP executed a Real Estate Mortgage over the Disputed Property in favor of
FINASIA Investment and Finance Corporation to secure a loan of P1 million. The
mortgage contract specifically provided that in the event of default in payment, the
mortgagee may immediately foreclose the mortgage judicially or extrajudicially.
4. Real Estate Mortgage by CRCP in favor of FINASIA executed in favor of defendantappellee, Pioneer Savings & Loan Bank, Inc. (Defendant Bank, for brevity), an
"Outright Sale of Receivables without Recourse" including the receivable of
P610,752.59 from CRCP.
5. FINASIA executed a "Supplemental Deed of Assignment" in favor of Defendant
Bank confirming and ratifying the assignment in the latter's favor of the receivable of
P610,752.59 from CRCP and of the mortgage constituted by CRCP over the disputed
property.
6. CRCP failed to settle its obligation and Defendant Bank opted for extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage.
7. On learning of the intended sale, plaintiff-appellant filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch CLXXII, an action for declaration of
nullity of the real estate mortgage with an application for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction
8. Defendant Bank opposed the application for Preliminary Injunction and asserted its
right to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage on the Disputed Property based on
recorded public documents.
9. RTC granted the petition.
ISSUE: WON the notice of the scheduled sale of the land sent to the agent (CRCP) is also
Notice to the principal (Plaintiff Appellant), the land owner.
RULING: YES, the notice is binding. The cases which plaintiff-appellant cites express the
general rule when there is no "documentary evidence admitted by stipulation disclosing facts
sufficient to defeat the claim." Where, however, such evidence is before the Court and has
been stipulated upon, a Court can go "beyond the disclosure in the complaint."
Moreover, the rule is explicit that "rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice."
The evidence on record sufficiently defeats plaintiff-appellant's claim for relief from
extrajudicial foreclosure. Her Special Power of Attorney in favor of CRCP specifically
included the authority to mortgage the Disputed Property. The Real Estate Mortgage in favor
of FINASIA explicitly authorized foreclosure in the event of default. Indeed, foreclosure is
but a necessary consequence of non-payment of a mortgage indebtedness. Plaintiff-appellant,
therefore, cannot rightfully claim that FINASIA, as the assignee of the mortgagee, cannot
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extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged property. A mortgage directly and immediately

subjects the property upon which it is imposed to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose
security it was constituted.

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Public Estates Authority v. Uy 372 SCRA 180 (2001)

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Public Estates Authority is the government agency tasked by the Bases
Conversion Development Authority to develop the first-class memorial park known as
the Heritage Park, located in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila.
2. On November 20, 1996, petitioner executed with respondent Elpidio S. Uy, doing
business under the name and style Edison Development & Construction, a
Landscaping and Construction Agreement, whereby respondent undertook to perform
all landscaping works on the 105-hectare Heritage Park.
3. The Agreement stipulated that the completion date for the landscaping job was within
450 days, commencing within 14 days after receipt by respondent from petitioner of a
written notice to proceed.
4. Due to delays, the contracted period was extended to 693 days. Among the causes of
the delay was petitioners inability to deliver to respondent 45 hectares of the property
for landscaping, because of the existence of squatters and a public cemetery
5. Respondent instituted with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission an
action seeking to collect from petitioner damages arising from its delay in the delivery
of the entire property for landscaping.
6. Petitioner assails the dismissal of its petition by the Court of Appeals based on a
technicality, i.e., the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed
by its Officer-in-Charge, who did not appear to have been authorized by petitioner to
represent it in the case. Petitioner moreover argues that in an earlier resolution, the
First Division of the Court of Appeals gave due course to its petition. Despite this, it
was the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals which rendered the Joint
Decision dismissing its petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of petitions was proper based on a technicality
RULING: Yes. Petitioner, being a government owned and controlled corporation, can act
only through its duly authorized representatives
Premium Marble Resources, Inc. vs. CA: in the absence of any board resolution from its
board of directors the authority to act for and in behalf of the corporation, the present action
must necessary fail. The power of the corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged
with the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers. Thus, the issue of authority
and the invalidity of plaintiff-appellants subscription which is still pending, is a matter that is
also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in finding that, in view of the absence of a board
resolution authorizing petitioners Officer-in-Charge to represent it in the petition, the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping executed by said officer failed to satisfy
the requirement of the Rules.

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Clavecilla v. Quitain 482 SCRA 623 (2006)

FACTS:
1. Teresito and Rico Quitain filed a complaint against Rolando Clavecilla for the
enforcement of the amicable settlement entered into by them before the Lupon
Tagapamayapa.
2. Pertinent portions of said settlement reads: That the respondent (Clavecilla) agreed to
purchase the property on October 15, 1996; Failure to pay the property on the said
date the respondent will voluntarily vacate the place with the assistance of five
thousand (P5,000.00) pesos only.
3. The complainant (Rico Quitain) agreed to the demand of the respondent.
4. The Quitains alleged that Clavecilla failed to pay the amount agreed upon and six
months had already passed since the agreement was entered into and yet Clavecilla
has still not left the premises.
5. When the trial ensued it was shown that the Verification and Certification of nonforum shopping, which accompanied the petition at bench, was executed and signed
by petitioners counsel Atty. Oswaldo A. Macadangdang, without the proper authority
from petitioner, in violation of Sec. 5, Rule 7 and Sec. 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. The duty to certify under oath is strictly addressed to petitioner,
Rolando Clavecilla. To allow delegation of said duty to anyone would render Revised
Circular No. 28-91 inutile.
6. Petitioner moves for the reconsideration of our Resolution dated 05 October 2000
dismissing the petition for the reason that the certificate of non-forum shopping was
signed by petitioners counsel and not by the petitioner.
7. Admitting that the duty to sign under oath the certificate is addressed to the petitioner,
petitioner attached to his motion a Special Power of Attorney dated 09 August 2000
authorizing his counsel to sign the certificate. The court believes that this
authorization was made after the petition had been filed, in a vain attempt to cure the
fatal defect, for if Atty. Macadangdang had such authority, he would have indicated
that in the Verification and Certification he signed on 25 August 2000 attached to the
petition.
8. Petitioner avers that: his lawyer had the authority to sign the certification against
forum shopping; the CA was hasty in concluding that the authorization of petitioners
lawyer was made after the petition had been filed; the CA should have granted
petitioner the benefit of the doubt that he gave such authorization to his lawyer at the
time that his lawyer signed the verification and certification against forum shopping;
petitioners failure to have a properly executed certification against forum shopping
attached to his petition for review is not fatal; the rules of procedure are used only to
help secure and not override substantial justice, and the CA departed from the
established liberal interpretation of the rules despite petitioners substantial
compliance with the rule on non-forum shopping.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in their Judgment with regards the SPA given by the petitioner to
his counsel?
RULING: The SC disagrees with the CA. The rule is that any suspicion on the authenticity
and due execution of the special power of attorney which is a notarized document, thus a
public document, cannot stand against the presumption of regularity in their favor absent
evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.

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In this case, the petition before the CA was filed on September 13, 2000. The special power
of attorney meanwhile was dated August 9, 2000. Absent any proof that the special power of
attorney was not actually in existence before the petition was filed, this Court has no recourse
but to believe that it was indeed in existence at such time.
The next matter to be determined is whether the CA was correct in dismissing Clavecillas
petition and motion for reconsideration, notwithstanding the authority given by Clavecilla in
favor of his lawyer to sign the verification and certification in his behalf.
The Court answers in the affirmative.
Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if we are to expect fair results
therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the
policy of liberal construction. Time and again, this Court has strictly enforced the
requirement of verification and certification of non-forum shopping under the Rules of Court.
This case is no exception.
Verification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition have been
made in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative.
In this case, petitioners counsel signed the verification alleging that he had read the petition
and the contents thereof are true and correct of his own "knowledge and belief."
On this ground alone, the petition should already be dismissed for as provided for in Section
4 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court
While the Court has exercised leniency in cases where the lapse in observing the rules was
committed when the rules have just recently taken effect, the attendant circumstances in this
case however do not warrant such leniency.
The certification against forum shopping in this case was signed by petitioners counsel
despite the clear requirement of the law that petitioners themselves must sign the
certification. The certification must be made by petitioner himself and not by counsel, since it
is petitioner who is in the best position to know whether he has previously commenced any
similar action involving the same issues in any other tribunal or agency. And the lack of a
certification against forum shopping, unlike that of verification, is generally not cured by its
submission after the filing of the petition.

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Heirs of Dicman v. Cario 490 SCRA 240 (2006)

FACTS:
1. Sioco Carino bought a parcel of land together with its improvements from HC Heald
and took possession of it.
2. On the advice of his lawyers, and because there were already many parcels of land
recorded in his name, Sioco Cario caused the survey of the land in controversy in the
name of Ting-el Dicman.
3. Ting-el Dicman executed a public instrument entitled "Deed of Conveyance of Part
Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" wherein it stated that Mr. Sioco Cario has
advanced all expenses for said survey for him that for and in consideration of said
advance expenses, made to him, he promises to convey, deliver and transfer one half
(1/2) of his title, rights, and interest to and in the aforesaid parcel of land as soon as
title for the same is issued to me by proper authorities.
4. After the execution of the foregoing deed, Sioco Cario, who had been in possession
of the land in controversy since 1916, continued to stay thereon.
5. On January 10, 1938, Sioco Cario executed, as seller, a public instrument entitled
"Deed of Absolute Sale" covering the subject land and its improvements with his son,
Guzman Cario, as buyer.
6. On July 27, 1954, Guzman Cario had the entire Lot 46 resurveyed so as to indicate
the half portion that belonged to him and the other half that belonged to the
petitioners. The resurvey evenly divided the lot into Lot 76-A and 76-B, and
purportedly indicated that Lot 76-A, consisting of 50,953 square meters, belonged to
the petitioners, while Lot 76-B, also consisting of 50,953 square meters, formerly
pertained to Sioco Cario and, later, to Guzman Cario.
7. Before the trial court could dispose of the case, the Supreme Court promulgated
Republic v. Marcos9 which held that Courts of First Instance of Baguio have no
jurisdiction to reopen judicial proceedings on the basis of Republic Act No. 931. As a
consequence, on July 28, 1978, the trial court dismissed the petition to reopen Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. 211 insofar as Lot 76-B was concerned, and the
certificate of title issued pursuant to the partial decision involving Lot 76-A was
invalidated.
8. After the dismissal of the case, Guzman Cario was left undisturbed in his possession
of the subject property until his death on August 19, 1982. Guzmans widow and son,
private respondent Jose Sioco C. Cario, continued possession of the subject property.
9. On April 20, 1983, petitioners, suing as compulsory heirs of Ting-el Dicman, revived
the foregoing case by filing a complaint for recovery of possession with damages
involving the subject property with the RTC.
10. Respondent Carino, however, alleged that he has been in possession of the subject
property for 55 years peacefully, in good faith, and in concept of owner and therefore
perfected title over the same through acquisitive prescription.
11. RTC declared that Carino he lawful possessor and as the party who has the better
right over the land subject matter.
12. CA dismissed the petition and affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent have better title over the disputed land.
RULING: Yes. The records show that as early as 1938, the land in controversy had been in
the possession of Guzman Cario, predecessor-in-interest of private respondent,
continuously, publicly, peacefully, in concept of owner, and in good faith with just title, to
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the exclusion of the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest, well beyond the period
required under law to acquire title by acquisitive prescription which, in this case, is 10 years.
Although arguably Sioco Cario may not have been the owner of the subject property when
he executed the "Deed of Absolute Sale" in 1938 in favor of his son, the requirement of just
title is nonetheless satisfied, which means that the mode of transferring ownership should
ordinarily have been valid and true, had the grantor been the owner.
By the time the successors-in-interest of Ting-el Dicman sought to establish ownership over
the land in controversy by filing their "Petition of the Heirs of Dicman to Reopen Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. 211" on April 24, 1959 with the trial court, and which
Guzman timely opposed, more than 20 years had already elapsed. Thus, the 10-year period
for acquisitive prescription is deemed satisfied well before Guzmans possession can be said
to be civilly interrupted by the filing of the foregoing petition to reopen
Prescinding from the issue on prescription, the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest
are nonetheless guilty of laches.
As correctly held by the RTC, there is no evidence to the effect that Ting-el Dicman or his
successors-in-interest ever filed any action to question the validity of the "Deed of
Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" after its execution on October
22, 1928 despite having every opportunity to do so. Nor was any action to recover possession
of the property from Guzman Cario instituted anytime prior to April 24, 1959, a time when
the period for acquisitive prescription, reckoned from Guzmans occupation of the property
in 1938, had already transpired in his favor. No evidence likewise appears on the record that
Sioco Cario or his Estate ever filed any action to contest the validity of the "Deed of
Absolute Sale" dated January 10, 1938.
Private respondent and his predecessors-in-interest were made to feel secure in the belief that
no action would be filedagainst them by such passivity. There is no justifiable reason for
petitioners delay in asserting their rightsthe facts in their entirety show that they have slept
on them. For over 30 years reckoned from the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and
Interests in Agricultural Land" dated October 22, 1928, or 20 years reckoned from the "Deed
of Absolute Sale" dated January 10, 1938, they neglected to take positive steps to assert their
dominical claim over the property. With the exception of forgery, all other issues concerning
the validity of the two instruments abovementioned, as well as the averment that the former
was in the nature of a contract to sell, were issues raised only for the first time on appeal and
cannot therefore be taken up at this late a stage.

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Solar Team Entertainment v. Ricafort 293 SCRA 661 (1998)

FACTS:
1. This is a case for the recovery of possession and damages with a prayer for a writ of
replevin. Private respondents filed their Answer and a copy was furnished to the
counsel of petitioner by registered mail but the pleading did not contain and written
explanation why personal service was not made upon petitioner-plaintiff as required
by the Rules of Court.
2. On 11 August 1997, petitioner filed a motion to expunge the "Answer (with
Counterclaims)" and to declare herein private respondents in default, 5 alleging
therein that the latter did not observe the mandate of the aforementioned Section 11,
and that there was: [A]bsolutely no valid reason why defendant[s] should not have
personally served plaintiff's . . . counsel with [a] copy of their answer [as] (t)he office
of defendant's (sic) counsel, Atty. Froilan Cabaltera, is just a stone [sic] throw away
from the office of [petitioner's] counsel, with an estimate (sic) distance of about 200
meters more or less.
3. Petitioner further alleged that the post office was "about ten (10) times farther from
the office of Atty. Cabaltera,"
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner's motion to expunge private respondents'
answer with counterclaims on the ground that said pleading was not served personally
RULING: We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other
modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is
practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing
is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other
modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal
service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an
explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or
the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged
for violation of Section 11. This Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of
the innovation introduced by the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the administration of
justice.
Returning, however, to the merits of this case, in view of the proximity between the offices of
opposing counsel and the absence of any attendant explanation as to why personal service of
the answer was not effected, indubitably, private respondents' counsel violated Section 11 of
Rule 13 and the motion to expunge was prima facie meritorious. However, the grant or denial
of said motion nevertheless remained within the sound exercise of the trial court's discretion.
Thus, as guided by Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which ordains that
the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding, as well as by the dictum
laid down in Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315 [1910], the trial court opted to exercise its
discretion in favor of admitting the "Answer (with Counterclaims)," instead of expunging it
from the record.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect only on 1 July 1997, while the questioned
"Answer (with Counterclaims)" was filed only on 8 August 1997, or on the 39th day
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following the effectivity of the 1997 Rules. Hence, private respondents' counsel may not have
been fully aware of the requirements and ramifications of Section 11, Rule 13. In fact, as
pointed out by petitioner's counsel, in another case where private respondents' counsel was
likewise opposing counsel, the latter similarly failed to comply with Section 11

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Gamido vs. New Bilibid Prisons G.R. No. 114829 (1995)

FACTS:
1. In the Resolution of 7 September 1994, The Court required Atty. Icasiano M. dela
Rea, to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for
making it appear in the jurat of the petition in this case that the petitioner subscribed
the verification and swore to before him, as notary public, on 19 April 1994, when in
truth and in fact the petitioner did not. In his Explanation, Atty. Icasiano M. dela Rea
admitted having executed the jurat without the presence of petitioner Gamido. The
explanation states: xxx I did it in the honest belief that since it is jurat and not an
acknowledgement. xxx Then he apologizes to the Court and assures it that henceforth
he would be more careful and circumspect.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Reas explanation is satisfactory that he honestly confused Jurat and
Acknowledgement.
RULING: No, a jurat which is, normally in this form:
Subscribed and sworn to before me in _______________, this ____ day of ____________,
affiant having exhibited to me his Community (before, Residence) Tax Certificate No.
____________ issued at ______________ on ____________.
It is that part of an affidavit in which the officer certifies that the instrument was sworn to
before him. It is not a part of a pleading but merely evidences the fact that the affidavit was
properly made. The jurat in the petition in the case also begins with the words "subscribed
and sworn to me."
To subscribe literally means to write underneath, as one's name; to sign at the end of a
document. To swear means to put on oath; to declare on oath the truth of a pleading, etc.
Accordingly, in a jurat, the affiant must sign the document in the presence of and take his
oath before a notary public or any other person authorized to administer oaths.
As to acknowledgment, Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:
(a) The acknowledgement shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized
by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place
where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall
certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that
he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and
deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a
seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. (See Lorenzo M. Taada and Francisco A.
Rodrigo, Modern Philippine Legal Forms, vol. II, 1964 Fifth ed., 735).
It is obvious that the party acknowledging must likewise appear before the notary public or
any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents.
The claim or belief of Atty. dela Rea that the presence of petitioner Gamido was not
necessary for the jurat because it is not an acknowledgment is patently baseless. If this had
been his belief since he was first commissioned as a notary public, then he has been making a
mockery of the legal solemnity of an oath in a jurat. Notaries public and others authorized by
39 | P a g e

law to administer oaths or to take acknowledgments should not take for granted the solemn
duties appertaining to their offices. Such duties are dictated by public policy and are
impressed with public interest.

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Public Estates Authority v. Uy SCRA NO147933-34 (2001)

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Public Estates Authority is the government agency tasked by the Bases
Conversion Development Authority to develop the first-class memorial park known as
the Heritage Park, located in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila.
2. On November 20, 1996, petitioner executed with respondent Elpidio S. Uy, doing
business under the name and style Edison Development & Construction, a
Landscaping and Construction Agreement, whereby respondent undertook to perform
all landscaping works on the 105-hectare Heritage Park. The Agreement stipulated
that the completion date for the landscaping job was within 450 days, commencing
within 14 days after receipt by respondent from petitioner of a written notice to
proceed.
3. Due to delays, the contracted period was extended to 693 days. Among the causes of
the delay was petitioners inability to deliver to respondent 45 hectares of the property
for landscaping, because of the existence of squatters and a public cemetery.
4. Respondent instituted with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission an
action, docketed as CIAC Case No. 02-2000, seeking to collect from petitioner
damages arising from its delay in the delivery of the entire property for landscaping.
Specifically, respondent alleged that he incurred additional rental costs for the
equipment which were kept on stand-by and labor costs for the idle
manpower. Likewise, the delay incurred by petitioner caused the topsoil at the
original supplier to be depleted, which compelled respondent to obtain the topsoil
from a farther source, thereby incurring added costs. He also claims that he had to
mobilize water trucks for the plants and trees which have already been delivered at the
site. Furthermore, it became necessary to construct a nursery shade to protect and
preserve the young plants and trees prior to actual transplanting at the landscaped
area.
ISSUE: WON respondent Public Estates should be held liable for the expenses caused by the
delay in delivering the entire property.
RULING: YES, we have found no ground to disturb the decision of the CIAC, especially
since it possesses the required expertise in the field of construction arbitration. It is well
settled that findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally
accorded not only respect, but finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Thus, we affirm the factual findings and conclusions of the CIAC as regards the arbitral
awards to respondent. The records clearly show that these are amply supported by substantial
evidence.

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Clavecilla v. Quitain 482 SCRA 623 (2006)

FACTS:
1. Teresito and Rico Quitain (Quitains) filed on March 7, 1997, a complaint against
Rolando Clavecilla (Clavecilla) before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6,
Davao City (MTCC) for the enforcement of the amicable settlement entered into by
them on August 19, 1996 before the Lupon Tagapamayapa, Barangay Talomo,
Davao.
2. On September 13, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court with the CA which rendered the herein assailed Resolution on October
5, 2000 thus, the Verification and Certification of non-forum shopping, which
accompanied the petition at bench, was executed and signed by petitioners counsel
Atty. Oswaldo A. Macadangdang, without the proper authority from petitioner, in
violation of Sec. 5, Rule 7 and Sec. 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The duty to certify under oath is strictly addressed to petitioner, Rolando Clavecilla.
To allow delegation of said duty to anyone would render Revised Circular No. 28-91
inutile.
3. Petitioner avers that: his lawyer had the authority to sign the certification against
forum shopping; the CA was hasty in concluding that the authorization of petitioners
lawyer was made after the petition had been filed; the CA should have granted
petitioner the benefit of the doubt that he gave such authorization to his lawyer at the
time that his lawyer signed the verification and certification against forum shopping;
petitioners failure to have a properly executed certification against forum shopping
attached to his petition for review is not fatal; the rules of procedure are used only to
help secure and not override substantial justice, and the CA departed from the
established liberal interpretation of the rules despite petitioners substantial
compliance with the rule on non-forum shopping.2
ISSUE: W/N counsel may sign verifition nd certification of non-forum shopping
HELD: NO. Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if we are to expect
fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking
on the policy of liberal construction. Time and again, this Court has strictly enforced the
requirement of verification and certification of non-forum shopping under the Rules of
Court. This case is no exception.
Verification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition have been
made in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative.
In this case, petitioners counsel signed the verification alleging that he had read the petition
and the contents thereof are true and correct of his own "knowledge and belief."
On this ground alone, the petition should already be dismissed for as provided for in Section
4 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC dated May 1, 2000:
Sec. 4. Verification. ---xxx
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.

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A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and

belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading.
While the Court has exercised leniency in cases where the lapse in observing the rules was
committed when the rules have just recently taken effect, the attendant circumstances in this
case however do not warrant such leniency.
The certification against forum shopping in this case was signed by petitioners counsel
despite the clear requirement of the law that petitioners themselves must sign the
certification. The certification must be made by petitioner himself and not by counsel, since it
is petitioner who is in the best position to know whether he has previously commenced any
similar action involving the same issues in any other tribunal or agency. And the lack of a
certification against forum shopping, unlike that of verification, is generally not cured by its
submission after the filing of the petition
No such justifiable or compelling reasons exist in the case at bar.
In this case, petitioner did not present any cause for his failure to personally sign the
certification against forum shopping at the time that the petition was filed at the CA. He
merely acknowledged in his motion for reconsideration of the October 5, 2000 Resolution of
the CA that he "has the duty to certify under oath. He then asked for a reconsideration of the
said Resolution and attached a Special Power of Attorney executed by him in favor of his
lawyer

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Heirs of Dicman v. Cario 490 SCRA 240 (2006)

FACTS:
1. The subject land had been part of the land claim of Mateo Cario. Within this site,
buildings were constructed which were bought by Sioco Cario, son of Mateo Cario
and grandfather of private respondent Jose Cario. Sioco Cario then took possession
of the buildings and the land.
2. Ting-el Dicman, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, had been employed by
Sioco Cario as his cattle herder.
3. On the advice of his lawyers, and because there were already many parcels of land
recorded in his name, Sioco Cario caused the survey of the land in controversy in the
name of Ting-el Dicman.
4. Ting-el Dicman executed a public instrument entitled "Deed of Conveyance of Part
Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" with Sioco Cario, which reads: That Mr.
Sioco Cario has advanced all expenses for said survey xxx, and also all other
expenses for the improvement of said land, to date; That for and in consideration of
said advance expenses, I hereby pledge and promise to convey, deliver and transfer
unto said Sioco Cario, his heirs and assigns, one half (1/2) of my title, rights, and
interest to and in the aforesaid parcel of land; same to be delivered, conveyed and
transferred to him, his heirs and assigns, by me, my heirs, and assigns, xxx.
5. After the execution of the foregoing deed, Sioco Cario, who had been in possession
of the land in controversy since 1916, continued to stay thereon.
6. On January 10, 1938, Sioco Cario executed, as seller, a public instrument entitled
"Deed of Absolute Sale" covering the subject land and its improvements with his son,
Guzman Cario, as buyer. Consequently, Guzman Cario took possession of the
property publicly, peacefully, and in the concept of owner.
7. Guzman Cario had the entire Lot resurveyed so as to indicate the half portion that
belonged to him and the other half that belonged to the petitioners. The resurvey
evenly divided the lot into Lot 76-A and 76-B
8. A petition was later filed by the heirs of Ting-el Dicman which sought to establish
ownership over Lot 76-A and Lot 76-B. Guzman Cario opposed the petition insofar
as he insisted ownership over Lot 76-B, the land in controversy.
9. While the foregoing petition was pending in the trial court, President Carlos P. Garcia
issued Proclamation No. 628 excluding from the operation of the Baguio Townsite
Reservation certain parcels of public land known as Igorot Claims. One such claim
pertained to the "Heirs of Dicman,"
10. As a consequence, the trial court dismissed the petition insofar as Lot 76-B was
concerned, and the certificate of title issued pursuant to the partial decision involving
Lot 76-A was invalidated.
11. After the dismissal of the case, Guzman Cario was left undisturbed in his possession
of the subject property until his death. His remains are buried on the land in question
12. On April 20, 1983, petitioners, suing as compulsory heirs of Ting-el Dicman, revived
the foregoing case by filing a complaint for recovery of possession with damages
involving the subject property
13. Private respondent Jose Cario filed his answer and prayed for dismissal. RTC ruled
in favor of respondents Carino
14. CA affirmed RTC. CA based its ruling on the following reasons: that the petitioners
raised for the first time on appeal the issue on whether the "Deed of Conveyance of
Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" is void ab initio under Sections 145
and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu
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ISSUE: W/N the Deed of Conveyance was invalid, hence, would not make Carino the lawful
owner and possessor of the subject lot
RULING: NO. SC ruled in favor of Carino.
RATIO: The foregoing issue and the incidents thereunder were never raised by the petitioners
during the proceedings before the RTC. Suffice it to say that issues raised for the first time on
appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel.
Matters, theories or arguments not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be
considered on review or appeal where they are raised for the first time. To consider the
alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic
principles of fair play, justice and due process.
4. Even if this Court should declare the sale null and void or the agreement merely a contract
to sell subject to a suspensive condition that has yet to occur, private respondent nonetheless
acquired ownership over the land in question through acquisitive prescription.
The records show that as early as 1938, the land in controversy had been in the possession of
Guzman Cario, predecessor-in-interest of private respondent, continuously, publicly,
peacefully, in concept of owner, and in good faith with just title, to the exclusion of the
petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest, well beyond the period required under law to
acquire title by acquisitive prescription which, in this case, is 10 years.
As correctly held by the RTC, there is no evidence to the effect that Ting-el Dicman or his
successors-in-interest ever filed any action to question the validity of the "Deed of
Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" after its execution on October
22, 1928 despite having every opportunity to do so. Nor was any action to recover possession
of the property from Guzman Cario instituted anytime prior to April 24, 1959, a time when
the period for acquisitive prescription, reckoned from Guzmans occupation of the property
in 1938, had already transpired in his favor. No evidence likewise appears on the record that
Sioco Cario or his Estate ever filed any action to contest the validity of the "Deed of
Absolute Sale" dated January 10, 1938. Though counsel for the Estate of Sioco Cario tried
to assail the deed as a forgery in the trial court, the attempt failed and no appeal was lodged
therefrom.
For over 30 years reckoned from the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in
Agricultural Land" dated October 22, 1928, or 20 years reckoned from the "Deed of Absolute
Sale" dated January 10, 1938, they neglected to take positive steps to assert their dominical
claim over the property. With the exception of forgery, all other issues concerning the
validity of the two instruments abovementioned, as well as the averment that the former was
in the nature of a contract to sell, were issues raised only for the first time on appeal and
cannot therefore be taken up at this late a stage.

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Solar Team Entertainment v. Ricafort 293 SCRA 661 (1998)

FACTS:
1. Solar Team Entertainment filed before the RTC, Paraaque a complaint for recovery of
possession and damages with prayer for a writ of replevin against Team Image
Entertainment, Inc.. The case was assigned to Branch 260 of said court, presided over
by public respondent Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort.
2. Summonses and copies of the complaint were forthwith served on private
respondents. On 8 August 1997, private respondents, as defendants, filed their
Answer (with Counterclaims). A copy thereof was furnished counsel for petitioner by
registered mail; however, the pleading did not contain any written explanation as to
why service was not made personally upon petitioner-plaintiff, as required by Section
11 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. Petitioner filed a motion to expunge the Answer (with Counterclaims) and to declare
herein private respondents in default, alleging therein that the latter did not observe
the mandate of the aforementioned Section 11, and that there was:
4. [A]bsolutely no valid reason why defendant[s] should not have personally served
plaintiffs ... counsel with [a] copy of their answer [as] (t)he office of defendants (sic)
counsel, Atty. Froilan Cabaltera, is just a stone throw away from the office of
[petitioners] counsel, with an estimate (sic) distance of about 200 meters more or less.
5. Petitioner further alleged that the post office was about ten (10) times farther from the
office of Atty. Cabaltera.
6. Judge Bautista-Ricafort issued an order stating that under Section 11 of Rule 13 it is
within the discretion of the [trial court] whether to consider the pleading as filed or
not, and denying, for lack of merit, petitioners motion to expunge the Answer (with
Counterclaims) and to declare private respondents in default.
7. Petitioner immediately moved for reconsideration of the order, but public respondent
Judge Bautista-Ricafort denied this motion in her order by stating that Section 6 of
Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure ordains that the Rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
ISSUE Whether or not Judge Ricafort is correct in not expunging the Answer of respondent
based on technicality?
RULING: Yes, liberal construction of the rules and the pleading is the controlling principle to
effect substantial justice.
In Alonso vs. Villamor, "the error in this case is purely technical. To take advantage of it for
other purposes than to cure it, does not appeal a fair sense of justice. Its presentation as fatal
to plaintiff is a case smacks of skill rather than right. A litigation is not a game of
technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement
and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is rather, a contest in which each contending
party fully and fairly lays before the Court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as
wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections or form of technicalities of procedure, asks that
justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's
thrust."
While it is desirable that the above Rules be faithfully and even meticulously observed,
courts should not strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper
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administration of justice. Furthermore, it is well settled that litigations should, as much as

possible be decided on their merits and not on technicalities.
Section 5, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure prescribes two modes of service of
pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers, namely: (1) personal service;
and (2) service by mail. The first is governed by Section 6, while the second, by Section 7 of
said Rule. If service cannot be done either personally or by mail, substituted service may be
resorted to under Section 8 thereof.
Pursuant, however, to Section 11 of Rule 13, service and filing of pleadings and other papers
must, whenever practicable, be done personally; and if made through other modes, the party
concerned must provide a written explanation as to why the service or filing was not done
personally.
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite
action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not
eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the
inefficiency of the postal service.
Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to
appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing
pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no
time to prepare, for instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving
notice from the post office that the registered parcel containing the pleading of or other paper
from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or,
worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading
or other papers.
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules
requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court
the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or
filing were resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was
not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily, consider the
practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause whenever
practicable.
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of
service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is
practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing
is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other
modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal
service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an
explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or
the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged
for violation of Section 11. This Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of
the innovation introduced by the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the administration of
justice.

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Here, the proximity between the offices of opposing counsel was established; moreover, that
the office of private respondents counsel was ten times farther from the post office than the
distance separating the offices of opposing counsel. Of course, proximity would seem to
make personal service most practicable, but exceptions may nonetheless apply. For instance,
where the adverse party or opposing counsel to be served with a pleading seldom reports to
office and no employee is regularly present to receive pleadings, or where service is done on
the last day of the reglementary period and the office of the adverse party or opposing
counsel to be served is closed, for whatever reason.
Returning, however, to the merits of this case, in view of the proximity between the offices of
opposing counsel and the absence of any attendant explanation as to why personal service of
the answer was not effected, indubitably, private respondents counsel violated Section 11 of
Rule 13 and the motion to expunge was prima facie meritorious. However, the grant or denial
of said motion nevertheless remained within the sound exercise of the trial courts discretion.
Thus, as guided by Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which ordains that
the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding, as well as by the dictum
laid down in Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315 [1910], the trial court opted to exercise its
discretion in favor of admitting the Answer (with Counterclaims), instead of expunging it
from the record.
To our mind, if motions to expunge or strike out pleadings for violation of Section 11 of Rule
13 were to be indiscriminately resolved under Section 6 of Rule 1 or Alonzo v. Villamor and
other analogous cases, then Section 11 would become meaningless and its sound purpose
negated. Nevertheless, we sustain the challenged ruling of the trial court, but for reasons
other than those provided for in the challenged order.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect only on 1 July 1997, while the questioned
Answer (with Counterclaims) was filed only on 8 August 1997, or on the 39th day following
the effectivity of the 1997 Rules. Hence, private respondents counsel may not have been fully
aware of the requirements and ramifications of Section 11, Rule 13. In fact, as pointed out by
petitioners counsel, in another case where private respondents counsel was likewise opposing
counsel, the latter similarly failed to comply with Section 11.
It has been several months since the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect. In the interim,
this Court has generally accommodated parties and counsel who failed to comply with the
requirement of a written explanation whenever personal service or filing was not practicable,
guided, in the exercise of our discretion, by the primary objective of Section 11, the
importance of the subject matter of the case, the issues involved and the prima facie merit of
the challenged pleading.
However, as we have in the past, for the guidance of the Bench and Bar, strictest compliance
with Section 11 of Rule 13 is mandated one month from promulgation of this Decision.

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Igmedio Azajar vs. Court Of Appeals And Cham Samco & Sons, Inc. G.R. No. L-40945
(1986)
FACTS:
1. This case originated from a complaint filed by petitioner Igmedio Azajar against
respondent Cham Samco and Sons, Inc. in the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur.
Azajar's claim is that he had purchased from defendant Cham Samco nails of various
sizesand had given P18,000.00 as payment thereof; but in breach of contract, Cham
Samco had offered to deliver only a part of the quantity ordered.
2. Cham Samco filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds: (1) failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action-the complaint's language indicating not a perfected sale but
merely an "offer to buy by plaintiff that was partly accepted by defendant," and failing
to show that as explicitly required by the order form prices had been confirmed by
Cham Samco's "Manila Office," and (2) that venue was improperly laid-Cham
Samco's invariable conditions in transactions of this nature, as Azajar well knew from
many such transactions in the past, being that "any legal action thereon must be
instituted in the City of Manila.
3. Contending that such a notice was fatally defective and rendered the Motion to
Dismiss incapable of to the period to answer, Azajar filed a motion dated February 20,
1974 to declare Cham Samco in default, which the Court granted. By Order dated
February 22, 1974 the Court pronounced Cham Samco in default and allowed Azajar
to present evidence ex parte.
4. Then on March 30, 1974, the Trial Court rendered judgment by default against
defendant Cham Samco.
5. The Court of Appeals set aside the judgment by default rendered against Cham Samco
by the Regional Trial Court, and directed that Cham Samco be allowed to file its
answer to the complaint and after joinder of issues, trial be had and judgment
rendered on the merits.
6. Cham Samco quite frankly admits its error. It pleads however that under the
circumstances the error be not regarded as irremediable or that it be deemed as
constituting excusable negligence, warranting relief. It argues that legal and logical
considerations, which it took to be tenable, caused it to theorize that a hearing on the
motion was dispensable.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is necessary that the motion to dismiss be set for hearing?
RULING: Yes, the uniform holding of this Court has been that a failure to comply with the
hearing requirement is a fatal flaw. However, in this case, the Court brushes aside
technicality and affords the petitioner its day in court so that the ends of justice would be
better served.
It was wrong, of course, for Cham Samco to have failed to set its motion to dismiss for
hearing on a specified date and time. The law explicitly requires that notice of a motion shall
be served by the appellant to all parties concerned at least three days before the hearing
thereof, together with a copy of the motion, and of any affidavits and other papers
accompanying it; and that the notice shag be directed to the parties concerned, stating the
time and place for the hearing of the motion. The uniform holding of this Court has been that
a failure to comply with the requirement is a fatal flaw. Such notice is required to avoid
surprises upon the opposite party and give the latter time to study and meet the arguments of

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the motion, as well as to determine or make determinable the time of submission of the
motion for resolution.
The purpose of said notice being not only to give the latter time to oppose the motion if so
minded, but also to determine the time of its submission for resolution. Without such notice,
the occasion would not arise to determine with reasonable certitude whether and within what
time the adverse party would respond to the motion, and when the motion might already be
resolved by the Court. The duty to give that notice is imposed on the movant, not on the
Court.
Withal the reasons for Cham Samco's erroneous notion of the dispensability of a hearing on
its motion to dismiss are not utterly without plausibility. This circumstance, taken together
with the fact, found by the Intermediate Appellate Court and not disputed by petitioner
Azajar, that Cham Samco has meritorious defenses which if proven would defeat Azajar's
claim against it, and the eminent desirability more than once stressed by this Court that cases
should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their
causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections, all
conduce to concurrence with the Court of Appeals that "the ends of justice would be better
served in this case if we brush aside technicality and afford the petitioner its day in court.

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Neri v. De La Pea A.M. No. RTJ-05-1896; April 29, 2005

FACTS:
1. The case stems from a motion for reconsideration from a civil case of damages filed
by one Aznar, the plaintiff in the original case, against Citibank. The motion for
reconsideration was re-raffled to the sala of Respondent Judge De La Pea. Judge De
La Pea granted the motion for reconsideration which prompted the filing of Atty.
Neri of the administrative case now in dispute, charging Respondent Judge of
dishonesty and gross ignorance of the law. Respondent Judge, in his defense,
contended that he based his decision from an ex parte manifestation made by Aznar.
Petitioner assailed the Respondents appreciation of the ex parte manifestation as
Citibank was not served a copy of such.
2. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found Respondent Judge liable for
violating for violating Section 4, Rule 13 which requires that adverse parties be served
copies of all pleadings and similar papers; in relation to Section 5, Rule 15 which
requires a movant to set his motion for hearing, unless it is one of those which a court
can act upon without prejudicing the rights of the other party; both provisions of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. According to the OCA, the fact that plaintiff Aznar had failed to serve a copy of his
ex parte manifestation upon Citibank should have been reason enough for respondent
to disregard the same. The OCA found Respondent only liable for simple misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Judge is liable for violating the aforesaid provisions of
the Rules of Civil Procedure
RULING: No, Respondent Judge did not violate the stated provisions of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. The prevailing doctrine in our jurisdiction is that a motion without a notice of
hearing addressed to the parties is a mere scrap of paper. However, the same cannot be said
for manifestations which, unless otherwise indicated, are usually made merely for the
information of the court.
Nevertheless, Judge must still be found guilty for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,
for having based his decision on an ex parte manifestation while Citibank was never made
aware of such. Said action violates the principle of fair play, proof that there is something
amiss Respondent Judges sense of fairness and righteousness.

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Boiser v Judge Aguirre, Jr A.M. No. RTJ-04-1886; May 16, 2005

FACTS:
1. The case stems from an ejectment case filed by Petitioner Boiser against one Julleza,
which was decided in favor of Boiser by the MTC. When the case reached the RTC
on appeal by Julleza, Julleza filed a motion to release bond which was granted by
Respondent Judge. Boiser then filed the instant administrative case against
Respondent Judge for ignorance of the law, alleging that the motion did not state that
he was furnished a copy of the motion thereby depriving him of his right to due
process.
2. After it was found out by Boiser that Respondent Judge held in his favor in the
decision of his ejectment case, Boiser withdrew his administrative complaint. The
administrative complaint was still placed under investigation with the CA which held
to dismiss the case; the case was raised to the Supreme Court for instant review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the administrative case is moot, the petitioner having withdrawn the
case
RULING: No, mere desistance on the part of the complainant does not warrant the dismissal
of an administrative complaint against any member of the bench
The withdrawal of complaints cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction nor strip it of its
power to determine the veracity of the charges made and to discipline, such as the results of
its investigation may warrant, an erring respondent. Even the retirement of respondent does
not oust the Court of its jurisdiction over an administrative case by the mere fact that the
respondent public official ceases to hold office during the pendency of respondents case.
On deciding the main issue, the Court held that the Motion to Release Bond was defective,
not having a proper notice of hearing. Not to mention the fact that the date and time of the
hearing were not specified, and that neither complainant nor his counsel was furnished a copy
thereof. These were never controverted by respondent judge. A motion without notice of
hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper. It presents no question which the court could
decide. The court has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it.
.

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De Jesus v. Dilag 471 SCRA 176 (2005)

FACTS:
1. A complaint was filed with the Office of the Court Administrator by Maria Teresa H.
De Jesus charging respondent Judge Renato J. Dilag of the RTCOlongapo City, with
gross ignorance of the law, rendering unjust orders, abuse of authority and misuse of
court processes.
2. Complainant alleged inter alia that her husband Wolfgang Heinrich Konrad
Harlinghausen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage with the
Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City
3. Harlinghausen, through counsel, filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Preserve
Properties to be Collated. On the same day, respondent judge issued an Order setting
the hearing of the motion
4. Complainant received summons. Forthwith, she filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of improper venue. This was denied by respondent judge.
5. Then, respondent judge considered the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Preserve Properties
to be Collated submitted for resolution after hearing the testimonies of
Harlinghausens attorney-in-fact, Harry E. Joost, and his counsel of record, Atty.
Edmundo S. Carian.
6. Respondent judge issued an Order granting the urgent ex-parte motion and placing
under legal custody the properties enumerated therein. The Register of Deeds of
Tarlac was directed to annotate the Order on the 62 land titles allegedly purchased by
Harlinghausens wife using his money without his consent.
7. Harlinghausen, through counsel, filed another Ex-Parte Motion praying for the
issuance of an Order directing the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) to
allow him to enter this country in order to prosecute his petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
8. Respondent judge issued an Order granting Harlinghausens Ex-Parte Motion.
9. Eventually, complainant filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
assailing respondent judges Order granting Harlinghausens Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
to Preserve Properties to be Collated; Order granting his Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
enter this country; and Order denying her (complainants) motion to dismiss the
complaint for improper venue. Complainant averred that in issuing the challenged
Orders, respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74167.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Judge Dilag committed abuse of authority and gross
ignorance of the law. Yes.
RULING: Yes. Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, are:
SECTION 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing
the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such
a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing,
unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and
shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing
of the motion.

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SECTION 6. Proof of service necessary. No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the
court without proof of service thereof.

Respondent judge blatantly disregarded the provisions. Instead of denying the motion
outright for being manifestly defective, he granted the same. While he set the motion for
hearing, still the three-day notice was not observed, thus complainant failed to attend the
hearing. Clearly, she was deprived of her right to due process.
When a judge fails to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the
discharge of his duties, he is either too incompetent and undeserving of his position, or is too
vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of
judicial authority. In both instances, the judges dismissal is in order.
Likewise, respondents failure to afford complainant the opportunity to be heard as a matter of
due process of law deserves administrative sanction.
Relative to the challenged Order, respondent judge shows his ignorance of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. This law confers upon the Commissioner of the BID,
to the exclusion of the courts of justice, the power and authority to enforce its provisions,
specifically the admission of foreigners to this country.
We sustain the observation of the Court of Appeals that the Order of respondent judge
directing the BID to allow the entry of Harlinghausen to this country would effectively
countermand the order of detention issued by the BID and constitutes an intrusion into its
prerogatives as regards the entry, admission, exclusion, registration, repatriation, monitoring
and deportation of foreigners within our national territory.
In his desperate attempt to evade administrative sanction, respondent judge maintains that
since complainant has already resorted to a proper remedy, i.e., by filing a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning his twin Orders, she is barred from filing the
instant administrative complaint involving the same Orders. He cited our ruling in Hilario vs.
Ocampo III, 371 SCRA 260 (2001) that where some judicial means is available, an
administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for an act of a judge deemed aberrant
or irregular.
While it is true that the Court of Appeals has set aside the questioned twin Orders, the fact
remains that respondent judge has shown his ignorance of both substantive and procedural
laws which warrants an administrative sanction.
The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if
committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases within
the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where, however, the procedure is so simple and the
facts so evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, as in this case, to still err
thereon amounts to ignorance of the law.
In this case, respondent judge displayed a deplorable deficiency in his grasp of the basic
principles governing motions, specifically, the three-day notice rule and the requisite proof of
service. Also, he showed his utter lack of knowledge and understanding of our immigration
laws.

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Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. Velarde, 439 SCRA 1 (2004)

FACTS:
1. In a complaint for sum of money filed before the RTC, petitioner Permanent Savings
and Loan Bank sought to recover from respondent Mariano Velarde, the sum of
P1,000,000.00 plus accrued interests and penalties, based on a loan obtained by
respondent from petitioner bank as evidence by promissory notes. Petitioner bank sent
a letter of demand to respondent on July 27, 1988, demanding full payment of the
loan. Despite receipt of said demand letter, respondent failed to settle his account.
2. Velarde contends that he caused the preparation of the complaint and that all the
allegations thereat are true and correct; that the promissory note sued upon, assuming
that it exists and bears the genuine signature of herein defendant, the same does not
bind him and that it did not truly express the real intention of the parties as stated in
the defenses
3. The Bank claims, that there is no need to prove the loan and its supporting papers as
Velarde has already admitted these. Velarde had in fact denied these in his responsive
pleading.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant has really executed the Promissory Note considering
the doubt as to the genuineness of the signature and as well as the non-receipt of the said
amount
RULING: No. The mere presentation of supposed documents regarding the loan, but absent
the testimony of a competent witness to the transaction and the documentary evidence,
coupled with the denial of liability by the defendant does not suffice to meet the requisite
preponderance of evidence in civil cases.
The documents, standing alone, unsupported by independent evidence of their existence, have
no legal basis to stand on. They are not competent evidence. Such failure leaves this Court
without ample basis to sustain the plaintiffs cause of action and other reliefs prayed for. The
loan document being challenged. Plaintiff did not exert additional effort to strengthen its case
by the required preponderance of evidence. On this score, the suit must be dismissed.
The bank should have presented at least a single witness qualified to testify on the existence
and execution of the documents it relied upon to prove the disputed loan obligations of
Velarde. This falls short of the requirement that (B)efore any private writing may be received
in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw
the writing executed; (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or
(c) By a subscribing witness. (Rule 132, Sec. 21, Rules of Court)

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Boaz International Trading Corporation and F.R. Cement Corporation v. Woodward

Japan, Inc. and North Front Shipping Services Inc. ,418 SCRA 287 (2003)
FACTS:
1. Respondent Woodward Japan, Inc. filed a complaint for a Sum of Money and
Damages against petitioners Boaz International Trading Corp. and F. R. Cement
Corp.
2. Petitioners Boaz and F. R. Cement filed their answer to the complaint as well as a
third party complaint against North Front Shipping Services, Inc.
3. Respondent North Front filed its answer to the third-party complaint with a
counterclaim against the third-party plaintiffs.
4. COURT a quo: scheduled a pre-trial conference for 04 November 1997. This initial
pre-trial conference was however postponed to give the parties time to settle their
respective claims amicably. Succeeding schedules of pre-trial conference were
likewise cancelled for the same reason. Finally, when it became apparent that the
parties would not be able to arrive at an amicable settlement, the trial court scheduled
a pre-trial conference anew.
5. On the scheduled day of the pre-trial conference, both Woodward and its counsel
failed to appear.
6. Consequently, counsel for Boaz and F. R. Cement moved that Woodward be declared
non-suited, that the complaint against them be dismissed and that they be allowed to
present evidence on their counterclaim.
7. COURT a quo: granted the motion of Boaz and F. R. Cement to dismiss the complaint
of Woodward and the motion of North Front to dismiss the third-party complaint of
Boaz and F. R. Cement.
8. Petitioner Boaz and F. R. Cement presented their evidence consisting of the testimony
of one Jose Ernesto Rodriguez and reserved the right to present the original of certain
documents. No formal offer of evidence has yet been made by Boaz and F. R.
Cement.
9. Respondent Woodward filed a Motion to Reinstate Plaintiffs (Woodwards)
Complaint and Allow Them to Present Evidence Ex-Parte.
10. TC: granted Woodwards Motion to Reinstate Plaintiffs (Woodwards) Complaint
and Allow Them to Present Evidence Ex-Parte
11. Petitioner Boaz and F. R. Cement moved for reconsideration but the trial court denied
the same.
12. Imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, Petitioners Boaz and
F. R. Cement elevated the case to the CA under Rule 65.
13. CA: in prosecuting the claim of Woodward against petitioners, its lawyers acted
negligently. It found that the trial court did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion when it reinstated Woodwards Complaint.
14. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the RTCs Order reinstating the Complaint
of Woodward.
HELD: Yes. The CA erred in affirming the Order of the RTC and in ordering the
reinstatement of the third-party Complaint of petitioners against North Front Shipping
Services, Inc.

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First, the rules on pretrial were designed precisely to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of an action. The parties themselves -- not only their counsels -- are required to be
present, so that they can discuss and possibly agree on a settlement and thus end the case
justly, speedily and inexpensively right there and then. The Rules explicitly impose upon the
former the duty to appear at the pretrial conference. The representative of Woodward, as well
as its counsel, failed to do so on the date set for the purpose -- not just on October 20, 1998,
but also earlier, on September 17, 1998. By its unexplained nonappearance, it inexcusably
delayed the case and even caused added expense to the opposing party who had come to court
in obedience to the Rules. Evidently, the RTCs October 20, 1998 Order dismissing the case
was proper and in accord with Section 5 of Rule 18, which provides that "[t]he failure of the
plaintiff to appear [for pretrial] shall be cause for dismissal of the action."
Second, after violating the rules on pretrial, Woodward had the temerity to file a Motion for
Reconsideration beyond the 15-day reglementary period, again in violation of the Rules.
Then, upon denial of that Motion, instead of properly elevating the denial to the appellate
court for review, it filed a Motion to Reinstate Complaint. As previously explained, the latter
Motion amounted to a second motion for reconsideration, which is prohibited by the Rules.
By its acts, Woodward unnecessarily delayed the disposition of the case and caused
additional expenses to all involved. Furthermore, such acts indicate a propensity to violate the
Rules or a gross ignorance thereof, either of which deserves nothing less than opprobrium.
Third, the CA did not err in finding negligence on the part of the counsel of Woodward,
which is nonetheless bound by such negligence. "Settled [is the] rule that the negligence of
counsel binds the client." We find no cogent reason to depart from this settled rule, especially
because the counsels negligence in the present case has not been sufficiently explained.
Fourth, Respondent Woodward has failed to demonstrate that it has a meritorious case. It
filed a collection case against Petitioner Boaz International Trading Corporation for
demurrage charges in the total sum of US$75,065.96. Yet it has failed to show prima facie
any agreement on the payment of demurrages. The April 18, 1995 Letter, which Woodward
unilaterally made and which Petitioner Boaz did not sign, does not show that the latter agreed
to pay demurrages of "US$6,500/half despatch" in case the discharge rate fell below
2,500MT.
Contrary to Woodwards contention, Boaz has not admitted the April 18, 1995 LetterAgreement. Paragraph 1.8 of the Answer is not a "negative pregnant." Woodward itself states
that a "negative pregnant is that form of denial which at the same time involves an
affirmative implication favorable to the opposing party." Since the aforementioned paragraph
is explicitly an admission, not a denial, it follows that it cannot be taken as a denial pregnant
with an admission of substantial facts.

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Francisco A.G. De Liano, Alberto O. Villa-Abrille Jr., and San Miguel Corporation v.
Court of Appeals and Benjamin A. Tango, 370 SCRA 349 (2001)
FACTS:
1. RTC of Quezon City, Branch 227: issued a Decision ordering San Miguel
Corporation to release to the plaintiff the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 299551
in the same of Benjamin A. Tango; to release to plaintiff the originals of the REM
contracts and to cause the cancellation of the annotation of the same on plaintiffs TCT
No. 299551; and to pay the plaintiff the following sums: P100,000.00 as and by way
of moral damages; P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees; costs of suit.
2. In brief, the case involved the cancellation of two (2) real estate mortgages in favor of
petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) executed by private respondent Benjamin
A. Tango over his house and lot in Quezon City.
3. The mortgages were third party or accommodation mortgages on behalf of the
spouses Bernardino and Carmelita Ibarra who were dealers of SMC products in
Aparri, Cagayan. Other defendants in the case were Francisco A.G. De Liano and
Alberto O. Villa-Abrille, Jr., who are senior executives of petitioner SMC.
4. Petitioners SMC, De Liano and Abrille appealed the aforesaid decision to the Court of
Appeals.
5. In due time, their counsel, Atty. Edgar B. Afable, filed an Appellants' Brief which
failed to comply with Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court.
6. Private Respondent Tango was quick to notice these deficiencies, and accordingly
filed a "Motion to Dismiss Appeal".
7. Required to comment, the Petitioners averred that their brief had substantially
complied with the contents as set forth in the rules. They proffered the excuse that the
omissions were only the result of oversight or inadvertence and as such could be
considered "harmless" errors. They prayed for liberality in the application of technical
rules, adding that they have a meritorious defense.
8. CA: issued the first assailed resolution dismissing the appeal.
9. Petitioners sought to have the foregoing resolution reconsidered. Simultaneously,
through the same counsel, they filed a "Motion to Admit Amended DefendantsAppellants' Brief.
10. CA: denied the consolidated motions in its Resolution.
11. Hence, this petition for review certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing San Miguel Corporations
Appeal on the basis of pure technicalities and even after SMC has corrected the
technical defect of its appeal
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing SMCs appeal without
considering its merits
HELD: [1] No. [2] No. The petition has no merit.
RATIO: [1] The premise that underlies all appeals is that they are merely rights which arise
from statute; therefore, they must be exercised in the manner prescribed by law. It is to this
end that rules governing pleadings and practice before appellate courts were imposed. These
rules were designed to assist the appellate court in the accomplishment of its tasks, and
overall, to enhance the orderly administration of justice.

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Relative thereto, Section 13, Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court governs the format to be
followed by the appellant in drafting his brief. This particular rule was instituted with reason,
and most certainly, it was not intended to become a custom more honored in the breach than
in the observance." It has its logic, which is to present to the appellate court in the most
helpful light, the factual and legal antecedents of a case on appeal.
The first requirement of an appellant's brief is a subject index. The index is intended to
facilitate the review of appeals by providing ready reference, functioning much like a table of
contents.
Next, when the appellant has given an account of the case and of the facts, he is required to
state the issues to be considered by the appellate court. The statement of issues is not to be
confused with the assignment of errors: they are not one and the same, for otherwise, the
rules would not require a separate statement for each.
Thereafter, the appellant is required to present his arguments on each assigned error. The
petitioners arguments go hand in hand with his assignment of errors, for the former provide
the justification supporting his contentions, and in so doing resolve the issues.
Lastly, the appellant is required to state, under the appropriate heading, the reliefs prayed for.
In so doing, the appellate court is left in no doubt as to the result desired by the appellant, and
act as the circumstances may warrant.
The Court reminds members of the bar that their first duty is to comply with the rules, not to
seek exceptions.
[2] The Rules of Court prescribe two (2) modes of appeal from decisions of the Regional
Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals. When the trial court decides a case in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, the mode of review is by an ordinary appeal in accordance with Section
2(a) of Rule 41. In contrast, where the assailed decision was rendered by the trial court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the mode of appeal is via a petition for review pursuant
to Rule 42.
The Court is more concerned here about the first mode since the case at bar involves a
decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court exercising its original jurisdiction.

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In the matter of the charges of plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo. [A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC]
FACTS:
1. On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision which dismissed a petition
filed by the Malaya Lolas Organization in the case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty.
Herminio Harry Roque Jr., counsel for Vinuya et al, questioned the said decision. He
raised, among others, that the ponente in said case, Justice Mariano del Castillo,
plagiarized three books when the honorable Justice twisted the true intents of these
books to support the assailed decision. These books were: a. A Fiduciary Theory of
Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International
Law (2009); b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis,
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2006); and c. Enforcing Erga
Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge University Press (2005).
2. As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism, misconduct, and at least
inexcusable negligence. Interestingly, even the three foreign authors mentioned
above, stated that their works were used inappropriately by Justice Del Castillo and
that the assailed decision is different from what their works advocated.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is plagiarism in the case at bar.
HELD: No. There is no plagiarism. Even if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme Court in
its ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al in 2011), the rule on
plagiarism cannot be applied to judicial bodies.
No Plagiarism
At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another persons language, thoughts, or ideas.
To plagiarize, as it is commonly understood according to Webster, is to take (ideas, writings,
etc.) from (another) and pass them off as ones own.The passing off of the work of another as
ones own is thus an indispensable element of plagiarism.
According to Blacks Law Dictionary: Plagiarism is the deliberate and knowing presentation
of another persons original ideas or creative expressions as ones own.
This cannot be the case here because as proved by evidence, in the original drafts of the
assailed decision, there was attribution to the three authors but due to errors made by Justice
del Castillos researcher, the attributions were inadvertently deleted. There is therefore no
intent by Justice del Castillo to take these foreign works as his own.
But in plagiarism, intent is immaterial.
On this note, the Supreme Court stated that in its past decisions, (i.e. U.P Board of Regents vs
CA, 313 SCRA 404), the Supreme Court never indicated that intent is not material in
plagiarism. To adopt a strict rule in applying plagiarism in all cases leaves no room for errors.
This would be very disadvantageous in cases, like this, where there are reasonable and logical
explanations.
On the foreign authors claim that their works were used inappropriately

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According to the Supreme Court, the passages lifted from their works were merely used as
background facts in establishing the state on international law at various stages of its
development. The Supreme Court went on to state that the foreign authors works can support
conflicting theories. The Supreme Court also stated that since the attributions to said authors
were accidentally deleted, it is impossible to conclude that Justice del Castillo twisted the
advocacies that the works espouse.
No Misconduct
Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error here is in good faith. There was no
malice, fraud or corruption.
No Inexcusable Negligence (explanation of Justice Del Castillo)
The error of Justice del Castillos researcher is not reflective of his gross negligence. The
researcher is a highly competent one. The researcher earned scholarly degrees here and
abroad from reputable educational institutions. The researcher finished third in her class and
4th in the bar examinations. Her error was merely due to the fact that the software she used,
Microsoft Word, lacked features to apprise her that certain important portions of her drafts
are being deleted inadvertently. Such error on her part cannot be said to be constitutive of
gross negligence nor can it be said that Justice del Castillo was grossly negligent when he
assigned the case to her. Further, assigning cases to researchers has been a long standing
practice to assist justices in drafting decisions. It must be emphasized though that prior to
assignment, the justice has already spelled out his position to the researcher and in every
sense, the justice is in control in the writing of the draft.
With the advent of computers, however, as Justice Del Castillos researcher also explained,
most legal references, including the collection of decisions of the Court, are found in
electronic diskettes or in internet websites that offer virtual libraries of books and articles.
Here, as the researcher found items that were relevant to her assignment, she downloaded or
copied them into her main manuscript, a smorgasbord plate of materials that she thought she
might need.
She electronically cut relevant materials from books and journals in the Westlaw website and
pasted these to a main manuscript in her computer that contained the issues for discussion in
her proposed report to the Justice. She used the Microsoft Word program. Later, after she
decided on the general shape that her report would take, she began pruning from that
manuscript those materials that did not fit, changing the positions in the general scheme of
those that remained, and adding and deleting paragraphs, sentences, and words as her
continuing discussions with Justice Del Castillo, her chief editor, demanded. Parenthetically,
this is the standard scheme that computer-literate court researchers use everyday in their
work.

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