Professional Documents
Culture Documents
REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
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Present:
- versus -
With respect to the birth certificates of Carlitos children, he prayed that the
date of his and his wifes marriage be corrected from April 27,
QUISUMBING,* J., Chairperson
1989 to January 21, 2000, the date appearing in their marriage certificate.
CARPIO,**
CARPIO MORALES,
The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as
TINGA, and
respondent.
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
On April 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition [3] in which it was
additionally prayed that Carlitos second name of John be deleted from his
PROMULGATED:
record of birth; and that the name and citizenship of Carlitos father in his
(Carlitos) marriage certificate be corrected from John Kho to Juan Kho and
Filipino to Chinese, respectively.
DECISION
In a letter of June 18, 2001 addressed to the trial court, the city
civil registrar[5] stated her observations and suggestions to the proposed
corrections in the birth records of Carlito and his siblings but interposed no
objections to the other amendments.
On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and
Heddy Moira filed before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for
correction of entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in
their respective birth certificates. Carlito also asked the court in behalf of
his minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of some entries
in their birth certificates.
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birth of Carlito, as follows: (1) change the citizenship of his mother from
Chinese to Filipino; (2) delete John from his name; and (3) delete the word
married opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The last correction
was ordered to be effected likewise in the birth certificates of respondents
Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.
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FIRST DIVISION
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4. The minor was left under the care of [respondent] since he was yet nine
(9) years old up to the present;
5. Minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate natural child of
Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. [He] was born on July 9,
1982 [,] prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code and as such, his
mother used the surname of the natural father despite the absence of
marriage between them; and [Giovanni] has been known by that name
since birth [as per his birth certificate registered at the Local Civil Register
of San Juan, Southern Leyte];
6. The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time [Giovanni] was born and
up to the present, failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters
of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns. [Giovanni's pleas]
for attention along that line [fell] on deaf ears xxx xxx xxx;
7. [Giovanni] is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he
desires to have his surname changed to that of his mother's surname;
8. [Giovanni's] mother might eventually petition [him] to join her in the
United States and [his] continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the
surname of his natural father, may complicate [his] status as natural child;
andcralawlibrary
9. The change of name [from] GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO to GIOVANNI
NADORES will be for the benefit of the minor.
xxx xxx xxx4
Respondent prayed for an order directing the local civil registrar to effect
the change of name on Giovanni's birth certificate. Having found
respondent's petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave
due course to the petition.5 Publication of the petition in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province of Southern Leyte once a week for three
consecutive weeks was likewise ordered.6 The trial court also directed that
the local civil registrar be notified and that the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) be sent a copy of the petition and order.7
After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering
the change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. 8
From this decision, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG,
filed an appeal with a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in
granting the petition in a summary proceeding.
Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as
required, the CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name. 9
In this petition, the Republic contends that the CA erred in affirming the
trial court's decision which granted the petition for change of name despite
the non-joinder of indispensable parties.10 Petitioner cites Republic of the
Philippines v. Labrador11 and claims that the purported parents and all
other persons who may be adversely affected by the child's change of
name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding
adversarial.12
We deny the petition.
"The subject of rights must have a fixed symbol for individualization which
serves to distinguish him from all others; this symbol is his
name."13 Understandably, therefore, no person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority.14 This is a reasonable requirement for
those seeking such change because a person's name necessarily affects his
identity, interests and interactions. The State must be involved in the
process and decision to change the name of any of its citizens.
The Rules of Court provides the requirements and procedure for change of
name. Here, the appropriate remedy is covered by Rule 103,15 a separate
and distinct proceeding from Rule 108 on mere cancellation and correction
of entries in the civil registry (usually dealing only with innocuous or
clerical errors thereon).16
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Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave
of court to present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed
commissioner. The OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not
object; hence, the lower court granted the motion.
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mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they
may bear the father's surname.
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WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the January 13, 2003
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128 AFFIRMED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 159966. March 30, 2005]
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR
CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF
JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG,
to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN
WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA
WANG, Petitioners, v. CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly
represented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a
long time because they will let him study there together with his sister
named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore'. Since in Singapore
middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a
person's name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be
discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries
a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are
brother and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds
funny in Singapore's Mandarin language since they do not have the letter
"R" but if there is, they pronounce it as "L." It is for these reasons that the
name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin
Wang.1
On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. 2 The
trial court found that the reason given for the change of name sought in
the petition that is, that petitioner Julian may be discriminated against
when studies in Singapore because of his middle name did not fall within
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was
denied in a resolution dated 20 May 2004.4 The trial court maintained that
the Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle name does not justify the
dropping of the middle name of a legitimate Filipino child who intends to
study there. The dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to
giving due recognition to or application of the laws of Singapore instead of
Philippine law which is controlling. That the change of name would not
prejudice public interest or would not be for a fraudulent purpose would not
suffice to grant the petition if the reason for the change of name is itself
not reasonable.5
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule
45)6 arguing that the trial court has decided a question of substance not
theretofore determined by the Court, that is: whether or not dropping the
middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 1747 of the Family Code.
Petitioner contends that "[W]ith globalization and mixed marriages, there is
a need for the Supreme Court to rule on the matter of dropping of family
name for a child to adjust to his new environment, for consistency and
harmony among siblings, taking into consideration the "best interest of the
child."8 It is argued that convenience of the child is a valid reason for
changing the name as long as it will not prejudice the State and others.
Petitioner points out that the middle name "Carulasan" will cause him
undue embarrassment and the difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be
an obstacle to his social acceptance and integration in the Singaporean
community. Petitioner also alleges that it is error for the trial court to have
denied the petition for change of name until he had reached the age of
majority for him to decide the name to use, contrary to previous
cases9 decided by this Court that allowed a minor to petition for change of
name.10
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the grounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the change sought
is merely for the convenience of the child. Since the State has an interest
in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience
of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children
have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and
there is no reason why this right should now be taken from petitioner
Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial court added that when
petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then decide whether
he will change his name by dropping his middle name.3
10
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11
Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle
name as this would help him to adjust more easily to and integrate himself
into Singaporean society. In support, he citesOshita v.
Republic23 and Calderon v. Republic,24 which, however, are not apropos
both.
In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother,
Buena Bartolome, and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita, sought to
change her name from Antonina B. Oshita to Antonina Bartolome. The
Court granted her petition based on the following considerations: she had
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; her other
siblings who had also elected Philippine citizenship have been using their
mother's surname; she was embarrassed to bear a Japanese surname
there still being ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World War;
and there was no showing that the change of name was motivated by a
fraudulent purpose or that it will prejudice public interest.
In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, an
illegitimate minor child acting through her mother who filed the petition in
her behalf, to change her name to Gertudes Josefina Calderon, taking the
surname of her stepfather, Romeo C. Calderon, her mother's husband. The
Court held that a petition for change of name of an infant should be
granted where to do is clearly for the best interest of the child. The Court
took into consideration the opportunity provided for the minor petitioner to
eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry if she continued
to use the surname of her illegitimate father. The Court pronounced that
justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to
improve his social standing as long as doing so he does not cause prejudice
or injury to the interests of the State or of other people.
Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,25 in arguing that although Article 174 of
the Family Code gives the legitimate child the right to use the surnames of
the father and the mother, it is not mandatory such that the child could use
only one family name, even the family name of the mother. In Alfon, the
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12
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In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping
his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would
make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not
clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause
confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to
drop it from his registered complete name.
13
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeks
the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated October 28,
1994 in CA-G.R. SP NO. 31786 2 . The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals upheld the Orders issued by respondents Judges Hon. Lorenzo B.
This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same man
but begotten of two (2) different mothers. One set, the private respondents
herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok
Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly children of Lee
Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K. LeeChin, Lucia K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee, Martin K.
Lee, Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-Miguel and Thomas K. Lee
(hereinafter referred to as private respondents) filed two (2) separate
petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of
birth of Marcelo Lee, Albina Lee-Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee,
Catalino K. Lee, Eusebio Lee, and Emma Lee (hereinafter referred to as
petitioners). On December 2, 1992, the petition against all petitioners, with
the exception of Emma Lee, was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila and docketed as SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 5 and later assigned to
Branch 47 presided over by respondent Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion. On
February 3, 1993, a similar petition against Emma Lee was filed before the
RTC of Kalookan and docketed as SP. PROC. NO. C-1674 6 and assigned to
the sala of respondent Judge Jaime T. Hamoy of Branch 130.
Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous
entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or
canceling therein the name of "Keh Shiok Cheng" as their mother, and by
substituting the same with the name "Tiu Chuan", who is allegedly the
petitioners true birth mother.
The private respondents alleged in their petitions before the trial courts
that they are the legitimate children of spouses Lee Tek Sheng and Keh
Shiok Cheng who were legally married in China sometime in 1931. Except
for Rita K. Lee who was born and raised in China, private respondents
herein were all born and raised in the Philippines.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
Sometime in October, 1948, Lee Tek Sheng, facilitated the arrival in the
Philippines from China of a young girl named Tiu Chuan. She was
introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his family as their new housemaid but far
from becoming their housemaid, Tiu Chuan immediately became Lee Tek
Shengs mistress. As a result of their illicit relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth
to petitioners.
Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu
Chuan gave birth to each of the petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek
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14
Based on the birth record of MARIANO LEE in 1953, the recorded age of
KEH SHIOK CHENG was 23 years old. Two years after PABLO LEE was born
in 1955, the difference is only 2 years, so it is impossible for PABLO LEE to
be the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, as it will only mean that she have
(sic) given birth at that impossible age.
5. As per Birth Certificate of HELEN LEE (Annex F-5), it was made to
appear that she is the 6th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, but as per Birth
Certificate of JULIAN LEE (Annex E-5), he is the true 6th child of KEH
SHIOK CHENG. Per Hospital Record, KEH SHIOK CHENG is only 28 years
old, while KEH SHIOK CHENGS true age at that time was 45 years
old.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
6. EMMA LEE has no record in the hospital because, as per complainants
allegation, she was born at their house, and was later admitted at Chinese
General Hospital.
7. As per Birth Certificate of CATALINO LEE (Annex F-7), it was made to
appear that he is the 14th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, and that the age of
KEH SHIOK CHENG a.k.a. Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, jumped from 28 years old
at the birth of HELEN LEE on 23 August 1957 to 38 years old at the birth of
CATALINO LEE on 22 April 1959.
8. As per Birth Certificate of EUSEBIO LEE, the alleged last son of KEH
SHIOK CHENG, the age of the mother is 48 years old. However, as per
Hospital Record, the age of Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, then was only 39 years
old. Considering the fact, that at the time of MARCELOs birth on 11 May
1950. KEH SHIOK CHENGs age is 38 years old and at the time of
EUSEBIOs birth, she is already 48 years old, it is already impossible that
she could have given birth to 8 children in a span of only 10 years at her
age. As per diagnosis, the alleged mother registered on EUSEBIOs birth
indicate that she had undergone CEASARIAN SECTION, which Dr. RITA K.
LEE said is not true.
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15
SO ORDERED. 11
On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued an Order dated April
SO ORDERED. 12
Petitioners attempts at seeking a reconsideration of the above-mentioned
orders of Judge Veneracion and Judge Hamoy failed, hence their recourse
to the Court of Appeals via a Petition forCertiorari and Prohibition with
Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction. Petitioners averred that respondents judges had
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders allowing the petitions for the
cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners records of birth to
prosper in the lower courts.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners raised the
following arguments: (1) Rule 108 is inappropriate for impugning the
legitimacy and filiation of children; (2) Respondents judges are sanctioning
a collateral attack against the filiation and legitimacy of children; (3)
Respondents judges are allowing private respondents to impugn the
legitimacy and filiation of their siblings despite the fact that their
undisputed common father is still alive; (4) Respondents judges are
entertaining petitions which are already time-barred; and (5) The petitions
below are part of a forum-shopping spree. 13
Finding no merit in petitioners arguments, the Court of Appeals dismissed
their petition in a Decision dated October 28, 1994. 14 Petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration of the said decision was also denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated December 19, 1994. 15
Hence, this petition.
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16
"Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts
have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been
given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or
proceeding is appropriate.
The pertinent sections of rule 108 provide:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
SECTION 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the
court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same,
and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in
the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once in a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province.
SECTION 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is
sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from
the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
"Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning
the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are (1) the
civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the
duty of the court to (1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the
hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the
petition: (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming
any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.
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17
At the outset, it should be pointed out that in the cited case of LabayoRowe v. Republic, 30 the reason we declared null and void the portion of
the lower courts order directing the change of Labayo-Rowes civil status
and the filiation of one of her children as appearing in the latters record of
birth, is not because Rule 108 was inappropriate to effect such changes,
but because Labayo-Rowes petition before the lower court failed to
implead all indispensable parties to the case.
We explained in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . An appropriate proceeding is required wherein all the indispensable
parties should be made parties to the case as required under Section 3,
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.
"In the case before Us, since only the Office of the Solicitor General was
notified through the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, representing the
Republic of the Philippines as the only respondent, the proceedings taken,
which is summary in nature, is short of what is required in cases where
substantial alterations are sought. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor
General, all other indispensable parties should have been made
respondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but the
child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their
hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other persons
who may be affected by the change should be notified or represented . . . .
x
"The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be
substantially impaired if her status would be changed from legitimate to
illegitimate. Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and
embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that
she will bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing of the petition
was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was
served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken.
Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority
under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which directs that
such rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. If Rule
108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or
corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial
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18
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35 that Rule 108, when all the procedural requirements thereunder are
followed, is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial
corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.
19
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20
II. The petitioners contend that the private respondents have no cause of
action to bring the cases below as Article 171 of the Family Code allows the
heirs of the father to bring an action to impugn the legitimacy of his
children only after his death. 48
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is. Republic Act No. 9048 now embodies that summary procedure while
Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary proceeding. Be that as it may, the
case at bar cannot be decided on the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which
has prospective application. Hence, the necessity for the preceding
treatise.
21
"A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged
not be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather,
these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as
his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who
can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically
impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first
120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the
child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not
have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was
obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence.
Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the
prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file
the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the
appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the
case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late
Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather,
their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel.
Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451,
457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Petitioners recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of
the Family Code] is not well taken. This legal provision refers to an action
to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private
respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless
deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an
illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedents child at
all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child,
nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir
of the deceased." 53
III. Petitioners claim that private respondents cause of action had already
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prescribed as more than five (5) years had lapsed between the registration
of the latest birth among the petitioners in 1960 and the filing of the
actions in December of 1992 and February of 1993. 54
22
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the Revised Penal Code, and which seeks the punishment of the accused;
or the action for the cancellation of Lee Tek Sheng naturalization certificate
which has for its cause of action the commission by Lee Tek Sheng of an
immoral act, and his ultimate deportation for its object; or for that matter,
the action for partition of Keh Shiok Chengs estate which has for its cause
of action the private respondents right under the New Civil Code to inherit
from their mothers estate.
23
SECOND DIVISION
[G. R. No. 120587 - January 20, 2004]
MILAGROS M. BARCO, as the Natural Guardian and Guardian Ad
Litem of MARY JOY ANN GUSTILO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS
(SPECIAL SIXTEENTH DIVISION), REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BR.
133-MAKATI), NCJR; THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MAKATI; and
NADINA G. MARAVILLA, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The story behind the present petition is a portrait of dysfunction. The
familial situation of the parties is complicated, to say the least. The judicial
conferment of the status of illegitimacy on a daughter who is by law
legitimate has created a tangled braid of various legal doctrines that, like
the Gordian knot of yore, is in this case ultimately unbound through one
fell swoop of the sword.
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24
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wherein the parties had agreed that the only heirs of the decedent
Armando are "the surviving spouse, Nadina G. Gustilo, the daughter, June
Salvacion G. Gustilo, the son, Jose Vicente Gustilo III, and another
daughter, Mary Joy Ann Gustilo." 26 However, this compromise agreement
was subsequently voided on petition by Jose Vicente to the Court of
Appeals, on the ground that the Civil Code prohibited compromise as to the
civil status of persons.27
25
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26
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of
Appeals correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance with
Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication, thus:
Section 4. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by order, fix the
time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall
also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to
the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would
cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule
108, but were inadvertently left out. The Court of Appeals correctly noted:
The publication being ordered was in compliance with, and borne out by
the Order of January 7, 1985. The actual publication of the September 22,
1983 Order, conferred jurisdiction upon the respondent court to try and
decide the case. While "nobody appeared to oppose the instant petition"
during the December 6, 1984 hearing, that did not divest the court from its
jurisdiction over the case and of its authority to continue trying the case.
For, the rule is well-settled, that jurisdiction, once acquired continues until
termination of the case.45
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing
and not against a person.46The decision on the petition binds not only the
parties thereto47 but the whole world.48 Anin rem proceeding is validated
essentially through publication.49 Publication is notice to the whole world
that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be
minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established.50 It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole
world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear
and decide it.51
Since the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the parties, what remains
for determination is whether it had acquired jurisdiction over Nadinas cause
of action. It should be emphasized that jurisdiction over the nature of the
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27
The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412 contemplates a
summary procedure.
First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows:
"No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial
order."
It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed except to
say that the corrections or changes must be effected by judicial order. As
such, it cannot be gleaned therefrom that the procedure contemplated for
obtaining such judicial order is summary in nature.
Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms
"corrected" and "changed." In its ordinary sense, to correct means "to
make or set right;" "to remove the faults or errors from" while to change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute". The provision neither qualifies as to
the kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor does it distinguish on the
basis of the effect that the correction or change may have. Hence, it is
proper to conclude that all entries in the civil register may be changed or
corrected under Article 412. What are the entries in the civil register? We
need not go further than Articles 407 and 408 of the same title to find the
answer.
"Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register."
"Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
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28
Next, Barco argues that the petition for correction had prescribed under
the Civil Code; and that the petition for correction should be treated as a
petition for change of name which can only be filed by the person whose
name is sought to be changed. These arguments can be decided jointly.
They both are not well taken as they cannot allude to a lack of jurisdiction
that would render the RTC Ordersubject to annulment.
Assuming arguendo that Nadinas petition for correction had prescribed
and/or that the action seeking the change of name can only be filed by the
party whose name is sought to be changed, this does not alter the reality
that under the law the Makati RTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the petition for correction. The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the
applicable law at the time, clearly conferred on the Makati RTC exclusive
original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.62 In complementation of grant of
jurisdiction, Section 1 of Rule 108 provides that the verified petition to the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto should be filed with
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where
the corresponding civil registry is located.
Prescription and lack of capacity to bring action cannot be ignored by a
court of law in properly resolving an action, to the extent that a finding
that any of these grounds exist will be sufficient to cause the dismissal of
the action.63 Yet, the existence of these grounds does not oust the court
from its power to decide the case. Jurisdiction cannot be acquired through,
waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or omission of the
parties.64 Contrariwise, lack of capacity to sue and prescriptions as grounds
for dismissal of an action may generally be rendered unavailing, if not
raised within the proper period.65
It thus follows that assuming that the petition for correction had
prescribed, or that Nadina lacked the capacity to file the action which led to
the change of her daughters name, the fact that the RTC granted
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29
The law sanctions the annulment of certain judgments which, though final,
are ultimately void. Annulment of judgment is an equitable principle not
because it allows a party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment
that has long lapsed into finality but because it enables him to be
discharged from the burden of being bound to a judgment that is an
absolute nullity to begin with. The inevitable conclusion is that the
RTC Order, despite its apparent flaws, is not null and void, and thus cannot
be annulled. Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible
error in issuing the assailed decision.
This Court has been constrained in the past to leave erroneous decisions as
they were.75 Our fealty to justice in its pristine form the upholding of "right"
over "wrong" is equipoised with our adherence to due process, and the
rules that emanate from that principle. The Court takes great care in
drafting rules of procedure so that the axioms that govern the legal
battleground may live up to Justice Frankfurters approximation of due
process as "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play." 76Due process
dictates that litigants be afforded a reasonable opportunity to attack
erroneous judgments and be shielded from the adverse effects of void
judgments. Due process likewise demands that a party, after trekking the
long road of litigation should be permitted to enjoy the fruits of an
auspicious final judgment. Absent any convincing demonstration that the
RTC Order is patently null and void, there is no reason under law and
jurisprudence to upset it, given the reality that it has long become final.
WHEREFORE, the above premises considered, the Petition is hereby
dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Page
30
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be
married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed
from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People's
Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for
three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were
established. No opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. ReysioCruz, Jr. and his American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of petitioner.
Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or
any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose
of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief
asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
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31
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32
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of
petitioner's first name was not within that court's primary jurisdiction as
the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned,
assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It
was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does
not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals
correctly dismissed petitioner's petition in so far as the change of his first
name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To
Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a
legal issue and the court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection,
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by
RA 9048 in so far asclerical or typographical errors are involved. The
correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In
effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Page
prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official
name.
33
xxx
xxx
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or
error from" while to change means "to replace something with something
else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." 26 The
birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein,
including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct.
No correction is necessary.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is,
the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age,
nationality and his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate,
or his being married or not. The comprehensive termstatus' include such
matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have
rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes
even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person's sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a
part of a person's legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article
413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall
be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner's cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. - The declaration of the
physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the
Page
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate
children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages,
naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations,
annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions,
naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial
determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and
judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly
sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those
acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even
mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
34
xxx
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the
facts as they existed at the time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is
no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a
person's sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common
and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The
words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and
laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore
be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no
legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the
sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a
female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33 Female is "the
sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has
organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words
"male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who
have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed
in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to
have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the
contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was
enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued
that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his
body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex
Be Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with
the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition
would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal
and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that
the petition was but petitioner's first step towards his eventual marriage to
his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the
changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man
with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female
post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply
particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal
Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule
131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the
public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioner's petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court
shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law,
not to make or amend it.
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35
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36
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 166676, September 12, 2008]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. JENNIFER B.
CAGANDAHAN, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising
purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision 1 dated
January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following
changes of entries in Cagandahan's birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer
Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female"
to "male."
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition
for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate2 before the RTC, Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and
was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing
up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to
have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where
persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She
further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her
early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was
discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that
her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she
has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all
interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become
a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such
that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be
changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
Page
37
Page
been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
38
CAH is one of many conditions21 that involve intersex anatomy. During the
twentieth century, medicine adopted the term "intersexuality" to apply to
human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. 22 The
term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is
the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are
determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with
intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female
sexes."
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In
most societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to
either a male or female gender role.23 Since the rise of modern medical
science in Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous
external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble
either male or female genitals.24More commonly, an intersex individual is
considered as suffering from a "disorder" which is almost always
recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime
medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the
category of either male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition
of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject
to outright denial. "It has been suggested that there is some middle ground
between the sexes, a `no-man's land' for those individuals who are neither
truly `male' nor truly `female'"25 The current state of Philippine statutes
apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a
female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature
itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there
is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we
determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development showing
the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the
subject's birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently
Page
39
As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held
that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to
be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that
will follow.28 The trial court's grant of respondent's change of name from
Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name.
Considering the consequence that respondent's change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of
name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth
certificate from female to male.
WHEREFORE, the Republic's petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page
case.
40
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 111994. December 29, 1994.]
SOTENIA GONO-JAVIER, TEBURCIO GONO, ANUNCIACION G.
JAVIER, GERMANA G. GULAY, LUCIO GONO, RAMON GONO,
ALFREDO GONO and MANUEL GONO, Petitioners, v. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, RESTITUTA CASOCOT, FERMIN CASOCOT,
ALICIA YONSON, ADRIANO CASOCOT, CARLOS MONTE DE RAMOS,
REGINA DUGLAS and NONITO MARAVE, Respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Page
41
Page
42
"4. The appellate court gravely erred in ruling that the action for recovery
of possession and ownership filed by the herein petitioners with the trial
court is barred by the dismissal of the complaint for nullification of the
Deed of Sale filed by the deceased Juan Casocot himself during his lifetime,
which was dismissed, for his failure to attend the hearing wherein he was
not notified. 2
Petitioners first assignment of error would have been impressed with merit
had the acknowledgment in the deed of donation in 1954 been extended to
Catalino prior to his death some time in 1942 or 1943. Juan Casocot
himself died in 1964. Article 278 of the New Civil Code, the law applicable
in 1954, 3 provided:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art. 278. Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. (Emphasis
supplied).
The statement made in the deed of donation, a public document, executed
by Juan Casocot in favor of Eugenia Gonzales, widow of Catalino, i.e., that
among the reasons for the donation was that the donee was "the surviving
spouse of my son with my common law wife," would have well been explicit
enough or, at the very least, sufficient to make it fall within the purview of
the doctrine of incidental recognition. Unfortunately for petitioners,
however, the recognition came too late. The donation, whereon the
questioned statement appeared, was made on 29 march 1954, or about 11
years after the death of Catalino in 1942 or 1943.
The provisions of the Civil Code 4 on acknowledgment would really indicate
that voluntary acknowledgment can legally be effected only during the
lifetime of both the acknowledging parent and the acknowledged
illegitimate child. When that voluntary recognition is so timely made, as
above, an action for its judicial declaration can survive the death of either
or both parties (see Gaspay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102372, 15
November 1994). The reason for this latter rule is that the due recognition
of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing (Art. 278, Civil Code) is, in
itself, a consummated act or acknowledgment of the child, and no further
court action is required (see Divinagracia v. Bellosillo, 143 SCRA 356),
albeit not prohibited, to yet have it declared as such. When a party is so
minded as to still bring an action on the basis of such voluntary
acknowledgment, no time frame for initiating it would obviously be a
constraint.
Parenthetically, where, a claim for recognition is predicated on other
evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing,
Page
43
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 46746. March 15, 1990.]
LIGAYA GAPUSAN-CHUA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and
PROSPERO PARCON,Respondents.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for Petitioner.
Gil B. Parreno for Respondent.
SYLLABUS
Page
44
DECISION
NARVASA, J.:
Felisa Gapusan Parcon died intestate and without legitimate issue on April
6, 1966 in Bacolod City. Neither her surviving spouse, Prospero Parcon, nor
her other known relatives three (3) sisters and a nephew - made any
move to settle her estate judicially.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
It was Ligaya Gapusan-Chua, claiming to be an acknowledged natural
daughter of Felisa Gapusan Parcon, who instituted judicial proceedings for
the settlement of the latters estate. About a year and eight months after
Felisas demise, or on January 15, 1968, Ligaya filed with the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the settlement of the estate
and for issuance of letters of administration in her favor. 1 She also sought
her designation as Special Administratrix pending her appointment as
regular administratrix. 2
By Order dated January 16, 1968, the Court appointed Ligaya Special
Administratrix of Felisa Parcons estate.
On April 22, 1968, Prospero Parcon, Felisa Parcons surviving husband, filed
a motion for reconsideration of the Order of January 16, 1968. 3 He denied
that Ligaya was an acknowledged natural child of his deceased wife, and
applied for his own appointment as administrator of his wifes estate. 4
Hearings were had on the issue of Ligayas claimed filiation. Ligaya
presented, among other proofs, 5 the following documents:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
a) Felisa Parcons sworn statement of assets and liabilities wherein Ligaya
Page
45
Here, Ligaya insists that the evidence submitted by her does indeed
sufficiently establish her status as the acknowledged natural child of Felisa
Parcon, and that her appointment as regular administratrix is justified by
law and jurisprudence.
More particularly, she contends that the sworn statement of assets and
liabilities, a public document submitted by the decedent pursuant to a legal
requirement therefor, and the latters application for life insurance were in
law indubitable recognition by her mother of her status as an
acknowledged natural child, voluntarily made, and were adequate
foundation for a judicial declaration of her status as heir. These statements,
she alleges, were "authentic writings" in contemplation of Article 278 of the
Civil Code:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ART. 278. Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing."cralaw
virtua1aw library
These, she contends, together with her treatment as a daughter by Felisa
a fact found to have been established by the evidence by both the Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals eliminate all doubt about the juridical
verity of her recognition as a natural child.
Prospero Parcon disagrees. He argues that, as ruled by the Court of
Appeals, the statements designating Ligaya as Felisas daughter merely
furnished ground for Ligaya to compel recognition by action which,
however, should have been brought during the lifetime of the putative
parent in accordance with Article 285 of the Civil Code, reading as
follows:chanrobles law library
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought
only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following
cases:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which
case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from
the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should
appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both
parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the
Page
ground to compel recognition;" and that Ligaya had failed to establish that
she had been acknowledged by Felisa in accordance with Article 278 of the
Civil Code (Article 131 of the Civil Code of 1889). Appeal has in turn been
taken from this judgment to this Court by Ligaya Gapusan-Chua.
46
Page
47
Page
Upon the foregoing facts and considerations, Ligaya Gapusan Chua must be
held to be a voluntarily acknowledged natural child of Felisa Gapusan
Parcon. She is therefore entitled, in accordance with Article 282 of the Civil
Code, to bear her mothers surname, and to receive the hereditary portion
accorded to her by the Code.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
48
SYLLABUS
Page
FIRST DIVISION
49
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The issue before the Court is not the status of the private respondent, who
has been excluded from the family and inheritance of the petitioners. What
we are asked to decide is whether he should be allowed to prove that he is
an illegitimate child of his claimed father, who is already dead, in the
absence of the documentary evidence required by the Civil
Code.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
The trial court said he could and was sustained by the respondent Court of
Appeals. 1 The latter court held that the trial judge had not committed any
grave abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in allowing the
private respondent to prove his filiation. Moreover, the proper remedy was
an ordinary appeal and not a petition for prohibition. The petitioners ask for
a reversal of these rulings on the ground that they are not in accordance
with law and jurisprudence.
Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, Dorotea, four
legitimate children (her co-petitioners herein), and considerable properties
Page
50
It must be added that the illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish
his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family
Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting
his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other
kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 8
The problem of the private respondent, however, is that, since he seeks to
prove his filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family
Code, his action is now barred because of his alleged fathers death in
1975. The second paragraph of this Article 175 reads as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time
to introduce evidence of his open and continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child or prove his alleged filiation through any of the
means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The simple reason is
that Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer be heard on
the claim of his alleged sons illegitimate filiation.chanrobles law library
In her Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, Justice Alicia
Sempio-Diy explains the rationale of the rule, thus: "It is a truism that
unlike legitimate children who are publicly recognized, illegitimate children
are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate
family being aware of their existence. Who then can be sure of their
filiation but the parents themselves? But suppose the child claiming to be
the illegitimate child of a certain person is not really the child of the latter?
The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny
the childs filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already
dead." 9
Finally, it must be observed that the provisions invoked by the parties are
among those affected by the following articles in the Family
Page
surname Uyguangco without objection from his father and the petitioners
as shown in his high school diploma, a special power of attorney executed
in his favor by Dorotea Uyguangco, and another one by Sulpicio
Uyguangco; that he has shared in the profits of the copra business of the
Uyguangcos, which is a strictly family business; that he was a director,
together with the petitioners, of the Alu and Sons Development
Corporation, a family corporation; and that in the addendum to the original
extrajudicial settlement concluded by the petitioners he was given a share
in his deceased fathers estate. 7
51
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52
FAMILY HOME
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue in this petition is whether or not a final judgment of the Court of
Appeals in an action for damages may be satisfied by way of execution of a
family home constituted under the Family Code.
The facts are undisputed.
On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 09218 entitled "Francisco Salinas, Et. Al. v. Jose
Modequillo, Et Al.," the dispositive part of which read as follows:cralawnad
"WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal should be, as it is hereby,
reversed and set aside. Judgment is hereby rendered finding the
defendants-appellees Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay jointly and
severally liable to plaintiffs-appellants as hereinbelow set forth.
Accordingly, defendants-appellees are ordered to pay jointly and severally
to:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Plaintiffs appellants, the Salinas spouses:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a. the amount of P30,000.00 by way of compensation for the death of their
The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution
was issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City to satisfy the said
judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and
Benito Malubay at Malalag, Davao del Sur.
On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at
Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 600 square meters
with a market value of P34,550.00 and assessed value of P7,570.00 per
Tax Declaration No. 87-0008-01359, registered in the name of Jose
Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur; and a
parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong, Bulacan, Malalag, Davao
del Sur containing an area of 3 hectares with a market value of P24,130.00
and assessed value of P9,650.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87-08-01848
registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial
Assessor of Davao del Sur. 2
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by
defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land located
at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to
the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code
except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof; and that the
judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant
is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. As to
the agricultural land although it is declared in the name of defendant it is
alleged to be still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the
original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority
In an order dated August 26, 1988, the trial court denied the motion. A
motion for reconsideration thereof was filed by defendant and this was
denied for lack of merit on September 2, 1988.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari wherein it is alleged that
the trial court erred and acted in excess of its jurisdiction in denying
petitioners motion to quash and/or to set aside levy on the properties and
in denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of the order dated August
26, 1988. Petitioner contends that only a question of law is involved in this
petition. He asserts that the residential house and lot was first occupied as
his family residence in 1969 and was duly constituted as a family home
under the Family Code which took effect on August 4, 1988. Thus,
petitioner argues that the said residential house and lot is exempt from
payment of the obligation enumerated in Article 155 of the Family Code;
and that the decision in this case pertaining to damages arising from a
vehicular accident took place on March 16, 1976 and which became final in
1988 is not one of those instances enumerated under Article 155 of the
Family Code when the family home may be levied upon and sold on
execution. It is further alleged that the trial court erred in holding that the
said house and lot became a family home only on August 4, 1988 when the
Family Code became effective, and that the Family Code cannot be
interpreted in such a way that all family residences are deemed to have
been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupancy prior to
the effectivity of the said Code and that they are exempt from execution
for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of said Code;
and that it also erred when it declared that Article 162 of the Family Code
does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive
effect.
Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code provide as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife
or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and
their family reside, and the land on which it is situated."cralaw virtua1aw
library
"Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its
constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein,
the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the
value allowed by law."cralaw virtua1aw library
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house
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accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not
state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
54
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ABSENTEES
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 163604 : May 6, 2005]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS (Twentieth Division), HON. PRESIDING JUDGE
FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, RTC-BR. 35 and APOLINARIA MALINAO
JOMOC, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
In "In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse
Clemente P. Jomoc, Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc, petitioner," the Ormoc City,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, by Order of September 29, 1999,1 granted
the petition on the basis of the Commissioner's Report 2 and accordingly
declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years
earlier, presumptively dead.
In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, cited
Article 41, par. 2 of the Family Code. Said article provides that for the
purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriageduring the subsistence
of a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years, the spouse present must institute summary
proceedings for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee
spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent
spouse.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal
the trial court's order by filing a Notice of Appeal.3
By Order of November 22, 1999s,4 the trial court, noting that no record of
appeal was filed and served "as required by and pursuant to Sec. 2(a),
Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the present case being a
special proceeding," disapproved the Notice of Appeal.
The Republic's Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's order of
disapproval having been denied by Order of January 13, 2000,5 it filed a
Petition for Certiorari6 before the Court of Appeals, it contending that the
declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family
Code is not a special proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals
requiring a record on appeal.
By Decision of May 5, 2004,7 the Court of Appeals denied the Republic's
petition on procedural and substantive grounds in this wise:
At the outset, it must be stressed that the petition is not sufficient in form.
It failed to attach to its petition a certified true copy of the assailed Order
dated January 13, 2000[denying its Motion for Reconsideration of the
November 22, 1999 Order disapproving its Notice of Appeal]. Moreover, the
petition questioned the [trial court's] Order dated August 15, 1999, which
declared Clemente Jomoc presumptively dead, likewise for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, yet,
not even a copy could be found in the records. On this score alone, the
petition should have been dismissed outright in accordance with Sec. 3,
Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.
However, despite the procedural lapses, the Court resolves to delve deeper
into the substantive issue of the validity/nullity of the assailed order.
The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for declaration
of the presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a special
proceeding. If it is, the period to appeal is 30 days and the party
appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a
record on appeal to perfect its appeal. Otherwise, if the petition is an
ordinary action, the period to appeal is 15 days from notice or decision or
final order appealed from and the appeal is perfected by filing a notice of
appeal (Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
As defined in Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, "a civil action is
one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
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That the Family Code provision on repeal, Art. 254, provides as follows:
Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of Republic
Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as
amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent
therewith are hereby repealed, (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
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GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP Case No. 44306 affirming the orders dated October 22, 1996 and
February 12, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Manila. These
orders dismissed the appeal of petitioner from the orders dated April 2,
1981 and April 30,1985 of the same Regional Trial Court.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The facts of the case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On November 15, 1981, the fourth floor of the City Hall of Manila was
completely gutted by fire. The records of the settlement proceedings were
among those lost in the fire. Thus, on January 2,1985, private respondent
filed a Petition for Reconstitution 10 of the said records.
Due to the delay caused by the fire and the reconstitution of the records, it
was only on April 30, 1985 that the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4
issued an Order 11 denying Marias June 6, 1981 Motion for
Reconsideration.
Sometime thereafter, Maria died and her testate estate also became the
subject of settlement proceedings. Atty. Marcial F. Lopez was appointed as
interim special administrator and engaged the services of the Siguion
Reyna Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Offices on behalf of the estate.
On August 21, 1996, the law firm was allegedly made aware of and given
notice of the April 30, 1985 Order when its associate visited Branch 4 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila to inquire about the status of the case.
The associate checked the records if there was proof of service of the April
30, 1985 Order to the former counsel of Maria, Atty. Marcial F. Lopez, but
he discovered that there was none. 12 He was able to secure a certification
13 from the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4
which stated that there was no proof of service of the Order dated April 30,
1985 contained in the records of SP. Proc. No. 98037.
A Notice of Appeal 14 dated April 22, 1996 was filed by petitioner from the
Orders dated April 2, 1981 and April 30, 1985 of the trial court. While the
said notice of appeal was dated April 22, 1996, the stamp of the trial court
on the first page of the notice dearly indicated that the same was received
by the trial court on September 20, 1996. A Record of Appeal 15 dated
September 20, 1996 was likewise filed by petitioner.
On October 22,1996, the trial court issued an Order 16 denying petitioners
appeal on the ground that the appeal was filed out of time. The trial court
ruled that the April 2, 1981 Order which was the subject of the appeal
already became final as the Motion for Reconsideration thereof was filed
sixty-five (65) days after petitioner received the same. In addition, the
court ruled that the notice of appeal itself was filed manifestly late as the
same was filed more than 11 years after the issuance of the June 11, 1985
Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The Motion for
Reconsideration dated November 13, 1996 of petitioner was likewise
denied by the trial court in an Order 17 dated February 12, 1997.
Not satisfied with this decision, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with
Prayer for Mandatory Injunction 18 with the Court of Appeals questioning
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1981 Order, Maria filed her motion for reconsideration 8 which private
respondent opposed. 9
59
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the
substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or
denying a motion for new trial or for reconsideration."cralaw virtua1aw
library
An appeal is allowed in these aforesaid cases as these orders, decrees or
judgments issued by a court in a special proceeding constitute a final
determination of the rights of the parties so appealing. 22 In contrast,
interlocutory orders are not appealable as these are merely incidental to
judicial proceedings. In these cases, the court issuing such orders retains
control over the same and may thus modify, rescind, or revoke the same
on sufficient grounds at any time before final judgment. 23
In the instant case, the Order dated April 2,1981 of the trial court decreed,
among others, that Maria Manuel Vda. De Biascan, the lawful wife of the
deceased Florencio Biascan, private respondent Rosalina Biascan and her
brother, German Biascan, are entitled to participate in the settlement
proceedings. Moreover, the said Order likewise denied Marias motion to set
aside the order appointing private respondent as regular administratrix of
the estate. These rulings of the trial court were precisely questioned by
Maria in her Motion for Reconsideration dated June 6, 1981.
The ruling of the trial court that Maria, private respondent Rosalina Biascan
and German Biascan were entitled to participate in the settlement
proceedings falls squarely under paragraph (b), Section 1, Rule 109 of the
Rules of Court as a proper subject of appeal. By so ruling, the trial court
has effectively determined that The three persons are the lawful heirs of
the deceased. As such, the same may be me proper subject of an appeal.
Similarly, the ruling of the trial court denying petitioners motion to set
aside the order appointing private respondent as the regular administratrix
of the estate of Florencio Bisacan is likewise a proper subject of an appeal.
We have previously held that an order of the trial court appointing a
regular administrator of a deceased persons estate is a final determination
of the rights of the parties thereunder, and is thus, appealable. 24 This is in
contrast with an order appointing a special administrator who is appointed
only for a limited time and for a specific purpose. Because of the temporary
character and special character of this appointment, the Rules deem it not
advisable for any party to appeal from said temporary appointment. 25
Considering however that private respondent has already been appointed
as regular administratrix of the estate of Florencio Biascan, her
appointment as such may be questioned before the appellate court by way
of appeal.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
It is thus clear that the Order dated April 2, 1981 may be the proper
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