Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1424

February 17, 1948

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
FERNANDO CARPIZO, defendant-appellee.

The motion to quash is well-taken. The alleged victim of the attack, a mere
clerk in the provincial auditor's office, is not a person in authority or an agent
of a person in authority. A person in authority, in the words of article 152 of
the Revised Penal Code, is "any person directly vested with jurisdiction,
whether as an individual or as a member of some court or governmental
corporation, board or commission;" while an agent of a person in authority is
one who, by direct provisions of law, or by appointment by competent
authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection
and security of life and property, or who comes to the aid of a person in
authority. (U. S. vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472.)

TUASON, J.:

Even if, as the Solicitor General says, it be possible that this particular clerk
might be clothed with functions that bring him under the above definition of
an agent of a person in authority, still such functions must be clearly shown
in the information. Merely to say that a clerk is an agent of a person in
authority is a conclusion of the law. Jurisdictional facts must be alleged if
courts are to entertain jurisdiction. Court jurisdiction is not made to depend
on what might turn up in the course of the trial.

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Sulu

dismissing an information for assault upon an agent of authority with slight
physical injuries, on a motion to quash based on the ground that the facts
alleged in the said information do not constitute the crime charged.

With the elimination of the charge for assault, the remaining offense does
not fall within the original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. The
offense of slight physical injuries, formerly a mere misdemeanor, is, upon the
allegations of the information, punishable with arresto menor.

The information recites as follows:

The order of the lower court granting the motion to quash is affirmed.

Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor General

Manuel Tomacruz for appellant.
Diosdado Pion and Paulino J. Sevilla for appellee.

That on or about the 29th day of April, 1946, in the municipality of

Jolo, Province of Sulu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the said accused being the husband of Mrs. Martina Carpizo,
the creditor of provincial voucher No. A-2250, which voucher is on
pre-audit in the possession of Eutiquio de la Victoria, clerk, duly
appointed in the office of the Provincial Auditor of Sulu, and while
the said Eutiquio de la Victoria was in the point of writing on the
typewriter the tentative suspension of said voucher No. A-2250, for
being defective, did the and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
attacked the said Eutiquio de la Victoria and took hold of his neck
with his left hand and at the same time inflicted upon him a fistic
blow on his left cheek which produced a contusion thereon and
scratches on the left arm, which injuries have required and will
require medical attendance for a period of four days and have
incapacitated and incapacitate him in the customary performance of
his official duties as such clerk for the same period of time.

Paras, Perfecto, and Briones, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Felipe Sion alias "Junior," whose full name is Felipe Rodriguez Sion,
Jr. 2 (hereafter appellant Sion), and Federico Disu alias "Miguel" (hereafter
appellant Disu), seasonably appealed therefrom to this Court 3 in view of the
penalty imposed. 4

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 109617 August 11, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELIPE SION @ "JUNIOR," JOHNNY JUGUILON, EDONG SION, FELIX
SION @ "ELLET," and FEDERICO DISU @ MIGUEL," accused.
FELIPE SION @ "JUNIOR" and FEDERICO DISU @ "MIGUEL," accusedappellants.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In its decision 1 in Criminal Case No. D-10796 dated 20 January 1993, but
promulgated on 8 February 1993, Branch 44 (Dagupan City) of the Regional
Trial Court of the First Judicial Region decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Felipe Sion alias "Junior"
and Federico Disu alias Miguel Disu guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principals of the crime of Murder pursuant to Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, and in view of the attendance of the
aggravating circumstance of cruelty which is not offset by any
mitigating circumstance, the two accused are hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, and to indemnify jointly
the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs
of the proceedings.
Accused Felipe Sion alias "Junior" and Federico Disu alias Miguel
Disu are ordered to pay jointly the heirs of the victim the sum of
P11,910.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.

The case against appellants commenced with the filing of a criminal

complaint for Murder 5 on 19 November 1991 in Criminal Case No. 2141
(SP-91) before the Fourth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Fabian-San
Jacinto in the Province of Pangasinan. Charged with appellants therein were
Johnny Juguilon, Edong Sion, Felix Sion alias"Ellet," and "four (4) other John
Does." After appropriate preliminary examination, Judge Sergio Garcia of
said court issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused with no bail fixed for
their temporary liberty. 6 However, the warrant was served only on appellant
Disu, while the rest then remained at large. Upon appellant Disu's motion for
bail, to which Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Restituto Dumlao, Jr.,
recommended that bail be fixed at P40,000.00 for said accused only, the
court fixed said accused's bail at such amount; and upon filing and approval
of the bail bond, appellant Disu was ordered released. 7 Subsequently, one
Atty. Fernando Cabrera filed, for the rest of the accused, a motion to reduce
the bail from P40,000.00 to
P20,000.00. 8 As Provincial Prosecutor Dumlao agreed to a reduction of
P10,000.00, the court granted the motion and fixed bail at P30,000.00. None
of them, however, filed a bail bond.
For failure of the accused to submit the required counter-affidavits, the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, finding probable cause against all the accused
for the crime of murder on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution,
ordered the transmittal of the record of the case, including the bail bond of
accused Federico Disu, to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pangasinan for appropriate action. 9
On 21 January 1992, an Information 10 was filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), First Judicial Region, in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, against
appellants Sion and Disu and Johnny Juguilon, Edong Sion, Felix
Sion alias"Ellet," and four (4) unidentified persons (designated as John,
Peter, Richard and Paul Doe), accusing them of the crime of murder
committed as follows:
That on or about October 16, 1991 in the evening at Brgy. Binday,
municipality of San Fabian, province of Pangasinan, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with stones and a bladed weapon
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with

intent to kill with treachery and evident premeditation did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously hurl with stones, attack and
stab Fernando Abaoag inflicting upon him the following injuries:
stab wound 1 1/2 inches in
width, 9 inches in depth
between 10-11 ICS, mid
axillary area slanting upwards
hitting the left lobe of the lung
stab wound right lateral side
of the neck 1 1/2, inch in depth
stab wound 1 1/2 inches in
width, 1 1/2 in depth mid
scapular area, left
contusion superimposed
abrasion left eyebrow
which caused his instant death, to the damage
and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code.
The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. D-10796 and assigned
to Branch 44 thereof.
On 2 June 1992, accused Sion was arrested. 11 Then on 10 June 1992, the
RTC annulled and voided the bail earlier granted to appellant Disu by the
MCTC Judge Sergio Garcia for luck of proper hearing, denied the motion for
bail filed by appellant Sion, and ordered their detention in jail. 12
Since only appellants Sion and Disu were arrested, the case proceeded
against them only. Upon arraignment, both pleaded not guilty to the charge
and waived pre-trial. 13
The prosecution's witnesses were Cesar and Felicitas Abaoag, the brother
and the wife of the victim, respectively; Dr. Leopoldo Manalo, San Fabian
Municipal Health Officer; Rosendo Imuslan, barangay captain of Barangay
Binday; and SPO1 Ricardo Abrio. On the other hand, the defense presented

as its witness appellant Disu; appellant Sion; Corazon Sion, wife of appellant
Sion; and Dr. Leopoldo Manalo.
The evidence for the prosecution as established by the testimonies of its
witnesses is partly summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General in the
Brief for the Appellee, as follows:
On or about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of October 16, 1991, Cesar
Abaoag was at the barangay road in front of his house situated in
Binday, San Fabian, Pangasinan. He was with his elder brother
Carlos Abaoag and Ricardo Manuel (p. 6, TSN, August 20, 1992)
when all of a sudden, Ronnie Manuel arrived coming from the west
complaining that he was being chased by Felipe Sion and Johnny
Juguilon (p. 7, TSN, id.). On that same occasion, Fernando Abaoag
also arrived at the scene. He said to Ronnie, "why Ronnie, you are
making trouble again." The latter answered, "I am not making
trouble uncle because while I was inside the house of Eling
Alcantara, Felipe Sion and Johnny Juguilon were trying to stab me.
(p. 8, TSN, id.). Seconds later, Felipe Sion and Johnny Juguilon
appeared and started throwing stones. Fernando Abaoag told them
to stop throwing stones but before they desisted and left, one of
them uttered "even you Andong, you are interfering, you will also
have your day, vulva of your mother, you Abaoag[s]" (pp. 9-10, id.)
Apparently, the utterance was directed against Fernando Abaoag
whose nickname is Andong.
Subsequently thereafter, at about 9:00 o'clock on that same
evening, Cesar Abaoag while inside his house lying down on his
bed heard the sound of stone throwing at the nearby house of his
brother Fernando. He went out to see who were throwing stones
(14, TSN, id.). When already near the house of Lolly Galdones,
Cesar Abaoag saw his brother Fernando already outside his house.
He also saw Johnny Juguilon, one of the members of the group of
stone throwers, hurl a big stone against Fernando. Upon being hit
on the left eyebrow, Fernando turned his back towards Felix Sion,
Edong Sion and Miguel Disu who were also throwing stones
towards his direction. On the other hand, appellant Felipe Sion,
who was near the victim, with a very sharp double bladed dagger,
stabbed Fernando, first on the left side just below the armpit, then
on the left waistline and finally on the right side of the neck below
the jaw (pp. 18-19, TSN, id.).

Cesar tried to extend help to his brother but Miguel Disu hurled a
stone on him which landed on his right side below the armpit. When
he heard Felipe Sion shouting to his companions saying, "we will
also kill Cesar," Cesar desisted in helping brother (pp. 22-23,
TSN, id.). Instead, he ran to his brother's house and informed
Felicitas, the wife, about the helpless condition of Fernando (pp.
22-23, TSN, id.). Upon being informed, Felicitas accompanied by
Carlos Abaoag, went to the place of the incident. The assailants
were no longer there. She only saw her husband lying prostate on
the ground very weak in the state of dying. When she inquired what
happened, Fernando answered "naalaak" which in English means
"I was hit" (pp. 4-5, TSN, July 27, 1992). Fernando told his wife that
his assailants were Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu, Edong Sion, Johnny
Juguilon and Felix Sion (p. 6, TSN, id.)
The victim was rushed to St. Blaise Hospital in San Fabian but he
was pronounced dead on arrival (pp. 24-25, TSN, August 20,
1992).
Dr. Leopoldo Manalo, a Municipal Health Officer of San Fabian,
Pangasinan conducted post mortemexamination (Exh. A) on the
body of the victim. The result of his findings showed that Fernando
Abaoag sustained the following injuries, to wit:
1) stab wound 1 1/2 inches in width, 9 inches in depth between 1011, ICS, mid axillary area slanting upwards hitting the left lobe of
the lung
2) stab wound right lateral side of the neck 1 1/2 inches in width, 1
1/2 inch in depth
3) stab wound 1 1/2 inches in width, 1 1/2 in depth mid scapular
area, left
4) contusion superimposed abrasion left eyebrow. 14
Dr. Manalo further testified that the stab wounds were caused by a sharppointed instrument, possibly a dagger, with the first wound hitting the lower
lobe of the left lung causing severe bleeding and its eventual collapse. He
determined the cause of death to be hemorrhagic shock secondary to
multiple stab wounds. 15

Barangay Captain Imuslan testified that he and Kagawad Fernando

Gatchalian, on the night of the incident, found a small bolo and a bloodied
double-bladed weapon (dagger) near the scene of the crime. 16 Cesar
Abaoag recognized this weapon as the one used by appellant Sion in
stabbing the
victim. 17 On her part, Felicitas Abaoag declared that she spent more than
P11,000.00 for the wake and burial of her husband whose death saddened
her, she being left alone to take care of their children. 18
In his defense, appellant Sion, brother and cousin of accused Edong 19 Sion
and Felix Sion alias "Ellet," respectively, admitted that on the night in
question, he participated in a stone-throwing incident and "free-for-all
rumble" between his group (the Sions and Johnny Juguilon) on one hand,
and the Abaoags and Manuels, on the other. However, he professed his
innocence, claiming that it was his brother Edong Sion and Johnny Juguilon
who stabbed the victim. 20 His version of the incident was summarized by the
trial court, thus:
On October 16, 1991 at about 7:00 p.m., he, together with Johnny
Juguilon went to the house of Eling Alcantara as he wanted to talk
with his son, his friend. Ronnie Manuel was already there when
they arrived. While at the place, Johnny Juguilon and Ronnie
Manuel came out and started fighting with each other. Ronnie and
Manuel ran and proceeded to the place of his cousin. He was
pacifying Johnny Juguilon and Ronnie Manuel but Johnny Juguilon
threw stones at Ronnie Manuel. At this point, Fernando Abaoag
intervened in the quarrel saying, "vulva of your mother Johnny, you
are too much, you will also have your day." Johnny Juguilon
answered "vulva of your mother Andoy, do not interfere because
you are not our enemy." After the verbal exchange, he took Johnny
Juguilon to their (Sion's) house . . . . At about 9:00 p.m., that same
evening, they stoned their house, its sides and the stairs. He and
Idong and Johnny Juguilon looked for Cesar Abaoag, Ronnie
Manuel, Ricky Manuel, Andong Abaoag and two (2) other
companions. They were at the place of Marta Soriano. After that,
they still threw stones towards them. There was a free for all rumble
between Ronnie Manuel, Ricky Manuel, the Abaoags and Idong
Sion, and Johnny Juguilon, Ellet Sion and himself, in front of the
house of Loly Galdones. He denied the testimony of Cesar Abaoag
that he stabbed Fernando Abaoag three times and before he was
stabbed Johnny Juguilon stoned him (Fernando Abaoag). It was
Idong Sion and Johnny Juguilon who stabbed Fernando Abaoag.
After Fernando Abaoag was stabbed, they ran away. His group also
ran away. He went home and rushed towards Johnny Juguilon

because he was stabbed. He brought Juguilon to the St. Blaise

Clinic and Hospital. He did not report the incident to Barangay
Captain Rosendo Imuslan. On October 17, 1:00 p.m., he presented
himself to Kagawad Lagman who brought him to the Police
Station . . . . 21

Then, at a distance of two (2) meters, Cesar Abaoag saw accused

Felipe Sion stab Fernando Abaoag three times, hitting the left side
below the armpit, then on the left waistline and the right side of the
neck below the jaw of the deceased with the use of a sharp double
bladed dagger.

In his defense, appellant Disu offered denial and alibi. He declared that he
had no participation in the killing of Fernando Abaoag, and during the whole
night of 16 October 1991, while the quarrel, stoning and stabbing incidents in
question were taking place, he was resting and sleeping in the house of his
employer, Felicidad Gatchalian, after driving the latter's jeepney the entire
day. However, before proceeding home from work that afternoon, he went to
the store of Oping Juguilon to buy cigarettes and dropped by the house of
appellant Sion where he stayed for about five minutes. He only learned
about the killing the following morning when he was told that he was one of
the suspects. He was arrested about a month after the incident. 22

Cesar Abaoag could not be mistaken in the identification because

he was two meters away when he saw the accused Felipe Sion
stab his brother, and, moreover, there was a light illuminating the
place of the incident coming from the houses of Marta Soriano and
Loly Caldones. Cesar Abaoag identified the dagger (Exhibit D).

On rebuttal, Cesar Abaoag refuted the testimony of appellant Sion. Cesar

asserted that neither his brothers, the Manuels nor himself threw stones at
Sion's house; there was no free-for-all fight between the Sions and the
Abaoags; Johnny Juguilon and Edong Sion merely threw stones at, but did
not stab, Fernando Abaoag; and it was only appellant Sion who stabbed
Fernando Abaoag. 23
After the conclusion of trial, the court granted appellants' motion to file a
memorandum within fifteen days. Despite the extension given, appellants'
counsel did not file the memorandum. Thus, in its order of 11 December
1992, the trial court declared the case submitted for decision. 24
On 8 February 1993, the trial court promulgated its decision, 25 the
dispositive portion quoted in the introductory paragraph of this ponencia.
As to the culpability of appellants Sion and Disu, the trial court found:
The defense of accused Federico Disu alias Miguel Disu and Felipe
Rodriguez Sion, Jr. deserve scant consideration. Cesar Abaoag
narrated in detail how his brother Fernando Abaoag was stoned by
accused Johnny Juguilon, Federico Disu and Felix Sion and how
accused Felipe Sion stabbed Fernando Abaoag three times. Cesar
Abaoag saw Johnny Juguilon throw stone hitting the left eyebrow of
Fernando Abaoag, and when his brother (Fernando Abaoag) turned
left, accused Federico Disu alias Miguel Disu, Idong Sion and Felix
Sion simultaneously threw stones toward him (Fernando Abaoag).

The narrations of Cesar Abaoag are bolstered by the testimony of

Dr. Leopoldo Manalo, the doctor who conducted the postmortem
examination on the cadaver of Fernando Abaoag. Dr. Manalo
stated that "stab wound 1 1/2 inches in width, 9 inches in depth
between 10-11 ICS, mid-axillary area slanting upwards hitting the
left lobe of the lung" is located below the left armpit. The second
stab wound, "stab wound right lateral side of the neck 1 1/2 inches
in width, 1 1/2 in depth," is located at the right side of the nec[k] at
the back. The doctor stated that the wounds were caused possibly
by a dagger.
Finally, it is well to quote the statement uttered by Fernando
Abaoag in the presence of Felicitas Abaoag, to wit: "naalaak, which
means, I was hit, take note of this because I cannot survive these
injuries of mine". Fernando Abaoag told Felicitas Abaoag, Felipe
Sion, Miguel Disu, Idong Sion, Johnny Juguilon and Felix Sion
stabbed him. (2-12 tsn July 27, 1992). This is a dying declaration
because it was made under a consciousness of impending death
(Section 37, Rule 130, Rules of Court). 26
The trial court likewise found that conspiracy was duly established by the
prosecution, thus:
As stated in the decision, accused Johnny Juguilon threw stone,
hitting the left eyebrow of Fernando Abaoag, and Edong Sion, Felix
Sion and Federico (Miguel) Disu simultaneously threw stones upon
the deceased, while accused Felipe Sion alias "Junior" stabbed him
(victim) three times, resulting in the latter's death. 27
It then appreciated against appellants (a) the qualifying circumstance of
treachery because the "attack was so sudden that the victim had no time to

defend himself" and (b) the generic aggravating circumstance of cruelty

because "there were three stab wounds" and the first wound which
"caused severe bleeding and collapse of the lung" and the death of
Fernando Abaoag "was deliberately augmented by inflicting the other
wounds which are unnecessary for its commission." 28 It did not, however,
appreciate evident premeditation for lack of "substantial" evidence; 29 nor
give the benefit of voluntary surrender in favor of appellant Sion since his
surrender was merely "forced by circumstances," as he "presented himself
to Kagawad Lagman because he was suspected as one of the persons who
stabbed the victim." 30
Appellants, through counsel, seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal.

31

In their eight-page Appellant's Brief, filed by counsel de oficio Atty. Iris L.

Bonifacio, 32 appellants plead for their acquittal, contending that the trial court
erred: (1) in convicting them of murder; (2) in taking into account the
aggravating circumstance of cruelty; (3) in ruling that conspiracy was
established; (4) in not appreciating the presence of voluntary surrender; and
(5) in disregarding the defense of appellant Sion that it was Edong Sion and
Johnny Juguilon who were responsible for the death of Fernando Abaoag.
In support of their first assigned error, appellants attack the identification
made of them by prosecution witnesses. They claim that if witness Cesar
Abaoag actually saw appellant Sion stab the victim, then Cesar should have
immediately informed Felicitas Abaoag, the victim's wife, of this fact. Cesar's
failure was then unusual and unnatural. Then, too, Felicitas Abaoag's
testimony on her husband's alleged dying declaration was "not specific" as
far as the assailant's identities were concerned because the victim merely
said "naalaak" ("I was hit"), without identifying appellant Sion as the one who
stabbed him; and, her claim that her husband identified all the five (5)
accused as the ones who "stabbed" him was "an impossibility." Moreover,
the prosecution witnesses were limited to relatives of the victims; "other vital
witnesses" such as Marta Soriano, Loly Galdones, or Eling Alcantara
should have been presented to corroborate the "biased" testimonies of
Cesar and Felicitas Abaoag.
Appellants further contend that: (1) there was no treachery since the
stabbing of the victim was not "sudden"; (2) cruelty was not proven because
"there is no clear testimony" that the first stab wound was fatal and the
second and third wounds were "unnecessary"; (3) conspiracy cannot be
deduced from the mere fact that all the accused threw stones at the victim
before the stabbing; (4) appellant Sion voluntarily surrendered even before
the police started investigating the case when he was not yet a suspect; and

(5) appellant Sion could not have testified that it was Edong Sion and
Johnny Juguilon who stabbed the victim if such were not true, considering
that the former is his brother and the latter his barriomate; and (6) appellant
Sion bore no grudge against the victim and did not escape.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, in its Brief for the
Appellee, supports the trial court's findings and conclusions, except as to the
appreciation of cruelty, which it concedes to be erroneous.
Our careful review of the record of the evidence adduced by the parties
convinces us that prosecution witness Cesar Abaoag positively identified
appellants as being present during the incident in question and saw
appellant Sion stab the victim thrice. As correctly found by the trial court:
Cesar Abaoag could not be mistaken in the identification because
he was two meters away when he saw the accused Felipe Sion
stab his brother, and, moreover, there was a light illuminating the
place of the incident coming from the houses of Marta Soriano and
Loly Caldones. Cesar Abaoag identified the dagger (Exhibit D).
Cesar Abaoag also saw the rest of the accused, including appellant Disu,
throwing stones at the victim. He was definite, however, that it was only
accused Johnny Juguilon who was able to hit the victim at the left eyebrow.
The three stab wounds inflicted by appellant Sion and the injury at the left
eyebrow caused by the stone thrown by Juguilon jibed with the post
mortem findings of Dr. Manalo as he described the injury on the left eyebrow
as "contusion superimposed abrasion left eyebrow." 33 If Cesar had any
ulterior motive to testify against appellant Disu, he could have declared that
it was Disu, and not Juguilon, who hit the victim with a stone. Cesar then
honestly narrated what he observed.
That Cesar did not at once inform Felicitas Abaoag that it was appellant Sion
who stabbed her husband, was not proof, as appellants suggest, that Cesar
was absent from the crime when it was committed. Cesar's presence was
admitted by appellant Sion himself on direct examination, thus:
Q Did you see Cesar Abaoag on that occasion
anywhere near Fernando Abaoag when you said
he was stabbed by Johnny Juguilon and Idong
Sion?
A Yes, sir. 34

Furthermore, Cesar satisfactorily explained his failure to forthwith inform

Felicitas of this fact. At that time, Cesar himself was running away from the
accused who had hit him with a stone. His pressing concern then was to get
someone to help his wounded brother; besides, he was scared of accused
Felix Sion, uncle of appellant Sion, who was a "notorious" character in their
neighborhood. 35 It is settled that delay in divulging the name of the
perpetrator of a crime, if sufficiently explained, does not impair the credibility
of the witness nor destroy its probative value. 36 In any event, in his sworn
statement 37 which was submitted on 22 October 1991 before Judge Sergio
Garcia, he narrated what he had witnessed and mentioned appellants Sion
and Disu as among the perpetrators of the crime.
The identifications of appellants and their co-accused were further bolstered
by the declaration made by the victim to his wife, Felicitas Abaoag. The trial
court correctly characterized this as a "dying declaration," 38 having been
made under the consciousness of impending death. The victim was already
weak his wife saw him and he knew that he would not survive the injuries he
sustained; he even died a few minutes later while on the way to the
hospital. 39 When Felicitas saw her husband, he told her what had happened
to him, who caused his injuries and that he did not expect to live, thus:
Q What happened next after that when you met
your husband?

COURT:
Proceed.
PROSECUTOR DUMLAO:
Q Do you know the reason why he was hit?
A What I understand is that in the course of his
pacifying the trouble between his nephew and the
rest, he was stabbed, sir.
Q Aside from the statement of your husband
Fernando Abaoag that he was hit, what else did
he say, if you know?
A He said, take note of this because I know I
cannot survive with these injuries of mine.
COURT:
Q What else did he tell you aside from that?

A Immediately asked him what happened to him.

Q And what was the answer of Fernando
Abaoag?
A He said, "naalaak," which means, I was hit.
COURT:
Q Did you ask him why he said "naalaak"?
A He said he was stabbed and he was injured.
Q What do you mean by word "naalaak"?
A I was hit.

A He said, remember that in case I cannot

survive with the injuries that I sustained, the men
who stabbed me are Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu,
Idong Sion, Johnny Juguilon and Felix Sion,
sir. 40(emphasis supplied)
We find these statements given by the victim to his wife to have met the
requisites of a dying declaration under Section 37 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, viz: (a) death is imminent and the declarant was conscious of that
fact; (b) the preliminary facts which bring the declaration within its scope
must be made to appear; (c) the declaration relates to the facts or
circumstances pertaining to the fatal injury or death; and (d) the declarant
would have been competent to testify had he survived. 41 Dying declarations
are admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule because
of necessity and trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarant's death
renders impossible his taking the witness stand, and it often happens that
there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime; and trustworthiness,
for it is "made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and every

hope of this world is gone; when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and
the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the
truth. 42 We find no ulterior motive on the part of Felicitas to fabricate the
declarations of her husband.
We likewise find to be without basis appellants' claim that all the prosecution
witnesses were biased due to their relation to the victim's family. Plainly,
witnesses Imuslan (the barangay captain) and Dr. Manalo were not related
to the victim, while the relationship of witnesses Cesar Abaoag and Felicitas
Abaoag to the victim, as brother and wife, respectively, neither disqualified
them as witnesses nor rendered their testimony unworthy of belief. It is not
to be lightly supposed that relatives of the deceased would callously violate
their conscience to avenge the death of a dear one by blaming it on persons
whom they believe to be innocent thereof. 43 A witness' relationship to a
victim, far from rendering his testimony biased, would even render the same
more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in
vindicating the crime to accuse somebody other than the real culprit. 44
Neither was the failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses, such
as those mentioned by the appellants, fatal to the cause of the People. It is
well-settled that the decision as whom to present as witnesses for the
prosecution is addressed to the sound discretion of the prosecutor handling
the case and the non-presentation of certain witnesses by the prosecution is
not a plausible defense. 45 The prosecution is not obliged to present all
possible witnesses, especially if their testimony will only serve to corroborate
that of another eyewitness' testimony, in which case the former may every
well be dispensed with considering that the testimony of a single witness, if
credible and positive to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, would suffice. 46
The trial court correctly rejected appellant Sion's defense that it was not he
who stabbed the victim, but his brother Edong Sion and Johnny Juguilon,
both of whom fled after the incident. Constituting a mere denial of Cesar
Abaoag's positive testimony that it was appellant Sion who stabbed the
victim, such must fail in light of the settled rule of evidence that positive
testimony is stronger that negative testimony. 47 Moreover, the claim was
made rather late in the day, casting serious doubt as to its veracity. From the
time that appellant Sion presented himself to Kagawad Lagman and the
police authorities on 17 October 1991, and during his subsequent
incarceration, he never told anyone nor made any statement that he was not
one who stabbed the victim; he did not even so inform his close relatives,
not even his wife who visited him in jail. 48 Also, during the preliminary
investigation, when he had the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and
other evidence to refute the charges, he did not care to dispute the

statements of Felicitas and Cesar Abaoag identifying him and detailing his
participation in the crime. 49He raised this claim for the first time only during
his testimony in court almost one (1) year after the stabbing incident and his
initial surrender, and notably, only after the hope of apprehending Idong Sion
and Johnny Juguilon, together with the other accused, already seemed
remote. Such failure to immediately disclose the information as soon as he
was implicated in the crime and his prolonged silence on a vital matter
hardly inspire belief, being unnatural and inconsistent with ordinary habits of
men and common experience.
That appellant Sion did not flee, unlike his brother Edong and Johnny
Juguilon, neither proved his innocence. Non-flight unlike flight of an
accused which validly serves as a badge of guilt is simply inaction which
may be due to several factors; hence, it should not be construed as an
indication of innocence. 50
Appellant Sion's claim of lack of ill-feeling or grudge against Fernando
Abaoag was belied and contradicted by his admission in court that just
before the stabbing of the victim, he and his co-accused hurled stones at
and fought with the Abaoags, including Fernando, whom he blamed for
allegedly stoning his house. 51 It is also belied by his actuation and utterance
made earlier in the evening of 16 October 1991 when Fernando Abaoag
interfered in the quarrel between appellant Sion and Fernando's nephew,
Ronnie Manuel, which prompted appellant Sion and Johnny Juguilon to
curse and warn Fernando, thus: "even you Andong [Fernando Abaoag] you
are interfering, you are siding with your nephew Ronnie Manuel, you have
also your day . . . . you Abaoags." 52 Appellant Sion also admitted that he
"had an ill-feeling towards" Ronnie Manuel, the victim's nephew, because
"he was making trouble" inside his jeepney "5 days before the incident." 53
In light of the positive identification of appellants, appellant Disu's alibi must
fail.
It is settled that alibi is a weak defense for it is easy to concoct and fabricate;
it cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face of the positive identification
by credible witnesses that an accused perpetrated the crime. 54We are
unable to discern any plausible reason, and appellant Disu does not offer
any, why he should be falsely implicated by Cesar Abaoag and mentioned in
the victim's dying declaration as one of the victim' assailants, if appellant
Disu was not actually present during the incident and had no participation in
the commission of the crime. As to his motive or lack thereof, appellant Disu
claims that he had no misunderstanding with Fernando Abaoag or his
family. 55 However, Felipe Sion, Jr., disclosed that appellant Disu was close

to the Sion clan, which explains why appellant Disu sympathized with and
joined the Sions and Juguilon in assaulting the victim: Federico Disu was
Sion Jr.'s jeepney conductor for five (5) months, the latter teaching the
former how to drive for three (3) months; and when Disu became a driver
himself, they had the same route and saw each other every day at the
poblacion. 56 Disu even admitted that on 16 October 1991, after 5:00 p.m., he
"dropped by" the house of Felipe Sion, which he often did before. 57
We now rule on the presence or absence of conspiracy. There is conspiracy
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 58 Direct proof of a previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary; it may be deduced from the
mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from
acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose design,
concerted action and community of interest. 59 Once conspiracy is
established, the act of one is the act of all. 60
In this case, appellants and the other accused were already at the barangay
road of Binday, near the houses of Lolly Galdones and Marta Soriano, when
Fernando Abaoag, who was looking for the persons who just stoned his
house several times, and Cesar Abaoag, arrived. Immediately, Johnny
Juguilon threw a stone at Fernando hitting him on the left eyebrow; then,
Edong, and Felix Sion and appellant Disu, "simultaneously" threw stones,
also at Fernando. As Fernando turned away from his assailants, appellant
Sion "rushed" and stabbed the victim three (3) times, even as the latter
raised his arms saying, "I will not fight back." When Cesar Abaoag tried to
help his brother Fernando, appellant Disu threw and hit Cesar with a stone.
Appellant Sion then commanded his companions to also kill Cesar,
prompting the latter to run away. Then the assailants fled, leaving behind a
small bolo and a dagger. The confluence of their acts indubitably manifested
a community of interest and unity of purpose and design to take Fernando
Abaoag's life.
We also find to be unsupported by evidence appellant's claim, through the
testimony of appellant Sion, that the fatal stabbing of Fernando Abaoag was
a result of a "free-for-all rumble," thereby possibly tempering their liability to
that of causing death in a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised
Penal Code, which carries a penalty lower than that for homicide. 61 In this
case, it was ascertained beyond doubt that appellant Sion inflicted the fatal
stab wounds; hence, this claim must be rejected.
Having resolved appellants' liability for Fernando Abaoag's death, we now
rule on the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime.

In convicting appellants of murder, the trial court considered the qualifying

circumstance of treachery, and disregarded the qualifying circumstance of
evident premeditation, which was likewise alleged in the information. We
agree as to the latter as the prosecution failed to prove the essential
elements of evident premeditation, viz: (a) the time when appellants
determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that they
clung to their determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such
determination and execution to allow them to reflect upon the consequences
of their act. 62
We disagree, however, with the trial court's finding as regards the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. Under the law, there is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly or specifically
to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make. 63 We find no clear and convincing evidence
of treachery. Cesar Abaoag's testimony as to how his brother was attacked
lacks sufficient detail showing conclusively that the mode and manner of the
assault rendered the victim entirely defenseless. He merely testified that
when he and his brother proceeded west of the barangay road of Binday, he
saw Johnny Juguilon stone his brother and hit him on the left eyebrow.
Fernando Abaoag then turned to the left with his back towards Felix Sion,
Edong Sion, Miguel Disu and the four (4) other unidentified companions,
who then "simultaneously" threw stones at Fernando. "Seconds later," Cesar
saw appellant Sion holding a very sharp double bladed dagger and stab his
brother three (3) times; Fernando Abaoag, when stabbed, "was just standing
and said 'I will not fight.'"64 They were six (6) meters away from Johnny
Juguilon when the latter first hurled a stone at Fernando which signaled the
other accused to the same. 65
Considering therefore the distance between the assailants and the victim
when the attack commenced, and the fact the three were two (2) waves of
stoning which preceded the stabbing of the victim, these should have
sufficiently forewarned him of the greater danger which loomed and
prompted him to escape. Moreover, in light of the absence of clear details
showing conclusively that the stabbing was inflicted from behind or the victim
was entirely helpless when stabbed, we are not prepared to conclude that
the attack was "so sudden and unexpected" as to render the victim entirely
defenseless. Treachery cannot qualify the killing to murder when the victim
was forewarned of the attack by the assailant, or when the attack was
frontal, or the attack was not so sudden as to have caught the deceased
completely unaware. 66 Furthermore, the evidence does not disclose that the
means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by appellants.

Absent then of any qualifying circumstance, the crime committed was

homicide as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code.

he was already a suspect "does not gainsay the spontaneity of the

surrender, nor alter the fact that by giving himself up, he saved the State the
time and trouble of searching for him until arrested." 75

The trial court likewise erred in appreciating against appellants the generic
aggravating circumstance of cruelty, 67based solely on the fact that the victim
was stabbed thrice, with the first stab wound hitting the lower left lung
causing severe bleeding and its collapse. In fact, appellee concedes this
error of the trial court. Cruelty cannot be appreciated in absence of any
showing that appellants, for their pleasure and satisfaction, caused the
victim to suffer slowly and painfully and inflicted on him unnecessary
physical and moral pain; and, the mere fact that wounds in excess of what
was indispensably necessary to cause death were found on the body of the
victim does not necessarily imply that such wounds were inflicted with
cruelty and with the intention of deliberately intensifying the victim's
suffering. 68 In the instant case, the evidence only shows that the three (3)
stab wounds were delivered in succession, nothing more.

We disagree with Appellee's submission that there was no voluntary

surrender because appellant Sion surrender to a mere barangay "Kagawad"
or Sangguniang Barangay member, and not to the police authorities,
implying that the former is not a person in authority. 76 This ignores Section
388 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which expressly provides, in
part, that "[f]or purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay,
sangguniang barangay members, and members of the lupong
tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in
their jurisdictions . . . ." 77 This law expands the definition of a person in
authority under the Revised Penal Code, wherein among the barangay
officials, only the barangay captain or chairman, now called Punong
Barangay, is expressly considered a person in authority, as provided in
Article 152 thereof. Thus, in addition to the Punong Barangay, the members
of the Sangguniang Barangay, or Kagawads, and members of the Lupong
Tagapayapa are now considered not merely as agents of, but as persons, in
authority. 78

We agree with appellants that appellant Sion is entitled to the benefit of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, which requires that "the
offender voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority." 69 Its
requisites are: (a) the offender had not been actually arrested; (b) the
offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent;
and (c) the surrender was voluntary. 70 For a surrender to be voluntary, it
must be spontaneous and show the intent of the accused to submit himself
unconditionally to the authorities, either: (1) because he acknowledges his
guilt; or (2) because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense
incidental to his search and capture. 71
As shown by the records, in the afternoon of 17 October 1991, appellant
Sion "presented" himself to Kagawad Modesto Lagman who, in turn,
"escorted and surrendered" him to the police in the poblacion. 72 His
admission that he surrendered because he was already suspected as one of
the perpetrators of the crime does not make his surrender "forced by
circumstances" as ruled by the trial court. His arrest at that time was neither
imminent nor inevitable. At the time of his surrender, no warrant of arrest
against him had yet been issued, the same having been issued only on 19
November 1991. 73 In fact, he was released from custody after a few days,
and was ordered committed to jail only sometime in June 1992, after his
motion for bail was denied by the trial court on 10 June 1992 and was thus
taken into custody. 74 This subsequent fact should not diminish nor erase the
favorable effect of Felipe Sion Jr.'s voluntary surrender on 17 October 1991.
As has been held, whatever the accused's reason for surrendering either
the fear of reprisal from victim's relatives or, in this case, his knowledge that

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 44 (Dagupan City) of the

Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial Region in Criminal Case No. D10796 is MODIFIED. As modified, appellants FELIFE SION, alias "JUNIOR"
or FELIFE RODRIGUEZ, JR., and FEDERICO DISU, alias "MIGUEL," are
hereby declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the
crime of HOMICIDE as defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code, with the former entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are
sentenced, respectively, to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from
eight (8) years of prison mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years
and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and an
indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayormaximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum, with all the
accessory penalties therefor, and subject to the provision of Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code. Except as so modified, the rest of the challenged
judgment stands.
Costs against accused-appellants.SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19603 December 29, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CATALINO TEVES, defendant-appellant.
Leopoldo Rovira for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

OSTRAND, J.:
The defendant is accused of the crime of falsification of public documents,
the information alleging:
That on or about the period between January 1st and April 30th,
1921, in the municipality of Dumaguete, Province of Oriental
Negros, P. I., and within the jurisdiction of this court the said
accused being the warden of the provincial prison of this province
did at that time and place wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit
the crime of falsification of public documents by making an
untruthful statement of facts and by simulating the intervention of
persons who had not intervened in various public documents, to
wit: In the provincial voucher No. 350 of February, 1921; in the
provincial voucher No. 724 of March, 1921; and in the provincial
voucher No. 1075 of April, 1921; stating therein facts which were
not true, by means of which falsification the accused made it
appear and simulated that he had purchased from a Chinese
person, Tan Juanco, of Dumaguete on the aforesaid dates and
place and under the provincial voucher No. 350, 1,1750 liters of
rice-corn at P0.13 per liter and 122 gantas of beans at P0.75 a
ganta, for the amount of P236.10; under provincial voucher No.
724, 150 liters of rice-corn at P0.13 a liter, 75 gantas of beans at
P0.75 a ganta, 65 kilos of dry fish at P0.73 a kilo, and two sacks of
sugar at P6.90 a sack, for the sum of P254.12; and under the

provincial voucher No. 1075, 138 gantas of beans at P0.70 a ganta,

85 kilos of dry fish at P0.66 a kilo and a sack of salt at P4 a sack,
for the sum of P155.85; when as a matter of fact the aforesaid
accused had bought from said Tan Juanco only 114 gantas of ricecorn on January 8, 1921, for the sum of P80; that by means of said
falsification the accused succeeded in collecting from the
Government P566.07 more than he was entitled to, manifestly
contrary to law.
As will be seen, the information charges three separate offenses but the
defendant did not demur to it, or object, and under the doctrine established
in the case of United States vs. Balaba (37 Phil., 260), he must be
considered to have waived the right secured to him under section 21 of
General Order No. 58. The trial court found him guilty on all three counts
and, taking into consideration the aggravating circumstance of having taken
advantage of his position as a public functionary, sentenced him to suffer ten
years and one day of prision mayor and to pay a fine of 250 pesetas for
each offense; to indemnify the provincial treasury of Oriental Negros in the
sum of P566.07, to be perpetually disqualified for public office and to pay the
costs. From this judgment he appeals and presents six assignments of error.
The first assignment is to the effect that the trial court erred in taking into
consideration the aggravating circumstance that advantage was taken by the
defendant of his public position. This point is well taken; the defendant was
convicted under article 300 of the Penal Code which prescribes the penalty
of prision mayor and a fine for "any public officer, employee or notary who,
by taking advantage of his official position, shall be guilty of falsification of a
document." The taking advantage of official position being a necessary
element of the crime, it cannot, of course, also be taken into consideration
as an aggravating circumstance. The penalty imposed by the court below
must, accordingly, be reduced to that of the medium of prision mayor, there
being no aggravating or extenuating circumstance.
The second error assigned is that the court erred in convicting the accused
of three separate offenses in the same judgment, the penalty imposed thus
resulting disproportionate to the crime. This assignment is without merit; in
the case of United States vs. Balaba, supra, this court held (quoting
syllabus): "The accused having made no objection to the information on the
ground that it charged more than one offense, the prosecution properly
submitted evidence as to the commission of each and all of the offenses
charged; and the court properly entered judgment of conviction of each and
all of these offenses which were established by the introduction of
competent evidence at the trial, and should, thereupon, have imposed the
prescribed penalties for each and all of the offenses of which the accused

was convicted in accord with the provisions of article 87 of the Penal

Code."lawphil.net
The penalty which we must impose upon the defendant may seem severe,
but it is that prescribed by law and its measure does not lie within the
discretion of the court; for his relief by way of a reduction of the penalty,
recourse must be had to a petition for executive clemency.
The remaining assignments of error relate to the admissibility of certain
documents offered by the prosecution and objected to by the defense
principally on the ground that they were not properly certified or
authenticated. Standing alone, the documents might be of doubtful
admissibility but taken in connection with the oral evidence they were, in our
opinion, properly admitted.
With the sole modification that the term of imprisonment imposed by the
lower court be reduced from ten years and one day to eight years and one
day of prision mayor for each of the three offenses charged in the
information, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against
the appellant. So ordered.
Araullo, C. J., Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

by the defense, stated that he knew the writing of the accused and did not
believe that the entry in question was made by Inosanto, while he did identify
the handwriting of other entries in that register as being that of the
latter.1awphil.net

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6896

October 23, 1911

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee,

vs.
ANTERO INOSANTO, defendant and appellant.
Lucas Gonzales, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

ARELLANO, C. J.:
The hearing on the appeal raised n this case has disclosed the
following facts:
1. The crime under prosecution consists of the making of a false entry
in a registry book of births of the municipality of Libacao, Province of Capiz,
by recording therein that the girl Maxima, the daughter of Caridad Zausa,
was the latter's legitimate daughter and that her father was Pedro Zausa,
when in fact he was not her father and she was not the legitimate, but the
natural daughter of Caridad Zausa.
2. Antero Inosanto was charged with having committed this
falsification in an official register, as he was the municipal secretary whose
duty it was to keep the same, and because, according to the complaint, he
wrote and recorded in the said register the following words: "Maxima Zausa,
legitimate daughter of Pedro Zausa and Caridad Zausa," which words are
contrary to and different from those uttered by {Pedro Zausa; the said
Inosanto thus preventing the truth in the narration of the facts.
3. Martin O. Ruiz, the successor of Antero Inosanto to the office of
municipal secretary, a witness for the prosecution, testified that he could not
positively identify the writing of the entry in the register of births,
aforementioned, as being that of Antero Inosanto, and, on cross-examination

4. According to the same witness, there is furthermore a certificate of

birth, and there was issued a corresponding birth certificate for Maxima
Zausa, which was presented as evidence in this case. This birth certificate is
a copy of the entry, and the witness positively asserts that the handwriting is
that of Vicente Coronel, an assistant to the former municipal secretary,
Antero Inosanto.
5. Antero Inosanto also issued a certificate which, according to the
same witness, is made out and delivered when requested, and was
presented in evidence as Exhibit C. There is no doubt that this certificate
was issued by Antero Inosanto. It, also, is an exact reproduction of the
falsified entry found in the register of births.
6. The Court of First Instance of Capiz, which tried the case, found
from the evidence that it was not Inosanto, but his clerk, Vicente Coronel,
who recorded the birth, and that, at the time Pedro Zausa presented himself,
Inosanto was in the council chamber, where the council was holding a
session.
7. Although the trial court did not consider the defendant guilty o the
falsification committed in the register itself, it held him liable for the falsity
contained in the certificate, Exhibit C, issued in accordance with that entry,
for the reason that he knowingly recorded a falsehood, for he knew that the
child Maxima Zausa could not be the legitimate daughter of Pedro and
Caridad, knowing that Caridad was Pedro's daughter, and, instead of
correcting and rectifying the entry in the register book, ratified and
sanctioned the falsification therein committed, by his issuance of this
certificate.
By virtue of these findings the court held that the defendant was guilty
of the crime penalized by article 310 of the Penal Code and accordingly
sentenced him to suspension from public office for a period of three years,
four months and one day, to pay a fine of 325 pesetas and, in case of
insolvency, to the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to the
payment of the costs.
The Attorney-General, in this instance, is of the opinion that, leaving
aside the question as to whether the defendant could issue the certificate

from these contained in the register book without incurring the crime of
falsification with which he is charged, Antero Inosanto certainly can not be
sentenced under the said article 310 of the Penal Code, inasmuch as the
Exhibit C is not a certificate of merit or service, of good conduct, of poverty
or of other similar circumstances, that is to say, of purely personal things or
accidentals, according to the interpretation given to the words of this last
phrase by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of February 17, 1877;
but that it is a certificate of an inscription in a register under his charge, with
the data of which it substantially agrees. Therefore he concluded that, with a
reversal of the judgment appealed from, the defendant should be acquitted,
and the costs assessed de oficio.
In entire agreement with the preceding opinion, the judgment
appealed from is reversed and the defendant acquitted, with the costs de
oficio.
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-67472

July 3, 1987

DARIO CABIGAS Y CACHO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
PARAS, J.:
Under separate informations both dated September 20, 1982, the Office of
the Tanodbayan charges Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y
Lopez on two (2) counts, with the crime of Falsification of Official Documents
allegedly committed in the following manner:
(1) Criminal Case No. 6529
That on or about March 29, 1982, in the Municipality of Makati,
Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez,
both public officers being then employed as Securities Custodian
and Securities Receiving Clerk, respectively, of the Land Bank of
the Philippines, Makati Branch, a government-owned and/or
controlled corporation, conspiring together, taking advantage of
their official position and committing the crime herein charged in
relation to their Office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify ... Securities Delivery Receipt dated March 9,
1982 ... evidencing, among others, receipt by them in their official
capacity of Treasury Bills bearing Serial No. A-000064 up to
A000082 of the 795th series, by then and there making alterations
and/or intercalations thereon to the effect that only treasury bills
bearing SN-A-000064 to A-000076 were received by them on
March 9, 1982, for the purpose of hiding or concealing the loss
while in their custody of six (6) treasury bills bearing SN-A-000077
to A-000082 of the 795th series, thereby changing the meaning of
said Securities Delivery Receipt.
(2) Criminal Case No. 6938

That on or about March 30, 1982 in the Municipality of Makati,

Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez,
both public officers, being then employed as Securities Custodian
and Securities Receiving Clerk, respectively, of the Land Bank of
the Philippines, Makati Branch, a government-owned and/or
controlled corporation, conspiring together, and taking advantage of
their official positions and committing the crime herein charged in
relation to their office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify the Daily Report of Securities/Documents under
custody dated March 30, 1982, which is an official document
evidencing the securities transactions and/or operations of the
Makati Branch of the aforenamed bank, and which it was their
official duty to prepare and submit to their superiors, by then and
there indicating in said document, for the purpose of hiding the loss
or disappearance while in their custody of six (6) treasury bills of
the 795th series, with face value of P500,000.00 each, that the
beginning balance of securities under their custody as to volume
was 1,533 pieces, when, the ending balance as to volume in the
previous day's report was 1,539 pieces and that the beginning
balance as to face value in the previous day's report was
P610,095,000.00 and thereafter falsely stating in the footnote of the
same document that the reduction was due to "Adjustment on
Erroneous Entry (incoming) dated 3/09/82" the truth being that the
six (6) pieces of treasury bills with aggregate face value of
P3,000,000.00 were not erroneously entered in either the Securities
Delivery Receipt or the Daily Report of Securities /Documents
under Custody, both dated March 9, 1982, but were discovered to
have been missing after an inventory conducted by accused on
March 20, 1982, thereby making an untruthful statement in a
narration of facts in violation of par. 4 of Articles 171 of the Revised
Penal Code.
After arraignment and trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in both
cases, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. 6529 ACQUITTING the accused Dario
Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, with costs de
officio and ordering their bail bonds in the said case cancelled.

2. In Criminal Case No. 6938:

a) Finding the accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of
Falsification of a Public or Official Document defined and
penalized under Article 171, paragraph No. 6 of the
Revised Penal Code without any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances; and applying the indeterminate Sentence
Law, hereby sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum, to
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as
maximum, to pay a fine of P2,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
b) ACQUITTING accused Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, with
costs de officio, an ordering his bail bond cancelled.
SO ORDERED.
The instant petition is an appeal, interposed by herein petitioner
Dario Cabigas y Cacho from the foregoing decision in Criminal
Case No. 6938.
The following pertinent facts are not disputed: Petitioner Dario
Cabigas is the Securities Custodian of the Securities Section of the
Land Bank of the Philippines assigned to its branch at Makati,
Metro Manila. Assisting him in his work is Benedicto Reynes, the
securities receiving clerk. The Fund Management Department
(FMD) of the Land Bank of the Philippines is engaged in money
market and securities trading transactions. The securities which are
in the form of treasury notes and bills are in turn deposited with the
Securities Section of the Land Bank of the Philippines, Makati
Branch.
On March 9, 1982, the Fund Management Department, delivered to
the Securities Section, Makati Branch of the Land Bank of the
Philippines, for safekeeping, 112 pieces of treasury notes and
treasury bills worth P46,000,000.00 and for which a copy of the
Securities Delivery Receipt (SDR) Exh. D, was issued to the Fund
Management Dept. while the original of the same was retained by
the Securities Section. Included in the securities received on March
9, 1982 are 19 pieces of treasury bills with Serial Nos. A-000064 to

A-000082, 795th series, in the denomination of P500,000.00 each,

or a total amount of P9,500,000.00. After receiving the securities,
the accused would prepare the Daily Report on
Securities/Documents Under Custody (DR SDUC) evidencing the
securities transactions and operations of the Makati Branch of the
Land Bank of the Philippines. This has been the routine procedure
being adopted by the accused in the performance of his duty as a
Security Custodian.
On March 29, 1982, in the course of their inventory of treasury
notes and bills deposited with them, Cabigas and Reynes
discovered the loss of six (6) treasury bills of the 795th series with a
total value of P3,000,000.00. Upon verification that Securities
Delivery Receipt (SDR) dated March 9, 1982, Exhibit C, was the
source document of the missing securities which were delivered to
them for safekeeping, accused Reynes crossed out with a red ink in
the said document the last two digits "82" and the addition after
them of the figure "76" on the serial numbers A-000064 to A000082 of the 19 treasury bills of the 795th series with a total
maturity value of P9,500,000.00. Then at the bottom of the SDR
Cabigas placed the notation "For adjustment" and below it the date
"3/29/82." Then upon Cabigas' suggestion, Reynes reported the
incident to their branch manager, Aurora Pigram When the DR
SDUC for March 29, 1982 was prepared, the number of treasury
bills of the 795th series stood at 1,539 pieces with a total face value
of P610,095,000.00.
The following day, Reynes prepared a draft report for March 30,
1982 by Carrying forward the ending balance of the treasury bills of
the 795th series reflected in the DR SDUC dated March 29, 1982.
However, instead of following the draft prepared by Reynes,
Cabigas prepared his own report-DR SDUC (Exh. "G ") dated
March 30, 1982 wherein he indicated 1,533 pieces of treasury bills
of the 795th series with a total amount of P607,095,000.00 which
the latter claimed to be the number of securities of the 795th series
in his possession at the time of the preparation of said report. At the
bottom of DR SDUC (Exh. "G") Cabigas place the notation
"Adjustment on Erroneous Entry (incoming) dated March 9, 1982"
as legend of the asterisk (*) sign which appears after the figure
"1,533."
On May 20, 1982, a certain Rosie Chua was found to be
authenticating with the Central Bank of the Philippines a treasury
bill of the 795th series with Serial No. A-000082 in the amount of

P500,000.00. Upon investigation by NBI agents, it was discovered

that the Land Bank of the Philippines Makati Branch Manager,
Aurora Pigram was the one who negotiated the said treasury bill
with the Gainsbo Commodities. Further investigation revealed that
the five (5) missing treasury bills with series numbers A-000077 to
A-000081 were negotiated by Pigram with the Home Savings Bank
to secure a loan. The Land Bank immediately sought the
assistance of the NBI in investigating the case. On May 24, 1982,
Cabigas and Reynes were investigated by NBI agents. After the
investigation, Cabigas and Reynes were arrested for having
allegedly conspired together in falsifying the Securities Delivery
Receipt (SDR) dated March 9, 1982 (Exh. "C") and the Daily Report
on Securities/Documents under custody (DR SDUC) Exh. G dated
March 30, 1982 and for which the corresponding informations were
filed with the Sandiganbayan. Both accused were acquitted in
Criminal Case No. 6529. However, accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho
was convicted in Criminal Case No. 6938, while his co-accused
was acquitted therein.
In convicting accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho, the Sandiganbayan
stated in its now assailed Decision that
In the case of Exhibit "G", the Daily Report on
Securities/Documents Under Custody (DR SDUC) for
March 30, 1982, the alleged falsification consists of the
following entries (figures) pertaining to treasury bills:
"1,533", "607,095,000.00", "1,533 and 607,095,000.00
"marked on the document as Exhibit G-1, and the legend
of the asterisk (*) sign at the bottom portion reading,
"Adjustment on erroneous entry (incoming) dated 3/09/82"
marked as Exhibit G-2. The numbers "1,533" and
"607,095,000.00" represent the volume and the total
face/maturity value, respectively, of the treasury bills
supposedly in the custody of the Securities Section as of
March 30, 1982. Those entries were falsifications, the
prosecution maintains, because the correct number of
treasury bills deposited with the Securities Section as of
that date was 1,539 valued at P610,095,000.00; that the
said figures were altered to "1,533 and 607,095,000.00,"
respectively, to conceal the loss or disappearance of 6
treasury bills worth P3,000,000.00, and that the footnote at
the bottom portion of the document (Exh. G-2) was written
to attribute the reduction in the number of treasury bills

from "1,539" to "1,533" to mistake or error in the entries in

the Securities Delivery Receipt of March 9, 1982 (Exh. C).
The discrepancy in the figures is indeed apparent. In the
DR SDUC for March 29, 1982 (Exh. F), the ending
balance on the number of treasury bills at the close of
office hours on that day was 1,539 pieces with a total
face/maturity value of P610,095,000.00 (Exh. F-1).
Accordingly, the beginning balance on the number of the
same treasury bills on the following day, March 30, 1982,
must also be 1,539 pieces with a total face/Maturity value
of P610,095,000.00. But as it was made to appear in the
DR SDUC for March 30, 1982 (Exhs. G and G-1), the
beginning and ending balances on the number and value
of treasury bills for that date were 1,533 pieces and
P607,095,000.00 maturity value.1avvphi1
The question now is, who caused the alterations and what
was caused the alteration and what was the purpose
behind them.
xxx

xxx

xxx

By changing the original figures in the draft of the DR

SDUC from "1,539" and "610" to "1,533" and "607"
respectively, and causing Reynes to type the final copy of
the DR SDUC on the basis of the corrected draft Cabigas
caused the document to show that the treasury bills in
their custody as of March 30, 1982 were 1,533 pieces with
a total face/maturity value of P607,095,000.00. By placing,
likewise, an asterisk (*) sign after the figure "1,533" and
writing the words "Adjustment on erroneous entry
(incoming) dated 3/09/82" as legend of the asterisk (*)
sign, Cabigas caused to make it appear that the
discrepancy of 6 treasury bills valued at P3,000,000.00
was due to error in the entries in the Securities Delivery
Receipt of March 9, 1982(Exh. C). Considering that the
said SDR of March 9, 1982 (Exh. C) did not contain any
error but reflected the number of securities received by
them on that day, it is obvious that Cabigas made the
alterations in Exhibit G and the misleading footnote (Exh.
G-2) in order to suppress, hide or conceal the fact that the

6 treasury bills comprising the discrepancy were lost while

in their custody.
The alterations amounted to falsification of Exhibit G, a
public or official document, under paragraph No. 4, Article
171, of the Revised Penal Code, by making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts. As Securities Custodian,
Cabigas was under obligation to disclose in the said
document the correct number and total maturity value of
the securities under his official custody as of March 30,
1982.
It is a settled doctrine that in falsification by an employee under par.
No. 4 of Article 171, which reads-"by making untruthful statements
in a narration of facts,"-the following elements must concur(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful
statements in a narration of facts;
(b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of
the facts narrated by him;
(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely
false; and
(d) That the perversion of truth in the narration of facts
was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third
person.
Herein petitioner contends that the foregoing elements are not
present in the case at bar. The correction of the figure from 1,539 to
1,533 pieces to conform to the actual number of treasury under
custody is not falsification because it was made to speak the truth
(US vs. Mateo, 25 Phil. 324). The placing of an asterisk (*) sign
after the figure "1,533" and writing the words, "Adjustment on
erroneous entry (incoming) dated 3/09/82" as legend of the asterisk
sign, contrary to the ruling of the respondent court, was not effected
to hide or conceal the fact that the missing 6 treasury bills were
lost. It would be far more difficult to detect or discover the loss if
there was no asterisk or footnote in the DR SDUC Exh. G. In fact,
the evidence discloses that immediately upon discovery of the loss
on March 29, 1982, petitioner reported the matter to his immediate

supervisor, Estela L. Espiritu and Branch Manager of the Securities

Section, Aurora Pigram. This shows good faith and lack of motive
on the part of petitioner to conceal the said loss.
Petitioner further argues that the Daily Report on
Securities/Documents under Custody (DR SDUC) is a form purely
devised and adopted by him. This form was never required, neither
was it introduced nor prescribed by the Land Bank. Petitioner,
therefore, was not under "legal obligation" to disclose in the DR
SDUC or SDR, the correct number and total maturity value of the
securities under their official custody as of a given date. It is purely
optional on the part of petitioner to use the said forms.
The Honorable Solicitor General recommends that the accused be
acquitted because
There is nothing to show the DR SDUC dated March 30, 1982, Exh.
G, for the alleged falsification of which petitioner was convicted in
Criminal Case No. 6938 is a form the submission of which was or is
required by law. In the petition for review, petitioner points out that
as testified by him the form was not an official form of the Land
Bank. The form was his own initiative adopted "for our own
convenience and also for reference purposes." Petitioner therefore,
was not under legal obligation to disclose or reveal the truth by said
DR SDUC. In the absence of such obligation and of the alleged
wrongful intent, defendant cannot be legally convicted of the crime
of falsification of public document with which he is charged. (People
vs. Quasha, 93 Phil. 333).
WHEREFORE, on ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 6938 is hereby REVERSED and
another one rendered ACQUITTING the petitioner, Dario Cabigas y Cacho.
Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22560

January 29, 1925

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSE S. DIZON, defendant-appellant.
Pedro Valdes Liongson for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that on the 25th day of April, 1923, a complaint
was filed in the court of the justice of the peace of the municipality of
Angeles, of the Province of Pampanga, against the above-named defendant,
charging him with misappropriation of a certain sum of money and
falsification. The defendant having renounced his right to a preliminary
investigation, the cause was forwarded for further proceedings to the Court
of First Instance of said province. On the 18th day of June, 1923, the
prosecuting attorney of said province filed against the defendant the
following information:
That in or about the month of January, 1922, at Camp Stotsenburg,
in the province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court of First Instance, the above-named
defendant Jose S. Dizon, at that time assistant bookkeeper of the
Post Exchange of said Camp, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally,
and with intent to defraud said Post Exchange, altered and falsified
the entries on the books kept by him, and destroyed and rendered
unless certain documents and papers relative to the accounts of
said Post Exchange, succeeding, through such fraudulent means,
to swindle away the amount of three thousand nine hundred and
sixty-four pesos and ninety-one centavos (P3,964.91), equivalent to
19,824 pesetas, belonging to the Post Exchange, said defendant
having embezzled said amount to the prejudice of said Post
Exchange, and in violation of law.

Upon said information the defendant was arraigned, tried, found guilty of the
crime charged in the complaint, and sentenced by the Honorable
Hermogenes Reyes, judge, under the provisions of articles 301, 534 and 89
of the Penal Code, to suffer five years, four months and twenty-one days
of prision correccional, with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine
of P50, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P3,964.91, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. From
that sentence the defendant appealed.
The appellant now insists that the evidence adduce during the trial of the
cause fails to show that he committed a crime; that he is only liable in a civil
action. He presents no argument in support of that contention, however, but
limits himself to a criticism of the decision of the lower court, insisting that
the evidence does not support his conclusions and that said sentence is full
of "fifty thousand errors," without specifying the particular errors.
A thorough study of the evidence shows that the accused, Jose S. Dizon,
during the period from October, 1920, to January, 1922, was in the employ,
as assistant bookkeeper at the Post Exchange of Camp Stotsenburg, an
army post in the Province of Pampanga; that during the time of his
employment he brought on credit various articles from the several stores of
the Post Exchange, for which he signed chits (vales) showing the nature and
value of the articles so brought; that said chits as well as chits signed by
other customers were recorded in the books of the corresponding stores
from which the articles were bought; that every morning all of the chits of the
preceding day were turned over to the office of the Post Exchange, also to
be recorded in the books of said office, including the ledger (personal
accounts) of the customers; that said chits were kept in the office of the Post
Exchange, and were returned to the customers only upon payment of their
account; that Jose S. Dizon, as such assistant bookkeeper, was the
employee in charge of recording the sales of the several stores, in cash as
well as on credit, in the books of the office of the Post Exchange, and also of
the keeping of the said chits and the recording thereof in the personal
accounts of the customers; that he voluntarily did not record in his personal
account most of the chits signed by him for articles bought on credit,
amounting to P3,964.91 (Exhibit J-2), except a few of them amounting only
to P653.77, which latter amount he paid, leaving only a balance of P29.43
(Exhibit J-1); that all the chits for the said amount of P3,964.91 have
disappeared, and that only a few chits amounting to P199.99 were found
properly kept in separate envelopes (Exhibits I to I-4).
The foregoing facts clearly show that the accused voluntarily falsified the
ledger (personal accounts) of the office of the Post Exchange, which was a
commercial document, by not recording in his own personal account the

chits for articles bought by him from the stores of the Post Exchange
amounting to P3,964.91, thereby violating article 301 in relation with No. 4 of
article 300 of the Penal Code, evidently for the purpose of evading the
payment of said amount. The same facts also lead us to the conviction that
the accused maliciously destroyed those chits, for the same purpose, and
also to obliterate, to some extent, the traces of his indebtedness, which act
constitutes a violation of paragraph 9 of article 535 of the Penal Code.
(U.S. vs. Tan Jenjua, 1 Phil., 38; U.S. vs. Kilayko, 31 Phil., 371.)
The evidence clearly establishes the guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt, and the findings of facts of the lower court are in full
harmony therewith. The fifty thousand errors attributed to the lower court by
counsel for appellant could not be found in spite of our careful and
painstaking study of the whole record. The only error of said court noted by
us is the finding, that in the commission of the crime of estafa the accused
violated article 534 instead of article 535, No. 9, of the Penal Code. This
error, however, is immaterial as far as the appellant is concerned, in view of
the fact that under the provisions of either article the penalty remains the
same.
In view of all of the foregoing, and with the modification above indicated, the
sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.