G.R. No.

L-48183

November 10, 1941

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Cardenas & Casal for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Acting Solicitor Luciano for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
On March 16, 1926, the accused Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger married the compliant Elena Ramirez Cartagena
and after seven years of martial life, they agreed, for reason of alleged incompatibility of character, to live
separately each other and on May 25, 1935 they executed a document which in part recites as follows:
Que ambos comparecientes convienen en vivir separados el uno del otro por el resto de su vida y se
comprometen, y obligan reciprocamente a no molastarse ni intervenir ni mezclarse bajo ningun
concepto en la vida publica o privada de los mismos, entre si, quendado cada uno de los otorgantes
en completa libertad de accion en calquier acto y todos concepto.
On June 15, 1935, the accused Schneckenburger, without leaving the Philippines, secured a decree of divorce
from the civil court of Juarez, Bravos District, State of Chihuahua, Mexico. On May 11, 1936, he contracted
another marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel, in the justice of the peace court of Malabon, Rizal, and
since then they lived together as husband and wife in the city of Manila. Because of the nullity of the divorce
decreed by the Mexico Court, complaint herein instituted two actions against the accused, one for bigamy in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other concubinage in the court of First Instance of Manila. The first
culminated in the conviction of the accused for which he was sentenced to penalty of two months and one day
of arresto mayor. On the trial for the offense of concubinage accused interposed the plea of double jeopardy,
and the case was dismissed; but, upon appeal by the fiscal, this Court held the dismissal before the trial to be
premature this was under the former procedure and without deciding the question of double jeopardy,
remanded the case to the trial court for trial on the merits. Accused was convicted of concubinage through
reckless imprudence and sentenced to a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor. Hence this
appeal.
As to appellant's plea of double jeopardy, it need only be observed that the office of bigamy for which he was
convicted and that of concubinage for which he stood trial in the court below are two distinct offenses in law
and in fact as well as in the mode of their prosecution. The celebration of the second marriage, with the first still
existing, characterizes the crime of bigamy; on the other hand, in the present case, mere cohabitation by the
husband with a woman who is not his wife characterizes the crime of concubinage. The first in an offense
against civil status which may be prosecuted at the instance of the state; the second, an offense against
chastity and may be prosecuted only at the instance of the offended party. And no rule is more settled in law
than that, on the matter of double jeopardy, the test is not whether the defendant has already been tried for the
same act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense. (Diaz v. U. S., 223 U. S., 422;
People v. Cabrera, 43 Phil., 82)
Upon the other hand, we believe and so hold that the accused should be acquitted of the crime of concubinage.
The document executed by and between the accused and the complaint in which they agreed to be "en
completa libertad de accion en cualquier acto y en todos conceptos," while illegal for the purpose for which it
was executed, constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the act of concubinage within the meaning of section

344 of the Revised Penal Code. There can be no doubt that by such agreement, each party clearly intended to
forego to illicit acts of the other.
We said before (People vs. Guinucod, 58 Phil., 621) that the consent which bars the offended party from
instituting a criminal prosecution in cases of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness is that which has been given expressly or impliedly after the crime has been committed. We are
now convinced that this is a narrow view in way warranted by the language, as well as the manifest policy, of
the law. The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they
are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. (Emphasis
ours.)
As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, "consent" must have been
intended agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its commission. No logical difference
can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent, for in both instances as the offended party
has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid
in the vindication of the wrong. For instance, a husband who believers his wife another man for adultery, is as
unworthy, if not more, as where, upon acquiring knowledge of the adultery after its commission, he says or
does nothing. We, therefore, hold that the prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the
offended party from prosecuting the offense.
In this arriving at this conclusion we do not with to be misconstrued as legalizing an agreement to do an illicit
act, in violation of law. Our view must be taken only to mean that an agreement of the tenor entered into
between the parties herein, operates, within the plain language and manifest policy of the law, to bar the
offended party from prosecuting the offense. If there is anything morally condemnatory in a situation of his
character, the remedy lies not with us but with the legislative department of the government. What the law is,
not what it should be, defines the limits of our authority.
Judgment is reversed and the accused is hereby acquitted, without costs.
Avancea, C.J., Abad Santos, Diaz and Horilleno, JJ., concur.

###############
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673

August 11, 2004

EDUARDO P. DIEGO, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, DAGUPAN CITY, BRANCH 43, respondent.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is an administrative complaint against Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo for allegedly
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal case and/or rendering judgment in gross ignorance of the
law.
The facts and circumstances of the criminal case are summarized, as follows:
a) On January 9, 1965, accused Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr.,
solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City. The couple were both Filipinos. In the
marriage contract, the accused used and adopted the name Crescencia Escoto, with a civil status of
single;
b) In a document dated February 15, 1978, denominated as a "Decree of Divorce" and purportedly
issued to Jorge de Perio as petitioner by the Family District Court of Harris County, Texas
(247th Judicial District), it was "ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the bonds of matrimony heretofore
existing between Jorge de Perio and Crescencia de Perio are hereby Dissolved, Cancelled and
Annulled and the Petitioner is hereby granted a Divorce."
c) Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, the same Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with herein
complainants brother, Manuel P. Diego, solemnized before the Rev. Fr. Clemente T. Godoy, parish
priest of Dagupan City. The marriage contract shows that this time, the accused used and adopted the
name Lucena Escoto, again, with a civil status of single.1
After trial of the criminal case for bigamy, respondent Judge promulgated a decision, on February 24, 1999, the
dispositive part of which stated:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the STATE to prove accuseds guilt beyond whisper of doubt, the COURT
hereby orders her ACQUITTAL with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.2
The decision states that the main basis for the acquittal was good faith on the part of the accused. Respondent
Judge gave credence to the defense of the accused that she acted without any malicious intent. The combined
testimonial and documentary evidence of the defense was aimed at convincing the court that accused Lucena
Escoto had sufficient grounds to believe that her previous marriage to Jorge de Perio had been validly
dissolved by the divorce decree and that she was legally free to contract the second marriage with Manuel P.
Diego.
In rendering the decision, respondent Judge reasoned, thus:
While it is true that in our jurisdiction the matrimonial bond between Jorge de Perio and the accused
are not yet annulled, it remains undisputed that cessation of the same was decreed in the Family
District Court of Harris County, Texas, 247th Judicial District, effective February 15, 1978.
xxx
The CHARGE filed against the accused is categorized as Mala en se (sic) which requires the
indispensable presence of criminal intent/dolo.
The felony on BIGAMY as defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code explicitly mandates that it
must be committed with criminal intent. In other words, there must be an unquestionable
demonstration on the part of the perpetrator that he/she criminally, willfully and unlawfully contracted a
second marriage despite knowledge that his/her first marriage is still existing.

As borne out by the evidence adduced, the accused contracted the second marriage after she was
informed and furnished of the Divorce Decree which was granted by the Family District Court of Harris
County Texas in her favor.
As an ordinary laywoman accused being a recipient of a divorce decree, she entertains the impression
that she can contract a subsequent marriage which she did when she married the late Manuel Diego.
To the honest evaluation of the Court the act complained of against the accused is not patently illegal
for the reason that she acted in good faith believing that her marriage was already annulled by a
foreign judgment.3
Complainant herein alleges that the decision rendered by the respondent Judge is manifestly against the law
and contrary to the evidence. He questions the evidentiary weight and admissibility of the divorce decree as a
basis for the finding of good faith. In addition, complainant stresses that the evidence on record negates
respondent Judges finding of good faith on the part of the accused. Thus, complainant urges this Court to
impose sanctions upon respondent Judge as, according to complainant, these acts amount to knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law.
In his comment, respondent Judge explains that what was in issue was the criminal culpability of the accused
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent Judge does not dispute that the second marriage
was bigamous because at the time it was contracted, the first marriage was still subsisting since divorce is not
recognized in our country and because the accuseds first husband was still alive. Respondent Judge, however,
maintains that what was controlling was whether by virtue of the divorce decree the accused honestly believed,
albeit mistakenly, that her first marriage had been severed and she could marry again. According to respondent
Judge, the same is a state of mind personal to the accused. He further stressed that knowledge of the law
should not be exacted strictly from the accused since she is a lay person, and that ineptitude should not be
confused with criminal intent.
By separate manifestations, both parties agreed to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings.
The Disputed Decision
A careful study of the disputed decision reveals that respondent Judge had been less than circumspect in his
study of the law and jurisprudence applicable to the bigamy case.
In his comment, respondent Judge stated: "That the accused married Manuel P. Diego in the honest belief that
she was free to do so by virtue of the decree of divorce is a mistake of fact."
This Court, in People v. Bitdu,4 carefully distinguished between a mistake of fact, which could be a basis for the
defense of good faith in a bigamy case, from a mistake of law, which does not excuse a person, even a lay
person, from liability. Bitdu held that even if the accused, who had obtained a divorce under the Mohammedan
custom, honestly believed that in contracting her second marriage she was not committing any violation of the
law, and that she had no criminal intent, the same does not justify her act. This Court further stated therein that
with respect to the contention that the accused acted in good faith in contracting the second marriage, believing
that she had been validly divorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to say that everyone is presumed to
know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not
exempt him from the consequences thereof.5
Moreover, squarely applicable to the criminal case for bigamy, is People v. Schneckenburger, 6 where it was
held that the accused who secured a foreign divorce, and later remarried in the Philippines, in the belief that the
foreign divorce was valid, is liable for bigamy.
These findings notwithstanding, the issue before us is whether or not respondent Judge should be held
administratively liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law.

Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is a criminal offense defined and penalized under Article 204 7 of the
Revised Penal Code. For conviction to lie, it must be proved that the judgment is unjust and that the judge
knows that it is unjust. Knowingly means consciously, intelligently, willfully or intentionally. It is firmly established
in this jurisdiction that for a judge to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown
that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and that the same was
made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. 8
The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for
decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d) he knew that said judgment is unjust. 9 This Court reiterates that in order
to hold a judge liable, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with conscious and
deliberate intent to do an injustice. That good faith is a defense to the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment remains the law.10
As held in Alforte v. Santos,11 even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an accused, she still cannot be
administratively charged lacking the element of bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. Malice or bad faith on the
part of the judge in rendering an unjust decision must still be proved and failure on the part of the complainant
to prove the same warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint. 12
There is, therefore, no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Anent the charge of gross ignorance of the law, Maozca v. Domagas,13 is instructive. Therein respondent
judge was charged with gross ignorance of the law resulting in a manifestly unjust judgment for granting a
demurrer to the evidence in a bigamy case. The grant of the demurrer to the evidence was based on the
judges finding of good faith on the part of the accused, anchored upon a document denominated as a
"Separation of Property with Renunciation of Rights." This Court stated that said act of the judge exhibited
ignorance of the law, and accordingly he was fined in the amount of P5,000.
Also, in Guillermo v. Reyes, Jr.,14 where therein respondent judge was given a reprimand with a stern warning
of a more severe penalty should the same or similar act be committed in the future, this Court explained:
We have heretofore ruled that a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every
erroneous order or decision he renders. To unjustifiably hold otherwise, assuming that he has erred,
would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one
called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in
his judgment. The error must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in evident bad faith. It is only
in this latter instance, when the judge acts fraudulently or with gross ignorance, that administrative
sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of this Court.
As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt
motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of
the law can find refuge. It does not mean, however, that a judge, given the leeway he is accorded in
such cases, should not evince due care in the performance of his adjudicatory prerogatives.
Furthermore, in Wingarts v. Mejia,15 where therein respondent judge, although absolved of any guilt for the
charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, was still imposed sanctions by this Court, thus:
In any event, respondent judge deserves to be appropriately penalized for his regrettably erroneous
action in connection with Criminal Case No. 2664 of his court. We have repeatedly stressed that a
municipal trial judge occupies the forefront of the judicial arm that is closest in reach to the public he
serves, and he must accordingly act at all times with great constancy and utmost probity. Any kind of
failure in the discharge of this grave responsibility cannot be countenanced, in order to maintain the

faith of the public in the judiciary, especially on the level of courts to which most of them resort for
redress.16
Applying these precedents to the present case, the error committed by respondent Judge being gross and
patent, the same constitutes ignorance of the law of a nature sufficient to warrant disciplinary action.
Penalty
After evaluation of the merits of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that
respondent Judge be reprimanded with a stern warning of a more severe penalty in the future.
The act of respondent Judge in rendering the decision in question took place on February 24, 1999 or before
the effectivity, on October 1, 2001, of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which classified gross ignorance of the law as a
serious charge and penalized the offense with a fine of not less than P20,000 but not more than P40,000.
Applying the rule as then prevailing,17 and in line with applicable jurisprudence,18 the sanction on respondent
Judge should be a fine in the amount of P10,000.
WHEREFORE, Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

######################
G.R. No. 137567

June 20, 2000

MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the
RTC, Brach 139, Makati City, respondents.
BUENA, J.:
This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to review and set aside
the Order dated January 28, 1999 issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No. 98-3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the
Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden Cervantes of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61." The
said Order denied petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge
Cervantes from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 236176, a concubinage case against petitioner
on the ground that the pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner against his wife
constitutes a prejudicial question.
The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate
Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.1

On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children, 2 petitioner filed a petition for nullity
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code before Branch 87 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-30192. 3
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who
abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. 4 Charmaine
subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage 5 under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against
petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September
16, 1997, found probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information 6 against them. The case, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 236176, was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61.
1awphi1

On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to
Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that
the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the
determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the
Order7dated August 31, 1998. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order of denial was likewise
denied in an Order dated December 9, 1998.
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage case, petitioner went to the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders dated August 31, 1998 and
December 9, 1998 issued by Judge Cervantes and praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.8 In an Order9 dated January 28, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Makati denied the petition
for certiorari. Said Court subsequently issued another Order 10 dated February 23, 1999, denying his motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage based on
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the
suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting decisions might result from the civil case
for annulment of marriage and the criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case, the trial court might declare
the marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's complaint but in the criminal case, the trial court might acquit
petitioner because the evidence shows that his marriage is void on ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner submits that the possible conflict of the courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage can be avoided,
if the criminal case will be suspended, until the court rules on the validity of marriage; that if petitioner's
marriage is declared void by reason of psychological incapacity then by reason of the arguments submitted in
the subject petition, his marriage has never existed; and that, accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted in
the criminal case because he was never before a married man.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two
essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed. 11
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the
concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension

of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily
be determined.
Art. 40 of the Family Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, 12 this Court ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of
remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other
evidence is acceptable. The pertinent portions of said Decision read:
. . . Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as
an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary,
to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These needs
not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final judgment
declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other
than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his
marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage
is void from the beginning is not a defense.
Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Relova 1 cited in Donato vs. Luna 14 where this Court held that:
. . . Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact
would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and
so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when
the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman
not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a
criminal case for concubinage.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, JJ., concur.

#########
G.R. No. 133896

January 27, 2006

DOLORES MAGNO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Petitioner Dolores Magno appeals from the March 12, 1998 decision 1 and May 20, 1998 resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 16033, affirming an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City in Criminal Cases No. 8804-R and 8806-R which found petitioner guilty of two (2) counts of libel.
Records yield the following pertinent facts:
For around twenty (20) years, petitioner Dolores Magno (Dolores) and Cerelito T. Alejandro (Cerelito) have
been neighbors at Pucay Village, Marcos Highway, Baguio City. The land on which the Magnos house stands
abuts the Marcos Highway. The Alejandros, however, can access the highway only by traversing the Magnos
property. Thru the years, the Magnos had allowed the Alejandros the use of this passage way until Dolores
closed the same sometime in 1991, purportedly in retaliation to certain unsavory allegations made by Cerelito
against the Magnos and because of the deteriorating relationship between the two families. 3
In the afternoon of March 2, 1991, Cerelito, while at the upper portion of his house, saw Dolores write on the
wall at the back of her garage the following words: "Huag Burahin Bawal Dumaan Dito ang Maniac at
Magnanakaw ng Aso katulad ni Cere Lito O. Cedring."
Feeling that he was the "Cere", "Lito" or "Cedring" being alluded to, Cerelito reported the matter to the local
police and filed an affidavit-complaint with the Fiscals Office.
Subsequently, or on March 9, 1991, at around 4:00 p.m., Rodelito, Cerelitos 16-year old son, while on his way
to buy bread at a nearby store, saw Dolores writing something on her garage's extension wall with the use of a
paint brush and red paint. In full, the writing reads: "HUAG BURAHIN BAWAL DUMAAN ANG SUSPETSOSA
BASTOS AT MAKAPAL NA MUKHA DITO LALO NA SA MANIAC AT MAGNANAKAW NG ASO KATULAD NI
CERELITO." After reading what was thus written, Rodelito proceeded with his errand and, upon reaching
home, related what he saw to his father.4
Again, feeling that he was the maniac and dog thief being referred to, Cerelito lost no time in filing a complaint
with the Baguio City Police (BCP). Pictures were then taken of the aforesaid writing on the wall. 5 Eventually, the
Office of the City Prosecutor in Baguio, finding, following an investigation, probable cause for libel against
Dolores, filed the corresponding information giving rise to Criminal Case No. 8804-R.
Evidently apprised by the police of the complaint thus filed by Cerelito, Dolores repaired in the morning of
March 15, 1991 to the BCP sub-station to deliver her 3-page letter-answer written in yellow pad and addressed
to the station sub-commander.6

At around 12:20 p.m. of the same day, March 15, 1991, Dolores handed to and instructed Evelyn Arcartado,
Cerelito's sister, to deliver an unsealed white, long, ordinary envelope to Fe Alejandro, Cerelito's wife. Since Fe
was out of the house at that time, Evelyn gave the unsealed envelope to Cerelito, who immediately read the
three (3) separate letters contained in the envelope. Evelyn followed suit afterwards. Fe read the contents of
the envelope upon reaching home late in the afternoon of March 15, 1991. 7
The first letter, unsigned and undated8 and written on yellow pad, was addressed to spouses Cerelito and Fe
Alejandro. Quoted, in part, in the information in Criminal Case No. 8806-R, this unsigned letter reads:
If your husband can't show any proof of his makating dila then comply & if your husband can't understand this
simple English dahil mangmang, dayukdok na galing sa isang kahig isang tukang pamilya at walang
pinagaralan, illiterate, mal educado kaya bastos eh huag na niya kaming idamay sa kaniyang katangahan na
alam na trabaho eh humawak ng grasa sa Saudi. Kaya iyong pambabastos mo at pagdudumi niya sa pangalan
naming at higit pa siyang marumi at putang ina rin niya. Galing siya sa p ng baboy at hindi sa p ng tao.
Huag niyang ikumpara ang pinangalingan niya sa pinangalingan namin. Siya ang magnanakaw at mandaraya.
Malinaw na ibidensiya iyan kinalagyan ng hagdan ninyo, di ba lampas kayo sa lote ninyo. Pinalakad ninyo ang
mojon para lumaki ang lote ninyo. Bago kayo magsalita mambintang ng kapitbahay ninyo, tignan ninyo muna
ang sarili ninyo. Mas mukha pang magnanakaw ang asawa mo para malinaw.
The second letter is a photo-copy of the first, but with the following addendum written in ink at the back page
thereof which reads:
Ang tibay mo rin naman Mrs. Alejandro, makapal pa ang mukha mo at ikaw pa ang magpapablotter sa akin
para pagtakpan mo ang maniac mong asawa. Kailan mo masasabi na pumasok sa bakuran mo para
mamirhuesyo sa inyo. Tanga.
The third letter, a photo-copy of Dolores signed letter 9 dated March 15, 1991, supra, to the Sub-Station 5
Commander of the BCP purportedly in reply to the statement given by Fe Alejandro to the police station on
March 3, 1991, reads in part as follows:

The Sub Station Commander

Sub-Station 5
Marcos Highway, B.C.
Dear sir:
xxx xxx xxx
Allow me then to explain to you . . . why I call Mr. Alejandro a maniac. Pumasok siya sa
lote ko sa garahe na naging shelter (temporary) namin ng pamilya ko pagkatapos ng
lindol (3 weeks after) ng hatinggabi-lasing na lasing nakapaa, bukas ang zipper ng
pantaloon nakayapak na walang sapin sa paa. Tulog na kami. We were awakened by
the constant barking of my dogs. I have 3 native dogs but 1 was slaughtered by Mr.
Cerelito Alejandro . He is even a dog-napper. My Manang Louie can relate the incident
since we were out of the country x x x. I don't trust him as my kapitbahay na bantay
salakay. In simple tagalog magnanakaw ng aso para may malamon dahil takaw na
takaw at walang maibili.

It is upon the foregoing factual backdrop that Dolores was charged with libel under four (4) separate
informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, docketed as Criminal Cases No. 8803-R, 8804R, 8805-R and 8806-R and raffled to Branch 6 of the court.

The information in Criminal Case No. 8803-R was based on Dolores letter dated March 15, 1991 10 to the BCP
Sub-station Commander explaining why she called Cerelito a "maniac," whereas the information in Criminal
Case No. 8805-R arose out of the following statement written by Dolores on March 2, 1991 at the back of her
garage wall, viz. " Bawal Dumaan ang Maniac at Magnanakaw ng aso katulad ni Cerelito O. Cedring..."
The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 8804-R reads in full as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of March, 1991, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, the above-named accused
[Dolores Magno], with deliberate and malicious intent and evil motive of impeaching the reputation, virtue and
integrity of CER[E]LITO T. ALEJANDRO, . . ., and with malicious intent of exposing the said Cerelito Alejandro
to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, discredit and dishonor, without any justifiable motive, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and criminally paint with brush in bold letters at the wall of the extension of
her garage, the following defamatory words: "'HUAG BURAHIN BAWAL DUMAAN ANG SUSPETSOSA
BASTOS AT MAKAPAL ANG MUKHA DITO LALO NA SA MANIAC AT MAGNANAKAW NG ASO KATULAD NI
CERELITO", which aforesaid defamatory, malicious and libelous statements have been read by the public,
when in truth and in fact said accused well knew that the allegations are false, untrue and malicious, thereby
causing dishonor, discredit, ridicule or contempt against the said Cerelito Alejandro, to his damage and
prejudice.
On the other hand, the information in Criminal Case No. 8806-R reads:
That on or about the 15th day of March, 1991, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate and malicious intent and evil motive of
impeaching the reputation, virtue and integrity of CERELITO T. ALEJANDRO, a person of good standing in the
community, and with malicious intent of exposing the said Cerelito Alejandro to public hatred, contempt,
ridicule, discredit and dishonor, without any justifiable motive, did then and there willfully and criminally prepare
and write a letter in yellow pad paper addressed to herein complainant and his wife, Fe Alejandro, in an
unsealed envelope, the following statements:
"IF YOUR HUSBAND CAN'T SHOW ANY PROOF OF HIS MAKATING DILA THEN COMPLY & IF YOUR
HUSBAND CAN'T UNDERSTAND THIS SIMPLE ENGLISH DAHIL MANGMANG, DAYUKDOK NGA GALING
SA ISANG KAHIG ISANG TUKANG PAMILYA AT WALANG PINAG-ARALAN, ILLITERATE, MAL EDUCADO
KAYA BASTOS EH HUAG NA NIYA KAMING IDAMAY SA KANIYANG KATANGAHAN NA ALAM NA TRABAHO
E HUMAWAK NG GRASA SA SAUDI. KAYA IYONG PAMBABASTOS MO AT PAGDUDUMI NIYA SA
PANGALAN NAMIN AT HIGIT PA SIYANG MARUMI AT PUTANG INA RIN NIYA. GALING SIYA SA PUKI NG
BABOY AT HINDI PUKI NG TAO, HUAG IKUMPARA ANG PINANGALINGAN NAMIN. SIYA ANG
MAGNANAKAW AT MANDARAYA. MALINAW NA IBIDENSIYA IYAN KINALALAGYAN NG HAGDAN NINYO,
DI BA LAMPAS KAYO SA LOTE NINYO. PINALAKAD NINYO ANG MOJON PARA LUMAKI ANG LOTE
NINYO. BAGO KAYO MAGSALITA MAMBINTANG NG KAPITBAHAY NINYO, TIGNAN NINYO MUNA ANG
SARILI NINYO. MAS MUKHA PANG MAGNANAKAW ANG ASAWA MO PARA MALINAW
which aforesaid defamatory, malicious and libelous words and statements have been read by the public, when
in truth and in fact said accused well knew that the allegations are false, untrue and malicious, thereby causing
dishonor, discredit, ridicule or contempt against the said Cerelito T. Alejandro, to his damage and prejudice.
Upon arraignment, Dolores, as accused, entered a plea of "Not Guilty" to each of the offenses charged in the
four informations aforecited.11 Following a joint trial, the trial court rendered judgment on September 23,
1993,12finding her guilty of libel in both Criminal Cases Nos. 8804-R and 8806-R and sentencing her to suffer
imprisonment and ordering her to indemnify the offended party a certain sum as moral damages. In Criminal
Cases Nos. 8803-R and 8805-R, however, she was acquitted. The decretal portion of the trial courts decision
reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 8803-R, the Court Finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of
accused beyond reasonable doubt and hereby Acquits Dolores Magno of the offense of Libel as
charged. Costs de oficio.
The bond of the accused in Criminal Case No. 8803-R is cancelled and discharged.
2. In Criminal Case No. 8804-R, the Court Finds accused Dolores Magno Guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of Libel as charged and hereby sentences her to an imprisonment ranging from 3
months and 11 days of Arresto Mayor as Minimum to 1 year 8 months and 21 days of Prision
Correccional as Maximum; to indemnify the offended party Cerelito Alejandro the sum of P5,000.00 as
Moral Damages and the costs of suit.
3. In Criminal Case No. 8805-R, the Court Finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of
accused beyond reasonable doubt and hereby Acquits Dolores Magno of the offense of Libel as
charged. Costs de oficio.
The bond of accused Dolores Magno in Criminal Case No. 8805-R is cancelled and discharged.
4. In Criminal Case No. 8806-R, the Court Finds accused Dolores Magno Guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of Libel as charged and hereby sentences her to an imprisonment ranging from 3
months and 11 days of Arresto Mayor as Minimum to 1 year 8 months and 21 days of Prision
Correccional as Maximum; to indemnify the offended party Cerelito Alejandro the sum of P5,000.00 as
Moral Damages and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied, Dolores went on appeal to the CA. In its Decision dated March 12, 1998, 13 the appellate court
affirmed in toto the judgment of conviction of the RTC. It likewise denied Dolores motion for reconsideration in
its Resolution dated May 20, 199814 for lack of merit.
Hence, this appeal by Dolores via the instant petition for review.
Dolores urges her acquittal contending that her conviction for libel in Criminal Case No. 8804-R is predicated
on what she considers as the incredible testimony of the prosecutions principal witness, Rodelito Alejandro.
She claims that it is extremely difficult to believe that Rodelito, after seeing the libelous writings on the wall at
the back of her garage, would proceed to buy bread instead of reporting immediately to his father. In Dolores
own words: "In the natural order of things, or in the natural course of events, a son in the place of Rodelito
would have gone home first to report the incident to his father, instead of going some place to buy
bread."15 Pressing on, she alleges that father and son could not even agree as to the whereabouts of the former
in the afternoon of March 9, 1991, noting that, while Cerelito testified being at their house at that time, Rodelito
said his father was not at the house the whole day.16
Shifting to another point, Dolores states that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of the elements of
authorship and publication of the malicious writings on the wall, as well as the unsigned letter addressed to the
spouses Alejandro, referring to Exhibit "F-1".17
The appeal is without merit
The familiar and well-entrenched doctrine is that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses lies within the
area and competence of the trier of facts, in this case, the trial court and, to a certain extent, the CA. This
doctrine is based on the time-honored rule that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness
stand is best and most commonly performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, is in the best
position to assess the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before his sala as he had personally heard
them and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 18 Succinctly put, findings of fact of
the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses command great weight and respect since it had the

opportunity to observe their demeanor, conduct and attitude and is therefore placed in a more competent
position to discriminate between truth and falsehood.19
Verily, the Court finds no reason to doubt the identification by Rodelito of Dolores as the person who wrote on
her garages extension wall the libelous writing " . . . Maniac at Magnanakaw ng Aso Katulad ni Cerelito." The
fact that Rodelito, upon witnessing this particular incident, proceeded to buy bread instead of immediately
informing his father of what occurred, does not, without more, vitiate the formers credibility a bit nor diminish
the probabilities of the situation testified upon . As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals:
Anent the first argument, it is not at all improbable for Rodelito to proceed to buy bread first before telling his
father of the incident. The fact that he did not immediately go home and tell his father what he witnessed but
instead proceeded first to the store is not an unusual behavior for this Court to speculate or doubt witness'
credibility. As the records show, such maligning of Cerelito's person in public was not the first time for the
[petitioner] had priorly (sic) made insulting writings on her garage wall. Thus, this second incident witnessed by
Rodelito was no longer a surprise for him which could have immediately prompt (sic) him to report it to his
father. (Word in bracket added.)
Of little moment, too, is the minor variance in the respective testimonies of Rodelito and Cerelito on whether or
not Cerelito was at his house in the eventful afternoon of March 9, 1991. Given Rodelitos positive assertion of
what and who he saw at that time, the exact whereabouts of Cerelito hardly assumes any decisive significance.
At any rate, there is no irreconcilable inconsistency between the testimonies of Rodelito and Cerelito. Cerelito
testified that at the time Dolores was making the writings on the wall, he was at the upper portion of their
house,20for which reason, Rodelito probably was not able to see him when he went out to buy bread. But lest it
be overlooked, the cited inconsistency between the testimonies of father and son are not of such materiality to
overturn the positive identification of Dolores as the author of the writing on the wall in question. In fact, we
have previously held that minor discrepancies or inconsistencies in the declarations or testimonies of witnesses
do not affect, but even enhance their credibility for they remove any suspicion that the testimonies were
contrived or rehearsed. What is important is that the testimonies agree on essential facts and substantially
corroborated a consistent and coherent whole.21 What the CA said in this regard commends itself for
concurrence:
Anent the second and third arguments where [petitioner] faults Rodelito's testimony as suffering from material
inconsistencies, the same, if any, merely refers to minor points which do not detract from the credibility of his
testimony. What is relevant is the fact that Rodelito saw the [petitioner] write the insulting writings and that he
afterwards informed his father about it. Well-settled is the rule that inconsistencies and contradictions which are
minor, trivial and inconsequential cannot impair, and on the contrary, serve to strengthen the credibility of the
witness.22 (Word in bracket added)
This brings us to Dolores conviction in Criminal Case No. 8806-R where she insists on the absence of the
element of publication so vital in the prosecution for libel. To be liable for libel under Article 353 of the Revised
Penal Code, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition
concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of
malice.23
There can be no quibbling about the defamatory nature of the written imputation or allegations hurled against
Cerelito. And the derogatory writings were obviously made out of ill-will or revenge. The issue of defamation,
malice or the identity of the person defamed is not even raised in this recourse.
As earlier recited, the information in Criminal Case No. 8806-R arose out of what Dolores wrote about the
spouses Cerelito and Fe Alejandro contained in an unsealed envelope and delivered, through Evelyn
Arcartado, on March 15, 1991. Dolores contends that, from the time Evelyn was physically handed the
unsealed envelope to the time the latter turned it over to Cerelito, no one opened or read the offending letter
contained therein.24Prescinding therefrom, Dolores argues against the existence of libel, citing, for the purpose,
American jurisprudence holding that "where libelous matter is communicated only to a person defamed and he
voluntarily discloses the contents of the libelous communication to others, the originator of the libel is not
responsible for the publication." 25 Dolores argues that since the obnoxious letter was addressed to spouses
Cerelito and Fe Alejandro, Fe was, insofar as Cerelito is concerned, not a third person for purposes of

publication. She further declares that to call the husband (Cerelito) a thief in connection with a charge that he
and his wife had stolen goods, is not to speak words of defamation of him alone so as to make the utterance in
the presence of his wife a publication.
Publication, in the law of libel, means the making of the defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to
someone other than the person to whom it has been written. If the statement is sent straight to a person for
whom it is written there is no publication of it.26 The reason for this is that "a communication of the defamatory
matter to the person defamed cannot injure his reputation though it may wound his self-esteem. A mans
reputation is not the good opinion he has of himself, but the estimation in which others hold him." 27
In People vs. Silvela,28 the Court ruled that sending an unsealed libelous letter to the offended party constitutes
publication. In the present case, there is no dispute that the unsealed envelope containing the libelous letter
was handed by Dolores to Evelyn Arcartado. Contextually, there was a reasonable probability that the contents
of the unsealed envelope, particularly the libelous letter, could have been exposed to be read by Evelyn before
delivering the same to Cerelito. However, Evelyn categorically admitted not reading the letter at the first
instance, reading it only after securing Cerelitos permission. An excerpt of her testimony:
Direct Examination:
FISCAL CENTENO:
Did you read the contents of the letter?
A Yes, sir. I read it after my brother had read it.
Q And what did you find out?
A Damaging words.29
CROSS EXAMINATION
BY ATTY. AGRANZAMENDEZ
Q On March 15, 1991 at 12:20 P.M., as you said, you were called by Mrs. Magno, is that correct? A. Yes, sir.
Q And she handed an envelope, is that correct. A. Yes, sir.
Q And she told you to give this envelope to your sister-in-law?
A Yes, sir.
Q And because her instruction to you was to give the envelope to your sister-in-law, you did not open the
envelope yourself, correct?
A No, I did not, sir.
Q But when you got to your house, your sister-in-law was not there, is that correct? A. Yes, sir.
Q And that is the reason why you gave it instead to your brother, correct? A. Yes, sir.
Q Between the time that Mrs. Magno gave you that envelope up to the time you gave it to your brother, you
yourself did not open it, correct. A. Yes, sir.30

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY FISCAL CENTENO
Q So, madame witness, all in all how many documents were read by Cerelito Alejandro when you handed this
envelope, Exhibit "F"?
A He read all the letters.
COURT: (To witness)
Q How about you?
A I also read all the letters.
Q Are you saying that after your brother read those letters you read them also? A. Yes, sir
.
Q Your brother handed them to you?
A I asked permission from him and he said, yes.
Q Does he always allow you to read his private letters?
A This is the only letter which he allowed me to read.31
Inasmuch, therefore, as Cerelito voluntarily disclosed the contents of Dolores libelous letter to Evelyn, the act
of publication cannot be ascribed to Dolores insofar as Evelyn is concerned. However, it could not be said that
there was no publication with respect to Cerelitos wife, Fe. While the letter in question was addressed to "Mr.
Cerelito & Fe Alejandro," the invectives contained therein were directed against Cerelito only, as shown below:
Mr. Cerelito & Fe Alejandro
xxx xxx xxx
Reason: In retaliation and stupidity of Mr. Cerelito Alejandro accusing us of being corrupt & magnanakaw in the
Bu. Of Forestry I am going to sue in due time for Oral Defamation & other moral damages, stealing my dog
para lamunin nang asawa mo.
If your husband can't show any proof of this makating dila then comply & if your husband can't understand this
simple English dahil mangmang, dayukdok na galing sa isang kahig isang tukang pamilya at walang
pinagaralan, illiterate, mal educado kaya bastos eh huag na niya kaming idamay sa kaniyang katangahan na
alam na trabaho eh humawak ng grasa sa Saudi. Kaya iyong pambabastos mo at pagdudumi niya sa pangalan
naming at higit pa siyang marumi at putang ina rin niya. Galing siya sa puki ng baboy at hindi sa puki ng tao.
Huag niyang ikumpara ang pinangalingan niya sa pinangalingan namin. Siya ang magnanakaw at mandaraya.
Malinaw na ibidensiya iyan kinalagyan ng hagdan ninyo, di ba lampas kayo sa lote ninyo. Pinalakad ninyo ang
mojon para lumaki ang lote ninyo. Bago kayo magsalita mambintang ng kapitbahay ninyo, tignan ninyo muna
ang sarili ninyo. Mas mukha pang magnanakaw ang asawa mo para malinaw.
Writing to a person other than the person defamed is sufficient to constitute publication, for the person to whom
the letter is addressed is a third person in relation to its writer and the person defamed therein. 32 Fe, the wife, is,
in context, a third person to whom the publication was made.

Finally, the Court cannot give credence to Dolores allegation that she is not the author of the unsigned libelous
letter. It cannot be overstressed that she herself handed the unsigned letter to Evelyn Arcartado with specific
instructions to give the same to Fe Alejandro. Likewise, the contents of the letters are basically
reiteration/elaborations of Dolores previous writing on the wall and her letter to the BCP Sub-Station
commander. What the Court of Appeals said on this point is basic common sense and deserving of acceptance:
Anent the second assigned error, [petitioner] contends authorship of the unsigned letters was not proven. This
contention is bereft of merit. As keenly observed by the Solicitor General, said letters were positively identified
as written by [petitioner] by reference to the contents thereof which are reiterations of her previous writings on
the walls of her garage and her letter to the police. Moreover, the testimony of Evelyn that said unsealed
envelope came from the [petitioner] remain unrebutted. Therefore, it appears that there would be no other
conclusion except that [petitioner] was the author of the subject letter. (Words in bracket added.)
In all, we find all the elements of libel to have been sufficiently established. Accordingly, the ascription of
reversible errors on the part of the CA and the trial court in adjudging Dolores guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two counts of libel cannot be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.