Crim2 doctrines (based on Atty.

Esguerra notes)
1.

Laurel vs. Misa- Citizen owes absolute/permanent allegiance to his government/sovereign, which should not be
confused with the qualified/temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government of his current residence.
This absolute allegiance is not abrogated by enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the government de jure is
not transferred thereby to the occupier, remaining vested in the legitimate government. What may be suspended is the
exercise of the rights of sovereignty passing temporarily to the occupant, and not the allegiance which subsists with
the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government.The change in government from commonwealth does
not affect the crime of treason. It holds applicable to the present government being an offense against the same
government and sovereign people.

2.

People vs. Perez-For an act to be treasonous, it should be one that renders assistance to the occupants to further their
hostile designs. Sexual relations between the women and the Japanese officials cannot be said to aid in the
furtherance of the objectives of the enemies.
Dissent by Pablo: Entertainment tones up the nerves of the soldiers. Services or favors that should have been
performed by Japanese women were done by Filipino women. This helped improve the phases of their military
activities.

3.

People vs. Prieto-

4.

People vs. Manayao-

5.

People vs. Adriano- The

Murder and physical injuries are identified as an element of treason and they cannot be the
subject of a separate punishment, or make a complex crime with treason. They are averred as a constitutive ingredient
of treason. But where the State prosecutes them for such acts not as an overt act for treason, then the accused can be
punished for such acts if found guilty.
The Makapili is not part of the Japanese Army in the Philippines being an organization
of traitors, pure and simple. This doesnt divest the Peoples Court of jurisdiction. They have not lost their citizenship
when no evidence that he has subscribed to an oath of allegiance to support the laws of Japan and that he showed his
acceptance of a commission in the Armed Forces of Japan were presented. They are still subject of the law on treason
in the Philippines.
two-witness requirement in the crime of treason should be applied restrictively
the lawmakers having intended for it to be applied with the same rigidity and inflexibility due to the seriousness of the
crime and the abnormality of the times from American origin.
Hilado dissenting: Being a Makapili was one single continuous and indivisible overt act of giving aid to the Japanese
invaders. There is no need for at least 2 witnesses to have testified on one same act.

6.

People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw- Pirates are in the law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular
state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be
found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction in the crime of piracy unlike other crimes has no territorial
limits, nor does it matter that a crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, for
those limits, through neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes.

7.

People vs. Rodriguez- Where rape, murder or homicide is committed in the crime of piracy, the penalty imposable is
mandatory death penalty according to PD532 amending RPA 134.

8.

People vs. Siyoh- Although the body of de Guzman was still missing, the number of persons killed on the occasion of
piracy is not material. PD532 considers qualified piracy (when rape, murder, or homicide is committed as a result or on
the occasion of piracy) as a special complex crime punishable by death regardless of the number of victims.

9.

Umil vs. Ramos- No compelling reason exists to abandon the pronouncement in Ilagan vs. Enrile, that a writ of habeas
corpus is no longer available after an information is filed against the person detained and a warrant of arrest or an
order of commitment is issued by the court where said information has been filed. However, the answer and the better
practice would be, not to limit the function of habeas corpus to a mere inquiry as to whether or not the court which
issued the process, judgment or order of commitment or before whom the detained person is charged, had jurisdiction
or not to issue the process, judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, but rather, in all petitions for habeas
corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention from the moment petitioner was
taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny
can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied."

10. People v. Burgos- Arrest and search by the PC officers were not lawful where personal knowledge of the fact of the
crime is essential. Knowledge came from Masamloks information. Burgos was not committing any criminal or

subversive act at the time of the arrest. Evidence adduced against him are inadmissible, having been obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights.
11.

Milo vs. Salonga- Barrio captains are recognized persons in authority long before PD299. Therefore, Tuvera had
authority to detain Valdez but such detainment for 11 hours was without legal cause. The crime committed is arbitrary
detention.

12. Astorga vs. People (2004)- The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint,
is fear. After a careful review of the evidence on record, the court found no proof that Astorga instilled fear in the
minds of the private offended parties. Based on the testimony of SPO1 Capoquian, the police who escorted the DENR
team, what appears is that petitioner, being then a municipal mayor, merely extended his hospitality and entertained
the DENR Team in his house.
13. Stonehill vs. Diokno- The legality of the seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby. The objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by 3 rd parties.
Consequently, the petitioners may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the things seized, since the
right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom they
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
The warrants issued in this case state that the persons named therein committed a violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Laws and the Revised Penal Code. As such, no specific offense has been
alleged in said application. It was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought
has performed particular acts or omission, violating a given provision of criminal laws.
Finally, the warrants issued here were general warrants that authorized the search and seizure of records pertaining to
all business transactions of petitioners, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
14. Burgos Sr., vs. Chief of Staff- The search warrants in this case were also in the nature of general warrants, hence
invalid.

15. People vs. Mandoriao- The meeting here was not a religious ceremony. A religious meeting is an assemblage of people
met for the purpose of performing acts of adoration to the Supreme Being, or to perform religious services in
recognition of God as an object of worship The meeting here was not limited to the members of the INC. The
supposed prayers and singing of hymns were merely incidental because the principal object of the rally was to
persuade new converts to their religion.
Assuming that the rally was a religious ceremony, the appellant cannot be said to have performed acts or uttered words
offensive to the feelings of the faithful. The act complained of must be directed against a dogma or ritual, or upon an
object of veneration. There was no object of veneration at the meeting.
16. People vs. Baes- In his MTD, the fiscal denies that the unlawful act committed by the accused had offended the
religious feelings of the Catholics of the municipality in which the act took place. Such ground of the motion is
indefensible. Whether or not the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question
of fact which must be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholics and not those of other faithful ones, for it
is possible that certain acts may offend the feelings of those who profess a certain religion, while not otherwise
offensive to the feelings of those profession another faith.

17. People vs. Tengson- The act of performing burial rites inside a Roman Catholic cemetery, in accordance with the
rules of practices of the sect called Christ is the Answer, by reading passages from the Bible, chanting the Alleluia,
singing religious hymns and praying for the repose of the soul of the dead, is not notoriously offensive to the feelings of
religious persons, provided there was no intent to mock, scoff, or to desecrate any religious sect or object venerated
by people of a particular religion. Such act may have offended the Roman Catholic priest of the municipality and some
Catholic adherents, but since there was a permit for the burial in question in the Roman Catholic Cemetery of that
municipality, the religious rights of that sect, to which the members of the family of the deceased belong, and
performed upon request of the bereaved husband, are not offensive to the feelings of everybody who professes the
Christian religion.

18. People vs. Nanoy- The accused is only guilty of unjust vexation.
19. Enrile vs. Salazar- The written and oral pleas for the defendants (Enrile et al.) presented the SC with three options:
First, abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the dissent that rebellion cannot absorb more
serious crimes, and that under Article 48, rebellion may be complexed with common offenses. Second, hold Hernandez
applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance or as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, but not
to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute common crimes of grave or less grave character.
Third, maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course, whether or
not necessary to its commission or furtherance thereof.

11 members of the SC voted against abandoning Hernandez, while 2 felt the doctrine should be re-examined. Because of this,
the ruling remains good law, as no new challenges are presented in this case persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal.

This view is reinforced by the fact that President Aquino, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, repealed
P.D. No. 942 of the former regime which sought to nullify Hernandez by enacting a new provision in the RPC to the effect that
when by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter, acts which constitute offenses upon which
graver penalties are imposed by the law are committed, the penalty for the more serious offense in its maximum period shall be
imposed upon the offender. The president has then in effect reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law by
legislative fiat.

The court unanimously voted to reject the second option. The consensus was that the arguments were not sufficient to
overcome the thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course under
either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48.

If Art. 48 were applied, and murder were not complexed with rebellion and the 2 crimes were punished separately, the extreme
penalty could be imposed upon him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed
this way, would be unfavorable to the accused.

Thus, Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other crime. The SC ruled
by a vote of 11 to 3 that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense. That indictment is to be
read as charging simple rebellion.
20. Ponce Enrile vs. Amin- The rebellion charges filed against Enrile in Q.C. were based on affidavits executed by 2
employees of a hotel who stated that Gringo and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday party held at
the Enrile residence in Dec 1, 1989. Based on this testimony, the prosecution concluded that Enriles talking with the
rebel leader Gringo in his house in the presence of 100 armed soldiers, it can be inferred that they were coconspirators in the December coup attempt. Thus, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge include the
very incident which gave rise to the charge of the violation under P.D. 1829.

Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Gringo, Enriles alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in
furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constituting a part thereof. It was motivated by the single intent or resolution to
commit the crime of rebellion. The decisive factor in political crimes is the intent or motive. If Enrile is not charged with
rebellion and he harbored or concealed Gringo simply because the latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act
is completely different. But if the act is committed with political motives, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of
rebellion instead of being punished separately.

Inthis case, the act or harboring or concealing Gringo is clearly a mere component of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of
rebellion. It cannot therefore be made basis of a separate charge. All crimes, whether punishable under special law or general
law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion
and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes themselves.

21. People vs. Dasig- Dasig should be prosecuted for rebellion. Appellant not only confessed voluntarily his membership
with the Sparrow unit, but also his participation and that of his group in the killing of Manatad. The Sparrow unit is the
liquidation squad of the NPA with the objective of overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is therefore not
hard to comprehend that the killing of Manatad was committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends
of the NPA. As such, appellant is liable for rebellion and not murder with direct assault upon a person in authority.

Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion.
The act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority, is a mere component of rebellion or
an act done in furtherance of rebellion. It cannot be made the basis of a separate charge.

22. People vs. Lovedioro- In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts
to ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political motive of the act should
be conclusively demonstrated. If no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be convicted of the
common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an
organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.

Appellants contentions regarding the reason for the killing of Lucilo are couched in terms so general and non-specific that they
offer no explanation as to what contribution the killing would have made towards the achievement of the NPAs subversive aims.
Thus, in the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a political motive for the killing of SPO3 Lucilo, the trial court
correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder.

23. People v. Silongan (2003)- The argument that the crime was politically motivated and that consequently, the charge
should have been rebellion and not kidnapping is without merit. The Court cited the case of Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte vs. CA, where it was held that the political motivation for the crime must be
shown in order to justify finding the crime committed to be rebellion. Merely because it is alleged that appellants were
members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front or of the Moro National Liberation Front does not necessarily mean that
the crime of kidnapping was committed in furtherance of a rebellion. The evidence adduced is insufficient for a finding
that the crime committed was politically motivated. Neither have the appellants sufficiently proven their allegation
that the present case was filed against them because they are rebel surrenderees. This court has invariably viewed the
defense of frame-up with disfavor. Like the defense of alibi, it can be just as easily concocted.

24. People v. Oliva (2001)- Oliva's contention that he should have been charged with and tried for rebellion lacks factual
and legal basis, hence, bereft of merit. True, one can be convicted only of rebellion where the murders, robberies and
kidnapping were committed as a means to or furtherance of rebellion. Corollarily, offenses which were not committed
in furtherance of the rebellion, but for personal reasons or other motives, are to be punished separately even if
committed simultaneously with the rebellious acts. In the instant case, there was no evidence at all to show that the
killing of Jacinto Magbojos Jr. was in connection with or in furtherance of their rebellious act. Besides, it was not
indubitably proved that Oliva was indeed a member of the New People's Army. Oliva and Salcedo was found guilty of of
the crime of Homicide and not murder, the trial cout having erroneously appreciated the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.
25. People vs. Cabrera- The crime committed was sedition. Sedition, in its more general sense, is the

raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. The Philippine law on the subject makes all
persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or
outside of legal methods any one of five objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or
revenge upon the person or property or any official or agent of the Insular Government or of a
Provincial or Municipal Government. It is not necessary that the offender be a private citizen
and the offended party a public functionary. The law makes no distinction between the persons
to which it applies.

26. US vs. Tolentino- The crime committed is inciting to sedition. The publication and presentation of the drama directly
and necessarily tended to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and to suggest and incite
rebellious conspiracies and riots and to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the
community and the safety and order of the Government. The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view of
the time, place, and manner of its presentation, was to inculcate a spirit of hatred and enmity against the American
people and the Government of the United States in the Philippines.
27. Espuelas vs. People- The essence of seditious libel is its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch
of illegal courses or to induce people to resort to illegal methods in order to redress the evils which press upon their
minds. A published writing which calls our government one of crooks and dishonest persons infested with Nazis and
Fascists, and which reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to
remain loyal to the government, is a scurrilous libel against the Government.
28. Umil vs. Ramos- Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion
being a continuing offense, his arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense
when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or
offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and
are in the nature of continuing crimes. As stated by the SC in an earlier case: The crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the
furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them
apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude.
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent
acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell
the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest,
therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a
judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if
the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing
persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance
of the rebellious movement. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of
armed hostilities which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion,
merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified
29. Advincula vs. CA (2000)- The rule is well settled that in cases of Illegal Possession of Firearms, two (2) things must be
shown to exist: (a) the existence of the firearm, and (b) the fact that it is not licensed. However, it should be noted
that in People v. Ramos, citing People v. Gy Gesiong, this Court ruled: " . . . Even if he has the license, he cannot carry
the firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor."

The Secretary of Justice, in his contested Resolution, thus made the following findings: Even if Amando had the requisite license,
there was no proof that he had the necessary permit to carry it outside his residence; and Isagani's plain denial could not
overcome his positive identification by petitioner that he carried a firearm in assaulting him. These are findings of fact supported
by evidence, which cannot be disturbed by this Court.

People vs. Tac-an (1990)

Tac-an and the deceased Escao were high school classmates [and gang mates in Bronx gang]. The relationship between Tac-an
and Escao turned sour as the quarrel between them escalated from September up to December 1984. While the class was still
going on, Tac-an slipped out of the classroom and went home to get a gun. Tac-an suddenly burst into the room, and upon
sighting Escao Tac-an fired at scampering Escao, hitting Escao. Escao remained sprawled on the floor bleeding profusely. Tacan was charged with qualified illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition and of murder. After trial the RTC imposed upon
him the penalty of death in both cases.

HELD: P.D. 1866 is applicable. There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 (which was promulgated on 29 June 1983) which suggests that it
was intended to remain in effect only for the duration of the martial law imposed upon the country by former President Marcos.
Neither does the statute contain any provision that so prescribes its lapsing into non-enforceability upon the termination of the
state or period of martial law. On the contrary, P.D. No. 1866 by its own terms purported to "consolidate, codify and integrate" all
prior laws and decrees penalizing illegal possession and manufacture of firearms, ammunition and explosives in order "to
harmonize their provisions," as well as to update and revise certain provisions and prior statutes "in order to more effectively
deter violators of the law on firearms, ammunitions and explosives."

Misolas vs. Panga (1990)

Philippine Constabulary (PC) raided a suspected NPA "underground house" in Foster Village, Del Carmen, Pili the early morning.
The house was searched and in a red bag under a pillow allegedly used by Misolas a .20 gauge Remington shotgun and four live
rounds of ammunition were found. Misolas was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD
1866 with allegation that it was in furtherance of subversion so as to qualify the offense.

HELD: Illegal possession of firearms is not absorbed in rebellion or subversion. Hernandez ruling cannot find application in this
case because Misolas is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under
PD 1866.
He is not being charged with the complex crime of subversion with illegal possession of firearms. Neither is he being separately
charged for subversion and for illegal possession of firearms.
SC considered the fact that the Legislature had deemed it fit to provide for two distinct offenses:
(1) illegal possession of firearms qualified by subversion (P.D. No. 1866) and
(2) subversion qualified by the taking up of arms against the Government (R.A. No. 1700).

Baylosis vs. Chavez (1991)

Baylosis, de Vera and Marco Palo, all known high ranking officers of the CPP-NPA, were charged with a illegal possession of
firearms in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion or subversion.

HELD: Charging the qualified offense of Illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866 does not charge the complex crime of
subversion with illegal possession of firearms, and hence does not run counter to Hernandez, et al., is good and correct rule and
is applicable in CAB.

People vs. Tiozon (1991)

Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua
"upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess any firearm, part of firearm,
ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition." It goes further by providing that "if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,
the penalty of death shall be imposed."
It may be loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense penalized in said Section 1 because it is a
circumstance which increases the penalty. It does not, however, follow that the homicide or murder is absorbed in the
offense; otherwise, an anomalous absurdity results whereby a more serious crime defined and penalized in the Revised
Penal Code is absorbed by a statutory offense, which is just a malum prohibitum. The rationale for the qualification, as
implied from the exordium of the decree, is to effectively deter violations of the laws on firearms and to stop the "upsurge
of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured
firearms, . . . " In fine then, the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate
prosecutions for (a) violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and (b) violation of either Article 248 (Murder) or Article 249
(Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused cannot plead one as a bar to the other; or, stated otherwise, the rule

against double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the first is punished by a special law while the second, homicide or
murder, is punished by the Revised Penal Code.
However, to justify the imposition of the increased penalty under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 because of the resulting
crime of homicide or murder, the prosecution must allege in the information and prove by the quantum of evidence required
for conviction violation of said section and, more specifically, the use of an unlicensed firearm and the commission of
homicide or murder.
Undoubtedly, there is unlawful possession under the foregoing section if one does not have the license to possess the
firearm. Even if he has the license, he cannot carry the firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor. It
follows then that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the offense which the prosecution must allege
and prove. Every element of the crime must be alleged and proved.
There being no proof that accused-appellant had no license to possess the firearm in question , he could not be
convicted for illegal possession of a firearm. Therefore, the trial court then committed an error in holding the accusedappellant guilty thereof.

People vs. De Gracia (1994)

The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What the law
requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the
subjection of the thing to one's control and management. This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be
effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of
a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the proprietary concept of the
possession can have no bearing whatsoever.
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for unlawful possession of
firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes significance since
the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law, in which case good faith and
absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses.
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that
the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to
perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend
to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime),
there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely
and consciously.
A distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere possession, without criminal
intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus
possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to any
other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here
refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in
convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the
decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the
same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be considered a
violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although
there is physical or constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed.

People vs. Garcia (2002)

Tioleco was kidnapped while he was jogging alone in the morning. His abductors took him to a house in Fairview, where the
accused Rogel and Lariba were assigned to watch over him. When the police discovered the hideout, Rogel and Lariba
immediately ran to a room in the house where several unlicensed firearms were stored. Both were convicted of Kidnapping for
Ransom AND Illegal Possession of Firearms.

HELD: Rogel and Lariba cannot be held liable for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions there being another crime kidnapping for ransom - which they were perpetrating at the same time.

Under R.A. 8294, if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple
illegal possession of firearms. The language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. The law is
clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that "no other crime was committed by the
person arrested." If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have
expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

People vs. Castillo (2000)

Wilhelmina was kidnapped by persons pretending to be interested buyers of real estate. She was brought to a safehouse in
Quezon City, where the accused Gonzales was assigned to watch over her at all times. Gonzales carried an unlicensed firearm
while watching over Wilhelmina. When the police discovered the safehouse, Gonzales immediately threw his firearm away from
him. The police found more unlicensed firearms in another room in the house. Gonzales was convicted of Illegal Possession of
Firearms, with penalty derived from P.D. 1866.

HELD: The penalty imposed on him by the trial court exceeded that prescribed by law. Under Republic Act No. 8294, amending P.
D. No. 1866, the penalty for illegal possession of firearm classified as high powered is prision mayor minimum or six (6) years and
one (1) day to eight (8) years and a fine of thirty thousand (P30,000.00) pesos. Here, the offense was committed on November
27, 1992. Since the amendatory law is favorable to the accused, it shall be given retroactive application.

People vs. Nepomuceno (1999)

Accused here was charged with parricide that was committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The 2 charges were
separately charged and tried.

RA8294 was passed which said that if a homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the latter cannot
be tried separately but will just be treated as an aggravating circumstance.

HELD: Accused can no longer be separately charged with parricide and illegal possession of firearms. The amendment says that
the latter is only to be treated as an aggravating circumstance. Being clearly favorable to the accused, the amendatory law
RA8294 can be applied retroactively to this case.

People vs. Evangelista (1996)

Accused here was charged with murder and simple illegal possession of firearms. Accused here killed someone with a homemade
gun. However the court found the accused guilty of murder and aggravated illegal possession of firearms (weapon used for
murder) and sentenced him to death.

Held:

1)

2)

Accused cannot be found guilty of aggravated illegal possession as the information simply charged simple illegal possession.
That an unlicensed firearm was used in the commission of murder or homicide is a qualifying circumstance. Consequently, it
must be specifically alleged in the information, otherwise the accused cannot be sentenced to death without violating his
right to be informed of the charge against him.
He cannot even be convicted of simple illegal possession as there was no proof that the gun was unlicensed. The fact that
the gun used was homemade does not mean that it cannot be licensed and therefore it is right for the court to
automatically assume that it is unlicensed. Even if a homemade gun is used, it does not dispense with the required proof
that the gun was indeed unlicensed.

Note: In this case, the amendatory law AR8294 had not yet been passed, therefore it was still allowed to separately charge
murder and illegal possession of firearms.

Palanganas v. CA (2006)

With the passage of Republic Act. No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now
considered as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not a generic aggravating circumstance.

People vs. Beltran

Mayor Quirolgico and patrolman Tolentino went to the Puzon compound to talk to Beltran and his companions to surrender in
connection with an incident where Beltran shouted vulva of your mother to Alvarado and Urbi. Mayor and patrolman suffered
gunshot wounds and the mayors son died due to a simultaneous discharge of gunfire by the accused.

HELD: The accused are guilty of murder and double attempted murder with direct assault (under the 2 nd form of direct assault).
The accused attacked and employed force against the mayor and police while the latter were engaged in the actual performance
of duty and the accused knew that they were assaulting persons in authority.

People vs. Dollantes

Barangay Captain was delivering a speech to start a dance when Dollantes went to the middle of the dancing floor making a
dance movement, brandishing a knife and challenging everyone. The Barangay Captain approached him and told him to stop and
keep quiet. Dollantes and his companions stabbed and eventually killed the Barangay Captain.

HELD: The accused were guilty of Assault upon a person in authority, resulting in Murder. The Barangay captain was in the act of
trying to pacify Dollantes who was making trouble in the dance hall when he was stabbed to death. Hence, he was killed while in
the performance of duties. A Barangay Captain is a person in authority.

Alberto vs. Dela Cruz

Denaque escaped while working on the governors fence. Petition to include as defendants Governor Cledera and assistant
provincial warden Esmeralda due to the belief that they had a hand in the escape of Pablo Denaque. Allegedly, the governor sent
a note to Esmeralda asking for five men to work on his fence.

HELD: The Governor and Esmeralda cannot be prosecuted for the offense. It is necessary that the public officer consented to or
connived in the escape of the prisoner under his custody. If the public officer charged with the duty of guarding him does not
connive with the fugitive, then he has not violated the law and is not guilty of the crime. Article 156 is usually committed by an
outsider. If the offender is a public officer, then Article 223 applies.

Tanega vs. Masakayan

Tanega was found guilty of slander. He failed to show up on the day of the execution of the sentence imposed.

HELD: Under Article 157, escape should take place while serving the sentence. For prescription of penalty of imprisonment
imposed by final judgment to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment. Never placed
in confinement, prescription of penalty does not run in Tanegas favor.

People vs. Abilong

Abilong was sentenced to destierro by virtue of final judgment for attempted robbery. He violated this judgment by going
beyond the limits made against him, and committed vagrancy.

HELD: Abilong is guilty of evasion of service of sentence for having violated the judgment of destierro against him. Destierro is a
deprivation of liberty (though partial) and he may escape from the restrictions of the penalty.
Torres vs. Gonzales

Torres was convicted of estafa. He was granted a conditional pardon and was released. Subsequent to his release, he was
charged with 20 counts of estafa (cases pending), was convicted of sedition (appeal pending) and had a long list of crimes
charged against him (grave threats, grave coercion, swindling etc.)

HELD: Article 159 defines a distinct and substantive felony. Under this article, the convict must be charged, prosecuted and
convicted by FINAL JUDGMENT before he can be made to suffer the penalty in said article. In proceeding against a convict who
violated the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department may: 1) proceed against him under Section 64 (1) of the Revised
Administrative Code or 2) proceed against him under this article of the RPC.

People vs. Kong Leon

Kong Leon, a goldsmith, was selling illegally fabricated US dollar coins which are already withdrawn from circulation. Several
unfinished coins were found by the police in his shop and pockets.

HELD: When RPC was enacted, the Spanish text was the one approved. Thus it controls the interpretation of provisions.
Therefore, under Spanish Penal Code, fabrication of coin withdrawn from circulation is punishable because of (1) the harm it
caused to the public when it goes into circulation again, (2) the danger of a counterfeiter staying within the country (he may
counterfeit coins in actual circulation and (3) collectors will be defrauded.
Del Rosario vs. People

Del Rosario was shown by the accused a P1 bill and a P2 bill inducing him to believe that the bills were counterfeited when they
were in fact genuine treasury notes. One of the digits of each bill was altered to make it appear counterfeited.

Held: The possession of genuine treasury notes of the Phils, where any of the figures, letters, words or signs contained therein
had been erased and/or altered, with knowledge of such erasure/alteration, and with intent to use such notes in enticing
another to advance funds for the purpose of financing the manufacture of counterfeit notes is punishable by Art. 168 in relation
to Art 169 (1).

People vs. Galano

Galano bought 4 balut eggs with a P1 bill with the word victory written on it. The P1 bill had been withdrawn from circulation.
It is however redeemable at face its face value if presented to the Central Bank.

Held: The forgery committed falls under Art 169(1) where the treasury note by the addition of the word victory was given the
appearance of a true and genuine document. This provision also covers the situation where originally true and genuine
documents have been withdrawn or demonetized were made to appear a true legal tender.

Caubang vs. People 1992

Accused was organizing the merger of two stevedoring companies. Among the documents presented and filed with the SEC for
the registration of the company was a Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL) of the company. This had the signature of the
treasurer; but this signature was forged.
HELD: Accused guilty of falsification of public documents. In the absence of contrary proof, the accused who filed all the
documents with the SEC, is presumed to have also filed the forged SAL. And thus since his possession of the forged instrument is
presumed, it is also presumed from this fact that he is the forger of the document.
It is immaterial that the entries in the SAL were true, the important thing is that the signature of the treasurer was forged. What
is punished in this crime is the violation of the faith in public documents and the destruction of the truth in making it appear
that a person did something when in fact he did not; damage is not essential.

People vs. Romualdez

Romualdez, the secretary of Justice Romualdez, changed the grade of bar examinee, Mabunay, to enable him to reach the
required average to pass the bar. She claimed she had been given the authority to do so.

HELD: The acts of falsification are: (1) making alterations on genuine documents (2) making it appear that the correctors had
participated in blotting out the grades and writing out new and increased grades opposite their initials and (3) attributing to the
correctors statements other than those in fact made by them.

Beradio vs. CA
Beradio is the lawyer and election registrar accused of falsifying her daily time record, a public document. Her daily time record
shows she was at the office 8am-5pm when in fact she went to court.

HELD: Beradio belongs to a class of officers who are exempt from keeping and submitting daily time records. No criminal intent
to commit falsification can be imputed to her when she submits her time record not as a legal obligation but as a matter of
practice. The entries she made contain a color of truth and no damage was caused to the govt or a third party.

Luague vs. CA
Luague, a widow, signed her husbands name on the salary checks with the knowledge of her deceased husbands supervisor. She
encashed the same and use it to pay debts incurred for the illness and death of her husband.

HELD: There was no estafa thru falsification of a commercial document. No damage was incurred against the government as the
deceased employee deserved the salary his wife availed of. Even if there was falsification when she signed for her husband, this
was done with the knowledge of her deceased husbands supervisor that the husband was indeed dead. (Reezas dad in the RTC
ruled otherwise )

Cabigas vs. People

Cabigas, a securities custodian of Landbank, was convicted of falsification when he changed the entry of the figure of treasury
bills from 1539 to 1533 pieces in the Daily Report of Securities/Documents under Custody (DR SDUC) for the purpose of hiding the
loss of 6 treasury bills in his custody.

HELD: SC acquitted him since the elements of Art 171(4) were not present. The correction of the figure from 1539 to 1533 pieces
to conform to the actual pieces of treasury notes in custody is not falsification since it was made to speak the truth. Also, the
DR/SDUC is a form purely devised and adopted by Cabigas and was never required thus he was not legally obligated to disclose or
reveal the truth in that document. In the absence of legal obligation, there can be no falsification.

People vs. Sendaydiego

Sendaydiego, a provincial treasurer, used 6 forged provincial vouchers to embezzle from the road and bridge fund. TC convicted
them of malversation thru falsification of public document.

HELD: SC held that the crimes committed are separate crimes of malversation and falsification because in the 6 vouchers, the
falsification was used to conceal the malversation. Each falsification and malversation constituted independent offenses which
must be punished separately.

Siquian vs. People

Siquian, a municipal mayor, appointed a clerk and signed the latters appointment papers which stated that there was such a
position available and that funds for this position was available. However, no such position and funds were in existence. The
mayor knew that the Municipal Council failed to enact a new budget and has adopted the previous years budget.

HELD: SC held Mayor liable under Art 171(4), when he made an untruthful statement in a narration of facts contained in the
certification which he issued in connection with the appointment of the clerk. The existence of a wrongful intent to injure a
third person is not necessary when the falsified document is a public document. It is because the principal thing punished is the
violation of public faith and the destruction of truth proclaimed therein.

People vs. Villalon

Carrera brothers were co-owners of a parcel of land. A power of attorney was executed authorizing de Guzman to mortgage one
brothers half. De Guzman used the power of attorney to obtain a loan from the mortgagee bank. Loan was unpaid, bank
foreclosed the mortgage and sold land to Serafia who filed ejectment suit against the brothers.

HELD: The crime committed was estafa thru falsification of public document. The falsification of public document may be a
means to commit estafa because before the falsified document is actually used to defraud another, the crime of falsification is
already consummated and damage or intent to cause damage is not an element of falsification. The damage to another is caused
by the commission of estafa.

Santos v. Sandiganbayan (2000)

Valentino occupies a public position as bookkeeper at the Clearing Office of the Central Bank. He intercepted and pilfered BPILaoag checks with the assistance of petitioner Estacio, a janitor-messenger at the Central Bank. In the comfort room of the bank,
Valentino and/or one Villasanta tampered with the clearing statements and clearing manifests. Valentino then brought the
altered clearing statements back to the clearing center and prepared a Clearing Bank Manifests where he changed the figure in
the original copy to tally with those in the altered clearing statement. The tampered documents, along with the pilfered
demand envelopes, were then sent to the Central Bank Regional Clearing Center in Laoag. In utilizing this scheme from October
to December of 1981, the syndicate netted P9 Million.

Lumancas v. Intas (2000)

Lumancas and Uriarte were regular employees of the Philippine Postal Corporation in Tandag, Surigao del Sur. They made false
entries in their respective Personal Data Sheets (PDS, [CSC Form 212]) regarding their educational attainment, resulting in their
promotion to higher positions. Uriarte asserted that he finished his Bachelor of Science in Commerce, Major in Management, at
the IHU in 1968. In fllling up her PDS, Lumancas on the other hand indicated that she is a graduate of Bachelor of Science in
Commerce Major in Management at the IHU. She also claimed that she is a graduate of Pharmacy from the CEU. Both are not
college gradutes.

HELD: All the elements of falsification through the making of untruthful statements in a narration of facts are present: (a) That
the offender makes in a document statements in a narration of facts; (b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of
the facts narrated by him; (c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and, (d) That the perversion of truth
in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person. In People v. Po Giok To, the Court held
that "in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or by private persons, it is unnecessary that
there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private
documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed." Hence, the last requisite need not be present. Also, petitioners themselves have affirmed in their petition that their
Personal Data Sheets were not sworn to before any administering officer thereby taking their case away from the confines of
perjury. Nonetheless, they argue that they have no legal obligation to disclose the truth in their PDS since these are not official
documents. The Court disagrees and cited the case of Inting v. Tanodbayan, where it was held that "the accomplishment of the
Personal Data Sheet being a requirement under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in connection with employment in the
government, the making of an untruthful statement therein was, therefore, intimately connected with such employment. The
filing of a Personal Data Sheet is required in connection with the promotion to a higher position and contenders for promotion
have the legal obligation to disclose the truth. Otherwise, enhancing their qualifications by means of false statements will
prejudice other qualified aspirants to the same position.

Batulanon v. People (2006)

Cash vouchers are private documents and not commercial documents because they are not documents used by
merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions nor are they defined and regulated
by the Code of Commerce or other commercial law. Rather, they are private documents, which have been defined
as deeds or instruments executed by a private person without the intervention of a public notary or of other
person legally authorized, by which some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth.
People vs. Cortez
Accused introduced himself to a proprietress of a meatshop presenting an id card bearing another name. He claimed to be
authorized to waive inspection of books for P400. Upon learning that the accused was not a real BIR agent, the owner and
authorities set up a string operation. Accused was apprehended after taking the money.

HELD: Crime committed was usurpation of authority thru falsification of a public document by a private individual. It is not
robbery because there was no force or intimidation.

Gigantoni v People
Gigantoni, working on an investigation for another company, represented himself to PAL legal officer as a PC-CIS agent. He requested that he be
shown the PAL records which was granted and he xeroxed them.

HELD: He cannot be held liable for usurpation of authority because he did not knowingly represented himself to be an agent. AT
the time he went to PAL office, he was still an agent though he knew he was suspended. The conveyance to him of the notice of
dismissal was not proven. He should have been charged with usurpation of official functions where dismissal or suspension would
make no difference because both imply the absence of the power to represent himself as vested with authority to perform acts
pertaining to an office which he knowingly was deprived of.

Legamia v IAC
Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio Reyes for 19 years and gave him a son. She was known and introduced to others as Mrs. Reyes.
Upon Emilios death, Corazon filed for death benefits on behalf of their son. The real Mrs. Reyes, Felicisima, filed a complaint
against Corazon for using fictitious name.

HELD: Corazon was acquitted. It is not uncommon for a woman to represent herself as the wife of the person she is living with.
Corazon assumed the role of a wife not for any personal material gain but for her son. Ours is a tolerant and understanding
society

Diaz vs. People

Diaz was charged with falsification of official document. He allegedly executed and filed in CSC a personal data sheet, an official
document, where he stated he was a 4 th yr AB student at Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges w/c led to his reappointment.
The accused was never enrolled in said schools. He presented a transcript of record with no imprint of college seal nor signature
of school president.

HELD: The crime committed was perjury. This offense is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation
administered by authority of law on a material matter.

Acuna v. Deputy Ombudsman (2005)

FACTS: Petitioner Acua is a former teacher of the Angeles City National Trade School ("ACNTS") in Pampanga. Pascua was
ACNTS' Officer-In-Charge while Turla was a member of the faculty. Yabut, another ACNTS teacher, together with other school
personnel, requested a dialogue with Pascua on some unspecified matter. Turla attended the meeting upon Pascua's directive.
Acua, upon Yabuts invitation also attended the meeting. As an offshoot to an incident during the meeting which was held on
July 16, 1998, Acua charged Pascua with misconduct ("OMB-ADM-1-99-0387") and with violation of Article 131 of the RPC ("OMB
1-99-903") before the Office of the Ombudsman. In his sworn counter-affidavit in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387, Pascua alleged, among
others, that: (1) OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 is a "rehash and a duplication with a slight deviation of fact" of an administrative case
pending with DECS which Acua and Yabut earlier filed against him and (2) Yabut had no authority to invite in the meeting a nonemployee of ACNTS like Acua considering that Pascua was the one who called the meeting. Pascua also submitted a sworn
statement of Turla confirming that respondent Pascua and not Yabut called the said meeting. The Ombudsman dismissed OMBADM-1-99-0387 and OMB 1-99-0903. Contending that Pacua and Turla perjured themselves in their sworn statements in OMB-ADM1-99-0387, petitioner charged the former with perjury before the office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. Acua alleged that
Pascua and Turla were liable for perjury because: (1) the complaint she and Yabut filed against Pascua before the CSC, later
endorsed to the DECS, was not "the same" as her complaint in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 and (2) it was Yabut and not respondent
Pascua who called the meeting. The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dismissed the complaint.

HELD: In prosecutions for perjury, a matter is material if it is the "main fact which was the subject of the inquiry, or
any circumstance which tends to prove that fact . . ." 24 To hold private respondents liable, there must be evidence that their
assailed statements in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 were the subject of inquiry in that case. Petitioner has presented no such evidence.
The records are hardly helpful, as petitioner did not furnish the Court a copy of her complaint in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387.
What is before the Court is a portion of Pascua's counter-affidavit in that case as quoted by public respondent in his 4
April 2000 Resolution. Admittedly, some inference is possible from this quoted material, namely, that the basis of petitioner's
complaint in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 is that Pascua prevented her from taking part in the July 1998 meeting. However, it would be
improper for the Court to rely on such inference because the element of materiality must be established by evidence and not left
to inference.
At any rate, petitioner's complaint for perjury will still not prosper because Pascua's statement that OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 is
significantly the same as petitioner's and Yabut's administrative complaint against respondent Pascua before the DECS is
immaterial to the inferred issue.
The third element of perjury requires that the accused willfully and deliberately assert a falsehood. Good faith or lack of malice
is a valid defense. Here, the Court finds that respondent Pascua's statement in his counter-affidavit in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 that
he called the 16 July 1998 meeting does not constitute a deliberate assertion of falsehood. While it was Yabut and some
unidentified ACNTS personnel who requested a dialogue with respondent Pascua, it was Pascua's consent to their request which
led to the holding of the meeting. Thus, Pascua's statement in question is not false much less malicious. It is a good faith
interpretation of events leading to the holding of the meeting.

Regarding Pascua's allegation in his counter-affidavit in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 that petitioners complaint was a mere "rehash and
duplication with a slight deviation of fact" of the DECS administrative case petitioner and Yabut filed against Pascua, it was not
shown by petitioner why this is false. Petitioner again did not furnish the Court a copy of her and Yabut's complaint with the
DECS.
Turla's statement in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 that respondent Pascua called the 16 July 1998 meeting was a mere reiteration of what
respondent Pascua told him. Consequently, it was correct for the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to hold that since respondent
Turla merely repeated what he heard from respondent Pascua, he could not be held liable for making a false and malicious
statement. The dismissal is affirmed.

People v. Choa (2003)

FACTS: Alfonso Chan Choa, petitioner, a Chinese national, filed with the RTC a verified petition for naturalization. During the
initial hearing of the case, Choa testified on direct examination but he was not able to finish the same. He subsequently filed a
motion to withdraw his petition for naturalization for which the trial court granted. Meanwhile, State Prosecutor Delfin, acting
upon the complaint of petitioner's wife, Leni, filed an Information with the MTCC, charging petitioner with perjury under Article
183 of the RPC with respect to alleged false statements he made in his Petition for Naturalization. Petitioner alleged that there
is no basis to convict him of perjury because almost 2 years prior to the filing of the Information, his motion to withdraw the
petition for naturalization containing the alleged false statements was granted, hence, the alleged false statements were no
longer existing or had become functus officio. The lower courts found Choas allegation devoid of merit and convicted him guilty
of perjury. In his petition, Choa and the Solicitor General contend that (a) not all the elements of the crime of perjury are
present; and (b) the withdawal of the petition for naturalization which contains the alleged untruthful statements bars the
prosecution of petitioner for perjury.

HELD: Fully cognizant of the truth surrounding his moral character and residence, petitioner instead declared falsely in his
verified petition for naturalization that "he has all the qualifications and none of the disqualification under C.A. No. 473."
Clearly, he willfully asserted falsehood under oath on material matters required by law.
It is not necessary that the proceeding in which the perjury is alleged to have been committed be first terminated before a
prosecution for the said crime is commenced. At the time he filed his petition for naturalization, he had committed perjury. All
the elements of the crime were already present then. He knew all along that he wilfully stated material falsities in his verified
petition. Surprisingly, he withdrew his petition without even stating any reason therefor. But such withdrawal only terminated
the proceedings for naturalization. It did not extinguish his culpability for perjury he already committed. Indeed, the fact of
withdrawal alone cannot bar the State from prosecuting petitioner, an alien, who made a mockery not only of the Philippine
naturalization law but the judicial proceedings as well. And the petition for naturalization tainted with material falsities can be
used as evidence of his unlawful act.
Petitioner then claims that since the petition for naturalization is a pleading, the allegations therein are absolutely privileged
and cannot be used for any criminal prosecution against him, citing Sison vs. David, People vs. Aquino and Flordelis vs.
Himalaloan.
The argument is unavailing. Sison and Aquino both involve libel cases. In Sison, this Court categorically stressed that the term
"absolute privilege" (or "qualified privilege") has an "established technical meaning, in connection with civil actions for libel and
slander." The purpose of the privilege is to ensure that "members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and
witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal
prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages. It is granted in aid and for the advantage of the administration of justice."
Certainly, in the present case, petitioner cannot seek refuge under the absolutely privileged communication rule since the false
statements he made in his petition for naturalization has instead made a mockery of the administration of justice.
The Flordelis case is likewise not in point. There, Flordelis was charged with perjury for having alleged false statements in his
verified answer. This Court held that no perjury could be committed by Flordelis because "an answer to a complaint in an
ordinary civil action need not be under oath," thus, "it is at once apparent that one element of the crime of perjury is
absent . . ., namely, that the sworn statement complained of must be required by law.

People vs. Ouano

Echavez and Ouano had an oral agreement that only the former would make a bid for a parcel of land in a public bidding, and if
accepted, they would divide the property in proportion to their adjoining properties. To ensure the success of their plans, they
induced the only other party interested by paying her P2000 to desist from bidding.

HELD: The acts constituted a crime under Art 185. They caused another bidder to stay away from the auction in order to cause
the reduction of the price of the property auctioned. The parties have no cause of action against each other to and are both
liable for the crime.

La Chemise Lacoste v Fernandez

In 1975, Hemandas & Co., a domestic firm was issued registration for the trademark "CHEMISE LACOSTE & CROCODILE DEVICE" by
the Philippine Patent Office for use on T-shirts, sportswear and other garment products of the company.
La Chemise Lacoste, S.A.,the actual owner of the TMs "LACOSTE", "CHEMISE LACOSTE", "CROCODILE DEVICE" used on clothings
and sporting apparels sold worldwide filed a Petition for Cancellation of Hamandas registration as it is claiming prior registration
of the TMs.

HELD: The records show that the goodwill and reputation of La Chemise products bearing the TM LACOSTE date back even before
1964 when LACOSTE clothing apparels were first marketed in the Philippines. To allow Hemandas to continue using the trademark
Lacoste for the simple reason that he was the first registrant of a trademark used in international commerce and not belonging
to him is to render nugatory the very essence of the law on trademarks and tradenames.

The purpose of the law is to point out distinctly the origin or ownership of the article to which it is affixed, to secure to him,
who has been instrumental in bringing into a market a superior article of merchandise, the fruit of his industry and skill, and to
prevent fraud and imposition. It is based on the principle of business integrity and common justice.
Suson v. People (2006)

The recording or non-recording thereof in an official record will not necessarily lead to an acquittal as long as the sale of the
prohibited drug is adequately proven. In the case at bar, SPO2 Patio, the poseur-buyer, testified on the circumstances regarding
the sale of the shabu for which petitioners were charged and convicted. Settled is the rule that in the prosecution for the sale of
dangerous drugs, the absence of marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution as long as the sale of
dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court.

People v. Nicolas (2007)

Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test-buy does not affect the legality of the buy-bust operation.
There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the
selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers. A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not necessary especially
where the police operatives are accompanied by their informant during the entrapment. Flexibility is a trait of good police
work. In the case at bar, the buy-bust operation was conducted without need of any prior surveillance for the reason that the
informant accompanied the policemen to the person who is peddling the dangerous drugs.

People vs. Kottinger

Postcards of non-Christians inhabitants of the Philippines in their native dress were questioned to be obscene.

HELD: The SC said that the postcards were not obscene because the aggregate judgment of the community, and the moral sense
of the people were not shocked by those pictures. They were not offensive to chastity but merely depicted persons as they
actually lived.

People vs. Aparici

A case about a girl dancing hula-hula in the theater making the audience of males shout sige muna, sige, nakakalibog!

HELD: The SC decided that the dance was immoral and indecent using the reaction of the public as the gauge in the
determination of indecency.

People vs. Padan

This is a case about a live show done in Tondo.

HELD: SC said that an actual exhibition of sexual act can have no redeeming feature- no room for art. Therefore, it is a clear and
unmitigated obscenity. The exhibition was an offense to public morals.
Manipon vs. Sandiganbayan

Manipon, a deputy sheriff assigned to execute the decision of the labor arbiter ordering Harry Dominguez, a building contractor
to pay the balance of their work contract. He sent a notice to the Comtrust Bank in Baguio City garnishing the bank accounts of
Dominguez. The bank agreed to hold the accounts. Later on Dominguez sought Manipon's help in the withdrawal of the garnished
account. Manipon told Dominguez that he "can remedy the withdrawal so they will have something for the New Year." Dominguez
interpreted this to mean that Manipon would withdraw the garnished amount for a consideration. Manipon contends that the
Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him of direct bribery, in not giving credence to the defense theory that there was novation of
the money judgment.

HELD: It is very strange indeed that for such an important agreement that would be a final judgment, no one took the bother of
putting it down or paper. Of course Manipon would have us believe that there was no need for it because he trusted Dominguez
and Tabek.

And yet did he not also claim that Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge? And if there was really an agreement to
alter the judgment, why did he not inform the labor arbiter about it considering that it was the labor arbiter who had issued the
order of execution? Manipon could not give satisfactory explanations because there was no such agreement in the first place.

Dacumos vs. Sandiganbayan

Dacumos was a BIR revenue examiner when he offered to settle the tax liability of R. Revilla Interiors by pulling out its
assessments papers from the office of the BIR Commissioner and procuring a tax clearance. For such service, he would require a
fee of P35,000.00. Samia, the manager of the firm, pretended to go along with him but reported the matter to the National
Bureau of Investigation, which arranged an entrapment. Dacumos was caught and convicted of direct bribery. He argues that he
could not have promised to remove the assessment papers from the Commissioner's office as he had no access to that place.

HELD: The implausibility of his promises does not mean they were not made or that they did not appear to be credible, coming as
they did from one with his long experience in the BIR and appeared to know his way around. The Court finds it especially
remarkable that he met Samia at a private place instead of his office at the BIR, considering that they were supposed to be
discussing official business and it was Samia who he says was requesting his assistance. The Court is not inclined to believe that
Samia would be so vindictive as to falsely incriminate the petitioner with the serious charge of bribery simply because the
petitioner refused to reduce the tax assessment of R. Revilla Interiors. Samia was not even directly involved in the assessment.

Morfe vs. Mutuc

Issue: Whether RA 3019 sec 7 was unconstitutional

HELD: No. The Anti- Graft Act of 1960 was aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and
maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public administration. A
public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent of all.
The conditions then prevailing called for norms of such character. The times demanded such a remedial device. By the provisions
of the challenged section, it becomes much more difficult by those disposed to take advantage of their position to commit acts
of graft and corruption. While in the attainment of such public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is permissible,
there must be a showing, clear, categorical, and undeniable, that what the Constitution condemns, the statute allows.
It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public service with
its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that
imposed on public officials and employees to file such sworn statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having done
so upon assuming office. The due process clause is not susceptible to such a reproach. There was therefore no unconstitutional
exercise of police power.

Jaravata vs. Sandiganbayan

Jaravata was an asst. principal when he informed the classroom teachers of the approval of the release of their salary
differentials and to facilitate its payment accused and the classroom teachers agreed that accused follow-up the papers in Manila
with the obligation on the part of the classroom teachers to reimburse the accused of his expenses. He did incur expenses in the
amount of P36 for each of the 6 teachers. The teachers actually received their salary differentials and pursuant to said
agreement, they, with the exception of 2 teachers, gave the accused varying amounts but as the administrator did not approve
it, he ordered the Jaravata to return the money given to him which he complied. Jaravata was charged and convicted under RA
3019 SEC 3(b)

HELD: Jaravata was not in violation of RA 3019 Sec 3(b). Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, refers to a public officer whose official
intervention is required by law in a contract or transaction.
There is no law which invests the petitioner with the power to intervene in the payment of the salary differentials of
the complainants or anyone for that matter. Far from exercising any power, the petitioner played the humble role of a supplicant
whose mission was to expedite payment of the salary differentials. In his official capacity as assistant principal, he is not
required by law to intervene in the payment of the salary differentials. Accordingly, he cannot be said to have violated the law
afore-cited although he exerted efforts to facilitate the payment of the salary differentials.

Trieste vs. Sandiganbayan

Mayor Trieste had been charged and convicted for 12 violations of RA 3019 Sec 3 (h) for the purchases of construction materials
by his municipality from a company of which he is allegedly the
president.

HELD: No violation. Petitioner has divested his interest with the company. Petitioner established that before he assumed office
as mayor he had already sold his shares of the company to his sister. The sale was made by corresponding indorsements to her
stock certificate which was duly recorded in the stock and transfer book of the corporation.
In as much as Treasurer Vega signed and paid the vouchers after the materials were delivered, petitioner's signature on
the vouchers after payment is not, we submit, the kind of intervention contemplated under Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is
the actual intervention in the transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach. The
official need not dispose his shares in the corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with the
office. For the law aims to prevent the dominant use of influence, authority and power.
There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his capacity as Mayor, used his influence, power, and authority in having
the transactions given to Trigen.

Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan

Mejorada was a right-of-way agent with DPWH. Petitioner contacted the persons affected by the widening of the road and
informed them that he could work out their claims for payment of the values of their lots and/or improvements affected by the
widening of said highway. They were paid more than what was the value of their property. Right after the claimants had received
the proceeds of their checks, accused accompanied them to his car where they were divested of the amounts paid to them. All
the claimants were helpless to complaint because they were afraid of the accused and his armed companion.

Petitioner contends that the eight informations filed against him before the Sandiganbayan are fatally defective in that
it failed to allege the essential ingredients or elements constituting the offense penalized by Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019.

HELD: Section 3s reference to "any public officer" is without distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared
unlawful. The last sentence of paragraph (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers or
government corporations, which, under the ordinary concept of "public officers" may not come within the term. It is a strained
construction of the provision to read it as applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or
permits or other concessions.

The government suffered undue injury as a result of his inflating the true claims of complainants which eventually became the
basis of payment. His contention that he had no participation is belied by the fact that as a right-of-way-agent, his duty was
precisely to negotiate with property owners who are affected by highway constructions for the purpose of compensating them.
On the part of the complainants, the injury caused to them consists in their being divested of a large proportion of
their claims and receiving payment in an amount even lower than the actual damage they incurred. They were deprived of the
just compensation to which they are entitled.

Labatagos vs. Sandiganbayan

Labatagos was the cashier and collecting officer of the Mindanao State University. She filed a leave of absence and did not
discharge her duties for the said period. When COA conducted the examination, the petitioner did not have any cash in her
possession, so she was asked to produce all her records, books of collection, copies of official receipts and remittance advices
and her monthly reports of collections. Petitioner incurred shortages. Petitioner was charged and convicted of malversation of
public funds.

HELD: Conviction upheld. Her claim that she signed the audit report and statement of collections and deposits prepared by the
audit team of Francisco Rivera on the understanding that her shortage was only P2,000.00 is belied by the figures clearly
reflected on the said documents. Mrs. Ester Guanzon, the prosecutions rebuttal witness, confirmed that the accused filed
application for maternity leave in March 1978 but continued reporting for work during that month and that she (Guanzon) was
the one assigned to collect the fees in her stead. When the accused was physically absent from office, she also turned over her

collections to the accused in the latters house with the duplicate copies of the receipts she issued which the accused signed
after satisfying herself that the amounts turned over tallied with the receipts.

All the other sums allegedly taken from the accused by Director Osop, Alikhan Marohombsar and Auditor Casan supported as they
are by mere pieces of paper, despite the admission by Director Osop of having signed some of them were not valid
disbursements. Granting that the amounts reflected in the chits were really secured by the persons who signed them, the
responsibility to account for them still rests in the accused accountable officer. Malversation consists not only in
misappropriation or converting public funds or property to ones personal use but also by knowingly allowing others to make use
of or misappropriate them.

Estepa vs. Sandiganbayan

Estepa, then a senior paymaster lost P50,000 government money. Petitioners contention is that the facts alleged in the
information did not constitute an offense since there can be no crime of malversation of public funds through mere failure to
count the money.

HELD: In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received the
public funds and that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefore was made and he could not satisfactorily
explain his failure so to account. An accountable public officer may be convicted for malversation even if there is no direct
evidence of personal misappropriation, where he has not been able to explain satisfactorily the absence of the public funds
involved.

Ilogon vs. Sandiganbayan

Ilogon was the acting Postmaster when the examination showed that the petitioner incurred a shortage in his accounts. He was
charged and convicted of malversation of public funds.

HELD: In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received public
funds and that he did not have them in his possession when demand 23herefore was made. There is even no need of direct
evidence of personal misappropriation as long as there is a shortage in his account and petitioner cannot satisfactorily explain
the same.

The fact that petitioner did not personally use the missing funds is not a valid defense and will not exculpate him from his
criminal liability. And as aptly found by respondent Sandiganbayan, the fact that (the) immediate superiors of the accused
(petitioner herein) have acquiesced to the practice of giving out cash advances for convenience did not legalize the
disbursements.

The fact also that petitioner fully settled the amount of P118,003.10 later is of no moment. The return of funds malversed is not
a defense. It is neither an exempting circumstance nor a ground for extinguishing the accuseds criminal liability. At best, it is a
mitigating circumstance.

Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan

Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like
Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the formers premises. A Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by the BIR to
the personal property of Jaime Ancla, a delinquent taxpayer. Later on, Azarcon wrote the BIR stating Ancla surreptitiously
withdrew his equipment from hiss custody. Because of this, Azarcon was charged and convicted of malversation of public
property. The issue here is whether petitioners designation by the BIR as a custodian of distrained property qualifies as
appointment by direct provision of law, or by competent authority
HELD: Not a public officer. The case of U.S. vs. Rastrollo is not applicable to the case before us simply because the facts
therein are not identical, similar or analogous to those obtaining here. While the cited case involved a judicial deposit of the
proceeds of the sale of attached property in the hands of the debtor, the case at bench dealt with the BIRs administrative act of
effecting constructive distraint over alleged property of taxpayer Ancla in relation to his back taxes, property which was received
by Petitioner Azarcon. In the cited case, it was clearly within the scope of that courts jurisdiction and judicial power to
constitute the judicial deposit and give the depositary a character equivalent to that of a public official. However, in the
instant case, while the BIR had authority to require Petitioner Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the NIRC did not
grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer.
People v. Wa-Acon (2006)
Article 217 no longer requires proof by the State that the accused actually appropriated, took, or misappropriated public funds
or property. Instead, a presumption, though disputable and rebuttable, was installed that upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which said officer is
accountableshould be prima facie evidence that he had put such missing funds or properties to personal use. When these
circumstances are present, a presumption of law arises that there was malversation of public funds or properties as decreed
by Article 217.
Campomanes v. People (2006)

As gleaned from the parties stipulation of facts, the PSC and the FIDE entered here into a contract requiring the PSC to provide
the FIDE the funds for the latter to organize the Chess Olympiad and Congress in Manila. The PSC delivered the funds to the
FIDE, which apparently successfully organized the Chess Olympiad and Congress since the PSC does not claim that the FIDE failed
to organize the two events. In short, the FIDE complied with its undertaking under the contract.

There is no claim by the PSC or the COA that the FIDE, a foreign non-governmental entity, is obligated under the contract to
render an accounting.

There is also no showing that the PSCs charter or any law or regulation requires the FIDE to render an accounting to the PSC or
the COA as a condition for the receipt of funds. Clearly, this situation cannot give rise to criminal liability on the part of the
FIDEs officers under Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code which admittedly requires that there must be a law or regulation
requiring the rendering of accounts by private individuals.

Rodillas vs. Sandiganbayan

Rodillas was a Patrolman when he was directed by his superior, to escort prisoners to face trial. While waiting for
the arrival of the judge, Pat. Andres, a relative of the husband of detention prisoner Zenaida, approached the

accused and requested the latter if he could permit Zenaida to talk to her husband. The accused consented and
Zenaida had a short talk with her husband. He consented to the request that they eat at the canteen. While eating,
the husband of Zenaida asked accused if he could accompany his wife to the comfort room as she was not feeling
well and felt like defecating. The accused accompanied Zenaida and a lady companion to the ladies' comfort room.
Zenaida and her lady companion entered the comfort room, while he stood guard near the ladies' comfort room
facing the door. Not long after, the lady companion of Zenaida came out of the comfort room and told him that she
was going to buy sanitary napkins for Zenaida. After ten minutes elapsed without the lady companion of Zenaida
coming back, the accused became suspicious and entered the comfort room. To his surprise, he found Zenaida no
longer inside the comfort room. He immediately went out to look for the escapee inside the building but they were
not able to see her. Accused was unable to recapture Zenaida. Was the Sandiganbayan correct in holding the
petitioner guilty of infidelity in the custody of a prisoner through negligence penalized under Art. 224?

HELD: Yes. The only disputed issue is the petitioner's negligence resulting in the escape of detention prisoner
Zenaida Andres. The negligence referred to in the Revised Penal Code is such definite laxity as all but amounts to a
deliberate non-performance of duty on the part of the guard. It is evident from the records that the petitioner acted
negligently and beyond the scope of his authority when he permitted his charge to create the situation which led to
her escape. The petitioner contends that human considerations compelled him to grant Zenaida Andres' requests to
take lunch and to go to the comfort room to relieve herself. As a police officer who was charged with the duty to
return the prisoner directly to jail, the deviation from his duty was clearly a violation of the regulations. It is the
duty of any police officer having custody of a prisoner to take necessary precautions to assure the absence of any
means of escape. A failure to undertake these precautions will make his act one of definite laxity or negligence
amounting to deliberate non-performance of duty. His tolerance of arrangements whereby the prisoner and her
companions could plan and make good her escape should have aroused the suspicion of a person of ordinary
prudence.
People vs. Jumawan

Presentacion Jumawan, her father and two brothers conspired to kill Presentacions husband Rodolfo in a store near the public
market. The fiscal filed an information for murder against the four accused and they were subsequently convicted for such
crime.

HELD: Since Presentacions relationship to the victim is not alleged in the information, she can be convicted of murder only.
Relationship can be appreciated as generic aggravating circumstance only.

People vs. Tomotorgo

Julian Tomotorgo hit his wife with a piece of wood, after the latter tried to leave their conjugal home. Although Julian stopped
the beating when his wife complained of chest pains, the wife succumbed to the serious injuries. Julian was convicted of
parricide but he claims that he should be sentenced to the penalty corresponding to serious physical injuires only, the offense
which he intended to commit.

HELD: The fact that the accused intended to maltreat the victim or inflict physical injuries DOES NOT exempt him from liability
for the resulting and more serious crime committed. He is only entitled to the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong.

People vs. Malabago (1996)

After an argument, Pedro Malabago fatally hacked and struck his wife with a bolo. He was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of PARRICIDE.

HELD: Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the
legitimate spouse of the accused.

The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best
proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence thereof, oral
evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected to.

People vs. Ignacio (1997)

Accused wife here was accused of parricide for the killing of her husband by hitting the latter on the nape with a piece of wood.
Accused was convicted of parricide. She however appeals saying that the crime she committed is not parricide but only homicide
since there was no proof of marriage between her and the victim.
HELD: Guilty of parricide. The phrase whether legitimate or illegitimate in the law just refers to children and not to spouses
who must therefore be legitimate.
In CAB, accused declared in open court that they were husband and wife. And even without this, there is a presumption in law
that persons deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful marriage without proof to the contrary.

People vs. Genosa

Accused wife here was convicted parricide for the killing her husband and was sentenced to death. Accused asks for a reopening
of the case in order to prove her state of mind during the killing in as she says that she is a battered wife (battered wife
syndrome).
HELD: Case should be remanded for the psychological examination. If accused can prove that she indeed was a battered wife,
this may be raised as a valid defense as a species of self-defense. Having been proven to be a victim of domestic violence of the
husband. This can be self defense because since the wife already always assumes, and correctly that the husband will beat her
up again, she may be justified in taking steps to protect herself. And since there is the fear of an impending beating again in the
mind of the wife, she would have no opportunity beforehand to choose means to protect herself other than to injure and/ or kill
the husband.
The psychological examination can prove how the accused perceived danger and how, in her honest belief, she believed that
danger to herself was imminent (as one of the elements of self-defense).

People vs. Abarca

Abarca caught his wife in the act of sexual intercourse with Koh. An hour later, Abarca fired several shots at Koh during a
mahjongg session. Koh was killed and two others were seriously wounded. Abarca was convicted of Murder and Double
Frustrated Murder.

HELD: Though quite a length of time, about an hour, had passed between the time Abarca caught his wife in sexual intercourse
with Koh and the time the latter was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the
victim by Abarca. The RPC, in requiring that the accused shall kill any of them or both of themimmediately after surprising
his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the
death caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon the spouse in the basest act
of infidelity.

People v. Mallari, 404 SCRA 170

FACTS: Joseph admonished Rufino and his brothers Ino and Felix Mallari not to drive fast while passing by Joseph's
house. Rufino and his brothers, who were then hot-tempered, challenged Joseph to a fight. The latter just ignored the challenge;
and, instead he and his own brothers Radi and Manny asked apology from Rufino. Later that afternoon, while Joseph and Liza
were watching a basketball game at the barangay basketball court, Rufino and his brothers, who were then carrying bladed
weapons, arrived and attempted to stab Joseph; but Joseph was able to run away. When they were not able to catch up with
him, Rufino boarded and drove the truck parked near the basketball court and continued chasing Joseph until the truck ran over
the latter, which caused his instantaneous death. The trial court found Rufino guilty of murder. It ruled that the crime was
committed by means of a motor vehicle as a qualifying circumstance.

HELD: The Court affirmed the trial court's finding that Rufino deliberately bumped Joseph with the truck he was
driving. The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in pursuing Joseph. Upon catching up with him, Rufino hit
him with the truck, as a result of which Joseph died instantly. It is therefore clear that the truck was the means used by Rufino
to perpetrate the killing of Joseph.
The case of People v. Muoz cited by Rufino finds no application to the present case. In the said case, the police patrol
jeep was merely used by the accused therein in looking for the victim and in carrying the body of the victim to the place where
it was dumped. The accused therein shot the victim, which caused the latter's death. In the present case, the truck itself was
used to kill the victim by running over him.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who kills another "by means of a motor vehicle" is guilty of
murder. Thus, the use of motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder.

People v. Pascual (2006)

At any rate, the doctrinal rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not life threatening, the accused not having
performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about death, the crime committed is only attempted murder.

People v. Whisenhunt, 386 SCRA 586

FACTS: Whisenhunt and the deceased, Elsa Santos-Castillo, were lovers. They met at the Apex Motor Corporation
where accused was the Manager while Elsa was the Assistant Personnel Manager. Both accused and Elsa were married, but they
were estranged from their respective spouses. Inside his condominium unit, accused Whisenhunt killed Elsa by stabbing her with
a knife. He then beheaded her and mutilated her body parts. Thereafter, with the help of Ravelo, the dismembered parts of
Elsas body were wrapped in three separate black garbage bags. Whisenhunt and Ravelo packed all the garbage bags in another

bag with zipper and rollers. The two then drove in Whisenhunts car and the garbage bags were eventually thrown on the
roadside; and into a river. The trial court found Whisenhun guilty of murder qualified by outraging and scoffing at the victim's
person or corpse.

HELD: The mere decapitation of the victim's head constitute outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim, thus
qualifying the killing to murder. In this case, accused-appellant not only beheaded Elsa. He further cut up her body like pieces of
meat. Then, he strewed dismembered parts of her body in a deserted road in the countryside, leaving them to rot on the ground.
The sight of Elsa's severed body parts on the ground, vividly depicted in the photographs offered in evidence, is both revolting
and horrifying. At the same time, the viewer cannot help but feel utter pity for the sub-human manner of disposing of her
remains. Hence, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder, qualified by outraging and
scoffing at the victim's person or corpse.

Sabang v. People (2007)

The distance from which a shot is fired affects the nature and extent of the injury caused on the victim. In close range fire, the
injury is not only due to the missile but also due to the pressure of the expanded gases, flame and other solid products of
combustion. In contrast, distant fire usually produces the characteristic effect of the bullet alone. A shot fired from a distance
of more than 60 cm or about two (2) feet does not produce the burning, smudging or tattooing typically present in loose contact
or near fire, short range fire and medium range fire.
Powder burns is a term commonly used by physicians whenever there is blackening of the margin at the entrance of the
gunshot wound. The blackening is due to smoke smudging, gunpowder tattooing and, to a certain extent, burning of the wound
margin.
The fact that there were no powder burns on Butads body indicates that the shots were fired at a distance of more than two (2)
feet and not at close range as the defense suggests. Moreover, Butad sustained four (4) gunshot wounds, three (3) of which were
in the chest area, circumstances which are inconsistent with the defenses theory of accidental firing
People vs. Buensuceso

Several police officers fired shots at a knife-wielding guy, who later died from the gunshot wounds. The investigation showed
that all the four officers actually fired their service pistols but it was not established as to which wound was inflicted by each
policeman.

HELD: Where several personas acting independently of each other inflicted wounds on a victim but it cannot be determined
which wound was inflicted by each person, all the assailants are liable for the victims death.

People vs. Pugay

Pugay poured gasoline on a 25-year old mental retardate while Samson set the poor guy on fire, killing him in the process. They
were both convicted of murder.

HELD: Pugay can only be convicted of Homicide thru reckless imprudence because of his failure to exercise all the diligence
necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act committed by his companions. Samson is guilty of
Homicide although it was not his intention to kill the guy, but he shall be credited with the mitigating circumstance of no
intention to commit so grave a wrong.

People vs. Basay (1993)

The two accused here were charged with Multiple Murder and Frustrated Murder with Arson in one information. They were
charged with having stabbed people, and to conceal the crime, they burned down the house. The burning of the house then led
to the death of another and 3rd degree burns on the lone survivor.

HELD: It was not proper to have consolidated all the charges against the accused in one single complaint. It was proven that 3
victims were hacked and stabbed before the house was burned down. And then when the house was burned down, this led to the
death of another person and serious burns on another.

Several separate informations must be filed where the victims were killed by separate acts. 4 crimes were committed here, 3
separate murders under the RPC and arson as punished under sec5 PD1613 (if by reason/ on occasion of the arson, death results,
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death imposed). Therefore the information was vulnerable to a motion to quash for being
duplicitous.

People vs. Rivera (2006)

An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated, frustrated or attempted stage, is intent of the
offenders to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent
which the prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed from the
commission of a felony by dolo.

People v. Unlagada, 389 SCRA 224

FACTS: At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening Laurel left his house together with his visitor, Selda, to attend a public
dance. Two hours later, Danilo asked Edwin to take a short break from dancing to attend to their personal necessities outside the
dance hall. Once outside, they decided to have a drink and bought 2 bottles of beer at a nearby store. Not long after, Daniloleft
to look for a place to relieve himself. While Danilo was relieving himself, Unlagada approached Danilo and stabbed him at the
side. Danilo retaliated by striking his assailant with a half-filled bottle of beer. Almost simultaneously, a group of men numbering
about seven 7, ganged up on Danilo and hit him with assorted weapons, i.e., bamboo poles, stones and pieces of wood. Danilo
died before he could be given any medical assistance. Unlagada was convicted by the RTC. He claims the trial court erred in
convicting him of murder and not "death in a tumultuous affray." under Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code.

HELD: A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons who engage in a confused and
tumultuous manner, in the course of which a person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. The
quarrel in the instant case is between a distinct group of individuals, one of whom was sufficiently identified as the principal

author of the killing, as against a common, particular victim. It is not, as the defense suggests, a "tumultuous affray" within the
meaning of Art. 251 of The RPC, that is, a melee or free-for-all, where several persons not comprising definite or identifiable
groups attack one another in a confused and disorganized manner, resulting in the death or injury of one or some of them.

Dado v. People, 392 SCRA 46

FACTS: The Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police Station formed 3 teams to intercept cattle rustlers. The team, composed
of petitioner SPO4 Dado and CAFGU members Eraso, Balinas, and Alga, waited behind a large dike. Balinas and Alga, who were
both armed with M14 armalite rifles, positioned themselves between Dado, who was armed with a caliber .45 pistol, and accused
Eraso, who was carrying an M16 armalite rifle. They were all facing southwards in a half-kneeling position and were about 2 arms
length away from each other. Thereafter, the team saw somebody approaching at a distance of 50 meters. Though it was a
moonless night, they noticed that he was half-naked. When he was about 5 meters away from the team, Balinas noticed that
Eraso, who was on his right side, was making some movements. Balinas told Eraso to wait, but before Balinas could beam his
flash light, Eraso fired his M16 armalite rifle at the approaching man. Immediately thereafter, Dado, fired a single shot from his .
45 caliber pistol. The victim shouted, "Tay Dolfo, ako ini," ("Tay Dolfo, [this is] me") as he fell on the ground. The victim turned
out to be Silvestre "Butsoy" Balinas, the nephew of Balinas and not the cattle rustler the team were ordered to intercept.
Silvestre Balinas died as a result of the gunshot wounds he sustained. The RTC convicted Dado of the crime of Homicide.

HELD: Dado is guilty of the crime of illegal discharge of firearm. Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the
victim, petitioner should be held liable for the crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254 of the RPC. The elements of
this crime are: (1) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person; and (2) that the offender has no intention
to kill that person. Though the information charged the petitioner with murder, he could be validly convicted of illegal discharge
of firearm, an offense which is necessarily included in the crime of unlawful killing of a person. Under Rule 120, Section 4, of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and
that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted
of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
People vs. Salufrania

After quarrelling with his pregnant wife, Salufrania boxed her on the stomach and strangled her to death. He was convicted of
the complex crime of parricide with INTENTIONAL ABORTION.

Held: There is no evidence to show that the accused had the intention to commit an abortion. Mere boxing on the stomach,
taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim is not sufficient to show an intent to cause an abortion. Thus,
Salufrania should be convicted of the crime of parricide with UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION.
People vs. Orita

A PC soldier raped a 19-year old student while poking a knife on her neck. However, only a portion of his penis entered her
vagina because the victim kept on struggling until she was finally able to escape. The soldier was convicted of FRUSTRATED
RAPE.

HELD: There is NO crime of frustrated rape because In rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of the
victim, he actually attains his purpose, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished.
Nothing more is left to be done by the offender because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime.

People vs. Mangalino

A 55-year old man lured a 6-year old to his bedroom by giving her two pesos. He then tried to force his penis in to her vagina but
he was not able to completely do so, because of the little girls undeveloped genitalia (only 1 cm. in diameter).

HELD: Rape was committed even though the penetration could only go as deep as the labia. The court has consistently held that
for rape to be committed, full penetration is not required. Even the slightest penetration is sufficient to consummate the crime
of rape.

People vs. Balbuena

A tomboy went on a drinking spree with her male friends. Two of her companions raped her on top of a billiard table. While one
guy was raping her, the other pinned her arms down.

HELD: In the crime of rape, when a woman testifies that she had been raped, she says all that need to be said to signify that this
crime has been committed. Note that each accused was sentenced to two counts of rape - one for actually raping the girl and
another for helping the other rape the girl.

People vs. Castro

Castro brought a 6-year old girl inside the bathroom. He made the girl stand on the toilet bowl and tried to insert his penis into
her vagina. Medical findings showed that the victims hymen was not lacerated.

HELD: Perfect penetration, rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina are not essential for the offense of consummated
rape. Entry to the extent of the labia or lips of the female organ is sufficient. The victims remaining a virgin does not negate
rape.

People vs. Atento

A 16-year old mental retardate was repeatedly raped by her neighbor, and she later on gave birth to their child. She described
the sexual experience as pleasurable (Masarap!)

HELD: Even though force and intimidation has not been established, rape was still committed because the victim is deprived of
reason. Under paragraph 2 of Article 335, it is not necessary that the culprit actually deprives the victim of reason prior to the

rape, as by administration of drugs or some other method. This provision also applies to cases where the woman has been earlier
deprived of reason by other causes, as when she is congenitally retarded.

People vs. Dela Cuesta

The RTC of Makati found De La Cuesta guilty of 6 counts of rape against 9-year-old Merma Binasbas. At the time of the alleged
incidents of rape, De La Cuesta, then 64 years old, was boarding with Merma and her mom. De La Cuesta threatened the girl and
gave her P20 after each encounter. De La Cuesta claims it was error for the lower court to find that he was Mermas guardian,
and that he could have committed the rape in view of his age (he claims his last erection was 3 years ago).

HELD: The trial court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death. R.A. 7659 provides that the death penalty shall be
imposed when the victim is under 18 years old and the offender is a guardian. In People v. Garcia (281 SCRA 463), we held that
the restrictive definition of a guardian, that of a legal or judicial guardian, should be used in construing the term guardian for
the purpose of imposing the death penalty under R.A. 7659.

The mere fact that the mother asked De La Cuesta to look after her child while she was away did not constitute the relationship
of guardian-ward as contemplated by the law. He watched over the girl as a favor to mother for letting him stay while his place
was being renovated.

De La Cuestas contention that he was incapable of committing rape due to his age, physical condition and lack of earthly desires
is self-serving. There is no evidence presented to substantiate his alleged dysfunction. In one case, we rejected the defense even
after a doctor had examined the accused by stimulating his organ with a wisp of cotton for three minutes and there was no
erection. (People v. Palma, 144 SCRA 236). At any rate, advanced age does not mean that sexual intercourse is no longer
possible, as age is not a criterion taken alone in determining sexual interest and capability of middle-aged and older people.
(People v. Bahuyan, 238 SCRA 330).

People vs. Sabredo (2000)

Jimmy Sabredo, uncle of victim Judeliza, lived with their family in Cebu for more than a year. He forcibly dragged her at knife's
point, and brought her to Masbate. Armed with a blade, he sexually assaulted Judeliza. After satisfying his lust, Jimmy inserted
three fingers into her vaginal orifice and cruelly pinched it. Later, Jimmy struck Judeliza with a piece of wood, rendering her
unconscious. TC sentenced him to death for the complex crime of abduction with rape.

HELD: When a complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC is charged, such as forcible abduction with rape, it is axiomatic that
the prosecution must allege and prove the presence of all the elements of forcible abduction, as well as all the elements of the
crime of rape. Prosecution failed to allege the 3 rd element of forcible abduction which is that the abduction is with lewd designs.
Thus, when Jimmy, using a blade, forcibly took away complainant for the purpose of sexually assaulting her, as in fact he did
rape her, the rape may then absorb forcible abduction. Hence, the crime committed by appellant is simple rape only.

Where the rape is committed with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the imposable penalty ranges from RP to
death. The use of the bladed weapon already qualified the rape. Since there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty
shall be applied.

Section 11 (1) of R.A. No. 7659 imposes the death penalty when the rape victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim. However, R.A. No. 7659 cannot apply IN CAB because (1) at the time the rape was committed,
victim was already more than 18 years old and (2) the information did not allege that offender and offended party were relatives
within the third degree of consanguinity. Sentence should only be reclusion perpetua.

People vs. Arillas (2000)

Amor O. Arillas accused her father, Romeo Arillas of raping her on two occasions when she was barely 16 years old. The trial court
found her father guilty beyond reasonable doubt and imposed the death penalty for the reason that the victim was under 18
years old at the time of the commission of the offense and the offender was her father.

HELD: The informations in these cases alleged that the victim is the daughter of the appellant but it did not allege that the
victim is under 18 years old. It is a denial of the right of an accused not to be informed of the nature of the accusation against
him, and consequently, a denial of due process if he is convicted of a crime in its qualified form notwithstanding the fact that
the information, on which he was arraigned, charges him only of the crime in its simple form by not specifying the circumstance
that qualifies the crime. Hence, the appellant was only charged with simple rape and its penalty is reclusion perpetua.

People vs. Mahinay

Accused here was a houseboy who raped and killed the 12-year-old daughter of their neighbor. Accused was convicted of Rape
with Homicide and sentenced to death.
HELD: Since the victim here was 12 years old already, must prove sexual congress by force and violence and lack of consent.
Since in this case the victim was unconscious, the conclusion is that there was lack of consent.
The crime here is Rape with Homicide, which is a special complex crime with an indivisible penalty of death. This is treated in
the same way as qualified rape, rape with any of the 10 attendant circumstances properly alleged in the information and proven
at trial. However if any of the circumstances are not alleged but proven, the penalty cannot be death except if the circumstance
can be made to fall under Art.14/15 RPC. In CAB, the court has no choice but to impose death as this is what is given in the law
as the penalty for the special complex crime.

People vs. Quianola (1999)

There were 2 accused here who took turns in raping a 15-year-old girl. They were convicted of frustrated rape based on People
vs. Erina despite the fact that the subsequent case of People vs. Orita saying that there can never be a crime of frustrated rape.
The ruling was based on the testimony of the victim that she only felt the penis touching her.

HELD: The 2 accused should be convicted each of two counts of consummated rape. Frustrated rape can never be committed
because no matter how slight the penetration, as long the penis touches the external genitalia of the woman, the rape is
consummated as the person has done all the necessary acts to complete the crime.
Even if Art335 RPC as amended still uses frustrated rape, the Court will ignore it and just treat it as a mere lapse in language.

People vs. Campuhan

Campuhan had his pants down and was on top of the 4-year old child when the childs mother arrived.
showed that there were no signs of genital injury and that the victims hymen was intact.

A medical examination

HELD: For rape to be consummated, a slight brush or scrape of the penis on the external layer of the vagina (mons pubis) will
not suffice. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ,
and NOT merely stroked the external surface thereof. AT LEAST THE LABIA MAJORA MUST BE ENTERED FOR RAPE TO BE
CONSUMMATED.

People v. Oga, 431 SCRA 354 (2004)

FACTS: At around 10:00 p.m., Oga summoned 14-year-old Irene to his barracks. Inside his barracks, Oga, however,
suddenly pulled her and laid her on the wooden bed. The appellant then took off her pants and panty, as well as his clothes.
Irene allegedly resisted the sexual assault, but her efforts proved in vain because the Oga was strong and drunk. He pinned her
down with his body, while his right hand pinned her hands above her shoulders and his left hand separated her legs. Then he
inserted his penis into her vagina. It was only at around 2:00 a.m. when her parents caught Oga naked atop Irenes naked body.
Irene denied that the appellant was her boyfriend. For his part, Oga interposed as a defense the sweetheart theory.

HELD: In reviewing rape cases, the Court has established the following principles as guides: (1) an accusation of rape
can be made with facility, difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) by
reason of the intrinsic nature of rape, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense. In the present case, the Cout ruled that no physical force was used to quell Irenes alleged resistance. Irene claimed
that she resisted the sexual molestation, but a careful reading of her testimony failed to reveal the kind of resistance she did
under the circumstances. While it is true that a rape victim is not expected to resist until death, it is contrary to human
experience that Irene did not even make an outcry or use her hands which must have been free most of the time to ward off the
lustful advances of appellant. Further, the findings of Dr. Villena, who examined Irene only several hours after the alleged rape,
showed no sign of extragenital injuries on her body. Not a piece of Irenes apparel was torn or damaged as would evince a
struggle on her part. These circumstances additionally belie Irenes claim that the appellant had sexual intercourse with her
without her consent.

People v. Buates, 408 SCRA 278 (2003)

FACTS: On July 28, 1990, at around 5:00 p.m., Jennifer Buates was on her way home when the appellant, who is his
uncle, called her, allegedly to give her something. As Jennifer approached the appellant, the latter pointed a knife at her and
told her to undress. Fearful for her life, Jennifer undressed, followed by the appellant. Thereafter, he ordered her to lie down on
the grassy portion of the area. He spread her legs and inserted his penis into her vagina while she cried and felt severe pain. The

appellant appeared to have shivered before finally pulling out his penis. He instructed Jennifer to dress up and warned her not to
tell her family about the incident, otherwise they would all be killed. After the incident appellant succeeded in molesting her
several times more on different dates. In December 1994, Jennifer went to live with her grandmother one month after her own
father allegedly molested her. Subsequently, she stayed with an aunt a before transferring to another aunt, a certain Enrica
Provido, to whom she finally revealed her harrowing experience in the hands of the appellant and her own father. Consequently,
Enrica called Jennifers mother, Gliceria in Bicol and related her daughters ordeal. The RTC convicted Oga of two counts of
rape. Appellant principally assails the credibility of Jennifer, claiming that her actuations after the alleged commission of each
act of rape were not typical of a rape victim. Specifically, appellant points out that Jennifer continued to take a bath alone and
fetch water from the river near where the appellant allegedly raped. She also took the same path on her way to school where
the second sexual assault allegedly took place. Moreover, Jennifer remained respectful of the appellant. In addition, she did not
inform any member of her family about the alleged sexual assaults in 1990 and 1993 but only after several years, in 1998.

HELD: The appellant cannot successfully impugn the credibility of the private complainant on account of her alleged
"normal" behavior after both sexual assaults. It must be borne in mind that different people respond differently to a given
stimulus or type of situation and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one undergoes a shocking or startling
experience. The demeanor of the private complainant was understandable in the light of the circumstances in both incidents of
rape. She did not immediately disclose her misfortune to anybody because of the death threats from the appellant. Being in her
early teens, she was obviously cowed into silence as the appellant warned her not to divulge the incident to anybody, otherwise
she and her family would be killed. Such threat from the appellant, for sure, generated much fear in her mind. Further the
victims lowly station in life simply offered no other option for the private complainant but to continue doing those things. i.e.
taking a bath alone; fetching water
The Court also held that it was extremely ludicrous for the appellant to claim the continued respect and affection
of the private complainant solely from the latter's customary act of obtaining his blessing (pagmamano). The private complainant
herself clarified that the practice was an involuntary gesture to keep the public from getting wind of her sorry episode of
defloration and to maintain her honor.

Anonimity of Victim

People v. Cabalquinto (2006)

Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004 and
its implementing rules, the real name of the victim, together with the real names of her immediate family members, is withheld
and fictitious initials instead are used to represent her, both to protect her privacy.

Statutory Rape

People v. Jalosjos, 369 SCRA 179 (2001)

FACTS: The victim 11 year-old, Maria Rosilyn Delantar, grew up under the care of Simplicio Delantar, whom she treated
as her own father. Simplicio was a 56 year-old homosexual whose ostensible source of income was selling longganiza and tocino
and accepting boarders at his house. On the side, he was also engaged in the skin trade as a pimp. At a very young age of 5,

Rosilyn was exposed by Simplicio to his illicit activities. She and her brother would tag along with Simplicio whenever he
delivered prostitutes to his clients. When she turned 9, Rosilyn was offered by Simplicio as a prostitute to an Arabian national
known as Mr. Hammond. Thus begun her ordeal as one of the girls sold by Simplicio for sexual favors. Simplicio brought Rosilyn to
Congressman Jalosjos condominium unit at Ritz Towers on several occassions. There, Cong. Jalosjos would kiss, caress and fondle
said Rosilyn's face, lips, neck, breasts, vagina; suck her nipples and insert his finger and then his tongue into her vagina, and
other similar lascivious conduct. On two occasions, Jalosjos placed himself on top of Rosilyn and inserted his sexual organ into
her vagina. On said occassions, Cong. Jalosjos would thereafter give her money which she in turn gives to Simplicio. After trial,
the RTC convicted Cong. Jalosjos of two (2) counts of statutory rape, and six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness defined and
penalized under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, also known as the Child Abuse Law.

HELD: In statutory rape, mere sexual congress with a woman below twelve years of age consummates the crime of
statutory rape regardless of her consent to the act or lack of it. The law presumes that a woman of tender age does not possess
discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, it was held that carnal knowledge of a child
below twelve years old even if she is engaged in prostitution is still considered statutory rape. The application of force and
intimidation or the deprivation of reason of the victim becomes irrelevant. The absence of struggle or outcry of the victim or
even her passive submission to the sexual act will not mitigate nor absolve the accused from liability.
In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge
of Rosilyn. Moreover, the prosecution successfully proved that Rosilyn was only eleven years of age at the time she was sexually
abused. As such, the absence of proof of any struggle, or for that matter of consent or passive submission to the sexual advances
of accused-appellant, was of no moment. The fact that accused-appellant had sexual congress with eleven year-old Rosilyn is
sufficient to hold him liable for statutory rape, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Note: Republic Act No. 8353, the Anti-Rape law of 1997 was enacted after 1996-the year the above acts were
committed, hence, it does not apply in this case.

People v. Basquez, 366 SCRA 154 (2001)

FACTS: Around 4:00 pm, Jiggle Jilt dela Cerna, six (6) years old, was on her way home from school, where she was a
Grade 1 student. While casually walking, Basquez, who was drinking outside a store along her way blocked her way and pulled
her by the belt of her dress. She was then dragged towards the direction of the houses at the back of the school and was brought
inside an unoccupied dilapidated house. Upon reaching the said house, her hands, feet and body were tied with a tieback. Jiggle
struggled and cry. At this point, her attacker undressed himself, untied Jiggle, had her lie down and put himself on top of her.
Basquez hands then started groping all over her young and fragile body and forced himself inside her. Jiggle, despite the
excruciating pain, kicked appellant repeatedly in an effort to free herself from him. Basquez, however, continued forcing his
penis inside her vagina. An hour after when the Basquez left Jiggle with her body still tied. With her school bag just beside her,
Jiggle mustered enough courage and strength to take a pair of scissors from it and cut the remaining tiebacks tied at her body.
The following day, Jiggle, traumatized by the assault and rape committed by the appellant, refused to go to school for fear of
seeing the Basquez again. She later narrated her horrifying experience to her grandmother Segundina dela Cerna with whom she
was living.
HELD: Although there had been no complete penetration of the victim's vagina by appellant's penis, contact between
them was not ruled out by the doctor who testified in this case. In fact, he found the victim's vagina positive for spermatozoa.
Existing rulings on rape do not require complete or full penetration of the victim's private organ. Neither is the rupture of the
hymen necessary. The mere introduction of the penis into the labia majora of the victim's genitalia engenders the crime of rape.
40 Hence, it is the "touching" or "entry" of the penis into the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum of the victim's
genitalia that consummates rape. 41 Penile invasion necessarily entails contact with the labia. Even the briefest of contacts,
without laceration of the hymen, is deemed to be rape.

People v. Dalisay, 408 SCRA 375 (2003)

FACTS: Lanie was lying in bed when her father, the appellant arrived from work. Suddenly appellant removed
Lanies pants and underwear. Lanie resisted but appellant boxed her on her thigh. Appellant touched her daughters vagina and
licked it. Thereafter, while in a kneeling position, he placed his penis at the entrance of Lanie's vagina and inserted his private
organ into hers. He then proceeded to make push and pull movements. Lanie felt pain but she did not complain because she was
afraid. The following day, Lanie went to school and pretended as if nothing happened. However, her Grade V teacher noticed
that Lanie looked depressed that day. When she inquired, Lanie answered that she was raped by her father. Appellant had
sexually abused Lanie since she was in grade III. She estimated that her father had raped her seventeen (17) times, although she
could no longer remember the exact dates when they took place. Incidentally, Lanie's sister, Luz, also filed a complaint for acts
of lasciviousness against appellant. Appellant contends that since Lanie's hymen is intact and that there was no spermatozoa in
her genitalia, he could not have committed the crime.

HELD: The appellant is guilty of statury rape. The presence of either hymenal laceration or spermatozoa on Lanie's
private part is not an essential element of rape. The court cited the cases of; People vs. Parcia, where it was held that the
absence of sperm does not disprove the charge of rape; People vs. Regala, where was ruled that an intact hymen does not
necessarily prove absence of sexual intercourse; and People vs. Rafales, where it was declared that, ". . .. For rape to be
committed, entrance of the male organ within the labia or pudendum of the female organ is sufficient. Rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina are not essential. Entry to the least extent of the labia or the lips of the female organ is sufficient, the
victim remaining virgin does not negate rape."
As testified to by Lanie, "the tip" of appellant's penis was inserted into her vagina, as a result of which she felt pain.
In other words, there was no full penetration, and this explains why her hymen remained intact. Nonetheless, carnal knowledge
was consummated by the entry of "the tip" of appellant's private organ into the labia or pudendum of Lanie's genitalia. It is wellsettled that full penetration is not required to consummate carnal knowledge, as proof of entrance showing the slightest
penetration of the male organ within the labia or pudendum of the female organ is sufficient.

Liability of Several Accused in Multiple Rape

People v. Plurad, 393 SCRA 306 (2002)

FACTS: An hour and a half past midnight, after Norielene consumed half a glass of gin handed to her by accused
Bernadas, she began to feel dizzy. Norielene fell asleep on the lap of her friend, Ibaez. At around 3:00 in the morning, Norielene
woke up and found that she was being carried by the three (3) accused towards the bedroom of accused Bernadas. Since she still
felt dizzy, Norielene fell fast asleep in the room. She later woke up when accused Bernadas was removing her shorts and panties.
Norielene tried to shout for help but her mouth was covered by Bernadas. When she was already naked, accused Bernadas placed
himself on top of her, inserted his sex organ into her private parts and performed pumping motions. Both hands of the victim
were held by the accused Plurad and Caedo. After Bernadas finished raping her, Plurad took his turn and had sexual intercourse
with Norielene while fondling her breasts. Norielene struggled to free herself but Bernadas held her hands while Plurad covered
her mouth with a handkerchief When Plurad was through, Caedo also had sexual intercourse with her while Bernadas and
Plurad held her hands.

HELD: In cases of multiple rape, each of the defendants is responsible not only for the rape committed by him but also
for those committed by the others. Plurad, therefore, is responsible not only for the rape committed personally by him but also
for the two other counts of rape committed by his co-accused.

Rape may be commited by a woman

People v. dela Torre, 419 SCRA 18 (2004)

FACTS: Appellant-spouses Butchoy and Fe de la Torre were convicted by the RTC of 9 counts of rape committed against
their maid Baby Jane Dagot, who was then only 16 years old.
Baby Jane and the appellant-spouses were asleep on the floor of the same bedroom when appellant Fe de la Torre woke
Baby Jane and her husband Butchoy. Baby Jane was surprised to see that Fe was holding a lighted kerosene lamp and a scythe. Fe
ordered her husband to transfer and lie beside Baby Jane. As appellant Butchoy did not comply, Fe herself transferred so that
Baby Jane was between her and Butchoy. Fe put down the scythe and the lamp and proceeded to take Butchoy's clothes off and
then Baby Jane's. Butchoy offered no resistance but Baby Jane objected and cried to no avail. Fe then ordered Butchoy to have
sex with Baby Jane. Baby Jane, fearful of the spouses and the dawning realization of what would happen to her, could not ward
off his advances. Butchoy placed himself on top of Baby Jane, inserted his penis into her vagina and did a push and pull motion.
Baby Jane felt pain. All the while, Fe was standing beside them, holding the lamp and the scythe. After the sexual intercourse,
Butchoy kissed her on the neck and fondled her breasts. Baby Jane found it revolting but could not do much to refuse him, as she
was afraid of Fe. When Butchoy was finished, he threw her clothes to her and got dressed. Baby Jane immediately put on her
clothes. She wanted to leave the room but Fe prevented her from doing so. The following morning, Baby Jane saw that there was
blood on her panty. The rape was repeated once a week from the second week of September 1992 on to the fourth week of
October 1992. Baby Jane had her menarche in the month of November 1992 and was spared from the appellants' abuse that
month. However she was again raped in the second week of December. This was to be the last. Baby Jane testified that the
subsequent rape incidents were carried out in the same manner as the first. She felt pain during the first and second rapes, but
did not feel pain anymore in the succeeding rape incidents.

HELD: An accused may be considered a principal by direct participation, by inducement, or by indispensable

cooperation. This is true in a charge of rape against a woman, provided of course a man is charged together with her. In two
cases the Court convicted the woman as a principal by direct participation since it was proven that she held down the
complainant in order to help her co-accused spouse consummate the offense. In People v. Villamala, the Court found the
husband and wife guilty for raping their neighbor and "kumare" in this factual setting, viz: the wife visited the victim at her home
on the pretext of inquiring as to the whereabouts of her husband. Once inside, she whistled for her husband and he immediately
appeared at the doorstep. The wife then suddenly pinned her "kumare" to the floor. The husband forcefully removed the victim's
skirt and panties, removed his shorts, placed himself on top of the victim and consummated the rape. In the more recent People
v. Saba, the accused married couple victimized a fourteen (14) year-old epileptic who stayed at their home for treatment by the
wife who was a reputed healer. On the pretext of conducting a healing session, the wife ordered the victim to lie down on the
floor then pinned the victim's hands to the floor and covered her mouth while her husband removed his pants and briefs and the
victim's panties and raped the young girl. These two cases show not only the possibility but the reality of rape committed by a
woman together with a man. The Court affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Rape through sexual assault

Ordinario v. People, 428 SCRA 773 (2004)

FACTS: Jayson Ramos and accused Geronimo Ordinario were student and teacher, respectively, at Nicanor Garcia
Elementary School during the time the crime was perpetrated. Jayson was then in Grade 4 and accused was his teacher in Boy
Scout. After being summoned by accused at the Boy Scout headquarters, Jayson was ordered to strip off which the latter
complied unwary of the perverse intentions of accused. Accused then approached Jayson and started kissing him all over his
body including his male organ. Thereafter, accused inserted his private part into the mouth of Jayson but the latter could not
hold on for long as he felt vomiting prompting accused to remove his penis and ordered Jayson to dress up. Before they parted
ways, accused told Jayson 'pag nagsumbong ka sa mga magulang mo, may masamang mangyayari sa iyo.' Interpreting the same to

mean an immediate bodily harm, Jayson kept mum on the incident for fear of accused reprisal. The same sexual molestation
recurred, and several more thereafter until Jayson had mustered enough courtage to inform his parents about the incident.

HELD: The definition of the crime of rape has been expanded with the enactment of Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise
also known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, to include not only "rape by sexual intercourse" but now likewise "rape by sexual
assault. "An act of sexual assault under the second paragraph of Article 266-A of the RPC can be committed by any person who,
under the circumstances mentioned in the first paragraph of the law, inserts his penis into the mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice, of another person. The law, unlike rape under the first paragraph of said
Article 266-A of the Code, has not made any distinction on the sex of either the offender or the victim. The court found
Ordinario guilty of rape by sexual assault on twelve (12) counts.

People v. Soriano, 388 SCRA 140 (2002)

FACTS: On four occasions, the Camilo Soriano forced his penis into her daughter Maricels vagina, On twelve other
occasions, the accused inserted his finger into her daughters private organ. The victim was then 11 years old.

HELD: The Court found Camilo guilty of 4 counts of rape by sexual intercourse and 12 counts of rape through sexual
assault. Inserting a finger inside the genital of a woman is rape through sexual assault within the context of paragraph 2 of
Article 266-A of the RPC. (Emphasis supplied)

People v. Fetalino (2007)

The insertion of ones finger into the genital or anal orifice of another person constitutes rape by sexual assault and not merely
an act of lasciviousness

Delay in Reporting Rape

People v. Arnaiz (2006)

Neither does AAAs failure to tell her mother about the incident nor her long delay in reporting the matter to the authorities
negate rape. As correctly observed by the OSG, the delay in reporting the rape incident does not weaken the case for the
prosecution. It is not uncommon for a young girl to conceal assaults on her virtue, especially when the rapist is living with her.
In fact, we have previously ruled in People v. Coloma, that even a delay of 8 years is not a sign of fabrication.

Absence of Medical Findings

People v. Teodoro (2006)

Thus, the contention of appellant that there were no lacerations in the vagina does not merit any consideration. In that regard,
it has been held that the medical examination of the victim is merely corroborative in character and is not an element of rape.
Likewise, a freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape and healed lacerations do not negate rape.

Sweetheart defense

People v. Bautista, 430 SCRA 469 (2004)

FACTS: On the pretext that he had been sent by his wife to fetch the victim, a 15-year-old girl for an field
trip, Baustista, brought the latter to a motel, where he had sexual intercourse with her against her will. Contending that he and
the victim were lovers, appellant claims that what transpired was consensual, though illicit, sexual intercourse.

HELD: Bautistas sweetheart defense was rejected by the court for lack of corroboration. As an affirmative
defense, it must be established with convincing evidence by some documentary and/or other evidence like mementos, love
letters, notes, pictures and the like. In this case, the only thing he proffered to prove that he and the victim were lovers was his
self-serving statement, which she and her mother categorically denied. Even if he and the victim were really sweethearts, such
a fact would not necessarily establish consent. It has been consistently ruled that "a love affair does not justify rape, for the
beloved cannot be sexually violated against her will." The fact that a woman voluntarily goes out on a date with her lover does
not give him unbridled license to have sex with her against her will. The court cited the case of People v. Dreu, where it was held
that "A sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her will. Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a
fiancee and, worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust."

Moral Character of Victim

People v. Agsaoay, 430 SCRA 450 (2004)

FACTS: Josephine and her sister were sleeping on the second floor of their house, while the other members of the
family were at the ground floor. Their mother left their house early and went to the field to uproot palay seedlings. Josephine
was awakened when her father suddenly kissed her lips. Instinctively, she pushed him away but to no avail. He threatened to kill
her and her entire family should she report the matter to her mother. Josephine was so terrified and was not able to shout and
resist. Her father then undressed her, spread her legs, held her hands, and inserted his penis into her vagina and made a push
and pull movement. Josephine felt pain. Josephine did not tell her mother, about the incident because of her father's threat. It
was only the following day that she revealed to her mother what had happened. Her mother was shocked but scared to report
the matter immediately to the authorities because in the past, accused killed her brother. Accused ravished Josephine for the
second time. At first, her mother again refused to report the incident to the police. Later, however, her mother finally went to
the PNP to report the incident. Now, the defense endeavors to prove that Josephine is an unchaste young woman who habitually
goes out with different men.

HELD: The debasement of Josephines character does not necessarily cast doubt on her credibility, nor does it negate
the existence of rape. It is a well-established rule that in the prosecution and conviction of an accused for rape, the victim's
moral character is immaterial, there being absolutely no nexus between it and the odious deed committed. Even a prostitute or
a woman of loose morals can be the victim of rape, for she can still refuse a man's lustful advances.

Forcible abduction absorbed in rape

People v. Lining, 384 SCRA 427 (2002)

FACTS: Emelina, then fifteen (15) years old, requested permission from her parents to visit her aunt where she was
supposed to spend the night. While in her aunt josephines house, Emelina was invited to a dance party. Emelina accepted the
invitation and she went to the party, accompanied by her aunt. Josephine then left Emelina at the party, telling her that she had
to go home but she would return later to fetch her. When the party ended Josephine still had not returned. Emelina decided to
go home alone. On her way to her aunts house, Emelina was accosted by Gerry Lining and Lian Salvacion, both of whom were
known to her since they were her former neighbors. Lining poked a kitchen knife at Emelinas breast and the two held her hands.
Emelina was dragged towards the ricefield and was forcibly carried to an unoccupied house. Inside the house, Lining removed
Emelinas t-shirt, pants and undergarments. She was pushed to the floor and while Salvacion was holding her hands and kissing
her, Lining inserted his penis inside her vagina. Emelina shouted and tried to ward off her attackers, but to no avail. After Lining
had satisfied his lust, he held Emelinas hands and kissed her while Salvacion in turn inserted his penis inside her vagina.
Thereafter, the two directed Emelina to put on her clothes. Emelina saw an opportunity to escape, and she returned to her
aunts house.i However, because of fear, as the accused threatened her that she would be killed if she would reveal what they did
to her, she did not tell her aunt what transpired. She next went to the house of her friend Evelyn Saguid where he told Gerry
Selda, a friend of her father, who saw her crying about the rape incident. Accused Salvacion remained at large while Lining was
convicted by the trial as principal of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape.

HELD: Lining could only be convicted for the crime of rape, instead of the complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape. Indeed, it would appear from the records that the main objective of the accused when the victim was taken to the house
of Mila Salvacion was to rape her. Hence, forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape.
Napolis vs. CA

Facts: Nicanor Napolis, with several co-accused, entered the house of the Penaflor spouses by breaking a wall of a store, and
forcing the door of the house adjacent to the store open. Once inside, the accused used violence against the husband and
initimidation against the wife, enabling them to get away with P2557 in cash and goods. They were convicted of robbery by
armed men in an inhabited place.

Held: The crime is considered a complex one under Art 48, where the penalty for the most serious offence in its max period
should be imposed. Otherwise, there will exist an absurd situation where the concurrence of a graver offence results in the
reduction of the penalty.

People vs. Biruar

There is no law or jurisprudence which requires the presentation of the thing stolen in order to prove that it had been taken
away.

People vs. Salas

Salas was last seen with the victim at 3:00am. At 6:00, the victims body was found in a canal. Her purse, alleged to contain
P2,000 and jewelry were missing. No one witnessed the robbery, much less the killing. Is the crime committed homicide or
robbery with homicide?

HELD: Robbery with Homicide. In this special complex crime against property, Homicide is incidental to the robbery, which is the
main
purpose
of
the
criminal. The onus probandi is to establish: "(a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a
person; (b) the property belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized with animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the
robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is used in the generic sense, was committed."
While there is indeed no direct proof that Virginia Talens was robbed at the time she was killed, we may conclude from four
circumstances that the robbery occasioned her killing: (1) Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake. (2) The appellant
knew that victim was winning. (3) The victim was last seen alive with appellant. (4) The victim's purse containing her money and
earrings were missing from her body when found.
These circumstances logically lead to the inescapable conclusion that appellant should be liable not just of simple homicide, but
robbery with homicide

People v. Del Rosario, 359 SCRA 166 (2001)

FACTS: Del Rosario stole six pieces of jewelry belonging to Paragua. He then pawned and sold the same. Also,
on the occasion of the said robbery, Del Rosario hit Paraguas niece, Racquel, with a hard object, strangled her and and tied the
the latters neck of with a Cat-V wire which resulted to her death shortly thereafter. Del Rsoario admitted in court that he
needed money to marry his common-law wife. The RTC convicted del Rosario of the crime of robbery with homicide. Del Rosario
contends that it is essential to prove the intent to rob and that the intent to rob must come first before the killing transpired.

HELD: Animus lucrandi or intent to gain, is an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the
offender. Although proof as to motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of the theft is circumstantial, the intent to
gain or animus lucrandi is the usual motive to be presumed from all furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another,
unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. ". . . (T)he intent to gain may be presumed
from the proven unlawful taking." Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information where it is
charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things subject of the robbery.
In this case, it was apparent that the reason why Del Rosario stole the jewelry of Paragua was because he intended to
gain by them. He had already admitted that he needed money to marry his common-law wife. The court also stated that if
gaining through unlawful means was farthest from the mind of the accused, why then did he pawn and sell the jewelry he had
taken from Paragua
It is immaterial whether the killing transpired before or after the robbery. In the crime of robbery with homicide, the
homicide may precede robbery or may occur after robbery. What is essential is that there is a nexus, an intimate connection
between robbery and the killing whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former, or whether both crimes be committed
at the same time.

People v. Reyes, 399 SCRA 528 (2003)

FACTS: Cergontes forcibly took the wristwatch of Solis while Reyes stabbed the latter at the back resulting to his death.
The victims gold necklace, one gold ring, all of an undetermined value, and a wallet containing unspecified amount of cash were
also taken from him. Reyes was found guilty of Robbery with Homicide. Appellant now contends that the animus lucrandi was
not sufficiently established as the taking of the watch could have been a mere afterthought and the real intent of the
malefactors was to inflict injuries upon the victim. Moreover, there was no evidence of ownership of the wristwatch, as it may
have belonged to the two persons who attacked the victim

HELD: The court held that appellants contention is devoid of merit. Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act
which can be established through the overt acts of the offender. Although proof of motive for the crime is essential when the
evidence of the robbery is circumstantial, intent to gain or animus lucrandi may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful
property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. The intent
to gain may be presumed from the proven unlawful taking. In the case at bar, the act of taking the victim's wristwatch by one of
the accused Cergontes while accused-appellant Reyes poked a knife behind him sufficiently gave rise to the presumption.
The detailed narration of how the victim was forcibly divested of the wristwatch by accused Cergontes and stabbed at
the back by accused-appellant cannot be taken lightly on the argument that the attackers owned the wristwatch and they
attacked the victim solely on their desire to retrieve it. In any event, in robbery by the taking of property through intimidation or
violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully divested of the personal property be the owner thereof. Article 293 of the
Revised Penal Code employs the phrase "belonging to another" and this has been interpreted to merely require that the property
taken does not belong to the offender. Actual possession of the property by the person dispossessed thereof suffices. In fact, it
has been held that robbery may be committed against a bailee or a person who himself has stolen it. So long as there is
apoderamiento of personal property from another against the latter's will through violence or intimidation, with animo de lucro,
robbery is the offense imputable to the offender. If the victim is killed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the offense is
converted into the composite crime of robbery with homicide.

People v. Suela, 373 SCRA 163 (2002)

FACTS: Brothers Edgar and Nerio Suela, and Edgardo Batocan sporting ski masks, bonnests and gloves, brandishing
handguns and knife barged into the room of Director Rosas who was watching television together with his adopted son, Norman
and his friend Gabilo. They threatened Rosas, Norman and Gabilo to give the location of their money and valuables, which they
eventually took. They dragged Gabilo downstairs with them. Upon Nerios instructions, Batocan stabbed Gabilo 5 times which
caused the latters death. After the incident, Edgar Suela demanded P20,000.00 from Rosas for an information regarding the
robbery. The RTC found Edgar Suela guilty of robbery for demanding P200,000 as payment for information on the robbery-slay
case.

HELD: With respect to the charge of robbery for demanding P200,000 as payment for information on the robbery-slay
case, the Court held that Edgar Suela should be acquitted. The OSG explained: "Simple robbery is committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons as distinguished from the use of force upon things, but the extent of the violence or
intimidation does not fall under pars. 1 to 4 of Article 294 (Revised Penal Code) "Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the
prosecution failed to prove that appellant, Edgar Suela employed force or intimidation on private complainant Rosas by instilling
fear in his mind so as to compel the latter to cough out the amount of P200,000.00. Instead, what was established was that he
had agreed to give the P200,000.00 in exchange for information regarding the identity and whereabouts of those who robbed him
and killed his friend. There was no showing that appellant Edgar Suela had exerted intimidation on him so as to leave him no
choice but to give the money. Instead, what is clear was that the giving of the money was done not out of fear but because it was
a choice private complainant opted because he wanted to get the information being offered to him for the consideration of
P200,000.00. In fact, the money was delivered not due to fear but for the purpose of possibly having a lead in solving the case
and to possibly bring the culprit to justice (ibid.). As such, the elements of simple robbery have not been established in the
instant case, hence, appellant Edgar Suela should be acquitted of that charge." However, Edgar is still guilty as principal of the
complex crime of robber with homicide for robbing the house of Rosas and for Gabilo death.

People vs. Calixtro

When death results, the crime is still robbery with homicide, regardless of the circumstances, modes or persons intervening in
the commission of the crime.

People vs. Pecato

Whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the commission of the crime are also guilty as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
although they did not actually take part in the homicide unless it clearly appeared that they endeavored to prevent the
homicide.

People vs. Tapales

When rape and homicide co-exist in the commission of robbery, should rape be considered an aggravating circumstance? YES.
Rapes, wanton robbery for personal gain and other forms of cruelties are condemned and their perpetration will be regarded as
aggravating circumstances of ignominy and deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrongs.

Poeple vs. Quinones

There is no such crime as robbery with multiple homicide. There is only the special complex crime of robbery with homicide,
regardless of the fact that 3 persons were killed in the commission of the crime. In robbery, all homicides and murders are
merged in the composite. As such, the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed only once even if
multiple killings accompanied the robbery.

People vs. Faigano

Nely was suddenly roused from her sleep by Carmelo Faigano, a worker at a nearby construction project. He was in black T-shirt
but was no longer wearing pants or underwear. He poked a 29-inch balisong at her neck and threatened to kill her and the
children beside her. Then forcibly tore her nightie, raised her pair of brassieres above her breasts and pulled her to the edge of
the king-size wooden bed. He spread her thighs apart against her will and inserted his organ into hers. He had sexual intercourse
with her. After satisfying his lust, Faigano then put on his short pants and ordered Nely to bring out her money. He took Nely's
money, her husband's wristwatch and two rings. TC found him guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with rape

HELD: SC found him guilty of the separate crimes of robbery and rape. If the intention of the accused was to rob but rape was
also committed even before the asportation the crime is robbery with rape. But if the original plan was to rape but the accused
after committing the rape also committed robbery when the opportunity presented itself, the offenses should be viewed as
separate and distinct. To be liable for the special complex crime of robbery with rape the intent to take personal property of
another must precede the rape. Under the circumstances, SC is convinced that when Faigano entered the victim's house he only
had in mind sexual gratification. The taking of the cash and pieces of jewelry against Nely's will appears to be an afterthought.

People v. Reyes, 427 SCRA 28 (2004)

FACTS: Dr. Aurora Lagrada, a spinster of about 70 years old, lived alone in her 2-storey house. Reyes house was about
4-5 meters away from the doctor's house. Reyes was able to gain entry into the house of Lagrada without the latter knowing.

Armed with a bolo, Reyes stole one Rolex wristwatch, 1 gold bracelet, 1 gold ring with birthstone of Jade, 1 Pass Book from
Lagrada. On the occasion of the said robbery, Reyes stabbed Lagrada several times in the different parts of her body directly
causing her death. The trial court convicted Reyes of robbery with homicide.

HELD: To sustain a conviction of the accused for robbery with homicide, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
essential elements of the crime. The accused must be shown to have the principal purpose of committing robbery, the homicide
being committed either by reason of or on occasion of the robbery. The homicide may precede robbery or may occur thereafter.
What is essential is that there is a nexus, an intrinsic connection between the robbery and the killing. The latter may be done
prior to or subsequent to the former. However, the intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of the victim's life.
Furthermore, the constituted crimes of robbery and homicide must be consummated.
A homicide is considered as having been committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery when the motive of the
offender in killing the victim is to deprive the latter of his property, to eliminate an obstacle to the crime, to protect his
possession of the loot, to eliminate witnesses, to prevent his being apprehended or to insure his escape from the scene of the
crime.
Appellant stated that he barged into the house of the victim to rob her, and that he stabbed the victim when she was
about to shout and because he was drunk. The appellant then took the victim's money and personal belongings and fled from the
scene of the crime. The trial court correctly convicted the appellant of robbery with homicide.

People v. Hernandez, 432 SCRA 104 (2004)

FACTS: Catapang and Hernandez dragged 72 year-old Natividad Mendoza, in the direction of a forested area where
there were also mango and coconut trees. The two took the money and jewelry of Natividad while she was lying on the ground.
Thereafter, Catapang and Hernandez strangled Natividad to death with the use of a white rope made of buri/vine string.

HELD: The Court held that appellant is guilty of robbery with homicide under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
The court further held that, in robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit
robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the
taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without
reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to
be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence.
The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery and homicide, must be consummated.

People v. Milliam, 324 SCRA 155 (2000)

FACTS: Demarayo, a member of the 15th Infantry Battalion, Philippine Army, was leisurely pacing along Quezon Street,
Iloilo City, when Roberto and Ricky both surnamed Martin blocked his path. Without any provocation coming from the soldier,
Ricky drew his firearm and fired at Demarayo, hitting the latters left hand. A brief struggle among the three (3) men ensued
which caused the victim to fall down. As Roberto pulled away he warded off Demarayo by kicking him on the waist. While the
victim was sprawled on the ground Roberto aimed his rifle at Demarayo's chest and pulled the trigger. Roberto fired another shot
hitting Demarayo on the same spot. After the brutal slaying, the assailants nonchalantly walked away with Demarayo's M-16. The
lower court ruled that the crime committed was Robbery with Homicide.

HELD: In People v. Salazar, accused-appellants stabbed a security guard and thereafter took away his gun. It was ruled
that since the prosecution failed to establish that the homicide was committed by reason or on the occasion of stealing the
security guard's firearm, both of them could only be convicted of the separate crimes of Homicide and Theft.
The records are bereft of any evidence to prove that the asportation of Demarayo's service firearm was the prime
motive of accused-appellants. Although it may be true that they were seen grabbing the gun from the victim as the latter was
lying prone on the ground, it could be possible that it was done to prevent him from retaliating as he was still conscious after
sustaining the first gunshot wound. The taking of the gun might have been an afterthought and not the real purpose of the crime.
It can therefore be seen that the prosecution failed to establish convincingly that the homicide was committed for the purpose or
on the occasion of robbing the victim. As such, accused-appellants should properly be convicted of the separate offenses of
Homicide and Theft, which were both duly proved.

People v. Ranis, 389 SCRA 45 (2002)

FACTS: While Marivic and Ben with their baby were watching television in their bedroom, Murphy and Sabiyon, both
armed with bladed weapons, suddenly entered their unlocked bedroom. Murphy poked a knife at her neck while Ernesto
straddled on top of Ben who was then lying in bed. Murphy asked for the proceeds of the land Ben sold and some jewelry but
Marivic told him that they only had P2,000 in their possession. Murphy then took the P2,000 and several pieces of luxury watches
and jewelry. After taking the money and jewelry, both accused tied her hands and those of Ben with electric cord and then they
went out of the house, taking Ben with them. The body of Ben was later found lying about five to ten meters from the house with
a cloth in the mouth, blood stains on the body, and hack wounds on his right nape and mouth. Ben was brought to the hospital
but he was proclaimed dead on arrival.

HELD: In charging robbery with homicide, the onus probandi is to establish: (a) the taking of personal property with the
use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by animus
lucrandi; (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is used in the generic sense, has
been committed. In this case, Marivic Rodelas positively identified appellants Ernesto Sabiyon and Cesario Murphy as the two
persons who entered her bedroom. Using sharp, bladed weapons, appellants demanded and took money, watches, and jewelry
belonging to the victim, Ben Hernandez. Thereafter, Hernandez was found stabbed to death. The Court ruled that appellants are
guilty of robbery with homicide.

People v. Gonzales, 382 SCRA 694 (2002)

FACTS: Nicanor Suralta was having drinks with his visitors in their house when two armed men, one carrying a gun and
the other a knife, suddenly entered the house through the kitchen door. The one carrying a gun had a bonnet over his face, with
only his eyes exposed, while the other one carrying a knife had the lower half of his face covered with a handkerchief. The knifewielder held Chona, the third child of the Suralta spouses, and announced a holdup. All persons in the house were ordered to go
inside the bedroom, about 2 meters away from the sala. There, the man with a gun demanded a gun and money from Nicanor.
Nicanor answered that he had no gun, but asked his wife, Carolita, to give money to the holduppers. Carolita gave P2,100.00,
which was intended to be deposited in the bank, to the knife-wielder, who placed it in his pocket. Then the knife-wielder
ransacked the cabinet and took the remaining amount of P325.00, which was intended for the school expenses of the Suralta
children. In addition, he took the family's Sanyo cassette recorder and some clothes. The holduppers also divested one of the
guests of his Seiko diver's wristwatch and then left. As the holduppers were leaving, two gunshots rang out. Nicanor was heard
moaning. Nicanor eventually died.

HELD: After reviewing the records of this case, the court ruled that the prosecution evidence establishes the guilt of
accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. A conviction for robbery with homicide requires proof of the following elements:
(a) the taking of personal property with violence or intimidation against persons or with force upon things; (b) the property taken
belongs to another; (c) the taking be done with animus lucrandi (intent to gain); and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by

reason thereof, homicide in its generic sense is committed. The offense becomes the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide under Art. 294 (1) of Revised Penal Code if the victim is killed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. All elements
are present in the case at bar.

People v. Torres, 359 SCRA 761 (2001)

FACTS: Vicente Galanao, his sons Julian and Macky and Jose all surnamed Bulanao went with their employer, Boloy ,
to buy copra and abaca. They were on board a truck driven by Boloy. On the way, they were stopped by Torres who stood at the
left side of the road. Torres approached the left side of the truck, went up the truck, and shot Boloy once. After shooting, two
persons armed with guns appeared from nowhere and approached the back of the truck and told them to lie face downward. The
two persons came from the portion where bamboos grew by the side of the road. Afterwards the men ran towards the
mountainside with the victims bag containing P500,000.00, the victims necklace, ring and his wristwatch.

HELD: Robbery with homicide is a special complex crime against property. Homicide is incidental to the robbery which
is the main purpose of the criminal. In charging robbery with homicide, the onus probandi is to establish: xxx xxx (d) on the
occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is used in the generic sense, was committed. The
phrase "by reason" covers homicide committed before or after the taking of personal property of another, as long as the motive
of the offender in killing a person before the robbery is to deprive the victim of his personal property which is sought to be
accomplished by eliminating an obstacle or opposition or in killing a person after the robbery to do away with a witness or to
defend the possession of the stolen property. Thus, it matters not that the victim was killed prior to the taking of the personal
properties of the victim. What is essential in robbery with homicide is that there be a direct relation and intimate connection
between robbery and killing, whether both crimes be committed at the same time. The Court ruled that all elements of robbery
with homicide are present in this case.

People v. Maxion, 361 SCRA 414 (2001)

FACTS: Himor, a teller at the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), walked across the street towards the Hi-Top
Supermarket, to pick up the cash deposit of the supermarket amounting to P1,464,644.75. After issuing the deposit slip, he
placed the money inside a duffle bag and padlocked the bag. Thereafter, he called the bank to send his security escort. UCPB
sent security escort Gargaceran. While Himor and Gargaceran were about to cross the street going back to the bank. Maxion and
another man suddenly emerged and walked towards them. Maxion was in front of Gargaceran while the second stayed behind
him. Both of them aimed their guns at Gargaceran. The man behind Gargaceran immediately took Gargaceran's handgun, and
shortly thereafter, Maxion shot Gargaceran at close range hitting him on the chest eventually causing his death. Himor attempted
to run with the bag towards the bank but he was stopped by the armed men who ordered him to release the bag. With their guns
pointed at him, Himor tossed the bag containing the money to them and ran back to the supermarket.

HELD: There is no question that the original and principal intention of the two armed men was to get the money of HiTop Supermarket. This is evident from the testimony of teller Himor that as soon as the two men stopped him from running
towards the bank, they shouted to release the bag containing the money. As the robbery resulted in the killing of the security
guard Gargaceran, the offense committed by the malefactors is indubitably the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
In robbery with homicide, what is essential is that there be "a direct relation, an intimate connection between robbery and the
killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crime be committed at the same time.

People v. Consejero, 352 SCRA 276 (2001)

FACTS: While they were fishing, Accused Consajero, a CAFGU member and Malapit, armed with an M-14, asked Castillo
and Usigan if they were the ones exacting quota from the Barangay captain. The two replied in the negative. Consajero then
asked Castillo and Usigan to accompany them to a nearby store. They then killed Castillo and Usigan. Thereafter, they took the
Briggs and Straton engine of the motorized banca ridden by Castillo and Usigan which is owned by Israel. Castillo was found lying
on the ground, face down, drenched in his own blood with hands tied at the back. Twenty meters away lay the dead body of
Usigan, who sustained thirty-one stab and hack wounds on the different parts of his body.

HELD: The criminal acts of accused-appellant constitute not a complex crime of robbery with homicide, but three
separate offenses: 1. Murder, for the killing of Modesto Castillo, 2. Homicide, for the death of Dionisio Usigan; and 3. Theft, for
the unlawful taking of the Briggs and Straton engine of the motorized banca.
In People v. Amania, the Court had occasion to rule that in robbery with homicide, the killing must have been directly
connected with the robbery. It is necessary that there must have been an intent on the part of the offenders to commit robbery
from the outset and, on occasion or by reason thereof a killing takes place. The original design must have been robbery, and the
homicide, even if it precedes or is subsequent to the robbery, must have a direct relation to, or must be perpetrated with a view
to consummate the robbery. The taking of the property should not be merely an afterthought which arose subsequent to the
killing.
In the present case, it does not appear that the primary purpose of accused-appellant in accosting the two deceased
was to rob the engine of the motorized banca. From all indications, accused-appellant, a CAFGU member, was primarily
interested in taking the life of the two deceased whom he suspected of exacting quota from the Barangay captain, and the taking
of the subject engine was merely an afterthought that arouse subsequent to the killing of the victims.

People v. Legaspi, 331 SCRA 95

FACTS: Carlos Deveza, erstwhile member of the PNP arrived at the Cartimar Plaza Market to fetch his wife, Estella,
who was then closing the family chain of stalls for the day. Upon arrival, Carlos parked his Toyota Tamaraw vehicle in front of the
stall. Immediately thereafter, Estella approached Carlos, who was still at the driver's seat, and handed him a black leather bag
which contained P300,000.00 cash, pieces of jewelry and checks. As Estella left to make a phone call, Carlos alighted from the
Tamaraw and stood on the left side of the vehicle with both arms resting on the vehicle's window. Legaspi, coming from the front
of the vehicle position himself 2 meters away from Deveza, level and poke a gun wrapped in a piece of cloth or towel at the
latters nape and eventually pull the trigger. Deveza fell on the pavement. The gunman then picked up Deveza's black shoulder
bag and casually walked away from the scene of the crime.
While conversing with other tricycle drivers, Wilfredo Dazo heard the gunshot prompting him to dart his eyes toward
the direction of the gunfire where he saw Deveza stooping and about to fall. Pitying the victim, Dazo hid behind a post and
waited in ambush for Legaspi and the latters companion, Franco. In so doing, Dazo intended to seize and stop Legaspi who was
then holding a gun, but in the process mistakenly grabbed the unarmed Franco by the waist. Thereafter, Dazo and Franco
wrestled causing Dazo to fall on his knees and allowing Legaspi to take an aim and shoot at Dazo twice. At the height of the
struggle between Dazo and Franco, shots were fired by Legaspi, one bullet hitting Dazo on the right jaw.

HELD: Obviously, the killing of Carlos Deveza and the shooting of Wilfredo Dazo were perpetrated by reason of or on
the occasion of the robbery. Thus, the physical injuries sustained by Dazo are deemed absorbed in the crime of robbery with
homicide. Taken in its entirety, the overt acts of accused-appellant Legaspi prove that the lone motive for the killing of Deveza
and the shooting of Dazo was for the purpose of consummating and ensuring the success of the robbery.
In the final analysis, the shooting of Dazo was done in order to defend the possession of the stolen property. It was
therefore an act which tended to insure the successful termination of the robbery and secure to the robber the possession and
enjoyment of the goods taken. Accused-appellant's argument that the element of "taking" was not proved is thus unavailing in the
face of Tulod's testimony.

People v. Temanel, 341 SCRA 319 (2000)

FACTS: Renato Sucilan, his wife Adelina, daughter Liezl, and brother Romeo were eating dinner in Renato's house. After
dinner, Adelina prepared for bed while Renato played with Liezl. Romeo went home to his own hut situated five meters away.
Suddenly, a stone was hurled into Renato's house hitting the petromax lamp. Immediately, brothers Jose and Eddie Temanel
entered the house. Jose poked Renato with a bladed weapon while Eddie ordered Adelina to take out their money and valuables.
Later, cohorts of the Temanels entered the hut. Osis grabbed Liezl, and held a knife against her. Terrified, Adelina put the
valuables in an empty milk can and placed the same outside the door. Efren Temanel, who was outside the hut, took the can. The
intruders tied the couple. When Renato and Adelina were able to free themselves, the former stepped out of the house and was
shocked to find his brother, Romeo, dead with several stab wounds in the neck and his intestines exposed. The pieces of jewelry
he usually wore, were no longer on his body.

HELD: All the elements of robbery with homicide concur in this case. The properties taken consisted of pieces of
jewelry, a radio, rice, money and other valuables, all of which clearly belonged to the Sucilans. The properties were violently
taken and intent to gain can be presumed from the unlawful taking. In addition, Romeo Sucilan was killed by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery.
Where homicide is perpetrated with a view to rob, the offense is robbery with homicide. But if robbery was an
afterthought and a minor incident in the homicide, there are two distinct offenses. Here, the killing was committed in the course
of the robbery. The fact that it was Efren Temanel and not accused-appellants, Eddie and Jose Temanel, who stabbed Romeo is of
no moment. In People v. Mendoza, if all accused take part in a robbery resulting in death, all of them shall be held liable for
robbery with homicide in the absence of proof that they prevented the killing.

People v. Cruz, 380 SCRA 13 (2002)

FACTS: Donato Cruz, who was high on drugs, entered the house of the Robleses, and sat on a sofa near the kitchen.
While seated on the sofa, Laura saw respondent and she became hysterical and started shouting. Thinking that he will be
assaulted by Laura, Cruz went inside the house, got hold of a pointed object and stabbed to death Laura Robles and her 5-year
old daughter, Lara. Thereafter, he ransacked the cabinet of the Robleses taking away a Minolta camera, a wedding ring and
P8,000.00 in cash, as well as an undetermined amount of US dollars. The RTC convicted Cruz of two (2) counts of murder and one
(1) count of theft. Appellant argues that he should have been charged with the crime of robbery with homicide.

HELD: The Court held that the argument of the Appellant is without merit. The special complex crime of robbery with
homicide is primarily a crime against property, and not against persons, homicide being a mere incident of the robbery with the
latter being the main purpose and object of the criminal (People vs. Navales, 266 SCRA 569 [1997]). In the case at bar, the
evidence on record shows that appellant stole the camera and cash only as an afterthought. His primary purpose was to kill Laura
and her 5-year old daughter, Lara, after he panicked. Hence, the prosecution was correct when it did not charge appellant with
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

People v. Zuela, 323 SCRA 589 (2000)

FACTS: Maria Abendao was engaged in business. She had a store, operated a passenger jeepney and engaged in the
buy and sale of palay. Her sister Romualda also had a store. Accused Nelson was Maria's store helper. Accused Tito Zuela alias
"Anting" helped Romualda in her store during palay season. The other accused Maximo Velarde was known to Romualda because
she met him at a birthday party held at Maria's house. The three accused were friends. Maximo, Tito and Nelson conceived the

plan to hold-up Maria while drinking in front of Romualda's store because Maximo needed money for his fare to Manila. Maximo,
Tito and Nelson boarded the palay-laden jeepney of Maria and upon reaching an uninhabited place. Maximo poked a gun at the
driver and shot him. He also shot Maria at the neck when the latter shouted. Nelson and Tito alighted from the jeepney. Nelson
went to the left front side of the jeepney, while Tito approached the right front side of the jeepney, in the process stepping on
the sleeping John-John who was then awakened. The boy stood up and said, "You will see I will tell my father that you killed my
mother." To avoid being identified by the boy, Tito told Maximo to kill the boy. Maximo then took hold of the boy's hair and
slashed his neck. Tito took Maria's money and divided it, each accused receiving about seven thousand (P7,000.00) pesos from the
loot.

HELD: The crime committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide defined and penalized in Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court correctly considered the crime as robbery with homicide and not "robbery with
triple homicide" as charged in the information. The term "homicide" in Article 294(1) is used in its generic sense, embracing not
only the act which results in death but also all other acts producing anything short of death. Neither is the nature of the offense
altered by the number of killings in connection with the robbery. The multiplicity of victims slain on the occasion of the robbery
is only appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. This would preclude an anomalous situation where, from the standpoint of
the gravity of the offense, robbery with one killing would be treated in the same way that robbery with multiple killings would
be.

People v. Dinamling, 379 SCRA 107 (2002)

FACTS: Marilyn Pajarillo was in their house lying down in bed with her 2-year old daughter. Seated beside her was 11year old Rosemarie Malalay, who was waiting for her father Rogelio. Rogelio was then in the patio, outside the house, drinking gin
with Marilyn's husband Charlie Pajarillo and Deogracias Acosta. Suddenly, Orlando Dinamling entered their house and poked a long
gun at Marilyn's forehead, ordered her to lie prone on the ground. Marilyn merely sat down. Dinamman, with a short firearm,
entered their sari-sari store, searched their belongings and took more or less P1,500.00 in cash representing her sales, two (rims
of Champion cigarettes, one dozen cans of sardines and one pack of Juicy Fruit chewing gum. Outside, Fernando Dinamling and
Linnam poked guns at the heads of Rogelio and Deogracias, who were then lying prostrate on the ground.. After a while, Rogelio
and Deogaracias were shot to death. The trial court's ruled that Orlando and Fenando Dinamling, Diinamman and Linnam are
guilty of "robbery with double homicide"

HELD: Accused-appellants' crime is robbery with homicide. The trial court's denomination of the offense as "robbery
with double homicide" is erroneous. It is settled that regardless of the number of homicides committed, the crime should still be
denominated as robbery with homicide. The number of persons killed is immaterial and does not increase the penalty prescribed
by Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. Stated differently, the homicides or murders and physical injuries, irrespective of their
numbers, committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged in the composite crime of robbery with homicide.

People v. Daniela, 401 SCRA 519 (2002)

FACTS: Manuel Daniela and Jose Baylosis came to the house of Ronito and his common-law wife, Maria Fe to borrow
money. Manuel, Jose, and Ronito then had a drinking spree. Later, Manuel armed with a .38 caliber gun, entered the bedroom of
Ronito and Maria Fe and poked the said gun on Maria Fe. Jose, armed with a knife followed Manuel to the bedroom. Upon
Manuels order Jose tied the hands of Maria Fe behind her back and put a tape on her mouth. Jose also tied the hands of Marifes
cousin, Leo. Jose and Manuel then divested Maria Fe of her necklace, rings and earrings. Manuel demanded that she give them
her money but Maria Fe told them that she had used her money to pay her partners in the fish vending business. Manuel and Jose
did not believe Maria Fe and ransacked the room but failed to find money. Manuel then threatened to explode the grenade
tucked under his shirt and kill Maria Fe, her family and their househelps if she refused to surrender her money. Petrified, Maria
Fe took the money from her waist pouch and gave the same to Manuel and Jose. Manuel took a blanket and ordered Jose to kill
Ronito with it. Jose went to the kitchen, got a knife, covered Ronito with the blanket and sat on top of him then stabbed the

latter several times. Manuel also stabbed Ronito on different parts of his body. Manuel hit Ronito with the butt of his gun. Jose
slit the throat of Ronito and took the latter's wristwatch and ring. Manuel then raped Julifer, a househelp of Marife.

HELD: The law does not require that the sole motive of the malefactor is robbery and commits homicide by reason or
on the occasion thereof. In People vs. Tidula, et al., this Court ruled that even if the malefactor intends to kill and rob another,
it does not preclude his conviction for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. In People v. Damaso, the Court held
that the fact that the intent of the felons was tempered with a desire also to avenge grievances against the victim killed, does
not negate the conviction of the accused and punishment for robbery with homicide.
A conviction for robbery with homicide is proper even if the homicide is committed before, during or after the
commission of the robbery. The homicide may be committed by the actor at the spur of the moment or by mere accident. Even if
two or more persons are killed and a woman is raped and physical injuries are inflicted on another, on the occasion or by reason
of robbery, there is only one special complex crime of robbery with homicide. What is primordial is the result obtained without
reference or distinction as to the circumstances, cause, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime.
Robbery with homicide is committed even if the victim of the robbery is different from the victim of homicide, as long
as the homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. It is not even necessary that the victim of the robbery
is the very person the malefactor intended to rob. For the conviction of the special complex crime, the robbery itself must be
proved as conclusively as any other element of the crime. It may be true that the original intent of appellant Manuel was to
borrow again money from Ronito and Maria Fe but later on conspired with Jose and robbed the couple of their money and pieces
of jewelry, and on the occasion thereof, killed Ronito. Nonetheless, the appellants are guilty of robbery with homicide.

People v. Napalit, 396 SCRA 687 (2003)

FACTS:A group of more than six armed men including Napalit barged into the Tondo General Hospital. One of the armed
men pointed a gun at the security guard and announced a hold-up. Simultaneously, Napalit pointed a gun at, and grabbed the
firearm of, another security guard. Four members of the group then entered the cashier's office of the hospital and ordered the
employees to lie down on the floor. One of them pointed a gun at the cashier, Alonzo, and ordered him to open the vault. Before
Alonzo could do as instructed, he was searched for weapons in the course of which his wallet containing P450.00 in cash was
taken. Alonzo then opened the vault which the four emptied of P1,010,274.90 in cash. While the four malefactors were at the
cashier's office, another security guard, Gomez, who was manning the hospital gate was disarmed of his service pistol, pushed
outside the hospital premises, and shot twice by one of the armed men. The four armed men who emptied the vault then rushed
out of the hospital and one of them also shot Gomez who had by then collapsed on the ground. Two of them headed toward a
Toyota Tamaraw vehicle driven by Castor which was on a stop position, due to heavy traffic, in front of the hospital. One of the
duo ordered the passenger at the front seat to get off the vehicle. The other, after forcing Castor to alight from the vehicle,
drove it and fled with his companion. The RTC found Napalit guilty of robbery with homicide and violation of R. A. 6539 (the AntiCarnapping Act), respectively. Napalit argues that assuming that he had indeed participated in the incident, he should only be
held liable for robbery and not for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

HELD: In a long line of cases, the Court has ruled that whenever homicide is committed as a consequence or on the
occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals in the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not take part in the homicide, unless it is clearly shown that they
endeavored to prevent the homicide. (People v. Lago, 358 SCRA 550 (2001), People v. Liad, 355 SCRA 11 (2001), People v.
Pedroso, 336 SCRA 163)

People v. Lara (2006)

The Court disagrees with the Court of Appeals that appellant committed the crime of robbery with homicide in Criminal Case No.
97-13706. There is nothing in the records that would show that the principal purpose of appellant was to rob the victim of his
shotgun (Serial No. 9600942). It must be emphasized that when the victim and appellant met and had a heated argument, the
absence of the intent to rob on the part of the appellant was apparent. Appellant was not trying to rob the victim. Appellants
act of taking the shotgun was not for the purpose of robbing the victim, but to protect himself from the victim. No one would in
ones right mind just leave a firearm lying around after being in a heated argument with another person. Having failed to
establish that appellants original criminal design was robbery, appellant could only be convicted of the separate crimes of
either murder or homicide, as the case may be, and theft.
People vs. Patola

Robbery committed with rape is punished under RPC Art 294 par 2, not under RPC 335 on qualified rape.

People vs. Dinola

Facts: Dinola saw victim Marilyns watch after he had raped her. She refused to give him the watch so he took if forcibly from
her and left. Dinola was convicted of robbery with rape.

Held: The crime of robbery and rape should be punished as 2 separate offences. If the original design was to commit rape but
the accused after committing rape also committed robbery (more of an afterthought, even accidental) because the opportunity
presented itself, the criminal act should be viewed as 2 distinct offences. If the intention of the accused was to commit robbery
but rape was also committed even before the robbery, the crime of robbery with rape was committed.

People vs Moreno

Facts: Accused Moreno, Deloria and Maniquez robbed the Mohnani spouses. Deloria raped househelp Narcisa while Maniquez
raped househelp Mary Ann. Moreno was convicted of robbery while Deloria and Maniquez, robbery with rape.

Held: Moreno who took no part in the rape is guilty of robbery only. Ruling was correct.

People v. Fabon, 328 SCRA 302 (2000)

FACTS: Locsin Fabon, alias "Loklok," entered the home of 64 year-old, Bonifacia Lasquite and forcibly took the
victims money amounting to P25,000.00. On the occasion of the robbery, Fabon raped Lasquite. Thereafter, Fabon strangled and
stabbed Lasquite with a knife resulting to her death. The RTC convicted Fabon of Robbery with Homicide and Rape, penalized
under Article 294, number 1 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 7659.

HELD: The trial court inaccurately designated the crime committed as "robbery with homicide and rape." When the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide is accompanied by another offense like rape or intentional mutilation, such
additional offense is treated as an aggravating circumstance which would result in the imposition of the maximum penalty of

death. The Court cited the case of People vs. Lascuna, where it was held that We agree with the Solicitor General's observation
that the crime committed was erroneously designated as robbery with homicide, rape and physical injuries. The proper
designation is robbery with homicide aggravated by rape. When rape and homicide co-exist in the commission of robbery, it is the
first paragraph of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code which applies, the rape to be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
...

People v. Domingo, 383 SCRA 43 (2002)

FACTS: Appellant Domingo Temporal, Pedro, Valdez, and Rivera went to the house of Spouses Valentin and Clara
Gabertan, armed with a piece of bamboo, 2x2 piece of wood, ipil-ipil posts and bolo, They assaulted and clubbed Valentin with
their weapons, weakening and injuring him. Eventually they stole from the Gabertan spouses cash in the amount of P5,350.00, 1
ladies gold Seiko watch, 9 turkeys, and 2 chickens. Thereafter, while Rivera guarded Valentin, the four accused took turns in
raping Carla outside the house where she was forcibly laid on the cogon grass. RTC found appellant guilty of robbery with
multiple rape.

HELD: The RTC should have convicted appellant of robbery with rape instead of robbery with multiple rape. In the special
complex crime of robbery with rape, the true intent of the accused must first be determined, because their intent determines
the offense they committed. To sustain a conviction for robbery with rape, it is imperative that the robbery itself must be
conclusively established. To support a conviction therefor, proof of the rape alone is not sufficient. Robbery with rape occurs
when the following elements are present: (1) personal property is taken with violence or intimidation against persons, (2) the
property taken belongs to another, (3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi, and (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape.
In the case at bar, all the foregoing elements are present. The contemporaneous acts of appellant and his co-accused
stress the fact that they were initially motivated by animus lucrandi. They first demanded guns, moneys and animals from
Valentin Gabertan. Apparently, it was only when they entered the house and saw his wife when they thought of raping her.The
prosecution likewise established that appellant and his co-accused took chickens, a watch and money from complainants through
violence.

People v. Verceles, 388 SCRA 515 (2002)

FACTS: Accused Verceles alias "Baldog", Corpuz, Soriano alias "Merto", Ramos and Soriano entered the house of Mrs.
Rosita Quilates by forcibly destroying the grills of the window. Once inside, they took away 1 colored T.V., 1 VHS, assorted
jewelries, 1 alarm clock and 1 radio cassettes. In the course of the robbery, Soriano, succumbed to lustful desires and raped
Maribeth Bolito while the others just stood outside the door and did nothing to prevent Soriano.

HELD: Once conspiracy is established between two accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they would be
both equally culpable for the rape committed by one of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them proves that he
endeavored to prevent the other from committing the rape. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever a rape is committed as
a consequence, or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as principals of the crime of robbery
with rape, although not all of them took part in the rape. Appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
with Rape punished under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.

People v. Moreno, 374 SCRA 667 (2002)

The special complex crime of robbery with rape defined in Article 293 in relation to paragraph 2 of Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, employs the clause "when the robbery shall have been accompanied with rape." In other words,

to be liable for such crime, the offender must have the intent to take the personal property of another under circumstances that
makes the taking one of robbery, and such intent must precede the rape. If the original plan was to commit rape, but the
accused after committing the rape also committed robbery when the opportunity presented itself, the robbery should be viewed
as a separate and distinct crime.
A painstaking assessment of the evidence in this case convinces us that ROGELIO committed two separate offenses of
rape and theft, and not the special complex crime of robbery with rape. Immediately after ROGELIO put his arms around
MARITES and directed the knife at her neck, he dragged Marites to the vacant space in ABC Commercial Complex and removed
her clothes. These acts clearly showed that ROGELIO had in mind sexual gratification. This intent was further established by the
fact that when MARITES offered to give her ring to ROGELIO, the latter did not take it and instead replied, "Mamaya na iyan";
"That will come later on because I will give it back to you but you have to follow me first." Again, when ROGELIO removed his
pants, MARITES told him to get her bag if he needed money; but ROGELIO replied "I do not need money." After giving vent to his
lustful desire, he snatched the victim's shoulder bag, which was then on her right foot, and then he ran away. Clearly then, the
taking of personal property was not the original evil plan of ROGELIO. It was an afterthought following the rape.
Significantly, the constitutive element of violence or intimidation against persons in robbery was not present at the
time of the snatching of the shoulder bag of MARITES. The force or intimidation exerted by ROGELIO against the victim was for a
reason foreign to the fact of the taking of the bag. It was for the purpose of accomplishing his lustful desire. Hence, it cannot be
considered for the purpose of classifying the crime as robbery. Accused-appellant may thus be held liable for simple theft only, in
addition to the crime of rape.

People v. Seguis, 349 SCRA 547 (2001)

FACTS: Seguis a.k.a. Junior, Estebe a.k.a. Dodong, Doquila a.k.a. Lolong, r Canico, Gibertas, dela Cruz, and a certain
John Doe took turns in raping Juliet Magamayo at the house of his friend where she stayed for the night. One of the said accused
took her gold ring, bracelet and cash though Juliet can not pinpoint who specifically did it among the many accused. The RTC
finds each of the accused, Adriano guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of simple rape under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code

HELD: It is to be noted that the accused in this case were originally indicted for the felony of robbery with multiple
rape, a special complex crime punishable under Art. 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code and which is committed "when the
robbery shall have been accompanied by rape." The said provision, needless to say, covers cases of multiple rapes. This is
primarily due to the fact that the juridical concept of this crime does not limit the consummation of rape against one single
victim or to one single act, making other rapes in excess of that number as separate, independent offense or offenses. All the
rapes are merged in the composite, integrated whole that is robbery with rape, so long as the rapes accompanied the robbery. It
does not matter too whether the rape occurred before, during, or after the robbery.
Still and all, this does not change the nature of the felony. It is essentially a crime against property. To sustain a
conviction, it is imperative that the robbery itself must be conclusively established; just as the fact that it was the accused who
committed it be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must be able to demonstrate the level of their participation
with legal and moral certainty, including the existence of a conspiracy, if any. Otherwise, those who were charged should be
acquitted, at least for the robbery. Proof of the rape alone is not sufficient to support a conviction for the crime of robbery with
rape.
The lower court's finding of the accusednon-participation in the robbery does not mean that they are totally guiltless.
They will still be held accountable for whatever unlawful acts they may have committed, and for which acts they were charged.
In a criminal action for robbery with rape, where the prosecution failed to prove the robo or the participation of the accused in
it, the latter may still be convicted for the rape. The trial courts ruling that the appellants had carnal knowledge of the private
complainant by using force and intimidation, convicting them of one count of rape each because there was no showing that they
conspired or assisted each other in committing those rapes is affirmed.

People v. Gano, 353 SCRA 126 (2001)

Accused Castanito Gano killed three (3) persons by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. The question that needs
to be resolved is whether the multiplicity of homicides could be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. For sometime,
this ticklish issue has been the subject of conflicting views by this Court when it held in some cases that the additional
rapes/homicides committed on the occasion of robbery would not increase the penalty, while in other cases it ruled that the
multiplicity of rapes/homicides committed could be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. But in People v. Regala this
Court spoke with finality on the matter
It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s should be considered as
aggravating circumstance. The enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive
as opposed to the enumeration in Article 13 of the same Code regarding mitigating circumstances where there is specific
paragraph (paragraph 10) providing for analogous circumstances.
It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of multiple homicide on the occasion of the robbery) would
result in an "anomalous situation" where from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one rape would be on
the same level as robbery with multiple rapes. However, the remedy lies with the legislature. A penal law is liberally construed in
favor of the offender and no person should be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute.
This case is singular in its barbarity and nauseating in the manner with which the accused, bolo in hand, butchered his
preys. Notwithstanding the viciousness with which he perpetrated the offense, we are constrained to apply the principle laid
down in People v. Regala, and accordingly, the two (2) other killings contrary to the ruling of the trial court, should not be
appreciated as aggravating circumstances. Gano is guilty of Robbery with Homicide.

People v. Regala, 329 SCRA 707 (2000)

FACTS: Sixteen-year old, Nerissa Tagala, and her grandmother Consuelo Arevalo were sleeping, when appellant
Armando Regala and his two other companions entered the former's house. Regala and his companions entered the house
through the kitchen by removing the pieces of wood under the stove. Regala went to the room of Nerissa and her grandmother
and poked an 8-inch gun on them, one after the other. Nerissa and her grandmother were hogtied by appellant and his
companions. Thereafter, Nerissa was raped by twice by Regala in bed and in the kitchen. After the rape, appellant and his two
companions counted the money which they took from the "aparador. Appellant and his companions then ran away with P3,000 in
cash, 2 pieces of ring and two wrist watches.

HELD: It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s should be considered
as aggravating circumstance. The enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is
exclusive as opposed to the enumeration in Article 13 of the same code regarding mitigating circumstances where there is a
specific paragraph (paragraph 10) providing for analogous circumstances.
It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in. the case of multiple homicide on the occasion of the robbery) would
result in an "anomalous situation" where from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one rape would be on
the same level as robbery with multiple rapes. However, the remedy lies with the legislature. A penal law is liberally construed in
favor of the offender and no person should be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute.
People vs. Sevilla
Facts: The accused detained several persons as hostages in a store they robbed. The police launched an offensive. In the
ensuing gunfight, the hostages suffered physical injuries. One of the hostages eventually had to have her leg amputated. The
accused were convicted of the complex crime of robbery with serious physical injuries and serious illegal detention. Should the
crime of serious illegal detention be prosecuted as a separate offence?

People vs. Apduhan

Apduhan was convicted of robbery with homicide and was sentenced to death because the court considered the use of unlicensed
firearm as a special aggravating circumstance under Art 296. SC rejected this. SC believes that: (1) Art 296 is exclusively linked
and singularly applicable to Art 295 on robbery in band, (2) RPC 295 is explicitly limited to scope to pars. 3, 4, 5 of Art 294, and
(3) par 3, 4, 5 of Art 294 does not include cases where homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, impotence, imbecility, blindness
and insanity occurred by reason or on the occasion of accompanying robbery. Thus, since Apduhan was convicted of robbery with
homicide under par 1 Art 294, Art 296 in relation to par 3, 4, 5 of Art 295 is inapplicable. Hence, the use of an unlicensed
firearm should not have been considered as a special aggravating circumstance.

People vs. Tomio

A Japanese national named Tomio was arrested after being implicated for possessing marijuana. Two other Japanese claimed
that they paid money for Tomios release and so they held Tomio under their custody, asking for the amount they allegedly
advance to the police.

HELD: Even if the two accused only wanted to recover the money they allegedly advanced to the police, the crime is still
kidnapping because of the essential element of deprivation of liberty.

People vs. Mercado

The accused held a knife against his girlfriends sister for nearly five hours. The victims ordeal ended only after the barangay
captain was able to subdue the accused.

HELD: The crime is kidnapping because the victim was actually restrained or deprived of her liberty, notwithstanding the fact
that the accused only wanted the victim to produce her.

People vs. Del Socorro

Del Socorro grabbed a little girl and brought the child to a doctor, asking for 700 pesos in return. The doctor gave the child to
her spinster aunt.

HELD: The defense that the child voluntarily went with the accused is belied by the fact that the child openly resisted the
abduction and even had to be carried to the jeep.

People vs. Lim

Lim took in two young girls who were loitering in front of her sari-sari store. Lim sent the younger girl to Cebu while the older
girl stayed in the store. Days later, the girls father arrived to bring the two girls back with him.

HELD: There is no kidnapping in this case because the two minors voluntarily entered Lims residence and there was no showing
that there was actual confinement or restriction of the person of the offended party. Both girls were free to go in and out of the
store.

People vs. Padica

A 14-year old boy was brought to a sugarcane plantation, where he was shot and killed immediately. The accused demanded
ransom soon after.

HELD: Where the evident purpose of taking the victim was to kill him, and from the acts of the accused it cannot be inferred
that the latters purpose was to actually detain or deprive the victim of his liberty, the subsequent killing of the victim did not
constitute the crime of murder. The demand for ransom did not convert the crime into kidnapping since no deprivation of liberty
was involved.

People vs. Luartes

Luartes kidnapped a 3-yr old girl outside Isettan Recto. The girl was in the mall with her mother, who lost her. Luartes defense
was that he was merely helping the lost girl find her mother. He says he had no intention of kidnapping Junichi and that the
prosecution witnesses (police officers) merely misconstrued his actuations.

HELD: If indeed accused-appellant was trying to help the lost child, why then did he misrepresent himself as her uncle? And, if
his intention was only to help the child look for her mother, why did he have to board a passenger jeepney taking the child with
him?

The essence of kidnapping under Art. 267 is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty coupled with the intent of the accused
to effect it. The crime in this case clearly comes under par. 4 of Art. 267 of the Penal Code. The detention was committed by
Luartes who was a private individual and the person kidnapped was a three (3)-year old minor.

People vs. Pavillare

Pavillare was convicted of kidnapping an Indian national and sentenced to death. He argues that he should have been convicted
of simple robbery only and not kidnapping with ransom because the evidence proves that their prime motive was to obtain
money and that the complainant was detained only for two hours.

HELD: The pretense that the money was supposedly in exchange for the dropping of the charges for rape is not supported by the
evidence. The accused released the complainant when the money was handed over to him and after counting the money, he and
his companions immediately left the scene. This clearly indicated that the payment of the ransom money is in exchange for the
liberty of the private complainant.

The duration of the detention even if only for a few hours does not alter the nature of the crime committed. The crime of
kidnapping is committed by depriving the victim of liberty whether he is placed in an enclosure or simply restrained from going
home. As squarely expressed in Article 267, above-quoted the penalty of death is imposable where the detention is committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom, and the duration of the detention is not material.

People vs. Ballenas

Accused Ballenas pointed a short firearm to Wilma and Consorcia inside their home. Accused told Wilma to accompany him to
Maria his girlfriend. Wilma refused, as they were about to eat supper. Consorcia also told her daughter, Wilma not to go out
because it was already dark. Accused Ballenas forced Wilma to go out with him. Because of the abduction, Consorcia sought the
help of a neighbor, Andres but to no avail, as Andres shut the door on her for fear of Ballenas as the latter is known as a member
of the dreaded Sparrow Unit of the NPA.

The following morning, Consorcia reported the abduction of Wilma to her son-in-law who is a member of the Integrated National
Police. She learned from Aurelio that Wilma was already dead. The police then proceeded to the scene of the incident. Ballenas
was found guilty of forcible abduction with rape and sentenced to Reclusion perpetua.

HELD: BALLENAS committed the crime of forcible abduction with rape on March 20, 1987, before the passage of Republic Act
7659 or the Heinous Crimes Law that took effect on December 31, 1993. At the time that BALLENAS committed the crime of
forcible abduction with rape, the penalty then applicable was reclusion perpetua to death. The use by BALLENAS of a firearm in
committing the crime, a fact duly alleged in the information and proven in court, should have warranted the imposition of the
death penalty. However, since the crime took place prior to the implementation of RA 7659, the trial court correctly ruled that
the penalty that can be imposed on BALLENAS is reclusion perpetua. Hence, despite the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, the penalty herein of reclusion perpetua would not be affected. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may
have attended the commission of a crime.

People v. Silongan, 401 SCRA 459 (2003)

FACTS: Businessman Alexander Saldaa went to Isulan, Sultan Kudarat with Rejuso, Tormis, and Cinco to meet with
Macapagal Silongan alias Commander Lambada concerning the gold nuggets that were purportedly being sold by the latter. During
the meeting Macapagal told them that someone in his family has just died and that he has to pick up an elder brother in hence,
they had better transact business in the afternoon. In the afternoon, Alexanders group and Macapagal, with Teddy and Oteng
both surnamed Silongan, traveled to fetch Macapagals brother. Afterwards, the group returned to Isulan on Macapagals orders.
At Isulan, Macapagal gave additional instructions to wait until dark allegedly because the funeral arrangements for his relative
were not yet finished. When the group finally got on their way, Macapagal who was earlier busy talking over his hand-held radio
with someone in the Maguindanaoan dialect ordered the driver to drive slowly towards the highway. Oteng and his bodyguards
alighted somewhere long the way. As they neared the highway, Macapagal ordered the driver to stop. Suddenly, 15 armed men
appeared. Alexander and his 3 companions were ordered to go out of the vehicle, tied up, and blindfolded. Macapagal and Teddy
were also tied up and blindfolded, but nothing more was done to them. The 4 were taken to a mountain hideout. After much
haggling twelve million pesos was demanded from Alexander for his release, They made Alexander write a letter to his wife to
pay the ransom which was hand-carried by a certain Jafar, alias Dante, and two of the victims, Tormis and Cinco, who both later
managed to escape. No ransom was obtained so other persons were sent and one of the victims, Rejuso to renegotiate with
Alexanders wife. No agreement was likewise reached. Seven days later, Alexander and Rejuso were transferred to the town
proper and was guarded them by several men. When the kidnappers learned that the military was looking for Alexander, they
returned to the mountain hideout and stayed there for two weeks.
At one time, Alexander Saldaa was made to stay at a river hideout where a certain Commander Kugta held him and
sheltered his abductors for at least a week. There, Alexander saw Macapagal with Manap and other armed men. These men
brought Alexander to different places and was made to write more letters to his family. All in all appellant was detained for a
total of 6 months. Saldaa was later released to the military in exchange for a relative of one of the abductors who was caught
delivering a ransom note to Alexanders family.

HELD: The essence of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and penalized in Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty coupled with proof beyond reasonable doubt of an intent
of the accused to effect the same. It is thus essential that the following be established by the prosecution: (1) the offender is a
private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of
detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances enumerated in
Article 267 be present. But if the kidnapping was done for the purpose of extorting ransom, the fourth element is no longer
necessary.
There is no mistaking the clear, overwhelming evidence that the appellants abducted Alexander Saldaa and his
companions at gunpoint and deprived them of their freedom. That the appellants took shifts guarding the victims until only
Alexander was left to be guarded and in transferring Alexander from one hideout to another to prevent him from being rescued
by the military establish that they acted in concert in executing their common criminal design.

People v. Cortez, 324 SCRA 335 (2000)

FACTS: Mendoza was in her house when accused Cortez, Callos and Betonio, all armed with bolos, arrived. They were
looking for Lolita's cousin, Esminda, and were threatening to kill him on sight. Unable to find Santos, they decided to abduct
Lolita to prevent her from reporting the incident to the police. Accompanied by the other two, accused Callos pointed his bolo at
Lolita's back and dragged her to the mountain. They brought her to the house of Torral, an uncle of accused Cortez, where Cortez
bound her hand with a belts and thereafter continued their search for Santos. Hours later, PO2 Santos and barangay captain
Colarina rescued found Lolita outside the nipa hut of the Torrals, conversing with Pablo Torral. Lolita told them that the Torrals
did not prevent her from leaving their house. However, she did not attempt to escape for fear that the accused would make good
their threat to kill her. Appellants allege failure to establish one of the essential elements of the crime, i.e., deprivation of the
victim's liberty. They point out that at the time of the rescue, Lolita was not physically confined inside the house as they found
her standing outside, conversing with Pablo Torral. They stress that Lolita herself declared that she was not prevented by the
Torrals from leaving the house.

HELD: For the crime of kidnapping to prosper, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty, in any
manner, has to be established by indubitable proof. However, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept within an
enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. In the case at bar, the deprivation of Lolita's liberty was amply established by
evidence. When the appellants failed to find Lolita's cousin, they forcibly dragged her to the mountains and kept her in the house

of the Torrals. Cortez even bound her hands with a belt. Although at the time of the rescue, she was found outside the house
talking to Pablo Torral, she explained that she did not attempt to leave the premises for fear that the appellants would make
good their threats to kill her should she do so. Her fear is not baseless as the appellants knew where she resided and they had
earlier announced that their intention in looking for Lolita's cousin was to kill him on sight. Certainly, fear has been known to
render people immobile. Indeed, appeals to the fears of an individual, such as by threats to kill or similar threats, are equivalent
to the use of actual force or violence which is one of the elements of the crime of kidnapping under Article 267 (3) of the Revised
Penal Code.

People v. Suriaga, 381 SCRA 159 (2002)

FACTS: Edwin Ramos was cleaning the car of his older brother, Johnny who was taking care of his 2-year old daughter,
Nicole, playing inside the car. Suriaga, a cousin of the Ramos brothers, arrived. He was accompanied by his live-in-partner
Rosita. Suriaga requested Edwin if he could drive the car, but the latter declined, saying he did not have the keys. Meanwhile,
Johnny returned to his house because a visitor arrived. At this instance, Rosita held Nicole and cajoled her. Rosita asked Edwin
if she could take Nicole with her to buy barbeque. Having been acquainted with Rosita for a long time and because he trusted
her, Edwin acceded. When Rosita and the child left, Suriaga joined them. More than an one hour has passed but the two failed to
return with Nicole. Edwin, Johnny and his wife, Mercedita, then began searching but they could not find their daughter and
Rosita. Nicoles grandfather then receive a call from Suriaga asking for ransom in the amount of P100,000.00. Johnny
immediately reported the call to the PACC Task Force. The next day, Suriaga called Mercedita, introduced himself and asked her
if she and her husband would give the amount to which the latter responded in the positive. Suriaga instructed Mercidita as to
the how the money should be delivered to him with a warning that if she will not deliver the money, her daughter would be
placed in a plastic bag or thrown in a garbage can. Thereafter, with the cash money, and while being tailed by PACC agents,
Mercida proceeded to deliver the money to Suriaga. The PACC agents arrested Suriaga and his companion Isidera after Mercida
gave the money to them. Prior thereto, Nicole was rescued in a shanty where Rositas sister lived.
HELD: The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled with indubitable
proof of the accuseds intent to effect the same. And if the person detained is a child, the question that needs to be addressed is
whether there is evidence to show that in taking the child, there was deprivation of the childs liberty and that it was the
intention of the accused to deprive the mother of the childs custody.
Undoubtedly, the elements of kidnapping for ransom have been sufficiently established by the prosecution considering the
following circumstances: 1) appellant, a private individual, took the young Nicole without personally seeking permission from her
father; 2) appellant took the girl and brought her to a shanty where Rositas sister lived, without informing her parents of their
whereabouts; 3) he detained the child and deprived her of her liberty by failing to return her to her parents overnight and the
following day; and 4) he demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 through telephone calls and gave instructions where and how it
should be delivered.

People v. Acbangin, 337 SCRA 454 (2000)

FACTS: Jocelyn brought four-year old Sweet to Nius house without the consent of the childs father Danilo
Acbangin. When Danilo asked Jocelyn about her daughter who he last saw playing in the latters house, Jocelyn denied knowing of
the child's whereabouts. After 2 days, Jocelyn acompanied Danilo, Sweet's grandfather and police officers to Niu's house. The
latter voluntarily turned Sweet over to her father and the policemen. Sweet was well-dressed and smiling. She ran to her father
and embraced him.

HELD: In cases of kidnapping, if the person detained is a child, the question is whether there was actual deprivation of
the child's liberty, and whether it was the intention of the accused to deprive the parents of the custody of the child.
Sweet was deprived of her liberty. True, she was treated well. However, there is still kidnapping. For there to be
kidnapping, it is not necessary that the victim be placed in an enclosure. It is enough that the victim is restrained from going
home. Given Sweet's tender age, when Jocelyn left her in Niu's house, at a distant place in Tondo, Manila, unknown to her, she
deprived Sweet of the freedom to leave the house at will. It is not necessary that the detention be prolonged.
The intention to deprive Sweet's parents of her custody is indicated by Jocelyn's hesitation for two days to disclose

Sweet's whereabouts and more so by her actual taking of the child. Jocelyn's motive at this point is not relevant. It is not an
element of the crime.

People v. Pavillare, 329 SCRA 684 (2000)

FACTS: Sukhjinder Singh, an Indian national was on his way back to his parked motorcycle when three men blocked his way.
Pavillare, who was one of them, accused Singh of having raped the woman inside a Kia taxi cab parked nearby. Singh denied the
accusation, the three men nevertheless forced him inside the cab and brought him in Quezon City. One of the abductors took the
key to his motorcycle and drove it alongside the cab. Singh was beaten up and P100,000.00 was demanded for his release. Singh
told them that he only had P5,000.00 with him. Pavillare then forced him to give the phone numbers of his relatives so they can
make their demand from them. Singh gave the phone number of his cousin Lakhvir Singh and then Pavillare made the call. The
amount of 25,000.00 was agreed upon. An uncle and his cousin Lakhvir arrived in a motorcycle and together with the kidnappers
they entered a mini-grocery. Later the kidnappers brought the complainant to the mini-grocery where he met his relatives. The
ransom money was handed to the appellant. He counted the money and then, together with his cohorts, immediately left the
scene. Pavillare argues that he should have been convicted of simple robbery and not kidnapping with ransom because the
evidence proves that the prime motive of the Pavillare and his companions is to obtain money and that the complainant was
detained only for two hours:
HELD: The duration of the detention even if only for a few hours does not alter the nature of the crime committed. The
crime of kidnapping is committed by depriving the victim of liberty whether he is placed in an enclosure or simply restrained
from going home. As squarely expressed in Article 267 of the RPC the penalty of death is imposable where the detention is
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, and the duration of the detention is not material.

Ransom
People v. Castro, 385 SCRA 24
FACTS: Saez was informed by his siblings that Castro called up to say that the latter wanted to speak with Saez. After
taking a quick shower, Saez repaired to Castros residence. Just as Castro opened the gate for Saez, Castro pointed and fired his
9 mm. handgun at Saez, its bullet whizzing by his right ear. Saez was thrown against the concrete wall of the house. He was
then taken inside the house. Reyes and Jde los Angeles, joined Castro in mauling Saez. Castro hit Saez with an iron club. At
around nine oclock in the evening, Castro handed over to him a phone and ordered him to tell his family to raise twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos. Fifteen minutes later, Castro gave back the phone to Saez and told him to instruct the person on
the other line to bring the money to a place near a hospital. About half an hour later, another call was placed to follow-up the
demand. Turning to de los Angeles and Reyes, Castro instructed the two to go to the drop-off point. Nobody showed up. After
an hour, Saez was ordered to call again, this time to designate another place where the money was to be delivered. Castro told
Saez to have his relatives bring the money to the vicinity of the Aglipay Church in Caridad. Again, no meeting materialized.
Around midnight, Castro, de los Angeles and Reyes left the house and stayed by the gate conversing with one another. The victim
took the opportunity to flee. He was able to untie his legs and tackle the stairs towards the second storey. He jumped out
through the window but the noise he created caught the attention of Castro. The latter fired his gun, hitting the fleeing victim
and planting a bullet in his buttocks. His plea for help alarmed some barangay officials who immediately came to his rescue and
brought him to the nearest hospital
HELD: The corpus delicti in the crime of kidnapping for ransom is the fact that an individual has been in any manner
deprived of his liberty for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. Whether or not the ransom is
actually paid to or received by the perpetrators is of no moment. In People vs. Salimbago, the Court stressed:
x x x No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom so long as it
was intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victims freedom. In municipal criminal law, ransom refers to
the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that
releases from captivity. Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be
committed.

People v. Ejandra, 429 SCRA 364

FACTS: While Ed Henderson, the 9-year old son of spouses Eddie and Marileen Tan was on his way back to the house of
his tutor in Chinese language to wait for his father, accused Tampos, armed with a revolver, chased and overtook the boy. Tampos

then ordered the boy to proceed to a motorcycle parked nearby where appellants Ejandra and Revilla were waiting. Ejandra
covered Ed Henderson's mouth with his hand, pointed his gun at the boy and warned the latter not to shout. Thereafter, Tampos
ordered Ed Henderson to board the motorcycle, or else, he would be shot. Ed was brought to a house where one Huera, and
Calunod was. Ed Henderson was ordered to write down his father's telephone number, as well as that of their house and their
store. Eddie then received a call through his home phone, informing him that his son had been kidnapped. Several calls were
made and a reduced ransom of P548,000 for the safe release of Ed Henderson was eventually agreed upon. Eddie was then
instructed to place the money in a newspaper and to bring the money to the parking lot in front of a Church. Eddie did as he was
told. He proceeded to the designated place. When Calunod approached and called Eddie, the latter handed over the plastic bag
which contained the money. Eddie asked Calunod how his son was. Calunod told Eddie not to worry because the latter would
bring the boy home. Calunod then walked to the gate of the church and went home to wait for his son's return. Ed Henderson
returned on board a taxi and was soon reunited with his waiting family. Ejandra, Calunod, Tampos and Revilla were convicted of
kidnapping for ransom and were sentenced to suffer the death penalty.

HELD: Since all the foregoing facts indubitably show that the appellants conspired to kidnap the victim for ransom, the
Court affirmed the conviction of Ejandra, Calunod, Tampos and Revilla of kidnapping for ransom.
To warrant an imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom, the
prosecution must prove the following beyond reasonable doubt: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his
liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and, (c) motive of the accused, which is ransom for the victim or other
person for the release of the victim. The purpose of the offender in extorting ransom is a qualifying circumstance which may be
proven by his words and overt acts before, during and after the kidnapping and detention of the victim. Neither actual demand
for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed. Ransom, as employed in the law, is so used in its
common or ordinary sense; meaning, a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or consideration paid or demanded for
redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment that releases from captivity. It may include benefits not necessarily
pecuniary which may accrue to the kidnapper as a condition for the victim's release. n this case, the appellants not only
demanded but also received ransom for the release of the victim. The trial court correctly sentenced the appellants to death.

Mandatory Imposition of Death Penalty

People v. Morales, 427 SCRA 765

FACTS: Jefferson Tan was with his siblings, Jessie Anthony and Joanna Tan, his cousin, Malou and their driver, Cesar on
board the family L-300 van. Along the highway, the vehicle slowed down to steer clear of a damaged portion of the road when
Malit suddenly poked a gun at Cesar. Simultaneously, Morales, Esguerra, and Saldaa entered the van. Esguerra took the driver's
seat and the other two blindfolded the five victims. Jefferson was eventually sent home to get the 2M ransom which was later
reduced to 1.5M, from his father, Feliciano. Jefferson was instructed to bring the ransom to a snack center. Feliciano did not
allow his son to bring the ransom and explained to the kidnappers that Jefferson was in shock and could not go. When asked
about the ransom money, he told the caller that he could only give P92,000. The caller agreed. Later, at the place where the
kidnappers instructed Feliciano to go, the latter gave the money and he was handed the keys to the L-300 van where his children
are.

HELD: The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are the following: (a) the accused is a
private individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of
detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned in Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code are present. The imposition of the death penalty is mandatory if the kidnapping was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom. In the instant case, appellants cannot escape the penalty of death, inasmuch as it was
sufficiently alleged and indubitably proven that the kidnapping had been committed for the purpose of extorting ransom.
People vs. Ty

A mother left her sick child in a clinic and only came back to claim the child five years later. Unfortunately, the doctors had
already entrusted the child to a guardian.

HELD: Two elements must concur in the crime of kidnapping of a minor: (a) the offender had been entrusted with the custody of
the minor; and (b) the offender DELIBERATELY fails to restore said minor to his parents or legal guardian. In the case at bar, it is
evident that there was no deliberate refusal or failure to return the minor as it was proven that the doctors tried their best to
locate the child, even seeking NBIs assistance along the way.

People vs. Gutierrez (1991)

Lilia Gutierrez was convicted by the RTC of Manila of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. The minor was Hazel Elpedes, her 2 and a half-year-old nephew (yup, Hazels a guy in this story), whom
Gutierrez allegedly sold to the spouses Felipe for P250 (Lilia claims she did it to spite her husband, brother of Hazels mom, who
had abandoned her).

HELD: The offense of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Art. 270 of the RPC consists of 2 elements:

the offender has been entrusted with the custody of a minor person, and
the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or guardians.

It is clear that Gutierrez admitted the existence of the first element (she asked her in-laws for permission to take the boy out).

The second element has likewise been established. In the first place, Gutierrez's own conduct in leading the boys father and
police to the Felipe residence in Intramuros indicated her awareness of the probable whereabouts of the child. The logical
conclusion is that she must have been the person responsible for originally leaving the child with the Felipe spouses. In the
second place, the precise motive that Gutierrez might have had for bringing Hazel Elpedes to the Felipe spouses and leaving him
with them, apparently for an indefinite period, is not an indispensable element of the offense charged. All that was necessary for
the prosecution to prove was that she had deliberately failed to return the minor to his parents.

People vs. Reyes (1996)

Delia Reyes, maid of the Mohamad spouses, was convicted of kidnapping one of their daughters, Asnia. After spending 300-grand
on a manhunt, Asnia was recovered a couple of months later. Reyes claims that, while out with Asnia, she ran into her sister who
informed her of their moms death; Reyes then allegedly had a friend take Asnia home while she (Reyes) and her sister went to La
Union for their moms wake (basically, shes blaming somebody else).

HELD: Reyes's negligence is wanton and gross as to amount to a deliberate and willful scheme to take the child away from her
parents. This willfulness is sufficiently established by the following circumstances: (1) appellant lured Asnia and her sister into
leaving their house; (2) she instructed the two elder sisters to go home but kept the youngest with her; (3) she and Asnia could
not be located despite extensive search by the authorities and the widespread publicity generated through the television, radio
and print media; (4) the child was found two months later and only after the arrest of appellant; and (5) appellant harbored ill-

feelings against the Mohamads family (she admitted that, at one point, the Mohamads did not pay her salary for 5 months when
she worked for them in 1989).

People vs. Borromeo (2000)

Borromeo alias "Sonny", a bakery helper of Rowena who had been discharged by her due to negative attitude problems,
kidnapped her 1-year and 7-months old son. The next day, Sonny demanded a P300,000 ransom. He was convicted of kidnapping a
minor for ransom and was sentenced to death.

HELD: There is no question that the elements of kidnapping for ransom were sufficiently established: (a) the accused is a private
individual; (b) the accused kidnapped or detained the victim and deprived him of his liberty; and, (c) the deprivation of the
victim's liberty was illegal. As provided for in Art. 267 of the RPC as amended, the imposition of the death penalty is mandatory if
the victim is a minor and also, if the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person.

IN CAB, the minority of Kenneth was never disputed. The minority and the demand for the payment of ransom, both specifically
described in the Information, were clearly established by the State, free of any scintilla of doubt.

People v. Borromeo (2000)

FACTS: Borromeo alias "Sonny", a bakery helper of Rowena who had been discharged by her due to negative attitude
problems, kidnapped her 1-year and 7-months old son. The next day, Sonny demanded a P300,000 ransom. He was convicted of
kidnapping a minor for ransom and was sentenced to death.

HELD: There is no question that the elements of kidnapping for ransom were sufficiently established: (a) the accused is
a private individual; (b) the accused kidnapped or detained the victim and deprived him of his liberty; and, (c) the deprivation of
the victim's liberty was illegal. As provided for in Art. 267 of the RPC as amended, the imposition of the death penalty is
mandatory if the victim is a minor and also, if the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim
or any other person.
IN CAB, the minority of Kenneth was never disputed. The minority and the demand for the payment of ransom, both
specifically described in the Information, were clearly established by the State, free of any scintilla of doubt.

People v. Pastrana, 387 SCRA 342

FACTS: Postejo, working as a domestic helper in Canada, has four children namely, Jenny, Doroteo, Aresola, and 9-year
old Willy. Erma was introduced by her sister to spouses Frias who informed her that their daughter, Pastrana can help process
Willy's travel documents to Canada. Erma agreed to hand the processing of her son's papers. In one of the telephone
conversations of Erma and Pastrana, the latter informed Erma that Willy was suffering from acute bronchitis. Erna sent money for
the medical treatment of his son. Pastrana then fetched Willy and Aresola from their residence in Caloocan and brought them to
her apartment. Thought she never brought Willy to a hospital for treatment, Pastrana kept on demanding money from Erma

which include the amount of P60,000.00 for the installation of a water purifier in her apartment allegedly for Willy's safety, and
for additional money for her job application in Singapore. Erna, however, refused to transmit the amounts demanded by Pastrana
and ordered the return of Willy to their residence in Caloocan. Pastrana deliberately failed to return Willy for 7 days until the
latter disappeared while allegedly playing in front of Pastranas apartment.

HELD: Kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code has two essential elements,
namely: (1) the offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and (2) the offender deliberately fails to restore the
said minor to his parents or guardians. What is actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the
deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. The word deliberate as used in
Article 270 must imply something more than mere negligence it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or
intentionally and maliciously wrong. In the case at bar, there is no question that accused-appellant was entrusted with the
custody of 9-year old Willy. Erma and her children trusted accused-appellant that they sent her money for the processing of
Willy's travel documents, and more importantly, they allowed Willy to stay in her apartment. As to the second element, It was
this deliberate failure of accused-appellant to return custody of Willy to his relatives that gave rise to her culpability under
Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code. The disappearance of Willy and accused-appellant's inability to return him to Caloocan by
reason thereof has no bearing on the crime charged as it was her willful disobedience to Erma's order that consummated the
crime.

People v. Bernardo, 378 SCRA 708

FACTS: While Rosita was undergoing medical check up inside a hospital, her two daughters waited at the
lobby. Roselle was seating on a bench with her 15-day old sister on her lap. Bernardo befriended Roselle and later gave her P3.00
and asked her to buy ice water. Thereafter, Bernardo took the baby from Roselle. Roselle was not able to find ice water for sale
and on her way back to the hospital, she saw Bernardo running away with her baby sister. Roselle pulled and pulled Bernardo's
skirt to prevent the latter from getting away. Torres saw Bernardo carrying a child and struggling with Roselle. Roselle begged
Torres to help her because her mother was at the hospital and the accused was getting her baby sister. Torres took the baby from
the Bernardo and entrusted the baby to his wife. Then he led Bernardo and Roselle to the hospital to look for Rosita who
confirmed that she was the mother of the baby. The RTC convicted Bernardo of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a
minor under Article 270 of the RPC.

HELD: The essential element of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor is that the offender is entrusted
with the custody of the minor, but what is actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the deliberate
failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. Indeed, the word deliberate as used in
Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code must imply something more than mere negligence it must be premeditated, headstrong,
foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong. When Roselle entrusted Roselyn to appellant before setting out on an
errand for appellant to look for ice water, the first element was accomplished and when appellant refused to return the baby to
Roselle despite her continuous pleas, the crime was effectively accomplished. In fine, we agree with the trial court's finding that
appellant is guilty of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor.
People v. Delantar (2007)

Appellants violation of Sec. 5, Art. III of R.A. No. 7610 is as clear as day. The provision penalizes anyone who engages in or
promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution either by: (1) acting as a procurer of a child prostitute; or (2) inducing a
person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or other similar means; or (3) by taking
advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute; or (4) threatening or using violence towards a child to
engage him as a prostitute; or (5) giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefits to the child with the intent
to engage such child in prostitution.

The purpose of the law is to provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. A child exploited in prostitution may seem to consent to
what is being done to her or him and may appear not to complain. However, we have held that a child who is a person below
eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of their age or mental disability or condition is incapable of giving rational consent to any
lascivious act or sexual intercourse. In fact, the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the woman is below the
age of twelve

Navarrete v. People (2007)

The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 that must be proven in addition to the elements of acts of
lasciviousness are as follows:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

Lascivious conduct is defined under Section 2 (h) of the rules and regulations of RA 7610 as:

[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or
buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the
same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire
of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
Marzalado v. People, 441 SCRA 595 (2004)

FACTS: The petitioner, Marzalado, argues that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in sustaining the lower
court, since in the proceedings below, there was a grave misapprehension of facts by both the MeTC and RTC in finding that he
committed trespass to dwelling despite the glaring proof that his entry was justifiable under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the
Revised Penal Code to prevent an imminent danger to property. He stresses that while he did enter the unit, he did so with the
aid of barangay officers and for the sole purpose of turning off the faucet that was causing the flooding of the unit.

HELD: In the prosecution for trespass, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the
trespass. The gravamen of the crime is violation of possession or the fact of having caused injury to the right of the possession.
As certified by Barangay Lupon Secretary Ragaya, the unit rented by Albano was "forcibly opened by the owner
(Marzalado) because of the strong water pressure coming out of the faucet. . . ." As Albano herself admitted, she and her
children already left the unit when the electricity supply was cut off in the month of September. Hence, nobody was left to
attend to the unit, except during some nights when Albano's maid slept in the unit. Clearly, Marzalado, acted for the justified
purpose of avoiding further flooding and damage to his mother's property caused by the open faucet. No criminal intent could be
clearly imputed to petitioner for the remedial action he had taken. There was an exigency that had to be addressed to avoid
damage to the leased unit. There is nothing culpable concerning Marzalados, judgment call to enter the unit and turn off the
faucet instead of closing the inlet valve as suggested by the OSG.

i
People vs. Timbol

The accused made several advances towards the offended party. He threatened to kill the womans husband if she did not accede to his
advances. He was convicted of acts of lasciviousness and grave threats.

HELD: The accused should not be convicted of grave threats because such threats formed part of the intimidation that he employed to
succeed in his lewd designs.

Reyes vs. People

A disgruntled employee staged a demonstration in front of the house of the guy who dismissed him from work. Phrases of this nature
were spoken out loud: Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin, lumabas ka, papatayin kita!

HELD: All the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 paragraph 2 are present: (1) the offender threatened
another person with the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) the wrong amounted to a crime and (3) the threat was not subject to
a condition.
Timoner vs. People (1983)

Jose Timoner, the mayor of Daet, ordered the fencing off of stalls which protruded into the sidewalks of Maharlika highway. The stalls
were recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer.

HELD: There is no grave coercion when the restraint was made under authority of law or in the lawful exercise of a right. Mayor Timoner
had the authority under the Civil Code to abate public nuisances. Also, he was merely implementing the orders of the municipal health
officer and was acting under the authority of a previous decision which declared one of the stalls as a public nuisance.

Lee vs. CA (1991)

Francis Lee, the branch manager of Pacific Banking Corporation, threatened to file charges against complainant de Chin, unless she
returned all the money equivalent to a forged Midland National Bank cheque which de Chin deposited in an account in the Pacific Bank.

HELD: To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind. De Chin was
pregnant, but she was also educated and familiar with banking procedures. She could not have been easily intimidated by Lee. Besides,
a threat to enforce ones claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent. Lees threat is not
improper because there is nothing unlawful about the threat to sue. Finally, there is a difference between performing an act reluctantly,
even against ones good sense and judgment versus performing an act with no consent at all, such as when a person acts against her will
or under a pressure cannot resist. In this case, de Chin consented to signing the withdrawal slips. She did so voluntarily, although
reluctantly. Hence, there is no coercion.

People vs. Alfeche, Jr. (1992)

Complaint for Usurpation of Real Rights in Property (Art312) in relation to Grave Coercion (Art286) was filed against accused where it was
alleged that he usurped the possession of the tenants from the land by threatening to kill them if the latter resisted. This was filed in the
RTC. RTC dismissed saying that the penalty under Art312 was below the jurisdictional amount of the RTC therefore it had no jurisdiction
on the assumption that the grave coercion was absorbed with the usurpation.

HELD: RTC had jurisdiction. Art312 defines a single, special and indivisible crime with a 2-tiered penalty. The principal one for the
usurpation with violence/ intimidation and an incremental penalty based on the value obtained in addition to the penalty incurred for the
acts of violence and intimidation.

When the usurpation is done with violence or intimidation (in the CAB, grave coercion), the accused must be prosecuted under Art312 for
usurpation and not for the acts of violence or intimidation under Art286 for grave coercion. But whenever appropriate, accused may be
held liable for the separate acts of violence or intimidation (e.g. grave coercion). This separate penalty is in addition to the fine based on
the gain obtained by him.

People v. Santos, 378 SCRA 157 (2002)

FACTS: Josephine gave a 1-year loan to Leonida but the latter was unable to timely pay the debt. For the next 4 years,
Josephine was unsuccessful in securing payment from Leonida as the latter stubbornly maintained her having already settled the account.
Josephine, Manny et. al., with the assistance of CIS agents, then brought Leonida to Baguio City from her house in Pangasinan, in order to
surrender her to the custody of Baguio City authorities where Josephine thought she could rightly seek redress. She was advised, however,
that it was in the province of Pangasinan, not Baguio City, where a case could be lodged. The trial court convicted Josephine on the
ground that the deprivation of Leonida of her liberty, regardless of its purpose and although lasting for less than twenty-four hours, was
sufficient to support the charge of kidnapping.

HELD: The circumstances that have surfaced warrant a conviction for grave coercion. Grave coercion is committed when a
person prevents another from doing something not prohibited by law or compelling him to do something against his will, whether it be
right or wrong, and without any authority of law, by means of violence, threats or intimidation. Its elements are First, that the
offender has prevented another from doing something not prohibited by law, or that he has compelled him to do something against his
will, be it right or wrong; second, that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such display of
force as would produce intimidation and control over the will of the offended party; and, third, that the offender who has restrained the
will and liberty of another did so without any right or authority of law. Where there is a variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information and that proved and the offense charged necessarily includes the lesser offense established in evidence, the
accused can be convicted of the offense proved.

Timoner vs. People (1983)

Jose Timoner, the mayor of Daet, ordered the fencing off of stalls which protruded into the sidewalks of Maharlika highway. The stalls
were recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer.

HELD: There is no grave coercion when the restraint was made under authority of law or in the lawful exercise of a right. Mayor Timoner
had the authority under the Civil Code to abate public nuisances. Also, he was merely implementing the orders of the municipal health
officer and was acting under the authority of a previous decision which declared one of the stalls as a public nuisance.

Lee vs. CA (1991)

Francis Lee, the branch manager of Pacific Banking Corporation, threatened to file charges against complainant de Chin, unless she
returned all the money equivalent to a forged Midland National Bank cheque which de Chin deposited in an account in the Pacific Bank.

HELD: To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind. De Chin was
pregnant, but she was also educated and familiar with banking procedures. She could not have been easily intimidated by Lee. Besides,
a threat to enforce ones claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent. Lees threat is not
improper because there is nothing unlawful about the threat to sue. Finally, there is a difference between performing an act reluctantly,
even against ones good sense and judgment versus performing an act with no consent at all, such as when a person acts against her will
or under a pressure cannot resist. In this case, de Chin consented to signing the withdrawal slips. She did so voluntarily, although
reluctantly. Hence, there is no coercion.

People vs. Alfeche, Jr. (1992)

Complaint for Usurpation of Real Rights in Property (Art312) in relation to Grave Coercion (Art286) was filed against accused where it was
alleged that he usurped the possession of the tenants from the land by threatening to kill them if the latter resisted. This was filed in the
RTC. RTC dismissed saying that the penalty under Art312 was below the jurisdictional amount of the RTC therefore it had no jurisdiction
on the assumption that the grave coercion was absorbed with the usurpation.

HELD: RTC had jurisdiction. Art312 defines a single, special and indivisible crime with a 2-tiered penalty. The principal one for the
usurpation with violence/ intimidation and an incremental penalty based on the value obtained in addition to the penalty incurred for the
acts of violence and intimidation.

When the usurpation is done with violence or intimidation (in the CAB, grave coercion), the accused must be prosecuted under Art312 for
usurpation and not for the acts of violence or intimidation under Art286 for grave coercion. But whenever appropriate, accused may be
held liable for the separate acts of violence or intimidation (e.g. grave coercion). This separate penalty is in addition to the fine based on
the gain obtained by him.

People v. Santos, 378 SCRA 157 (2002)

FACTS: Josephine gave a 1-year loan to Leonida but the latter was unable to timely pay the debt. For the next 4 years,
Josephine was unsuccessful in securing payment from Leonida as the latter stubbornly maintained her having already settled the account.
Josephine, Manny et. al., with the assistance of CIS agents, then brought Leonida to Baguio City from her house in Pangasinan, in order to
surrender her to the custody of Baguio City authorities where Josephine thought she could rightly seek redress. She was advised, however,
that it was in the province of Pangasinan, not Baguio City, where a case could be lodged. The trial court convicted Josephine on the
ground that the deprivation of Leonida of her liberty, regardless of its purpose and although lasting for less than twenty-four hours, was
sufficient to support the charge of kidnapping.

HELD: The circumstances that have surfaced warrant a conviction for grave coercion. Grave coercion is committed when a
person prevents another from doing something not prohibited by law or compelling him to do something against his will, whether it be
right or wrong, and without any authority of law, by means of violence, threats or intimidation. Its elements are First, that the

offender has prevented another from doing something not prohibited by law, or that he has compelled him to do something against his
will, be it right or wrong; second, that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such display of
force as would produce intimidation and control over the will of the offended party; and, third, that the offender who has restrained the
will and liberty of another did so without any right or authority of law. Where there is a variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information and that proved and the offense charged necessarily includes the lesser offense established in evidence, the
accused can be convicted of the offense proved.

People vs. Reyes (1934)

During a pabasa, the appellants started to construct a barbed wire fence in front of the chapel. The noise disrupted the ceremonies and
some of the participants even fled, fearing trouble. The appellants were convicted of Offending Religious Feelings under Art. 133.

HELD: The construction of a fence even though irritating and vexatious under the circumstances to those present is not such an act as
can be designated as notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful. The appellants act was innocent and was simply to protect
private property rights. The circumstances under which the fence was constructed late at night, vexing and annoying those who had
gathered indicate that the crime committed was only unjust vexation.

People vs. Anonuevo (1937)

Teodulo Anonuevo embraced and kissed Rosita Tabia and held her breasts while in church. He was convicted of abuse against chastity.

HELD: It is error to ascribe the conduct of appellant to lustful designs or purposes in the absence of clear proof as to his motive. The
religious atmosphere and the presence of many people belie the fact that he acted with lewd designs. He either performed a bravado (in
defiance of alleged threats of Rositas boyfriend) or wished merely to force Rosita to accept him as a lover. He is only guilty of unjust
vexation.

Ong Chiu Kwan v. CA, 345 SCRA 586 (2000)

Ong Chiu Kwan admitted having ordered the cutting of the electric, water and telephone lines of complainant's business
establishment because these lines crossed his property line. He failed, however, to show evidence that he had the necessary permits or
authorization to relocate the lines. Also, he timed the interruption of electric, water and telephone services during peak hours of the
operation of business of the complainant. Thus, petitioner's act unjustly annoyed or vexed the complainant. Consequently, petitioner Ong
Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust vexation.

Baleros v. People (2007)

The court wishes to stress that malice, compulsion or restraint need not be alleged in an Information for unjust vexation. Unjust
vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that the term is broad enough to include any human

conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person.

Napolis vs. CA

Facts: Nicanor Napolis, with several co-accused, entered the house of the Penaflor spouses by breaking a wall of a store, and forcing the
door of the house adjacent to the store open. Once inside, the accused used violence against the husband and initimidation against the
wife, enabling them to get away with P2557 in cash and goods. They were convicted of robbery by armed men in an inhabited place.

Held: The crime is considered a complex one under Art 48, where the penalty for the most serious offence in its max period should be
imposed. Otherwise, there will exist an absurd situation where the concurrence of a graver offence results in the reduction of the
penalty.

People vs. Biruar

There is no law or jurisprudence which requires the presentation of the thing stolen in order to prove that it had been taken away.

People vs. Salas

Salas was last seen with the victim at 3:00am. At 6:00, the victims body was found in a canal. Her purse, alleged to contain P2,000 and
jewelry were missing. No one witnessed the robbery, much less the killing. Is the crime committed homicide or robbery with homicide?

HELD: Robbery with Homicide. In this special complex crime against property, Homicide is incidental to the robbery, which is the main
purpose
of
the
criminal. The onus probandi is to establish: "(a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person;
(b) the property belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized with animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by
reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is used in the generic sense, was committed."
While there is indeed no direct proof that Virginia Talens was robbed at the time she was killed, we may conclude from four
circumstances that the robbery occasioned her killing: (1) Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake. (2) The appellant knew that
victim was winning. (3) The victim was last seen alive with appellant. (4) The victim's purse containing her money and earrings were
missing from her body when found.
These circumstances logically lead to the inescapable conclusion that appellant should be liable not just of simple homicide, but robbery
with homicide

People v. Del Rosario, 359 SCRA 166 (2001)

FACTS: Del Rosario stole six pieces of jewelry belonging to Paragua. He then pawned and sold the same. Also, on the
occasion of the said robbery, Del Rosario hit Paraguas niece, Racquel, with a hard object, strangled her and and tied the the latters neck
of with a Cat-V wire which resulted to her death shortly thereafter. Del Rsoario admitted in court that he needed money to marry his
common-law wife. The RTC convicted del Rosario of the crime of robbery with homicide. Del Rosario contends that it is essential to
prove the intent to rob and that the intent to rob must come first before the killing transpired.

HELD: Animus lucrandi or intent to gain, is an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender.
Although proof as to motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of the theft is circumstantial, the intent to gain or animus

lucrandi is the usual motive to be presumed from all furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another, unless special
circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. ". . . (T)he intent to gain may be presumed from the proven
unlawful taking." Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information where it is charged that there was unlawful
taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things subject of the robbery.
In this case, it was apparent that the reason why Del Rosario stole the jewelry of Paragua was because he intended to gain by
them. He had already admitted that he needed money to marry his common-law wife. The court also stated that if gaining through
unlawful means was farthest from the mind of the accused, why then did he pawn and sell the jewelry he had taken from Paragua
It is immaterial whether the killing transpired before or after the robbery. In the crime of robbery with homicide, the homicide
may precede robbery or may occur after robbery. What is essential is that there is a nexus, an intimate connection between robbery and
the killing whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former, or whether both crimes be committed at the same time.

People v. Reyes, 399 SCRA 528 (2003)

FACTS: Cergontes forcibly took the wristwatch of Solis while Reyes stabbed the latter at the back resulting to his death. The
victims gold necklace, one gold ring, all of an undetermined value, and a wallet containing unspecified amount of cash were also taken
from him. Reyes was found guilty of Robbery with Homicide. Appellant now contends that the animus lucrandi was not sufficiently
established as the taking of the watch could have been a mere afterthought and the real intent of the malefactors was to inflict injuries
upon the victim. Moreover, there was no evidence of ownership of the wristwatch, as it may have belonged to the two persons who
attacked the victim

HELD: The court held that appellants contention is devoid of merit. Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which
can be established through the overt acts of the offender. Although proof of motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of the
robbery is circumstantial, intent to gain or animus lucrandi may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to
another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. The intent to gain may be presumed from
the proven unlawful taking. In the case at bar, the act of taking the victim's wristwatch by one of the accused Cergontes while accusedappellant Reyes poked a knife behind him sufficiently gave rise to the presumption.
The detailed narration of how the victim was forcibly divested of the wristwatch by accused Cergontes and stabbed at the back
by accused-appellant cannot be taken lightly on the argument that the attackers owned the wristwatch and they attacked the victim
solely on their desire to retrieve it. In any event, in robbery by the taking of property through intimidation or violence, it is not necessary
that the person unlawfully divested of the personal property be the owner thereof. Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code employs the
phrase "belonging to another" and this has been interpreted to merely require that the property taken does not belong to the offender.
Actual possession of the property by the person dispossessed thereof suffices. In fact, it has been held that robbery may be committed
against a bailee or a person who himself has stolen it. So long as there is apoderamiento of personal property from another against the
latter's will through violence or intimidation, with animo de lucro, robbery is the offense imputable to the offender. If the victim is killed
on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the offense is converted into the composite crime of robbery with homicide.

People v. Suela, 373 SCRA 163 (2002)

FACTS: Brothers Edgar and Nerio Suela, and Edgardo Batocan sporting ski masks, bonnests and gloves, brandishing handguns and
knife barged into the room of Director Rosas who was watching television together with his adopted son, Norman and his friend Gabilo.
They threatened Rosas, Norman and Gabilo to give the location of their money and valuables, which they eventually took. They dragged
Gabilo downstairs with them. Upon Nerios instructions, Batocan stabbed Gabilo 5 times which caused the latters death. After the
incident, Edgar Suela demanded P20,000.00 from Rosas for an information regarding the robbery. The RTC found Edgar Suela guilty of
robbery for demanding P200,000 as payment for information on the robbery-slay case.

HELD: With respect to the charge of robbery for demanding P200,000 as payment for information on the robbery-slay case, the
Court held that Edgar Suela should be acquitted. The OSG explained: "Simple robbery is committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons as distinguished from the use of force upon things, but the extent of the violence or intimidation does not fall
under pars. 1 to 4 of Article 294 (Revised Penal Code) "Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove that appellant,
Edgar Suela employed force or intimidation on private complainant Rosas by instilling fear in his mind so as to compel the latter to cough
out the amount of P200,000.00. Instead, what was established was that he had agreed to give the P200,000.00 in exchange for

information regarding the identity and whereabouts of those who robbed him and killed his friend. There was no showing that appellant
Edgar Suela had exerted intimidation on him so as to leave him no choice but to give the money. Instead, what is clear was that the giving
of the money was done not out of fear but because it was a choice private complainant opted because he wanted to get the information
being offered to him for the consideration of P200,000.00. In fact, the money was delivered not due to fear but for the purpose of
possibly having a lead in solving the case and to possibly bring the culprit to justice (ibid.). As such, the elements of simple robbery have
not been established in the instant case, hence, appellant Edgar Suela should be acquitted of that charge." However, Edgar is still guilty
as principal of the complex crime of robber with homicide for robbing the house of Rosas and for Gabilo death.
Title Twelve
CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS

Chapter One. SIMULATION OF BIRTHS AND USURPATION OF CIVIL STATUS

Article 347. Simulation of births, substitution of one

child for another, and concealment or

abandonment of a legitimate child

Article 348. Usurpation of civil status

Chapter Two ILLEGAL MARRIAGES

Article 349. Bigamy

Article 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of
laws
Article 351. Premature marriages
Article 352. Performance of illegal marriage ceremony

Article 347. Simulation of births, substitution of one child for another, and concealment or
abandonment of a legitimate child.

Acts punishable:

1.
2.
3.

Simulation of births;
Substitution of one child for another;
Concealing or abandoning any legitimate child with intent to cause such child to lose its civil
status.
Elements:

a.
b.
c.

the child must be legitimate;

the offender conceals or abandons such child; and
the offender has the intent to cause such child to lose its civil status.

The object of the crime is the creation of false, or the causing of the loss of, civil status.
Example of simulation of birth: a woman pretends to be pregnant when in fact she is not,
and on the day of the supposed delivery, takes the child of another as her own.
The fact that the child will be benefited by the simulation of birth is not a defense
Example of substituting one child for another: A and B both gave birth on the same
day. The nurse in the hospital exchanges the children of A and B in the nursery.
Abandon leaving a child in a place where other people may find it, causing the child to lose
its status.
Example of concealing or abandoning: A mother who leaves her child at the door of an
orphanage.
A physician or surgeon or public officer, who cooperates in the execution of these crimes, is
also liable if he acts in violation of the duties of his profession or office.

People vs. Sangalang

The Sangalang spouses together with Gloria and Bienvenido were charged of the crime of simulation of birth. The information alleged
that a child was furnished by Gloria to the Sangalangs. Accused Bienvenido registered the birth of said child in the local civil registrar by
supplying to said office the necessary information required so that a birth certificate would be issued. He named the Sangalangs as the
childs parents. A birth certificate was hence issued. Information did not contain any specific allegation as to what the spouses did,
except that they had conspired with Gloria and Bienvenido.

HELD: In the crime of simulation of births, it must be shown that the pretending parents have registered or caused in the registration
of the child as their own with the Registry of Births, or that in doing so they were motivated by a desire to cause the loss of any trace as
to the childs true filiation to his prejudice.

In the instant case, SC found no evidence to sport the finding of TC that the registration was effected by the Sangalangs. As the evidence
would show, it was their daughter Alicia (not Bienvenido, but still not the spouses) who had a hand in the registration of the child).

Article 348. Usurpation of civil status

Committed when a person usurps the civil status of another, by assuming the filiation, or the
parental or conjugal rights of another.
The term civil status includes ones public station, or the rights, duties, capacities and
incapacities which determine a person to a given classs.
Usurpation of profession may be punished under this article.
There must be intent to enjoy the rights arising from the civil status of another, otherwise the
case will be considered only as using a fictitious name, or as estafa, depending on the facts of the case.
The purpose of defrauding the offended party or his heirs qualifies the crime.

Article 349. Bigamy

Elements:

1.
2.
3.
4.

Offender has been legally married;

The marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead by means of a judgment rendered in a proper proceedings,
according to the Civil Code;
He contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
The second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Nullity of the first marriage is not a defense in a bigamy charge. There must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before contracting the second marriage.
Causes which may produce the legal dissolution of the first marriage:
o
Death of one of the contracting parties
o
Judicial declaration annulling a void marriage
o
Judicial declaration annulling a voidable marriage
Defense has the burden of proof of dissolution of first marriage.
For the present spouse to contract a subsequent marriage, an absent spouse is presumed
dead if he has been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief
that he is already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death, an absence of only two
years will be sufficient. However, a declaration of presumptive death should first be obtained from the
courts.
The second marriage must have all the requisites for validity were it not for the existence of
the first marriage.
The second spouse is not necessarily liable for the bigamy. If the second husband or wife
knew of the first marriage, he/she is an accomplice in the crime of bigamy.
The witness who falsely vouched for the capacity of either of the contracting parties is also an
accomplice.
Bigamy is not a private crime. It is an offense against the State, not against the second wife.
A person convicted of bigamy may still be prosecuted for concubinage.

People vs. Aragon

Aragon contracted a 2nd marriage while the first marriage was still subsisting. Eventually the first wife died. He contracted a third
marriage. Aragon was charged of bigamy.

HELD: A subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse is illegal and void from its performance,
and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity as distinguished from mere annullable marriages. The second marriage is
void, hence the third marriage is valid.

Article 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws

Elements:

1.

Offender contracted marriage;

2.

He knew at the time that a.

b.

The requirements of the law were not complied with; or

The marriage was in disregard of a legal impediment.

If either of the contracting parties obtains the consent of the other by means of violence,
intimidation or fraud, the maximum period of the penalty shall be imposed.
The offender must not be guilty of bigamy, to be punishable under this article.

Lucio Morigo v People (2002)

FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates. After school year 1977-78 they lost contact with each other. In
1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of
letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in
Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to Lucio to join her in
Canada. Both agreed to get married. On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio
behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court for divorce which was granted on January 17, 1992. On October 4,
1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago. On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage in the RTC. On October 19, 1993, Lucio was charged with Bigamy and found guilty thereon.
HELD: The primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good
faith is valid. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1)

the offender has been legally married;

(2)

the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;

(3)

he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

(4)

the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.

aDcTHE

Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that the trial court found that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally
speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of
retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage
is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia
at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential
element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first
marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

Abunado v. People (2004)

FACTS: September 18, 1967 Salvador married Narcisa Arceo at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Pedro Tiangco. In 1988
Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines in 1992, Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with Fe
Corazon Plato. She also discovered that on January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage with a certain Zenaida Bias. An
annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa. A case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida.
Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955 before a municipal trial court judge in Concepcion,
Iloilo and has four children with her prior to their separation in 1966. It appeared however that there was no evidence of their 1955
marriage so he and Zenaida remarried on January 10, 1989, upon the request of their son for the purpose of complying with the
requirements for his commission in the military. The trial court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado of bigamy.

HELD: Abunado claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of marriage was a prejudicial question, hence,
the proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended during the pendency of the annulment case. Petitioner, in fact,

eventually obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on October 29, 1999. 15
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner's assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases
considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action
as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that. 17
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner's marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the determination of
petitioner's innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that
the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a
judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the
point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.

Diego v. Castillo (2004)

FACTS: On January 9, 1965, Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr. The couple were both Filipinos. In
the marriage contract, the accused used and adopted the name Crescencia Escoto, with a civil status of single. In a document dated
February 15, 1978, denominated as a Decree of Divorce purportedly issued by an American court, Crescencia de Perio was granted a
Divorce from Jorge. Subsequently, Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with Manuel P. Diego. The marriage contract shows that this
time, the accused used and adopted the name Lucena Escoto, again, with a civil status of single. Later, a case for bigamy was filed
against her by her brother in law.
After trial of the criminal case for bigamy, Judge Castillo promulgated a decision stating that the main basis for the
acquittal was good faith on the part of the accused. Judge Castillo gave credence to the defense of the accused that she acted
without any malicious intent. The evidence he averred gave accused Lucena Escoto sufficient grounds to believe that her previous
marriage had been validly dissolved by the divorce decree and that she was legally free to contract the second marriage with Manuel
P. Diego.

HELD: A careful study of the disputed decision reveals that respondent Judge had been less than circumspect in his study of
the law and jurisprudence applicable to the bigamy case. In his comment, respondent Judge stated: That the accused married
Manuel P. Diego in the honest belief that she was free to do so by virtue of the decree of divorce is a mistake of fact.
This Court, in People v. Bitdu, carefully distinguished between a mistake of fact, which could be a basis for the defense of
good faith in a bigamy case, from a mistake of law, which does not excuse a person, even a lay person, from liability. Bitdu held that
even if the accused, who had obtained a divorce under the Mohammedan custom, honestly believed that in contracting her second
marriage she was not committing any violation of the law, and that she had no criminal intent, the same does not justify her act. This
Court further stated therein that with respect to the contention that the accused acted in good faith in contracting the second
marriage, believing that she had been validly divorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to say that everyone is presumed to
know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the
consequences thereof.
Moreover, squarely applicable to the criminal case for bigamy, is People v. Schneckenburger, where it was held that the
accused who secured a foreign divorce, and later remarried in the Philippines, in the belief that the foreign divorce was valid, is
liable for bigamy.

Article 351. Premature marriages

Persons liable:

1.

A widow who is married within 301 days from the date of the death of her husband, or before having
delivered if she is pregnant at the time of his death;

2.

A woman who, her marriage having been annulled or dissolved, married before her delivery or before
the expiration of the period of 301 days after the date of the legal separation.

Reason behind the law: to prevent doubtful paternity, because the woman might have
conceived and become pregnant by her previous husband.
The period of 301 days may be disregarded if the first husband was impotent or sterile.

Article 352. Performance of illegal marriage ceremony

Priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony
The offender must be authorized to solemnize marriages. If the accused is not authorized, he
is liable under article 177 (usurpation of authority or official functions)
Offender is punished under the marriage law (there is such a law?!?).

Title Thirteen
CRIMES AGAINST HONOR

Chapter One. Libel

Section One. Definition, forms and punishment of this crime

Article 353. Libel
Article 354. Requirement for publicity
Article 355. Libel by means of writings or similar

means

Article356. Threatening to publish and offer to

present such publication for a compensation

Article 357. Prohibited publication of acts referred

to in the course of official proceedings

Article 358. Slander

Article 359. Slander by deed

Section Two. General Provisions

Article 360. Persons responsible
Article 361. Proof of the truth
Article 362. Libelous remarks

Chapter Two. Incriminatory Machinations

Article 363. Incriminating innocent persons
Article 364. Intriguing against honor

Article 353. Definition of Libel

A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstances tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a
natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

Elements:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

There must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status, or circumstance;
The imputation must be made publicly;
It must be malicious;
The imputation must be directed at a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead;
The imputation must tend to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person defamed.

There must be a defamatory imputation. The imputation may cover:

a.
b.
c.

crime allegedly committed by the offended party;

vice or defect, real or imaginary, of the offended party; or
any act or omission, condition, status of, or circumstance relating to the offended party.

Defamation is the proper term for libel as used in Art. 353.

Libel strictly is a defamation committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio,
phonograph . or any similar means.
When the defamation is oral, it is called slander.

Seditious libel is punished not in this chapter but in Art. 142 (Inciting to sedition).

Test of defamatory character of words used: A charged is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce
the hearers to suppose and understand that the person against whom they were uttered was guilty of certain
offenses, or are sufficient to impeach his honesty, virtue or reputation, or to hold him up to public ridicule.

The meaning of the writer is immaterial. It is not the intention of the writer or speaker, or the
understanding of the plaintiff or of any hearer or reader by which the actionable quality of the words is to be
determined, but the meaning that the words in fact conveyed on the minds of persons of reasonable
understanding, discretion and candor, taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances which were

known to the hearer or reader.

ELEMENT 1: IMPUTATION
Examples:
* Imputation of a vice imputing upon a person lascivious and immoral habits in an article
* Imputation of an act or omission X borrows money without intention to pay, she had her breasts
augmented without paying the doctor
* Imputation of condition, status or circumstance calling another a bastard or mangkukulam

ELEMENT 2: PUBLICATION
Publication is the communication of the defamatory matter to some third person or persons.
Hence, sending a latter in a sealed envelope through a messenger is not publication. But sending to the
wife, a letter defamatory of her husband, is sufficient publication. (The person defamed is the husband and
the wife is already considered a 3rd person)
If the defamatory imputation is not published there is NO crime. The law permits us to think as badly as we
please of our neighbors so long as we keep our uncharitable thought to ourselves.

ELEMENT 3: MALICE
Malice is used to indicate that the offender is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks merely to
injure the reputation of the person defamed.
Malice may be in-fact or in-law.
Malice in fact
- must be proved by a showing of ill-will, hatred or purpose to injure
Malice in law
- is presumed from a defamatory imputation proof of malice is not required

(The distinction exists for purposes of determining WON there is defamation where privileged
communication is involved thus:) As a general rule, malice in law is presumed from a defamatory imputation.
But where privileged communication is involved, malice (in law) is NOT presumed the plaintiff must prove
malice in fact. In either case, where malice in fact is present, justifiable motives cannot exist and the
imputations become actionable.

ELEMENT 4: IDENTIFICATION
It must be shown that at least a 3 rd person could identify the offended party as the object of the libelous
publication.

 But libel published in different parts may be taken together to establish the identification of the offended
party.

ELEMENT 5: DISHONOR, DISCREDIT, CONTEMPT

Dishonor disgrace, shame, ignominy
Discredit loss of credit or reputation; disesteem
Contempt state of being despised

There are as many offenses as there were persons defamed (PP vs. Del Rosario). When the alleged slanderous
utterances were committed on the same date and at the same place, but against two different persons, the
situation has given rise to two separate and individual causes for prosecution, with respect to each of the
persons defamed.

Mercado vs. CFI

Petitioner was charged with libel for imputing to Mrs. Virginia Mercado acts constituting enrichment thru corrupt practices. The offensive
telegram which contained the allegations was addressed to the Secretary of the, Department of Public Works and Communications
purportedly in line with President Marcos' appeal to the public to give information on undesirable employees in the government service to
achieve the objectives of the New Society. He filed an MTD on the ground of the telegram being privileged communication. After the
same was denied, a MTQ, alleging that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, was filed but when the same again met with a
denial, the present action was instituted to annul the aforesaid orders. Respondents, in their Comment, stressed there was absence of
any privilege, there being malice and bad faith, petitioner having been motivated by vengeance and ill-will in making the said
communication as established by his previous conduct viz a viz the private respondent: the filing of several complaints, both
administrative and criminal aimed to malign her good character and reputation which were subsequently dismissed or closed for lack of
merit and/or insufficiency of evidence.
HELD: Petition dismissed. Qualified privilege communication may be lost by proof of malice. The prosecution should be given the
opportunity of proving malice in view of petitioner's conduct towards private respondent which casts doubt on his good faith.

Agbayani vs. Sayo

Mahinan, manager of the Cagayan Valley Branch of the GSIS at Cauayan, Isabela, file at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya a complaint for
written defamation against 4 subordinates. The 4 accused filed a MTQ, contending that the CFI Nueva Vizcaya has no jurisdiction over the
case.

HELD: The proper venue of Mahinans criminal action against the petitioners is the CFI Isabela, since as GSIS branch manager, he was a
public officer stationed at Cauayan, Isabela and that alleged libel was committed when he was in the public service.

Newsweek vs. IAC

An article entitled An Island of Fear was published in Newsweek. The author wrote that that the island province of Negros Occidental is
a place dominated by big landowners who not only exploited the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane laborers, but also brutalized and
killed them with impunity. The sugarcane planters instituted a class action for libel.

HELD: To maintain a libel suit, a victim must be identifiable. Defamatory matter which does not reveal the identity of the person upon
whom the imputation is cast affords no ground of action unless it can be shown that the readers of the libel could have identified the
personality of the individual defamed. Defamatory remarks directed at a group of persons is not actionable unless the statements are allembracing or sufficiently specific for the victim to be identifiable.

Lacsa vs. IAC

Lacsa and Marquez were officers of the Philippine Columbian Association. Lacsa uncovered a glitch in the qualification of Marquez to be
president. He addressed a letter to Marquez in the ff. tenor: that Marquez should step down from the presidency, because the position is
open only for proprietary members and Marquez has failed to show any proof of his proprietary membership, that in view of these, he has
been holding the position in a de facto capacity. This letter was published in the publication of the association.

HELD: The test of libelous meanings is not the analysis of a sentence into component phrases with the meticulous care of the grammarian
or stylist, but the import conveyed by the entirety of the language to the ordinary reader. The SolGen is correct in holding that the
imputation of being called a de facto president is tantamount to being acknowledged as a pretender or impostor.

Soriano vs. IAC

Sorianos criminal liability was based on an article published in The Guardian, of which he is the editor. The basis of the article was a
press release prepared in Tacloban and delivered to various newspapers. The intended circulation of The Guardian is nationwide. The
libel case was docked at the RTC Letye. Soriano filed n MTQ on the basis of improper venue. He argues that the Leyte court had no
jurisdiction because the publication house of The Guardian was located in Quezon City and that Tantuico also holds office in QC.

HELD: Local jurisprudence follow the multiple publication rule that each and every publication of the same libel suit constitutes a
separate offense, and warrants a separate cause of action for filing a libel suit. However, the publication requirement set forth by RPC360
refers to the publication (the official circulating organ) and not the press release. In harmonizing RPC360 with the multiple
publication rule, the press release is not the document to be examined. Since the official publication is produced in QC and was not
proven to have been produced/copied in Leyte or elsewhere, the trial should have been handled by a QC court.

Bulletin vs. Noel

The article contained statements to the effect that American influence was a significant driver of the political ascendancy of the
Mindalanos of Lanao. Complainants claimed this was an insulting statement that damaged the social standing of the clan.

HELD: The published work alleged to contain the libelous excerpt must be examined and viewed as a whole. Titles of royalty and nobility
are not generally recognized or acknowledged socially in the national community. Personal hurt or embarrassment, even if real, is not

automatically equivalent to defamation. The law against defamation protects the interest of a person in acquiring, retaining, and
enjoying a reputation as good as ones character and conduct warrant in the community. It is the community standards, not personal or
family standards, that a court must refer in evaluation a publication claimed to be defamatory.

Santos vs. CA

The article published was a verbatim copy of a complained filed by Sandejas with the SEC against the brokerage firm of Carlos Sison.

HELD: The public article is but a faithful reproduction of a pleading filed before a quasi-judicial body. There are no embellishments, wild
imputations etc. calculated to damage the reputation of the offended parties and expose them to public contempt. No valid cause of
action to institute an action for libel exists.

Sazon vs. CA

HELD: When the imputation is already held defamatory, malice on the part of the defendant (malice-in-fact) need not be proved because
the law already presumes that the imputation is malicious (malice-in-law).

Defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or acts of public officers which are related to the discharge of their duties will not
constitute libel if the defendant proves that truth of the imputation (thus a form of privileged communication), but any attack on the
private capacities of a public officer clearly beyond the scope of his official duties may constitute libel.

Even if the article falls under the cloak of privileged communications, it will not discount the fact that he wrote the same with malice,
due to grudges an ill-will attendant in the circumstances surrounding the facts.

Vasquez vs. CA

HELD: If the defamatory statement is made against a public official with respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and
the truth of the allegation is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he doesnt prove that the imputation was
published with good motives and for justifiable ends. (Because, upon proof of truth, the burden of proving that the offender acted with
malice would be on the public officer)

Actual Malice Rule Even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public
official concerned proves that the statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not.

Navarette vs. CA

Petitioner claims that private respondent alluded to him when she said the words "stupid", "bastards", "swindlers", and "plunderers" while
testifying on the Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase subject of a civil case. In her Answer, private respondent cited decisions of the
Supreme Court to the effect that no action for libel or for damages may be founded on utterances made in the course of judicial
proceedings.
HELD: It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged.
This absolute privilege remains regardless of the defamatory tenor and the presence of malice if the same are relevant, pertinent or
material to the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry. Thus, the person making these statements such as a judge, lawyer or witness does
not thereby incur the risk of being found liable thereon in a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages.
The statements made during the course of judicial proceedings enjoy the shield of absolute privilege. The privilege is not intended so
much for the protection of those engaged in the public service and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of
public welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers and witnesses may speak their minds
freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for damages. In
determining the issue of relevancy of statements made in judicial proceedings, courts have adopted a liberal attitude by resolving all
doubts in favor of relevancy.
Without question, the use of blatantly defamatory language like "stupid", "bastards", "swindlers", and "plunderers" in describing the
adverse parties detract from the honor and dignity that befits a court proceeding and should have been stricken out of the records.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds that the terms used by the private respondent in her pleading and in her testimony cannot
be the basis for an award of moral damages and attorney's fees in favor of petitioner.

Jalandoni vs. Drilon

Respondents here were accused of printing libelous matter in newspapers. The matter pertained to actions by Jalandoni as member of
the PCGG alleged to be illegal and unauthorized (sold certain shares of a company at undervalued prices to RCBC thereby defrauding the
government). Justice secretary reversed the findings of prosecutors and dismissed the complaints.

HELD: Articles are not libelous. Articles merely stated insinuations on the deal between RCBC and Jalandoni as part of the PCGG. It just
served to inform the public of irregularities in the transaction. In libels against public officers, to be liable, libel must relate to official
conduct, even if the statement is false, unless officer proves that it was made with actual malice (with knowledge that it was false or
not).

Borjal vs. CA

Borjal wrote a series of articles in his column about a certain Edsa hero who is organizing conferences and seminars and soliciting money
in the name of the President and DOTC secretary without the latters consent and authority. Wenceslao filed a case for libel saying that
he felt alluded to in the articles as the organizer and that he was almost certain that it was him.

HELD: No libel. In libel, it is essential that the victim be identifiable even if not actually named. It is not sufficient that the victim
himself made the identification, but it is necessary that at least the victim be identifiable by a 3 rd person.

CAB, no sufficient identification. Victim was not named, there were many Edsa heroes and many organizers of the seminars. And even the
victim was not absolutely sure that it was him being alluded to.

Fortich vs. Galleron

Fortich is a salesman of San Miguel. His supervisor Galleron suspected him of misappropriating the collections he received retailers and
buyers, so an investigation was conducted on the matter. Galleron submitted an inter-office memorandum containing the results of his
investigation. The memo was addressed to the Regional Sales Manager and contained this paragraph:

In addition, I would like to further inform management that S/M Stanley Fortich is an avid mahjong player and a cockfighting enthusiast.
In spite of several advices, there seems to be no change in his lifestyle. Also, respondent had a similar case last September 11, 1978.

HELD: The controversial paragraph is not libelous. First, the memo was part and parcel of the investigation on Fortichs non-remittance
of collections.
Secondly, the memo was notcirculated or publicized, much less read by officers of the corporation other than those
involved in the investigation or those directly supervising the petitioner's work. More importantly, Fortich was unable to prove that the
issuance of the memo was motivated by malice.

While malice is presumed in every defamatory imputation, there are certain exceptions to this rule. The memo falls under the privileged
communication rule. A privileged communication is one made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has
an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty. In the case at bar, Galleron, being Fortichs supervisor, was charged with the duty to
carry out and enforce company rules and policies, including the duty to undertake initial investigation of possible irregularities in
customer accounts. The memo was an official act done in good faith, an honest innocent statement arising from a moral and legal
obligation which the private respondent certainly owed to the company in the performance of his duties.

Salcedo-Ortanez vs. CA

Rafael filed an action for annulment of his marriage to Teresita. Among the evidence presented by Rafael in the trial court were several
tape recordings of telephone conversations between Teresita and unidentified persons. The recordings were obtained when Rafael
allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone.

HELD: Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of
Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. Absent a clear showing that both
parties to the telephone conversations allowed to recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep.
Act No. 4200.

People v. Ogie Diaz (2007)

The last element of libel is that the victim is identified or identifiable from the contents of the libelous article. In order to maintain a
libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that the person be named. It is enough if by intrinsic
reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters of description or reference to facts and circumstances from
which others reading the article may know the person alluded to, or if the latter is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that
those knowing such person could and did understand that he was the person referred to. Kunkle v. Cablenews-American and Lyons laid
the rule that this requirement is complied with where a third person recognized or could identify the party vilified in the article.

Article 354. Requirement for Publicity

Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justiable
motice for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1.
2.

A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or
social duty;
A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the
exercise of their functions.

The two exceptions in Art. 354 are the so-called privileged communications. When privileged
communication is involved, malice in fact must be proved to convict the accused.

Illustration of Art. 354: A tells C that B is a thief. The fact is B is really is a thief, because he was previously
convicted of theft. Can it be presumed that the imputation by B is malicious? Yes, because Art. 354 says that
every defeamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious even if it be true.
But the presumption of malice is rebutted if A can show (1) good intention and (2) justifiable motive for
making the imputation.

Thus, if B is applying for a position of security guard in the store of C, brother of A, and the purpose of A is to
protect his brother from undesirable employees, then malice cannot be presumed.

Two kinds of privileged communication:

(1) Absolute
- not actionable, EVEN IF its author acted in bad faith

- this class includes statements made by members of Congress in the discharge of

their functions as such, allegations in pleadings made by parties or their counsel,
answers given by witnesses in reply to questions propounded to them (provided the
answers are responsive and the allegations are relevant)
- usually limited to legislative and judicial proceedings and other acts of state
(2) Conditional or qualified
- not actionable UNLESS made with malice or bad faith
- this class includes those communications mentioned as exceptions in Art. 354

RE: Par. 1 (Private communication made by any person to another)

Illustration: X files a complaint in good faith against a priest to his ecclesiastical superior allegedly for taking
indecent liberties of women private communication in the performance of a moral duty privileged!

Unnecessary publicity destroys good faith. So for example, if a copy of the complaint above is sent to a
newspaper for publication, the privilege is destroyed.

That the statement is a privileged communication is a matter of defense and, like all other matters of
defense, must be established by the accused.

Tapos, if the accused sets up privileged communication as a defense, to overcome it, the prosecutions
must prove that (1) the defendant acted with malice in fact (because the privileged only negates the
presumption of malice in law), or (2) there is no reasonable ground for believing the charge to be true.

Illustration of no reasonable ground for believing the charge to be true: X admitted that he had personally
made no investigation with reference to the truth of many of the statements made in the communication to
the Secretary of Justice, especially with reference to the statements based on rumors that a judge received a
bribe for dismissing a murder case.

RE: Par. 2 (Fair and true report of official proceedings)

Defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or acts of public officers which are related to the
discharge of their official duties will not constitute libel if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation.
The conduct of public officers which are related to the discharge of their official duties are matters of public
interest, and it is a defense to an action for libel or slander that the words complained of are a fair comment
on a matter of public interest.

What is a fair comment? If the comment is an expression of an opinion, based upon proven facts, then it is no
matter that the opinion happens to be mistaken so long as it might be reasonably inferred from the facts.
Comment may be fair, although wrong.

But any attack upon the private character of the public officer on matters which are not related to the
discharge of their official functions, may constitute libel. No one has the right to invade anothers privacy.

Rule on self-defense A person libeled is justified to hit back with another libel. But the defamatory
statements made by the accused must be a fair answer to the libel made by the offended party and must be
related to the imputation made. The answer should not be unnecessarily libelous.

Illustration: A to B, C & D: You pimp, women of ill repute, thieves, paramours of my husband. B to A: You
are a woman of the street, you smell bad, and your money was stolen from the PCAU + C to A You are

shameless, blackmailer, murderer + D to A You have a thick face, you are not legally married, you are the
paramour of Father Baluyut.

Held: To repel attack, the defendant may make an explanation of the imputation, and it is only where, if by
explaining, he must of necessity have to use scurrilous and slanderous remarks, that he may legally be
allowed to do so without placing himself under criminal prosecution. Here, B, C, Ds remarks were
unnecessarily scurrilous.

Article 355. Libel by Means of Writings or Similar Means

A libel may be committed by means of 1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Writing;
Printing;
Lithography;
Engraving;
Radio;
Photograph;
Painting;
Theatrical exhibition;
Cinematographic exhibition; or
Any similar means.

Defamation through amplifier is not libel, but oral defamation. The word radio should be considered in
relation to the terms with which it is associated all of which have a common characteristic, namely, their
permanent nature as a means of publication.
But defamation made in a TV program is libel. It easily qualifies under the general provision or any similar means.

Magno v. People (2006)

Sending an unsealed libelous letter to the offended party constitutes publication.

Buatis v. People (2006)

Facts: One lawyer sent another an insulting letter, in closing saying, Yours in Satans name.
Held: There is publication in this case. In libel, publication means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone
other than the person against whom it has been written. Petitioners subject letter-reply itself states that the same was copy
furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author of the libel
complained of has communicated it to a third person. Furthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbox, was open, not contained in
an envelope thus, open to public.

While Vaca case is for violation of B.P. 22, we find the reasons behind the imposition of fine instead of imprisonment applicable to
petitioners case of libel. We note that this is petitioners first offense of this nature. He never knew respondent prior to the demand
letter sent by the latter to Mrs. Quingco who then sought his assistance thereto. He appealed from the decision of the RTC and the CA in
his belief that he was merely exercising a civil or moral duty in writing the letter to private complainant. In fact, petitioner could have

applied for probation to evade prison term but he did not do so believing that he did not commit a crime thus, he appealed his case. We
believe that the State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of
destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other social ends. Consequently, we delete the
prison sentence imposed on petitioner and instead impose a fine of six thousand pesos.

This is not the first time that we removed the penalty of imprisonment and imposed a fine instead in the crime of libel. In Sazon v. Court
of Appeals, petitioner was convicted of libel and was meted a penalty of imprisonment and fine; and upon a petition filed with us, we
affirmed the findings of libel but changed the penalty imposed to a mere fine.

Article 356. Threatening to Publish and Offer to Prevent Such Publication for A Compensation

Acts punished
1.Threatening another to publish a libel concerning him, or his parents, spouse, child, or other members of his family;
2. Offering to prevent the publication of such libel for compensation or money consideration.

Blackmail - In its metaphorical sense, blackmail may be defined as any unlawful extortion of money by
threats of accusation or exposure. Two words are expressive of the crime - hush money.
In what felonies is blackmail possible? Blackmail is possible in (1) light threats under Article 283; and (2)
threatening to publish, or offering to prevent the publication of, a libel for compensation, under Article 356.

Article 357. Prohibited Publication of Acts Referred to in the Course of Official Proceedings

Elements
1.
2.
3.

Offender is a reporter, editor or manager of a newspaper, daily or magazine;

He publishes facts connected with the private life of another;
Such facts are offensive to the honor, virtue and reputation of said person.

The provisions of Art. 357 constitute the so-called Gag Law. Newspaper reports on cases pertaining to
adultery, divorce, issues about the legitimacy of children etc., will necessarily be barred from publication.
The prohibition applies even though said publication be made in connection with or under the pretext that it is necessary in the narration of any judicial
or administrative proceedings wherein such facts have been mentioned.

Illustration: A uttered defamatory remarks calling a priest a savage and that he had a concubine. While the
case was pending trial, a newspaper published the complaint verbatim including the defamatory expressions
of A.

RA1477 The publisher, editor, columnist or reporter of any periodical of general circulation cannot be
compelled to reveal the source of any news report or information appearing in said publication which was
related in confidence to such publisher etc. unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that
such revelation is demanded by the security of the State, without prejudice to the publishers etc. liability
under civil and criminal laws.

Article 358. Slander

Slander is oral defamation. There are tow kinds of oral defamation:

(1) Simple slander; and

(2) Grave slander, when it is of a serious and insulting nature.
Factors that determine the gravity of oral defamation:
1.
2.
3.

expressions used
personal relations of the accused and the offended party
circumstances surrounding the case

Illustration of grave slander: You sold the union. You swindled the money of the members and received bribe
money in the amount of P10K

Illustration of simple slander: An accusation that the offended party has been living successively and with
several men uttered before several persons, when intended to correct an improper conduct of the offended
party, a kin of the accused, is only simple slander.
The slander need not be heard by the offended party, because a mans reputation is the estimate in which
other hold him, not the good opinion which he has of himself.

People vs. Pelayo

Pelayo told Clapano (councilor), within the hearing of three people, that in one of his investigations on illegal gambling, an operator, Lim
Peng, told him Almendras (governor) received P500 from said operator as protection money. The following day, Pelayo delivered a
privileged speech in the City Councils session where it could be inferred that he was referring to Almendras as a tong collector.

HELD: Facts of the case do NOT constitute intriguing against honor where the source of the derogatory information cannot be determined
and defendant borrows the same without subscribing to the truth thereof, passes it to others. The information allegedly came from a
definite source (Lim Peng) which he adopted as his, passed it to another for the purpose of causing dishonor to the others reputation.
The act is slander (light oral defamation).

Victorio vs. CA

Father and son Victorio were overheard by people to have uttered defamatory words against Atty. Ruiz after a hearing where Atty. Ruiz
moved for contempt of the counsel of Victorio. They were found guilty of Grave Oral Defamation.

HELD: Oral defamation or slander has been defined as the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his
reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood. The special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between
offended and offender, which might tend to prove intention of offender at the time, aside from the sense and grammatical meaning of
the defamatory words are considered as guidelines in determining whether the offense is serious or slight.

Attributing to a prominent lawyer a crime (estafa) is a serious and insulting imputation that strikes deep into the character of the victim.
No special circumstance need be shown for defamatory words to be considered grave oral defamation.

That defamatory words were uttered in the heat of anger cannot lie where there was no reason or lawful cause to be angry against Ruiz
who was merely performing his duties aw a lawyer in defense of client, and no provocation.

People vs. Orcullo

Judge Orcullo dismissed the case for oral defamation against Peralta (she imputed adultery and prostitution against Flores) on the ground
that it was a private crime to be instituted by the offended party. SC reinstated case for trial.

HELD: The words said by Peralta are indubitably imputation of the crime of prostitution, which can be prosecuted de oficio and not
adultery. Connotation of hostess is notoriously referred to prostitutes. Only when derogatory remarks clearly and categorically reflect the
elements constituting adultery would the complainant for libel by the offended party be necessary to commence prosecution

Villanueva v. People (2006)

The Court does not condone the vilification or use of scurrilous language on the part of petitioner, but following the rule that all possible
circumstances favorable to the accused must be taken in his favor, it is our considered view that the slander committed by petitioner can
be characterized as slight slander following the doctrine that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation
on the part of the offended party, constitutes only a light felony.

Figeroa v. People (2006)

While it is true that a publication's libelous nature depends on its scope, spirit and motive taken in their entirety, the article in question
as a whole explicitly makes mention of private complainant Rivera all throughout. It cannot be said that the article was a mere general
commentary on the alleged existing state of affairs at the aforementioned public market because Rivera was not only specifically pointed
out several times therein but was even tagged with derogatory names. Indubitably, this name-calling was, as correctly found by the two
courts below, directed at the very person of Rivera himself.

Article 359. Slander by Deed

Elements
1.
2.
3.

Offender performs any act not included in any other crime against honor;
Such act is performed in the presence of other person or persons;
Such act casts dishonor, discredit or contempt upon the offended party.

Slander by deed refers to performance of an act, not use of words.

Two kinds of slander by deed

1.
2.

Simple slander by deed; and

Grave slander by deed, that is, which is of a serious nature.

What is slander by deed? It is a crime against honor which is committed by performing an act which casts dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another
person.

Illustrations: slapping the face of another if the intention is to cause shame and humiliation, fighting another
with intention to humiliate him

vs. Acts of lasciviousness

Kissing a girl in public and touching her breasts without lewd designs, committed by a rejected suitor to cast
dishonor on the girl is slander by deed NOT acts of lasciviousness.

vs. Maltreatment
The nature and effects of the maltreatment determine the crime committed. If the offended party suffered
from shame or humiliation caused by the maltreatment, it is slander by deed.

Unjust vexationSlander by deedActs of lasciviousnessIrritation or annoyance+ With publicity and dishonor or

contempt+ presence of the circumstances provided for in RPC 335 on rape (force or intimidation, unconscious etc.)
together with lewd designs

People vs. Motita

Motita used a mirror to view reflection of private parts of Letada. Crowd nearby were laughing with their eyes directed towards her.

HELD: Crime committed was slander by deed.

Unjust vexation is committed when the offenders act caused annoyance, irritation, vexation, torment, distress or disturbance to the
mind of the person to whom it is directed. If there was attendant publicity and dishonor or contempt in addition to the irrigation or
annoyance, offense would be slander by deed as in this case. If any of the circumstances provided for rape together with lewd designs
were present in addition to the annoyance, the offense would be act of lasciviousness.

Article 360. Persons responsible

The persons responsible for libel are:

1.
2.
3.
4.

The person who publishes, exhibits or causes the publication or exhibition of any defamation in
writing or similar means;
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet;
The editor or business manager of a daily newspaper magazine or serial publication;
The owner of a printing plant which publishes a libelous article with his consent and all other persons
who in any way participate in or have connection with its publication.

Venue of criminal and civil actions for damages in cases of written defamations (In case one of the offended
parties is a private individual)

1.
2.

Where the libelous article is printed and first published; or

Where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.

Where one of the offended parties is a public officer, the action shall be filed in the CFI (1) of the province
or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense OR (2) where the libelous article is
printed and first published.

The civil action shall be filed in the same cdourt where the criminal action is filed and vice versa.

The court where the criminal action or civil action for damages is 1 st filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the
exclusion of other courts.

If the defamation consists in the imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio (adultery,
concubinage, seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness), then the offended party must a complaint.

RE: DAMAGES recoverable

Actual damages need not be proved, at least (1) where the publication is libelous per se or (2) when the
amount of the award is more or less nominal, because libel, by its nature, causes injury to the reputation of
the offended party.

 There is no remedy for damages for slander or libel in case of absolutely privileged communication.

Article 361. Proof of the truth

In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the court and if it appears that
the matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with good motives and for
justifiable ends, the defendant shall be acquitted.

Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not be admitted, unless
the imputation shall have been made against the Government employees with respect to facts related to the
discharge of their duties.

In such cases, if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he shall be acquitted.

Proof of truth is admissible in any of the following:

1.
2.

When the act or omission imputed constitutes a crime regardless of whether the offended party is a
private individual or a public officer;
When the offended party is a Government employee, even if the act or omission imputed doesnt
constitute a crime, provided, it is related to the discharge of his official duties.

Illustration: A said that B, a govt official, was in the habit of drinking during office hours and that he was
always in a boisterous condition. Is proof of truth allowed in case B should file a complaint against A for
defamation? Yes. Both public interest and the good of the service demand that a drunkard be barred from the
service. But when the imputation involves the private life of B which is not related to the discharge of his
official duties, the offender cannot prove the truth thereof.

Another illustration: A made several imputations against C, a private individual, some of which insinuated the
commission of crimes and some did not. Is proof of truth allowed? It depends. The defendant will be allowed
to prove the truth of the imputations constituting crimes but he will not be allowed to prove the truth of the
imputations not constituting crimes.

DEFENSE in defamation, requisities:

1.
2.
3.

Truth
Matter was published with good motives
For justifiable ends

Retraction may mitigate damages. But in order to have the desired effect, the retraction should contain an
admission of the falsity of the libelous publication and evince a strong desire to repair the wrong occasioned
thereby.

Article 362. Libelous remarks

Libelous remarks or comments connected with the matter privileged under the provisions of Article 354, if
made with malice, shall not exempt the author thereof nor the editor or managing editor of a newspaper from
criminal liability.

Thus, the author of a publication who distorts or discolors official proceedings reported by him, or adds
comments thereon to cast aspersion on the character of the parties concerned, is guilty of libel,
notwithstanding that the defamatory matter is published in connection with a privileged matter.

Article 363. Incriminating Innocent Persons

Elements
1.
2.
3.

Offender performs an act;

By such an act, he incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime;
Such act does not constitute perjury.

This article is limited to planting evidence and the like, which do not in themselves constitute false
prosecutions but tend directly to cause false prosecution.

Incriminating an innocent personPerjury by making false accusationCommitted by performing an act by which the
offender directly incriminates anotherThe gravamen is the imputation itself, falsely made before an officerLimited to the act
of planting evidenceGiving of false statement under oath or making a false affidavit, imputing to another the commission of
a crime
Incriminatory machinationsDefamationOffender doesnt avail himself of written or spoken words in besmirching the
victims reputationWords, written or spoken, are availed ofNot requiredImputation must be public and malicious & must be
calculated to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the aggrieved party

People vs. Alagao

Is there a complex crime of incriminating an innocent person through unlawful arrest?

HELD: Yes. The two acts imputed to the accused closely followed each other, the unlawful arrest being a necessary means
to plant the incriminatory evidence. Under the circumstances of the case, the accused had to arrest M because it was the
only way that they could with facility detain him, search his person or effects and, commingle therewith the marked peso
bill. A complex crime was committed.

Huggland vs. Lantin

Judge Lantin was arrested for bribery for allegedly having received marked money amounting to P5,000 from one Magdalena Huggland
who was implicated in a criminal case. The P5,000 was allegedly part of the P25,000 being asked by Judge Lantin for the cancellation of
the hold departure order issued against Ms. Huggland. The issue is whether this is case of entrapment or planting of evidence.
HELD: This is a case of entrapment. Let us distinguish entrapment from planting of evidence. In entrapment, the criminal intent or
design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused and the law enforcement officials merely facilitate the
commission of the offense, the accused cannot justify his conduct. Planting of evidence or incriminating innocent person is committed
by performing an act by which the offender directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime.
From the testimonial and documentary evidence submitted by the parties, there is reason to believe that indeed, this is a case of
entrapment not planting of evidence. The conclusion is based on the following:
(1) The subpoena was illegally issued;
(2) The Motion to Quash Hold Departure Order and the Order of Cancellation of the Hold Departure Order were prepared and typewritten
by the respondent; and
(3) The Money used in the entrapment operation was recovered from one of the left drawers of the respondent's table.

Article 364. Intriguing against Honor

This crime is committed by any person who shall make any intrigue which has for its principal purpose to
blemish the honor or reputation of another person.

Incriminating an innocent personIntriguing against HonorOffender performs an act by which he directly

incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crimeOffender resorts to an intrigue for the purpose of
blemishing the honor or reputation of another person
DefamationIntriguing against HonorDone by availing directly of spoken words
ex., gossipingCommitted by means which consists of some tricky and secret plot
SlanderIntriguing against HonorThe source of the info can be pinpointed and the defendant, adopting as his own the
information he has obtained, passes the same to another for the purpose of causing dishonor to complainants
reputationThe source or the author of the derogatory info cannot be determined and the defendant borrows the same,
and without subscribing to the truth thereof, passes it to others
REPUBLIC ACT No. 4200
AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY OF
COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
It shall be unlawful:
a)

b)

c)

for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone
or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described;
for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, (1) to
knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof , of any
communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner
prohibited by this law; or (2) to replay the same for any other person or persons; or (3) to communicate the
contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or (4) to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial,
to any other person. Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil,
criminal investigation or trial of offenses, shall not be covered by this prohibition;
for any person who willfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the acts
declared to be unlawful or who violates the provisions of the following section or of any order issued thereunder ,
or aids, permits, or causes such violation.

It is not unlawful:
a)

for any peace officer, who is authorized by a written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be
unlawful in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy,
mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition,
conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and
violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against national security:
Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the
examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a
showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has
been committed or is being committed or is about to be committed: Provided, however, That in cases involving
the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to
commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or
acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution
of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for
obtaining such evidence.

Effect of violation of the law: Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in
violation of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.

Gaanan vs. IAC

Atty. Pinto filed a complaint for direct assault against Atty. Laconico. Pintor, through phone, offered to withdraw the complaint for
consideration. Atty. Gaanan was able to overhear this conversation through a telephone extension. Pinto was arrested for extortion. But
Gaanan and Laconico were charged with violation of RA4200 and found guilty by the lower court.

HELD: The phrase any other device or arrangement in the Ant-Wiretapping Law doesnt cover an extension line. The law refers to a tap
of a wire or cable or the use of a device or arrangement for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording the
communication. There must be the physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in
order to overhear, intercept or record the spoken words. The extension here was not installed for the purpose but for ordinary office use.
Also, an extension phone is an instrument which is very common, not what the law refers to in which the presence of such devices cannot
be presumed by the party being overheard.

Ramirez vs. CA

Ramirez field a civil case for damages against Garcia. IN support of her claim, she produced a verbatim transcript of the confrontation
with Garcia where the latter allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her. The transcription on which the civil case was based was culled
from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. As a result of the recording, Garcia filed a criminal case against Ramirez
for violation of RA 4200.

HELD: The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication. The statutes intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier any. Consequently, as respondent CA correctly concluded, even a person privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under
the provisions of RA4200. The lawmakers contemplated to make illegal unauthorized taped recording of private conversation or
communication taken by either of the parties themselves of by third persons. The nature of the conversation is immaterial for conviction
of the crime and communication as used includes conversation.
Title Fourteen
QUASI OFFENSES

Sole Chapter. CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE

Article 365. Imprudence and negligence

Article 365. Imprudence and negligence

Quasi-offenses punished:

1.

Committing through reckless imprudence any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave
or less grave felony or light felony;

2.

Committing through simple imprudence or negligence an act which would otherwise constitute a grave or
a less serious felony;

3.

Causing damage to the property of another through reckless imprudence or simple imprudence or
negligence;

4.

Causing through simple imprudence or negligence some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have
constituted a light felony.

Imprudence or negligence is not a crime in itself; it is simply a way of committing a crime.

In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalised
is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care, or foresight.
A negligent act causing damage may produce civil liability arising from crime or create an action for
quasi-delict under the Civil Code. The injured party may choose which remedy to enforce. He cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Imprudence indicates a deficiency of action; negligence indicates a deficiency of perception.
Reckless imprudence = consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree
of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.
Simple imprudence = consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
Elements of reckless imprudence:
1) that the offender does or failes to do an act
2) that the doing of or the failure to do that act is voluntary
3) that it be without malice
4) that material damage results
5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration
a) his employment or occupation
b) degree of intelligence, physical condition, and
c) other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
TEST OF NEGLIGENCE: would a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of
the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from
that course or to take precaution against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so
constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born
of this provision, is the constitutive fact in negligence.
Criminal negligence presupposes lack of intention to commit the wrong done, but that it came about due
to imprudence on the part of the offender.
There must be injury to person or damage to property as a consequence of reckless or simple
imprudence.

Elements of simple imprudence:

1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender
2) that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest.
The essence of a negligent act is that it be in every case voluntary.
The measure of the damage should be the difference in value of the property immediately before the
incident and immediately after the repair.
Art 64 relative to mitigating and aggravating circumstances is not applicable to crimes committed thru
negligence.
Contributory negligence is not a defence; it only mitigates criminal liability.
Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of 2 or more persons, although acting
independently of each other are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a 3rd
person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is
responsible for the whole injury (ie SOLIDARY LIABILITY), even though his act alone might not
have caused the entire injury.
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the
action if it be shown that the accused might, by the exercise of reaonable care and prudence, have
avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party.
Emergency Doctrine a person who is confronted with a sudden emergency may be left no time for
thought, must make speedy decision based largely upon impulse or instinct, and cannot be held to the
same conduct as one who has had an opportunity to reflect, even though it later appears that he made
the wrong decision. However, this doctrine is applicable only where the situation which arises to confront
the actor is sudden and unexpected, and is such as to deprive him of all opportunity for deliberation.
The violation of a statute which imposes a specific requirement to omit or to do a definite act
is negligence per se.
The failure to render assistance constitutes a qualifying circumstance.

People vs. Cano

Facts: Cano was charged of the crime of damage to property with multiple physical injuries thru reckless imprudence for causing to the
bus driven by him to hit and bump a Phil Rabbit Bus producing damage to the said bus and injuries to the passengers. Prosecution
appealed from order of lower court in quashing the information based on the theory that offence of injuries thru reckless imprudence
cannot be complexed with that of damage to property.
Held: SC set aside the order. The information does not purport to complex the offence of slight physical injuries with reckless
negligence with that of damage to property and serious and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. Negligence is a quasioffence. What is punished is not the effect of the negligence but the recklessness of the accused. For convenience to the
administration of justice in general and to the accused in particular, the prosecution should not split the action against him in several
information for it would require the presentation of substantially the same evidence.

Ibabao vs. People

The proviso in Art 365 that the provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable refers to the preceding paragraphs thereof.
Par 1 & 2 are exceptions to the application of the said preceding paragraphs under the circumstances mentioned. The last par on failure
to lend aid on the spot necessarily applies to all situations envisioned in the said article whenever there is an injured party. It is a
qualifying circumstance (because its presence raises the penalty by 1 degree) that must be alleged in the information to apprise the
defendant of this charge.

Buerano vs. CA
The law penalises the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offence. And as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result

should affect 1 person or several persons, the offence remains 1 and the same, and cannot be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.

Gan vs. CA

The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property
of another is: would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as
a reasonable consequence of the course about to e pursued? The law imposes the duty on the doer to take precaution against its
mischievous results and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required
to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence unless the
emergency is brought about by own negligence (EMERGENCY RULE).

Carillo vs. People

Kid dies 3 days after her operation. Doctors found guilty of criminal negligence. SC held
that doctors should exercise a higher degree of care in view of the vulnerable
condition of the child. The gravamen of offence of simple negligence is the
failure to exercise the diligence necessitated or called for by the situation which
is not immediately life-destructive but resulted still in the death of the patient. It
is the mere lack of prevision in a situation where either the threatened harm is
not immediate or the danger not openly visible.

Reodica vs. CA
(Very long blurb, but I dont know how else to put it. Enlightening naman. )
Reodica was convicted by the RTC of the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical
injuries. She was sentenced to arresto mayor (6 months) and to pay the complainant P13K. Assailed is the penalty imposed by the lower
court.
HELD: According to the par. 1 of Art. 365, the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, a light felony, is
arresto menor in its maximum period, with a duration of 21 to 30 days. If the offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed
deliberately or with malice, it is penalized with arresto menor under Art. 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30
days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may be either lower than or equal to the penalty prescribed under the first paragraph of
Art. 365. This being the case, the exception in the par. 6 of Art. 365 applies. Hence, the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting
in slight physical injuries is public censure, this being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor.
As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, par. 3 of Art. 365, which provides for the penalty
of fine, does NOT apply since the reckless imprudence in this case did not result in damage to property only. What applies is the par. 1 of
Art. 365, which provides for arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods (1 month and 1 day to 4 months) for an act committed
through reckless imprudence which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony. Note that if the damage to the
extent of P8,542.00 were caused deliberately, the crime would have been malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code,
and the penalty would then be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months which is higher than
that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365). If the penalty under Art. 329 were equal to or lower than that provided for in the
par. 1, then par. 6 of Art. 365 would apply, i.e., the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in its maximum period to
arresto mayor in its minimum period or imprisonment from 21 days to 2 months. Accordingly, the imposable penalty for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods,
which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a maximum of 4 months, at the discretion of the court, since the par.
5 of Art. 365 provides that in the imposition of the penalties therein provided "the courts shall exercise their sound discretion without
regard to the rules prescribed in article 64."

Since public censure is classified under Art. 25 of the Code as a light penalty, it follows that the offense of reckless imprudence resulting
in slight physical injuries is a light felony. On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlier
discussed, penalized with arresto mayor (a correccional penalty), thus the quasi offense in question is a less grave felony.
Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony, should Article 48 of the Revised Code on complex crimes be
applied? No.
Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed.
However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio, this Court declared that where one of the resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light
felony, there is no complex crime. Applying Art. 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex crime. The resulting
offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony may be absorbed by the grave felony.
Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries
should have been charged in a separate information because it is NOT covered by Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner
may no longer question, at this stage, the duplicitous character of the information. This defect was deemed waived by her failure to raise
it in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the information.
However, the case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC Makati. At the time the information was filed, the
MTC had jurisdiction over crimes punishable by censure (RIRI slight physical injuries) and over crimes where the imposable penalty
therefor was arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods the duration of which was from 1 month and 1 day to 4 months (RIRI
damage to property).

Manzanares v. People (2006)

Finally, as to petitioners argument that Jesus Basallo (Victim; deceased) should be presumed negligent because he was driving with an
expired license and the passenger jeepney owned by his brother Teodorico did not have a franchise to operate, we hold that the same
fails to convince. The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence,
since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence.

R.A. 8750
Seat Belts Use Act of 1999

What is a seat belt device?

Seat belt device shall refer to any strap, webbing or similar device in the form of pelvic restraint or lap belt, upper
torso restraint or shoulder strap or a combination thereof designed to secure a person in a motor vehicle in order to
mitigate the results of any accident, including all necessary buckles and other fasteners, and all hardware designed for
installing such seat belt device in a motor vehicle. (3)

Requirements under the law

1.

The driver and front seat passengers of a public or private motor vehicle are required to wear or use their seat
belt devices while inside a vehicle of running engine on any road or thoroughfare

For private vehicles, except for jeeps, jeepneys, vans, buses and such other private vehicles as may be determined in
IRR, front and back seat passengers are likewise required to use their seat belt devices at all times. (4)

NOTE: Motor vehicles shall not include the tricycle and the motorcycle.

"Private motor vehicle" shall refer to any of the following:

Any motor vehicle owned by individuals and juridical persons for private use;
Any motor vehicle owned by the National Government or any of its agencies, instrumentalities or political
subdivisions, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries for official use; and
Any diplomatic vehicle.

"Public motor vehicle" shall refer to public utility vehicle or vehicle for hire.

"Front seat passengers" shall refer to:

persons on board a public utility vehicle seated at the right side beside the driver for public utility jeepneys
(PUJs)
passengers seated at the right side beside the driver and those at the first row immediately behind the driver
in the case of public utility buses (PUBs)
passengers seated on the right side beside the driver for private motor vehicles.

2.

In the case of public motor vehicles, the driver shall be required to immediately inform and require the front seat
passengers upon boarding a vehicle of running engine to wear the prescribed seat belts. Any passenger who refuses to
wear seat belts shall not be allowed to continue his/her trip. (4)

3.

For special public service vehicles such as school services and other similar vehicles as may be determined by the
IRR, seat belt devices should be provided and used by both drivers and front seat passengers and the first row
passengers immediately behind the driver at all times while inside a vehicle of running engine. (4)

4.

Operational motor vehicles, both public and private, which are not equipped with the required seat belt devices, are
given one (1) year from the issuance of the IRR by the Land Transportation Office (LTO) to retrofit appropriate seat belt
devices in their vehicles. (4)

5.

Infants and/or children with ages six (6) years and below shall be prohibited to sit in the front seat of any running
motor vehicle. (5)

6.

Car manufacturers, assemblers and distributors should ensure that seat belt devices are properly installed before the
distribution and sale of the said vehicles as determined by the IRR. The type of devices required should be in
accordance with the standards set by the DTI and the DOTC (see IRR).

Manufacturers, assemblers and distributors of jeepneys may install a pelvic restraint or lap belt only in the
driver's and front seat passengers' seats and this shall be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements
of this law. (7)

NOTE: Registration of motor vehicles covered by this law shall not be allowed unless the seat belt devices are properly
installed. (10)

Acts punishable (8)

1.

(on the importer) Importation or causing the importation of any vehicle without appropriate and operational seat belt
devices as required.

2.

(on the driver)

a.
b.

failure to wear the prescribed seat belt devices and/or failure to require his passengers to wear the prescribed seat
belt device
for public utility vehicles, failure to post appropriate signages instructing front seat passengers to wear seat belts
when inside the vehicle. (operator also liable in this case)

(On any manufacturer, assembler, importer and distributor) For distributing to the pubilc vehicles without seat belt devices
installed
RA 4136
Traffic Rules, Chapter 4

**Lengthy and technical rules on right of way, turning, overtaking, speed limit, etc. which cannot be
summarized without sacrificing substance.

CHAPTER IV. - TRAFFIC RULES

ARTICLE I. - Speed Limit and Keeping to the Right

Sec. 35.Restriction as to speed. - (a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful
and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the
highway, and of any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway
at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to
bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.
(b)
Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the rate of speed of any motor vehicle shall not exceed the
following:

MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE SPEEDS

Passenger Cars and Motorcycle

Motor trucks and buses

On open country roads, with no "blinds corners" not closely bordered by habitations.
80 km. per hour
50 km. per hour

On "through streets" or boulevards, clear of traffic, with no "blind corners," when so designated.

40 km per hour
30 km per hour

On city and municipal streets, with light traffic, when not designated "through streets".
30 km per hour
30 km per hour

Through crowded streets, approaching intersections at "blind corners," passing school zones, passing other vehicles which
are stationery, or for
similar dangerous circumstances.
20 km per hour
20 km per hour

(c)

The rates of speed hereinabove prescribed shall not apply to the following:

(1)

A physician or his driver when the former responds to emergency calls;

(2)

The driver of a hospital ambulance on the way to and from the place of accident or other emergency;

(3)
place;

Any driver bringing a wounded or sick person for emergency treatment to a hospital, clinic, or any other similar

(4)
The driver of a motor vehicle belonging to the Armed Forces while in use for official purposes in times of riot,
insurrection or invasion;
(5)

The driver of a vehicle, when he or his passengers are in pursuit of a criminal;

(6)

A law-enforcement officer who is trying to overtake a violator of traffic laws; and

(7)
The driver officially operating a motor vehicle of any fire department, provided that exemption shall not be
construed to allow unless or unnecessary fast driving of drivers afore-mentioned.

Sec. 36.Speed limits uniform throughout the Philippines. - No provincial, city or municipal authority shall enact or
enforce any ordinance or resolution specifying maximum allowable speeds other than those provided in this Act.

Sec. 37.Driving on right side of highway. - Unless a different course of action is required in the interest of the safety
and the security of life, person or property, or because of unreasonable difficulty of operation in compliance herewith, every
person operating a motor vehicle or an animal-drawn vehicle on a highway shall pass to the right when meeting persons or
vehicles coming toward him, and to the left when overtaking persons or vehicles going the same direction, and when
turning to the left in going from one highway to another, every vehicle shall be conducted to the right of the center of the
intersection of the highway.

Sec. 38.Classification of highways. - Public highways shall be properly classified for traffic purposes by the provincial
board, municipal board or city council having jurisdiction over them, and said provincial board, municipal board or city
council shall provide appropriate signs therefor, subject to the approval of the Commissioner. It shall be the duty of every
provincial, city and municipal secretary to certify to the Commissioner the names, locations, and limits of all "through
streets" designated as such by the provincial board, municipal board or council.

ARTICLE II. - Overtaking and Passing a Vehicle, and

Turning at Intersections

Sec. 39.Overtaking a vehicle. - The driver of any motor vehicle overtaking another vehicle proceeding in the same
direction shall pass at a safe distance to the left thereof, and shall not again drive to the right side of the highway until
safety clear of such overtaken vehicle except that on a highway, within a business or residential district, having two or
more lanes for the movement of traffic in one direction, the driver of a vehicle may overtake and pass another vehicle on
the right. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a driver overtaking and passing, upon the right, another
vehicle which is making or about to make a left turn.

Sec. 40.Driver to give way to overtaking vehicle. - The driver of a vehicle about to be overtaken and passed by
another vehicle approaching from the rear shall give way to the overtaking vehicle on suitable and audible signal being
given by the driver of the overtaking vehicle, and shall not increase the speed of his vehicle until completely passed by the
overtaking vehicle.

Sec. 41.Restrictions on overtaking and passing. (a)

The driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the center line of a highway in overtaking or passing
another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, unless such left side is clearly visible, and is free of oncoming traffic for a
sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be made in safety.
(b)
The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, when
approaching the crest of a grade, not upon a curve in the highway, where the driver's view along the highway is obstructed
within a distance of five hundred feet ahead, except on a highway having two or more lanes for movement of traffic in one
direction where the driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass another vehicle: Provided, That on a highway within a business
or residential district, having two or more lanes for movement of traffic in one direction, the driver of a vehicle may
overtake or pass another vehicle on the right.
(c)
The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass any other vehicle proceeding in the same direction, at any
railway grade crossing, not at any intersection of highways unless such intersection or crossing is controlled by traffic
signal, or unless permitted to do so by a watchman or a peace officer, except on a highway having two or more lanes for
movement of traffic in one direction where the driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass another vehicle on the right.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a driver overtaking or passing upon the right another vehicle which is
making or about to make a left turn.
(d)
The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass, or attempt to pass, any other vehicle, proceeding in the same
direction, between any points indicated by the placing of official temporary warning or caution signs indicating that men
are working on the highway.
(e)
The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass, or attempt to overtake or pass, any other vehicle proceeding in
the same direction in any "no-passing or overtaking zone."
ARTICLE III. - Right of Way and Signals
Sec. 42. Right of way. - (a) When two vehicles approach or enter an intersection at approximately the same time, the driver
of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right, except as otherwise hereinafter provided.
The driver of any vehicle traveling at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any right of way which he might otherwise have
hereunder.

(b)
The driver of a vehicle approaching but not having entered an intersection, shall yield the right of way to a vehicle
within such intersection or turning therein to the left across the line of travel of such first-mentioned vehicle, provided the
driver of the vehicle turning left has given a plainly visible signal of intention to turn as required in this Act.
(c)
The driver of any vehicle upon a highway within a business or residential district shall yield the right of way to a
pedestrian crossing such highway within a crosswalk, except at intersections where the movement of traffic is being
regulated by a peace officer or by traffic signal. Every pedestrian crossing a highway within a business or residential
district, at any point other than a crosswalk shall yield the right of way to vehicles upon the highway.
(d)
The driver of a vehicle upon a highway shall bring to a full stop such vehicle before traversing any "through
highway" or railroad crossing: Provided, That when it is apparent that no hazard exists, the vehicle may be slowed down to
five miles per hour instead of bringing it to a full stop.

Sec. 43.Exception to the right of way rule. - (a) The driver of a vehicle entering a highway from a private road or drive
shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on such highway.
(b)
The driver of a vehicle upon a highway shall yield the right of way to police or fire department vehicles and
ambulances when such vehicles are operated on official business and the drivers thereof sound audible signal of their
approach.
(c)
The driver of a vehicle entering a "through highway" or a "stop intersection" shall yield the right of way to all
vehicles approaching to either direction on such "through highway": Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall be
construed as relieving the driver of any vehicle being operated on a "through highway" from the duty of driving with due
regard for the safety of vehicles entering such "through highway" nor as protecting the said driver from the consequence of
an arbitrary exercise off such right of way.

Sec. 44.Signals on starting, stopping or turning. (a)

The driver of any vehicle upon a highway, before starting, stopping or turning from a direct line, shall first see that
such movement can be made in safety, and if any pedestrian may be affected by such movement, shall give a clearly
audible signal by sounding the horn, and whenever the operation of any other vehicle approaching or following may be
affected by such movement, shall give a signal plainly visible to the driver of such other vehicles of the intention to make
such movement. cdt
(b)
The signal herein required shall be given by means of extending the hand and arm beyond the left side of the
vehicle, or by an approved mechanical or electrical signal device.

ARTICLE IV. - Turning and Parking

Sec. 45.Turning at intersections. - (a) The drive of a vehicle intending to run to the right at an intersection shall
approach such intersection in the lane for traffic nearest to the right-hand side of the highway and, in turning, shall keep as
close as possible to the right-hand curb or edge of the highway.
(b)
The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left shall approach such intersection in the lane for traffic to the
right of and nearest to the center line of the highway, and, in turning, shall pass to the left of the center of the intersection,
except that, upon highways laned for traffic and upon one-way highways, a left turn shall be made from the left lane of
traffic in the direction in which the vehicle is proceeding.
(c)
For the purpose of this section, the center of the intersection shall mean the meeting point of the medial lines of
the highways intersecting one another, except when it is occupied by a monument, grass plot or any permanent structure,
other than traffic control device.

Sec. 46.Parking prohibited in specified places. - No driver shall park a vehicle, or permit it to stand, whether attended
or unattended, upon a highway in any of the following places:

(a)

Within an intersection

(b)

On a crosswalk

(c)

Within six meters of the intersection of curb lines.

(d)

Within four meters of the driveway entrance to and fire station.

(e)

Within four meters of fire hydrant

(f)

In front of a private driveway

(g)

On the roadway side of any vehicle stopped or parked at the curb or edge of the highway

(h)

At any place where official signs have been erected prohibiting parking.

Sec. 47.Parked vehicle. - Whenever a motor vehicle is parked unattended on any highway, the driver thereof must turn
off the ignition switch and stop the motor and notch effectively the hand brake.

ARTICLE V. - Miscellaneous Traffic Rules

Sec. 48.Reckless driving. - No person shall operate a motor vehicle on any highway recklessly or without reasonable
caution considering the width, traffic, grades, crossing, curvatures, visibility and other conditions of the highway and the
conditions of the atmosphere and weather, or so as to endanger the property or the safety or rights of any person or so as
to cause excessive or unreasonable damage to the highway.

Sec. 49.Right of way for police and other emergency vehicles. - Upon the approach of any police or fire department
vehicle, or of an ambulance giving audible signal, the driver of every other vehicle shall immediately drive the same to a
position as near as possible and parallel to the right-hand edge or curb of the highway, clear of any intersection of
highways, and shall stop and remain in such position, unless otherwise directed by a peace officer, until such vehicle shall
have passed.

Sec. 50.Tampering with vehicles. - No unauthorized person shall sound the horn, handle the levers or set in motion or in
any way tamper with a damage or deface any motor vehicle.

Sec. 51.Hitching to a vehicle. - No person shall hang on to, ride on, the outside or the rear end of any vehicle, and no
person on a bicycle, roller skate or other similar device, shall hold fast to or hitch on to any moving vehicle, and no driver
shall knowingly permit any person to hang on to or ride, the outside or rear end of his vehicle or allow any person on a
bicycle, roller skate or other similar device to hold fast or hitch to his vehicle.

Sec. 52.Driving or parking on sidewalk. - No person shall drive or park a motor vehicle upon or along any sidewalk,
path or alley not intended for vehicular traffic or parking.

Sec. 53.Driving while under the influence of liquor or narcotic drug. - No person shall drive a motor vehicle while
under the influence of liquor or narcotic drug.

Sec. 54.Obstruction of traffic. - No person shall drive his motor vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or impede the
passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free
passage of other vehicles on the highway.

Sec. 55.Duty of driver in case of accident. - In the event that any accident should occur as a result of the operation of
a motor vehicle upon a highway, the driver present, shall show his driver's license, give his true name and address and also
the true name and address of the owner of the motor vehicle.
No driver of a motor vehicle concerned in a vehicular accident shall leave the scene of the accident without aiding the
victim, except under any of the following circumstances:
1.

If he is in imminent danger of being seriously harmed by any person or persons by reason of the accident;

2.

If he reports the accident to the nearest officer of the law; or

3.

If he has to summon a physician or nurse to aid the victim.