HABEAS CORPUS (RULE 102)

JEANY-VI G. KIANI, Petitioner, v. THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and DEPORTATION (BID),

EDGARDO CABRERA, ELISEO EXCONDE and JOSE VALE, JR., Respondents.
[G.R. No. 160922 February 27, 2006]
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari for the nullification of the decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. No. 74484, dismissing the appeal of Jeany-Vi G. Kiani, which assailed the Order of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 8, in Special Proceedings (Sp. Proc.) No. 02-103935, dismissing her Petition
for Habeas Corpus.
On June 19, 2002, Javed Kiani, a British national but a Pakistani by birth[2] reported to the Rodriguez, Rizal Police
Station that his friends, Iqbal Singh and Balbir Singh, had been forcibly taken by four (4) armed men from their
residence at Balita, Rodriguez, Rizal.[3] A couple of days later, then Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) issued Mission Order No. ADD-02-203 based on Executive Order
No. 287 of former President Joseph Estrada. In said Order, appropriate officers of the Bureau were directed to
conduct verification/validation of the admission status and activities of Javed Kiani, and, if found to have violated
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, to immediately place him under arrest. [4] Per records of the
BID, Javed Kiani was married to a Filipina, Jeany-Vi Kiani, on July 27, 1988. He was admitted as an immigrant
and was issued a permanent resident visa on March 17, 1993.[5]
A week later, on June 27, 2002, Javed Kiani was arrested at Felicidad Village, Montalban, Rizal. The
arresting officers, Eduardo Cabrera,Eliseo Exconde and Jose Vale, Jr., operatives of the Bureau of Intelligence of
the BID, relied on information from Iqbal and Balbir Singh, who pointed to Javed Kiani as the one who had
furnished them with fake Alien Certificate Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate Registration
(ICR). Apparently, the forms used were not official BID forms. [6]
On July 1, 2002, the BID Prosecutor filed a Charge Sheet [7] against Javed Kiani alias Ahmad Singh before
the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) for violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended,
particularly Section 37(a)(7) and Section 45 thereof. The case was docketed as D.C. No. ADD-02-080. The
Charge Sheet reads:
Records show that the above-named subject was arrested on June 27, 2002 by Bureaus
Intelligence operatives at Felicidad Village, Montalban, Rizal, pursuant to Mission Order No.
ADD-02-203, dated June 20, 2002.
Records also show that subject national was positively identified by Indian
nationals Balbir Singh and Iqbal Singh when they were arrested by the same operatives on June
18, 2002 as the person who gave them spurious immigration documents and as their protector
evidenced by copies of the ACRs and ICRsof Balbir and Iqbal Singh, which were certified by Mr.
Reynaldo Joson as fake. Additionally, Mr. Joson certified that the forms used in the
forgery/falsification are not official forms of this Bureau.
Contrary to law.[8]

On the same day, July 1, 2002, the Board of Commissioners (BOC) conducted a summary proceeding and issued
a Summary Deportation Order revoking the visa issued to Javed Kiani. The Order reads in part:
Considering the seriousness of the charge/s and the evidence in support thereof, respondent,
whose Temporary Residence Visa is hereby ordered cancelled and revoked, is hereby ordered
summarily deported to his country of origin, subject to PNP, Court and NBI clearances and
payment of an administrative fine in the amount of P50,000.00.[9]
The next day, July 2, 2002, Javed Kianis wife, Jeany-Vi, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus[10] for and in
behalf of her husband before the RTC of Manila, naming the BID and its intelligence officers as respondents. She
prayed that the court issue a writ of habeas corpus directing respondents to produce the person
of Javed Kiani before it in the soonest time possible and to show the cause or legal justification for the latters
detention and imprisonment, if any; and for such other or further reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable
under the premises. She further alleged that her husband had intervened in the arrest of Iqbal and Balbir Singh,
and that the arresting officers resented such intervention. She insisted that the arrest and detention of her husband
were bereft of factual and legal basis, since at the time, no deportation order had yet been issued against
him. Citing the ruling of this Court in Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa,[11] she alleged that the Mission Order
issued by the Immigration Commissioner was void. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 02-103935.
[12]
Javed Kiani had been detained at the BID DetentionCenter, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila
since July 3, 2002.[13]
On July 18, 2002, the RTC issued an Order[14] granting bail for Javed Kiani on a bond of P50,000.00, and
ordered respondent BID Intelligence Officers to file their return on the writ. The respondents complied, and
alleged in their return that Javed Kiani had already been charged before the BOC and ordered deported; hence, the
petition had become moot and academic. They refused to release Kiani although the bond had already been
posted.[15] Instead, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an Omnibus
Motion[16] for the reconsideration of the Order on the following grounds: (1) under Section 37(9)(e) of
Commonwealth Act 613, as amended, it is the Commissioner of Immigration, and not the court, who has authority
to grant bail in a deportation proceeding; (2) the court has no authority to grant the petition considering
that Javed Kiani was lawfully charged with violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended,
before the BSI; and (3) the BOC has subsequently issued a Summary Deportation Order.
On October 28, 2002, the RTC issued an Order [17] granting the motion and setting aside its July 18,
2002 Order. In dismissing the petition, it ruled that Jeany-Vi was barred from questioning the legality of the arrest
and detention of her husband, following the filing of the Charge Sheet with the BSI; as such, there was no
justification for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. It declared that, as gleaned from the return of the writ
filed by the respondents, Javed Kiani was lawfully charged with violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940, as amended; hence, the Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC was valid.
The RTC also ruled that the proper remedy of Javed Kiani from the Summary Deportation Order of the
BOC was to file a petition for review with the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court (and not a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus before it), as it had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and reverse the Summary
Deportation Order issued by the BOC.
Jeany-Vi appealed the RTCs Order of July 18, 2002 to the CA, in which she raised the following issues:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ARREST OF JAVED KIANI ON 27 JUNE 2002 AND HIS
SUBSEQUENT DETENTION BY THE RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES WERE VALID
AND/OR LEGAL.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE SUPPOSED ISSUANCE OF A SUMMARY DEPORTATION

ORDER AGAINST JAVED KIANI HAS THE EFFECT OF LEGALIZING AND/OR
VALIDATING HIS CONTINUED DETENTION, THEREBY RENDERING
THE HABEAS CORPUS PETITION DISMISSIBLE.[18]

On May 8, 2003 the CA rendered judgment dismissing the appeal. [19] The CA declared that a Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus can no longer be allowed since the party sought to be released had been charged before
the BSI. Assuming that Javed Kianis detention or his arrest was illegal, any incipient infirmity thereon was cured
by the filing of the Charge Sheet against him. The appellate court cited the ruling of this Court inVelasco v. Court
of Appeals.[20] It likewise affirmed the ruling of the RTC that it had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and
reverse the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC, that the remedy of petitioner from the Summary Deportation
Order of the BOC was to file a petition for review with the CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and that her failure to do so rendered said Order final and executory.
Jeany-Vi received a copy of the CA Decision on May 22, 2003, and filed a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof on June 6, 2003. She alleged that since the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC had not yet been
promulgated by the BSI, the period to appeal was yet to commence, and as such, said order could not become
final and executory. Even assuming that such order had become final and executory, her husband was entitled to a
writ of habeas corpus since he was deprived of his right to due process.
On November 21, 2003, the appellate court resolved to deny the motion. [21] Jeany-Vi received a copy of
the Resolution on December 1, 2003.
On January 15, 2004, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, alleging that:
A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO NULLIFY AND TO DECLARE

AS ILLEGAL THE ACTUAL ARREST AND SUBSEQUENT DETENTION OF JAVED
KIANI.

B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE AS NULL AND

VOID AB INITIO THE PUTATIVE SUMMARY DEPORTATION ORDER AGAINST
JAVED KIANI.

C.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SUMMARY

DEPORTATION ORDER AGAINST JAVED KIANI HAS ALREADY BECOME FINAL
AND EXECUTORY.

D.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT HABEAS CORPUS IS

NOT THE CORRECT OR PROPER REMEDY AVAILABLE TO THE HEREIN
PETITIONER.[22]

Petitioner avers that the Mission Order issued by the Immigration Commissioner for the investigation and
arrest of her husband, Javed Kiani, is null and void. She points out that when said Order was issued, the BOC had
not yet made a determination as to the existence of a lawful ground for his deportation. She further avers that the

Immigration Commissioner has no power to issue a Mission Order or Warrant of Arrest solely for the purpose of
investigation, and before a final order for deportation is issued by the BOC. She insists that an order of arrest is
proper only if the BOC has already issued an Order of deportation. She cites the rulings of this Court
in Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board,[23] Ang Ngo Chiong v. Galang,[24] and Board of Commissioners
v. Dela Rosa.[25]
Petitioner further maintains that the filing of the Charge Sheet against Javed Kiani by the BOC did not
render the issue of the illegality of arrest and detention moot and academic. She asserts that there is no factual and
legal basis for the deportation of her husband because he had been issued a permanent visa and his passport is yet
to expire. She avers that a warrant for the arrest of her husband may be issued only after a Summary Deportation
Order shall have become final and executory. Considering that there was no showing in the records that said
Order had already been promulgated by the BSI, it could not have become final and executory. She avers that the
ruling of this Court in Velasco v. Court of Appeals[26] is not applicable in this case.
In its Comment on the petition filed on December 10, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
avers that it agrees with the ruling of the CA and prays that it be affirmed. Citing the ruling of this Court
in Dwikarna v. Domingo,[27] the OSG posits that the remedy of petitioner from the Summary Deportation Order of
the BOC was to appeal to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court. It
maintains that it was inappropriate for petitioner to assail the arrest and detention of her husband after the filing of
the Charge Sheet with the BSI.
The OSG also alleges that Javed Kiani had filed an Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam[28] dated March 19,
2004 in the BID, presumably with the BOC, wherein he prayed that the Summary Deportation Order issued by the
BOC against him be set aside, and that he be released in the meantime. The OSG also asserts that in said
motion, Javed Kiani alleged that his arrest and detention was illegal because there had been as yet no
determination by the BOC of any ground for his deportation; in effect, he pursued the same reliefs he seeks from
this Court in his motion with the BOC, that is, to declare as illegal his continued detention and order his
release. The OSG avers that this is a classic example of forum shopping which is prohibited under the Rules.
In reply, petitioner asserts that during the pendency of this case, Immigration Commissioner Alipio F.
Fernandez, Jr. granted her husbands Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam in an Order[29] dated June 22, 2004, and
ordered his provisional release on a cash bond of P50,000.00. The Commissioner also declared that the Summary
Deportation Order against her husband had been improvidently issued, and ruled that there was no factual and
legal basis for his summary deportation. Moreover, Javed Kiani was deprived of his right to due process when the
Order was issued on the same day the Charge Sheet was filed with the BSI.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: (1) whether petitioner engaged in forum shopping; and
(2) whether the CA erred in (a) holding that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC was not the
proper remedy of petitioner; (b) upholding the validity of the Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC;
and (c) declaring that such Order had become final and executory.
On the first issue, we agree with the contention of the OSG that the petitioner indulged in forum
shopping. Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on
the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Section 6, Rule 43 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides that a petition for review on certiorari must contain a sworn certification against
forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42 of said Rules, to wit:

The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under oath that he has
not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such
other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn
that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to
promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5)
days therefrom.
Under Section 5, Rule 45 of said Rules, the failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
In Balite v. Court of Appeals,[30] the Court held that there is forum shopping when a party seeks to obtain
remedies in an action in one court, which had already been solicited, and in other courts and other proceedings in
other tribunals. While a party may avail of the remedies prescribed by the Rules of Court, such party is not free to
resort to them simultaneously or at his/her pleasure or caprice. A party should not be allowed to present
simultaneous remedies in two different forums, for it degrades and wreaks havoc to the rule on orderly
procedure. A party must follow the sequence and hierarchical order in availing such remedies and not resort to
shortcuts in procedure or playing fast and loose with the said rules. Forum shopping, an act of malpractice, is
considered as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. It is improper conduct and degrades the
administration of justice.
In this case, petitioner seeks not only the reversal of the Order of the RTC dismissing her Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in behalf of her husband (where it was also declared that he had been legally
deported), as well as the decision of the CA affirming the RTCs Order;she also prays that the Court render
judgment nullifying the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC and order her husbands release from
detention. However, Javed Kiani himself, during the pendency of this case, filed an Omnibus
Motion Ad Cautelam with the BID, seeking the same reliefs, which his wife prayed for in this case. By filing said
motion, Javed Kiani sought to preempt the decision of this Court. Petitioner and her husband even failed to inform
the Court of the filing of such motion, and did so only after the OSG had already informed the Court of such
petition, and after petitioner had been ordered to reply to the Comment of the OSG.
Petitioner and her husband were represented by the same law firm, the Cruz Cruz and Neria Law
Offices. The instant petition and said motion were signed by the same lawyer, Atty. Marlon Alexandre C.
Cruz. That the instant petition was filed by Jeany-Vi Kiani while the Omnibus Motion was filed
by Javed Kiani himself is of no moment; after all, the petition was filed for and in behalf of the latter, who is the
real party-in-interest.[31] In effect, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by him, as the beneficiary,
through his wife as his representative. Worse, the Immigration Commissioner took cognizance of and granted the
same, despite the pendency of the instant petition, thereby preempting the ruling of this Court.
The Immigration Commissioner and Atty. Marlon Alexandre C. Cruz ought to be reprimanded for their
acts.
On the merits of the petition, we find and so rule that the CA acted in accord with jurisprudence when it
affirmed the assailed Order of the RTC dismissing the Petition for Habeas Corpus. As the Court held
in Caballes v. Court of Appeals,[32]

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the
trial courts function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot
be used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or
on the merits.The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether
the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void.The writ is not ordinarily
granted where the law
provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of exceptional
circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly
course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ
where exceptional circumstances are extant.In another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot
be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not
involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the
caveat that constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not
destroyed. It has also been held that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and
irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by habeas
corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal. [33]
In this case, when petitioner filed her Petition for Habeas Corpus with the RTC in behalf of her husband,
a Charge Sheet had already been filed against him for violation of Section 37(a)(7) and Section 45 of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. The filing of the Charge Sheet before the BSI cured whatever
irregularities or infirmities were attendant to his arrest. The remedy of petitioner was to file a motion for the
dismissal of the Charge Sheet and the Mission Order of the Immigration Commissioner, not a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus before the RTC.The RTC had no authority to nullify the Mission Order issued by the
Immigration Commissioner, much less set aside the arrest of Javed Kiani. As held by this Court in Commissioner
Rodriguez v. Judge Bonifacio:[34]
Be that as it may, there was a valid judicial process justifying Ma Jings detention even
before respondent judge rendered his decision as shown by the Return of the Writ which averred,
among others, that a Charge Sheet was filed against Ma Jing. Even granting that the arrest of
Ma Jing was initially illegal, the filing of the Charge Sheet cured whatever incipient infirmity
there was in her arrest. Respondent judge therefore had no authority to release the party who was
thus committed. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that
the person to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge; or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court
of record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of
any informality or defect in the process, judgment or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted
of an offense in thePhilippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention
through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.His remedy would be to quash the
information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be

allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term court
includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.[35]
The CA acted in accord with jurisprudence when it affirmed the ruling of the RTC declaring that it had no
jurisdiction over petitioners plea to set aside the Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC against her
husband Javed Kiani. Under Section 8, Chapter 3, Title I, Book III of Executive Order No. 292, the power to
deport aliens is vested on the President of the Philippines, subject to the requirements of due process. The
Immigration Commissioner is vested with authority to deport aliens under Section 37 of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.Thus, a party aggrieved by a Deportation Order issued by the BOC is
proscribed from assailing said Order in the RTC even via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Conformably
with ruling of the Court in Domingo v. Scheer,[36] such party may file a motion for the reconsideration thereof
before the BOC. The Court ruled therein that there is no law or rule which provides that a Summary Deportation
Order issued by the BOC in the exercise of its authority becomes final after one year from its issuance, or that the
aggrieved party is barred from filing a motion for a reconsideration of any order or decision of the BOC. The
Court, likewise, declared that in deportation proceedings, the Rules of Court may be applied in
a suppletory manner and that the aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration of a decision or final order
under Rule 37 of said Rules.[37]
In case such motion for reconsideration is denied by the BOC, the aggrieved party may appeal to the
Secretary of Justice[38] and, if the latter denies the appeal, to the Office of the President of the Philippines. The
party may also choose to file a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on the
ground that the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in dismissing the appeal, the remedy of appeal not being adequate and speedy remedy. [39] In case the
Secretary of Justice dismisses the appeal, the aggrieved party may resort to filing a petition for review under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court, as amended.[40]
In this case, the petitioner did not file any motion with the BOC for reconsideration of the Summary
Deportation Order or appeal therefrom;neither did she appeal to the Secretary of Justice or to the Office of the
President or file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
We note that under Section 3, Rule XIII [41] of the Rules of Procedure to Govern Deportation Proceedings,
the decision of the BOC shall be returned to the BSI for promulgation, and shall become final and executory after
thirty (30) days from promulgation unless within such period, the President of the Philippines shall order the
contrary. This rule, however, is not applicable in this case. What the petitioner assailed before the RTC was
a Summary Deportation Order of the BOC, not a BOC decision based on the recommendation of the BSI after due
hearing as mandated by Rule IX of the said Rules of Procedure.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioner. SO ORDERED.

HABEAS CORPUS (RULE 102)

MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. G.R. No. 162734

SALIENTES, ORLANDO B. SALIENTES,
and ROSARIO C. SALIENTES,
Present:
Petitioners,
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, HONORABLE
JUDGE PEDRO SABUNDAYO, JR.,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH Promulgated:
203,MUNTINLUPA CITY,
Respondents.
August 29, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
QUISUMBING, J.:
The instant petition assails the Decision[1] dated November 10, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 75680, which dismissed the petition for certiorari against the orders of the Regional Trial Court in Special
Proceedings No. 03-004. Likewise assailed is the Court of Appeals Resolution [2] dated March 19, 2004 denying
reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the
parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie Antonettes parents, petitioners
Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private respondent suggested to his wife
that they transfer to their own house, but Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house of
the Salientes.Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son.
Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative of his son, filed a Petition
for Habeas
Corpus and
Custody,[3]docketed
as
Special
Proceedings
No.
03-004
before
the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. On January 23, 2003, the trial court issued the following order:
Upon verified Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by Petitioners, the Respondents
Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes, Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes are hereby
directed to produce and bring before this Court the body of minor Lorenzo
Emmanuel Salientes Abanilla on January 31, 2003 at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon and to show
cause why the said child should not be discharged from restraint.
Let this Writ be served by the Sheriff or any authorized representative of this Court, who
is directed to immediately make a return.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration which the court denied.

Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but the same was
dismissed on November 10, 2003. The appellate court affirmed the February 24, 2003 Order of the trial court
holding that its January 23, 2003 Order did not award the custody of the 2-year-old child to any one but was
simply the standard order issued for the production of restrained persons. The appellate court held that the trial
court was still about to conduct a full inquiry, in a summary proceeding, on the cause of the minors detention and
the matter of his custody. The Court of Appeals ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied on March 19, 2004.
Hence, petitioners interposed this appeal by certiorari anchored on the following grounds:
1.

The Court of Appeals erred in not pronouncing the respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion, amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing an order for the petitionermother to first show cause why her own three-year old child in her custody should not be
discharged from a so-called restraint despite no evidence at all of restraint and no evidence of
compelling reasons of maternal unfitness to deprive the petitioner-mother of her minor son of
tender years. The assailed orders, resolutions and decisions of the lower court and the Court of
Appeals are clearly void;

2.

The Court of Appeals erred in not pronouncing that the respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion in issuing a writ of habeas corpus which clearly is not warranted considering that there
is no unlawful restraint by the mother and considering further that the law presumes the fitness of
the mother, thereby negating any notion of such mother illegally restraining or confining her very
own son of tender years. The petition is not even sufficient in substance to warrant the writ. The
assailed orders are clearly void.

3.

Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, the Sombong vs. CA case supports rather than
negates the position of the petitioners.

4.

Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, summary proceeding does violence to the tenderyears-rule

5.

The Court of Appeals failed to consider that the private respondent failed to present prima
facie proof of any compelling reason of the unfitness of the petitioner-mother;

6.

The Court of Appeals failed to see that the New Rules on Custody SUFFICES AS REMEDY.
[6]

Plainly put, the issue is: Did the Court of Appeals err when it dismissed the petition for certiorari against
the trial courts orders dated January 23, 2003 and February 24, 2003?
Petitioners contend that the order is contrary to Article 213 [7] of the Family Code, which provides that no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise. They maintain that herein respondent Loran had the burden of showing any compelling reason
but failed to present even a prima facie proof thereof.
Petitioners posit that even assuming that there were compelling reasons, the proper remedy for private
respondent was simply an action for custody, but not habeas corpus. Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is
unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor. They insist there was no
illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his own mother. There was no need for the mother to show cause
and explain the custody of her very own child.

Private respondent counters that petitioners argument based on Article 213 of the Family Code applies
only to the second part of his petition regarding the custody of his son. It does not address the first part, which
pertains to his right as the father to see his son. He asserts that the writ ofhabeas corpus is available against any
person who restrains the minors right to see his father and vice versa. He avers that the instant petition is merely
filed for delay, for had petitioners really intended to bring the child before the court in accordance with the new
rules on custody of minors, they would have done so on the dates specified in the January 23, 2003 and
the February 24, 2003 orders of the trial court.
Private respondent maintains that, under the law, he and petitioner Marie Antonette have shared custody
and parental authority over their son. He alleges that at times when petitioner Marie Antonette is out of the
country as required of her job as an international flight stewardess, he, the father, should have custody of their son
and not the maternal grandparents.
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the assailed January 23, 2003 Order of the trial court
did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in
court and explain why they are restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order precedent to
the trial courts full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending before it.
Under Rule 41, Section 1[8] of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is not appealable but the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action under Rule 65. The aggrieved party must show that the
court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent upon
petitioners to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order.
Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled
thereto.[9] Under Article 211[10] of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint
parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de
facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to
one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondents
cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. [11] Hence, the remedy
of habeas corpus is available to him.
In a petition for habeas corpus, the childs welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and Youth
Welfare Code[12] unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the
child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. [13]
Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely
directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why private respondent is prevented from seeing his
child. This is in line with the directive in Section 9 [14] of A.M. 03-04-04-SC[15] that within fifteen days after the
filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, the court shall issue an order requiring the
respondent (herein petitioners) to present the minor before the court. This was exactly what the court did.
Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a
guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for private
respondents petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the
said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age.
In sum, the trial court did not err in issuing the orders dated January 23, 2003 and February 24,
2003. Hence, the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the petition for certiorari against the said orders of the trial
court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 10, 2003 and the
Resolution dated March 19, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75680 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.

HABEAS CORPUS (RULE 102)

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO,
DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX, BJMP
BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA, TAGUIG CITY AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON HIS
BEHALF AND/OR HAVING CUSTODY OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 197597, April 08, 2015]
LEONEN, J.:
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In such cases, the
person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally detained.
This is a Petition for Review1 on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals Decision 2 reversing the Decision3of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice) granting Datukan Malang Salibo's Petition
for Habeas Corpus.
From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) and other Filipinos were
allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage. 4 "While in Saudi Arabia, . . . Salibo visited and prayed in the
cities of Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah." 5 He returned to the Philippines on December 20, 2009.6
On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected
him to be Butukan S. Malang.7
Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly participating in the
November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court
in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.8
Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name. There, he
explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he could not have participated in the November 23, 2009
Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time. 9
To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police "pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes and
other documents"10 tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from November 7
to December 19, 2009.11
The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him because he was not Butukan S.
Malang.12
Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of his passport that evidenced
his departure for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009. They then detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station
for about three (3) days.13
The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Cotabato City, where
he was detained for another 10 days. While in Cotabato City, the Criminal Investigation and Detention Group
allegedly made him sign and affix his thumbprint on documents. 14
On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management
and Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently detained. 15

On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas
Corpus16 questioning the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty. 17 He maintained that he is not the
accused Butukan S. Malang.18
In the Resolution19 dated September 21, 2010, the Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making the
Writ returnable to the Second Vice Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of
Justice).20 The Court of Appeals ordered the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex to file a Return of the Writ one
day before the scheduled hearing and produce the person of Salibo at the 10:00 a.m. hearing set on September 27,
2010.21
Proceedings before the trial court
On September 27, 2010, the jail guards of the Quezon City Jail Annex brought Salibo before the trial court. The
Warden, however, failed to file a Return one day before the hearing. He also appeared without counsel during the
hearing.22
Thus, the trial court canceled the hearing and reset it to September 29, 2010 at 2:00 p.m. 23
On September 28, 2010, the Warden filed the Return of the Writ. However, during the September 29, 2010
hearing on the Return, the Warden appeared with Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr., Legal Officer/Administering
Officer of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology.24
Salibo questioned the appearance of Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr. on behalf of the Warden and argued that only the
Office of the Solicitor General has the authority to appear on behalf of a respondent in a habeas corpus
proceeding.25
The September 29, 2010 hearing, therefore, was canceled. The trial court reset the hearing on the Return to
October 1, 2010 at 9:00 a.m.26
The Return was finally heard on October 1, 2010. Assistant Solicitors Noel Salo and Isar Pepito appeared on
behalf of the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex and argued that Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus should be
dismissed. Since Salibo was charged under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest, a petition for habeas corpus
was "no longer availing."27
Salibo countered that the Information, Amended Information, Warrant of Arrest, and Alias Warrant of Arrest
referred to by the Warden all point to Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, as accused. Reiterating that
he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he was in Saudi Arabia on the day of the Maguindanao Massacre, Salibo
pleaded the trial court to order his release from detention. 28
The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially charged" 29 under any resolution, information, or amended
information. The Resolution, Information, and Amended Information presented in court did not charge Datukan
Malang Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly arrested as there was no Warrant of Arrest or Alias Warrant
of Arrest against Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo, the trial court ruled, was not restrained of his liberty under
process issued by a court.30
The trial court was likewise convinced that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang charged with murder in
connection with the Maguindanao Massacre. The National Bureau of Investigation Clearance dated August 27,
2009 showed that Salibo has not been charged of any crime as of the date of the certificate. 31 A Philippine
passport bearing Salibo's picture showed the name "Datukan Malang Salibo." 32
Moreover, the trial court said that Salibo "established that [he] was out of the country" 33 from November 7, 2009
to December 19, 2009. This fact was supported by a Certification 34 from Saudi Arabian Airlines confirming

Salibo's departure from and arrival in Manila on board its flights. 35 A Flight Manifest issued by the Bureau of
Immigration and Saudi Arabian Airlines Ticket No. 0652113 also showed this fact. 36
Thus, in the Decision dated October 29, 2010, the trial court granted Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus and
ordered his immediate release from detention.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
On appeal37 by the Warden, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's
Decision.38 Through its Decision dated April 19, 2011, the Court of Appeals dismissed Salibo's Petition for
Habeas Corpus.
Contrary to the trial court's finding, the Court of Appeals found that Salibo's arrest and subsequent detention were
made under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest. 39 Even assuming that Salibo was not the Butukan S.
Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, the Court of Appeals said that "[t]he orderly course of trial must be
pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ [of habeas corpus] may be invoked[.]" 40 According to
the Court of Appeals, Salibo's proper remedy was a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. 41
Salibo filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 42 which the Court of Appeals denied in the Resolution 43dated July 6,
2011.
Proceedings before this court
On July 28, 2011,44 petitioner Salibo filed before this court the Petition for Review (With Urgent Application for a
Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction). Respondent Warden filed a Comment,45 after which petitioner Salibo filed a Reply.46
Petitioner Salibo maintains that he is not the Butukan S. Malang charged with 57 counts of murder before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City. Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals' finding, he, Datukan
Malang Salibo, was not duly charged in court. He is being illegally deprived of his liberty and, therefore, his
proper remedy is a Petition for Habeas Corpus.47
Petitioner Salibo adds that respondent Warden erred in appealing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
153, Pasig City before the Court of Appeals. Although the Court of Appeals delegated to the trial court the
authority to hear respondent Warden on the Return, the trial court's Decision should be deemed a Decision of the
Court of Appeals. Therefore, respondent Warden should have directly filed his appeal before this court. 48
As for respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo was duly charged in court. Even assuming that he is
not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, petitioner Salibo should have pursued the
ordinary remedy of a Motion to Quash Information, not a Petition for Habeas Corpus. 49
The issues for our resolution are:
First, whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City on petitioner Salibo's Petition for
Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals; and Second, whether petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is
to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
We grant the Petition.

I
Contrary to petitioner Salibo's claim, respondent Warden correctly appealed before the Court of Appeals.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before this court or any of its
members,50 the Court of Appeals or any of its members in instances authorized by law, 51or the Regional Trial
Court or any of its presiding judges.52 The court or judge grants the writ and requires the officer or person having
custody of the person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ. 53 A hearing on the return of the writ
is then conducted.54
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ. 55 Should the court issuing the
writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall proceed to decide the
petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court "acquire[s] the power and authority to
determine the merits of the [petition for habeas corpus.]" 56Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision
appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court. 57
In Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc,58 "a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court . . . [o]n behalf of. . .
Alfredo B. Saulo [(Saulo)]."59 This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered respondent Commanding
General of the Philippine Constabulary to file a Return of the Writ. This court made the Writ returnable to the
Court of First Instance of Manila.60
After hearing the Commanding General on the Return, the Court of First Instance denied Saulo's Petition for
Habeas Corpus.61
Saulo appealed before this court, arguing that the Court of First Instance heard the Petition for Habeas Corpus
"not by virtue of its original jurisdiction but merely delegation[.]" 62 Consequently, "this Court should have the
final say regarding the issues raised in the petition, and only [this court's decision] . . . should be regarded as
operative."63
This court rejected Sciulo's argument and stated that his "logic is more apparent than real." 64 It ruled that when a
superior court issues a writ of habeas corpus, the superior court only resolves whether the respondent should be
ordered to show cause why the petitioner or the person in whose behalf the petition was filed was being detained
or deprived of his or her liberty.65 However, once the superior court makes the writ returnable to a lower court as
allowed by the Rules of Court, the lower court designated "does not thereby become merely a recommendatory
body, whose findings and conclusion[s] are devoid of effect[.]" 66 The decision on the petition for habeas corpus is
a decision of the lower court, not of the superior court.
In Medina v. Gen. Yan,67 Fortunato Medina (Medina) filed before this court a Petition for Habeas Corpus. This
court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City.
After trial on the merits, the Court of First Instance granted Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered that
Medina be released from detention.68
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court of Appeals. 69
Atty. Amelito Mutuc, counsel for Medina, filed before the Court of Appeals a "Motion for Certification of Appeal
to the Supreme Court." The Court of Appeals, however, denied the Motion. 70
This court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the "Motion for Certification of Appeal to the Supreme
Court," citing Saulo as legal basis.71 The Court of First Instance of Rizal, in deciding Medina's Petition for Habeas
Corpus, "acquired the power and authority to determine the merits of the case[.]" 72 Consequently, the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal on Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of
Appeals.73

In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City.
The trial court then heard respondent Warden on his Return and decided the Petition on the merits.
Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court "acquired the power and authority to determine the
merits"74 of petitioner Salibo's Petition. The decision on the Petition for Habeas Corpus, therefore, was the
decision of the trial court, not of the Court of Appeals. Since the Court of Appeals is the court with appellate
jurisdiction over decisions of trial courts, 75 respondent Warden correctly filed the appeal before the Court of
Appeals.
II
Called the "great writ of liberty," 76 the writ of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom."77 The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary78 and summary79 in nature, consistent with the law's
"zealous regard for personal liberty." 80
Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus "shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." 81 The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint
is illegal."82 "Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient." 83
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as to entitle a person to the efficient
remedy of habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy 84 or when there is an alleged violation
of the liberty of abode.85 In other words, habeas corpus effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens
constitutionally protected in the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. 86 Habeas corpus being
a remedy for a constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the
substantive right to liberty will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes. 87
In Gumabon, et al. v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,88 Mario Gumabon (Gumabon), Bias Bagolbagol
(Bagolbagol), Gaudencio Agapito (Agapito), Epifanio Padua (Padua), and Paterno Palmares (Palmares) were
convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with murder. They commenced serving their respective sentences
of reclusion perpetua.89
While Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares were serving their sentences, this court
promulgated People v. Hernandez90 in 1956, ruling that the complex crime of rebellion with murder does not
exist.91
Based on the Hernandez ruling, Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus. They prayed for their release from incarceration and argued that the Hernandez doctrine must
retroactively apply to them.92
This court ruled that Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares properly availed of a petition for
habeas corpus.93 Citing Harris v. Nelson,94 this court said:
[T]he writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary
and lawless state action. . . . The scope and flexibility of the writ its capacity to reach all manner of illegal
detention its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes have always been emphasized and
jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the
initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and
corrected.95

In Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro,96 the Provincial Board of Mindoro issued Resolution No. 25, Series of
1917. The Resolution ordered the Mangyans removed from their native habitat and compelled them to
permanently settle in an 800-hectare reservation in Tigbao. Under the Resolution, Mangyans who refused to
establish themselves in the Tigbao reservation were imprisoned. 97
An application for habeas corpus was filed before this court on behalf of Rubi and all the other Mangyans being
held in the reservation. 98 Since the application questioned the legality of deprivation of liberty of Rubi and the
other Mangyans, this court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered the Provincial Board of Mindoro to make
a Return of the Writ.99
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was likewise issued in Villavicencio v. Lukban.100 "[T]o exterminate vice,"101Mayor Justo
Lukban of Manila ordered the brothels in Manila closed. The female sex workers previously employed by these
brothels were rounded up and placed in ships bound for Davao. The women were expelled from Manila and
deported to Davao without their consent.102
On application by relatives and friends of some of the deported women, this court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus
and ordered Mayor Justo Lukban, among others, to make a Return of the Writ. Mayor Justo Lukban, however,
failed to make a Return, arguing that he did not have custody of the women. 103
This court cited Mayor Justo Lukban in contempt of court for failure to make a Return of the Writ. 104As to the
legality of his acts, this court ruled that Mayor Justo Lukban illegally deprived the women he had deported to
Davao of their liberty, specifically, of their privilege of domicile. 105 It said that the women, "despite their being in
a sense lepers of society[,] are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same
constitutional guaranties as are other citizens[.]" 106 The women had the right "to change their domicile from
Manila to another locality."107
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition for the issuance of the writ. It is the
writ that commands the production of the body of the person allegedly restrained of his or her liberty. On the other
hand, it is in the final decision where a court determines the legality of the restraint.
Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for its issuance, it is the issuance of the writ
that is essential. The issuance of the writ sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry on the legality of any
deprivation of liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas corpus even if the petition for its issuance "on
[its] face [is] devoid of merit[.]"108 Although the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in cases
of invasion, rebellion, or when the public safety requires it, 109 the writ itself may not be suspended.110
III
It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is
restrained under a lawful process or order of the court. 111 The restraint then has become legal, 112 and the remedy of
habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. 113 Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or
make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In Ilagan v. Hon. Ponce Enrile,114 elements of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police arrested
Atty. Laurente C. Ilagan (Atty. Ilagan) by virtue of a Mission Order allegedly issued by then Minister of National
Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile (Minister Enrile). On the day of Atty. Ilagan's arrest, 115 from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan in Camp Catitipan, where he was detained.115

Among Atty. Ilagan's visitors was Atty. Antonio Arellano (Atty. Arellano). Atty. Arellano, however, no longer left
Camp Catitipan as the military detained and arrested him based on an unsigned Mission Order.116
Three (3) days after the arrest of Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, the military informed the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Davao Chapter of the impending arrest of Atty. Marcos Risonar (Atty. Risonar). To verify his arrest
papers, Atty. Risonar went to Camp Catitipan. Like Atty. Arellano, the military did not allow Atty. Risonar to
leave. He was arrested based on a Mission Order signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander. 117
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group, and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism filed before this court a Petition for Habeas Corpus in behalf of Attys.
Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar.118
This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and required Minister Enrile, Armed Forces of the Philippines Acting
Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Fidel V. Ramos (General Ramos), and Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
National Police Regional Commander Brigadier General Dionisio Tan-Gatue (General Tan-Gatue) to make a
Return of the Writ.119 This court set the hearing on the Return on May 23, 1985. 120
In their Return, Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue contended that the privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus was suspended as to Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045A.121 The lawyers, according to respondents, allegedly "played active roles in organizing mass actions of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front." 122
After hearing respondents on their Return, this court ordered the temporary release of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and
Risonar on the recognizance of their counsels, retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and retired Associate
Justice Jose B.L. Reyes.123
Instead of releasing Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar, however, Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General
Tan-Gatue filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 124 They filed an Urgent Manifestation/Motion stating that
Informations for rebellion were filed against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar. They prayed that this court
dismiss the Petition for Habeas Corpus for being moot and academic. 125
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group, and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism opposed the motion. According to them, no preliminary investigation was
conducted before the filing of the Information. Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar were deprived of their right to
due process. Consequently, the Information was void. 126
This court dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus, ruling that it became moot and academic with the filing of
the Information against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar in court: 127
As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the filing of
an Information against them for Rebellion, a capital offense, before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and
the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them. The function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to
inquire into the legality of one's detention. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration is by virtue of a judicial
order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against them before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. The Writ had served its purpose.128 (Citations omitted)
This court likewise dismissed the Petitions for habeas corpus in Umil v. Ramos.129 Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural,
Renato Villanueva, Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Atty. Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, Vicky A.
Ocaya, Deogracias Espiritu, and Narciso B. Nazareno were all arrested without a warrant for their alleged
membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army.130

During the pendency of the habeas corpus proceedings, however, Informations against them were filed before this
court. The filing of the Informations, according to this court, rendered the Petitions for habeas corpus moot and
academic, thus:13
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts
against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or
make the order, or if such person is charged before any court , the writ of habeas corpus will not be
allowed.132 (Emphasis in the original)
In such cases, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary remedy of a petition for habeas corpus, persons
restrained under a lawful process or order of the court must pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the
usual remedies.133 This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the information or the warrant of arrest. 134
At any time before a plea is entered, 135 the accused may file a motion to quash complaint or information based on
any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Grounds.The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following
grounds:
(a)

That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b)

That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(c)

That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;.

(d)

That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e)

That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f)

That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed
by law;

(g)

That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h)

That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i)

That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

In filing a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against
him [or her] for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
information."136 If the accused avails himself or herself of a motion to quash, the accused "hypothetical[ly] admits
the facts alleged in the information." 137 "Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic from the information are not to be
considered."138
"If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order [the] amendment [of the complaint or information]." 139 If the motion to quash is
based on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint or information do not constitute an offense, the trial
court shall give the prosecution "an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment." 140 If after amendment, the
complaint or information still suffers from the same defect, the trial court shall quash the complaint or
information.141

IV
However, Ilagan142 and Umil do not apply to this case. Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant
charging him of an offense. He was not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally
deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City
in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al . charged and accused Butukan S. Malang, not
Datukan Malang Salibo, of 57 counts of murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre.
Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court enumerates the instances when a warrantless arrest may be made:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a)

When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

(b)

When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on- personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;

(c)

When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112.
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name and
to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police
officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police
officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not
an escapee prisoner.
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They deprived
him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued.
The arrest of petitioner Salibo is similar to the arrest of Atty. Risonar in the "disturbing" 143 case ofIlagan.144 Like
petitioner Salibo, Atty. Risonar went to Camp Catitipan to verify and contest any arrest papers against him. Then
and there, Atty. Risonar was arrested without a warrant. In his dissenting opinion in Ilagan,145 Justice Claudio
Teehankee stated that the lack of preliminary investigation deprived Atty. Risonar, together with Attys. Ilagan and
Arellano, of his right to due process of law a ground for the grant of a petition for habeas corpus: 146
The majority decision holds that the filing of the information without preliminary investigation falls within the
exceptions of Rule 112, sec. 7 and Rule 113, sec. 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Again, this is
erroneous premise. The fiscal misinvoked and misapplied the cited rules.The petitioners are not persons "lawfully
arrested without a warrant." The fiscal could not rely on the stale and inoperative PDA of January 25, 1985.
Otherwise, the rules would be rendered nugatory, if all that was needed was to get a PDA and then serve it at one's
whim and caprice when the very issuance of the PDA is premised on its imperative urgency and necessity as
declared by the President himself. The majority decision then relies on Rule 113, Sec. 5 which authorizes arrests
without warrant by a citizen or by a police officer who witnessed the arrestee in flagrante delicto, viz. in the act of
committing the offense. Quite obviously, the arrest was not a citizen's arrest nor were they caught in flagrante

delicto violating the law. In fact, this Court in promulgating the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure have tightened
and made the rules more strict. Thus, the Rule now requires that an offense "has in fact just been
committed." This connotes immediacy in point of time and excludes cases under the old rule where an offense
"has in fact been committed" no matter how long ago. Similarly, the arrestor must have "personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the [arrestee] has committed it" (instead of just "reasonable ground to believe that the
[arrestee] has committed it" under the old rule). Clearly, then, an information could not just be filed against the
petitioners without due process and preliminary investigation.147 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the
grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash,
the defect he alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.
Changing the name of the accused appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from "Butukan S.
Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case.
A motion for reinvestigation will' not cure the defect of lack of preliminary investigation. The Information and
Alias Warrant of Arrest were issued on the premise that Butukan S. Malang and Datukan Malang Salibo are the
same person. There is evidence, however, that the person detained by virtue of these processes is not Butukan S.
Malang but another person named Datukan Malang Salibo.
Petitioner Salibo presented in evidence his Philippine passport, 148 his identification card from the Office on
Muslim Affairs,149 his Tax Identification Number card, 150 and clearance from the National Bureau of
Investigation151 all bearing his picture and indicating the name "Datukan Malang Salibo." None of these
government-issued documents showed that petitioner Salibo used the alias "Butukan S. Malang."
Moreover, there is evidence that petitioner Salibo was not in the country on November 23, 2009 when the
Maguindanao Massacre occurred.
A Certification152 from the Bureau of Immigration states that petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on
November 7, 2009 and arrived in the Philippines only on December 20, 2009. A Certification 153 from Saudi
Arabian Airlines attests that petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on board Saudi Arabian Airlines Flight
SV869 on November 7, 2009 and that he arrived in the Philippines on board Saudi Arabian Airlines SV870 on
December 20, 2009.
V
People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. is probably the most complex case pending in our
courts. The case involves 57 victims 154 and 197 accused, two (2) of which have become state witnesses. 155 As of
November 23, 2014, 111 of the accused have been arraigned, and 70 have filed petitions for bail of which 42 have
already been resolved. 156 To require petitioner Salibo to undergo trial would be to further illegally deprive him of
his liberty. Urgency dictates that we resolve his Petition in his favor given the strong evidence that he is not
Butukan S. Malang.
In ordering petitioner Salibo's release, we are prejudging neither his guilt nor his innocence. However, between a
citizen who has shown that he was illegally deprived of his liberty without due process of law and the government
that has all the "manpower and the resources at [its] command" 157 to properly indict a citizen but failed to do so,
we will rule in favor of the citizen.
Should the government choose to prosecute petitioner Salibo, it must pursue the proper remedies against him as
provided in our Rules. Until then, we rule that petitioner Salibo is illegally deprived of his liberty. His Petition for
Habeas Corpus must be granted.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated April
19, 2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Warden, Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail
Management
and
Penology
Building,
Camp
Bagong
Diwa,
Taguig,
is ORDERED to
immediately RELEASE petitioner Datukan Maiang Salibo from detention.

The Letter of the Court of Appeals elevating the records of the case to this court is hereby NOTED.
SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGEST, HABEAS CORPUS (RULE 102)

JEANY-VI G. KIANI, Petitioner, v. THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION (BID), EDGARDO
CARBERA, ELISEO EXCONDE, AND JOSE VALE, JR. Respondents.
[G.R. No. 160922, February 27, 2006]
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS: On June 19, 2002, Javed Kiani, a British national but a Pakistani by birth, reported to the Rodriguez, Rizal Police
Station that his friends Iqbal Singh and Balbir Singh had been forcibly taken by 4 armed men from their residence. A couple
of days later, the BID Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo issued Mission Order for the appropriate officers to conduct
verification/validation of the admission status and activities of Javed, and, if found to have violated the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, to immediately place him under arrest. Per records of the BID, Javed is married to a
Filipine, Jeany-Vi Kiani. He was admitted as an immigrant and was issued a permanent resident visa on March 17, 1993. A
week later, on June 27, 2002, Javed was arrested. The arresting officers Edgardo Cabrera, Eliseo Exconde, and Jose Vale, Jr.,
operatives of the Bureau of Intelligence of the BID relied on the information of Iqbal and Balbir, who pointed to Javed as the
one who furnished them with fake Alien Certificate Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate Registration (ICR).
Apparently, the forms uses were not official BID forms.
On July 1, 2002, the BID Prosecutor filed a Charge Sheet against Javed Kiani alias Ahmad Singh before the Board of Special
Inquiry (BSI) for violation of Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. On the same day, the Board of Commissioners conducted
a summary proceeding and issued a Summary Deportation Order revoking the visa of Javed. The next day, Jeany-Vi filed a
Petition for w Writ of Habeas Corpus for and in behalf of her husband Javed before the RTC of Manila. The RTC issued an
order for the BID Intelligence Officers to file their return of the writ. The Respondents complied, and alleged in their return
that Javed had already been charged and ordered deported; hence, the petition had become moot and academic. They refused
to release Javed and instead filed an Omnibus Motion which the court granted thereby denying the petition for habeas corpus,
declaring that Javed was lawfully charged and the Summary Deportation Order was valid. Jeany-Vi appealed to the Court of
Appeals but it was dismissed. Hence, Jeany-Vi filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. She averred
that the Mission Order was null and void since it was issued for the purpose of investigation and before the issuance of final
order for deportation. She further maintained that the filing of the Charge Sheet did not render the issue of the illegality of the
arrest and detention moot and academic.
ISSUE: Is the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus moot and academic?
RULING: Yes. When Jeany-Vi filed her Petition for Habeas Corpus with the RTC in behalf of her husband, a Charge Sheet
had already been filed against him for violation of Section 37 (a) (7) and Section 45 of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940, as amended. The filing of the Charge Sheet before the BSI cured whatever irregularities or infirmities were attendant to
his arrest. The remedy of Jeany-Vi was to file a motion for the dismissal of the Charge Sheet and the Mission Order, not a
Petition for Habeas Corpus before the RTC. The RTC has no authority to nullify the Mission Order issued by the Immigration
Commissioner, much less set aside the arrest of Javed. Thus, a party aggrieved by a Deportation Order issued by the BOC is
proscribed from assailing said Order in the RTC even via petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
In Commisioner Rodriguez v. Judge Bonifacio, it was held that once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no
longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the
information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The Writ of Habeas Corpus should not be allowed after a party sought to

be released had been charged before any court. The term court includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of
the Bureau of Immigration.

CASE DIGEST, HABEAS CORPUS (RULE 102)

MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES, ORLANDO B. SALIENTES, AND ROSARIO C. SALIENTES,
Petitioners v. LORAN S. D. ABANILLA, HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO SABUNDAYAO, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 203, MUNTINLUPA CITY, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 162734, August 29, 2006]
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS: Loran S. D. Abanilla and Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S.
Abanilla. They lived with Marie Antonettes parents, Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C, Salientes. Due to in-laws
problems, Loran suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left the
house of the Salintes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son. Later, Loran, in his personal capacity and as thet
representative of his son, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody before the RTC of Muntinlupa. On January 23,
2003, the trial court issued an order directing Marie Anronette, Orlando, and Rosario to produce and bring before the court
the body of the minor Emmanuel on January 31, 2003 at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon and to show cause why the said child
should not be discharged from restraint.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration which the court denied. Consequently, they filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals but the same was dismissed on November 23, 2003 holding that the order of the trial court did not award the
custody of the child to any one but was simply a standard order for the production of restrained persons. Petitioners moved
for reconsideration which was denied on March 19, 2004. Hence, Petitioners interposed an appeal by certiorari before the
Supreme Court.
Petitioners contend that the order of the trial court is contrary to Aricle 213 of the Family Code, which provides that no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
They maintain that Loran had the burden of showing any compelling reason but failed to present even a prima facie proof
thereof. Petitioners posit that even assuming that there were compelling reasons, the proper remedy was simply an action for
custody, but not habeas corpus, which is according to them is unavailable against the mother, who, under the law, has the
right of custody of the minor. They insist there was no illegal or involuntary restraint on the minor by his own mother. There
was no need for the mother to show cause and explain the custody of her very own child.
Loran asserts that the writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who restrains the minors right to see his father
and vice versa. He also maintains that, under the law, he and Marie Antonette have shared custody and parental authority over
their son.
ISSUE: Should the order of the trial court granting the writ of habeas corpus be affirmed?
RULING: Yes. The assailed order of the trial court did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely
directed the Petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why they are restraining his liberty. Habeas corpus may be
resorted to in cases where the rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family
Code, Loran and Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further,
although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody is yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a
judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, Lorans
cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him. In a

petition for habeas corpus, the childs welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally
provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount
consideration. The issuance of the order by the trial court is in line with the Ruled on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas
Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M. 03-04-04-SC) which provides that within 15 days after the filing of the
answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, the court shall issue an order requiring the Respondent (herein
Petitioners) to present the minor before the court.

CASE DIGEST, HABEAS CORPUS (RULE 102)

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO,
DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX, BJMP BUILDING,
CAMP BAGONG DIWA, TAGUIG CITY AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON HIS BEHALF AND/OR
HAVING CUSTODY OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 197597, April 08, 2015]
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS: From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) and other Filipinos were
allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage. 4 "While in Saudi Arabia Salibo visited and prayed in the cities of
Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah." 5 He returned to the Philippines on December 20, 2009. 6 On August 3, 2010,
Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S.
Malang.7Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly participating in the
November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People of
the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.8 Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer
Police Station to clear his name. There, he explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he could not have
participated in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time. 9 To support
his allegations, Salibo presented to the police "pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes and other
documents"10 tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to
December 19, 2009.11The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him because he was not
Butukan S. Malang.12 Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of his passport
that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009. They then detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police
Station for about three (3) days. 13 The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group in Cotabato City, where he was detained for another 10 days. While in Cotabato City, the Criminal Investigation
and Detention Group allegedly made him sign and affix his thumbprint on documents. 14 On August 20, 2010, Salibo
was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Building, Camp
Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently detained.15
On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus 16 questioning
the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty.17 He maintained that he is not the accused Butukan S.
Malang.
Petitioner Salibo maintains that he is not the Butukan S. Malang charged with 57 counts of murder before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City. Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals' finding, he, Datukan Malang Salibo, was
not duly charged in court. He is being illegally deprived of his liberty and, therefore, his proper remedy is a Petition for
Habeas Corpus.47
As for respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo was duly charged in court. Even assuming that he is not
the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, petitioner Salibo should have pursued the ordinary
remedy of a Motion to Quash Information, not a Petition for Habeas Corpus.49
ISSUE: Is the charge against Salibo valid rendering the petition for habeas corpus unavailable to him?

RULING: No. Called the "great writ of liberty,"76 the writ of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom."77 The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary 78 and summary79 in nature, consistent with the law's "zealous
regard for personal liberty."80
Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus "shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person
is withheld from the person entitled thereto."81 The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal."82 "Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient."83
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as to entitle a person to the efficient remedy
of habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy 84 or when there is an alleged violation of the liberty
of abode.85 In other words, habeas corpus effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally
protected in the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. 86 Habeas corpus being a remedy for a
constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to
liberty will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes.87
It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained
under a lawful process or order of the court. 111 The restraint then has become legal,112 and the remedy of habeas corpus
is rendered moot and academic.113 Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order,
the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.
The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by
a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if such person is
charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.132 (Emphasis in the original)
In such cases, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary remedy of a petition for habeas corpus, persons
restrained under a lawful process or order of the court must pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual
remedies.133 This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the information or the warrant of arrest. 134
Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense. He was not restrained under a
lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself
of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City in People of
the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al . charged and accused Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang
Salibo, of 57 counts of murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre.

CASE DIGEST, HABEAS CORPUS (RULE 102)

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO,
DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX, BJMP BUILDING,
CAMP BAGONG DIWA, TAGUIG CITY AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON HIS BEHALF AND/OR
HAVING CUSTODY OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 197597, April 08, 2015]
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS: From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) and other Filipinos were
allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage. 4 "While in Saudi Arabia Salibo visited and prayed in the cities of
Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah." 5 He returned to the Philippines on December 20, 2009. 6 On August 3, 2010,
Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S.
Malang.7Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly participating in the
November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People of
the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.8 Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer
Police Station to clear his name. There, he explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he could not have
participated in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time. 9 To support
his allegations, Salibo presented to the police "pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes and other
documents"10 tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to
December 19, 2009.11The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him because he was not
Butukan S. Malang.12 Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of his passport
that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009. They then detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police
Station for about three (3) days. 13 The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group in Cotabato City, where he was detained for another 10 days. While in Cotabato City, the Criminal Investigation
and Detention Group allegedly made him sign and affix his thumbprint on documents. 14 On August 20, 2010, Salibo
was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Building, Camp
Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently detained.15
On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus 16 questioning
the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty.17 He maintained that he is not the accused Butukan S.
Malang.
Petitioner Salibo maintains that he is not the Butukan S. Malang charged with 57 counts of murder before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City. Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals' finding, he, Datukan Malang Salibo, was
not duly charged in court. He is being illegally deprived of his liberty and, therefore, his proper remedy is a Petition for
Habeas Corpus.47
As for respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo was duly charged in court. Even assuming that he is not
the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, petitioner Salibo should have pursued the ordinary
remedy of a Motion to Quash Information, not a Petition for Habeas Corpus.49
ISSUE: Is the charge against Salibo valid rendering the petition for habeas corpus unavailable to him?

RULING: No. Called the "great writ of liberty,"76 the writ of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom."77 The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary 78 and summary79 in nature, consistent with the law's "zealous
regard for personal liberty."80
Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus "shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person
is withheld from the person entitled thereto."81 The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal."82 "Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient."83
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as to entitle a person to the efficient remedy
of habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy 84 or when there is an alleged violation of the liberty
of abode.85 In other words, habeas corpus effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally
protected in the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. 86 Habeas corpus being a remedy for a
constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to
liberty will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes.87
It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained
under a lawful process or order of the court. 111 The restraint then has become legal,112 and the remedy of habeas corpus
is rendered moot and academic.113 Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order,
the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.
The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by
a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if such person is
charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.132 (Emphasis in the original)
In such cases, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary remedy of a petition for habeas corpus, persons
restrained under a lawful process or order of the court must pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual
remedies.133 This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the information or the warrant of arrest. 134
Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense. He was not restrained under a
lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself
of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City in People of
the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al . charged and accused Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang
Salibo, of 57 counts of murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre.