IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY vs COURT OF

APPEALS

FACTS:
Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created
by Presidential Decree No. 272 dated August 9, 1973
in order, to develop and promote the iron and steel
industry in the Philippines. P.D. No. 272 initially
created petitioner ISA for a term of 5 years, and when
ISAs original term expired on October 10, 1978, its
term was extended for another 10 years. The National
Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned
subsidiary of the National Development Corporation,
which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National
Government, embarked on an expansion program
embracing, among other things, the construction of
an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. Pursuant to the
expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239
was issued by the President of the Philippines on
November 16, 1982 withdrawing from sale or
settlement a large tract of public land located in Iligan
City and reserving that land for the use and
immediate occupancy of NSCs. Since certain portions
of the public land subject matter of Proclamation No.
2239 were occupied by a non-operational chemical
fertilizer plant owned by private respondent Maria
Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277,
also dated16 November 1982, was issued directing
the NSC to negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for
and on behalf of the Government, for the
compensation of MCFCs present occupancy rights
on the subject land. LOI No. 1277 also directed that
should NSC and private respondent MCFC fail to reach
an agreement within a period of 60 days from the
date of the LOI, petitioner ISA was to exercise its
power of eminent domain under P.D. No. 272 and to
initiate expropriation proceedings in respect of
occupancy rights of private respondent MCFC relating
to the subject public land as well as the plant itself
and related facilities and to cede the same to the
NSC. Negotiations between NSC and private
respondent MCFC did fail.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is
entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the
expiration of ISA's term.

HELD:
Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or
attributes
normally
associated
with
juridical
personality but did not possess general or
comprehensive juridical personality separate and
distinct from that of the Government. The ISA in fact
appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency
or instrumentality of the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines. ISA may thus be properly regarded

as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the

Philippines. When the statutory term of a nonincorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and
functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that
agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the
Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special
provisions of law specifying some other disposition
thereof such as, e.g., devolution or transmission of
such powers, duties, functions, etc. to some other
identified successor agency or instrumentality of the
Republic of the Philippines. When the expiring agency
is an incorporated one, the consequences of such
expiry must be looked for in the charter of that
agency and, by way of supplementation, in the
provisions of the Corporation Code. Since, in the
instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or
instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties,
functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded
as folded back into the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines and hence assumed once again by the
Republic, no special statutory provision having been
shown to have mandated succession thereto by some
other entity or agency of the Republic. In the instant
case, ISA instituted the expropriation proceedings in
its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative
of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its
authority under P.D. No. 272.From the foregoing
premises, it follows that the Republic of the
Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the
expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of
ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a
little differently, the expiration of ISA's statutory term
did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the
eminent domain proceedings.

ANTONIO
AUDIT

A.

MECANO

vs.

COMMISSION

ON

FACTS:
Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses
on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under
Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, in
his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioners claim on the
ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been
repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec.
Order No. 292), solely for the reason that the same
section was not restated nor re-enacted in the latter.
Petitioner also anchored his claim on Department of
Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary Drilon
stating that the issuance of the Administrative Code
did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety
the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on the
other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of
the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke
or supplant in its entirety the RAC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987

repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917.

Whether or not the petition has merit.

HELD:
HELD:
NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due
course on petitioners claim for benefits.

Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that

where a statute of later date clearly reveals an
intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a
prior act on the subject, that intention must be given
effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there
must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker
that the intent in enacting the new law was to
abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be
clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general
rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation
of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will
continue so far as the two acts are the same from the
time of the first enactment.

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that

repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The
presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy
for the legislature is presumed to know the existing
laws on the subject and not to have enacted
inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes
should be read in pari materia.

BUKLOD VS ZAMORA

FACTS:
During the time of President Corazon Aquino, she
created the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) to primarily conduct anti-smuggling
operations in areas outside the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Customs. In the year 2000, President
Estrada issued an order deactivating the EIIB. He
subsequently ordered the employees of EIIB to be
separated from the service. Thereafter, he created the
Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force Aduana,
which EIIB employees claim to be essentially the
same as EIIB. The employees of EIIB, through the
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, invoked the Supreme
Courts power of judicial review in questioning the
said orders. EIIB employees maintained that the
president has no power to abolish a public office, as
that is a power solely lodged in the legislature; and
that the abolition violates their constitutional right to
security of tenure.

ISSUE:

No. It is a general rule that the power to abolish a

public office is lodged with the legislature. The
exception is when it comes to agencies, bureaus, and
other offices under the executive department, the
president may deactivate them pursuant to control
power over such offices, unless such office is created
by the Constitution. This is also germane to the
presidents power to reorganize the Office of the
President. Basis of such power also has its roots in
two laws i.e., PD 1772 and PD 1416. These decrees
expressly grant the President of the Philippines the
continuing authority to reorganize the national
government, which includes the power to group,
consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices,
to transfer functions, to create and classify functions,
services and activities and to standardize salaries and
materials.

Also, it cannot be said that there is bad faith in the

abolition of EIIB. EIIB allocations have always
exceeded P100 million per year. To save the
government some money, it needed to abolish it and
replace it with TF Aduana which has for its allocation
just P50 million. Further, TYF Aduana is invested more
power that EIIB never had, i.e., search and seizure
and arrest.

Lastly, EEIB employees right to security of tenure is

not violated. Since there is no bad faith in the
abolition of EIIB, such abolition is not infirm. Valid
abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation
of the incumbents. If the public office ceases to exist,
there is no separation or dismissal to speak of.
Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to
hold office. Except constitutional offices which provide
for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no
one can be said to have any vested right in an office
or its salary.

BAGAOISAN
VS
NAT'L
TOBACCO
ADMINISTRATION. G.R. No. 152845 : August 5,
2003.

FACTS:
The petitioner was terminated from there position in
the national tobacco administration as a result of the
executive order issued by president Estrada which
mandates for the stream lining of the national
tobacco administration, a government agency under
the department of agriculture. The petitioners filed a
letter of appeal to the civil service commission to
recall the order. Petitioner all file a petition for

certiorari with prohibition an mandamus with prayer

for preliminary mandatory injunction and a temporary
restraining order with the regional trial court of Batak
to prevent the respondent from enforcing the notice
of termination and from austing the petitioners in
there respective offices.

ISSUE:

The regional trial court issued an order ordering the

national tobacco administration to appoint the
petitioner to the o position similar to the one that they
hold before. The national tobacco administration
appealed to the court of appeals who reversed the
decision of the RTC. Petitioner appealed to the
supreme court.

HELD:

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the reorganization of the national
tobacco administration is valid true issuance of
executive order by the president.

HELD:
According to the supreme court, the president has the
power to reorganize an office to achieve simplicity
,economy and efficiency as provided under executive
order 292 sec. 31 and section 48 of RA 7645 which
provides that activities of executive agencies may be
scaled down if it is no longer essential for the delivery
of public service.

Whether or not the mandatory drug testing of

candidates for public office an unconstitutional
imposition of additional qualification on candidates for
Senator?

Yes. Section 36 (g) of RA 9165, requiring all

candidates for public office whether appointed or
elected both in the national or local government
undergo a mandatory drug test is UNCONSITUTIONAL.
Under Sec.3, Art. VI of the Constitution, an aspiring
candidate for Senator needs only to meet 5
qualifications: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration,
(3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. The Congress
cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these
qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade,
or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or
alter or enlarge the Constitution. It is basic that if a
law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no
effect. In the discharge of their defined functions, the
three departments of government have no choice but
to yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed.

GSIS vs CSC

FACTS:
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Admit Petition for En Banc
resolution and the Petition for an En Banc Resolution
are DENIED for lack of merit. Let entry of judgment be
made in due course. No costs.

PIMENTEL VS. COMELEC GR 161658, NOV. 3,

2003

FACTS:
Congress passed RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, and makes it mandatory for
candidates for public office, students of secondary
and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public
and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutors office with certain offenses, among other
personalities, to undergo a drug test. Hence, Senator
Pimentel, who is a senatorial candidate for the 2004
synchronized elections, challenged Section 36(g) of
the said law.

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)

dismissed six (6)employees as being "notoriously
undesirable," they having allegedly been found to be
connected with irregularities in the canvass of
supplies and materials. Five of these six dismissed
employees appealed to the Merit Systems Board. The
Board found the dismissals to be illegal because
affected without formal charges having been filed or
an opportunity given to the employees to answer, and
ordered the remand of the cases to the GSIS for
appropriate disciplinary proceedings. The GSIS
appealed to the Civil Service Commission. By
Resolution, the Commission ruled that the dismissal of
all five was indeed illegal. GSIS appealed to the SC
and affirmed the decision of the CSC with a
modification that it eliminated the payment of back
salaries until the outcome of the investigation and
reinstatement of only 3 employees since the other
two had died. The heirs of the deceased sought
execution of the order from the CSC which was
granted. SIS opposed and came to the SC on certiorari
contending that the CSC does not have any power to
execute its resolution or judgment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CSC had powers to execute its

resolution or judgment.

HELD:
The Civil Service Commission, like the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit, is a
constitutional
commission
invested
by
the
Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority
to administer the civil service, but also with quasijudicial powers. It has the authority to hear and
decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted
directly with it or brought to it on appeal. The Civil
Service Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89779 adopting, approving and putting into effect
simplified rules of procedure on administrative
disciplinary and protest cases, pursuant to the
authority granted by the constitutional and statutory
provisions. The provisions are analogous and entirely
consistent with the duty or responsibility reposed in
the Chairman by PD 807, subject to policies and
resolutions adopted by the Commission. In light of all
the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions,
it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service
Commission the power or authority to enforce or
order execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders
which, it should be stressed, it has been exercising
through the years. It would seem quite obvious that
the authority to decide cases is inutile unless
accompanied by the authority to see that what has
been decided is carried out.

Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of

adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and
adjudge cases, should normally and logically be
deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or
execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law
otherwise provides.

Death, however, has already sealed that outcome,

foreclosing the initiation of disciplinary administrative
proceedings, or the continuation of any then pending,
against the deceased employees. Whatever may be
said of the binding force of the Resolution of July 4,
1988 so far as, to all intents and purposes, it makes
exoneration in the administrative proceedings a
condition precedent to payment of back salaries, it
cannot exact an impossible performance or decree a
useless exercise.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS.

COURT OF APPEALS

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was

created through RA No. 4850 in order to execute the
policy
towards
environmental
protection
and
sustainable development so as to accelerate the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake
area and the surrounding provinces and towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850
since water quality studies have shown that the lake
will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check
the same.

EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions

and powers of the LLDA and enumerated the towns,
cities and provinces encompassed by the term
Laguna de Bay Region.
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government
Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed exclusive
jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges
within their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof
provides: Municipal corporations shall have the
authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal
waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore

Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion

to establish fishpens & fish cages to the consternation
of the LLDA.

The implementation of separate independent policies

in fish cages & fish pen operation and the
indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the
lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake with
fishpens,
thereby
aggravating
the
current
environmental problems and ecological stress of
Laguna Lake.
The LLDA then served notice to the general public
that (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture
structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31,
1993 are declared illegal; (2) those declared illegal
shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task
Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and (3)
owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally
charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as
amended by PD 813.

A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the

owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages
and other aqua-culture structures advising them to
dismantle their respective structures otherwise
demolition shall be effected.

ISSUES:
FACTS:

Which agency of the government the LLDA or the

towns and municipalities comprising the region

should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and

its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for
fishery privileges is concerned?

de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated

thereinand the authority to exercise such powers as
are by its charter vested on it.

Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?

ECHEGARAY V SECRETARY G.R. NO. 132601
OCTOBER 12, 1998
HELD:
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the
provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of EO No.927,
specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface
water for any projects or activities in or affecting the
said region. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted
to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant
fishery privileges on municipal waters. The provisions
of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating
the LLDA and granting the latter water rights
authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.

Where there is a conflict between a general law and a

special statute, latter should prevail since it evinces
the legislative intent more clearly than the general
statute.The special law is to be taken as an exception
to the general law in the absence of special
circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. Implied
repeals are not favored and, as much as possible,
effect must be given to all enactments of the
legislature. A special law cannot be repealed,
amended or altered by a subsequent general law by
mere implication.

The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was

granted for revenue purposes. On the other hand, the
power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fish
cages, and other aqua-culture structures is for the
purpose of effectively regulating & monitoring
activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake
control and management. It partakes of the nature of
police power which is the most pervasive, least
limitable and most demanding of all state powers
including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the
charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise
of police power should prevail over the LGC of 1991
on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and

quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with
authority to issue a cease and desist order and on
matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens,
fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in
Laguna de Bay.

Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of

the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, as amended. Thus,
the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue
permits for enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna

FACTS:
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo
Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 yearold daughter of his common-law spouse and the
imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said
crime.

He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for

the first time the issue of the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape.
The Court denied both motions.

In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change

the mode of execution of the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic
Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL
INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS
AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
7659.

The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from

carrying out the lethal injection against him under the
grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or
unusual punishment, being violative of due process, a
violation of the Philippines' obligations under
international covenants, an undue delegation of
legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise
by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and
an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the
Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.

In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal

protection as a ground.

The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this

Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the
Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that
the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or
unusual punishment; execution by lethal injection, as
authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned
rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most
modern, more humane, more economical, safer and
easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas

chamber); the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly
prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; R.A. No.
8177 properly delegated legislative power to
respondent Director; and that R.A. No. 8177 confers
the power to promulgate the implementing rules to
the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Health and the
Bureau of Corrections.

The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for

Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus
Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or
Appear as Amicus Curiae. They alleged similarly with
Echegarays arguments.

The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first

arguments. The court gave due course to the petition.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177
and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional
muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional
proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty
obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of
legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.

However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement

Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that could
not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic
appears missing in Section 19 of the implementing
rules which provides a manual for the execution
procedure. It was supposed to be confidential.

The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of

the implementing rules a vacuum. The Secretary of
Justice has practically abdicated the power to
promulgate the manual on the execution procedure to
the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not
providing for a mode of review and approval. Being a
mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice,
the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a
manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the
administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the
rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such
apparent abdication of departmental responsibility
renders the said paragraph invalid.

CARPIO VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 206 SCRA

290 (1992)

ISSUE:

FACTS:

Whether or not there was an undue delegation of

legislative power?

Petitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and

member of the Philippine Bar, filed this petition,
questioning the constitutionality of RA 6975 with a
prayer for TRO.

HELD:
R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which
define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out
its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which
will apply it. It indicates the circumstances under
which the legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A.
No. 8177 specifically requires that "the death
sentence shall be executed under the authority of the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so
far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person
under the sentence during the lethal injection as well
as during the proceedings prior to the execution."
Further, "the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to
be administered is sufficient to cause the
instantaneous death of the convict." The legislature
also mandated that "all personnel involved in the
administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior
to the performance of such task." The Court cannot
see that any useful purpose would be served by
requiring greater detail. The question raised is not the
definition of what constitutes a criminal offense, but
the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed
by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is
sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by
the administrative officials concerned is, canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing.

RA 6875, entitled AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT,
AND
FOR
OTHER
PURPOSES,
allegedly contravened Art. XVI, sec. 6 of the 1986
Constitution: The State shall establish and maintain
one police force, which shall be national in scope and
civilian in character, to be administered and
controlled by a national police commission. The
authority of local executives over the police units in
their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.

ISSUEs:
Whether or
Constitution

not

RA

6975

is

contrary

to

the

Whether or not Sec. 12 RA 6975 constitutes an

encroachment upon, interference with, and an
abdication by the President of, executive control and
commander-in-chief powers

HELD:
Power of Administrative Control

Power of Executive Control

NAPOLCOM is under the Office of the President.

Sec. 12 does not constitute abdication of commanderin-chief powers. It simply provides for the transition
period or process during which the national police
would gradually assume the civilian function of
safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under
this instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates
nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state,
in reiteration of the preponderant view, that the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of
the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties
under the Commander-in-Chief provision represent
only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him.
All his other functions are clearly civil in nature. His
position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent
with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle
that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over
the military.

SC held that the President has control of all executive

departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential
power of control over the executive branch of
government extends over all executive officers from
Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. In the
landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, the power of
control means the power of the President to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former with that of
the latter. It is said to be at the very heart of the
meaning of Chief Executive.

As a corollary rule to the control powers of the

President is the Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency. As the President cannot be expected to
exercise his control powers all at the same time and
in person, he will have to delegate some of them to
his Cabinet members.

Under
this
doctrine,
which
recognizes
the
establishment of a single executive, all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of
the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law
to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

Thus, the Presidents power of control is directly

exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet
who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus
and other offices under their respective jurisdictions
in the executive department.

The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the

reorganized DILG is merely an administrative
realignment that would bolster a system of
coordination and cooperation among the citizenry,
local executives and the integrated law enforcement
agencies and public safety agencies.

DENR VS DENR EMPLOYEES

FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of
the memorandum order issued by the Regional Exec.
Director of DENR, directing the immediate transfer of
the DENR 12 Regional Offices from Cotabato to
Koronadal City. The memorandum was issued
pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued by the
DENR Secretary.

Issue:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to
reorganize the DENR Region 12 Office.

HELD:
The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries
of such departments, performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. It is
corollary to the control power of the President as
provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987
Constitution: "The President shall have control of all
the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."

In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly

reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the
DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to
Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this
authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is
presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter
had not expressly repudiated the same.

CARINO VS. CHR

Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear

the issues involved

HELD:
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights
to have no such power; and that it was not meant by
the fundamental law to be another court or quasijudicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less
take over the functions of the latter.

FACTS:
Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass
concerted actions to protest the alleged failure of
public authorities to act upon their grievances. The
mass actions consisted in staying away from their
classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio,
gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary
of Education served them with an order to return to
work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to
heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the
Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively
charged, preventively suspended for 90 days
pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily
replaced.
An
investigation
committee
was
consequently formed to hear the charges.

When their motion for suspension was denied by the

Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a
walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire
proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed
dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for
9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the
meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue
of violation of the right of the striking teachers to due
process of law. The case was eventually elevated to
SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers
submitted sworn statements to Commission on
Human Rights to complain that while they were
participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly
learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly
without notice and consequently for reasons
completely unknown to them.

While the case was pending with CHR, SC

promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it
earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the
return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued
hearing its case and held that the striking teachers
were denied due process of law;they should not
have been replaced without a chance to reply to the
administrative charges; there had been violation of
their civil and political rights which the Commission is
empowered to investigate.

ISSUE:

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in

the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings
of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is
not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence
and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy
is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to
those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by
law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not
have.

Power to Investigate

The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to

the Commission the power to investigate all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative
or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that
power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may
adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for
contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the
course of any investigation conducted by it or under
its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution
to any person whose testimony or whose possession
of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth. It may also request
the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
agency in the performance of its functions, in the
conduct of its investigation or in extending such
remedy as may be required by its findings.

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and

determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasijudicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate
or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical
sense, these terms have well understood and quite
distinct meanings.

Investigate vs. Adjudicate

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to

examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,
research on, study. The dictionary definition of
"investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire
into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to
subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official
inquiry." The purpose of investigation , of course, is to
discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of
settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved
in the facts inquired into by application of the law to
the facts established by the inquiry.

the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights

had been transgressed. More particularly, the
Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits"
the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted
actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are
prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether
or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those
actions, and the failureof the teachers to discontinue
those actions, and return to their classes despite the
order to this effect by the Secretary of Education,
constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations
warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or
are justified by the grievances complained of by
them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by
each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any,
may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

Who has Power to Adjudicate?

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the
same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry
or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to
examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to
find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking
of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation " being in turn describe
as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which
ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L
Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain
matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood,

means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide,
determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary
defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and
duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of
issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle
judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to
decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or
quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially
in a case of controversy . . . ."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in

the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and
"adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide,
settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . .
Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the
entry of a judgment."

These are matters within the original jurisdiction of

the Sec. of Education, being within the scope of the
disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil
Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction
of the CSC.

Manner of Appeal

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the

conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in
disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately
based on substantial evidence; whether or not the
proceedings themselves are void or defective in not
having accorded the respondents due process; and
whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth
committed "human rights violations involving civil and
political rights," are matters which may be passed
upon and determined through a motion for
reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education
himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may
be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and
eventually the Supreme Court.

TECSON VS. SALAS, 34 SCRA 275

FACTS:

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights,

having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and
should not "try and resolve on the merits"
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers
HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means
to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that
in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against
the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by

Jose C. Tecson, Superintendent of Dredging, Bureau of

Public Works, was assigned to the Office of the
President to assist inthe San Fernando Port Project
through a directive from the Executive Secretary
worded
as
follows:
"Mr.
Jose
G.
Tecson,
Superintendent of Dredging Bureau of Public Works, is
hereby detailed to the Office of the President,
effective immediately, to assist in the San Fernando
Port Project. Mr. Tecson shall report directly to

Commodore Santiago Nuval Presidential Assistant on

Ports and Harbors." It was clearly set forth therein
that it was issued "by authority of the President."

In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No.

04-92), limiting the term of appointment of harbor
pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or
cancellation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the assignment of herein petitioner on
temporary detail to the office of Commodore Santiago
Nuval, Presidential Assistant on Ports and Harbors, by
the President of the Philippines thru the Executive
Secretary, constitutes removal from office without
cause.

RULING:
According to paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of
our Constitution, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to
act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the
executive department and the acts of the secretaries
of such departments, performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. The
detail of petitioner to the Office of the President is
unobjectionable. By no stretch of the imagination
could it be considered a removal. It was not even a
transfer. Even if it could be so viewed, the same
conclusion would emerge, as such was allowable
under the Civil Service Act provision then in force, so
long as there be no reduction in rank or salary, such
transfer therefore not being considered disciplinary
when made in the interest of public service. Nor is
there any merit to the assertion made in the brief of
petitioner that the directive of the Executive
Secretary, acting upon authority of the President,
needed the approval of the Civil Service Commission
and the Commissioner of the Budget for its
enforcement. Such a thought is repugnant to the very
concept of a single, not a plural, executive in whom is
vested the whole panoply of executive power. It is not
only illogical, but it does not make sense, to require
as a prerequisite to its validity the approval of
subordinate to an action taken by their superior, the
President, who tinder the Constitution is the
Executive, all prerogatives attaching to such branch
being vested in him solely. In that sense, for those
discharging purely executive function in the national
government, he lie gives orders to all and takes
orders from none.

CORONA
VS.
ASSOCIATION

FACTS:

UNITED

HARBOR

PILOTS

On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots

Association and the Manila Pilots Association, through
Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 0492 before the Department of Transportation and
Communication, but they were informed by then
DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that the matter of
reviewing, recalling or annulling PPAs administrative
issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors
as its governing body.

On December 23, 1992, the OP issued an order

directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the
implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In its answer,
the PPA countered that said administrative order was
issued in the exercise of its administrative control and
supervision over harbor pilots under Section 6-a (viii),
Article IV of P. D. No. 857, as amended, and it, along
with its implementing guidelines, was intended to
restore order in the ports and to improve the quality
of port services.

On March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant

Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C.
Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the
restraining order issued earlier. He concluded that
PPA-AO No. 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots and, for
all intents and purposes, was not the act of Dayan,
but of the PPA, which was merely implementing
Section 6 of P.D. No. 857, mandating it to control,
regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots
in any port district.

Consequently, respondents filed a petition for

certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
damages, before Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PPA-AO No. 04-92 is constitutional.

HELD:

The Court is convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was

issued in stark disregard of respondents right against
deprivation of property without due process of law. In
order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two
conditions must concur, namely, that there is a
deprivation and that such deprivation is done without
proper observance of due process. When one speaks
of due process of law, however, a distinction must be
made between matters of procedure and matters of
substance. In essence, procedural due process
refers to the method or manner by which the law is
enforced, while substantive due process requires
that the law itself, not merely the procedures by
which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable,
and just. PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be examined in
light of this distinction. In the performance of its
executive or legislative functions, such as issuing
rules and regulations, an administrative body need
not comply with the requirements of notice and
hearing.

There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has

taken on the nature of a property right. Even
petitioner Corona recognized this when he stated in
his March 17, 1993, decision that (t)he exercise of
ones profession falls within the constitutional
guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or
interference with, property rights without due
process. He merely expressed the opinion that (i)n
the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does
not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a
wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those
affected thereby, and that PPA-AO 04-92 does not
forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor
pilots of their profession. As will be presently
demonstrated, such supposition is gravely erroneous
and tends to perpetuate an administrative order
which is not only unreasonable but also superfluous.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. CA

FACTS:
Private respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit
institution, which conducts various programs and
activities that are beneficial to the public, especially
the young people, pursuant to its religious,
educational and charitable objectives. YMCA earned
an income from leasing out a portion of its premises
to small shop owners and from parking fees collected
from non-members. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR) issued an assessment for deficiency
income tax, deficiency expanded withholding taxes on
rentals and professional fees and deficiency
withholding tax on wages. YMCA protested the
assessment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the income of private respondent

YMCA from rentals of small shops and parking fees is
exempt from taxation

HELD:
YMCA argues that Art. VI, Sec. 28(3) of the
Constitution exempts charitable institutions from the
payment not only of property taxes but also of income
tax from any source. The Court is not persuaded. The
debates, interpellations and expressions of opinion of
the framers of the Constitution reveal their intent.
Justice Hilario Davide Jr., a former constitutional
commissioner, stressed during the Concom debate
that what is exempted is not the institution itself;
those exempted from real estate taxes are lands,
buildings and improvements actually, directly and
exclusively used
for
religious,
charitable
or
educational purposes. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, an eminent
authority on the Constitution and also a member of
the Concom, adhered to the same view that the
exemption created by said provision pertained only to
property taxes. In his treatise on taxation, Justice Jose
Vitug concurs, stating that the tax exemption covers
property taxes only. Indeed, the income tax
exemption claimed by YMCA finds no basis in Art. VI,
Sec. 28(3) of the Constitution.

YMCA also invokes Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3) of the

Constitution claiming that YMCA is a non-stock, nonprofit educational institution whose revenues and
assets are used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes so it is exempt from taxes on its
properties and income. The Court reiterates that
YMCA is exempt from the payment of property tax,
but not income tax on the rentals from its property.
The bare allegation alone that it is a non-stock, nonprofit educational institution is insufficient to justify its
exemption from the payment of income tax. Laws
allowing tax exemption are construed strictissimi juris.
Hence, for the YMCA to be granted the exemption it
claims under the aforecited provision, it must prove
with substantial evidence that: 1. it falls under the
classification
non-stock,
non-profit
educational
institution; and 2. the income it seeks to be exempted
from taxation is used actually, directly and exclusively
for educational purposes. However, the Court notes
that not a scintilla of evidence was submitted by
YMCA to prove that it met the said requisites.

YMCA is not an educational institution within the

purview of Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3) of the Constitution. The
term educational institution, when used in laws
granting tax exemptions, refers to a school, seminary,
college or educational establishment. Therefore,
YMCA cannot be deemed one of the educational
institutions covered by the said constitutional
provision. Moreover, the Court notes that YMCA did
not submit proof of the proportionate amount of the
subject income that was actually, directly and
exclusively used for educational purposes.

FACTS:
YNOT VS. IAC

FACTS:
There had been an existing law which prohibited the
slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the
law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned
the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as
well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984,
Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from
Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of
EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional
for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due
process. He said that the authority provided by EO
626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without
being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled
against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of
police power in order to promote general welfare so
as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of
carabaos.

On 9 December 1988, PSU entered into a

Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
("DENR") for the evaluation of eleven (11)
government reforestation operations in Pangasinan.
The evaluation project was part of the commitment of
the Asian Development Bank ("ADB") under the
ADB/OECF Forestry Sector Program Loan to the
Republic of the Philippines and was one among
identical project agreements entered into by the
DENR with sixteen (16) other state universities.

On 16 January 1989, per advice of the PSU Auditor-inCharge with respect to the payment of honoraria and
per diems of PSU personnel engaged in the review
and evaluation project, PSU Vice President for
Research and Extension and Assistant Project Director
Victorino P. Espero requested the Office of the
President, PSU, to have the University's Board of
Regents ("BOR") confirm the appointments or
designations of involved PSU personnel including the
rates of honoraria and per diems corresponding to
their specific roles and functions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD:
The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed
violates due process. EO 626-A created a presumption
based on the judgment of the executive. The
movement of carabaos from one area to the other
does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same
would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself
and explain why the carabaos are being transferred
before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the
challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the
police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to
the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the
owner of the property confiscated is denied the right
to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the
guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers
to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken.

The BOR approved the MOA on 30 January 1989 and

on 1 February 1989, PSU
issued Voucher
No. 8902007 representing the amount of P70, 375 for
payment of honoraria to PSU personnel engaged in
the project. Later, however, the approved honoraria
rates were found to be somewhat higher than the
rates provided for in the guidelines of National
Compensation Circular ("NCC") No. 53. Accordingly,
the amounts were adjusted downwards to conform to
NCC No. 53. Adjustments were made by deducting
amounts
from
subsequent
disbursements
of
honoraria. By June 1989, NCC No. 53 was being
complied with.

On 6 July 1989, Bonifacio Icu, COA resident auditor at

PSU, alleging that there were excess payments of
honoraria, issued a "Notice of Disallowance"
disallowing P64,925 from the amount of P70,37 stated
in Voucher No. 8902007, mentioned earlier. The
resident auditor based his action on the premise that
Compensation Policy Guidelines ("CPG") No. 80-4,
dated 7 August 1980, issued by the Department of
Budget and Management which provided for lower
rates than NCC No. 53 dated 21 June 1988, also
issued by the Department of Budget and
Management, was the schedule for honoraria and per
diems applicable to work done under the MOA of 9
December 1988 between the PSU and the DENR.

ISSUE:
ESLAO VS. COA

Whether or not the evaluation project is in fact a

"special project" and that there were excess of
payments of honoraria

HELD:
The instant evaluation project being a ForeignAssisted Project, the PSU personnels involved in the
project shall be paid according to the Budget Estimate
schedule of the MOA.

COA, under its constitutional mandate, is not

authorized to substitute its own judgment for any
applicable law or administrative regulation with the
wisdom or propriety of which, however, it does not
agree, at least not before such law or regulation is set
aside by the authorized agency of government i.e.,
the courts as unconstitutional or illegal and void.
The COA, like all other government agencies, must
respect
the
presumption
of
legality
and
constitutionality to which statutes and administrative
regulations are entitled until such statute or
regulation is repealed or amended, or until set aside
in appropriate case by a competent court and
ultimately the Supreme Court.

TOLEDO VS. CSC

FACTS:
Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by then Comelec
Chairman Ramon Felipe as Manager of the Education
and Information Department of the Comelec on May
1986, at which time Toledo was already more than 57
years old. Toledos appointment papers and his oath
of office were endorsed by the Comelec to the CSC on
June 1986 for approval and attestation. However, no
prior request for exemption from the provisions of
Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAPwhich prohibits the
appointment of persons 57 years old or above into
government service without prior CSC approvalwas
secured. Petitioner then reported for work.

HELD:
No. The Civil Service Act of 959 (RA 2260), which
established the CSC, contained no provision
prohibiting appointment or reinstatement into
government service of any person already 57 years
old. Sec 5 Rule 6 of the Revised Civil Service Rules,
which prohibits such, was purely the creation of CSC.
Marcoss PD 807 (Civil Service Decree), which
established a new CSC and superseded RA 2260, also
provided that rules and regulations shall become
effective only 30 days after publication in the OG or in
any newspaper of general circulation. The new CSC
adopted the CSRPAP . No provision re prohibition of
appointment of 57 year old made in PD 807;
prohibition was purely created by CSC.

The provision cannot be valid, being entirely a CSC

creation, it has no basis in the law which it was meant
to implement. It cannot be justified as a valid exercise
of its function of promulgating rules and regulations
for that function, to repeat, may legitimately be
exercised only for the purpose of carrying the
provisions of the law into effect; and since there is no
prohibition or restriction on the employment of 57year old persons in the statuteor any provision
respecting age as a factor in employmentthere was
nothing to carry into effect through an implementing
rule on the matter. The power vested in the CSC was
to implement the law or put it into effect, not to add
to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to
supply perceived omissions in it.

Additionally, the CSRPAP cannot be considered

effective as of the time of the application to Toledo of
a provision thereof, for the reason that said rules were
never published as required by both RA 2260 and PD
807. The argument that it was a mere reiteration of
existing law and circularized cannot stand as
formerly discussed.

AMERICAN TOBACCO VS. DIRECTOR OF PATENTS

Comelec, upon discovery of the lack of authority
required under CSRPAP, and CSC Memo Circular 5
issued Resolution No. 2066, which declared void from
the beginning Toledos appointment. Petitioner
appealed to CSC, which considered him a de facto
officer and his appointment voidable, and moved for
reconsideration but was denied, hence the present
petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CSRPAP provision is valid.

FACTS:
ATC et al filed before the Philippine Patent Office
concerning the use of trade mark and trade name.
ATC et al challenged the validity of Rule 168 of the
Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent
Office in Trademark Cases as amended, authorizing
the Director of Patents to designate any ranking
official of said office to hear inter partes
proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that all
judgments determining the merits of the case shall be

personally and directly prepared by the Director and

signed by him. These proceedings refer to the
hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or
trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the
purpose of determining the question of priority of
adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or
service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a
trade-mark or trade name pending at the Patent
Office. Petitioners filed their objections to the
authority of the hearing officers to hear their cases,
alleging that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and
void because under the law the Director must
personally hear and decide inter partes case. Said
objections were overruled by the Director of Patents,
hence, the present petition for mandamus, to compel
the Director of Patents to personally hear the cases of
petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the hearing done by hearing officers

are within due process.

HELD:
The SC ruled that the power to decide resides solely
in the administrative agency vested by law, this does
not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a
hearing on the basis of which the decision of the
administrative agency will be made. The rule that
requires an administrative officer to exercise his own
judgment and discretion does not preclude him from
utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative
procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and
report to him the facts, on the basis of which the
officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the
judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of
the officer authorized by law. Neither does due
process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing
require that the actual taking of testimony be before
the same officer who will make the decision in the
case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to
present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof, and the decision is supported by the
evidence in the record, there is no question that the
requirements of due process and fair trial are fully
met. In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility
on the part of the officer concerned as the actual
decision remains with and is made by said officer. It
is, however, required that to give the substance of a
hearing, which is for the purpose of making
determinations upon evidence the officer who makes
the determinations must consider and appraise the
evidence which justifies them.

PHIL COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORP. VS.

ALCUAZ

FACTS:
By virtue of RA 5514, Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation was granted a franchise to
establish, construct, maintain and operate in the
Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select,
station or stations and associated equipment and
facilities for international satellite communications.
Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the
authority to construct and operate such ground
facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications
services from the communications satellite system
and ground terminal or terminals. Under Sec 5 of the
same law, PhilComSat was exempt from the
jurisdiction, control and regulation of the Public
Service Commission later known as the National
Telecommunications Commission. However, EO 196
was later proclaimed and the same has placed
PhilComSat
under
the
jurisdiction
of
NTC.
Consequently, PhilComSat has to acquire permit to
operate from NTC in order to continue operating its
existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but
it however directed PhilComSat to reduce its current
rates by 15%. NTC based its power to fix the rates on
EO 546. PhilComSat assailed the said directive and
holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of respondent
NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service
communications does not provide the necessary
standards constitutionally required hence there is an
undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the
adjudicatory powers of NTC. PhilComSat asserts that
nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing for the
creation of respondent NTC and granting its ratefixing powers, nor of EO 196, placing petitioner under
the jurisdiction of respondent NTC, can it be inferred
that respondent NTC is guided by any standard in the
exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers.
PhilComSat subsequently clarified its said submission
to mean that the order mandating a reduction of
certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but
of quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC, the
exercise of which allegedly requires an express
conferment by the legislative body.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.

HELD:
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative
power may be sustained only upon the ground that
some standard for its exercise is provided and that
the legislature in making the delegation has
prescribed the manner of the exercise of the
delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative
agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a
rate, its act must both be non-confiscatory and must
have been established in the manner prescribed by
the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed
standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing

power, the only standard which the legislature is

required to prescribe for the guidance of the
administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable
and just. However, it has been held that even in the
absence of an express requirement as to
reasonableness, this standard may be implied. In the
case at bar, the fixed rate is found to be of merit and
reasonable.

resolution dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal

was dismissed for having been filed out of time.

RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP VS. NLRC

Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative

law that administrative regulations and policies
enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law
which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of
law, and are entitled to great respect.

FACTS
In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R.
Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire
Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary
of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he was made a
regular employee, having been appointed as clerktypist, with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a
permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of
petitioner company's "General Information, Office
Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the
same year, without change in his positiondesignation, he was transferred to the Claims
Department and his salary was increased to P450,00
a month. In 1980, he was transferred to the
Underwriting Department and his salary was
increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living
allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire
Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was made
an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary
of P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits.

On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R.

Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the
grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences.
Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of
Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision
dated March 14, Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz
reinstated him to his position with back wages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it is still within the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.

HELD:
The record shows that the employer (petitioner
herein) received a copy of the decision of the Labor
Arbiter on April 1, 1985. It filed a Motion for Extension
of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April 11,
1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April
22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the
National Labor Relations Commission, aforesaid
motion for extension of time was denied in its

It will be noted however, that the foregoing provision

refers to the Rules of Court. On the other hand, the
Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations
Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room
for interpretation.

Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised

NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case
has become final and executory and can no longer be
subject to appeal.

MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE INC VS SEC

FACTS:
The SEC in its resolution, denied the Makati Stock
Exchange, Inc permission to operate a stock exchange
unless it agreed not to list for trading on its board,
securities already listed in the Manila Stock Exchange.
Objecting to the requirement, Makati Stock Exchange,
Inc. Contends that the Commission has no power to
impose it and that anyway, it is illegal, discriminatory
and unjust. The Commissions order or resolution
would make impossible, for all practical purposes, for
the Makati Stock Exchange to operate, such that its
permission amounted to prohibition.
ISSUE:
Does the Commission have
promulgate the rule in question?

the

authority

to

HELD:
None.
Test for determining the existence of authority
The commission cites no provision of law expressly
supporting its rule against double listing. It suggests
that the power is necessary for the execution of the
functions vested in it. It argues that said rule was
approved by the Department Head before the war and
it is not in conflict with the provisions of the Securities
Act. The approval of the Department, by itself, adds
no weight in judicial litigation.
The test is not whether the Act forbids Commission
from imposing a prohibition but whether it empowers
the Commission to prohibit.
Commission without power to impose prohibition
The Commission possesses no power to impose the
condition of the rule which results in discrimination
and violation of constitutional rights. It is fundamental
that an administrative officer has such powers as are
expressly granted to him by statute, and those
necessarily
implied
in
the
exercise
thereof.
Accordingly, the license of Makati Stock Exchange is
approved without such condition against double
listing.

HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION VS

SEC DEFENSOR
FACTS:
Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of
presidential issuances authorized the creation and
development of what is now known as the National
Government Center (NGC). On March 5, 1972, former
President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No.
1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills,
Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares as a
national government site to be known as the NGC. On
August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the 440
hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of
Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the
disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to
the bona fide residents therein.
In view of the rapid increase in population density in
the portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from
the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former
President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on
September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical
development of the excluded portion to maximize the
number of families who can effectively become
beneficiaries of the governments socialized housing
program. On May 14, 2003, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207.
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared
the policy of the State to secure the land tenure of the
urban poor. Toward this end, lands located in the NGC,
Quezon City shall be utilized for housing,
socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious and other
purposes.
Sec. 3. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National
Government Center Site to Bona Fide Residents.
Proclamation No. 1826, Series of 1979, is hereby
amended by excluding from the coverage thereof,
184 hectares on the west side and 238 hectares on
the east side of Commonwealth Avenue, and
declaring the same open for disposition to bona fide
residents therein: Provided, That the determination of
the bona fide residents on the west side shall be
based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and
the determination of the bona fide residents on the
east side shall be based on the census survey
conducted in 1994 and occupancy verification survey
conducted in 2000: Provided, further, That all existing
legal agreements, programs and plans signed, drawn
up or implemented and actions taken, consistent with
the provisions of this Act are hereby adopted.
Sec.4. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National
Government Center Site for Local Government or
Community Facilities, Socioeconomic, Charitable,
Educational and Religious Purposes. Certain portions
of land within the aforesaid area for local government
or community facilities, socioeconomic, charitable,
educational and religious institutions are hereby
reserved for disposition for such purposes: Provided,
That only those institutions already operating and
with existing facilities or structures, or those
occupying the land may avail of the disposition
program established under the provisions this
Act; Provided, further, That in ascertaining the specific
areas that may be disposed of in favor of these

institutions, the existing site allocation shall be used

as basis therefore: Provided, finally. That in
determining the reasonable lot allocation of such
institutions without specific lot allocations, the land
area that may be allocated to them shall be based on
the area actually used by said institutions at the time
of effectivity of this Act.
ISSUE:
Whether an IRR issued by an administrative office
may be reviewed by Courts
HELD:
Yes. Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative
or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative
or rule-making power is the power to make rules and
regulations which results in delegated legislation that
is within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of
powers.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule
or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a
party need not exhaust administrative remedies
before going to court. This principle, however, applies
only where the act of the administrative agency
concerned was performed pursuant to its quasijudicial
function, and not when the assailed act pertained to
its
rule-making
or
quasi-legislative
power.

The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasilegislative power of the Committee expressly
authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly
on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the
Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not
germane to the object and purpose of the statute it
seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation
issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the
regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the
same. Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to
pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by
the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative
power, the judicial course to assail its validity must
follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although
the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does
not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice
of court forum.
True, this Court has the full discretionary power to
take cognizance of the petition filed directly with it if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of
the issues raised, so warrant. A direct invocation of
the Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition.
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy
to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasilegislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary
writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-

judicial
or
ministerial
functions,
ordering
said entity or person to desist from further
proceedings when said proceedings are without or in
excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are
accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[20]
[21]
Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions,
but not against legislative or quasi-legislative
functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of
prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of
its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration
of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper
remedy to afford relief against usurpation of
jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in
the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly
within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses
the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there
is
no
adequate
remedy
available
in
the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be
obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to
invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary
action for its nullification, an action which properly
falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
In any case, petitioners allegation that respondents
are performing or threatening to perform functions
without or in excess of their jurisdiction may
appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a
writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is
DISMISSED.

PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATION
EXPORTERS VS TORRES

OF

SERVICE

HELD:
FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their
authority

and

did

not

commit

grave

abuse

of

discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC) clearly

grants the Labor Secretary to restrict and regulate
recruitment and placement activities, to wit:
Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor
shall have the power to restrict and regulate the
recruitment and placement activities of all agencies
within the coverage of this title [Regulation of
Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby
authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out the objectives and implement
the provisions of this title.
SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasijudicial

powers

in

administrative

bodies

is

constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing

complexities of the modern society.
THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however,
invalid and unenforceable. The reason is the lack of
proper publication and filing in the Office of the
National Administrative Registrar as required in Article
2 of the Civil Code to wit:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided;

FACTS:
DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department

Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit:

Order No. 16 Series of 1991 temporarily suspending

the recruitment by private employment agencies of

Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of

Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. As a

Labor and other government agencies charged with

result of the department order DOLE, through the

the administration and enforcement of this Code or

POEA took over the business of deploying Hong Kong

any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary

bound workers.

implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and

regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days

The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of

after announcement of their adoption in newspapers

private employment and recruitment agencies duly

of general circulation; and Sections 3(1) and 4,

licensed and authorized by the POEA to engage in the

Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of

business

1987 which provide:

Filipino

of

obtaining

land-based

overseas

workers

filed

employment
a

petition

for
for

prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and to

Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the

prohibit implementation.

University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3)

certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in

ISSUES:

force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are

whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of

not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter

discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making

be the basis of any sanction against any party or

authority in issuing said circulars;

persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative

whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars

Code of 1987.)

are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable,

unfair and oppressive; and

Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making

whether or not the requirements of publication and

requirements provided by law not inconsistent with

filing with the Office of the National Administrative

this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen

Register were not complied with.

(15) days from the date of filing as above provided

emergency rules known to persons who may be

unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in

affected by them. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the

the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health,

Administrative Code of 1987).

safety and welfare, the existence of which must be

expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The
agency shall take appropriate measures to make

Prohibition granted.