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SAN JUAN v. CSC, DBM, and ALMAJOSE (1991)

Gutierrez, Jr., J.
NATURE: Pursuant to Consti Art. IX (A) Sec 7, Petitioner Governor of Rizal prays for the nullification of Resolution 89-868 (1989) &
Res. 90-150 (1990) of the Civil Service Commission

The Resolutions resolved to dismiss the appeal of the governor and approved the appointment of Cecilia Almajose as
Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal

The 2nd Resolution denied the governors MR

FACTS:

In 1988, the position of Rizal Prov. Budget Officer (PBO) was left vacant. Its former holder was a certain del Rosario.

Gov. Reynaldo San Juan informed the Department of Budget & Management that Dalisay Santos assumed office as
Acting PBO, pursuant to a Memo issued by the Governor.
o
He requested then DBM Region 4 Dir. Abella to endorse the appointment of Santos as PBO of Rizal. Before
being an Acting PBO, Santos was Municipal Budget Officer.

The Director addressed a Memo to the DBM Secretary that based on a comparative study of all Municipal Budget
Officers which included 3 nominees of the Governor, Cecilia Almajose was the most qualified since she was the only
CPA among the contenders.
o
Upon this recommendation by the Director, DBM Undersecretary Cabuquit Jr signed the appointment papers
of Almajose

The Governor wrote to Secretary Carague, reiterating his request for the appointment of Santos
o
DBM Director Galvez wrote the Governor that Santos and his other recommendees did not meet the minimum
requirements under Local Budget Circular 31.

The Governor, after being informed of Almajoses appointment, wrote to Secretary Carague, protesting against the
appointment on the grounds:
o
That Cabuquit (as DBM USec) is not legally authorized to appoint the PBO
o
That Almajose lacks the required 3 yrs experience as provided in Local Budget Circular 31
o
That under EO 112, it is the Provincial Governor who has the power to recommend nominees for the
position of PBO

The DBM Director of the Bureau of Legal & Legislative Affairs issued a Memo ruling that the Governors letter-protest
is not meritorious because DBM validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up the position.

The Governor wrote the CSC protesting the appointment of Almajose.

The CSC then issued the resolutions (denying the Governors appeal).
ISSUE/HELD: In the event that the Governor recommends an unqualified person, is the Secretary free to appoint anyone he
fancies? ---- NO
Governors argument:

He, as the Governor, has the sole right and privilege to recommend nominees to the position and that the appointee
should come only from his nominees. He invokes EO 112 Sec 1:
o
Sec. 1. All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities shall be appointed by the Minister of Budget
and Management upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned, subject to civil service law,
rules and regulations, and they shall be placed under the administrative control and technical supervision of the
Ministry of Budget and Management.
RATIO:

Under EO 112, the governors power to recommend is subject to the qualifications prescribed by law. If the
recommendations fall short of the standard, the Secretary of DBM is expected to reject them.
But if the recommendations are unqualified, can the Secretary appoint anyone he fancies? (SC says no.)
Before EO 112, BP 337 (Local Govt Code) vested upon the Governor the power to appoint the PBO. This Code further
enumerated the qualifications for the position:
o
Citizen of the Phils
o
Of good moral character
o
A holder of a degree preferably in law, commerce, public administration or any related course from a recognized
college or university
o
A first grade civil service eligibility or its equivalent
o
Has acquired at least 5 yrs experience in budgeting or in any related field
The Governor argues:
o
Since the authority to appoint the PBO was vested in him before, the real intent of EO 112 in empowering him
to recommend is to make such recommendation part and parcel of the appointment process
o
That the phrase "upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned" must be given mandatory
application in consonance with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under
Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2.
o
That his power to recommend cannot validly be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of DBM reserving
to itself the right to fill-up any existing vacancy in case the governors nominees do not meet the qualification
requirements as embodied in public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 31
The CSCs justification is this:

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As required by EO 112, the DBM Secretary may choose from among the recommendees of the Governor who
are qualified for appointment to the position of PBO. Notwithstanding, the recommendation is merely directory
and not a condition sine qua non to the exercise by the Secretary of DBM of his appointing prerogative.
o
To rule otherwise would in effect give the law or EO 112 a different interpretation or construction not intended
o
It cannot be said that said national officer (PBO) has a similar role in the LGU, to that of a Commission on Audit
resident auditor. Hence, to preserve and maintain the independence of the PBO from the LGU, he must be
primarily the choice of the national appointing official, and the appointment power must not be unduly
hampered or interfered with.
o
The appointing official is not restricted to the list recommended by the local chief executive. He may consider
other nominees for the position vis a vis the nominees of the local chief executive.
The tug of war between the Secretary of DBM and the Governor involves the application of a most impt consti policy: that
of local autonomy.
o
We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy.
o
Where a law is capable of 2 interpretations, 1 in favor of centralized power in Malacanang, the other beneficial
to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy
The exercise by LGUs of meaningful power has been a national goal since the turn of the century. And yet, inspite of
constitutional provisions and legislation mandating greater autonomy, national officers cannot seem to let go of centralized
powers.
Pres. McKinleys instructions in 1900 ordered the new govt to devote their attention to the establishment of municipal
govts in which natives of the islands are to be afforded the opportunity to manage their own local offices
o
In this initial organic act, the Second Phil Commission, combined both exec and legis powers, was directed to
give priority to making local autonomy effective
The 1935 Consti had no specific article on local autonomy. However, in Art VII Sec 11: The President shall have control of
all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed
o
The Consti clearly limited the exec power over local govt to gen. supervision as may be provided by law
o
The Pres controls the exec dept; he has no such power over local govts
In the case of Tecson v. Salas, it was said: the presidential competence is not even supervision in general, but general
supervision as may be provided by law.
o
He could not go beyond the applicable statutory provs
o
Supervision goes no further than "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If they fail to fulfill them, the superior officer may take such action as prescribed by
law to make them perform their duties
o
Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate had done in
the performance of their duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Pursuant to this principle under the 1935 Consti, legislation implementing local autonomy was enacted. RA 2264 An Act
Amending the Law Governing Local Governments by Increasing Their Autonomy and Reorganizing Local Governments.
It was followed by RA 5185 (the Decentralization Law) was enacted, giving "further autonomous powers to local
governments in 1967.
By the 1973 Consti, legal provs moved towards greater economy. In Art II:
o
Sec. 10. The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the
barangay to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities
An entire article on Local Govt was incorporated into the Consti. It called for a local govt code defining more responsive
and accountable local govt structures.
In the present Consti, the exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked:
o
Art II. Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments
o
The 14 sections in Article X on Local Government not only reiterate earlier doctrines but give in greater detail
the provisions making local autonomy more meaningful
o
Art X. Sec 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
o
Art X. Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their
powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal,
term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units.
When the CSC interpreted the recommending power of the Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter
and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy
The right given by Local Budget Circular 31 is ultra vires and is set aside: this one---o
Sec. 6 The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none of the nominees of the local
chief executive meet the prescribed requirements.
The PBO is expected to synchronize his work with DBM. Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the local
level and after completion are forwarded to the national officials for review.
o
It is for this reason that there should be interplay, a balancing of viewpoints, and a harmonization of
proposals from both the local and national officials.
o
It is for this reason that the nomination and appointment process involves a sharing of power between the
two levels of government.
The appointment of the Almajose was formalized before the Governor was extended the courtesy of being informed that
his nominee had been rejected. The complete disregard of the local government's prerogative and the smug belief
that the DBM has absolute wisdom, authority, and discretion are manifest.

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In his classic work "Philippine Political Law" Dean Sinco stated that the value of local governments as institutions of
democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy.
Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also
appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are based.

Petition granted. CSC resolutions set aside.