Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 80508 January 30, 1990
EDDIE GUAZON, JOSEFINA CABRERA, YOLANDA DACUNES, VIOLETA
SEVILLA, QUERUBIN BILLONES, ESTELITA BILLONES, GORGONIA
MACARAEG, LAUREANA JOAQUIN, CRESTITA LICUP, SOLIDAD ABURDO,
ROSALINA VILLARDA, CONRADA HOBALANE, ERLINDA RESTORAN, VERIDIAN
FLORA, ROSELA CONDE, SOSIMA COSTO, JOSEFINA ALDIANO, ROSALINA
DOMINGO, ARESTIO YANGA, MILAGROS GONZALES, ESTRELITA ESTARES,
BONIFACIA ANTIVO, PATRIA VALLES, ERLINDA LEE, MELANIO GAROFIL,
ERIBERTO MATEO, FRANCISCO HORTILLANO, ANATALIA PESIMO, LOSENDO
GARBO, VIRGINIA LORESTO, LYDIA ELA, RAFAEL VILLABRILLE, MA.
RECHILDA SABALZA, EDITHA MAAMO, ELENIETA BANOSA, ALEXANDER
LABADO, ANDREW GO, WYNEFREDO REYES, ROSARIO SESPENE, ROSA
MARTIN and JAIME BONGAT,petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, BRIG. GEN.
RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO LIM, and COL. JESUS
GARCIA, respondents.
According to the petitioners, the following "saturation drives" were conducted in Metro
Manila:
1. March 5, 1987 at about 9:30 PM in Tindalo, Kagitingan, and Magdalena Streets,
Tondo, Manila.
2. June l9, 1987 at about l0:00 PM in Mata Street, Panday Pira Extension and San
Sebastian Street, Tondo, Manila.
3. July 20, 1987 at about 8:00 AM in Bangkusay Street, Tondo, Manila.
4. August 11 to l3, 1987 between 11:00 PM and 2:00 AM in six blocks along Aroma
Beach up to Happy Land, Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila.
5. August 19, 1987 at 9:00 PM in Herbosa Extension, Quirino Street, and Pacheco
Street, Tondo, Manila.
6. August 28, 1987 at l0:30 PM, in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan Navotas, Metro Manila.
7. August 30, 1987 at 9:30 PM at Paraiso Extension, Magsaysay Village, Tondo,
Manila.
8. October 12, 1987 at 12:00 midnight in Apelo Cruz Compound, Quezon City.
9. October 17, 1987 at 11:00 PM in Quirino Street, Tondo, Manila.
10. October 23, 1987 at 2:30 A.M. in Sun Valley Drive, Manila International Airport,
Pasay City.
11. November 1, 1987 at 4:00 A.M. in Cordillera Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila.
12. November 3, 1987 at 5:00 A.M. in Lower Maricaban, Pasay City, Metro Manila.
According to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or saturation drives" are in
critical areas pinpointed by the military and police as places where the subversives are
hiding. The arrests range from seven (7) persons during the July 20 saturation drive in
Bangkusay, Tondo to one thousand five hundred (1,500) allegedly apprehended on
November 3 during the drive at Lower Maricaban, Pasay City. The petitioners claim
that the saturation drives follow a common pattern of human rights abuses. In all these
drives, it is alleged that the following were committed:
1. Having no specific target house in mind, in the dead of the night or early
morning hours, police and military units without any search warrant or
warrant of arrest cordon an area of more than one residence and
sometimes whole barangay or areas of barangay in Metro Manila. Most of
them are in civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards.
2. These raiders rudely rouse residents from their sleep by banging on the
walls and windows of their homes, shouting, kicking their doors open
(destroying some in the process), and then ordering the residents within to
come out of their respective residences.
3. The residents at the point of high-powered guns are herded like cows,
the men are ordered to strip down to their briefs and examined for tattoo
marks and other imagined marks.
4. While the examination of the bodies of the men are being conducted by
the raiders, some of the members of the raiding team force their way into
each and every house within the cordoned off area and then proceed to
conduct search of the said houses without civilian witnesses from the
neighborhood.
5. In many instances, many residents have complained that the raiders
ransack their homes, tossing about the residents' belongings without total
regard for their value. In several instances, walls are destroyed, ceilings are
damaged in the raiders' illegal effort to 'fish' for incriminating evidence.
6. Some victims of these illegal operations have complained with increasing
frequency that their money and valuables have disappeared after the said
operations.
7. All men and some women who respond to these illegal and unwelcome
intrusions are arrested on the spot and hauled off to waiting vehicles that
take them to detention centers where they are interrogated and 'verified.'
These arrests are all conducted without any warrants of arrest duly issued
by a judge, nor under the conditions that will authorize warrantless arrest.
Some hooded men are used to fingerpoint suspected subversives.
8. In some instances, arrested persons are released after the expiration of
the period wherein they can be legally detained without any charge at all. In
other instances, some arrested persons are released without charge after a
few days of arbitrary detention.
9. The raiders almost always brandish their weapons and point them at the
residents during these illegal operations.
10. Many have also reported incidents of on-the-spotbeatings, maulings
and maltreatment.
11. Those who are detained for further 'verification' by the raiders are
subjected to mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical
information. (Rollo, pp. 2-4)
The public respondents stress two points in their Comment which was also adopted as
their Memorandum after the petition was given due course.
First, the respondents have legal authority to conduct saturation drives. And second,
they allege that the accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate disregard for
human rights are total lies.
Insofar as the legal basis for saturation drives is concerned, the respondents cite
Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution which provides:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis
supplied )
They also cite Section 18 of the same Article which provides:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
...
There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the police action of the
nature described by the petitioners would be illegal and blantantly violative of the
express guarantees of the Bill of Rights. If the military and the police must conduct
concerted campaigns to flush out and catch criminal elements, such drives must be
consistent with the constitutional and statutory rights of all the people affected by such
actions.
There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which denies the authority of the Chief
Executive, invoked by the Solicitor General, to order police actions to stop unabated
criminality, rising lawlessness, and alarming communist activities. The Constitution
grants to Government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements which
would bring down constituted authority and substitute a regime where individual
liberties are suppressed as a matter of policy in the name of security of the State.
However, all police actions are governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. The
Government cannot adopt the same reprehensible methods of authoritarian systems
both of the right and of the left, the enlargement of whose spheres of influence it is
trying hard to suppress. Our democratic institutions may still be fragile but they are not
in the least bit strengthened through violations of the constitutional protections which
are their distinguishing features.
In Roan v. Gonzales (145 SCRA 687; 690-691 [1986]), the Court stated:
One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right to
be left alone in the privacy of his own house. That right has ancient roots,
dating back through the mists of history to the mighty English kings in their
fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly subject had his own castle where
he was monarch of all he surveyed. This was his humble cottage from
which he could bar his sovereign lord and all the forces of the Crown.
That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian
regimes. Their number, regrettably, continues to dwindle against the
onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are among the fortunate few, able again
to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the past despotism. We must cherish
and protect it all the more now because it is like a prodigal son returning.
That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the 1973
Constitution:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Only last year, the Court again issued this reminder in 20th Century Fox Film
Corporation v. Court of Appeals (164 SCRA 655; 660- 661 [1988]):
This constitutional right protects a citizen against wanton and unreasonable
invasion of his privacy and liberty as to his person, papers and effects. We
have explained in the case of People vs. Burgos(144 SCRA 1)
citing Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why the right is so important:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it
could be also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected
area, primarily one's home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa
v. United States, 385 US 293 [1966]) What is sought to be guarded is a
man's prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that
haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of
who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around
him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access
except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from
any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. (Cf.
The individual's right to immunity from such invasion of his body was considered as "far
outweighed by the value of its deterrent effect" on the evil sought to be avoided by the
police action.
It is clear, therefore, that the nature of the affirmative relief hinges closely on the
determination of the exact facts surrounding a particular case.
The violations of human rights alleged by the petitioners are serious. If an orderly
procedure ascertains their truth, not only a writ of prohibition but criminal prosecutions
would immediately issue as a matter of course. A persistent pattern of wholesale and
gross abuse of civil liberties, as alleged in the petition, has no place in civilized society.
On the other hand, according to the respondents, the statements made by the
petitioners are a complete lie.
The Solicitor General argues:
This a complete lie.
Just the contrary, they had been conducted with due regard to human
rights. Not only that, they were intelligently and carefully planned months
ahead of the actual operation. They were executed in coordination with
barangay officials who pleaded with their constituents to submit themselves
voluntarily for character and personal verification. Local and foreign
correspondents, who had joined these operations, witnessed and recorded
the events that transpired relative thereto. (After Operation Reports:
November 5, 1987, Annex 12; November 20, 1987, Annex 13; November
24, 1987, Annex 14). That is why in all the drives so far conducted, the
alleged victims who numbered thousands had not themselves complained.
In her speech during turn-over rites on January 26, 1987 at Camp
Aguinaldo, President Aquino branded all accusations of deliberate
disregard for human rights as 'total lies'. Here are excerpts from her
strongest speech yet in support of the military:
All accusations of a deliberate disregard for human rights have been
shown- up to be total lies.
...To our soldiers, let me say go out and fight, fight with every assurance
that I will stand by you through thick and thin to share the blame, defend
your actions, mourn the losses and enjoy with you the final victory that I am
certain will be ours.
You and I will see this through together.
I've sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution.
We have wasted enough time answering their barkings for it is still a long
way to lasting peace. . . . The dangers and hardships to our men in the field
are great enough as it is without having them distracted by tills worthless
carping at their backs.
Our counter-insurgency policy remains the same: economic development
to pull out the roots-and military operations to slash the growth of the
insurgency.
The answer to terror is force now.
Only feats of arms can buy us the time needed to make our economic and
social initiatives bear fruit. . . Now that the extreme Right has been
defeated, I expect greater vigor in the prosecution of the war against the
communist insurgency, even as we continue to watch our backs against
attacks from the Right. (Philippine Star, January 27, 1988, p. 1, Annex 15;
emphasis supplied)
Viewed in the light of President Aquino's observation on the matter, it can
be said that petitioners misrepresent as human rights violations the military
and police's zealous vigilance over the people's right to live in peace and
safety. (Rollo, pp. 36-38)
Herein lies the problem of the Court. We can only guess the truth. Everything before us
consists of allegations. According to the petitioners, more than 3,407 persons were
arrested in the saturation drives covered by the petition. No estimates are given for the
drives in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas; Apelo Cruz Compound, Pasig; and Sun
Valley Drive near the Manila International Airport area. Not one of the several thousand
persons treated in the illegal and inhuman manner described by the petitioners
appears as a petitioner or has come before a trial court to present the kind of evidence
admissible in courts of justice. Moreover, there must have been tens of thousands of
nearby residents who were inconvenienced in addition to the several thousand
allegedly arrested. None of those arrested has apparently been charged and none of
those affected has apparently complained.
A particularly intriguing aspect of the Solicitor General's comments is the statement
that local and foreign co-respondents actually joined the saturation drives and
witnessed and recorded the events. In other words, the activities sought to be
completely proscribed were in full view of media. The sight of hooded men allegedly
being used to fingerpoint suspected subversives would have been good television
copy. If true, this was probably effected away from the ubiquitous eye of the TV
cameras or, as the Solicitor General contends, the allegation is a "complete lie."
The latest attempt to stage a coup d'etat where several thousand members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines sought to overthrow the present Government
introduces another aspect of the problem and illustrates quite clearly why those directly
affected by human rights violations should be the ones to institute court actions and
why evidence of what actually transpired should first be developed before petitions are
filed with this Court.
Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military may go in
force to the combat areas, enter affected residences or buildings, round up suspected
rebels and otherwise quell the mutiny or rebellion without having to secure search
warrants and without violating the Bill of Rights. This is exactly what happened in the
White Plains Subdivision and the commercial center of Makati during the first week of
December, 1989.
The areal target zonings in this petition were intended to flush out subversives and
criminal elements particularly because of the blatant assassinations of public officers
and police officials by elements supposedly coddled by the communities where the
"drives" were conducted.
It is clear from the pleadings of both petitioners and respondents, however, that there
was no rebellion or criminal activity similar to that of the attempted coup d' etats. There
appears to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest
before any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested.
There is no strong showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "areal
zoning" could not be achieved even as the rights of squatter and low income families
are fully protected.
Where a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitution is
involved, it is the duty of the court to stop the transgression and state where even the
awesome power of the state may not encroach upon the rights of the individual. It is
the duty of the court to take remedial action even in cases such as the present petition
where the petitioners do not complain that they were victims of the police actions,
where no names of any of the thousands of alleged victims are given, and where the
prayer is a general one to stop all police "saturation drives," as long as the Court is
convinced that the event actually happened.
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually committed.
This is so inspite of the alleged pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of
residents "to submit themselves voluntarily for character and personal verification." We
cannot imagine police actions of the magnitude described in the petitions and admitted
by the respondents, being undertaken without some undisciplined soldiers and
policemen committing certain abuses. However, the remedy is not to stop all police
actions, including the essential and legitimate ones. We see nothing wrong in police
making their presence visibly felt in troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots or
violent demonstrations if they do not move in sufficient numbers. A show of force is
sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not violated. A
blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions
to one on one confrontations where search warrants and warrants of arrests against
specific individuals are easily procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police
decide to sit down in their offices because all concerted drives where a show of force is
present are totally prohibited.
The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through a taxpayers' suit.
Where not one victim complains and not one violator is properly charged, the problem
is not initially for the Supreme Court. It is basically one for the executive departments
and for trial courts. Well meaning citizens with only second hand knowledge of the
events cannot keep on indiscriminately tossing problems of the executive, the military,
and the police to the Supreme Court as if we are the repository of all remedies for all
evils. The rules of constitutional litigation have been evolved for an orderly procedure
in the vindication of rights. They should be followed. If our policy makers sustain the
contention of the military and the police that occasional saturation drives are essential
to maintain the stability of government and to insure peace and order, clear policy
guidelines on the behavior of soldiers and policemen must not only be evolved, they
should also be enforced. A method of pinpointing human rights abuses and identifying
violators is necessary.
The problem is appropriate for the Commission on Human Rights. A high level
conference should bring together the heads of the Department of Justice, Department
of National Defense and the operating heads of affected agencies and institutions to
devise procedures for the prevention of abuses.
Under the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman
whom we can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an
orderly procedure, no permanent relief can be given at this time. Further investigation
of the petitioners' charges and a hard look by administration officials at the policy
implications of the prayed for blanket prohibition are also warranted.
In the meantime and in the face of a prima facie showing that some abuses were
probably committed and could be committed during future police actions, we have to
temporarily restrain the alleged banging on walls, the kicking in of doors, the herding of
half-naked men to assembly areas for examination of tattoo marks, the violation of
residences even if these are humble shanties of squatters, and the other alleged acts
which are shocking to the conscience.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Courts of
Manila, Malabon, and Pasay City where the petitioners may present evidence
supporting their allegations and where specific erring parties may be pinpointed and
prosecuted.
Copies of this decision are likewise forwarded to the Commission on Human Rights,
the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of National Defense, and the Commanding
General PC-INP for the drawing up and enforcement of clear guidelines to govern
police actions intended to abate riots and civil disturbances, flush out criminal
elements, and subdue terrorist activities.
In the meantime, the acts violative of human rights alleged by the petitioners as
committed during the police actions are ENJOINED until such time as permanent rules
to govern such actions are promulgated.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Grio-Aquino, J., I join JJ. Cruz, Padilla and Sarmiento's dissents.
Separate Opinions
influence. The parties directly aggrieved are afraid. They are the little people. They
cannot protest lest they provoke retaliation for their temerity. Their only hope is in this
Court, and we should not deny them that hope.)
The ruling that the petitioners are not proper parties is a specious pretext for inaction.
We have held that technical objections may be brushed aside where there are
constitutional questions that must be met. There are many decisions applying this
doctrine. (Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil. 603; Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, 41
SCRA 702; Philconsa v. Jimenez, 65 SCRA 479; Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481;
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835; Lagunsad v. Court of Appeals;
154 SCRA 199; Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208). Lozada was in fact an aberration.
I believe that where liberty is involved, every person is a proper party even if he may
not be directly injured. Each of us has a duty to protect liberty and that alone makes
him a proper party. It is not only the owner of the burning house who has the right to
call the firemen. Every one has the right and responsibility to prevent the fire from
spreading even if he lives in the other block.
The majority seems to be willing to just accept the Solicitor General's assertion that the
claimed abuses are "complete lies" and leave it at that. But a blanket denial is not
enough. The evidence is there on media, in the papers and on radio and television,
That kind of evidence cannot be cavalierly dismissed as "complete lies."
The saturation drive is not unfamiliar to us. It is like the "zona" of the Japanese
Occupation. An area was surrounded by soldiers and all residents were flushed out of
their houses and lined up, to be looked over by a person with a bag over his head. This
man pointed to suspected guerrillas, who were immediately arrested and eventually if
not instantly executed.
To be sure, there are some variations now. The most important difference is that it is
no longer 1943 and the belligerent occupation is over. There is no more war. It is now
1990, when we are supposed to be under a free Republic and safeguarded by the Bill
of Rights.
Article III, Section 2, clearly provides:
Sec. 2 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects againstunreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized. (Emphasis supplied.)
The provision is intended to protect the individual from official (and officious) intrusions,
no matter how humble his abode and however lowly his station in life. Against the
mighty forces of the government, the person's house is his castle, his inviolate refuge
and exclusive domain where he is the monarch of all he surveys.
Yet in the dead of night, armed soldiers may knock on one's door and command him at
gunpoint to come out so he and his neighbors, who have also been rounded up, can all
be placed on public examination, as in a slave market. This is followed by the arrest
and detention of those suspected of villainy, usually on the basis only of the tattoos on
their bodies or the informer's accusing finger.
Where is the search warrant or the warrant of arrest required by the Bill of Rights?
Where is the probable cause that must be determined personally by the judge, and by
no other, to justify the warrant? Where is the examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce to establish the probable cause?
Where is the particular description that must be stated in the warrant, of the places to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized? And where, assuming all these
may be dispensed with, is the admissible exception to the rule?
Saturation drives are not among the accepted instances when a search or an arrest
may be made without warrant. They come under the concept of the fishing expeditions
stigmatized by law and doctrine. At any rate, if the majority is really introducing the
"zona" as another exception to the rule, it must not equivocate. It must state that
intention in forthright language and not in vague generalizations that concede the
wrong but deny the right.
To justify the "zona" on the basis of the recent coup attempt is, in my view, to becloud
the issue. The "zonas" complained of happened before the failed coup and had nothing
whatsoever to do with that disturbance. There was no "large scale mutiny or actual
rebellion' when the saturation drives were conducted and there were no "combat
areas" either in the places where the violations were committed. The failed coup
cannot validate the invalid "zonas' retroactively.
The ponencia says that "we cannot take judicial notice of the facts and figures given by
the petitioners regarding these saturation drives conducted by the military and police
authorities." Maybe so. But we can and should take judicial notice of the saturation
drives themselves which are not and cannot be denied by the government.
I urge my brethren to accept the fact that those drives are per se unconstitutional. I
urge them to accept that even without proof of the hooded figure and the personal
indignities and the loss and destruction of properties and the other excesses allegedly
committed, the mere waging of the saturation drives alone is enough to make this
Court react with outraged concern.
Confronted with this clear case of oppression, we should not simply throw up our
hands and proclaim our helplessness. I submit that this Court should instead declare
categorically and emphatically that these saturation drives are violative of human rights
and individual liberty and so should be stopped immediately. While they may be
allowed in the actual theater of military operations against the insurgents, the Court
should also make it clear that Metro Manila is not such a battleground.
The danger to our free institutions lies not only in those who openly defy the authority
of the government and violate its laws. The greater menace is in those who, in the
name of democracy, destroy the very things it stands for as in this case and so
undermine democracy itself.
Where liberty is debased into a cruel illusion, all of us are degraded and diminished.
Liberty is indivisible; it belongs to every one. We should realize that when the bell tolls
the death of liberty for one of us, "it tolls for thee" and for all of us.
PADILLA, J., separate opinion:
This case is another classic instance of state power colliding with individual rights. That
the State, acting through the government and its forces, has the authority to suppress
lawless violence in all its forms cannot be denied. The exercise of that authority is
justified when viewed from the standpoint of the general welfare, because the State
has the elementary and indispensable duty to insure a peaceful life and existence for
its citizens. A government that loses its capability to insure peace and order for its
citizens loses the very right to remain in power.
But, in the exercise of such authority, i.e., in the choice of the means and methods to
suppress lawless violence, the right of the individual citizen to the dignity of his person
and the sanctity of his home cannot and should not be violated, unless there is, in a
particular case, a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a
compelling duty to suppress or abate.
Petitioners' vivid description of the "areal target zoning" or "saturation drives" allegedly
conducted by police and military units in Metro Manila, obviously intended to ferret out
criminals or suspected criminals in certain cordoned areas, while vigorously denied by
respondents, deserves an effective and immediate response from this Court.
I submit that since this Court is not a trier of facts and this case involves certainty of
facts alleged by petitioners and denied by respondents this case should be referred
to a proper trial court where the petitioners can present evidence to support and prove
the allegations they make of such brutal and inhuman conduct on the part of military
and police units.
More than the military and police checkpoints sustained by this Court as a general
proposition during abnormal times,** and which involve the right of military and police
forces to check on vehicles and pedestrians passing through certain fixed points for the
purpose of apprehending criminals and/or confiscating prohibited articles like
unlicensed firearms, the "areal target zoning" and "saturation drives", as described in
petitioners' allegations, are actual raids on private homes in selected areas, and are
thus positive assaults against the individual person and his dignity. The individual is, as
described, yanked out of his home, without any arrest warrant, to face investigation as
to his connections with lawless elements. In short, the sanctity of the home is
pulverized by military and police action. Thus, while the checkpoint is a defensive
device, on the part of government, the "areal target zoning" or "saturation drive" is a
direct assault against, an intrusion into individual rights and liberties.
Respondents, fortunately, have branded petitioners' allegations of such brutality, as
total lies. It is indeed difficult to even contemplate that such methods reminiscent of a
"police state" can exist in a society built on a republican and constitutional system.
Respondents Must be given a chance to face their accusers and prove that they are
indeed fabricating falsehoods. But the stakes I submit, are too high for this Court, as
the guardian of individual liberties, to avoid a judicial confrontation with the issue.
I vote, therefore, to refer this case (dispensing with normal venue requirements) to the
Executive Judge, RTC of Manila, for him
1. to receive the evidences of all the parties, in support and in refutation of the
petitioners' allegations;
2. to decide the case expeditiously on the bases of the evidence, subject to review by
this Court;
3. to report to this Court on action taken.
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
There is only one question here: Whether or not the police actions (saturation drives)
complained of constitute a valid exercise of police power.
The fact that on twelve occasions between March and November, 1987 the military
conducted the saturation drives in question is a fact open to no question. The Solicitor
General admits that they, the saturation drives, had been done, except that they had
been done "with due regard to human rights." "Not only that," so he states:
... they were intelligently and carefully planned months ahead of the actual
operation. They were executed in coordination with barangay officials who
pleaded with their constituents to submit themselves voluntarily for
character and personal verification. Local and foreign correspondents, who
had joined these operations, witnessed, and reported the events that
transpired relative thereto. (After Operation Reports: November 5, 1987,
Annex 12; November 20, 1987, Annex 13; November 24, 1987, Annex 14).
That is why in all the drives so far conducted, the alleged victims who
numbered thousands had not themselves complained.
The question, then, is purely one of law: Are the saturation drives in question lawful
and legitimate? It is also a question that is nothing novel: No, because the arrests were
not accompanied by a judicial warrant. 1
Therefore, the fact that they had been carefully planned, executed in coordination with
Tondo's barangay officials, and undertaken with due courtesy and politeness (which I
doubt), will not validate them. The lack of a warrant makes them, per se illegal.
According to the majority, "the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the
essential and legitimate ones . . . [w]e see nothing wrong in police making their
presence visibly felt in troubled areas . . . " 2 But the petitioners have not come to court
to "stop all police actions" but rather, the saturation drives, which are, undoubtedly,
beyond police power.
That "[a] show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are
protected and not violated 3 is a contradiction in terms. A "show of force" (by way of
saturation drives) is a violation of human rights because it is not covered by a judicial
warrant.
In all candor, I can not swallow what I find is a complete exaggeration of the issues:
...A show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people
are protected and not violated. A blanket prohibition such as that sought by
the petitioners would limit all police actions to one on one confrontations
where search warrants and warrants of arrests against specific individuals
are easily procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide
to sit down in their offices because all concerted drives where a show of
force is present are totally prohibited. 4
As a general rule, a peace officer can not act unless he is possessed of the proper
arrest or search warrant. The exception is when a criminal offense is unfolding before
him, in which case, action is justified and necessary. The majority would have the
exception to be simply, the general rule.
The fact of the matter is that we are not here confronted by police officers on the beat
or prowl cars on patrol. What we have and I suppose that everybody is agreed on itare lightning raids of homes, arbitrary confiscation of effects, and summary arrests of
persons, the very acts proscribed by the Constitution. If this is a "show of force", it
certainly has no place in a constitutional democracy.
I find allusions to the last aborted coup d'etat inapt. In that case, our men in uniform
had all the right to act amidst crimes being committed in flagrante. The instant case is
quite different. There are no offenses being committed, but rather, police officers
fishing for evidence of offenses that may have been committed, As I said, in that event,
a court warrant is indispensable.
That "the problem is not initially for the Supreme Court 5 is to me, an abdication of
judicial duty. As I indicated, the controversy is purely one of law the facts being
undisputed. Law, needless to say, is the problem of the Supreme Court, not the
Executive.
Worse, it is passing the buck. The petitioners, precisely, have a grievance to raise,
arising from abuses they pinpoint to the lower offices of the Executive (which
presumably has its imprimatur). To make it an executive problem, so I hold, is to make
the Executive judge and jury of its own acts, and hardly, a neutral arbiter.
I am also taken aback by references to "[w]ell meaning citizens with only second hand
knowledge of the events ... keep[ing] on indiscriminately tossing problems -of the
Executive, the military, and the police to the Supreme Court as if we are the repository
of all remedies for all evils." 6 First, the facts are not "second-hand", they are
undisputed:Ther had been saturation drives. Second, the petitioners have trooped to
the highest court with a legitimate grievance against the Executive (and military).
The fact that the majority would "remand" the case to the lower courts and the various
echelons of the Executive for investigation is to admit that walls have indeed been
banged, doors kicked in, and half-naked men herded. I do not see therefore why we
can not issue a writ of prohibition as prayed for, in the midst of these facts.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
Mr. Justice Gutierrez and I are kindred spirits and usually find ourselves together on
the side of liberty. It saddens me that in the case at bar he is on the side of authority.
This is not to say that liberty and authority are irreconcilable enemies. The two must in
fact co-exist, for only in a well-ordered society can rights be properly enjoyed. Implicit
in that theory, however, is the other imperative: that the highest function of authority is
to insure liberty.
While acknowledging that the military is conducting the saturation drives, the majority
practically blinks them away on mere technicalities. First, there are no proper parties.
Second, there is no proof Therefore, the petition is dismissed.
The approach is to me too much simplification. We do not choose to see the woods for
the trees. The brutal fact is staring us in the face but we look the other way in search of
excuses.
The majority says it cannot act against the drives because no one directly affected has
complained. Such silence, if I understand the ponencia correctly, has in effect purged
the drives of all oppressiveness and washed them clean.
(The reason for the silence is fear. These raids are conducted not in the enclaves of
the rich but in the deprived communities, where the residents have no power or
influence. The parties directly aggrieved are afraid. They are the little people. They
cannot protest lest they provoke retaliation for their temerity. Their only hope is in this
Court, and we should not deny them that hope.)
The ruling that the petitioners are not proper parties is a specious pretext for inaction.
We have held that technical objections may be brushed aside where there are
constitutional questions that must be met. There are many decisions applying this
doctrine. (Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil. 603; Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, 41
SCRA 702; Philconsa v. Jimenez, 65 SCRA 479; Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481;
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835; Lagunsad v. Court of Appeals;
154 SCRA 199; Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208). Lozada was in fact an aberration.
I believe that where liberty is involved, every person is a proper party even if he may
not be directly injured. Each of us has a duty to protect liberty and that alone makes
him a proper party. It is not only the owner of the burning house who has the right to
call the firemen. Every one has the right and responsibility to prevent the fire from
spreading even if he lives in the other block.
The majority seems to be willing to just accept the Solicitor General's assertion that the
claimed abuses are "complete lies" and leave it at that. But a blanket denial is not
enough. The evidence is there on media, in the papers and on radio and television,
That kind of evidence cannot be cavalierly dismissed as "complete lies."
The saturation drive is not unfamiliar to us. It is like the "zona" of the Japanese
Occupation. An area was surrounded by soldiers and all residents were flushed out of
their houses and lined up, to be looked over by a person with a bag over his head. This
man pointed to suspected guerrillas, who were immediately arrested and eventually if
not instantly executed.
To be sure, there are some variations now. The most important difference is that it is
no longer 1943 and the belligerent occupation is over. There is no more war. It is now
1990, when we are supposed to be under a free Republic and safeguarded by the Bill
of Rights.
Article III, Section 2, clearly provides:
authorities." Maybe so. But we can and should take judicial notice of the saturation
drives themselves which are not and cannot be denied by the government.
I urge my brethren to accept the fact that those drives are per se unconstitutional. I
urge them to accept that even without proof of the hooded figure and the personal
indignities and the loss and destruction of properties and the other excesses allegedly
committed, the mere waging of the saturation drives alone is enough to make this
Court react with outraged concern.
Confronted with this clear case of oppression, we should not simply throw up our
hands and proclaim our helplessness. I submit that this Court should instead declare
categorically and emphatically that these saturation drives are violative of human rights
and individual liberty and so should be stopped immediately. While they may be
allowed in the actual theater of military operations against the insurgents, the Court
should also make it clear that Metro Manila is not such a battleground.
The danger to our free institutions lies not only in those who openly defy the authority
of the government and violate its laws. The greater menace is in those who, in the
name of democracy, destroy the very things it stands for as in this case and so
undermine democracy itself.
Where liberty is debased into a cruel illusion, all of us are degraded and diminished.
Liberty is indivisible; it belongs to every one. We should realize that when the bell tolls
the death of liberty for one of us, "it tolls for thee" and for all of us.
PADILLA, J., separate opinion:
This case is another classic instance of state power colliding with individual rights. That
the State, acting through the government and its forces, has the authority to suppress
lawless violence in all its forms cannot be denied. The exercise of that authority is
justified when viewed from the standpoint of the general welfare, because the State
has the elementary and indispensable duty to insure a peaceful life and existence for
its citizens. A government that loses its capability to insure peace and order for its
citizens loses the very right to remain in power.
But, in the exercise of such authority, i.e., in the choice of the means and methods to
suppress lawless violence, the right of the individual citizen to the dignity of his person
and the sanctity of his home cannot and should not be violated, unless there is, in a
particular case, a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a
compelling duty to suppress or abate.
Petitioners' vivid description of the "areal target zoning" or "saturation drives" allegedly
conducted by police and military units in Metro Manila, obviously intended to ferret out
criminals or suspected criminals in certain cordoned areas, while vigorously denied by
respondents, deserves an effective and immediate response from this Court.
I submit that since this Court is not a trier of facts and this case involves certainty of
facts alleged by petitioners and denied by respondents-this case should be referred to
a proper trial court where the petitioners can presentevidence to support and prove the
allegations they make of such brutal and inhuman conduct on the part of military and
police units.
More than the military and police checkpoints sustained by this Court as a general
proposition during abnormal times,** and which involve the right of military and police
forces to check on vehicles and pedestrians passing through certain fixed points for the
purpose of apprehending criminals and/or confiscating prohibited articles like
unlicensed firearms, the "areal target zoning" and "saturation drives", as described in
petitioners' allegations, are actual raids on private homes in selected areas, and are
thus positive assaults against the individual person and his dignity. The individual is, as
described, yanked out of his home, without any arrest warrant, to face investigation as
to his connections with lawless elements. In short, the sanctity of the home is
pulverized by military and police action. Thus, while the checkpoint is a defensive
device, on the part of government, the "areal target zoning" or "saturation drive" is a
direct assault against, an intrusion into individual rights and liberties.
Respondents, fortunately, have branded petitioners' allegations of such brutality, as
total lies. It is indeed difficult to even contemplate that such methods reminiscent of a
"police state" can exist in a society built on a republican and constitutional system.
Respondents Must be given a chance to face their accusers and prove that they are
indeed fabricating falsehoods. But the stakes I submit, are too high for this Court, as
the guardian of individual liberties, to avoid a judicial confrontation with the issue.
I vote, therefore, to refer this case (dispensing with normal venue requirements) to the
Executive Judge, RTC of Manila, for him1. to receive the evidences of all the parties, in support and in refutation of the
petitioners' allegations;
2. to decide the case expeditiously on the bases of the evidence, subject to review by
this Court;
3. to report to this Court on action taken.
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
There is only one question here: Whether or not the police actions (saturation drives)
complained of constitute a valid exercise of police power.
The fact that on twelve occasions between March and November, 1987 the military
conducted the saturation drives in question is a fact open to no question. The Solicitor
General admits that they, the saturation drives, had been done, except that they had
been done "with due regard to human rights." "Not only that," so he states:
... they were intelligently and carefully planned months ahead of the actual
operation. They were executed in coordination with barangay officials who
pleaded with their constituents to submit themselves voluntarily for
character and personal verification. Local and foreign correspondents, who
had joined these operations, witnessed, and reported the events that
transpired relative thereto. (After Operation Reports: November 5, 1987,
Annex 12; November 20, 1987, Annex 13; November 24, 1987, Annex 14).
That is why in all the drives so far conducted, the alleged victims who
numbered thousands had not themselves complained.
The question, then, is purely one of law: Are the saturation drives in question lawful
and legitimate? It is also a question that is nothing novel: No, because the arrests were
not accompanied by a judicial warrant. 1
Therefore, the fact that they had been carefully planned, executed in coordination with
Tondo's barangay officials, and undertaken with due courtesy and politeness (which I
doubt), will not validate them. The lack of a warrant makes them, per se illegal.
According to the majority, "the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the
essential and legitimate ones . . . [w]e see nothing wrong in police making their
presence visibly felt in troubled areas . . . " 2 But the petitioners have not come to court
to "stop all police actions" but rather, the saturation drives, which are, undoubtedly,
beyond police power.
That "[a] show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are
protected and not violated 3 is a contradiction in terms. A "show of force" (by way of
saturation drives) is a violation of human rights because it is not covered by a judicial
warrant.
In all candor, I can not swallow what I find is a complete exaggeration of the issues:
...A show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people
are protected and not violated. A blanket prohibition such as that sought by
the petitioners would limit all police actions to one on one confrontations
where search warrants and warrants of arrests against specific individuals
are easily procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide
to sit down in their offices because all concerted drives where a show of
force is present are totally prohibited. 4
As a general rule, a peace officer can not act unless he is possessed of the proper
arrest or search warrant. The exception is when a criminal offense is unfolding before
him, in which case, action is justified and necessary. The majority would have the
exception to be simply, the general rule.
The fact of the matter is that we are not here confronted by police officers on the beat
or prowl cars on patrol. What we have and I suppose that everybody is agreed on itare lightning raids of homes, arbitrary confiscation of effects, and summary arrests of
persons, the very acts proscribed by the Constitution. If this is a "show of force", it
certainly has no place in a constitutional democracy.
I find allusions to the last aborted coup d'etat inapt. In that case, our men in uniform
had all the right to act amidst crimes being committed in flagrante. The instant case is
quite different. There are no offenses being committed, but rather, police officers
fishing for evidence of offenses that may have been committed, As I said, in that event,
a court warrant is indispensable.
That "the problem is not initially for the Supreme Court 5 is to me, an abdication of
judicial duty. As I indicated, the controversy is purely one of law the facts being
undisputed. Law, needless to say, is the problem of the Supreme Court, not the
Executive.
Worse, it is passing the buck. The petitioners, precisely, have a grievance to raise,
arising from abuses they pinpoint to the lower offices of the Executive (which
presumably has its imprimatur). To make it an executive problem, so I hold, is to make
the Executive judge and jury of its own acts, and hardly, a neutral arbiter.
I am also taken aback by references to "[w]ell meaning citizens with only second hand
knowledge of the events ... keep[ing] on indiscriminately tossing problems -of the
Executive, the military, and the police to the Supreme Court as if we are the repository
of all remedies for all evils." 6 First, the facts are not "second-hand", they are
undisputed:Ther had been saturation drives. Second, the petitioners have trooped to
the highest court with a legitimate grievance against the Executive (and military).
The fact that the majority would "remand" the case to the lower courts and the various
echelons of the Executive for investigation is to admit that walls have indeed been
banged, doors kicked in, and half-naked men herded. I do not see therefore why we
can not issue a writ of prohibition as prayed for, in the midst of these facts.
Footnotes
Padilla, J.
** Valmonte vs. Gen. de Villa, et al., G.R. No. 83988, 29 September 1989.
Sarmiento, J.
1 CONST., art III, sec. 21; People v. Burgos, No. 68955, September 4,
1986, 144 SCRA 1.
2 Decision, 15; emphasis supplied.
3 Supra; emphasis supplied.
4 Supra.
5 Supra; emphasis supplied.
6 Supra.
$ + GRSI Copyrightregno N94-027
{bmr footnote.bmp}75909_2_5_90_footnotes>mainG.R. No. 75909 February 5,
1990
RAMON FRANCISCO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 75909 February 5, 1990
RAMON FRANCISCO and CRISTINA MANALO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. BERNARDO P. PARDO, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XLIII, and
SPS. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN and EMILIANA BANGAYAN, respondents.
Manuel B. Dulay for petitioners.
Natalio M. Panganiban for private respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
Petitioners spouses Ramon Francisco and Cristina Manalo seek a review of the
decision dated August 29, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC),
now Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 06866, entitled "Ramon Francisco, et
al., Petitioners vs. Hon. Bernardo Pardo, etc., et al., Respondents", denying due
course to their petition, thereby affirming their ejectment from the subject
premises as decreed by both the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) and the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
The facts as found by the RTC and adopted by the IAC are as follows:
The premises in question located at 1512 Antipolo St., Sta. Cruz,
Manila, consist of a lot and a two-storey building owned by Antonio
Chua. Defendant (herein petitioner) Ramon Francisco leased the
ground floor and a room in the second floor of the said building since
1961, (and) used (the same) as an auto spare parts store and
residence. . . . (T)he latest rental as of June, 1982 was Pl,500.00 duly
paid to Antonio Chua.
In 1978, the plaintiffs (herein private respondents) acquired the
ownership of the premises by purchase from the former owner
Antonio Chua but it was agreed between the plaintiffs and the former
owner that the tenant defendant Ramon Francisco would continue to
pay to the former owner the monthly rental of P1,000.00 until the end
of 1978 and that thereafter the rentals shall accrue to the plaintiffs.
Nonetheless, starting January, 1979, plaintiffs received the monthly
rentals not from defendants but from the former owner Antonio Chua
who agreed to assume responsibility in paying the rental on behalf of
Ramon Francisco. Because Antonio Chua failed to remit the rental to
the plaintiffs, since September, 1979 and effective January, 1981 at
the increased rate of Pl,500.00 a month, on February 3, 1982, plaintiffs
wrote former owner Antonio Chua to pay the unpaid rentals then
amounting to P35,000.00. Parenthetically on July 3, 1982, plaintiffs
counsel sent a letter of demand to the defendant Ramon Francisco by
registered mail but the latter was returned unclaimed.
Another letter dated January 24, 1983 was addressed to defendant
Cristina Manalo but was also returned unclaimed.
In fact, however, defendants were paid up to the month of June, 1982
and defendants stopped paying rentals when they received a copy of
the letter of plaintiffs to the former owner Antonio Chua. 1
On March 7, 1983, private respondents Benjamin and Emiliana Bangayan filed
before the MTC of Manila a complaint for ejectment against the petitioners on the
following grounds: a) non-payment of the agreed monthly rental of P2,000.00;
and b) subleasing of the premises in violation of the condition of the lease.
Petitioners denied the existence of the grounds for ejectment. They asserted that
Antonio Chua, the previous owner of the leased property assumed the
responsibility of paying the rentals. They further stated that there was no
existing sublease but only a change of name of their auto parts business from
Impala Auto Supply to Starlet Supply Center. They likewise denied knowledge of
the transfer of ownership of the property involved from Antonio Chua, the
previous owner, to the private respondents.
The MTC, after due hearing, rendered judgment declaring petitioners to have
defaulted in the payment of the rent. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants
Ramon Francisco and Cristina Manalo and all persons claiming rights
under them to immediately vacate the premises . . . and to restore
possession thereof to plaintiffs; and for the said defendants to pay
jointly and severally the herein plaintiffs the amount of Pl,500.00 as
monthly rentals of the premises from August 1982 and every month
thereafter (less any amount they have paid to the plaintiffs) until they
have actually vacated the premises and the costs of the suit. 2
On appeal to the RTC, the lower court's decision was affirmed with modification.
The RTC pronounced:
WHEREFORE, the court affirms the decision subject of the appeal
with modification so as to make the decision definite and certain
because in the appealed decision, the lower court authorized
deduction of any amount they have paid the plaintiffs which being
undetermined, makes the decision uncertain and void (Cf. del Rosario
vs. Villegas, 49 Phil. 634). Defendants and all persons claiming rights
under them are ordered to immediately vacate the premises . . . and to
restore possession thereof to plaintiffs, to pay plaintiffs the sum of
Pl,500.00 a month as rental for the premises from July, 1982 and every
month thereafter until they actually vacate the premises, and costs.
SO ORDERED. 3
As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals also denied due course to petitioners'
petition for review. Hence, this recourse, petitioners contending that the
appellate court committed the following errors in its decision:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THERE WAS
NO CONTRACT OF LEASE BETWEEN THE PARTIES;
II
Article 1687 of the New Civil Code empowers the courts to fix the period of lease.
Such prerogative is addressed to the court's sound judgment. 7And such
discretion was certainly judiciously exercised in the case at bar for, again, as
observed by the appellate court:
. . . Certainly, the default of petitioners in the payment of the rentals
could not have inspired the court to extend any further their stay in
the premises as this would have imposed more unjustifiable burden
on the part of the owners. 8
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Corts, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 pp. 20-21, Rollo.
2 p. 25, Rollo.
3 pp. 21-22, Rollo.
4 p. 5, Petition, p. 7, Rollo.
5 p. 28, Rollo.
6 46 Phil. 184.
7 F.S. Divinagracia Agro Commercial, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 104
SCRA 180.
8 p. 29. Rollo
$ + GRSI Copyrightregno N94-027
{bmr footnote.bmp}77867_2_6_90_footnotes>mainG.R. No. 77867 February 6,
1990
ISABEL DE LA PUERTA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue involved in this case is the filiation of private respondent
Carmelita de la Puerta, who claims successional lights to the estate of her
alleged grandmother.
Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, with a will leaving her
properties to her three surviving children, namely, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel, all
surnamed de la Puerta. Isabel was given the free portion in addition to her
legitime and was appointed executrix of the will. 1
The petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel was opposed by her
brothers, who averred that their mother was already senile at the time of the
execution of the will and did not fully comprehend its meaning. Moreover, some
of the properties listed in the inventory of her estate belonged to them
exclusively. 2
Meantime, Isabel was appointed special administratrix by the probate
court. 3 Alfredo subsequently died, leaving Vicente the lone oppositor.
On August 1, 1974, Vicente de la Puerta filed with the Court of First Instance of
Quezon a petition to adopt Carmelita de la Puerta. After hearing, the petition was
granted. 5 However, the decision was appealed by Isabel to the Court of Appeals.
During the pendency of the appeal, Vicente died, prompting her to move for the
dismissal of the case 6
On November 20, 1981, Carmelita, having been allowed to intervene in the
probate proceedings, filed a motion for the payment to her of a monthly
allowance as the acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la Puerta. 7 At the
hearing on her motion, Carmelita presented evidence to prove her claimed status
to which Isabel was allowed to submit counter-evidence.
On November 12,1982, the probate court granted the motion, declaring that it
was satisfied from the evidence at hand that Carmelita was a natural child of
Vicente de la Puerta and was entitled to the amounts claimed for her support.
The court added that "the evidence presented by the petitioner against it (was)
too weak to discredit the same. 8
On appeal, the order of the lower court was affirmed by the respondent
court, 9 which is now in turn being challenged in this petition before us.
The petitioner's main argument is that Carmelita was not the natural child of
Vicente de la Puerta, who was married to Genoveva de la Puerta in 1938 and
remained his wife until his death in 1978. Carmelita's real parents are Juanita
Austrial and Gloria Jordan.
Invoking the presumption of legitimacy, she argues that Carmelita was the
legitimate child of Juanita Austrial and Gloria Jordan, who were legally or
presumably married. Moreover, Carmelita could not have been a natural child of
Vicente de la Puerta because he was already married at the time of her birth in
1962.
To prove her point, Isabel presented Amado Magpantay, who testified that he
was a neighbor of Austrial and Jordan. According to him, the two were living as
husband and wife and had three children, including a girl named "Puti,"
presumably Carmelita. He said though that he was not sure if the couple was
legally married. 10
Another witness, Genoveva de la Puerta, Identified herself as Vicente de la
Puerta's wife but said they separated two years after their marriage in 1938 and
were never reconciled. In 1962, Gloria Jordan started living with Vicente de la
Puerta in his house, which was only five or six houses away from where she
herself was staying. Genoveva said that the relationship between her husband
and Gloria was well known in the community. 11
In finding for Carmelita, the lower court declared that:
. . . By her evidence, it was shown to the satisfaction of the Court that
she was born on December 18, 1962 per her birth certificate (Exh. A);
that her father was Vicente de la Puerta and her mother is Gloria
Jordan who were living as common law husband and wife until his
death on June 14, 1978; that Vicente de la Puerta was married to, but
was separated from, his legal wife Genoveva de la Puerta; that upon
the death of Vicente de la Puerta on June 14, 1978 without leaving a
last will and testament, she was the only child who survived him
together with his spouse Genoveva de la Puerta with whom he did not
beget any child; that she was treated by Vicente de la Puerta as a true
child from the time of her birth until his father died; that the fact that
she was treated as a child of Vicente de la Puerta is shown by the
family pictures showing movant with Vicente de la Puerta (Exhs. D, D1 and D-2) and school records wherein he signed the report cards as
her parent (Exh. E and E-1); that during the hearing of her adoption
case in Special Proceeding No. 0041 in Branch V of this Court at
Mauban, Quezon, Vicente de la Puerta categorically stated in court
that Carmelita de la Puerta is his daughter with Gloria Jordan (Exhs. B
and B-1); that it was Vicente de la Puerta during his lifetime who spent
for her subsistence, support and education; . . . 12
This is a factual finding that we do not see fit to disturb, absent any of those
circumstances we have laid down in a long line of decisions that will justify
reversal. 13 Among these circumstances are: (1) the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference
made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10)
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
The petitioner insists on the application of the following provisions of the Civil
Code to support her thesis that Carmelita is not the natural child of Vicente de la
Puerta but the legitimate child of Juanito Austrial and Gloria Jordan:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following
the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days
following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than
that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having access to
his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
exclusively between the adopter and the adopted. "By adoption, the
adopters can make for themselves an heir, but they cannot thus make
one for their kindred. 23
The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la Puerta,
has successional rights to the intestate estate of her father but not to the estate
of Dominga Revuelta. Her claims for support and inheritance should therefore be
filed in the proceedings for the settlement of her own father's
estate 24 and cannot be considered in the probate of Dominga Revuelta's Will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed decision is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs against the private respondent. It is so
ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Original records, p. 1, Ibid., pp. 43-44.
2 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
3 Ibid., p. 31.
4 Ibid., p. 108.
5 Annex "E"
6 Ibid.
7 Original records, p. 7.
8 Annex "F".
9 Rollo, p. 48. Penned by Francisco, J. with Lombos de la Fuente and
Benipayo, JJ., concurring.
10 TSN, March 5, 1982, p. 6; Ibid., p. 9; Ibid., p. 13.
11 TSN January 21, 1982, pp. 3, 7; Ibid., p. 13.
12 Rollo, p. 49.
GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
This administrative complaint against respondent Judge Pedro Garcia is the
culmination of the complainant's frustrations with Branch 20 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu where in 1985 or five years ago, he filed a criminal case for
estafa against millionaire Ricardo Silverio, Sr. and Hermilo Rodis of the
notorious Philfinance caper. Up to this time, Silverio has not been arraigned
allegedly because his heart condition will not permit him to fly to Cebu to be
arraigned, although he has flown in and out of the country and is still out now.
For some cause not shown in the records of this administrative case, even
before the defendant was arraigned, Criminal Case No. CU-10568 reached the
Court of Appeals (CA-G. R. SP No. 04445) which rendered a decision on October
14, 1986 directing the Presiding Judge of Branch 20 (then Judge Exaltacion A.
Navarro) to set the arraignment and trial of Silverio, Sr. "as soon as possible"
(p.145,Rollo). Instead of complying with the Appellate Court's directive, Judge
Navarro dismissed the case. On January 30, 1988, complainant filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court's order, and numerous other pleadings. However,
on April 16,1988, Judge Navarro retired without acting on his motion for
reconsideration.
On June 6, 1988, respondent Judge Pedro T. Garcia was appointed to the
position vacated by Judge Navarro. According to complainant, respondent
Judge Garcia also refused to act on his motion for reconsideration and on his
other pleadings in the Silverio case praying for the immediate arraignment and
trial of Silverio.
Finally on August 15, 1988, Judge Garcia issued an order for the arrest of
Silverio and set his arraignment on October 18, 1988.
The accused filed a motion for postponement which the complainant opposed.
Nevertheless, Judge Garcia granted Silverio's motion, and made it appear in his
order that there had been no objection by the complainant. The latter filed two
manifestations and memoranda objecting to the judge's statement in the order of
October 18, 1988.
respondent." (p. 30, Rollo.) On June 20, 1988, he called complainant's attention
to that order of Judge Navarro. He explained that the delay in resolving
complainant's motions could not be helped because "the entire records of the
above-entitled case is still with the Court of Appeals in Manila" (Annex A of
Respondent's Answer).
In his order dated June 27, 1988, respondent Judge remarked that the
complainant's Urgent Motion dated June 26, 1988 was "highly litigious" meaning
hostile and provocative (p. 54, Rollo).
Upon receipt of the records from the Court of Appeals, Judge Garcia issued on
August 15, 1988 a warrant for the arrest of Silverio and his co-defendant (Exh. E,
Respondent's Answer).
Silverio posted bail. The case was set for arraignment on October 18, 1988.
Instead of appearing in court on the scheduled date, Silverio, through his
counsel, Atty. Reyes, asked for postponement on account of his heart condition.
The transcript of the stenographic notes of the hearing on October 18, 1988
records the following exchanges on the defendant's motion for postponement:
ATTY. REYES:
We pray that the arraignment be postponed to another date, your
Honor.
ATTY. SESBREO
The prosecution, your Honor, has filed the opposition to that motion
today, October 18, and in that opposition, we aver that up to today, I
have not been furnished with a copy of said motion, so that the 3-day
prior notice as required in Rule 15 of the Rules of Court has not been
complied, and therefore, that motion is just a mere scrap of paper,
and should be denied for failure to comply with the requirements. It is
very clear in the medical certificate that accused Silverio is not
confined in a hospital, and he is a walking patient. Considering that
he is a walking patient, there is no reason, no valid reason, for him
why he cannot attend to this arraignment, your Honor. He can come
to court just to listen to the reading of the information, which activity
is not strenuous. It will not strain him physically. There is no record
that he is hospitalized. He can walk and can move around, and there
is no impossibility to attend the arraignment. As stated in our
opposition, your honor, accused Silverio has filed cases against the
PNB for the recovery of his Delta Motors Corporation and also against
the Securities and Exchange Commission and a bank for the
Yes, but in the meanwhile, we give the benefit of the doubt for the
sickness of the accused in this case. In the sense of fairness and
good judgment, we will give him the chance to recuperate at least, if
he is really sick. It will be unchristian to order him to come here if he
is really sick. He might die on the way.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. SESBREO:
May I suggest, your Honor, that during the next setting, if it is
possible, just to have the arraignment of this case. Anyway, we could
have the trial ex-parte later on without the presence of accused. The
accused, your Honor, is a wailing patient and he should be required to
attend even in the company of his physician so that if he is really
having a heart ailment, as what was said he had a heart attack, a
physician should attend to him, because if the accused says that he
will attend the arraignment only if he gets clearance from his doctor
(unfinished)
COURT: (butted in)
The image of the Court will be placed in a predicament, as it will
appear that this is a one-way traffic affair, if we allow that condition. It
is a matter of public knowledge that the accused here is a multimillionaire. He might think his is an exceptional case. That is why I am
asking the cooperation of Atty. Reyes. For purposes of the
arraignment, to satisfy also Atty. Sesbreo because this is his
personal case. He is the plaintiff himself, and you know, Atty.
Sesbreo is very brave. He is one of the fightingest lawyer here in
Cebu. He fights for his right, even to the extent of filing cases after
cases against Judges. In other words, the Court would decide this
case on the level and would be impartial and fair in handling this
case, in accordance with law, as his conscience may dictate.
ATTY. SESBREO:
I would like to make it of record, that if only the medical certificate
shows that the accused Silverio is confined in a hospital, I could not
have interposed my objection, but he is not confined and he is a
walking patient.
COURT:
Who?
ATTY. SESBREO:
Accused Silverio has not been arrested in that case.
COURT:
Oh, Atty. Reyes?
ATTY. REYES:
He is bonded, your Honor.
ATTY. SESBREO:
But the bond has expired. The 30-day period has expired and the
bonding company was ordered to produce the accused and to explain
why the bond should not be confiscated.
COURT:
The problem of the Court now is whether on December 7 he can be
here. Well, inasmuch as the accused has another case in another sala
on December 7, we might as well set the arraignment here on said
date, to coincide with the date of the arraignment of the accused in
Branch 9, so that the accused will travel only in one instance.
ATTY. SESBREO:
May I suggest within one month, your Honor, the arraignment be set
within one month, to conform with the rules.
COURT:
Make it one month, but due to the exceptional predicament of the
accused, we will just reset this to December 7, 1988 at 8:30 in the
morning, to give the accused the chance.
ATTY. SESBREO:
In view of the suggestion of the Court, I may accede. (pp. 3-12, t.s.n.,
October 18, 1988; pp. 74-83, Rollo; italics supplied.)
The order of the Court dated October 18, 1988 reads as follows:
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and/or deliver dried marijuana
fruiting tops, a prohibited drug. (Rollo, p. 6)
The facts for the prosecution are stated by the Solicitor General in his Brief for
the Appellee as follows:
At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of September 11, 1985, the
Narcotics Command Unit (NARCOM) of the Philippine Constabulary in
Camp Crame, Quezon City, received a report that a certain Ray was
selling marijuana to out-of-school youth in Pulang-Lupa, Las Pias (p.
7, tsn, Jan. 6,1986).
The NARCOM Commanding Officer, Lt. Manuel Raval, ordered Lt.
Lavares to form a team for the 'buy-bust' operation and to arrest the
suspect. The team was composed of Lt. Lavares as team leader, Sgt.
Aladano buyer-poseur, Sgt. Lagos, Pfc. Labucay and Pulang-Lupa,
Las Pinas Brgy. Capt. De La Cruz who was the informant. The team
immediately proceeded to Tramo, Pulang-Lupa of Las Pias. Upon
arriving at the designated place, Lt. Lavares gave Sgt. Aladano four 5
peso bills which were previously dusted with ultra-violet powder to
use as purchase money (pp. 2-3, tsn, Dec. 2, 1985).
Sgt. Aladano and Brgy. Capt. De La Cruz found appellant at around
4:45 o'clock that afternoon and approached him De La Cruz, who was
appellant's cousin, introduced Sgt. Aladano to appellant. Sgt. Aladano
intimated his desire to buy marijuana. For marijuana in two (1)
aluminum foils, Sgt. Aladano gave appellant the marked money.
Thereafter, appellant left.
After some time, appellant returned. He handed over to Sgt. Aladano
something wrapped in a piece of paper. When Sgt. Aladano opened
the package, he found the two small packages of marijuana.
Immediately, he signaled his companions who were more or less 7 to
10 meters away from them (p. 7, tsn, January 6, 1986).
Appellant tried to escape, but Sgt. Aladano held him by his waist. The
team swooped down on appellant. They introduced themselves as
members of the NARCOM.
The team brought appellant and the marijuana to their headquarters.
Lt. Tita Advincula, a forensic chemist of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory,
examined the contents of the package (Exhibit "H") seized from
appellant. She reported that the contents were indeed marijuana.
said police officer demanded money in exchange for the latter's release after his
arrest.
On sur-rebuttal, the defendant-appellant's father Eleuterio Javier was called to
the witness stand to bolster the claim that Cpl. Antonio was guilty of extortion.
After trial, the defendant-appellant was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as charged.
In resolving the issue of whether or not the degree of proof required in criminal
cases has been met, the credibility of witnesses who appeared in court becomes
a foremost matter. On credibility, it is an oft-repeated rule that this Court will not
disturb the findings of the trial judge unless he has plainly overlooked certain
facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the
case (see People v. Jose Pirreras, G.R. No. 63462, November 6, 1989 and People
v. Eduardo Paco y Tamayo, G.R. No. 76893, February 27,1989)
The defendant-appellant alleges that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are tainted with inconsistencies and improbabilities, namely: (a) that
in Sgt. Aladano's testimony, it took the accused twenty minutes to get the
marijuana leaves after the deal to sell them to the poseur-buyer was made while
according to Lt. Lavares, almost an hour transpired before the defendantappellant came back and handed something to Sgt. Aladano; (b) that the buybust operation team of Lt. Lavares was planned, executed and successfully
carried out within a matter of two hours without any preliminary surveillance on
the defendant-appellant; and (c) that if the defendant-appellant was indeed a
drug pusher, the fact that he trusted his cousin, Barangay Captain Dela Cruz, the
alleged informer as to the poseur-buyer's identity would mean that the latter had
acted as "middleman" in previous transactions otherwise the defendantappellant would not allow the said informer to be involved in his illegal activity.
We find the above allegation devoid of merit. The inconsistencies pointed out by
the defendant-appellant are too minor to affect the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses who are law enforcers presumed to have regularly performed their
duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary. (People v. Lamberto
Borja y Martinez, G.R. No. 71838, February 26, 1990, citing People v. Patog, 144
SCRA 429 [1986]; People v. Said Sariol y Muhamading, G.R. No. 83809, June 22,
1989 citing People v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 533 [1988]; People v. Boholst 152
SCRA 263 [1987] citing People v. Gamayon, 121 SCRA 642 [1983]; People v.
Campana, 124 SCRA 271 [1983]; People v. Rosas, 149 SCRA 464 [1987]) With
respect to the alleged improbabilities, they are grounded on fanciful conjectures
and speculations which cannot topple the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
Thus, we are constrained to give credence to the witnesses of the prosecution
who had proven beyond reasonable doubt every essential element of the crime
of which defendant- appellant was charged. After all, "proof beyond reasonable
doubt" is defined under Rule 133, section 2 of the Rules of Court as follows:
... Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of
proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced and mind.
In the instant case, there is clear proof that the defendant-appellant was caught
in flagrante delicto, i.e., in the very act of selling and delivering dried marijuana
fruiting tops, a prohibited drug under Article I, section 2, subsections (e) and (i)
of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179.
Prosecution witnesses Sgt. Aladano and Lt. Lavares competently narrated the
pertinent details attendant to the crime of which the trial court convicted the
defendant-appellant who was positively identified as the perpetrator by the said
witnesses. Furthermore, corroborative evidence was offered by the prosecution
through the testimonies of the chemical engineer and forensic chemist of the PC
Crime Laboratory.
The defense of having been framed-up was not satisfactorily proved by
convincing evidence. Like alibi, it is a weak defense that is easy to concoct but
difficult to prove (See People v. Sergio Nabinat y Asag, G.R. No. 84392, February
7, 1990). It is difficult to believe that the NARCOM agents who did not know the
appellant and whom the appellant did not know would suddenly pounce upon a
completely unknown and innocent person taking a merienda and not only plant
marijuana in his clothes but also forcibly rub ultraviolet powder on his hands
while he was relieving himself in the toilet at Camp Crame. During the crossexamination of the defendant-appellant, he made the following declarations:
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You were present when Sgt. Aladano testified here in
Court and pointed to you?
A. Yes sir.
COURT: Was he the one who planted the marijuana?
A. No Your Honor, it was Lt. Lavares.
FISCAL:
ATTY. GARIN:
We thought that would be the proper subject of this
examination.
FISCAL:
This is a direct testimony of the witness and proper basis
should be laid.
COURT:
Sustain. Reform.
ATTY. GARIN:
Q. Were you able to talk to your son while he was in
prison?
A. No sir.
Q. Your wife?
A. I do not know whether my wife was able to talk to my
son while in prison.
Q. On or before the ll th day of September 1985, do you
remember this Antonio talking to your wife?
A. No sir.
ATTY. GARIN:
That will he all for the witness. (Original Records, pp. 130131)
In the absence of any motive shown on the part of the NARCOM agents to
implicate the defendant-appellant and considering the foregoing evidence for the
prosecution, we agree with the trial court's assessment that the presumption of
innocence in favor of the defendant-appellant has been overcome.
The argument that the Narcotics Command cannot organize a team and send it
from Camp Crame to Las Pias in a period of two hours has no merit. The
NARCOM's main function is to stem the traffic in prohibited drugs and catch and
prosecute violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act. By the very nature of its work,
NARCOM should have agents on duty all the time and ready to rush wherever
they are needed. Two hours is not too short for this purpose.
According to the appellant, the fact that he trusted the barangay captain who
introduced the buyers to him shows that the captain must have acted as
middleman in other drug transactions. Assuming this to be true, we fail to see
how it proves that the appellant is innocent. In truth, familiarity and trust do not
arise solely from joint participation in illegal acts. Mr. dela Cruz was not only a
leading member of the Pulang-lupa community but he was also the appellant's
relative. It simply did not occur to the appellant that dela Cruz was against his
drug dealing activities to the extent of turning him in to the authorities;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J. (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
$ + GRSI Copyrightregno N94-027
{bmr footnote.bmp}_78583_84_3_26_90_footnotes>mainG.R. Nos. 78583 March
26, 1990
BENIGNO TODA, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 78583-4 March 26, 1990
BENIGNO TODA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ROSE MARIE TUASON-TODA, respondents.
G.R. Nos.78696-7 March 26,1990
ROSE MARIE TUASON-TODA, petitioner,
vs.
BENIGNO TODA, JR., respondent.
Bautista, Picazo, Buyco, Tan & Fider for Benigno Toda, Jr. Belo, Abiera &
Associates for petitioner Rose Marie Tuason Toda.
REGALADO, J.:
These consolidated cases seek a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on January 29,1987 1 in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 06675 and 07936, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the payment of the cash dividends declared on July 1,
1981 amounting to P2,191.62 and those declared on July 25, 1981
amounting to P40,196.12 to Rose Marie Toda as her separate
property. The cash dividends declared on April 25, 1981 amounting to
P37,196.30 (sic) are hereby adjudicated to Benigno Toda, Jr. as his
share in the conjugal partnership assets; the portion of the order
dated November 2, 1981 with respect to the payment of the amount of
P360,095.12 to Rose Marie T. Toda is set aside;
2. Ordering the payment of the amount of P4,1623,982.24 to Rose
Marie Toda representing the balance of P15, 749,135.32 obligated to
be paid as estate taxes by Benigno Toda, Jr.;
3. Setting aside the order of the lower court dated June 2, 1982
directing Benigno Toda, Jr. to pay interest and non-payment penalty
of 18% and 5%, respectively; and
4. Setting aside the order of the lower court directing the annotation
of lien on the property of Benigno Toda, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
Benigno Toda, Jr. (Benigno for brevity) and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda (Rose
Marie for brevity) were married on June 9, 1951 and were blessed with two
children. Individual differences and the alleged infidelity of Benigno, however,
marred the conjugal union thereby prompting Rose Marie to file on December 18,
1979 in the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, 2 as Civil Case No. 35566, a
petition for termination of conjugal partnership for alleged mismanagement and
dissipation of conjugal funds against Benigno.
After hearings were held, the parties in order to avoid further "disagreeable
proceedings," filed on April 1, 1981 a joint petition forjudicial approval of
dissolution of conjugal partnership under Article 191 of the Civil Code, docketed
as Special Proceeding No. 9478, 3 which was consolidated with the aforesaid
civil case. This petition which was signed by the parties on March 30, 1981,
embodied a compromise agreement allocating to the spouses their respective
shares in the conjugal partnership assets and dismissing with prejudice the said
Civil Case No. 35566, CA-G.R. No. 11123-SP of the Court of Appeals and G.R. No.
56121 of this Court. The said petition and the compromise agreement therein
were approved by the trial court in its order of June 9, 1981.4
Thereafter, several orders were issued by the lower court pertaining to the
interpretation and implementation of the compromise agreement, as follows:
1. Order, dated November 20, 1981, ordering Benigno, inter alia, to
pay Rose Marie the cash dividends on the shares declared on April
25, 1981 amounting to P37,126.30; that declared on July 25, 1981
amounting to P40,196.12; that declared on July 1, 1981, given on
September 25, 1981 amounting to P2,191.62; and the payment of
P360,095.12 to Rose Marie which is the balance of P2 million paid on
April 4, 1981; 5
2. Order, dated June 2, 1982, ordering Benigno to pay Rose Marie
interest at 18% per annum on the amounts required to be paid in the
order of November 20,1981, as well as 5% non-payment penalty
should the said order of November 20,1981 be sustained on appeal; 6
3. Order, dated December 9, 1982, denying Benigno's motion to inhibit
Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera from hearing the case; 7
4. Order, dated March 1, 1983, ordering the annotation of a lien on
certain properties of Benigno as security for any and all amounts that
he may finally be ordered to pay to Rose Marie under the compromise
agreement; 8 and
5. Order, dated March 14, 1983, ordering Benigno to pay Rose Marie
the amount of P4,623,929.24, with interest and penalties thereon
at the rates stipulated in the compromise agreement from date of at the rates
stipulated in the compromise agreement from date of demand by Rose Marie.
On the other hand, Benigno contends in his present petition before us that:
1. The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law when it affirmed
the lower court's award of P4,623,929.24 without trial and evidencetaking and overruled petitioner's claim of violation of his due process
right;
2. The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law and due process
when it upheld the lower court's denial of petitioner's motion for her
inhibition/disqualification;
3. Since the document (the parties' compromise agreement) explicitly
provided for assumption of liability rather than agency to pay and
since there was no evidence-taking, the Court of Appeals finding of
an agency to pay is reviewable as a question of law; and
4. The Court of Appeals on a question of law involving the parol
evidence rule. 13
The award of cash dividends basically depends on the date of effectivity of the
compromise agreement as this will determine whether the same is conjugal
property or separate property of the spouses.
We are in agreement with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the
compromise agreement became effective only on June 9, 1981, the date when it
was approved by the trial court, and not on March 30,1981 when it was signed by
the parties. Under Article 190 of the Civil Code, 14 "(i)n the absence of an express
declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial
order." Hence, the separation of property is not effected by the mere execution
of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court
approving the same. It, therefore, becomes effective on y upon judicial approval,
without which it is void. 15 Furthermore, Article 192 of said Code explicitly
provides that the conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the issuance of a
decree of separation of property.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership of Benigno and Rose Marie should be
considered dissolved only on June 9, 1981 when the trial court approved their
joint petition for voluntary dissolution of their conjugal partnership. Conformably
thereto, the cash dividends declared on July 1, 1981 and July 25,1981 in the
amount of P2,191.62 and P40,196.12, respectively, should pertain to Rose Marie;
and that declared on April 2,5, 1981 in the amount of P37,126.30 ought to be paid
to Benigno, pursuant to Paragraph 4 (c) of the compromise agreement which
awards to Benigno the conjugal assets not otherwise specifically assigned to
Rose Marie.
With respect to the amount of P360,095.12 which Benigrio deducted from the P2
million supposed to be paid to Rose Marie, it is not clear from the records where
said amount came from. The Court of Appeals, in holding that it is conjugal and
therefore belongs to Benigno, presumed it to be in the nature of cash dividends
declared prior to the approval of the compromise agreement by reason of the
fact that the amount was deducted by Benigno from the P2 million which he paid
on April 14,1981. While no sufficient proof was adduced to conclusively explain
such deduction, there exists the legal presumption that all property of the
marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership absent any proof that it is the
exclusive property of either spouse. 16 Since Rose Marie failed to prove that the
amount forms part of her paraphernal property, it is presumed to be conjugal
property. Consequently, Benigno is entitled to the said amount of P360,095.12,
hence he rightfully deducted the same from the amount due to Rose Marie.
The issue regarding the annotation of the lien on Benigno's properties has been
mooted by our resolution dated Aprjl 3, 1989 wherein, at his instance, we
ordered the cancellation thereof upon his posting of the corresponding bond. In
our resolution of February 26, 1990, we noted Benigno's comphance, approved
the bond he filed, and ordered the cancellation of the hens annotated on the
certificates of title of the propertiesinvolved.
Likewise, the order denying the motion to inhibit Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera
has become academic considering that she no longer presides over the court
where the case was filed. Besides, as correctly explained by respondent court,
the groundfor inhibition raised by Benigno is not valid it being merely on the
basis of the judge having acquired knowledge of the facts surrounding the
agreement of the parties, hence she would be a material witness to the issue of
the true agreement which is contested by the parties. However, those facts came
to the knowledge of the judge in the course of her efforts to effect a compromise
between parties and are also known to the parties.This is not a ground for
disqualification; on the contrary, said, acts of the judge were in accord with the
rule encouraging compromises in litigations, especially between members of the
same family.
Anent the tax savings of P4,623,982.24 obtained by Benigno, we hold that this
forms part of the P40 million allocated to Rose Marie under paragraph 4 (b) (1) of
the compromise agreement.We give credit to the ratiocination thereon of the trial
court as quoted with approval by respondent court:
The records show that petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. paid only
Pl,125,152.48 in estate taxes, although the amount stated in the m
Compromise Agreement was P15,749,135.32. The balance of
P4,623,929.24 is now being claimed by both parties as aforestated. In
the opinion of this court, the pertinent terms of the Agreement as
quoted, are clear and do not require any interpretation. In brief, under,
Footnotes
1 Justice Jose A.R. Melo, ponente, with Justices Ricardo P. Tensuan
and Jaime M. Lantin, concurring; Rollo, G. R. Nos. 78583-84, 29-45.
2 Presided over by then Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera.
3 Rollo, G.R. Nos. 78696-97,69-74.
4 Ibid., 75-84.
5 Ibid., 85-98.
6 Ibid., 102-105.
7 Ibid., 62.
8 Ibid., 122-125.
9 Ibid.,110-115.
10 Ibid., 69-73.
11 Ibid., 73.
12 Ibid., 22.
13 Ibid., G.R. Nos. 78583-84,13-26.
14 Now Art. 134 of the Family Code.
15 Lacson vs. Lacson, et al., 24 SCRA 837 (1968); see also Tolentino,
Civil Code, Vol. 1, 1987 Ed., 487.
16 Article 160, Civil Code.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Whether the contract of lease is for a definite or indefinite period of time and the
applicability of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 20 and Batas Pambansa
Bilang 25 are the issues in this case.
The facts are undisputed.
In March 1964 and December 1964 petitioner and private respondent Rev. Father
Jose Torralba Sy, entered into separate contracts of lease over two apartments
located at 913-E and 193-F Josefina Street, Sampaloc, Manila, with the common
provision covering its duration as follows:
To hold the same for one month from the (15th day of March, 1964 for
Apt. No. 913-E and lst day of January, 1964 for Apt. No. 913- F) and so
on from month to month at a rent of TWO HUNDRED PESOS
(P200.00), Philippine Currency, per month, payable in advance on the
first TEN (10) days of each calendar month, until the lease shall
terminate, which termination shall be determined by either party
giving FIVE (5) days notice in writing. 1
It was further stipulated in the two contracts that "in case the lessee shall
continuously withhold possession of the apartments after he or she has been
properly notified of the termination of his or her right to occupy the same, the
lessor shall be entitled to collect P400.00 every month or fraction thereof, as
reasonable compensation for the use of the place and as damages."
Private respondent removed the portion separating the two apartments and
converted the same principally for use as a Buddhist chapel.
On August 1, 1970, petitioner leased to private respondent the apartment at 937E Josefina Street, Sampaloc, Manila, effective August 1, 1970 for the monthly
rental of P300.00, 2 payable in advance within the first ten (10) days of the month
for his use as residence only. It was also stipulated in said contract that "in case
the lessee shall continuously withhold possession of the apartments after
he/she has been notified of the termination of his/her right to occupy the same,
the lessor shall be entitled to collect P500.00 every month or fraction thereof, as
reasonable compensation for the use of the place and as damages.
On September 24, 1975, petitioner sent a letter to private respondent that
effective November 1, 1975 the new rental for the two apartments will be P500.00
per door or P1,000.00 for the two doors, likewise payable in advance within the
first ten (10) days of the calendar month, with the request that petitioner be
informed of private respondent's decision as to the new rate not later than
October 25, 1976 so that it may be guided accordingly. 3 Instead private
respondent complained to the Department of Public Information, Malacanang,
Manila. In the confrontation between the parties, the Presidential Complaint and
Action Committee found that there was no violation of P.D. No. 20 as the subject
premises are being principally as a Buddhist Temple and therefore are not
covered. Private respondent then sent a letter-complaint thru counsel dated
November 13, 1975 to them Asst. Executive Secretary Ronaldo E. Zamora who in
response issued Opinion No. 480, Series of 1975 dated November 20, 1975
signed by Deputy Executive Secretary Roberto V. Reyes. 4Therein it was held
that the increase in rental demanded was in violation of P.D. No. 20 and that as
1/4 of the two-door apartments is being used likewise as a chapel incidental to
the calling of the private respondent as a monk it cannot be called as a
commercial or public establishment or as a place for the exercise of one's
profession because the same is not for profit.
However, on November 16, 1976, in response to the letter of petitioner, Secretary
Ronaldo E. Zamora, as Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, issued Opinion
No. 629, Series of 1976, as follows:
While it may be conceded arguendo that for being used as a place for
worship, the premises may not necessarily be considered as
commercial for purposes of ruling out the applicability of Presidential
Decree No. 20 dated October 12, 1972, which freezes rates of rentals
of dwelling unit at their present levels when the same do not exceed
P300.00 per month, it is equally true that the same will, as it does, not
fall within the protective mantle of the decree.
It is to be noted that the decreed prohibition against rental increase
applies only to dwelling units or lots used for residential purposes,
the monthly rent of which does not exceed P300.00. On this point
Republic Act No. 6359 defines 'dwelling unit as follows:
"A dwelling unit refers to a house and lot used for
residential purposes and shall include not only buildings,
dwelling places, except motels, hotels, or hotel rooms; but
also those used for home industries or retail store if the
owner thereof and his family actually live therein and use it
principally for residential purpose; Provided, That in case
of a retail store the capital thereof does not exceed five
thousand pesos." (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus if the leased apartment units are used principally for purposes
of religious worship, the incidental fact that Father Sy and/or his
family live therein will not include them in that class of tenants
favored by the emergency law on housing (Morales vs. Zamora, 31
Phil. 204). In such case, the matter of regulating the monthly rentals
become conventional between him and the URC. This should not be
understood to mean, however, that the latter is free to demand an
arbitrary amount. Equity and justice require that both parties observe
reasonable terms and conditions in bringing about a mutual
covenant.
Under the circumstances, therefore, this Office, on equitable
considerations and for reasons of public policy, believes that rental
increases should be raised to reasonable levels only. 5
On January 3, 1977, petitioner through counsel furnished private respondent
through counsel a xerox copy of said Opinion No. 629, Series of 1976 and
demanded that the private respondent vacate and surrender the two premises
within five (5) days from receipt of the same and to pay his rental indebtedness
minus the deposit made. Nevertheless, private respondent failed to vacate the
premises.
Hence, petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the City Court of
Manila on March 7, 1977. After the issues were joined and the trial on the merits,
a decision was rendered on February 16, 1981 dismissing the complaint and
counter-claim without pronouncement as to costs. Both parties asked for a
reconsideration of the decision but the same was denied. Hence, both parties
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila, wherein in due course a
decision was rendered on December 28, 1981 affirming the judgment of the City
Court with the modification finding private respondent entitled to moral damages
in the amount of P4,000.00, exemplary damage ages in the amount of P2,000.00
and attorney's fees of P2,000.00 and the costs of the suit. A motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by the trial court in an order of
February 25, 1982.
Hence, a petition for review was filed by petitioner with the Court of Appeals,
wherein after the issues were joined, a decision was rendered on October 7, 1982
dismissing the petition with costs against petitioner. 6 A motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner of the decision was denied in a resolution of
November 17, 1982.
Thus, this petition.
A reading of the two contracts of lease entered into between petitioner and
private respondent hereinabove reproduced show that its period is from month
to month and that the lease may be terminated when either party gives a 5 days
notice in writing.
No doubt such a stipulation between the parties demonstrates that the
agreement of lease is for a definite period and not for an indefinite period as held
by the appellate court.
In Rantael vs. CA, 7 involving a similar contract of lease between the parties this
Court found that a lease on a month to month basis expires after the last day of
the 30th day period repeating the same cycle of the 30-day period until either
party express their prerogative under their agreement to terminate the same.
The only difference between Rantael and the present case is that in the former
the parties may terminate the agreement upon 30 days notice while in this case,
the agreement is that the termination by either party may be upon 5 days notice.
Such difference is of no moment. And such agreement is binding and is the law
between the parties.
Since the lease agreement in question is for a definite period it follows that
petitioner has a right to judicially eject private respondent from the premises as
an exception to the general rule provided for in Section 4 of P.D. No. 20 which
provides as follows:
Except when the lease is for a definite period, the provisions of
paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
insofar as they refer to dwelling unit or land on which another's
Footnotes
1 Exhibits A and A-1; page 6, Rollo.
2 Exhibit A-2.
3 Exhibit B.
4 Exhibits D and D-2
5 Exhibit E-1; pages 44-45, Rollo.
6 Madame Justice Milagros A. German was the ponente, concurred in
by Justices Carolina C. Grio-Aquino and Vicente V. Mendoza.
7 97 SCRA 453 (1980).
8 Vda. de Kraut vs. Lontok, 7 SCRA 281 (1963).
$ + GRSI Copyrightregno N94-027
{bmr footnote.bmp}87585_3_27_90_footnotes>mainG.R. No. 87585 March 27,
1990
BLUE MANILA, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 87585 March 27, 1990
BLUE MANILA, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION and EMMANUEL E. ABELLANEDA,
respondents.
Capuyan & Quimpo Law Office for petitioner.
Manuel L. Montilla for private respondents.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The petition for certiorari alleges a single ground for the allowance of the writ, to
wit:
reviewed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 (Hermogenes vs. Amores, 111
SCRA 658). Appeal is the proper remedy.
While the rule is that "No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the
subject matter will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors and
properly argued in the brief," the exception to the rule is: "save as the court, at
its option, may notice plain errors not specified, and also clerical errors" (Sec. 7,
Rule 51, Rules of Court).
The mathematical error in the POEA decision is a plain error which this Court
may correct (Sec. 7, Rule 51, Rules of Court). To overlook it would be
inconsistent with substantial justice, for it would permit a party to unjustly profit
from a mistake or inadvertence of another or others, the POEA and the petitioner
in this case. It would also put a premium on a technicality contrary to the spirit
and purpose of the Labor Code (Art. 221, Labor Code).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The dispositive part of the
decision of the POEA and the NLRC in Case No. M-87-06-525 is hereby modified
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering respondent Blue Manila, Inc. to pay to complainant
Emmanuel E. Abellaneda the following amounts, to wit:
1. THREE THOUSAND SEVENTEEN and 54/100 US DOLLARS
(US$3,017.54) or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of
payment, representing the balance of unpaid salaries, less cash
advances in the total of P23,500.00 and the sum of SEVEN HUNDRED
TWENTY FIVE and 64/100 US DOLLARS (US$725.64) or its equivalent
in Philippine Currency at the time of payment, representing the airfare
ticket for the repatriation of the complainant; and
2. TEN PERCENT (10%) of the total award as and by way of attorney's
fees.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* Words in parenthesis supplied.
FELICIANO, J.:
In 1983, Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. ("MOPI"), a domestic corporation engaged in
the marketing of petroleum products, was the subject of sale negotiations
between Mobil Petroleum Company of New York ("Mobil Pet") and Caltex
Petroleum Company, New York, U.S.A., ("Caltex Pet"). The negotiations covered,
among other things, the sale of (a) Mobil Pet's one hundred percent (100%)
interest in MOPI to Caltex Pet and (b) Mobil Pet's forty percent (40%) interest in
the Bataan Refining Company ("BRC").
To protect its interests, Mobil Employees Association ("MEA"), with whom MOPILuzon had an existing Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") covering the
period from 1 May 1982 to 30 April 1985, inquired about the impending sale in
the affected separating employees; and (7) the 1983 year-end bonus was paid to
separating employees pro-rated on the basis of 8/12 of one year's privilege.
Upon conclusion of the contract of sale between Mobil Pet and Caltex Pet, on 31
August 1983, 1 the latter caused MOPI's dissolution by appropriate filings with
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") in Manila. All the employees
separated from the service, 467 of them, were paid a total of P5,646,817.73
including loans waived, pursuant to the revised termination package. Some of
these employees were hired, on a contractual basis, to wind up MOPI's affairs,
by a newly formed subsidiary of Mobil Pet, Mobil Philippines, Inc. ("MPI").
On 31 August 1983, MEA filed a complaint for unfair labor practice ("ULP"),
illegal lay-off and separation benefits against MOPI with the National Labor
Relations Commission ("NLRC"), National Capital Region. The complaint was
later on amended to include Mobil Philippines, Inc. ("MPI"), Mobil Pet, Caltex Pet
and all the members of their respective Boards of Directors as respondents. Still
later, another amendment to the complaint was filed to include as additional
petitioner Inter-Island Labor Organization ("ILO"), with whom MOPI-Iloilo had a
CBA for the period from 1 May 1982 to 31 May 1985. Finally, a supplementary
mental complaint was filed charging respondents with another count of ULP, i.e.,
failure of the latter to check-off and pay petitioners' union dues for September,
1983.
In a decision in NLRC Case No. NCR-8-3929-83 dated 12 December 1984, 2 the
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for failure of petitioner to prove that MOPI
was guilty of ULP and illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter found that the
termination of all MOPI employees was caused by cessation of MOPI's business
operations in the country; that in respect of this kind of termination, MOPI's only
task pursuant to the Labor Code was to serve notice of termination on its
employees and on the then MOLE and its regional offices at least thirty (30) days
before its effectivity date and to pay separation pay to affected employees in
accordance with law; 3 that MOPI did comply with these requirements; that the
dissolution was done in good faith, no proof having been presented to establish
that the dissolution was carried out to circumvent the CBAs between MOPI and
the petitioner unions; that the newly created subsidiary of Mobil Pet, MPI, could
not be categorized as a successor-in-interest of MOPI because MOPI's main line
of business was the marketing of petroleum products while MPI was engaged in
the marketing of Mobil Pet's chemicals and international business like high
octane aviation fuels, marine fuels and exports; that Caltex Pet, upon acquiring
the shares of stock of MOPI caused the latter's dissolution at the SEC; that MPI's
hiring of some of MOPI's employees was merely for the purpose of liquidating
and winding up the affairs of MOPI; that MOPI had not restricted exercise of the
right to self-organization of members of MEA, who had free access to the use of
the conference room of MOPI in Makati, which access had not been availed of by
MEA; that MEA had not proved that its counsel, who was not an employee of
MOPI, was refused entrance to MOPI's Makati-based conference room; and that,
finally, check-off was no longer available considering that MOPI's relationship
with the employees had ceased by 31 August 1983.
In a resolution of the NLRC Second Division dated 6 April 1987, petitioners'
appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter was dismissed for lack of merit.
In the present Petition for Certiorari, petitioners claim that private respondents
committed acts constituting unfair labor practices. These acts, in their
allegations, were:
(a) the termination of the employment of MOPI's employees without
notice to the petitioner unions, in violation of relevant provisions of
their CBAS;
(b) the failure of private respondents to check off and pay to petitioner
unions their dues for September 1983;
(c) the dissolution of MOPI and the creation of MPI were done to
circumvent the CBA agreements between MOPI and petitioner MEA
on the one hand and MOPI and petitioner ILO on the other hand; and
(d) the interference with petitioner unions' members in the exercise of
their right to self-organization by refusing a non-MOPI employee the
use of the company conference room.
Petitioners supplementarily argue, apparently in relation to (c) above, that MPI is
a successor-in-interest of MOPI, considering that MPI is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Mobil Pet in the same manner that MOPI was; that the members of
MPI's Board of Directors are the same persons who had served as Directors of
MOPI; and that MPI had hired some of MOPI's former employees.
We do not find the contentions of petitioners persuasive.
The relevant provisions in the CBAs invoked by petitioners are identical and
read as follows:
EFFECTIVITY
Section 1. This agreement shall be effective from the l st day of May
l982 to 30th April 1985, subject to automatic extension for yearly
periods unless terminated at the end of the original period or any
subsequent year thereafter upon sixty (60) days prior written noticeby
either party to the other of its intention to terminate, modify, amend or
supplement this agreement. (Art. XVIII MEA-MOPI CBA, Annex 'A'; Art.
XIX, Annex 'LL' for ILO CBA, emphasis supplied). 4
from the bona fide character of MOPI's dissolution and withdrawal from
business. MPI's residual business consisting of the marketing of chemicals,
aviation and marine fuels as well as exports, all of which constituted a fraction of
the prior business of MOPI, similarly does not argue against the bona
fide character of the corporate reorganization which here took place. The net
effect of the reorganization was the liquidation by Mobil Pet of the great bulk of
its former business in the Philippines, the dissolution of the corporate entity of
MOPI and the transfer of its physical assets and business to some other
Philippine entity owned and controlled by Caltex Pet, presumably Caltex
Philippines, without any impact upon the foreign exchange reserves of the
Philippines.
The final argument of petitioner unions need not detain us for long. Having
validly ceased to operate as of 31 August 1983, the duty of MOPI to cheek off and
turn over to petitioners union dues from their members for September 1983, or
until the expiration of the CBA in accordance with its terms, also ceased. In
respect of alleged interference by MOPI with the rights of petitioners' members
to self-organization, petitioners have not adduced any compelling reason for
overturning the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that MOPI had not
interferred or encroached upon such right. Petitioner MEA admitted that it had
not been denied the use of the company conference room. Indeed, this matter
appears to us to be a de minimis affair.
We conclude that petitioners have failed to show any grave abuse of discretion
or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC in
rendering its decision dated 6 April 1987.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J. (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Comment, p. 12; Rollo, p. 74.
2 Rollo, p. 107.
3 See Article 284 (now Article 283) of the Labor Code dealing with
closing or cessation of operation of the company not due to serious
business losses.
CRUZ, J.:
On June 30, 1986, the bodies of three men were found in a wooded area in
barangay Tuaco, Basud, Camarines Norte. The corpses were in a state of
decomposition and bore various contusions, stab and bullet wounds, and other
injuries indicating foul play. The victims were later positively identified as
Alexander Sy, Augusto Gabo and Frisco Marcellana.
In due time, an information for robbery with multiple homicide was filed against
Adolfo Quiones, Alfredo Aban, Zaldy Civico, Ronilo Canaba, Amado Conda, Jr.,
Santiago Solarte, Armando Buitre and one John Doe. 1
their constitutional rights before their investigation and were actually assisted
by Atty. Santiago Ceneta when they gave their separate confessions. 12 Both
confessed to the crime charged and narrated in detail their participation in its
commission.
Quiones later testified that he had been subjected to torture to force him to
admit the killing and robbery, 13 but as the trial judge noted, no proof of such
coercion was ever presented in court. Moreover, the witness' narration of the
commission of the offense substantially jibed with the testimony of the other
accused, thus negating the suspicion that it had been merely concocted.
Understandably, Quiones sought to minimize his participation in this crime by
claiming that he stayed in the car when the three victims were forcibly taken to
the woods where they were robbed and slain. 14 This is another indication that
the had not been manhandled into signing the confession.
lt is important to note that when asked at the trial if he was affirming his extrajudicial statement, he categorically said he was, 15 thus in effect reiterating his
detailed account of the conduct of the several accused, including their escape to
Manila in the stolen car and their distribution of the loot among themselves. This
was now a judicial confession. Interestingly, Quiones also admitted to two
other hold-ups and his membership in another gang of robbers headed by one
Kapitan Mitra, an unnecessary embellishment that lent further credence to his
confession. 16
Canaba's own statement corroborated Quiones' confession and provided more
elaboration. Like Quiones, he admitted that they had placed sacks on the load
and forced the three victims to go with them to the parke where they were
unclothed and killed, two by Buitre and the third by Solarte. Quiones remained
in the car. Afterwards, the accused distributed the cash among themselves, each
receiving P10,000.00, with Solarte and Buitre getting the weapons also. Using
Sy's car, they proceeded to Sapang Palay after leaving the weapons with Sonny
Tabalan in his house in Tigbinan. 17
Conda also gave an extra-judicial confession, but this was not made with the
assistance of counsel and so must be rejected. It is totally worthless and
inadmissible against him. Such a confession is anathema in a free society. It was
not recognized even during the era of martial law under the 1973 Constitution as
interpreted by the Court in People v. Galit. 18 And it is also scorned under the
present Constitution, which is more deeply committed to the protection of the
rights of the accused.
Civico also gave an extra-judicial confession, likewise without the assistance of
counsel. 19 But testifying on his behalf, he purged it of invalidity when he freely
affirmed it on the stand in the presence of the judge himself and with the
assistance of defense counsel. 20 By so testifying, he in effect reiterated but
validly this time his earlier narration, replete with all the damming details, of
the commission of the crime.
The Court is satisfied that the evidence against the accused is sufficient to
justify their conviction. The declarations of the prosecution witnesses and
more so of defendants Quiones and Canaba, both of whom had pleaded guilty
are telling enough to toll their guilt. The seized weapons and the other
exhibits offer strong corroboration that has not been refuted. The state of the
cadavers of the swollen scrotums and the protruding tongues tell a tale of
their own of the defendants' perverted ruthlessness.
By contrast, the defense was practically one of mere denial. Even the claimed
maltreatment of Quiones has not been established.
It is clear from the evidence on record that there was a conspiracy among the
perpetrators of the crime to rob and slay. A conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. This need not be established by direct evidence but may be
proven through the series of acts done by each of the accused in pursuance of
the common unlawful purpose. 21
Proof of conspiracy in the case at bar was supplied, paradoxically enough,
mainly by defendants Quiones and Canaba themselves. From the time they
blocked the road to waylay their prey to the killing and robbing in the woods, to
the distribution of the loot and their escape in the stolen car, all the accused
were acting in concert and in accordance with their common plan.
It is argued that Civico and Aban were not part of the conspiracy and that
Quiones himself categorically said so in answer to a question from the
prosecution. Interpreting this merely as a gesture of loyalty or perhaps goodwill
or charity toward his fellow criminals, we dismiss it as a falsity. On the other
hand, Civico himself admitted his own participation in the offense, and in his
sworn confession (which he affirmed in court) also implicated Aban. And there is
also Bariuan's testimony that Aban was one of the armed group, including the
other accused, that went to his house on July 8, 1986, and talked of their
commission of the crime. These declarations are enough to place the two
defendants within the conspiracy together with the other defendants.
In a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all and every one of the conspirators
is guilty with the others in equal degree. Hence, every member of the group that
perpetrated the killing and robbery of the three victims must suffer the same
penalty prescribed by law even if they had different modes of participation in the
commission of the crime. 22
The trial judge found all the accused guilty as charged and sentenced each of
them to serve the triplepenalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay actual and
compensatory damages in the amount of P380,000.00 to the heirs of Alexander
Sy, P50,000.00 to the heirs of Augusta Gabo, and P50,000.00 to the heirs of
Frisco Marcellana. The firearms were also confiscated in favor of the State.
The Court finds that the accused were incorrectly charged with robbery with
multiple homicide and so were also incorrectly sentenced by the trial court. The
reason is that there is no crime of robbery with multiple homicide under the
Revised Penal Code. The charge should have been for robbery with homicide
only regardless of the fact that three persons were killed in the commission of
the robbery. In this special complex crime, the number of persons killed is
immaterial and does not increase the penalty prescribed in Article 294 of the said
Code. As held in People v. Cabuena: 23
But it was error to sentence the appellants to three life imprisonments
each as if 3 separate crimes had been committed. The complex crime
of robbery with homicide is not to be multiplied with the number of
persons killed. As was said by this Court in People vs. Madrid (88
Phil. 1), "the general concept of this crime does not limit the taking of
human life to one single victim making the slaying of human being in
excess of that number punishable as separate individual offense or
offenses. All the homicides or murders are merged in the composite,
integrated whole that is robbery with homicide so long as the killings
were perpetrated by reason or on the occasion of the robbery.
The penalty prescribed for the crime of robbery with homicide
is reclusion perpetua, to be imposed only once even if multiple killings
accompanied the robbery. Furthermore, the discussion by the trial court of the
attendant circumstances was unnecessary because Article 63 of the Code
provides that when the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be
applied without regard to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may
have attended the commission of the crime.
The civil indemnity for each of the three victims is reduced to P30,000.00, to be
paid to their respective heirs. The heirs of Alexander Sy are also awarded the
additional sum P330,000.00, representing the value of the articles taken from him
by the accused.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of all the accused-appellants is AFFIRMED, but
each of them is sentenced to only one term of reclusion perpetua for the crime of
robbery with homicide. The monetary awards are also modified in accordance
with the preceding paragraph. It is so ordered.
Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 6.
2 Records, pp. 54, 60, 65.
3 Ibid., p. 178.
4 Rollo, p. 53.
5 Ibid., p. 18.
6 Records, p. 39.
7 TSN, January 28, 1987, p. 5.
8 TSN, March 19, 1987, p. 7.
9 Records, pp. 28, 36.
10 TSN, November 27, 1986, pp. 47-48.
11 TSN, March 24, 1987, pp. 6-12.
12 Records, pp. 28, 36.
13 TSN, April 1, 1987, pp. 21-23.
14 Records, p. 29.
15 TSN, April 1, 1987 p. 54.
16 Records, pp. 32-34.
17 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
18 135 SCRA 465.
19 Records, p. 9.
20 TSN, April 8, 1987, pp. 11-13.
21 People v. Pineda, 157 SCRA 71.
22 People vs. Salvador, 163 SC RA 574.
23 98 Phil. 919.
$ + GRSI Copyrightregno N94-027
{bmr footnote.bmp}82027_3_29_90_footnotes>mainG.R. No. 82027 March 29,
1990
ROMARICO G. VITUG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990
ROMARICO G. VITUG, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROWENA FAUSTINO-CORONA,
respondents.
Rufino B. Javier Law Office for petitioner.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court 1 involving the
probate of the two wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in New
York, U. S.A., on November 10, 1980, naming private respondent Rowena
Faustino-Corona executrix. In our said decision, we upheld the appointment of
Nenita Alonte as co-special administrator of Mrs. Vitug's estate with her (Mrs.
Vitug's) widower, petitioner Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate.
On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from
the probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to
the estate to cover allegedly his advances to the estate in the sum of
P667,731.66, plus interests, which he claimed were personal funds. As found by
the Court of Appeals, 2 the alleged advances consisted of P58,147.40 spent for
the payment of estate tax, P518,834.27 as deficiency estate tax, and P90,749.99
as "increment thereto." 3 According to Mr. Vitug, he withdrew the sums of
P518,834.27 and P90,749.99 from savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of
America, Makati, Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that
the same funds withdrawn from savings account No. 35342-038 were conjugal
partnership properties and part of the estate, and hence, there was allegedly no
ground for reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for failure to include the
sums in question for inventory and for "concealment of funds belonging to the
estate." 4
Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the
same through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank
on June 19, 1970. The agreement provides:
We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK OF AMERICAN
NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (hereinafter referred
to as the BANK), that all money now or hereafter deposited by us or
any or either of us with the BANK in our joint savings current account
shall be the property of all or both of us and shall be payable to and
collectible or withdrawable by either or any of us during our lifetime,
and after the death of either or any of us shall belong to and be the
sole property of the survivor or survivors, and shall be payable to and
collectible or withdrawable by such survivor or survivors.
We further agree with each other and the BANK that the receipt or
check of either, any or all of us during our lifetime, or the receipt or
check of the survivor or survivors, for any payment or withdrawal
made for our above-mentioned account shall be valid and sufficient
release and discharge of the BANK for such payment or withdrawal. 5
The trial courts 6 upheld the validity of this agreement and granted "the motion
to sell some of the estate of Dolores L. Vitug, the proceeds of which shall be
used to pay the personal funds of Romarico Vitug in the total sum of P667,731.66
... ." 7
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in the petition for certiorari filed by the
herein private respondent, held that the above-quoted survivorship agreement
constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which "did not comply with the
formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil Code," 8 and
secondly, assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited
donation under the provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code. 9
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Judge dated November 26,
1985 (Annex II, petition) is hereby set aside insofar as it granted
private respondent's motion to sell certain properties of the estate of
Dolores L. Vitug for reimbursement of his alleged advances to the
lifetime of both, and the balance, if any, upon the death of either,
belonged to the survivor. 17
xxx xxx xxx
In Macam v. Gatmaitan, 18 it was held:
xxx xxx xxx
This Court is of the opinion that Exhibit C is an aleatory contract
whereby, according to article 1790 of the Civil Code, one of the parties
or both reciprocally bind themselves to give or do something as an
equivalent for that which the other party is to give or do in case of the
occurrence of an event which is uncertain or will happen at an
indeterminate time. As already stated, Leonarda was the owner of the
house and Juana of the Buick automobile and most of the furniture.
By virtue of Exhibit C, Juana would become the owner of the house in
case Leonarda died first, and Leonarda would become the owner of
the automobile and the furniture if Juana were to die first. In this
manner Leonarda and Juana reciprocally assigned their respective
property to one another conditioned upon who might die first, the
time of death determining the event upon which the acquisition of
such right by the one or the other depended. This contract, as any
other contract, is binding upon the parties thereto. Inasmuch as
Leonarda had died before Juana, the latter thereupon acquired the
ownership of the house, in the same manner as Leonarda would have
acquired the ownership of the automobile and of the furniture if Juana
had died first.19
xxx xxx xxx
There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence
it must be presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence
of the marita. relations. 20
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious
reasons, because it was to take effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is
not a donation between the spouses because it involved no conveyance of a
spouse's own properties to the other.
It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the
conjugal partnership, as held by the Court of Appeals, 21 by "mere
stipulation" 22 and that it is no "cloak" 23 to circumvent the law on conjugal
property relations. Certainly, the spouses are not prohibited by law to invest
conjugal property, say, by way of a joint and several bank account, more
Footnotes
1 Corona v. Court of Appeals, No. 59821, August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA
316.
2 Kapunan, Santiago, M., J., ponente; Puno Reynato S. and
Marigomen Alfredo, JJ., concurring.
3 Rollo, 21.
4 Id., 22.
5 Id.
6 Judge (now Justice of the Court of Appeals) Asaali S. Isnani
presiding.
7 Rollo, 23.
8 Id., 26.
9 Now, Article 87 of the Family Code.
10 Rollo, 28-29.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
A case of Carnapping with Homicide, as defined and penalized under Section 14
of Republic Act No. 6539, also known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.
There is no question that on 5 December 1984, a Ford Telstar automobile, TX5
bearing Plate No. N-PDW-382, was carnapped, and that ANTHONY Banzon, the
registered owner of said car, was shot and killed.
The Trial Court decided * that the three accused, Danilo DE LA CRUZ y Ruado,
Romeo SALVADOR y Mendoza, and Dantes BELOSO y de Castro, had
"conspired to steal away as they in fact stole and carried away the TELSTAR of
ANTHONY Banzon"; held them "liable as principals by direct participation" for
the crime of Carnapping with Homicide; and sentenced them as follows:
Continuing with the facts at around 3:00 P.M., Dantes BELOSO, who was at
the Centrum office, received a call from DE LA CRUZ, who instructed him to
proceed to his (DE LA CRUZ) house at Obrero Street, Makati, Metro Manila. On
BELOSO called for DE LA CRUZ, who came out and handed to him the key of the
Telstar. DE LA CRUZ instructed BELOSO to drive for SALVADOR who did not
know how to drive. BELOSO then boarded the car and waited for SALVADOR
who came out of the house some 15 to 20 minutes later. In his Affidavit (Exhibit
"C-11 "), BELOSO recounted that SALVADOR related to him that he had seen a
dead man in the house of DE LA CRUZ but that they were to keep it to
themselves because he (SALVADOR) was seared of DE LA CRUZ. SALVADOR
then showed to BELOSO a phone number of a certain Mr. Hernandez who was
interested in buying the car. After driving a short distance, BELOSO stopped at a
telephone booth to call Hernandez to ask for the latter's address. They then
started to look for the place but failed to locate it. Since BELOSO was already
hungry, he parked the car at the Brunch Restaurant in front of UERM and took
his snack thereat while SALVADOR took a taxi and proceeded to Hernandez (p.
13-16, TSN, 9 October 1985).
SALVADOR was able to reach Hernandez' place at about 4:00 P.M. Rodolfo
Hernandez recalled during the trial that SALVADOR introduced himself as
ANTHONY Banzon and offered to sell a car, which was parked at a nearby Caltex
station. They proceeded to the station to look at the car. Hernandez then looked
at the certificate of registration of the car in the name of ANTHONY Banzon and
the residence certificate presented to him by SALVADOR, which was also in the
name of ANTHONY Banzon. Believing that SALVADOR was really ANTHONY
Banzon, Hernandez then suggested that they go to the actual buyer at the
Metropolitan Pawnshop at P. Campa Street, Sampaloc, Metro Manila, leaving
BELOSO at the UERM. At the pawnshop, they met Hernandez' contact,
Patrolman Rosauro de la Rosa, who is the brother of the owner of the pawnshop.
Again, SALVADOR introduced himself as ANTHONY Banzon, the owner of the
car and offered to sell it for P130,000.00. Hernandez then left the pawnshop (pp.
85-95, TSN, 1 March 1985; pp. 4-13, TSN, 8 March 1985).
During the negotiation, Pat. de la Rosa became suspicious that the car had been
stolen because of the low price of P130,000.00, and when told that he would be
paid the next day, SALVADOR insisted that if possible, the former pay
P100,000.00 in advance as he was in need of money very badly. On top of that,
when Pat. de la Rosa declined to pay immediately, SALVADOR left the car
behind. Pat. de la Rosa then reported his suspicions to Sgt. Reynaldo Roldan of
the Quezon City Police (pp. 8-19, TSN, 8 March 1985). Sgt. Roldan forthwith
dispatched Pfc. Damaso Osma, Pat. Edgardo de Leon, Pat. Anthony Name and
Pat. Justiniano Estrella, Jr., to P. Campa Street (pp. 95-96, TSN, 27 February
1985; p. 4, TSN, 25 March 1985).
residence certificates were secured and kept by the three accused; 2) their
"business" of buying of cars was advertised in the newspapers; 3) the ads
yielding fruitful results, prospective sellers would be asked about their
respective certificates of registration and other documents; 4) when the portion
for the signature of the owner is found to be blank, the accused would pretend to
test the car, demand the certificate of registration, and fill in the signature space
with their own signature; 5) present the same certificate of registration bearing
their own signature, along with the residence certificate supplied by DE LA
CRUZ which is made to coincide with the name and signature appearing in the
certificate of registration, to the prospective buyers; and 6) pretend to test the
car although, in fact, just waiting for the opportunity to leave the owner of the car
behind so that the accused could dispose of the same in the meantime.
All accused, on the other hand, profess innocence. BELOSO claims that he was
merely hired to man the office at Centrum Condominium; that he had nothing to
do with the carnapping of ANTHONY'S vehicle; that he went to the house of DE
LA CRUZ at about 3:00 P.M. of 5 December 1984, but was not allowed to enter
the same; and that while he was by the gate, he was given the key of ANTHONY's
car by DE LA CRUZ to drive for SALVADOR who did not know how to drive; that,
in turn, the registration papers of the car and other documents were handed to
SALVADOR with specific instructions to bring the vehicle to the prospective
buyer, Hernandez.
For his part, SALVADOR claims that he was merely called by DE LA CRUZ to go
to the latter's house to assist BELOSO in the sale of the car. He denies having
been a long acquaintance of either DE LA CRUZ or BELOSO. He claims that on 5
December 1984 DE LA CRUZ instructed him to go to the Royal Beauty Parlor
between 10:00 and 11:00 A.M., which he did. After waiting for some ten (10) to
fifteen (15) minutes, DE LA CRUZ arrived on board a taxi cab. They proceeded to
DE LA CRUZ's house. Arriving thereat and finding it closed, they went to
Lugawan sa Makati for a snack. After eating, they returned to DE LA CRUZ's
house around 12:00 noon. A few minutes later, Elmer Mabunga, driver of DE LA
CRUZ arrived (pp. 14-15, TSN, March 5, 1986). At 12:30 P.M., the three of them left
the house. Elmer rode in a jeepney while they took a taxi. DE LA CRUZ dropped
him off at the Royal Beauty Parlor while DE LA CRUZ proceeded to Centrum
Condominium. He was instructed by DE LA CRUZ to wait from 2:00 to 2:30 P.M.
after which he should go back to the house. At around 3:00 P.M., he went back
and after calling DE LA CRUZ'name, the latter came out of the house, opened the
first door, and told him to wait for BELOSO. At around 3:20 to 3:30 P.M.,
BELOSO arrived. From here on, the testimonies of BELOSO and SALVADOR are
substantially similar in that they were given the keys of the car and some
documents and told to go to a certain Hernandez, a prospective buyer.
In a nutshell, it is BELOSO and SALVADOR's position that they were unaware of
any carnapping; that they were in a regular business transaction to sell a car
with promise of a commission; that they were not in the house of DE LA CRUZ in
the early afternoon of 5 December 1984 when ANTHONY was killed; that they
were unaware of the killing, of ANTHONY which, according to SALVADOR was
DE LA CRUZ' own doing.
Both BELOSO and SALVADOR are in unison in claiming that their statements,
marked as Exhibits "B" for SALVADOR, and "C" and "K" for BELOSO, are
inadmissible in evidence as the same were extracted by force and without the
presence of counsel.
The Trial Court gave no credence to the exculpatory allegations of BELOSO and
SALVADOR and convicted them, as well as DE LA CRUZ, of Carnapping with
Homicide. Hence, this appeal, filed originally by all three accused.
Appellants BELOSO and SALVADOR ascribe the following errors to the Trial
Court:
By Dantes BELOSO:
I. The Trial Judge who had no occasion to observe demeanors of
witnesses as he merely prepared the decision in this case as the trial
was entirely heard by Justice Elbinas erred in concluding that at
around 9:00 A.M. of December 5, 1984 the late Anthony Banzon was
called by Beloso.
II. The Lower Court, with due respect, gravely erred in holding that the
three (3) accused conspired in stealing the car subject of this case.
III. The Lower Court again, with due respect, gravely erred in applying
the case of People vs. Mangulabnan, et al. in concluding that the three
(3) accused are liable in the death of Anthony Banzon and that Beloso
could have been present at the time the victim was shot.
IV. The Court a quo gravely erred in ruling that all the accused
conspired in the killing of Anthony Banzon and Beloso 'could have
been inside the house and was present at the time Banzon was shot'
because if he were not present, 'he could have been found negative of
gun powder nitrates.
V. All in all, the Lower Court, as far as Beloso is concerned, as shown
by indubitable facts heretofore and/or hereinafter discussed and as
facts and evidence on records will show, committed grave error in
convicting Beloso of the crime charged.
By Romeo SALVADOR:
Today. On the same dates, BELOSO had rented an office space at the Centrum
Condominium under the name of said Garcia for the two days mentioned, and
again on 5 December 1984 at P50.00 per hour, complete with staff facilities.
BELOSO held himself out as in the business of buying cars. The victim,
ANTHONY, responded to the ad, went to said office and offered to sell his
Telstar, Model '83. Posing again as Mike Garcia, BELOSO called ANTHONY's
house at around 9:00 A.M. on 5 December 1984 and informed the latter's mother
that he was the buyer of the car. When ANTHONY went to the Centrum office,
BELOSO told ANTHONY to wait for DE LA CRUZ. Upon the latter's arrival, he had
a talk with ANTHONY. DE LA ORTIZ made sure that ANTHONY's certificate of
registration, official receipt and other pertinent papers of the Telstar were in
order (pp. 9-12, TSN, October 9, 1985). ANTHONY and DE LA CRUZ then
proceeded to the latter's house at Barrio Obrero, Makati.
Meanwhile, SALVADOR was instructed by DE LA CRUZ also to wait at the latter's
house. When DE LA CRUZ and ANTHONY arrived, the former told SALVADOR to
take a snack somewhere while he (DE LA CRUZ) and ANTHONY talked. It was
after SALVADOR returned to the house that the killing of ANTHONY transpired
between 12:00 noon and 2:00 P.M. Later, at about 3:00 P.M., DE LA CRUZ then
allegedly called for BELOSO at the Centrum office. When BELOSO arrived, DE
LA CRUZ handed him the keys to the car, which was parked nearby. DE LA
CRUZ also handed to SALVADOR a brown envelope containing papers of the
Telstar with the instruction to bring the car to a certain Hernandez, who was
buying the car. Following that bidding, the two left and looked for Hernandez.
But unable to locate him, SALVADOR went on his own in a taxi. BELOSO was left
with the car at the Brunch Restaurant near UERM. After having located
Hernandez, SALVADOR, Hernandez, and a driver went back to where BELOSO
was, took the car and proceeded to the Metropolitan Pawnshop leaving BELOSO
behind. At this place, the three alighted. SALVADOR introduced himself as
ANTHONY Banzon, the owner of the car and the name appearing in the car's
Certificate of Registration, to Pat. Rosauro de la Rosa, brother of the pawnshop
owner who was the real buyer of the car. SALVADOR even showed the
Registration Certificate and a Residence Certificate, purportedly ANTHONY'S, as
proof thereof. SALVADOR then asked for P130,000.00 as selling price. Pat. de la
Rosa agreed but asked that payment be made the following day as banks were
already closed. SALVADOR, however, insisted on payment that evening as he
was badly in need of money. This made Pat. de la Rosa suspicious that the car
had been stolen, and reported t6 the Quezon City police. Pat. de la Rosa then
instructed SALVADOR to return to the pawnshop the next day. As SALVADOR
did not know how to drive he left the Telstar at the pawnshop, went to the
Brunch Restaurant near UERM, picked up BELOSO so the latter could drive the
car back to DE LA CRUZ. When they returned that night and boarded the car,
elements of the Quezon City police approached them and asked them questions.
BELOSO got down from the car and started shouting that he was ANTHONY, the
owner of the car (p. 23, TSN, March 8, 1985). Notwithstanding, the police brought
them to the Quezon City police headquarters. Here, the investigators recovered
some documents inside BELOSO's clutch bag, among them, a residence
certificate in ANTHONY's name (Exhibit "H-1"). In BELOSO's possession were
also found a motor registration certificate in ANTHONY's name, two (2) blank
residence certificates and one residence certificate in the name of Mark Garcia
(p. 120, TSN, 27 February 1985).
BELOSO's and SALVADOR's protestations of innocence do not inspire belief.
Both of them posed as ANTHONY at one time or another during the
"negotiations." When SALVADOR offered to sell the car to Rodolfo Hernandez,
he introduced himself as ANTHONY Banzon. He even presented to Hernandez a
car registration certificate and a residence certificate all in the name of
ANTHONY Banzon. Later, when Hernandez introduced SALVADOR to Pat. de la
Rosa, the former's contact, SALVADOR again introduced himself as ANTHONY
Banzon (pp. 85-95, TSN, 1 March 1985; pp. 4-13, TSN, 8 March 1985). These
misrepresentations are indication that he knew the car was stolen. at further
bolsters the conclusion that he had a hand in the commission of the crime was
the fact that when he and BELOSO were arrested by the Quezon City anticarnapping unit, it was now BELOSO claiming to be ANTHONY Banzon (pp. 97102, TSN, 29 February 1985; pp. 21-28, TSN, 8 March 1985; pp. 26-31, TSN, 13
March 1985; pp. 71-76, TSN, 18 March 1985). BELOSO's claim that he was
ANTHONY Banzon and SALVADOR's silence in the face of such claim, despite
the fact that he had earlier misrepresented himself as ANTHONY, all the more
reveal that the two of them were one in keeping secret the true ownership of the
car.
A more perfect example of a conspiracy cannot be contrived BELOSO and
SALVADOR shared the same purpose with DE LA CRUZ in carnapping the
vehicle with a view to selling it at a low price and making money which they
badly needed. They were united in its execution as may be inferred from the
facts and circumstances established by the evidence. Conspiracy need not be
established by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally must
be proved by a number of indefinite acts, condition and circumstances which
vary according to the purpose to be accomplished (People vs. Colman, et al.,
G.R. Nos. L-6652-54, 28 February 1958, 103 Phil. 6). The existence of conspiracy
may be inferred from acts tending to show a community of design or purpose
(People vs. Mada-I Santalani, G.R. No. L-29979, 28 September 1979, 93 SCRA
315).
What of the killing of ANTHONY? There is no question that he was killed "in the
commission of the carnapping" (Sec. 14, RA 6539). It is clear from the evidence
as well that he was killed in the house of DE LA CRUZ between 1:30 and 2:00
P.M. on 5 December 1984 (Brief, Danilo de la Cruz, p. 19). It was at that house
where ANTHONY was found dead by a boarder by the name of Cynthia Juarez at
around 9:00 P.M. of the same date. DE LA CRUZ tried to camouflage the killing
by ostensibly reporting to the police that his place had been ransacked and that
a person had been killed. As Pat. Bactad testified, however, when he and a police
team went to the house, belongings therein were found wrapped and ready to be
transferred.
BELOSO claims that he was sent for by DE LA CRUZ from the Centrum office
only at 3:00 P.M. on 5 December 1984 and was not, therefore, at the DE LA CRUZ
residence at the time the killing was perpetrated in the nearly afternoon of that
date. Similarly SALVADOR claims that he went to the DE LA CRUZ house only at
3:00 P.M. and when he did he was merely at the gate and did not enter the house.
Consequently they conclude that neither of them can be held culpable for
ANTHONY'S death.
Those denial, however, cannot prevail over the physical evidence that BELOSO
and SALVADOR were found positive for nitrates, which means that they were
within the vicinity when the gun was fired.
When a paraffin or nitrate test is applied, there appears gunpowders
nitrate which are dark blue collor. These spects are nothing more or
less than minutes particles of nitrate which have blown into the skin
by what might be termed the invisible backfire of the pistol, but they
do not appear unless a hand has been instrumental in pulling the
trigger, (Rbinson, Science Cathes the Criminal, pp. 99-100).
The fact that DE LA CRUZ was negative for powder burns, although he was
tagged by SALVADOR as the triggerman, can only mean that he knew hoe to
sufficiently protect himself, a knowledge that must have been derived form his
stint as an officer of the Philippine Army.
The identical claims of BELOSO and SALVADOR that they were heavy smokers,
of about 3 packs of Marlboro cigarretes a day, which accounts for the pressent
of nitrate in both their right and left hands, is contradicted by the testimony of
the forensic chemist that nitrates produced by cigarrete smoking have different
characteristics form those caused by powder burns.
BELOSO's and SALVADOR's complicity in the kiling is, therefore, established
not by any of the extradujicial confesions (Exhibits "B", "C" and "K") but by the
physical evidence on record. So that, even if those sworns statements are
declared inadmissible for having been given without the presence of the
counsel, their culpability is borne out by the evidence indefendent of the same.
That the respective participations of BELOSO and SALVADOR in the kiling is not
claercut is of no moment:
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and
not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons,
or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than
seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years,
when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of
life imprisonment to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed in the commission
of the carnapping (Sec. 14, ibid.).
In this case, the owner of the carnapped vehicle was killed in the commission of
the carnapping obviously to gain possession of the car, its registration
certificate and other pertinent papers, get the owner out of the way, and thus
facilitate its sale to a third party, in keeping with the modus operandi of the
perpetrators.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with
proportionate costs against accused-appellants Dantes Beloso and Romeo
Salvador.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Paras J., took no part.
Footnotes
* Penned by Judge Phinney C. Araquil.
$ + GRSI Copyrightregno N94-027
{bmr footnote.bmp}83843_44_4_5_90_footnotes>mainG.R. Nos. 83843-44 April 5,
1990
ROSITA LABRADOR vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
PARAS, J.:
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the alleged holographic will of one
Melecio Labrador isdated, as provided for in Article 810 2 of the New Civil Code.
The antecedent and relevant facts are as follows: On June 10, 1972, Melecio
Labrador died in the Municipality of Iba, province of Zambales, where he was
residing, leaving behind a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 1916 under
Original Certificate of Title No. P-1652, and the following heirs, namely: Sagrado,
Enrica, Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all
surnamed Labrador, and a holographic will.
On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs),
Enrica Labrador and Cristobal Labrador, filed in the court a quo a petition for the
probate docketed as Special Proceeding No. 922-I of the alleged holographic will
of the late Melecio Labrador.
Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, Jesus Labrador (now deceased but
substituted by his heirs), and Gaudencio Labrador filed an opposition to the
petition on the ground that the will has been extinguished or revoked by
implication of law, alleging therein that on September 30, 1971, that is, before
Melecio's death, for the consideration of Six Thousand (P6,000) Pesos, testator
Melecio executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, selling, transferring and conveying in
favor of oppositors Jesus and Gaudencio Lot No. 1916 and that as a matter of
fact, O.C.T. No. P-1652 had been cancelled by T.C.T. No. T-21178. Earlier
however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador sold said parcel of land to Navat for only Five
Thousand (P5,000) Pesos. (Rollo, p. 37)
Sagrado thereupon filed, on November 28, 1975, against his brothers, Gaudencio
and Jesus, for the annulment of said purported Deed of Absolute Sale over a
parcel of land which Sagrado allegedly had already acquired by devise from their
father Melecio Labrador under a holographic will executed on March 17, 1968,
the complaint for annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 934-I, being premised on
the fact that the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale is fictitious.
After both parties had rested and submitted their respective evidence, the trial
court rendered a joint decision dated February 28, 1985, allowing the probate of
the holographic will and declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute sale. The
court a quo had also directed the respondents (the defendants in Civil Case No.
934-I) to reimburse to the petitioners the sum of P5,000.00 representing the
redemption price for the property paid by the plaintiff-petitioner Sagrado with
legal interest thereon from December 20, 1976, when it was paid to vendee a
retro.
Respondents appealed the joint decision to the Court of Appeals, which on
March 10, 1988 modified said joint decision of the court a quo by denying the
allowance of the probate of the will for being undated and reversing the order of
reimbursement. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision
was denied by the Court of Appeals, in the resolution of June 13, 1988. Hence,
this petition.
Petitioners now assign the following errors committed by respondent court, to
wit:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING AND
APPROVING THE PROBATE OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE
TESTATOR MELECIO LABRADOR; and
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ORDER OF
THE LOWER COURT DIRECTING THE REIMBURSEMENT OF THE
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS REPRESENTING THE REDEMPTION PRICE
WAS ERRONEOUS.
The alleged undated holographic will written in Ilocano translated into English, is
quoted as follows:
ENGLISH INTERPRETATION OF THE WILL OF THE
LATE MELECIO LABRADOR WRITTEN IN ILOCANO
BY ATTY. FIDENCIO L. FERNANDEZ
I First Page
This is also where it appears in writing of the place which is assigned
and shared or the partition in favor of SAGRADO LABRADOR which is
the fishpond located and known place as Tagale.
And this place that is given as the share to him, there is a
measurement of more or less one hectare, and the boundary at the
South is the property and assignment share of ENRICA LABRADOR,
also their sister, and the boundary in the West is the sea, known as
the SEA as it is, and the boundary on the NORTH is assignment
belonging to CRISTOBAL LABRADOR, who likewise is also their
brother. That because it is now the time for me being now ninety three
(93) years, then I feel it is the right time for me to partition the
fishponds which were and had been bought or acquired by us,
meaning with their two mothers, hence there shall be no differences
among themselves, those among brothers and sisters, for it is I
myself their father who am making the apportionment and delivering
to each and everyone of them the said portion and assignment so that
there shall not be any cause of troubles or differences among the
brothers and sisters.
II Second Page
And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the
partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of the said
fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year
1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be
followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than
MELECIO LABRADOR, their father.
Now, this is the final disposition that I am making in writing and it is
this that should be followed and complied with in order that any
differences or troubles may be forestalled and nothing will happen
along these troubles among my children, and that they will be in good
relations among themselves, brothers and sisters;
And those improvements and fruits of the land; mangoes, bamboos
and all coconut trees and all others like the other kind of bamboo by
name of Bayog, it is their right to get if they so need, in order that
there shall be nothing that anyone of them shall complain against the
other, and against anyone of the brothers and sisters.
III THIRD PAGE
And that referring to the other places of property, where the said
property is located, the same being the fruits of our earnings of the
two mothers of my children, there shall be equal portion of each share
among themselves, and or to be benefitted with all those property,
which property we have been able to acquire.
That in order that there shall be basis of the truth of this writing
(WILL) which I am here hereof manifesting of the truth and of the
fruits of our labor which their two mothers, I am signing my signature
below hereof, and that this is what should be complied with, by all the
brothers and sisters, the children of their two mothers JULIANA
QUINTERO PILARISA and CASIANA AQUINO VILLANUEVA Your
father who made this writing (WILL), and he is, MELECIO LABRADOR
y RALUTIN (p. 46, Rollo)
The petition, which principally alleges that the holographic will is really dated,
although the date is not in its usual place, is impressed with merit.
The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance
with Article 810. It is worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the second
page of the holographic will, viz:
And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the
partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of the said
fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year
1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be
followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than
MELECIO LABRADOR, their father. (emphasis supplied) (p. 46, Rollo)
The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in
the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed
in the hand of the testator. These requirements are present in the subject will.
Respondents claim that the date 17 March 1968 in the will was when the testator
and his beneficiaries entered into an agreement among themselves about "the
partitioning and assigning the respective assignments of the said fishpond," and
was not the date of execution of the holographic will; hence, the will is more of
an "agreement" between the testator and the beneficiaries thereof to the
prejudice of other compulsory heirs like the respondents. This was thus a failure
to comply with Article 783 which defines a will as "an act whereby a person is
permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree
the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death."
Respondents are in error. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of the
execution of the will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the
paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the will was not an agreement but a
unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that what he was executing
was a will. The act of partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as
the testator's instruction or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio Labrador
was fully aware of the nature of the estate property to be disposed of and of the
character of the testamentary act as a means to control the disposition of his
estate.
Anent the second issue of finding the reimbursement of the P5,000 representing
the redemption price as erroneous, respondent court's conclusion is incorrect.
When private respondents sold the property (fishpond) with right to repurchase
to Navat for P5,000, they were actually selling property belonging to another and
which they had no authority to sell, rendering such sale null and void.
Petitioners, thus "redeemed" the property from Navat for P5,000, to immediately
regain possession of the property for its disposition in accordance with the will.
Petitioners therefore deserve to be reimbursed the P5,000.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 10,
1988 is hereby REVERSED. The holographic will of Melecio Labrador is
APPROVED and ALLOWED probate. The private respondents are directed to
REIMBURSE the petitioners the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Justice Jorge S. Imperial and concurred in by Justices
Jose A.R. Melo and Manuel C. Herrera
2 Article 810 provides: A person may execute a holographic will which
must be entirely written, dated and signed by the hand of the testator
himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of
the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
$ + GRSI Copyrightregno N94-027
{bmr footnote.bmp}93419_32_9_18_90_footnotes>mainG.R. Nos. 93419-32
September 18, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. GUALBERTO P. DELGADO
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 93419-32 September 18, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUALBERTO P. DELGADO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, Br. 29, Toledo City,
ELSIE RAGO LUMANGTAD, VIVENCIA ABARIDO, AVELINA BUTASLAC,
ROSELLANO BUTASLAC, HAYDELISA LUMANGTAD, SILVESTRE LUMANGTAD,
MAXIMO RACAZA, NENA RACAZA, VICTORIANO/ VICTOR RAGO, EDNA TEJAS,
MERCEDITA TEJAS, TEOFISTO TEJAS, BERNABE TOQUERO, JR., and PEDRO
RAFAELA, respondents.
Jose P. Balbuena for petitioner.
Fred B. Casas for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The authority of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to review the actions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the investigation and prosecution of
election offenses filed in said court is the center of controversy of this petition.
On January 14, 1988 the COMELEC received a report-complaint from Atty.
Lauron E. Quilatan, Election Registrar of Toledo City, against private
respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC
directed Atty. Manuel Oyson, Jr., Provincial Election Supervisor of Cebu, to
conduct the preliminary investigation of the case.
After conducting such preliminary investigation, Oyson submitted a report on
April 26, 1989 finding aprima facie case and recommending the filing of an
information against each of the private respondents for violation of Section 261
(y) (2) and (5) of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC en banc in minute
resolution No. 89-1291 dated October 2, 1989 as amended by resolution No. 891574 dated November 2, 1989 resolved to file the information against the private
respondents as recommended.
On February 6, 1990, fifteen (15) informations were filed against each of private
respondents in the RTC of Toledo City docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. TCS1220 to TCS-1234. In three separate manifestations the Regional Election
Director of Region VII was designated by the COMELEC to handle the
prosecution with the authority to assign another COMELEC prosecutor.
COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary
investigation of an election offense and upon a prima faciefinding of a probable
cause, files the information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said
case must be subject to the approval of the court. 12 The COMELEC cannot
conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless
so ordered by the court. 13
The records of the preliminary investigation required to be produced by the
court must be submitted by the COMELEC. The trial court may rely on the
resolution of the COMELEC to file the information, by the same token that it may
rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary
investigation, in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Nevertheless the court
may require that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to
satisfy itself that there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. 14
The refusal of the COMELEC or its agents to comply with the order of the trial
court requiring them to conduct a reinvestigation in this case and to submit to
the court the record of the preliminary investigation on the ground that only this
Court may review its actions is certainly untenable.
One last word. The petition is brought in the name of the People of the
Philippines. Only the Solicitor General can represent the People of the
Philippines in this proceeding. 15 In the least, the consent of the Office of the
Solicitor General should have been secured by the COMELEC before the filing of
this petition. On this account alone, the petition should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J. and Paras, J., are on leave.