Middle Eastern Studies

ISSN: 0026-3206 (Print) 1743-7881 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmes20

A note on the Ottoman socioeconomic structure

and its response to the Balkan war of 1912
Glen W. Swanson
To cite this article: Glen W. Swanson (1978) A note on the Ottoman socioeconomic structure
and its response to the Balkan war of 1912, Middle Eastern Studies, 14:1, 116-126, DOI:
10.1080/00263207808700369
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263207808700369

Published online: 12 Dec 2006.

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A Note on the Ottoman Socio-Economic Structure and

its Response to the Balkan War of 1912

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Glen W. Swanson
In the autumn of 1912 the Ottoman empire staggered under a series of military
defeats in the Balkans. A supposedly powerful and modernised Ottoman army
collapsed before the determined -attacks of Greek-BulgarianSerb-Montenegrin forces, abandoned lands that had been under
Ottoman rule for centuries, and retreated to defensive positions at Catalca.
Europe pondered what might develop from the Ottoman setback, for it signalled
the beginning of the first major conflict of the twentieth century in Europe. The
debacle also alerted the statesmen of the great powers to the disturbing fact
that they had neither control over Balkan affairs nor adequate knowledge of
what modern warfare involved.
At least one country, Great Britain, took immediate steps to learn more
about the effect of war on the 'sick man of Europe', and compiled an
extraordinary collection of reports that graphically described the Ottoman
economy and society under stress. The present purpose is to bring the
substance of these reports before the reader. Through critical use of these
sources, we may improve our understanding of the nature and strength of the
Ottoman empire, just prior to the First World War, and more clearly
comprehend the basic problems that a large state encounters when prosecuting
a war that directly affects only one of its geographic sections. In addition, by
focusing attention on the empire in its entirety, we may discover reasons and
methods for correcting the traditional Istanbul-centered approach toward
Ottoman history and revising our general views about Ottoman decline.

I
The guide for the British data collection was a twenty-five point questionnaire
submitted by the British Committee of Imperial Defence to the Foreign Office.1
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, transmitted the
Committee's request to the British ambassador in Istanbul, Sir Gerard
Lowther, who, in turn, distributed copies of the questionnaire to British
representatives stationed throughout the Ottoman empire. Of the sixteen
British diplomatic posts that responded, the embassy in Istanbul and consulates
in Izmir, Beirut, Damascus, Salonika, Adana, and Adalia submitted the fullest
reports; briefer accounts came from posts at the Dardanelles, Erzerum,
Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Izmit, Jeddah, Alexandretta, and Rhodes.2
To evaluate the data concerning the influence of the Balkan war on the
Ottoman empire, certain issues have been stressed and the categories of
information considered by the British have been reclassified. Major questions
include: how and to what extent did the war influence the economy; how did
society respond to the war; how did Ottoman soldiers behave; how were
aliens and non-Muslims treated; what variable factors existed; and what
conclusion may be reached about the viability of the Ottoman empire. The

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assessment of categories in the Committee's questionnaire and the presentation

of information culled from the British reports required the construction of a
framework that classified 24 of the original 25 entries according to the three
following types of response: (1) economic, (2) military-social, and (3)
civilian-social.3
II
The economic response varied so much throughout the empire that no valid
generalisation can be applied to the entire country. In Istanbul, for example,
the interruption to medium and small-scale trade and business was less than
expected because Istanbul scarcely depended on its hinterland for basic items.
Bulgarian forces sweeping past Edirne could not interdict the major supply
channels connecting Istanbul to the Black Sea, the Asiatic shore, and the
immediately surrounding country. As a result, a constant supply of vegetables,
fish, meat and dairy products was available. The most disturbed urban
economic activities were transportation and large-scale business. The latter
suffered because its essentially maritime trade was carried in neutral shipping
which was adversely affected by high war risks and insurance rates. Within
the city, however, the freight system managed satisfactorily because of its
continued and unhindered use of male porters who could carry heavy loads
through the streets of Istanbul.
Trade and business activities outside the capital varied according to the type
of commercial relationships within a region, between the region and Istanbul,
or between the region and the Balkan battlefields. In some cities, e.g. Basra,
Baghdad, and Jeddah, the hostilities caused no commercial interruption, but in
Adana and Adalia, the war did produce a decline in imports to Adana and did
affect Adalia's local balance of commercial power. Only two steamship
companies plied the Adalia port: the P. Pantaleon (Greek flag) Company and
the American Archipelago Steam Navigation Company, both with
headquarters in Izmir. The war forced the Pantaleon firm to withdraw its
operations to Greece and the other company to raise its freight rates
considerably. In Damascus a depressed state of business already prevailed
when the Balkan war broke out. The conflict shattered hopes for a commercial
upturn, freight rates rose, prices fell, the pilgrimage trade to Mecca suffered,
exports were disturbed, and peasants were adversely affected because of their
need for cash which was in short supply.
The British consul in Izmir (Smyrna) described in his detailed report how
pre-war economic conditions helped determine the course of events in his city,
an important commercial centre in western Anatolia. Just before the outbreak
of the Italian-Turkish war in September 1911a financial crisis had occurred,
owing to the collapse 'of the Bank of Mitylene, a consequence of the failure of
the Zervudachi bankers of Alexandria. As other Greek banks were reported to
be largely compromised in the Zervudachi business, there was an immediate
run on those banks which soon extended to other financial establishments.'
The result was general discredit. Commercial firms, especially import houses,
which had been trading beyond their means, found themselves suddenly
deprived of banking facilities. Moreover, gold had become scarce in Istanbul
and sizable amounts of English sovereigns had to be imported from England

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and recoined into Turkish liras. A good deal of time was needed to meet the
demand for gold currency because
the mint could not produce more than LT 50,000 a day of which LT
35,000 went to the government and only LT 15,000 towards market
requirements. All the banks therefore at Constantinople with the
exception of the Imperial Ottoman Bank which did help the market to a
certain extent, were compelled to protect their gold and refused to buy
any paper on Europe. Exchange consequently fell heavily, especially as
the expenses incurred to import the gold and the considerable loss of
interest through the delay in coming had to be provided for.
The outbreak of war with Italy in September 1911 further weakened Izmir's
financial position. Although the placement of imported gold on the market
slightly improved the situation, the import business remained listless because
the merchants, unable to find the usual credit, had to stop buying or reduce
orders. During Izmir's export season in 1912 money once more became
scarce; Istanbul had to import gold from England; the exchange again
declined. Feeling the intensifying economic pressure and dreading a recurrence
of the previous year's panic, banks were loath to part with the gold they had.
Izmir did receive some imported gold sent overland but still found it difficult to
obtain the currency from Istanbul or other supply centres. With the approach
of the Balkan war, no gold could be obtained from Marseilles because shipping
firms there refused to carry gold which the Greek government had declared as
contraband and which was uninsurable. The British consul pointed out,
however, that were it not for the war, the region might have experienced a
relatively stable and prosperous period because the bountiful harvests during
the previous two years helped the district withstand the crisis quite well.
The impression that the British documents create as a whole (that each
commercial centre in the Ottoman empire had its own special relationship to
the war) applies to Beirut as well. Here the question is how to explain this
particular entrepot's prosperity in contrast to the economic situation in Izmir or
Damascus. The British report from Beirut contended that the city's excellent
record lay in its banking system and commercial relationships. A war in the
Balkans scarcely touched Beirut market interests because they depended more
on England, France, and Egypt than on Istanbul and European Turkey. As
distributing centre for other Ottoman provinces, Beirut managed without great
difficulty to meet its obligations because military movements hardly affected
the important railway from Aleppo and Damascus to Beirut; and unlike the
situation in Izmir, the credit base in Beirut rested in a few small houses and
four leading banks whose sound management policies prevented the economic
crisis from having the usual negative consequences. The result was stability in
the Beirut market and relative prosperity.
Ill
Just as the above cases indicate the wide variation between regions in their
economic response to the war, so are there examples of diversity in what one
may categorise as the empire's military-social response. Involved here was a
crucial issue for the Ottoman state: how to effect the reform of the Ottoman
socio-political system so that the traditional method of group identification,

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OTTOMAN SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

1 19

religion, could be replaced by the newer identity of Ottoman nationalism. The

gradual westernisation and secularisation of the last great Islamic state evoked
calls for freedom, equality, and liberty for all members of the empire. These
ringing cries sounded like excellent ideas to many subjects who had little
notion of what such terms entailed, but in time of stress the same persons who
demanded the removal of traditional ties and the adoption of western political
identifications found it difficult indeed to fulfil the new obligations placed on
them. The reaction to this dilemma is described by several consular officials.
While most Muslims accepted their military duties, non-Muslims and other
formerly exempt citizens usually shrugged off their opportunity to be equal to
the Muslim Anatolian peasant in military service, emigrated from the empire,
or sought refuge in the traditional manner of paying an exemption tax.
The British reports reveal that other special conditions and grievances also
existed. The complaint in Adalia reflected the problems encountered in the
modernisation of the Ottoman officer corps. Accustomed to the former type of
illiterate officer who had come up through the ranks, the common soldier
appeared to be reluctant to serve under the new breed of young, school-trained
officers whom he did not understand and whom he recognised to be from a
different social class. It would be interesting to learn whether or not this social
or educational antagonism prevailed elsewhere, but the other British reports
are unfortunately silent on this matter. If ill feeling between the common
soldier and the modernised officer were widespread, then it may signify the
clash between change and tradition in society. If, however, the absence of
similar information in the other British reports actually means that no such
reaction existed outside Adalia, then one must list it as an isolated case. The
issue may be resolved at some later date through intensive, co-operative
research.
It is clearly evident that soldiers from Alexandretta had their own reasons
for dissatisfaction. At the beginning of hostilities the response to mobilisation
had been prompt and willing but the hardships experienced on the march to
Istanbul were overwhelming. The British agent in Alexandretta reported that
once in the Taurus mountains the reservists, starving and poorly clad, suffered
from the cold weather and illness.
On seeing this pitiful situation, their officers obtained from
Constantinople, the authorization to disband them, and they were happy
to return to their homes. Later on when they were called again to serve,
remembering their first experience, and on hearing, on the other hand,
the defeat of the Turkish army, they emphatically refused to march, and
the authorities fearing serious trouble, were compelled to cancel the
order.
Despite the problems described in some of the reports, one must note that the
Ottoman army managed to mobilise large numbers of men. These soldiers,
mostly Muslim, responded promptly to the official summons to duty.
According to the British accounts, the Ottoman troops conducted themselves
in a proper manner almost everywhere. In Beirut, Erzerum, Adalia,
Damascus, Salonika, and Izmir the British consuls reported a state of sobriety
and general discipline. Although a mutinous spirit followed by
insubordination did manifest itself among the reservists leaving Damascus for

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Aleppo, the general behaviour of the troops was quite laudable. In European
Turkey the thousands of troops at San Stefano acted admirably despite the
hunger, neglect, and discomfort they experienced there. The British consul in
the Dardanelles, however, does refer vaguely to the invariable drunkenness in
his region; but the reasons for this apparently unique situation are yet to be
explained.
IV
Parallel to the economic and military-social reactions considered above was
the civilian-social response, described by British agents according to the
following categories: males left behind to carry on essential services; women
replacements for men called into service; crime; martial law; restrictions on
the press; censorship; popular reaction to government news about the war;
gifts and comforts to the troops; and, especially, civilian and official relations
with the non-Muslims and enemy aliens living within the Ottoman empire.
Before discussing the British findings, it would be well to keep in mind that
Ottoman society had for centuries followed the Islamic practice of tolerance
toward various groups living under Muslim rule. Whether this toleration
continued in time of stress has been a question the answer to which is couched
in generalities based, too often, on extraordinary episodes, incomplete
information, or anti-Ottoman prejudice. For persons whose awareness of
Ottoman policy toward the non-Muslim and alien rests primarily on accounts
of Ottoman persecutions during the First World War, it may come as a
surprise to learn that less than two years before that great war, the Ottoman
government and society proceeded usually in a neutral and sometimes highly
commendable fashion.
According to the British reports, the treatment of aliens, including those of
'enemy' nationality, was, with a few exceptions, generally good throughout
the empire. In Adalia, even though the Greek consul's flagstaff was cut down,
the few Hellenic subjects in the district continued with their trade and business.
In Salonika the Turks generally respected the rights of foreigners. Many
subjects of the four belligerent states did leave Salonika at the commencement
of hostilities, but did so voluntarily. The British representative in Izmir 'never
saw nor heard of any provocation or a bad word against aliens ....' In
Mesopotamia, the Greeks in Basra were not molested; in Baghdad the Turks
and some Arabs were known for their dislike of aliens, but most of the Arabs
were considered to be indifferent in this respect. The sensitive popular mood in
some regions did demand stringent control by authorities. The Ottoman
government took measures to safeguard aliens in Beirut and employed a policy
of caution in Izmir, where aliens were placed under the protection of foreign
consulates. Unfavourable war news 'caused a revival of fanaticism' in Adana,
especially among the lower-class Muslim population, but the British consul
points out that the-population 'as a rule' did not exhibit feelings of animosity. If
absence of information indicates that nothing untoward occurred, then the
British report for Erzerum may mean that tranquillity prevailed in this town
which was inhabited by many Armenians; the report makes no claim that the
Muslims had vented their frustration or anger on non-Muslims. In the case of
the Dardanelles, one is faced with an apparent exception and the problem of
verification regarding treatment of aliens. The British agent appears reliable

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but one must note that his presentation often differs from the picture given
elsewhere in the empire. Perhaps conditions in the Dardanelles were
exceptional, or perhaps complete objectivity was lacking in the compilation
and analysis of information. In bureaucratic fashion, perhaps he was trying to
show for some reason the value of his office to his superiors in Istanbul and
London, for he does indicate that the situation for aliens was 'extremely bad
where there is no consular corps'.
The almost complete lack of overt antagonism toward aliens and nonMuslims living in the Ottoman empire suggests that acts of cruelty and
intolerance were not automatic reactions of Ottoman Muslims in time of stress.
But this did not mean that the fear of emotional unrest was absent. In Istanbul,
although the influence of the war on the city's life appeared to be remarkably
small and ordinary activities continued as usual, the British' ambassador
describes in his report his impressions of the war's moral effect:
... There is a general feeling of apprehension: apprehension among the
Christians of massacres by the Moslems, apprehension among the
Moslems of the entry of the Bulgars, apprehension among both of the
irruption of a defeated Turkish army. Add to this the terror inspired by
the dread of cholera and other epidemic diseases, the large influx of
refugee peasants and the enormous numbers of sick and wounded
soldiers that are constantly being brought into the city and the wonder is
that Pera [a district of Istanbul] especially with its constitutional liability to
panic, still goes about its ordinary affairs. At one moment I think there
can be little doubt that the Christian population secretly looked forward
to the coming of the Bulgars, but at present I believe that both Christians
and Moslems will be very much relieved if both armies can be kept
outside.
To curb such fears (whether actual or only imagined by the British
representatives) and to lessen the political and military danger of internal
unrest, Ottoman authorities took steps to influence civil attitudes and actions
through martial law, press restriction, and censorship. Martial law was already
familiar to the Ottoman empire because it had been in effect, intermittently, in
some regions since the Young Turks deposed Sultan Abdiilhamid in 1909. The
capital grew accustomed to it and was able to continue with an undisturbed
community life most of the time; the greatest application of martial law was
for political purposes, such as arresting leaders of the opposing party.
The position of the press served as another indicator of government-civilian
relations during wartime. In Istanbul restrictions on the press were strict in
theory but were executed erratically so that, other than being irritating, they
had little effect. According to the British ambassador, the reports of victory
deceived few people but became 'so fantastic' that the ministry of war warned
the press that 'any paper publishing news of non-existent victories would be
suppressed or otherwise punished'.
One might have thought that on Rhodes and in Salonika the proximity of
the Balkan or (in the case of Rhodes) the Italian enemy would have affected the
way news influenced the populace; but if there were a correlation, it was not
evident. On Rhodes, where the British questionnaire was applied to conditions
during the Italian-Turkish war of 1911-12, the British observer reported that

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press restrictions were of no concern to the Muslims who received news of the
war with Italy with apparent equanimity. During the Balkan war the local
press in Salonika was 'forbidden to publish any news whatever concerning
military movements or the progress of military operations, beyond the
officially communicated and generally purely imaginary records of victory.'
The British consul-general in Salonika goes on to describe how one group
reacted: 'The more educated Turks ... welcomed all favourable rumours with
childish credulity, followed by fits of extreme dejection on the inevitable
disillusioning.'
In the Asiatic provinces of the empire the press hesitated to criticise
government policies. In Baghdad, where telegrams were generally submitted
to the Governor-General before publication, the local newspapers often altered
the facts 'to render them favourable to the party in political power'. The
Damascus press was cautious, and in Erzerum the news was only that of
success. One may add that the question of governmental control over news did
not arise in Adalia and Jeddah because no press existed in those districts.
Apparently the inhabitants of Jeddah paid scant attention to the hostilities for a
very special reason. As the principal native merchant of Jeddah told Consul
Shipley, 'The only "war" known in the Hejaz is a bad pilgrimage. If the
pilgrimage is good it is a matter of complete indifference to the population
whether Turkey be at war or not.' Whether the information contained in it
was true or false, Shipley's report was extraordinary because the consul did
identify his source of information, but his action was the exception rather than
the rule.
The failure of British agents to describe their methods of surveying public
opinion leaves us no clue about the objectivity of their research on civilian
attitudes toward the war. Their reports on this category must therefore be
treated with caution. It would appear that apathy marked the attitude of many
subjects. From Baghdad, Consul-General Scott writes that the Arabs in that
region believed that the war was not 'a clash of Cross and Crescent', even
though the Turks tried to convince the Arabs that it was. In Basra, where the
small Turkish minority consisted of a few officials and their families, both
Christians and Muslim Arabs expressed 'keen interest' in the war at the
beginning, but as the Turkish reverses in the Balkans became known the public
interest waned. In Mosul the false news of Turkish victories was received with
satisfaction at first, then people 'laughed' at the Turkish attempt to conceal
defeat. Peasants in Adalia saw little connection between the war and their
personal interests and paid scant heed to it except when being called to the
colours. Then they complained. In Izmir the Muslims accepted the bad news
'with dignity and resignation'. In Beirut life remained normal, but the news of
reverses did cause general consternation because the public had been led to
believe that, whatever may have been the situation in other government
departments, the army at any rate had improved.
Although its actual attitude remains unknown, the British Foreign Office
may have been perplexed at the subjective statements made in some of these
reports. Consul-General Scott, for example, expressed his opinion that 'at
present the majority of the inhabitants of Baghdad consider the situation of
Turkey to be a hopeless one'. In Alexandretta the British representative
detected a sense 'of great depression amongst all Moslem classes who now

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123

consider their position as hopeless. They have lost all confidence in their
government.' Consul Shipley wrote from Jeddah: 'The war in so far as it can
be said to have influenced public feeling at all has strengthened the desire of the
population for the termination of Turkish rule in this country.' From Mosul
came the following impression: 'There is no doubt that the Christians
universally rejoiced at the overthrow of Turkey, while the Moslems were for
the most part indifferent. If they felt any annoyance it was as Moslems and not
as Turkish subjects.' The British agent in Basra left room for various
implications as he wrote: 'I should say that, at heart, the Arab population was
wholly disloyal to the Turks but care is taken to study the susceptibilities of
their Turkish masters for obvious reasons.' Finally, there is the intriguing
report from Beirut: 'It was feared that the general collapse of the Ottoman
government would follow [the military disaster in the Balkans?] and an
agitation, still actively going on, was started for an Anglo-Egyptian occupation
of Syria ....' How the British consular officials were able to comprehend the
feelings of the native population is unknown, but later research may uncover
the type of information needed to ascertain the validity of these British
statements.
Despite the apparent civilian indifference, many citizens did support the war
effort. The Muslim population in Istanbul did its utmost to help refugees and
the wounded, but did this with little organisation. Similar efforts were made in
the Dardanelles, Salonika, Izmir, and Beirut. Owing to the initiative of the
Beirut governor's .wife, clothing and other comforts were collected for the
troops. The Greek government, however, had listed clothing for the army as
contraband of war and it was therefore difficult to ship the clothing to Istanbul
by sea because of fear of capture; the alternative, the land route, was not
considered practical. In Salonika, subscriptions were opened for the relief of
the families of men who had been summoned to active duty, as well as for the
sick and wounded. Ladies' committees were formed to aid in preparing items
for the wounded at base hospitals. Not all provinces, however, contained
citizens who were prepared to volunteer help. In Baghdad no gifts or comforts
were reported to have been collected for the troops; people were asked to
donate money, but they did so reluctantly because of their suspicion of where
the funds went.
To evaluate the effect of war on civilians, the British used another approach
which measured the changes in the civilian manpower system. Almost
everywhere the call to arms affected groups according to types of skill, class
standing, and religious and cultural background. In Istanbul mobilisation had
little apparent impact on the professional class, largely composed of Christians;
they presumably purchased exemption or otherwise evaded their military
service. The problem in the capital was with manual labour and artisans,
whose ranks had already been depleted owing to the expulsion of Italians
during the war with Italy. In Salonika, Adana, and Beirut the professional
class was scarcely touched and therefore could continue its services
unhindered. Mobilisation in Beirut and Adana affected primarily the
agricultural class which furnished most of the reserves for the war effort. As
for occupational replacements, Damascus had some women assuming the
tasks of weavers called up for military duty, but no other region reported the
necessity for females replacing men in essential services. The British consul in

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Salonika, however, was undoubtedly correct in stating that the share of

agricultural labour falling habitually to women was considerably increased.
V
However sketchy they may be, several conclusions emerge from the British
data. The reports establish that great contrasts in response to stress existed
within the Ottoman empire. The major variables in these cases were the
following: the type of relationship between Istanbul and the region; the
history and nature of the region's economic and social system; the make up of
the population and attitude of various groups; the proximity of enemy forces
or threat of enemy action; and the specific experiences and problems of the
region.
The extent to which war influenced the economy is difficult to assess, but
some generalisations suggest themselves. The evidence concerning credit
arrangements, relations between Istanbul merchants and customers elsewhere
in the empire, and the strength of local banks indicates that the war itself did
not cripple the decentralised economic structure of the empire. But it did
occasionally have a negative effect when joined to a weakening economic
factor already present in that region. In many districts no interruption to
commerce occurred, and in at least one area, Beirut, there were even signs of
economic growth. The basically agricultural economy may have suffered from
the decrease in the male labour supply, but in the fields the women left behind
appear to have assumed the extra burden. Finally, the enforced requisition of
animals had little effect because the basic work unit - oxen - was not needed
for military purposes.
The occasionally ambiguous nature of the British reports hints at the
dimensions and variety of Ottoman social response to the war effort. On one
hand, British consuls comment on the general apathy to the war in the
Balkans; the inconsistency of government policies in matters of mobilisation,
martial law, trade regulations, censorship, and press restriction; the unreliable
news coverage and corresponding public reaction of disbelief or resignation;
and the desire of many non-Muslims to evade military service. On the other
hand, we are informed of the satisfactory state of discipline; the lack of any
marked increase in crime; the scant impact mobilisation had on the
professional class of civilians; and the generally positive response to
mobilisation orders. With regard to Ottoman and Muslim relations with the
non-Muslim and alien, the impression from almost all the reports is that the
Muslims showed both tolerance and resignation, which is contrary to what
one might have expected of the 'terrible Turk'.
As for the question of the Ottoman empire's viability, the tentative
conclusions are threefold. Firstly, and again contrary to popular views related
to Ottoman decline, the Ottoman state in 1912 was not acting as if it were in an
advanced stage of a terminal illness. Secondly, the nature of the information
found in the British reports indicates the need for more research and new
perspectives which would free us from the snares of false analogies or
unsubstantiated generalisations. Thirdly, these same reports underline the
complex nature of the Ottoman imperial structure and the task entailed in
comprehending this sprawling empire, namely, to correct the traditional
Istanbul-centred approach by including the towns and provinces outside the

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capital in historical research. Once these exhaustive regional studies are made,
perhaps the finding will be that the Ottoman empire survived for six centuries
largely because of its decentralised socio-economic system, a system so durable
that it permitted the empire to weather the shock of regional wars right up to
1913. If this were the case, then the First World War must be regarded not as
the final light tap to a dying empire but as the unique blow in the Ottoman
dynasty's six hundred years of history, the only event that touched so many
parts of the empire at one critical moment.

NOTES
1. Public Record Office. Foreign Office, F.O.I95/2445, No. 6023, Grey to Lowther, 5 Nov.
1912. transmitting Committee of Imperial Defence request for information on war effects;
Committee request to Foreign Office is dated 25 Oct. 1912, and is signed by M. P. A. Hankey,
Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence. Crown copyright records reproduced by kind
permission of the Controller, H. M. Stationery Office.
2. The reports are located in P. R. O. Foreign Office embassy and consular records for Turkey
(F.O.371 /1776 and F.0.195/2445). F.0.371 /1776, File 429 includes two reports: No. 7937, Pera,
Lowther, transmitting report of Monahan, Erzeroum # 9 , 5 Feb. 1913; and No. 17974, Pera,
enclosure, report from Acting Political Resident in Turkish Arabia and Consul-General Baghdad
Major N.Scott #288/9, 17 March 1913. F.O.I 95/2445 includes the following reports: No. 6023,
Istanbul, Lowther to F.O. #994A, 25 Nov. 1912; No. 7053, Smyrna [Izmir], Consul-General
Barnham to Lowther #150, 31 Dec. 1912; No. 7046. Beirut, Consul-General Cumberbatch to
Lowther #82, 23 Dec. 1912; No. 6859, Damascus, Consul Devey to Lowther # 6 7 . 7 Dec. 1912;
No. 6695, Salonica, Consul-General Lamb to Lowther # 170, 6 Dec. 1912; No. 6657, Adana, W.
Matthews to Lowther #46, 2 Dec. 1912; No. 6953, Adalia, Vice-Consul Keun to Lowther. 14
Dec. 1912; No. 6570, Dardanelles, Vice-Consul Palmer to Consul-General in Constantinople
Eyres # 81, 30 Nov. 1912; No. 6712, Erzeroum, Consul Monahan to Lowther, 3 Dec. 1912; No.
7064, Basra, Crow to Lowther #57, 13 Dec. 1912; No. 7102, Mosul, Vice-Consul Hony to
Lowther, 17 Dec. 1912; No. 6572, Ismidt, A. Amat to Lowther, 29 Nov. 1912; No. 6900, Jeddah,
Consul Shipley to Lowther # 102, 7 Dec. 1912; No. 7035, Alexandretta, A. Catoni to Lowther, 20
Dec. 1912; No. 7054, Rhodes, Consul-General Alfred Biliotti. 30 Nov. 1912.
3. The 25 categories have been rearranged as follows:
A. Economic Response
1. General interruption to commerce, trade and business.
2. Interruptions caused during, and after, mobilisation to communication systems (railways,
post and telegraph service, etc.), with special attention as to what extent normal transport
arrangements were upset.
3. Finance. Whether a 'moratorium" was declared, how it was carried out, and its effect.
4. The extent to which enforced requisition was carried out, and how it was accepted by the
community. How the requisition of transport affected agriculture and industry.
5. How far the army was dependent on imports from abroad for the supply of war material,
such as arms, ammunition, explosives, stores, food, clothing, and how far these were supplied
by the country.
6. The policy adopted with regard to trade and financial transactions with "enemy" subjects, for
example, if there was any prohibition of exports during the war.
7. In the case of a maritime state, whether there was any government guarantee against loss of
trading vessels or cargoes.
B. Military-Social Response
8. The response to mobilisation. Was it prompt and willing, or the reverse; in the latter case
what the reasons were.
9. What special arrangements - if any - existed for securing the early return of reservists
serving abroad. What proportion of such (a) was reckoned on, and (b) actually came in.
10. Whether friction was engendered in those cases where the assumption of military rank on
mobilisation altered the existing social and civil position of individuals.
11. If lack of discipline, such as drunkenness, was shown by the troops departing for the front.

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12. The spirit displayed by soldiers returning from the front and whether there were many cases
of men so returning without authority.
13. Whether any measures were taken to prevent prostitutes going to the front and whether
many such women did reach the troops.

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C.

CivilianSocial Response

14. Whether the denudation of the country of military force caused an increase in crime. If so,
whether such crime was due to the fact that large sections of the population were thrown out of
employment or to the presence in the town of an unruly class.
15. Whether martial law was proclaimed, to what extent it was enforced, and how it was
accepted.
16. Details as to restrictions placed on the press as regards dissemination of war news. Whether
press comments or criticisms on the conduct of the operations were permitted.
17. Details as to the measures adopted for the censorship of cables, telegrams, wireless
telegrams, telephone messages and private letters from the front and elsewhere.
18. The spirit with which news, either favourable or the reverse, was received by the
population.
19. How far loyalty was affected by lack of success in the field when a member of the reigning
House was controlling operations.
20. Whether national feeling takes practical shape in the dispatch of gifts and comforts to the
troops.
21. Whether a sufficient proportion of the male population (especially the professional class)
was left behind to carry on efficiently supply, municipal, administrative, medical and other
services essential to national life.
22. To what extent women took the place of men in those services.
23. Details as to the treatment of aliens including those of 'enemy' nationality.
D. Other
24. [Not considered for this paper] Measures taken to ensure speedy transmission of official
intelligence to headquarters from the front in the case of naval or military operations.
25. [Information in this category was used for the three types of response above] Any other
points which may throw light upon the influence of a state of war upon the national life and the
reverse.
Although they were of indirect aid in analysing the answers to other questions, some categories
had such paucity of information or had so little bearing on the issues, either positively or
negatively, that they were put aside after careful consideration. Later research in Ottoman or other
sources may warrant a review of these categories and a reinterpretation of their value. Within this
group are the following: 'whether a "moratorium" was declared, how it was carried out. and its
effect': "how far the army was dependent on imports from abroad for the supply of war material":
"what special arrangements existed for securing the early return of reservists serving abroad'-,
'details as to the measures adopted for the censorship of cables, telegrams, wireless telegrams,
telephone messages and private letters from the front and elsewhere'; "how far loyalty was affected
by lack of success in the field whan a member of the reigning House was controlling operations'.
Persons interested in comparative studies may find two other categories to be of particular
significance: 'whether any measures were taken to prevent prostitutes going to the front and
whether many such women did reach the troops"; and "whether friction was engendered in those
cases where the assumption of military rank on mobilisation altered the existing social and civil
position of individuals'. The questions revealed the invalidity of a Western-orientated yardstick
when measuring certain aspects of a largely non-Western society. In respect to prostitutes going to
the front, this problem did not exist in the Ottoman empire because it was so foreign to the social
mores of the Ottoman military establishment. And unlike civil-military relationships in some
European countries, the assumption of officer rank by a mobilised reservist did not pose a social
problem in the empire because these officers were supplied from the active army establishment. As
Consul-General Lamb reported from Salonika. 'Under the Turkish military organization the
"cadres'" of reserve battalions remain "en permanence", and officers of the reserve consequently
do not return to civilian occupations, whilst the bulk of better-class reservists in the rank and file
habitually buy their exemption. The friction contemplated by this question consequently does not
arise in Turkey."