REPUBLIC VS.

TAGLE
[299 SCRA 549; G.R. No. 129079; 2 Dec 1998]
Facts:
Private respondent Helena Z. Benitez is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land located in Barangay Salawag, Dasmarias,
Cavite containing an area of 483,331 square meters more or less.
The Philippine Government, through the Philippine Human Resources Development Center (PHRDC), negotiated with the Japanese
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Survey Team on the technicalities of the establishment of the ASEAN Human Resources
Development Project in the Philippines. Among the five (5) main programs of the proposed project was Program III (Construction
Manpower Development) which involved the establishment of a Construction Manpower Development Center (CMDC). PHRDC and
private respondent Helena Z. Benitez, signed a Memorandum of Agreement which provides, among others, that Benitez undertakes
to lease within the period of twenty (20) years and/or sell a portion of that property (which is no less than ten-hectares) in favor of
PHRDC which likewise agrees to lease within a period of twenty (20) years and/or buy said property site.
The Philippine Womens University (PWU) and Benitez granted a permit to PHRDC to occupy and use the land in question and to
undertake land development, electrical and road network installations and other related works necessary to attain its objectives.
Pursuant thereto, the CMDC took possession of the property and erected buildings and other related facilities necessary for its
operations. A deposit made by the plaintiff with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the amount of P708,490.00 which is equivalent
to the assessed value of the property subject matter hereof based on defendants 1990 tax declaration, was made.
In view of the agreement on the sale of the land in question, PHRDC prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale with Benitez, as vendor, and
PHRDC and CMDC, as vendees, duly represented by then Undersecretary Gloria M. Arroyo, for the signature of Benitez. Benitez in
her own capacity did not sign the deed of absolute sale.
Failing to acquire the property involved through negotiated sale, petitioner, through the Department of Trade and Industry, to which
CMDC is attached, instituted a complaint for Eminent Domain, pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 1035, dated June
25, 1985.
A Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession was granted by the court but quashed it subsequently.
Issue:
Whether or Not the respondent judge may quash a writ of possession on the ground that the expropriating government agency is
already occupying the property sought to be expropriated.
Held:
No. Under Section 7 of EO 1035, when the government or its authorized agent makes the required deposit, the trial court has a
ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession. The expropriation of real property does not include mere physical entry or occupation
of land. Although eminent domain usually involves a taking of title, there may also be compensable taking of only some, not all, of
the property interests in the bundle of rights that constitute ownership.
In the instant case, it is manifest that the petitioner, in pursuit of an objective beneficial to public interest, seeks to realize the same
through its power of eminent domain. In exercising this power, petitioner intended to acquire not only physical possession but also
the legal right to possess and ultimately to own the subject property. Hence, its mere physical entry and occupation of the property
fall short of the taking of title, which includes all the rights that may be exercised by an owner over the subject property.

PASCUAL VS. SEC. OF PUBLIC WORKS

[110 PHIL 331; G.R. NO.L-10405; 29 DEC 1960]
Facts:
Petitioner, the governor of the Province of Rizal, filed an action for declaratory relief with injunction on the ground that RA 920, Act
appropriating funds for public works, providing P85,000 for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of
Pasig feeder road terminals, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads within Antonio Subdivision. Antonio
Subdivision is owned by the respondent, Jose Zulueta, a member of the Senate of the Philippines. Respondent offered to donate
the said feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig and the offer was accepted by the council, subject to a condition that the donor
would submit plan of the roads and an agreement to change the names of two of the street. However, the donation was not
executed, which prompted Zuleta to write a letter to the district engineer calling attention the approval of RA 920. The district
engineer, on the other hand, did not endorse the letter that inasmuch the feeder roads in question were private property at the time
of passage and approval of RA 920, the appropriation for the construction was illegal and therefore, void ab initio. Petitioner, prayed
for RA 920 be declared null and void and the alleged deed of donation be declared unconstitutional. Lower court dismissed the case
and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether or Not the deed of donation and the appropriation of funds stipulated in RA 920 are constitutional.
Held:
The ruling case law rules that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but public purpose. The
taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only and the money raised by taxation can be expended only for public
purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals.
In the case at bar, the legality of the appropriation of the feeder roads depend upon whether the said roads were public or private
property when the bill was passed by congress or when it became effective. The land which was owned by Zulueta, the
appropriation sought a private purpose and hence, null and void. The donation did not cure the nullity of the appropriation; therefore
a judicial nullification of a said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said appropriation.
The decision appealed from is reversed.

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSO. VS. MAYOR OF MANILA

[20 SCRA 849; G.R. NO.L-24693; 31 JULY 1967]
Facts:
Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association with one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, the
president and general manager of the second petitioner, filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 against the
respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the execution and enforcement of such ordinances . It was
alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen members
operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities and regularly
paying taxes. It was alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760,
approved on June 14, 1963 by the then acting City Mayor, Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga. After which the alleged grievances against
the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila to enact insofar as it regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no
reference is made to motels. it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would
be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives. The lower court on
July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760
from and after July 8, 1963.
Issue:
Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional, therefore, null and void.
Held:
A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a
sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has been the
accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that
attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor
of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very
nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which
surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the
regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there
is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless
the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the
leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis
tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the
police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and
hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of
this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing
the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the
stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.

YNOT VS. IAC

[148 SCRA 659; G.R. NO. 74457; 20 MAR 1987]
Facts:
Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one province to another. The carabaos of
petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive Order No 626-A while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo.
Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. The government argued that Executive Order No. 626-A
was issued in the exercise of police power to conserve the carabaos that were still fit for farm work or breeding.
Issue:
Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due Process.
Held:
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not reasonably necessary for the purpose of the law
and is unduly oppressive. It is difficult to see how prohibiting the transfer of carabaos from one province to another can prevent their
indiscriminate killing. Retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting the transfer of
carabeef, after the slaughter of the carabaos, will not prevent the slaughter either.

ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR)

[69 PHIL 635; G.R. NO. 46496; 27 FEB 1940]
Facts:
There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of
leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU,
from work. And this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of
Accounts of native dealers in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the
Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.
Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.
Held:
To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically
stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the
integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice
which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the
parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not
only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its
functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide,
and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers,
and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the
provisions of CA 103.
As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by
technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall
not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.
The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can in
justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials
and investigations of an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support
thereof;
The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
The decision must have something to support itself;
The evidence must be substantial;
The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected;
The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the
result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case
shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and
otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered.