Executive Departure Following Acquisitions in Germany An Empirical Analysis

of its Antecedents and Consequences

Prof. Dr. Torsten Wulf and Dr. Stephan Stubner

HHL Arbeitspapier Nr. 84

HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management

Executive Departure Following Acquisitions in Germany An Empirical Analysis

of its Antecedents and Consequences

Prof. Dr. Torsten Wulf and Dr. Stephan Stubner

HHL Arbeitspapier Nr. 84

ISSN 1864-4562 (Online-Version)

Copyright: Lehrstuhl fr Strategisches Management und Organisation
Leipzig 2008
Jede Form der Weitergabe und Vervielfltigung
bedarf der Genehmigung des Herausgebers

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the relationship between executive departure in

acquired companies and pre- as well as post-acquisition performance. Based
on corporate control theory and human capital theory we derive hypotheses
regarding this relationship and empirically test them using a sample of 44
German companies which were acquired between 1996 and 2004. The results
of the study show that executive departure after an acquisition indeed
constitutes a severe loss of human capital for a company, thus having a
negative effect on post-acquisition performance. However, we could find no
clear results to explain for a relationship between pre-acquisition success and
executive departure.

Index
1.

Introduction ................................................................................................. 1

2.

Theoretical Positions ................................................................................... 3

3.

2.1.

Corporate control theory ...................................................................... 3

2.2.

Human capital theory ........................................................................... 5

Research Design......................................................................................... 8
3.1.

Sample selection.................................................................................. 8

3.2.

Definition and measurement of variables ............................................. 9

3.2.1. Top management turnover ................................................................ 9

3.2.2. Pre- and post-acquisition performance............................................ 11
3.2.3. Control variables ............................................................................. 12
4.

Results ...................................................................................................... 12
4.1.

Descriptive analysis of the sample ..................................................... 12

4.2.

Correlation analyses .......................................................................... 14

4.3.

Regressions analyses ........................................................................ 16

5.

Discussions and Interpretation .................................................................. 18

6.

Implications ............................................................................................... 21

List of Figures and Tables ................................................................................... I

References ......................................................................................................... II
List of HHL Working Papers .............................................................................. XI

-1-

1. Introduction

Acquisitions continue to play an important role in todays business environment.

After a slight downturn at the beginning of the decade, the value of acquisitions
worldwide has again reached a new peak in 2006 (Tschoeke and Hofacker
(2007)). As the literature on corporate strategy mentions, various motivations for
acquisition-related activities are possible, among them the aim to secure further
growth, the will to improve competitive positioning, and most importantly the
goal to enhance performance (Hungenberg (2005)). However, whether
acquisitions really have a positive effect on corporate performance is not clear.
According to empirical studies, the success rates of acquisitions only lie
between 20 and 60 percent (Picken (2003); Habeck et al. (1999); Picot (2000)).
In view of these rather low and unsteady success rates, researchers in the field
of strategic management have in the last 30 years devoted a lot of attention to
the analysis of causes for success and failure of acquisitions. Their results show
that various factors among them the ownership structure of a company, the
size of a company, and the cultural compatibility between the acquisition
partners have an influence on acquisition success (Krishnan et al. (1997);
Markides and Ittner (1994); Hyland and Diltz (2002)).

One area of research has not caught very much attention by researchers in the
past, despite these intensive research efforts: the role of top managers of
acquired companies. Especially the causes and performance consequences of
executive departures following acquisitions have only seldom been empirically
analyzed, even though such a departure is a widely observed phenomenon.
Indeed, several empirical studies show quite consistently that in the first two
years after an acquisition acquired companies are characterized by a
significantly higher turnover rate among their top managers compared to both,
the time before the acquisition and companies which did not undergo an
acquisition process (Walsh (1988); Hambrick and Cannella (1993); Krug (2003);
Martin and McConnell (1991); Lubatkin et al. (1999)). But it remains

-2-

theoretically and empirically unclear if this higher turnover rate has a negative,
positive or no influence on post-acquisition performance (Gerpott (1993a)).

Two theoretical positions have been brought forward in the literature on

corporate strategy which come to very different conclusions regarding the
relationship between executive departure following acquisitions and pre- as well
as post-acquisition success. These two theoretical positions are corporate
control theory and human capital theory. Corporate control theory argues that
especially poorly managed and therefore less successful companies become
acquisition targets. In this context, the substitution of the underperforming top
management team after an acquisition has a positive impact on the subsequent
success level of that company. Human capital theory follows a very different
reasoning. It argues that top managers constitute a particularly important
resource of a company. Thus, their departure means a significant loss of human
capital which negatively affects the success level of the company after the
acquisition.

Empirically the relationship between executive departure in acquired companies

and pre- as well as post-acquisition performance has only been addressed by
very few studies so far, and the results of these studies do not offer clear
support for either of the conflicting theoretical positions (Cannella and Hambrick
(1993); Krishnan et al. (1997); Gerpott (1994); Gerpott (1993a); Bamberger
(1994)). As a matter of fact, studies which investigated the relationship between
pre-acquisition success and top management turnover rather back the
argumentation of corporate control theory i.e. they come to the conclusion that
a low performance level before an acquisition leads to higher turnover rates
among top managers (Kaplan (1994); Warner et al. (1988)). On the other hand,
studies which examined the relationship between executive departure and postacquisition success rather support the reasoning of human capital theory, i.e.
they show that a high turnover rate has negative effects on a companys
performance after the acquisition (Cannella and Hambrick (1993); Krishnan et
al. (1997); Gerpott (1993a)).

-3-

In this paper we build on these contradicting theoretical positions and empirical

findings and present the results of an empirical study in which we examined the
relationship between top management turnover in acquired companies and preas well as post-acquisition success. More precisely, we analyze executive
departure and performance of 44 German companies which were acquired
between 1996 and 2004. We start the paper by giving a brief introduction of
corporate control theory and human capital theory and by deriving central
hypotheses regarding the relationship between executive departure and pre- as
well as post-acquisition success from the viewpoint of both theories. A
description of the research design follows. Then, we present, discuss and
interpret the main results of the study. We close the paper with implications for
further research and for corporate practice.

2. Theoretical Positions

In the literature on corporate strategy two main theoretical positions concerning

the relationship between executive departure following acquisitions and pre- as
well as post-acquisition performance can be identified. These two theoretical
positions are corporate control theory and human capital theory (Gerpott
(1993a)). For deriving hypotheses in our paper, we describe the major lines of
reasoning of both theories below to guide the present empirical analysis.
2.1. Corporate control theory
Corporate control theory is based on agency theory and was mainly developed
by Manne (1965) in the late 1960s. The central idea of corporate control theory
is that different management teams compete on the market for corporate control
for the right to manage the resources of a company (Jensen and Ruback
(1983); Fama and Jensen (1983)). Corporate control theory argues that the
market for corporate control has a disciplinary effect on top managers since it
punishes chronic underperformance. Precisely, the theory claims that
companies which are less successful than they could be with a better
management team become an attractive acquisition target for other companies
or management teams who believe that they are able to manage this company

-4-

in

better

way.

Accordingly,

companies

which

show

chronic

underperformance are traded on the market for corporate control and face the
threat of being taken over by another company. After such a takeover, the main
task of the new owner then is to eliminate the causes for the acquired
companys profitability problems. In this context, the replacement of the old top
management team by a better one is one of the first and most important
measures. This reasoning of corporate control theory is based on the central
assumption that there is a high correlation between the quality of top managers
and a companys performance (Manne (1965); Marks (1994)).

With regard to the relationship between executive departure following

acquisitions and pre- as well as post-acquisition performance, corporate control
theory comes to very clear conclusions. As described above, the theory argues
that mainly poorly managed and thus less successful companies become
acquisition targets. Therefore, it is reasonable from the point of view of an
acquiring company to release the top managers of the acquired company and to
install a better management team. This leads to the conclusion that the degree
of executive departure after acquisitions is particularly high if a company is
characterized by a low level of pre-acquisition performance (Cannella (1990);
Hambrick and Cannella (1993); Gerpott (1991)). This reasoning is stated in
hypothesis 1A:

Hypothesis 1A: The less successful a company was previous to its

acquisition, the higher is the absolute and relative turnover of top
managers after the acquisition.

Since from the perspective of corporate control theory it is only reasonable for a
company or a management team to acquire another company on the market for
corporate control if it believes that it is capable of managing this company in a
better way, an improved post-acquisition performance should be expected. An
important precondition for this performance increase is, however, that the new
owner actually succeeds in eliminating the management deficits from which the
acquired company suffered. Accordingly, from the perspective of corporate

-5-

control theory, the replacement of the former top management team plays an
important role for post-acquisition success, too (Lucks and Meckl (2002);
Metzenthin (2002)). This conclusion is stated in hypothesis 1B:

Hypothesis 1B: The higher the absolute and relative turnover among
top managers of acquired companies is, the higher is the level of
post-acquisition performance.

2.2. Human capital theory

Human capital theory is based on the resource-based view. Thus, it assumes

that valuable resources which cannot or can only hardly be imitated, substituted
and transferred are the main drivers of a companys success (Barney (1991)).
Different from the resource-based view, however, human capital theory
concentrates on a specific type of resources of a company, namely human
capital (Eschen (2002)). Human capital comprises all individual skills, abilities
and experiences of a companys employees and managers on all levels
(Edvinsson and Bruenig (2000)). Different empirical studies point out that the
quality of a companys human capital is particularly relevant for its success
(Fitz-enz (2000)). Accordingly, access to human capital is often regarded as a
primary reason for acquisitions (Zoern (1994)).

Skills, abilities and experiences of top managers are a particularly important

type of human capital for most companies. Not only do top managers possess
valuable company- and industry-specific knowledge and experiences, but they
have in many cases also built up a personal network of relations to important
suppliers, customers, employees and other stakeholders which is of great
importance for a companys success. Accordingly, it can be expected that
executive departure has a significant impact on the development and the
performance level of any company, but particularly on companies which are
going through an acquisition process.

-6-

Although the reasoning of human capital theory mainly refers to the relationship
between executive departure and post-acquisition success, it also offers
conclusions for the relationship between the performance level of a company
prior to its acquisition and top management turnover. Precisely, human capital
theory argues that managers who were very successful prior to an acquisition
possess great opportunities on the executive job market. Furthermore, these
successful managers are in many cases rather willing to leave the company
than to follow the changed strategic direction which a new owner might want to
go into (Cannella (1990); Gerpott (1993a)). This reasoning is summarized in
hypothesis 2A:

Hypothesis 2A: The higher the level of pre-acquisition performance of

a company was, the higher is the absolute and relative turnover of
top managers after the acquisition.

Since according to human capital theory top managers represent a very

important resource of a company, their departure means a severe loss of
human capital. The main reason for this is that new managers neither have the
industry experience nor the company-specific knowledge which the former top
managers possessed (Gerpott (1994); Walsh and Ellwood (1991)). Additionally,
a top managers departure entails the loss of his or her network of personal
relations which is of great importance, particularly in the context of an
acquisition (Sewing (1996)).

But executive departure after acquisitions does not only lead to a loss of
valuable human capital. As a matter of fact, it also has a negative signaling
effect. Different empirical studies found for example that important stakeholders
like banks, suppliers, and customers regard an increased turnover rate among
top managers of a certain company as an alarm signal which causes them to
reduce the cooperation with that company in the aftermath (Mller-Stewens and
Lechner (2003)). Even worse is the signaling effect of an increased top
management turnover on the employees and middle-managers within the
company (Schuler et al. (2004); Krug and Nigh (2001); Cartwright and Cooper

-7-

(1992)). In this context, different empirical studies point out that acquired
companies are characterized by declining productivity and job satisfaction rates
as a consequence of executive departure (Marks (1994); Buono (2003)).
Furthermore, top managers who leave their company often take particularly
skilled employees along to their new employer. Thus, according to human
capital theory, high top management turnover after an acquisition does not only
lead to an important loss in human capital but also to an immense perturbation
and disruption of processes in a company. This leads to the conclusion that top
management turnover following acquisitions has a negative effect on postacquisition performance (Schrader (1995)). Hypothesis 2B reflects this
assumption:

Hypothesis 2B: The higher the absolute and relative turnover among
top managers of acquired companies is, the lower is the level of postacquisition performance.

Figure 1 summarizes the four hypotheses on the relationship between executive

departure following acquisitions and pre- as well as post-acquisition
performance which were derived from corporate control theory and human
capital theory. These hypotheses were tested empirically using a sample of
German companies. For this empirical test, three control variables were used in
addition to the three core variables for which detailed hypotheses have been
developed. Two of these controls relative size and relatedness of acquired
and acquiring companies address characteristics of the two companies
involved (Gerpott (1991)). The third control variable status gain of top
managers of acquired companies is related to the integration process
(Hambrick and Cannella, (1993)).

-8-

Corporate
control theory
Replacement of unsuccessful top
management team in order to
regain profitability
Hypothesis 1 A

Hypothesis 1 B

+
Top management
turnover in acquired
companies

Pre-acquisition
performance

Post-acquisition
performance

Hypothesis 2 A

Hypothesis 2 B

Human capital theory

Executive departure as severe
loss of human capital

Figure 1:

Overview of research hypotheses

3. Research Design

3.1. Sample selection

The aim of this study is to empirically analyze the relationship between

executive departure following acquisitions and pre- as well as post-acquisition
performance. For this purpose, we identified all takeovers which took place in
Germany in the years 1996 through 2004. This time period was selected in
order to be able to sufficiently analyze post-acquisition success. The
Bundesanzeiger, the official bulletin of the Federal Republic of Germany,
served as a primary source of information. This bulletin publishes all takeovers
in Germany which the Bundeskartellamt, the federal cartel office, is notified of,
i.e. all larger takeovers in Germany. All in all, between 1996 and 2004, 11,581
takeovers could be identified in Germany.

-9-

Out of these 11,581 mergers and acquisitions, in a first step, we excluded all
those takeovers which could be classified as mergers of equals or as asset
deals. This restriction seemed necessary because for mergers of equals as well
as for asset deals the measurement of post-acquisition performance and top
management turnover is hardly possible. In a second step, we eliminated all
takeovers which only led to minority participations because in these cases it is
not guaranteed that the acquiring company actually gains control of the
acquired company. In a third step, we filtered out takeovers of companies that
did not have their headquarters in Germany and did not have the legal form of
an Aktiengesellschaft (stock corporation). This restriction was necessary to
facilitate

data

collection,

since

the

available

databases

only

contain

performance data and information on top managers for German companies

under the legal form of an Aktiengesellschaft. In a last step, we excluded all
takeovers for which data was incomplete. Thus, we could identify 44
acquisitions of German stock corporations in the years 1996 through 2004
which we included in the analysis.

3.2. Definition and measurement of variables

3.2.1. Top management turnover

In order to measure top management turnover it is as a first step - necessary

to determine who actually belongs to the top management of a company. USbased studies which play a dominant role in upper echelons research normally
refer to one of three types of corporate-level top executives when analyzing
them empirically. A first group of studies considers only the CEO (Kesner and
Sebora (1994)). A second group takes the Board of Directors including the CEO
into account (Golden and Zajac (2001); Goodstein et al. (1994); Goodstein and
Boeker (1991); Westphal and Fredrickson (2001)), while a third group looks at
the whole top management team, which also includes senior vice presidents
and executive vice presidents (Gupta (1988); Tihanyi et al. (2000)).

- 10 -

In Germany, due to differences in corporate governance regulations compared

to the USA, relevant top managers have to be defined differently. As a matter of
fact, empirical studies which analyze top managers in German companies either
concentrate

on

the

Vorstandsvorsitzender

(CEO)

or

the

Vorstand

(management board) including the CEO (Oesterle (1999); Salomo (2001);

Poensgen (1982)). Which alternative is most appropriate depends on the
research question at hand. In this study it seemed to be reasonable to select all
members of the management board, the Vorstand, because one can assume
that all of these managers contribute more or less equally to inefficient
management or to the valuable human capital of a company respectively.

Thus, in this study we measured top management turnover as the departure of

a member of the management board from this position following an acquisition.
In order to facilitate data collection, we did not analyze, however, if this
manager also left the company. This procedure seemed to be justifiable since
several empirical studies show that top managers of acquired companies
almost always leave their company if they are not able to keep their position on
the management board after the takeover (Albach and Freund (1989); West and
Nicolson (1989)).

In order to actually measure top management turnover of the 44 companies in

the sample, first, we determined the names of all members of the respective
management boards for five different points in time 6 months before the
acquisition as well as 6, 12, 18 and 24 months after the acquisition. A two-year
time period after the acquisition was chosen since different empirical studies
show that executive departure in the context of an acquisition mainly takes
place within this time period (Walsh (1988); Hambrick and Cannella (1993);
Krug (2003)). The electronic edition of Hoppenstedts Handbook of Large
German Companies, which is published biannually, served as a basis for data
collection.

- 11 -

In a second step, we compared the names of all members of the management

board before and after the acquisition. In order to actually assess the degree of
executive departure after acquisitions we defined a relative measure the
turnover rate of top managers (turnrel) as well as an absolute measure the
absolute turnover of top managers (turnabs). The two measures of top
management turnover were calculated as follows:
turn
turn

rel
abs

Number of top managers who had departed at time t

Number of top managers prior to the acquisition
= Number of top managers who had departed at time t

3.2.2. Pre- and post-acquisition performance

In order to determine pre- and post-acquisition success we used an accountingbased performance measure precisely, return on assets (ROA). While this
measure has certain limitations, its main advantage is that the necessary
accounting data are publicly available and that the ratio is easy to calculate (Fey
(2000)). Furthermore, we could not use market-based performance measures
like stock returns in the present study since a number of companies in the
sample are not listed at the stock exchange. ROA was calculated as follows
(Kting and Weber (2001)):
Net income
t
ROA =
t (Total assets + Total assets
)/2
t
t 1

In order to overcome problems of accrual accounting, we calculated preacquisition performance as the arithmetic mean of the respective ROA in the
three years preceding the acquisition. For post-acquisition performance, we did
not take the year of the acquisition as a reference point, however, since the goal
of this study is to assess performance effects of executive turnover after
acquisitions. Thus, for each company, we calculated the median of the
departure dates of the companys executives within the two-year period
following the acquisition which served as a reference point. We then determined

- 12 -

post-acquisition performance as the arithmetic mean of ROA for the three years
following this median of the departure dates. All relevant data were obtained
from

Hoppenstedts

Handbook

of

German

Stock

Corporations,

from

Hoppenstedts Financial Database and from annual reports of the companies in

the sample.

3.2.3. Control variables

Relative size of acquired and acquiring company: In order to measure the

relative size of both companies involved in the acquisition process, we used
their respective revenues in the year of the acquisition. Precisely, we expressed
relative size as the target companys revenues in relation to the acquirers
revenues.

Relatedness of acquired and acquiring company: We measured relatedness on

the basis of SIC codes for the dominant business units of the acquired and the
acquiring companies. In order to assess relatedness, we created a dummy
variable which took on the value of 1 if the SIC codes of acquired and acquiring
companies were identical on a two-digit level.

4. Results

4.1. Descriptive analysis of the sample

The presentation of the results of this study starts with a brief descriptive
analysis of the companies in the sample. We devote special attention to the
observed levels of executive departure and to pre- as well as post-acquisition
performance. After this descriptive overview, we analyze the relationship
between top management turnover and pre- as well as post-acquisition
performance in more detail.

Altogether, the 44 companies in the sample had 148 board members before
they were acquired. This amounts to an average number of board members per

- 13 -

company of 3.4. In the 24 months following the acquisition of their company 62

members of the management boards abandoned their position. In the four 6month periods after the takeover the average turnover rates lay at 12.8 percent,
14.9 percent, 6.1 percent and 8.1 percent. Thus, two years after the acquisition
41.9 percent of all former board members had left the office (Figure 2).

Turnover rate
50 %
41.9 %
40 %
33.8 %
30 %

27.7 %

20 %
12.8 %

14.9 %

10 %

6.1 %

0%

12

18

8.1 %

24

t (months)

Turnover rate per 6-month period

Cumulative turnover rate

Figure 2:

Top management turnover rates in the analyzed companies

The top management turnover rates, which we found in the present study,
correspond to those of other, mostly US-based studies. These studies also
came to the conclusion that turnover rates among top managers are particularly
high immediately after an acquisition and decrease in the time that follows. The
turnover rate that resulted after 24 months varied between 33 and 61 percent in
these studies, with the median being as in the present study 45 percent
(Walsh (1988); Hambrick and Cannella (1993); Krug (2003); Martin and
McConnell (1991); Lubatkin et al. (1999)).

The overall success rate of the acquisitions analyzed in the present study lay at
55 percent, i.e. 55 percent of the companies in the sample had a higher ROA
after the acquisition than before the takeover. Similar results were found by
Bhner (1990) and Gerpott (1993b) for German companies. In comparison to

- 14 -

studies on acquisitions in the United States or Great Britain, however, the

success rate which we observed in the present study is relatively high. But as
Bamberger (1994) has shown in a meta-analysis German studies generally
come to more positive results regarding the success rates of acquisitions than
their American or British counterparts.

4.2. Correlation analyses

Following the descriptive overview, we examine bivariate relationships between

pre-acquisition

performance,

executive

departure

and

post-acquisition

performance in more detail. For this purpose, we computed correlations

between the single variables. Table 1 depicts the respective matrix of
correlations. It shows, first of all, that no significant relationship exists between
pre-acquisition ROA and the two executive departure variables. As far as the
relationship

between

top

management

turnover

and

post-acquisition

performance is concerned, however, negative correlations on a highly

significant level resulted for both executive departure variables. Additionally, the
matrix makes it clear that a highly significant correlation exists between pre- and
post-acquisition performance. For relatedness and relative size, we could not
find significant relationships.

- 15 -

Corr. 1
1 turnrel
Sig.

Corr. .840*** 1
2 turnabs
Sig.
3

.000

ROAbefor Corr. -.159

.
-.141

.360

Corr. -.404**

-.399**

.410**

Sig.

.007

.007

.006

Related- Corr. .170

.119

.006

-.220

ness

.442

.970

.151

Relative Corr. .035

-.093

.040

.066

-.138

size

.547

.795

.672

.370

Sig.

.302

4 ROAafter

Sig.

Sig.

.269

.819

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

***Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed)
Table 1:

Correlation matrix

Overall, the results of the correlation analysis offer support for hypotheses 2B,
i.e. a higher rate of executive departure has a negative effect on postacquisition performance, whereas hypotheses 2A has to be declined. As far as
hypotheses 1A and 1B are concerned, support for none of them could be found,
i.e. pre-acquisition performance has no effect on top management turnover
following the acquisition. Before final conclusions regarding the four hypotheses
can be drawn, however, multivariate analyses are necessary in order to control
for other factors. Results of respective regression analyses are presented in the
next section.

- 16 -

4.3 Regressions analyses

In order to fully explore the relationship between pre-acquisition performance,

executive departure and post-acquisition performance, we conducted two sets
of regression analyses. First, we analyzed the influence of pre-acquisition
performance and the control variables on executive departure. In a second step,
we examined the impact of executive departure, pre-acquisition performance
and the control variables on post-acquisition performance.
The first set of regression models used absolute top management turnover as
dependent variable. Altogether, we computed two regression models using
hierarchical multiple regression technique (Field (2005)). The first model only
considered the two control variables. The second model then also comprised
the effect of the variable pre-acquisition ROA on executive departure. For both
models additional tests showed that the requirements of homoscedasticity and
normal distribution were met and that neither collinearity nor autocorrelation
could be observed. Table 2 gives an overview of the two regression models.

Dependent variable:
Absolute top management
turnover
Standardized
coefficients (Beta)

Model 1

Model 2

Control variables
Relatedness
Relative size

0.108
-0.078

0.110
-0.072
-0.139

Average pre-acquisition ROA

R2

0.020

R2
Level of significance

0.659

0.039
0.019
0.376

44

44

Table 2:

Regression analyses for top management turnover as dependent variable

Table 2 shows that neither the two regression models as a whole nor any of the
coefficients are significant. We found similar results when using the variable
relative top management turnover as dependent variable. Thus, the first set of
regression analyses supports the findings of the correlation analysis and shows

- 17 -

that pre-acquisition performance does not have an impact on the degree of

executive departure following an acquisition.

For the second set of regression models post-acquisition ROA was used as the
dependent variable. Altogether, we computed three different regression models
using hierarchical multiple regression technique (Field (2005)). The first model
only considered the effect of the two control variables. The second model then
also comprised pre-acquisition performance, while the third model additionally
included the variable absolute top management turnover. For all three models
additional tests showed that the requirements of homoscedasticity and normal
distribution were met and that neither collinearity nor autocorrelation could be
observed. Table 3 gives an overview of the three regression models.

Dependent variable:
Average post-acquisition ROA
Standardized
coefficients (Beta)
Control variable
Relatedness
Relative size

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

-0.215
0.036

-0.220
0.019

-0.184
-0.005

0.410**

0.365**

Average pre-acquisition ROA

-0.326**

Absolute turnover of top managers

0.351

0.218
0.168
0.019

0.320
0.102
0.004

44

44

44

R2

0.050

R2
Level of significance
N
* Coefficient significant at the 0.05-level
**Coefficient significant at the 0.01-level

Table 3:

Regression analyses using post-acquisition performance as dependent variable

Table 3 shows that, except for the first model, all regression models are highly
or very significant, explaining between 21.8 and 32.0 percent of the variance in
post-acquisition performance. Furthermore, table 3 makes it clear that top
management turnover has a significant, negative effect on post-acquisition
performance, i.e. the higher the rate of executive departure, the lower the
performance of the respective company. A likewise significant effect can be

- 18 -

observed for the pre-acquisition ROA. This means that post-acquisition

performance is also positively influenced by the companys performance level
prior to the acquisition. As far as relative size and relatedness are concerned,
no significant effects resulted. We found similar results when using relative top
management turnover as dependent variable.

Thus, the results of the second set of regression analyses confirm the findings
of the correlation analysis and give support to hypothesis 2B, i.e. the reasoning
of human capital theory, whereas hypothesis 1B the reasoning of corporate
control theory has to be declined. These findings will be discussed in more
detail in the following section.

5. Discussions and Interpretation

All in all, the results of the present study support at least regarding the
relationship

between

top

management

turnover

and

post-acquisition

performance quite clearly the argumentation of human capital theory.

Particularly, they show that acquired companies perform better if top managers
stay in office or are even promoted to higher positions within the new joint
company. Thus, this study confirms the findings of Cannella and Hambrick
(1993), Krishnan et al. (1997) as well as Bergh (2001) for acquisitions in the
United States and of Gerpott (1993a) for takeovers in Germany.

With regard to the relationship between pre-acquisition performance and

executive departure, however, the study neither offered proof for the reasoning
of human capital theory nor for that of corporate control theory. Rather, we
could not observe any impact of pre-acquisition performance on top
management turnover. This result contradicts findings of Morck et al. (1989),
Warner et al. (1988), Weisbach (1988), Comment (1991) and Coughlan and
Schmidt (1985) who observed high degrees of top management turnover in low
performing target companies in the USA. Therefore, national differences might
have to be explored further in future research. Additionally, it certainly makes
sense to differentiate between voluntary and involuntary executive departure

- 19 -

after acquisitions. Here, the assumption is that the reasoning of corporate

control theory holds true in the case of involuntary turnover, whereas the
argumentation of human capital theory is valid for voluntary top management
turnover. In the present study, the different effects of voluntary and involuntary
turnover might have leveled each other out.

The study has also shown that the level of pre-acquisition performance has a
significant positive effect on post-acquisition performance. Nevertheless, a more
detailed analysis of the sample gives reason to believe, that particularly
companies with low performance levels prior to the acquisition are making a
mistake if they do not try to tie their top managers to the company after it has
been acquired. For this analysis we divided the companies in the sample up into
two groups with high and low pre-acquisition performance respectively. In each
of the two groups we draw a further distinction between companies with high
and with low top management turnover. The results of this analysis are
displayed in figure 3. The figure shows that for companies with high preacquisition performance an increased turnover among top managers after the
takeover led to a stronger decrease in performance compared to companies
with lower turnover rates. A more substantial effect, however, could be
observed for companies with low pre-acquisition performance. They were able
to strongly increase their performance if they were characterized by low
executive turnover, whereas in case of high degrees of executive departure
they almost remained on the same (low) performance level. This means that
despite the general impact of pre-acquisition performance on post-acquisition
performance a low turnover rate among top managers is particularly desirable
for companies with low performance levels before the acquisition.

- 20 -

ROA
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
-2%
-4%
-6%
-8%
Pre-acquisition
performance

Post-acquisition
performance

Companies with low top management turnover

Companies with high top management turnover

Figure 3:

Development of ROA for companies with high and low top management turnover

One has to take into account, however, that the period of observation in this
study is limited to the first three years after an acquisition. Thus, conclusions
regarding the long-term development of an acquired companys performance
cannot be drawn. For this reason, it is possible that though high levels of
executive departure have negative effects on performance in the first years after
an acquisition, they turn out to be the better alternative in the long run. But, as
Krug (2003) showed in an empirical study, companies which are characterized
by high turnover rates among top managers right after an acquisition also face a
higher level of departures among the newly appointed top managers in the time
that follows. This finding gives reason to believe that high top management
turnover following an acquisition also has negative consequences in the long
term.

Finally, the issue of causality, especially between executive departure and postacquisition performance deserves some further attention. As a matter of fact,
the present study has only shown that these two variables are positively related.
It cannot be concluded directly from the data, however, that a lower turnover

- 21 -

rate is actually the cause of higher post-acquisition performance. Nevertheless,

we measured performance in the time period following executive departure.
This time sequence of departure and performance speaks in favor of a causal
relationship. Therefore, it seems reasonable to actually regard executive
departure as a trigger of performance.

6. Implications

This study has shown that executive departure plays an important role in the
context of acquisitions and should therefore be analyzed in more depth. For this
deeper analysis a number of starting points exists. It seems promising, for
example, to distinguish between different types of executive departure after an
acquisition. This differentiation could especially lead to better results regarding
the relationship between pre-acquisition performance and executive departure.
Also, the inclusion of moderating variables into the analysis might be useful.
Indeed, empirical studies by Krishnan et al. (1997) and by Gerpott (1993a)
showed that factors like the complementarity of top managers background
characteristics in both companies moderate the relationship between executive
departure and post-acquisition performance. Last but not least, an expansion of
the period of analysis seems to be reasonable in order to get a clearer picture of
the long term effects of executive departure after acquisitions (Krug (2003)).

For management practice, the most important recommendation which can be

derived from the present study is that top managers of acquired companies
should in any case be persuaded to stay in office. For this purpose, it makes
sense to actively involve these top managers in the integration process of the
acquired company and to make it very clear to them that they will be regarded
as equal partners in the new company. In this context, it is certainly beneficial to
promote the one or the other top manager of the acquired company to the
management board of the acquiring company (Cannella and Hambrick (1993);
Gerpott (1993a)).

- 22 -

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1:

Overview of research hypotheses8

Figure 2:

Top management turnover rates in the analyzed companies...13

Figure 3:

Development of ROA for companies with high and low

top management turnover...20

Table 1:

Correlation matrix.15

Table 2:

Regression analyses for top management turnover as

dependent variable...16

Table 3:

Regression analyses using post-acquisition performance

as dependent variable.17

II

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XI

List of HHL Working Papers

HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management

Arbeitspapiere

Die Arbeitspapiere der HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management erscheinen in

unregelmigen Abstnden. Bisher sind folgende Arbeiten erschienen:

Nr. 1

Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Heribert Meffert (1996), 31 Seiten

Stand und Perspektiven des Umweltmanagement in der
betriebswirtschaftlichen Forschung und Lehre

Nr. 2

Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler (1996), 28 Seiten

Verluste trotz steigender Kurse? - Probleme der Performancemessung
bei Zinsnderungen

Nr. 3

Prof. Dr. Arnis Vilks (1996), 26 Seiten

Rationality of Choice and Rationality of Reasoning (Revised version,
September 1996)

Nr. 4

Prof. Dr. Harald Hungenberg (1996), 36 Seiten

Strategische Allianzen im Telekommunikationsmarkt

Nr. 5

Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler (1996), 41 Seiten

Die Kapitalkosten von Rckstellungen zur Anwendung des Shareholder
Value-Konzeptes in Deutschland

Nr. 6

Prof. Dr. Harald Hungenberg / Thomas Hutzschenreuter (1997),

32 Seiten
Postreform - Umgestaltung des Post- und Telekommunikationssektors in Deutschland

Nr. 7

Prof. Dr. Harald Hungenberg / Thomas Hutzschenreuter / Torsten

Wulf (1997), 31 Seiten
Investitionsmanagement in internationalen Konzernen
- Lsungsanstze vor dem Hintergrund der Agency Theorie

Nr. 8

Dr. Peter Kesting (1997), 47 Seiten

Visionen, Revolutionen und klassische Situationen Schumpeters
Theorie der wissenschaftlichen Entwicklung

Nr. 9

Prof. Dr. Arnis Vilks (1997), 36 Seiten

Knowledge of the Game, Rationality and Backwards Induction

XII

Nr. 10

Prof. Dr. Harald Hungenberg / Thomas Hutzschenreuter /

Torsten Wulf (1997), 22 Seiten
Ressourcenorientierung und Organisation

Nr. 11

Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler / Stephan Mahn (1997), 71 Seiten

IPOs: Optimale Preisstrategien fr Emissionsbanken mit Hilfe von
Anbot-Modellen

Nr. 12

Prof. Dr. Thomas M. Fischer (1997), 23 Seiten

Koordination im Qualittsmanagement Analyse und Evaluation im
Kontext der Transaktionskostentheorie

Nr. 13

Dr. Thomas Hutzschenreuter / Alexander Sonntag (1998), 32 Seiten

Erklrungsanstze der Diversifikation von Unternehmen

Nr. 14

Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler / Niklas Darijtschuk (1998), 33 Seiten

Unternehmensbewertung mit Hilfe der DCF-Methode eine Anmerkung
zum Zirkularittsproblem

Nr. 15

Prof. Dr. Harald Hungenberg (1998), 22 Seiten

Kooperation und Konflikt aus Sicht der Unternehmensverfassung

Nr. 16

Prof. Dr. Thomas M. Fischer (1998), 31 Seiten

Prozekostencontrolling Gestaltungsoptionen in der ffentlichen
Verwaltung

Nr. 17

Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler (1998), 34 Seiten

Shareholder Value Konzept, Managementanreize und Stock Option
Plans

Nr. 18

Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler / Serge Ragotzky (1998), 24 Seiten

Preisfindung und Vertragsbindungen bei MBO-Privatisierungen in
Sachsen

Nr. 19

Prof. Dr. Thomas M. Fischer / Dr. Jochen A. Schmitz (1998),

23 Seiten
Control Measures for Kaizen Costing - Formulation and Practical Use
of the Half-Life Model

Nr. 20

Prof. Dr. Thomas M. Fischer / Dr. Jochen A. Schmitz (1998),

35 Seiten
Kapitalmarktorientierte Steuerung von Projekten im Zielkostenmanagement

Nr. 21

Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler (1998), 25 Seiten

Unternehmensbewertung unter Unsicherheit
Sicherheitsquivalent- oder Risikozuschlagsmethode?

XIII

Nr. 22

Dr. Claudia Lhnig (1998), 21 Seiten

Industrial Production Structures and Convergence: Some Findings
from European Integration

Nr. 23

Peggy Kreller (1998), 54 Seiten

Empirische Untersuchung zur Einkaufsstttenwahl von Konsumenten
am Beispiel der Stadt Leipzig

Nr. 24

Niklas Darijtschuk (1998), 35 Seiten

Dividendenpolitik

Nr. 25

Prof. Dr. Arnis Vilks (1999), 25 Seiten

Knowledge of the Game, Relative Rationality, and Backwards Induction
without Counterfactuals

Nr. 26

Prof. Dr. Harald Hungenberg / Torsten Wulf (1999), 22 Seiten

The Transition Process in East Germany

Nr. 27

Prof. Dr. Thomas M. Fischer (2000), 28 Seiten

Economic Value Added (EVA) - Informationen aus der externen
Rechnungslegung zur internen Unternehmenssteuerung?
(berarb. Version Juli 2000)

Nr. 28

Prof. Dr. Thomas M. Fischer / Tim von der Decken (1999), 32 Seiten
Kundenprofitabilittsrechnung in Dienstleistungsgeschften
Konzeption und Umsetzung am Beispiel des Car Rental Business

Nr. 29

Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler (1999), 21 Seiten

Stochastische Verknpfung und implizite bzw. maximal zulssige
Risikozuschlge bei der Unternehmensbewertung

Nr. 30

Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Heribert Meffert (1999), 36 Seiten

Marketingwissenschaft im Wandel Anmerkungen zur
Paradigmendiskussion

Nr. 31

Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler / Niklas Darijtschuk (1999), 20 Seiten

Unternehmensbewertung, Finanzierungspolitiken und optimale
Kapitalstruktur

Nr. 32

Prof. Dr. Thomas M. Fischer (1999), 40 Seiten

Die Anwendung der Balanced Scorecard in Handelsunternehmen
Konzeption und Fallbeispiel

Nr. 33

Dr. Claudia Lhnig (1999), 29 Seiten

Wirtschaftliche Integration im Ostseeraum vor dem Hintergrund der
Osterweiterung der Europischen Union: eine Potentialanalyse

Nr. 34

dieses Arbeitspapier ist nicht mehr verfgbar

Nr. 35

Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler (2000), 31 Seiten

Der Einfluss von Wachstum, Risiko und Risikoauflsung auf den
Unternehmenswert

XIV

Nr. 36

Dr. Thomas Hutzschenreuter / Albrecht Enders (2000), 27 Seiten

Mglichkeiten zur Gestaltung Internet-basierter Studienangebote im
Markt fr Managementbildung

Nr. 37

Dr. Peter Kesting (2000), 26 Seiten

Lehren aus dem deutschen Konvergenzprozess Eine Kritik des
Eisernen Gesetzes der Konvergenz und seines theoretischen
Fundaments

Nr. 38

Prof. Dr. Manfred Kirchgeorg / Dr. Peggy Kreller (2000), 31 Seiten

Etablierung von Marken im Regionenmarketing eine vergleichende
Analyse der Regionennamen "Mitteldeutschland" und "Ruhrgebiet" auf
der Grundlage einer reprsentativen Studie

Nr. 39

Dr. Peter Kesting (2001), 23 Seiten

Was sind Handlungsmglichkeiten? Fundierung eines konomischen
Grundbegriffs

Nr. 40

Dr. Peter Kesting (2001), 29 Seiten

Entscheidung und Handlung

Nr. 41

Prof. Dr. Hagen Lindstdt (2001), 27 Seiten

Decisions of the Board

Nr. 42

Prof. Dr. Hagen Lindstdt (2001), 28 Seiten

Die Versteigerung der deutschen UMTS-Lizenzen Eine konomische
Analyse des Bietverhaltens

Nr. 43

PD Dr. Thomas Hutzschenreuter / Dr. Torsten Wulf (2001), 23 Seiten

Ansatzpunkte einer situativen Theorie der Unternehmensentwicklung

Nr. 44

Prof. Dr. Hagen Lindstdt (2001), 14 Seiten

On the Shape of Information Processing Functions

Nr. 45

PD Dr. Thomas Hutzschenreuter (2001), 18 Seiten

Managementkapazitten und Unternehmensentwicklung

Nr. 46

Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Althammer / Christian Rafflenbeul (2001),

42 Seiten
Kommunale Beschftigungspolitik: das Beispiel des Leipziger Betriebs
fr Beschftigungsfrderung

Nr. 47

Prof. Dr. Thomas M. Fischer / Dr. Petra Schmller (2001), 32 Seiten

Kunden-Controlling Management Summary einer empirischen
Untersuchung in der Elektroindustrie

Nr. 48

Prof. Dr. Manfred Kirchgeorg / Eva Grobe / Alexander Lorbeer

(2003), (noch nicht erschienen) 56 Seiten
Einstellung von Talenten gegenber Arbeitgebern und regionalen
Standorten : eine Analyse auf der Grundlage einer Befragung von
Talenten aus der Region Mitteldeutschland

XV

Nr. 49

Prof. Dr. Manfred Kirchgeorg / Alexander Lorbeer (2002),

60 Seiten
Anforderungen von High Potentials an Unternehmen eine Analyse
auf der Grundlage einer bundesweiten Befragung von High Potentials
und Personalentscheidern

Nr. 50

Eva Grobe (2003), 78, XXVI Seiten

Corporate attractiveness : eine Analyse der Wahrnehmung von
Unternehmensmarken aus der Sicht von High Potentials

Nr. 51

Prof. Dr. Thomas M. Fischer / Dr. Petra Schmller /

Dipl.-Kfm. Uwe Vielmeyer (2002), 35 Seiten
Customer Options Mglichkeiten und Grenzen der Bewertung von
kundenbezogenen Erfolgspotenzialen mit Realoptionen

Nr. 52

Prof. Dr. Thomas M. Fischer / Dipl.-Kfm. Uwe Vielmeyer

(2002), 29 Seiten
Vom Shareholder Value zum Stakeholder Value? Mglichkeiten und
Grenzen der Messung von stakeholderbezogenen Wertbeitrgen

Nr. 53

Carsten Reimund (2002), 34 Seiten

Internal Capital Markets, Bank Borrowing and Investment: Evidence
from German Corporate Groups

Nr. 54

Dr. Peter Kesting (2002), 21 Seiten

Anstze zur Erklrung des Prozesses der Formulierung von
Entscheidungsprozessen

Nr. 55

Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Althammer / Susanne Drge (2002), 27 Seiten

International Trade and the Environment: The Real Conflicts. - PdfDokument

Nr. 56

Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler / Maik Piehler (2002), 35 Seiten

Unternehmensbewertung bei Wachstum, Risiko und Besteuerung
Anmerkungen zum Steuerparadoxon

Nr. 57

Prof. Dr. Hagen Lindstdt (2002), 12, 5 Seiten

Das modifizierte Hurwicz-Kriterium fr untere und obere
Wahrscheinlichkeiten - ein Spezialfall des Choquet-Erwartungsnutzens

Nr. 58

Karsten Winkler (2003), 25 Seiten

Getting Started with DIAsDEM Workbench 2.0: A Case-Based Tutorial

Nr. 59

Karsten Winkler (2003), 31 Seiten

Wettbewerbsinformationssysteme: Begriff, Anforderungen,
Herausforderungen

Nr. 60

Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler / Carsten Reimund (2003), 31 Seiten

Conglomerate Discount and Cash Distortion: New Evidence from
Germany

XVI

Nr. 61

Prof. Pierfrancesco La Mura (2003), 10 Seiten

Correlated Equilibria of Classical Strategic Games with Quantum
Signals

Nr. 62

Prof. Dr. Manfred Kirchgeorg (2003), 26 Seiten

Markenpolitik fr Natur- und Umweltschutzorganisationen

Nr. 63

Stefan Wriggers (2004), 32, XXV Seiten

Kritische Wrdigung der Means-End-Theorie im Rahmen einer
Anwendung auf M-Commerce-Dienste

Nr. 64

Prof. Pierfrancesco La Mura / Matthias Herfert (2004), 18 Seiten

Estimation of Consumer Preferences via Ordinal Decision-Theoretic
Entropy

Nr. 65

Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler (2004), 31 Seiten

Mittelverwendungsannahme, Bewertungsmodell und Unternehmenswertung bei Rckstellungen

Nr. 66

Prof. Dr. Manfred Kirchgeorg / Lars Fiedler (2004), 47 Seiten

Clustermonitoring als Kontroll- und Steuerungsinstrument fr
Clusterentwicklungsprozesse - empirische Analysen von
Industrieclustern in Ostdeutschland

Nr. 67

Prof. Dr. Manfred Kirchgeorg / Christiane Springer (2005),

39 , XX Seiten
UNIPLAN LiveTrends 2004/2005 : Effizienz und Effektivitt in der Live
Communication ; Eine Analyse auf Grundlage einer branchenbergreifenden Befragung von Marketingentscheidern in Deutschland

Nr. 68

Prof. Pierfrancesco La Mura (2005), 11 Seiten

Decision Theory in the Presence of Uncertainty and Risk

Nr. 69

Prof. Dr. Andreas Suchanek (2005), 25 Seiten

Is Profit Maximization the Social Responsibility of Business? Milton
Friedman and Business Ethics

Nr. 70

Prof. Dr. Ralf Reichwald / Prof. Dr. Kathrin Mslein (2005),

48 Seiten
Fhrung und Fhrungssysteme

Nr. 71

Prof. Dr. Manfred Kirchgeorg / Christiane Springer (2006), VIII, 41,

XI-XXVI Seiten
UNIPLAN Live Trends 2006 : Steuerung des Kommunikationsmix im
Kundenbeziehungszyklus ; eine branchenbergreifende Befragung von
Marketingentscheidern unter besonderer Bercksichtigung der Live
Communication. 2., erw. Aufl.

Nr. 72

Prof. Pierfrancesco La Mura / Guido Olschewski (2006), 8 Seiten

Non-Dictatorial Social Choice through Delegation

Nr. 73

Prof. Dr. Arnis Vilks (2006), 13 Seiten

Logic, Game Theory, and the Real World

XVII

Nr. 74

Prof. Dr. Manfred Kirchgeorg / Elmar Gnther (2006),

VIII, 61, XIII-XXVI Seiten
Employer Brands zur Unternehmensprofilierung im Personalmarkt :
Eine Analyse der Wahrnehmung von Unternehmensmarken auf der
Grundlage einer deutschlandweiten Befragung von High Potentials

Nr. 75

Prof. Dr. Kathrin Mslein / Anne Sigismund Huff (2006), 43 Seiten

Management education and research in Germany

Nr. 76

Prof. Dr. Andreas Suchanek (2007), 35 S.

Corporate Responsibility in der pharmazeutischen Industrie

Nr. 77

Prof. Dr. Pierfrancesco La Mura / Lukasz Swiatczak (2007), 7 Seiten

Markovian Entanglement Networks

Nr. 78

Martina Wuttke (2007), 75 Seiten

Analyse der Markteintrittsstrategien chinesischer Unternehmen in
Mitteldeutschland am Beispiel von chinesischen Unternehmen im
MaxicoM in Leipzig

Nr. 79

Prof. Dr. Manfred Kirchgeorg / Dr. Tjark Freundt (2007), 57 Seiten

Neurobiologische Erklrungsbeitrge zur Struktur und Dynamik des
Markenwissens

Nr. 80

Prof. Dr. Manfred Kirchgeorg / Kathrin Jung (2007), 36 Seiten

User behavior in Second Life: an empirical study analysis and its
implications for marketing practice

Nr. 81

Prof. Dr. Andreas Suchanek (2007), 21 Seiten

Die Relevanz der Unternehmensethik im Rahmen der
Betriebswirtschaftslehre

Nr. 82

Prof. Dr. Henning Zlch / Prof. Dr. Edgar Lw / Dipl.-Kfm. Stephan

Burghardt (2008), 93 Seiten
Zur Bedeutung von IFRS-Abschlssen bei der Kreditvergabe von
Banken an mittelstndische Unternehmen

Nr. 83

Prof. Dr. Henning Zlch / Dipl.-Kfm. Ronny Gebhardt (2008)

Politische konomie der Rechnungslegung - Empirische Ergebnisse
und kritische Wrdigung des Forschungsansatzes
(erscheint demnchst)