A.

Adoption and Effectivity of the Present Constitution

Article V of the Provisional Constitution
ARTICLE V
ADOPTION OF A NEW CONSTITUTION
Section 1. Within sixty (60) days from date of this Proclamation, a Commission
shall be appointed by the President to draft a New Constitution. The Commission
shall be composed of not less than thirty (30) nor more than fifty (50) natural born
citizens of the Philippines, of recognized probity, known for their independence,
nationalism and patriotism. They shall be chosen by the President after
consultation with various sectors of society.
Section 2. The Commission shall complete its work within as short a period as may
be consistent with the need both to hasten the return of normal constitutional
government and to draft a document truly reflective of the ideals and aspirations
of the Filipino people.
Section 3. The Commission shall conduct public hearings to ensure that the people
will have adequate participation in the formulation of the New Constitution.
Section 4. The plenary sessions of the Commission shall be public and fully
recorded.
Section 5. The New Constitution shall be presented by the Commission to the
President who shall fix the date for the holding of a plebiscite. It shall become valid
and effective upon ratification by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite
which shall be held within a period of sixty (60) days following its submission to
the President.

Sec 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution

Section 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall
supersede all previous Constitutions.
The foregoing proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines was
approved by the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the twelfth day of
October, Nineteen hundred and eighty-six, and accordingly signed on the
fifteenth day of October, Nineteen hundred and eighty-six at the Plenary Hall,
National Government Center, Quezon City, by the Commissioners whose
signatures are hereunder affixed.

Proclamation No. 58 Feb 11, 1987

PROCLAIMING THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES ADOPTED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION OF 1986,
INCLUDING THE ORDINANCE APPENDED THERETO
WHEREAS, the Constitutional Commission of 1986 adopted the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines on October 15, 1986, together with the
Ordinance appended thereto, which shall become valid and effective upon
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose;
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, sitting as the national board of
canvassers for the February 2, 1987 plebiscite on the proposed Constitution,
certified that: XXX

DE LEON vs. ESGUERRA 153 S 602 (1987)

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the
other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal.
Petitioner received a Memorandum signed by respondent OIC Governor
Benjamin Esguerra designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay
Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC
Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government."
Respondent OIC Governor also signed a Memorandum designating other
respondents as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and
Municipality. So the OIC governor in the memorandum ordered the replacement
of all baranggay officials of all the baranggays in the municipality of Taytay
Rizal. Petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda be declared null and void
and that respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay
Captain and Barangay Councilmen. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to
Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of
office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall
continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or
up to June 7, 1988. That with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to
designate their successors.
Respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of
their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from
February 25,1986.
Respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials
were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the
aforequoted provision and not because their term of six years had not yet
expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of
office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been
repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the Provisional
Constitution. So elective officials under the 1973 Constitution may continue in
office but should vacate their positions upon the occurrence of any of the
events mentioned.
Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no
proclamation or executive order terminating the term of elective Barangay
officials.
ISSUE: WON the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly
made during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987.
HELD: Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold
that February 8, 1977, should be considered as the effective date of
replacement and not December 1, 1986 to which it was ante dated, in keeping
with the dictates of justice.
But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the
aforequoted provision in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have
been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading.

SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall
supersede all previous Constitutions.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987.
By that date Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been
superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no
longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the
elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law,
therefore, the term of office of six (6) years provided for in the Barangay
Election Act of 1982 should still govern. Contrary to the stand of respondents,
we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective
Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore,
be considered as still operative. Thus, Memoranda issued by respondent OIC
Governor declared to be of no legal force and effect
Compare with the Effectivity of Statutes
TAADA VS. TUVERA 136 S 27 (1985)
ESCOLIN, J.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine
qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves
provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the
presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they
are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for
their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's
construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, this Court has ruled that
publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where
the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then
the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates
the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of
other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached
that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity.
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia
legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or

otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he

had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

TAADA VS. TUVERA 146 S 446 (1986)

CRUZ, J.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in
its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be
shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief
Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code
which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the
Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not
apply because it was "otherwise provided.
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be
dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due
process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective
immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after
an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons
not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not
because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its
existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly
supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on
prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect
before they can begin to operate.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of
general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people
in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An
example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be
said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does
not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public
interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political
forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or
as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law
must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable
only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as a
whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application
and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all
since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.