G.R. No.

L-961

September 21, 1949

belonging to you, that is to say, the houses and lot

pertained to your paraphernal estate;

BLANDINA
GAMBOA
HILADO, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, JACOB
ASSAD and SELIM JACOB ASSAD,respondents.
Delgado,
Dizon
and
Flores
Vicente J. Francisco for respondents.

for

petitioner.

TUASON, J.:
It appears that on April 23, 1945, Blandina Gamboa Hilado
brought an action against Selim Jacob Assad to annul the sale of
several houses and lot executed during the Japanese occupation
by Mrs. Hilado's now deceased husband.
On May 14, Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita filed an
answer on behalf of the defendant; and on June 15, Attorneys
Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo registered their appearance
as counsel for the plaintiff. On October 5, these attorneys filed
an amended complaint by including Jacob Assad as party
defendant.
On January 28, 1946, Attorney Francisco entered his appearance
as attorney of record for the defendant in substitution for
Attorney Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita who had withdrawn from
the case.
On May 29, Attorney Dizon, in the name of his firm, wrote
Attorney Francisco urging him to discontinue representing the
defendants on the ground that their client had consulted with
him about her case, on which occasion, it was alleged, "she
turned over the papers" to Attorney Francisco, and the latter
sent her a written opinion. Not receiving any answer to this
suggestion, Attorney Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo on June
3, 1946, filed a formal motion with the court, wherein the case
was and is pending, to disqualify Attorney Francisco.
Attorney Francisco's letter to plaintiff, mentioned above and
identified as Exhibit A, is in full as follows:
VICENTE
Attorney-at-Law
1462 Estrada, Manila

J.

FRANCISCO

July 13, 1945.

Mrs.
Blandina
Manila, Philippines

Gamboa

Hilado

My dear Mrs. Hilado:

From the papers you submitted to me in connection
with civil case No. 70075 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, entitled "Blandina Gamboa Hilado vs. S. J.
Assad," I find that the basic facts which brought about
the controversy between you and the defendant
therein are as follows:
(a) That you were the equitable owner of the property
described in the complaint, as the same was
purchased and/or built with funds exclusively

(b) That on May 3, 1943, the legal title to the property

was with your husband, Mr. Serafin P. Hilado; and
(c) That the property was sold by Mr. Hilado without
your knowledge on the aforesaid date of May 3, 1943.
Upon the foregoing facts, I am of the opinion that your
action against Mr. Assad will not ordinarily prosper. Mr.
Assad had the right to presume that your husband had
the legal right to dispose of the property as the
transfer certificate of title was in his name. Moreover,
the price of P110,000 in Japanese military notes, as of
May 3, 1943, does not quite strike me as so grossly
inadequate as to warrant the annulment of the sale. I
believe, lastly, that the transaction cannot be avoided
merely because it was made during the Japanese
occupation, nor on the simple allegation that the real
purchaser was not a citizen of the Philippines. On his
last point, furthermore, I expect that you will have
great difficulty in proving that the real purchaser was
other than Mr. Assad, considering that death has
already sealed your husband's lips and he cannot now
testify as to the circumstances of the sale.
For the foregoing reasons, I regret to advise you that I
cannot appear in the proceedings in your behalf. The
records of the case you loaned to me are herewith
returned.

Yours very truly,

(Sgd.) VICENTE J. FRANCISCO

VJF/Rag.
In his answer to plaintiff's attorneys' complaint, Attorney
Francisco alleged that about May, 1945, a real estate broker
came to his office in connection with the legal separation of a
woman who had been deserted by her husband, and also told
him (Francisco) that there was a pending suit brought by Mrs.
Hilado against a certain Syrian to annul the sale of a real estate
which the deceased Serafin Hilado had made to the Syrian
during the Japanese occupation; that this woman asked him if
he was willing to accept the case if the Syrian should give it to
him; that he told the woman that the sales of real property
during the Japanese regime were valid even though it was paid
for in Japanese military notes; that this being his opinion, he
told his visitor he would have no objection to defending the
Syrian;
That one month afterwards, Mrs. Hilado came to see him about
a suit she had instituted against a certain Syrian to annul the
conveyance of a real estate which her husband had made; that
according to her the case was in the hands of Attorneys Delgado
and Dizon, but she wanted to take it away from them; that as he
had known the plaintiff's deceased husband he did not hesitate
to tell her frankly that hers was a lost case for the same reason
he had told the broker; that Mrs. Hilado retorted that the basis
of her action was not that the money paid her husband was
Japanese military notes, but that the premises were her private
and exclusive property; that she requested him to read the
complaint to be convinced that this was the theory of her suit;
that he then asked Mrs. Hilado if there was a Torrens title to the

property and she answered yes, in the name of her husband;

that he told Mrs. Hilado that if the property was registered in her
husband's favor, her case would not prosper either;
That some days afterward, upon arrival at his law office on
Estrada street, he was informed by Attorney Federico Agrava,
his assistant, that Mrs. Hilado had dropped in looking for him
and that when he, Agrava, learned that Mrs. Hilado's visit
concerned legal matters he attended to her and requested her
to leave the "expediente" which she was carrying, and she did;
that he told Attorney Agrava that the firm should not handle
Mrs. Hilado's case and he should return the papers, calling
Agrava's attention to what he (Francisco) already had said to
Mrs. Hilado;
That several days later, the stenographer in his law office,
Teofilo Ragodon, showed him a letter which had been dictated in
English by Mr. Agrava, returning the "expedients" to Mrs. Hilado;
that Ragodon told him (Attorney Francisco) upon Attorney
Agrava's request that Agrava thought it more proper to explain
to Mrs. Hilado the reasons why her case was rejected; that he
forthwith signed the letter without reading it and without
keeping it for a minute in his possession; that he never saw Mrs.
Hilado since their last meeting until she talked to him at the
Manila Hotel about a proposed extrajudicial settlement of the
case;
That in January, 1946, Assad was in his office to request him to
handle his case stating that his American lawyer had gone to
the States and left the case in the hands of other attorneys; that
he accepted the retainer and on January 28, 1946, entered his
appearance.
Attorney Francisco filed an affidavit of stenographer Ragodon in
corroboration of his answer.
The judge trying the case, Honorable Jose Gutierrez David, later
promoted to the Court of Appeals, dismissed the complaint. His
Honor believed that no information other than that already
alleged in plaintiff's complaint in the main cause was conveyed
to Attorney Francisco, and concluded that the intercourse
between the plaintiff and the respondent did not attain the point
of creating the relation of attorney and client.
Stripped of disputed details and collateral matters, this much is
undoubted: That Attorney Francisco's law firm mailed to the
plaintiff a written opinion over his signature on the merits of her
case; that this opinion was reached on the basis of papers she
had submitted at his office; that Mrs. Hilado's purpose in
submitting those papers was to secure Attorney Francisco's
professional services. Granting the facts to be no more than
these, we agree with petitioner's counsel that the relation of
attorney and client between Attorney Francisco and Mrs. Hilado
ensued. The following rules accord with the ethics of the legal
profession and meet with our approval:
In order to constitute the relation (of attorney and
client) a professional one and not merely one of
principal and agent, the attorneys must be employed
either to give advice upon a legal point, to prosecute
or defend an action in court of justice, or to prepare
and draft, in legal form such papers as deeds, bills,
contracts and the like. (Atkinson vs. Howlett, 11 Ky.
Law Rep. (abstract), 364; cited in Vol. 88, A. L. R., p.
6.)
To constitute professional employment it is not
essential that the client should have employed the
attorney professionally on any previous occasion. . . .
It is not necessary that any retainer should have been
paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material
that the attorney consulted did not afterward

undertake the case about which the consultation was

had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or
troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his
professional capacity with the view to obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney
voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation,
then the professional employment must be regarded
as established. . . . (5 Jones Commentaries on
Evidence, pp. 4118-4119.)
An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his
professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor-when
he is listening to his client's preliminary statement of
his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as
truly as when he is drawing his client's pleadings, or
advocating his client's cause in open court. (Denver
Tramway Co. vs. Owens, 20 Colo., 107; 36 P., 848.)
Formality is not an essential element of the
employment of an attorney. The contract may be
express or implied and it is sufficient that the advice
and assistance of the attorney is sought and received,
in matters pertinent to his profession. An acceptance
of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney
from his acting in behalf of his client in pursuance of a
request by the latter. (7 C. J. S., 848-849; see Hirach
Bros. and Co. vs. R. E. Kennington Co., 88 A. L. R., 1.)
Section 26 (e), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides that "an
attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined
as to any communication made by the client to him, or his
advice given thereon in the course of professional
employment;" and section 19 (e) of Rule 127 imposes upon an
attorney the duty "to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at
every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client."
There is no law or provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting
attorneys in express terms from acting on behalf of both parties
to a controversy whose interests are opposed to each other, but
such prohibition is necessarily implied in the injunctions above
quoted. (In re De la Rosa, 27 Phil., 258.) In fact the prohibition
derives validity from sources higher than written laws and rules.
As has been aptly said in In re Merron, 22 N. M., 252, L.R.A.,
1917B, 378, "information so received is sacred to the
employment to which it pertains," and "to permit it to be used in
the interest of another, or, worse still, in the interest of the
adverse party, is to strike at the element of confidence which
lies at the basis of, and affords the essential security in, the
relation of attorney and client."
That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were
furnished to Attorney Agrava and that, this being so, no secret
communication was transmitted to him by the plaintiff, would
not vary the situation even if we should discard Mrs. Hilado's
statement that other papers, personal and private in character,
were turned in by her. Precedents are at hand to support the
doctrine that the mere relation of attorney and client ought to
preclude the attorney from accepting the opposite party's
retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information
was received by him from his first client.
The principle which forbids an attorney who has been
engaged to represent a client from thereafter
appearing on behalf of the client's opponent applies
equally even though during the continuance of the
employment nothing of a confidential nature was
revealed to the attorney by the client. (Christian vs.
Waialua Agricultural Co., 30 Hawaii, 553, Footnote 7,
C. J. S., 828.)
Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one
party in litigation, had formerly represented the
adverse party with respect to the same matter

involved in the litigation, the court need not inquire as

to how much knowledge the attorney acquired from
his former during that relationship, before refusing to
permit the attorney to represent the adverse party.
(Brown vs. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286, F. 994.)
In order that a court may prevent an attorney from
appearing against a former client, it is unnecessary
that the ascertain in detail the extent to which the
former client's affairs might have a bearing on the
matters involved in the subsequent litigation on the
attorney's knowledge thereof. (Boyd vs. Second
Judicial Dist. Court, 274 P., 7; 51 Nev., 264.)
This rule has been so strictly that it has been held an
attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot
thereafter act as counsel against his client in the same
general matter, even though, while acting for his
former client, he acquired no knowledge which could
operate to his client's disadvantage in the subsequent
adverse employment. (Pierce vs. Palmer [1910], 31 R.
I., 432; 77 Atl., 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S, 181.)
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great
number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of
entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts.
In the complexity of what is said in the course of the dealings
between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature
suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial,
of other matters that might only further prejudice the
complainant's cause. And the theory would be productive of
other un salutary results. To make the passing of confidential
communication a condition precedent; i.e., to make the
employment conditioned on the scope and character of the
knowledge acquired by an attorney in determining his right to
change sides, would not enhance the freedom of litigants, which
is to be sedulously fostered, to consult with lawyers upon what
they believe are their rights in litigation. The condition would of
necessity call for an investigation of what information the
attorney has received and in what way it is or it is not in conflict
with his new position. Litigants would in consequence be wary in
going to an attorney, lest by an unfortunate turn of the
proceedings, if an investigation be held, the court should accept
the attorney's inaccurate version of the facts that came to him.
"Now the abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause
is by hypothesis an evil which is fatal to the administration of
justice." (John H. Wigmore's Evidence, 1923, Section 2285,
2290, 2291.)
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare
relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing
incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone
to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct,
but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded
suspicion of unprofessional practice. (Strong vs. Int. Bldg., etc.;
Ass'n, 183 Ill., 97; 47 L.R.A., 792.) It is founded on principles of
public policy, on good taste. As has been said in another case,
the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties,
but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper
professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves
attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the
client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.
So without impugning respondent's good faith, we nevertheless
can not sanction his taking up the cause of the adversary of the
party who had sought and obtained legal advice from his firm;
this, not necessarily to prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but
to keep above reproach the honor and integrity of the courts
and of the bar. Without condemning the respondents conduct as
dishonest, corrupt, or fraudulent, we do believe that upon the

admitted facts it is highly in expedient. It had the tendency to

bring the profession, of which he is a distinguished member,
"into public disrepute and suspicion and undermine the integrity
of justice."
There is in legal practice what called "retaining fee," the
purpose of which stems from the realization that the attorney is
disabled from acting as counsel for the other side after he has
given professional advice to the opposite party, even if he
should decline to perform the contemplated services on behalf
of the latter. It is to prevent undue hardship on the attorney
resulting from the rigid observance of the rule that a separate
and independent fee for consultation and advice was conceived
and authorized. "A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an
attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future services, and
induce him to act for the client. It is intended to remunerate
counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of
the opportunity of rendering services to the other and of
receiving pay from him, and the payment of such fee, in the
absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither
made nor received in payment of the services contemplated; its
payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to pay his
attorney for the services which he has retained him to perform."
(7 C.J.S., 1019.)
The defense that Attorney Agrava wrote the letter Exhibit A and
that Attorney Francisco did not take the trouble of reading it,
would not take the case out of the interdiction. If this letter was
written under the circumstances explained by Attorney
Francisco and he was unaware of its contents, the fact remains
that his firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal professional advice
from which, as heretofore demonstrated, emerged the relation
of attorney and client. This letter binds and estop him in the
same manner and to the same degree as if he personally had
written it. An information obtained from a client by a member or
assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm. (6 C.
J., 628; 7 C. J. S., 986.) This is not a mere fiction or an arbitrary
rule; for such member or assistant, as in our case, not only acts
in the name and interest of the firm, but his information, by the
nature of his connection with the firm is available to his
associates or employers. The rule is all the more to be adhered
to where, as in the present instance, the opinion was actually
signed by the head of the firm and carries his initials intended
to convey the impression that it was dictated by him personally.
No progress could be hoped for in "the public policy that the
client in consulting his legal adviser ought to be free from
apprehension of disclosure of his confidence," if the prohibition
were not extended to the attorney's partners, employers or
assistants.
The fact that petitioner did not object until after four months
had passed from the date Attorney Francisco first appeared for
the defendants does not operate as a waiver of her right to ask
for his disqualification. In one case, objection to the appearance
of an attorney was allowed even on appeal as a ground for
reversal of the judgment. In that case, in which throughout the
conduct of the cause in the court below the attorney had been
suffered so to act without objection, the court said: "We are all
of the one mind, that the right of the appellee to make his
objection has not lapsed by reason of failure to make it sooner;
that professional confidence once reposed can never be
divested by expiration of professional employment." (Nickels vs.
Griffin, 1 Wash. Terr., 374, 321 A. L. R. 1316.)
The complaint that petitioner's remedy is by appeal and not by
certiorari deserves scant attention. The courts have summary
jurisdiction to protect the rights of the parties and the public
from any conduct of attorneys prejudicial to the administration
of the justice. The summary jurisdiction of the courts over
attorneys is not confined to requiring them to pay over money
collected by them but embraces authority to compel them to do
whatever specific acts may be incumbent upon them in their
capacity of attorneys to perform. The courts from the general

principles of equity and policy, will always look into the dealings
between attorneys and clients and guard the latter from any
undue consequences resulting from a situation in which they
may stand unequal. The courts acts on the same principles
whether the undertaking is to appear, or, for that matter, not to
appear, to answer declaration, etc. (6 C.J., 718 C.J.S., 1005.)
This summary remedy against attorneys flows from the facts
that they are officers of the court where they practice, forming a
part of the machinery of the law for the administration of justice
and as such subject to the disciplinary authority of the courts
and to its orders and directions with respect to their relations to
the court as well as to their clients. (Charest vs. Bishop, 137
Minn., 102; 162, N.W., 1062, Note 26, 7 C. J. S., 1007.) Attorney
stand on the same footing as sheriffs and other court officers in
respect of matters just mentioned.
We conclude therefore that the motion for disqualification
should be allowed. It is so ordered, without costs.
MA. LUISA HADJULA,
Complainant,
- versus ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA,
Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 of the
Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
relative to the complaint for disbarment filed by herein
complainant Ma. Luisa Hadjula against respondent Atty. Roceles
F. Madianda.
The case started when, in an AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT[1] bearing
date September 7, 2002 and filed with the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline, complainant charged Atty. Roceles F. Madianda
with violation of Article 209[2] of the Revised Penal Code and
Canon Nos. 15.02 and 21.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In said affidavit-complaint, complainant alleged that she and
respondent used to be friends as they both worked at the
Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) whereat respondent was the
Chief Legal Officer while she was the Chief Nurse of the Medical,
Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant claimed that,
sometime in 1998, she approached respondent for some legal
advice. Complainant further alleged that, in the course of their
conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential, she
disclosed personal secrets and produced copies of a marriage
contract, a birth certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to
be informed later by the respondent that she (respondent)
would refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious, so
complainant states, of respondent to have refused handling her
case only after she had already heard her secrets.

Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of

respondent for the latters act of disclosing personal secrets and
confidential information she revealed in the course of seeking
respondents legal advice.
In an order dated October 2, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline required respondent to file her answer to the
complaint.
In her answer, styled as COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT, [5] respondent
denied giving legal advice to the complainant and dismissed
any suggestion about the existence of a lawyer-client
relationship between them. Respondent also stated the
observation that the supposed confidential data and sensitive
documents adverted to are in fact matters of common
knowledge in the BFP. The relevant portions of the answer read:
5. I specifically deny the allegation
of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in
paragraph 4 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT for
reason that she never WAS MY CLIENT nor
we
ever
had
any
LAWYER-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP that ever existed ever since
and that never obtained any legal advice
from me regarding her PERSONAL PROBLEMS
or PERSONAL SECRETS. She likewise never
delivered to me legal documents much more
told me some confidential information or
secrets. That is because I never entertain
LEGAL QUERIES or CONSULTATION regarding
PERSONAL MATTERS since I know as a
LAWYER of the Bureau of Fire Protection that
I am not allowed to privately practice law
and it might also result to CONFLICT OF
INTEREST. As a matter of fact, whenever
there will be PERSONAL MATTERS referred to
me, I just referred them to private law
practitioners and never entertain the same,
NOR listen to their stories or examine or
accept any document.
9. I specifically deny the allegation
of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in
paragraph 8 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT,
the truth of the matter is that her ILLICIT
RELATIONSHIP and her illegal and unlawful
activities are known in the Bureau of Fire
Protection since she also filed CHILD
SUPPORT case against her lover where she
has a child .
Moreover, the alleged DOCUMENTS
she purportedly have shown to me sometime
in 1998, are all part of public records .

Continuing, complainant averred that her friendship with

respondent soured after her filing, in the later part of 2000, of
criminal and disciplinary actions against the latter. What, per
complainants account, precipitated the filing was when
respondent, then a member of the BFP promotion board,
demanded a cellular phone in exchange for the complainants
promotion.

Furthermore, F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C.

HADJULA, is filing the instant case just to get
even with me or to force me to settle and
withdraw the CASES I FILED AGAINST HER
since she knows that she will certainly be
DISMISSED FROM SERVICE, REMOVED FROM
THE PRC ROLL and CRIMINALLY CONVICTED
of her ILLICIT, IMMORAL, ILLEGAL and
UNLAWFUL ACTS.

According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the filing

of the aforesaid actions, filed a COUNTER COMPLAINT [3] with the
Ombudsman charging her (complainant)with violation of Section
3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019,[4] falsification of public documents
and immorality, the last two charges being based on the
disclosures complainant earlier made to respondent. And also
on the basis of the same disclosures, complainant further
stated, a disciplinary case was also instituted against her before
the Professional Regulation Commission.

On October 7, 2004, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP

Commission on Bar Discipline came out with a Report and
Recommendation, stating that the information related by
complainant to the respondent is protected under the attorneyclient privilege communication. Prescinding from this postulate,
the Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have
violated legal ethics when she [revealed] information given to

her during a legal consultation, and accordingly recommended

that respondent be reprimanded therefor, thus:

and the complainant or the non-payment of

the formers fees.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is

respectfully recommended that respondent
Atty. Roceles Madianda be reprimanded for
revealing the secrets of the complainant.

Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the

existence of the attorney-client privilege communication, viz:

On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued

Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 reading as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE,
as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report
and
Recommendation
of
the
Investigating Commissioner of the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex A; and , finding the
recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering the actuation of
revealing information given to respondent
during a legal consultation, Atty. Roceles
Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED.

We AGREE with the recommendation and the premises holding

it together.
As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer
who incidentally was also then a friend, to bare what she
considered personal secrets and sensitive documents for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice and assistance. The moment
complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek
legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved
between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer
certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the
profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that which
enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate
confidential information acquired or revealed during legal
consultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the day, not
inclined to handle the clients case is hardly of consequence. Of
little moment, too, is the fact that no formal professional
engagement follows the consultation.Nor will it make any
difference that no contract whatsoever was executed by the
parties to memorialize the relationship. As we said in Burbe v.
Magulta,[6] A lawyer-client relationship was
established from the very first moment
complainant asked respondent for legal
advise regarding the formers business. To
constitute professional employment, it is not
essential that the client employed the
attorney professionally on any previous
occasion.
It is not necessary that any retainer
be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not
afterward handle the case for which his
service had been sought.
It a person, in respect to business
affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a
lawyer with a view to obtaining professional
advice or assistance, and the attorney
voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the
consultation,
then
the
professional
employments is established.

(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought

(2) from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such, (3) the communications
relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his
instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor,
(8) except the protection be waived.[7]
With the view we take of this case, respondent indeed breached
his
duty
of
preserving
the
confidence
of
a
client. As found by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, the
documents shown and the information revealed in confidence to
the respondent in the course of the legal consultation in
question, were used as bases in the criminal and administrative
complaints lodged against the complainant.
The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect
the client from possible breach of confidence as a result of a
consultation with a lawyer.
The seriousness of the respondents offense notwithstanding,
the Court feels that there is room for compassion, absent
compelling evidence that the respondent acted with illwill.Without meaning to condone the error of respondents ways,
what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends
becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges
against each other using whatever convenient tools and data
were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal information
respondent gathered from her conversation with complainant
became handy in her quest to even the score. At the end of the
day, it appears clear to us that respondent was actuated by the
urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the process of
giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule
on confidentiality.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda is
hereby REPRIMANDED and admonished to be circumspect in
her handling of information acquired as a result of a lawyerclient relationship. She is also STERNLY WARNED against
a repetition of the same or similar act complained of.
G.R. No. 97351 February 4, 1992
RAMON
A.
GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Solicitor
General,
PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION
ON
GOOD
GOVERNMENT, and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
In the instant petition for mandamus and prohibition with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, petitioner
submits for the Court's adjudication the twin issues of whether
or not the Solicitor General neglected his public duty by
withdrawing as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines and
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in
cases he had filed in court and whether or not the PCGG acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in hiring private lawyers as a
result of such withdrawal of appearance.

Likewise,
a
lawyer-client
relationship exists notwithstanding the close
personal relationship between the lawyer

Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, as a citizen taxpayer, filed the

petition as a class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court on the ground that the subject matters involved are of
common and general interest to all Filipino citizens and
taxpayers as they pertain to the enforcement of a public duty
and the prevention of unlawful expenditure of public funds.
According to the petitioner, the Solicitor General is the counsel
for the Republic and the PCGG in thirty-three (33) cases before
this Court, one hundred nine (109) cases in the Sandiganbayan,
one (1) case in the National Labor Relations Commission and
another case in the Municipal Trial Court or a total of one
hundred forty-four (144) cases. 1 In December 1990, the
Solicitor General withdrew as counsel in said cases through a
pleading
entitled
"Withdrawal
of
Appearance
with
Reservation." 2 The pleading states:
The SOLICITOR GENERAL, to this Honorable
Court, hereby respectfully withdraws as
counsel for plaintiff Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) in the abovecaptioned case, with the reservation,
however, conformably with Presidential
Decree No. 478, the provisions of Executive
Order No. 292 as well as the decisional law of
"Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, et al.,"
(G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990), to
submit
his
comment/observation
on
incidents/matters
pending
with
this
Honorable
Court,
if
called
for
by
circumstances in the interest of the
government or if he is so required by the
court.
Makati, Metro Manila, December 3, 1990
The Solicitor General filed a substantially
similar pleading in the cases where the
Republic is a party.
As a result of such withdrawal of appearance, the PCGG hired
forty (40) private lawyers, nineteen (19) of whom are trial
lawyers. They would receive a monthly compensation of at least
P10,000.00 plus appearance fee of P1,700.00 in actual trial
and/or P500.00 if trial is postponed. 3
Petitioner contends that since the Solicitor General's withdrawal
of appearance was made without any reason, it implied that it
was "within the absolute discretion" of said public official.
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478 and Section 35 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, however, mandatorily require the
Solicitor General to stand in the place of, and act for the
Republic and the PCGG in court. Therefore, the Solicitor General
has "no discretion to reject by withdrawing" as counsel for said
entities.
Applying the ruling of this Court with respect to a fiscal
in Sta. Rosa Mining Co. v. Zabala, 4 the petitioner further states
that: "Similarly, it is the duty of the Solicitor General to appear
for the Republic and the PCGG, hence regardless of his personal
convictions or opinions, he must proceed to discharge his duty
(not withdraw, which is equivalent to refusal to prosecute), and
let the court decide the merits of the case." 5
Moreover, petitioner avers that the Solicitor General cannot
withdraw his appearance "with reservation" nor can he file his
"comment/observation on the incident/matters" after such
withdrawal because by ceasing to appear as counsel, he loses
his standing in court. Unless a case involves the
constitutionality of a treaty, law, ordinance or executive order
for which Rule 3 Section 23 of the Rules of Court 6 mandates his
appearance, the Solicitor General is not authorized to appear

therein after his withdrawal as counsel inasmuch as he himself

is not a party-litigant.
Furthermore, under Section 26, of Rule 138, 7 the Solicitor
General may not unilaterally withdraw his appearance without
the consent of the Republic or the PCGG unless the court
authorizes his withdrawal. Since there was no such court
authority, the Solicitor General's withdrawal of appearance in
said several cases is null and void, as it constitutes an act
against a mandatory law and hence, it may be attacked
collaterally. Neither may the Solicitor General withdraw on the
authority of Orbos v. Civil Service Commission 8 wherein this
Court held:
In the discharge of this task the Solicitor
General must see to it that the best interest
of the government is upheld within the limits
set by law. . .
xxx xxx xxx
There are cases where a government agency
declines the services of the Solicitor General
or otherwise fails or refuses to forward the
papers of the case to him for appropriate
action. . .
The Court finds and so holds that this
practice should be stopped. To repeat, the
Solicitor General is the lawyer of the
government, any of its agents and officials in
any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of a lawyer.
The exception is when such officials or
agents are being charged criminally or are
being civilly sued for damages arising from a
felony. His
services cannot
be
lightly
rejected, much less ignored by the officer or
officials concerned.
Indeed, the assistance of the Solicitor
General should be welcomed by the parties.
He should be given full support and
cooperation by any agency or official
involved in litigation. He should be enabled
to faithfully discharge his duties and
responsibilities as the government advocate.
And he should do no less for his clients. His
burden of assisting in the fair and just
administration of justice is clear.
This Court does not expect the Solicitor
General to waver in the performance of his
duty. As a matter of fact, the Court
appreciates the participation of the Solicitor
General in many proceedings and his
continued fealty to his assigned task. He
should not therefore desist from appearing
before this Court even in those cases he
finds his opinion inconsistent with the
government or any of its agents he is
expected to represent. The Court must be
advised of his position just as well.
(Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner adds the following observations:

Therefore, this case militates more against

the Solicitor General than in his favor. For if
the government and its officials cannot reject
the services of the Solicitor General, neither

may the latter select the case he would

represent by withdrawing in some and
retaining others. For unlike private lawyers
who are bound to their clients by contract
and, therefore, can reject cases offered to
them, the Solicitor General and PCGG are
wedded to each other by statute for better
and for worse. And only a divorce, through
the abolition of PCGG or resignation of the
Solicitor General, can untie the marital knot.
Otherwise, the relationship should continue
sans PCGG demurring, and the Solicitor
General
withdrawing.
Absent
such
resignation or abolition, the Solicitor General
has to prosecute or defend the said cases to
the best of his ability.
Hence, petitioner contends, the PCGG acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction in hiring private lawyers as substitutes for the
Solicitor General. Nowhere in Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and 14
does it appear that the PCGG is authorized to hire said lawyers.
Since the Solicitor General is named by law as the lawyer for all
government agencies, the hiring of private lawyers by such
agencies is impliedly excluded. Thus, by employing private
lawyers, the PCGG is creating a public office and naming a
public officer. However, in the absence of a law providing for the
creation of the office of PCGG counsel, said hired lawyers are
usurpers or intruders whose acts may be challenged in a
collateral proceeding such as an action for prohibition.
Similarly, petitioner asserts, prohibition will lie against the
Commission on Audit considering that any payment for the
services of the PCGG-hired lawyers would result in an unlawful
expenditure of public funds. Stressing the need to preserve
the status quo until the determination of his rights as a citizen
and taxpayer, petitioner prays for the issuance of temporary
restraining order.
Acting on the petition, however, the Court required the
respondent to file their respective comments on the petition
without granting the prayer for a temporary restraining order. 10
In its comment, the Commission on Audit (COA) alleges that it
has not allowed the disbursement of funds to pay for the
services of PCGG-hired private lawyers. It points out the fact
that under COA Circular No. 89-299 dated March 21, 1989, the
COA has withdrawn the pre-audit of transactions entered into by
national government agencies pursuant to the constitutional
provision that the COA has the exclusive authority to "define the
scope of its audit and examination, to establish the techniques
and methods required therefor." 11 Neither has the COA allowed
in post-audit the disbursements of funds in payment of the
services of the hired private lawyers. Moreover, under COA
Circular No. 86-255 dated April 2, 1986, the hiring of private
lawyers by government agencies and instrumentalities is
prohibited unless there is prior written conformity of the
Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the
case may be, as well as the written concurrence of COA.
For its part, the PCGG, through Commissioner Maximo A.
Maceren and lawyer Eliseo B. Alampay, asserts in its comment
that the scope of its authority under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2
and 14 is broad enough to include the authority to engage the
services of private lawyers, if necessary, for the fulfillment of its
mandate. While such authority is not expressly stated in said
executive orders, "it must be deemed necessarily implied in and
subsumed under the expressly enumerated powers of the
Commission." 12
The PCGG contends that its power under Section 1 of Executive
Order No. 14 to "file and prosecute all cases investigated by it"
includes "the grant of discretion to the Commission in

determining the manner of filing and prosecuting its cases

including the matter of who, in particular, will control and
supervise the prosecution of said cases." The phrase "with the
assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General and other
government agencies" simply means that the Solicitor General
is called upon to render assistance to the PCGG and whether or
not such discretion is required by the Commission is a matter of
discretion on its part. Such provision does not preclude the
PCGG from engaging the services of private lawyers in the same
way that it is "clearly authorized to hire accountants, appraisers,
researchers and other professionals as it performs its functions."
Since, upon the dictates of legal and practical necessity, it has
hired lawyers in the United States and in Switzerland, "it may
similarly hire Filipino lawyers in prosecuting its Philippine
cases." 13
The PCGG further asserts that the hiring of private lawyers is
"not an ultra vires" act but a "means by which (it) can
effectively exercise its powers." It emphasizes the fact that it
hired private lawyers "only after the Officer of the Solicitor
General had unilaterally withdrawn its appearance" for the
PCGG in the various pending PCGG-instituted cases. Its own
Litigation Division, which was constituted after the Solicitor
General's withdrawal, is "sorely undermanned" but it has to
contend with "affluent and influential individuals and entities"
who can "afford to hire skilled lawyers and organize vast
litigation networks." The PCGG tried to seek the assistance of
the Department of Justice and the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel but only the former sent two additional
prosecutors to handle its cases. 14
The PCGG clarifies that its powers are circumscribed not only by
the executive orders aforementioned but also by the inherent
police power of the State. By hiring private lawyers, it was
merely trying to assist the President of the Philippines in
protecting the interest of the State. As such, it was acting as
an alter ego of the President and therefore, it was the Executive
which determined the necessity of engaging the services of
private prosecutors. Contending that "overwhelming necessity"
impelled it to hire private lawyers, the PCGG avers that
inasmuch as the Central Bank of the Philippines or the Philippine
National Bank may engage the services of private lawyers, with
more reason may it be allowed to hire private prosecutors after
it was abandoned by the Solicitor General in the prosecution of
the ill-gotten wealth cases. Consequently, "the Solicitor
General's withdrawal of assistance is tantamount to his tacit
approval of the PCGG's hiring of private prosecutors in
replacement of the solicitors handling the said civil cases." 15
The PCGG concludes that the reasonableness of the
compensation for its hired lawyers can hardly be questioned
considering the expertise of said lawyers and the complexity of
the cases they would be handling for the PCGG. Thus, the
prayer for a preliminary injunction must be denied otherwise
"the harm that would be done would be far greater than the
perceived mischief petitioner seeks to prevent." 16
Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez inhibits himself from
appearing in this case "considering that as far as the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG for brevity) is concerned, the subject
is a closed matter among the OSG, the PCGG and the
Courts." 17 In the comment filed by Assistant Solicitor General
Edgardo L. Kilayko and Solicitor Iderlina P. Pagunuran, the OSG
sets out at length the history of the PCGG from its creation until
the filing in the Sandiganbayan of thirty-nine (39) " prima
facie cases" for ill-gotten wealth against former President
Marcos and his cronies. As suits and countersuits stemmed from
the original thirty-nine (39) civil cases, "the OSG had been put
to a tremendous task and thus invariably in urgent need of
being consulted or informed by the PCGG of the facts and
circumstances material to the prosecution and progress not only
of the original 39 civil cases, but also of all kinds of "incidents."

Nonetheless, the OSG lawyers faced the challenge and the odds
if only to live up to their task as "the best lawyers there are in
the country." The OSG further explains: 18
On many a time, however a time, however,
the lack of the above-mentioned consultation
or information resulted in situations that
rendered the OSG unavoidably incapable of
performing its functions and duties as
Lawyer of the Government, not only as
mandated upon it by law and as spelled out
in Orbos v. CSC, G.R. No. 92561, September
12, 1990, but also in consonance with its
office motto: "Integrity In Advocacy."
Once
the
OSG
argued
before
the
Sandiganbayan that an asset was under
sequestration, only to be informed by the
adverse party waving a document before the
Sandiganbayan
Justices
that
the
sequestration had earlier been lifted, with a
PCGG resolution, the document, to boot
(Razon case). Then, again, OSG argued, even
before this Honorable Court, that an illgotten
asset
had
"mysteriously"
disappeared, only to be informed by the
Honorable Court, that a PCGG Commissioner
had earlier by resolution authorized the
disposition of the asset (COCOFED case). All
the instances need not be enumerated here,
as they are not meat and substance, even as
OSG is rendered thereby a laughing stock in
its professionalism.
As to matters that are of great pith and
moment, suffice it to say that the recent
Benedicto "compromise" agreement, not to
mention
the
SMC-UCPB
Compromise
settlement,
is sub
judice or
under
advisement not only of the Sandiganbayan
but also of this Honorable Court in separate
"incidents," and suffice it to state that the
relationship,
obtaining
between
the
Government offices/agencies and the Office
of the Solicitor General as counsel, is not at
all like one that simply would obtain between
private client and private lawyer in private
practice, although constant consultation and
advice are sine qua non in both types of
relationship. The relationship is rather one,
created as it is by law, where imposed upon
OSG is the responsibility to present to the
courts the position that will uphold the best
interests of the People, the Government and
the State, albeit the same may run counter
to its client's position or route of action. At
any rate, the PCGG through nationwide TV
broadcast
and
print
media,
publicly
announced that PCGG had disposed with or
otherwise did not need the legal services of
the Lawyer of the Government, and thus
OSG descended, not the unmerited remark
of having "abandoned" the ill-gotten wealth
cases, but the time-honored principle
of impossibilium nulla obligatio est, i.e., there
is no obligation to do impossible things (Lim
Co Chui v. Paredes, 47 Phil. 463), without in
any way casting any aspersion on the moral
integrity of any Commissioner or PCGG
official, as made clear by the Solicitor
General to the President in a meeting with
PCGG.

Hence, in the light of all the foregoing

circumstances, at rock-bottom precisely so
as not to prejudice "the interest of the
Government" (Orbos), the Solicitor General
withdrew as counsel for PCGG in all said
cases by filing a notice of "Withdrawal of
Appearance with Reservation."
In arguing that the instant petition should be dismissed, the
OSG contends that this case has become moot and academic as
this very Court had resolved to allow the withdrawal of
appearance of the Solicitor General in all the cases pending
before it "with reservation, conformably with PD No. 478,
Executive Order No. 292, as well as the doctrine laid down in
'Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, et al.,' G.R. No. 92561,
September 12, 1990, . . ." 19 For its part, the Sandiganbayan had
also resolved that "the appearance of the Solicitor General is
deemed withdrawn to be substituted by the PCGG's legal
panel." 20
The OSG maintains further that the instant petition does not
present a case and controversy as the petitioner himself does
not even have a "court standing" and a "litigable interest." All
the petitioner seeks is an "advisory opinion." The OSG asserts
that the "incident" (referring to the Solicitor General's
withdrawal of appearance) should be distinguished from that
in JPC Enterprise, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 21 wherein the
Assets Privatization Trust (APT) decided to appear for itself
because the law names the Minister of Justice only as its ex
oficiolegal adviser while by itself it can file suits and institute
proceedings and engage external expertise in the fulfillment of
its tasks. However, since the APT has no personality of its own,
it should have appeared through the Solicitor General. The OSG
argues that said "adversarial incident" is not present in this
case.
In his reply to the comments of the PCGG and the OSG, the
petitioner insists that although as between the Solicitor General
and the PCGG, this case may have been rendered moot and
academic, as between him on the one hand and the Solicitor
General and the PCGG on the other hand, a "real controversy"
still exists and the issues raised herein have not ceased to exist
either.
Moreover,
a
judgment
of
prohibition
and mandamus would have a "practical legal effect and can be
enforced." 22
Citing Miguel v. Zulueta, 23 and Taada v. Tuvera, 24 petitioner
asserts that he has a standing in court because where a
question of public right is involved and the object of
the mandamus is the enforcement of a public duty, the relator
need not show any legal or special interest in the result of the
proceeding. It is sufficient that, as a citizen, he is interested in
having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced.
The petitioner rebuts the PCGG's contention that its power to
hire private lawyers may be implied from its expressly
enumerated powers. He asserts that since P.D. No. 478
mandates that "the Solicitor General as law office of the
government with the duty to appear for the PCGG," no
implication from the express powers of (the) PCGG can stand
against the language of P.D. No. 478. On the other hand, the law
regarding the PCGG and that regarding the Solicitor General
should be harmonized. 25
The Court considers these pleadings sufficient bases for
resolving this petition and, on account of the importance and
imperativeness of the issues raised herein, the filing of
memoranda by the parties is dispensed with.
We shall, first of all, confront a preliminary issue interposed by
the OSG whether or not this case has been rendered moot
and academic by this Court's resolution granting the Solicitor

General's motion to withdraw appearance as counsel in the

several cases pending herein. It should be clarified that the
resolution had to be issued with the national interest in mind.
Time was of the essence and any hedging on the part of the
PCGG and/or its counsel could, not merely set back but
prejudice, the government's all-out efforts to recover ill-gotten
wealth.

whenever he deems it for the interest of the

Philippine Government, either in person
conduct and argue any case in any court of
the Philippine Islands in which the Philippine
Government is interested or may direct the
Solicitor General to do so. (Emphasis
supplied)

Notwithstanding the ostensible mootness of the issues raised in

a case, this Court has never shirked from its symbolic function
of educating bench and bar by formulating guiding and
controlling principles, precepts, doctrines and rules. 26 More so,
if the case is of such magnitude that certain legal ambiguities
must be unravelled for the protection of the national interest. 27

Six months later, a law was passed reorganizing the Office of

the Attorney-General and providing for the appointment of the
said official and the Solicitor General by the Civil Governor and
for an increase in their salaries. Their duties remained basically
the same. 30

To allow the transcendental issue of whether the OSG may

withdraw its appearance in a cluster of cases of national import
to pass into legal limbo simply because it has been "mooted"
would be a clear case of misguided judicial self-restraint. This
Court has assiduously taken every opportunity to lay down brick
by brick the doctrinal infrastructure of our legal system.
Certainly, this is no time for a display of judicial timorousness of
the kind which the Solicitor General is untimely exhibiting now.
Accordingly, we confront the issue conscious of their farreaching implications, not alone on the instant case but on
future ones as well, which the OSG will surely be called upon to
handle again and again.
The resolution of the first issue laid down at the beginning of
this ponencia hinges on whether or not the Solicitor General
may be compelled by mandamus to appear for the Republic and
the PCGG. This issue is best resolved by a close scrutiny of the
nature and extent of the power and authority lodged by law on
the Solicitor General.
At this juncture, a flashback on the statutory origins of the
Office of the Solicitor General is in order. Incorporated in Act No.
136
dated
June
11,
1901 28 providing for the organization of courts in the Philippine
Islands was Chapter III entitled "The Attorney General." Section
40 states:
There shall be an Attorney-General for the
Philippine Islands, to be appointed by the
Philippine Commission . . .
The catalog of his duties includes the following:
He shall prosecute or defend therein all
causes, civil and criminal, to which the
Government of the Philippine Islands, or any
officer thereof, in his official capacity, is a
party . . . 29
Section 41 further provides:
There shall be an officer learned in the law to
assist
the
Attorney-General
in
the
performance of all his duties, called the
Solicitor-General who shall be appointed by
the Commission . . . In case of a vacancy in
the office of Attorney-General, or of his
absence or disability, the Solicitor-General
shall have power to exercise the duties of
that office. Under the supervision of the
Attorney-General, it shall be the especial
duty of the Solicitor-General to conduct and
argue suits and appeals in the Supreme
Court, in which the Philippine Government is
interested, and the Attorney-General may,

In the meantime, Act No. 222 was passed on September 5, 1901

providing for the organization of, among others, the Department
of Finance and Justice which embraced within its executive
control the Bureau of Justice. 31
Under Act No. 2711, otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1917, the Bureau of Justice is specifically constituted
"the law office of the Government of the Philippine Islands and
by it shall be performed duties requiring the services of a law
officer." 32 Its chief officials are the Attorney-General and his
assistant, the Solicitor General. 33
As principal law officer of the Government,
the Attorney-General shall have authority to
act for and represent the Government of the
Philippine Islands, its officers, and agents in
any official investigation, proceeding, or
matter requiring the services of a lawyer. 34
In 1932, the office of the Attorney-General was phased out and
his
functions
were
assumed
by
the
Secretary
of
Justice. 35 Subsequently, the Bureau of Justice came to be
known as the Office of the Solicitor General, 36 headed by the
Solicitor General. 37
Parenthetically, these institutions were patterned after the
Office of Attorney-General, created by the First U.S. Congress in
the Judiciary Act of 1789 which called for a "meet person,
learned in the law, to act as Attorney-General for the
U.S." 38 When the Department of Justice was established in
1870, the position of Solicitor-General was created as an
assistant to the Attorney-General. 39 Over a century later, their
respective positions and functions remain the same. The
Attorney-General of the United States, appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, is now the
head of the Department of Justice. 40 In the same manner, a
Solicitor General, learned in the law, is appointed to assist the
Attorney-General in the performance of his duties. 41
In contrast, the Solicitor-General of the Philippines, emerging
from the shadow of the Attorney-General and later, of the
Secretary of Justice, has come to his own. On July 20, 1948,
Republic Act. No. 335, amending Section 1659 of the
Administrative Code, bestowed on him the rank of
Undersecretary of a Department. Subsequently, a series of
amendatory laws designed to enlarge the complement of the
Office of the Solicitor General was enacted 42 until on June 4,
1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 478, its pivotal role in
the government became clearly defined and delineated.
During the martial law years, President Ferdinand E. Marcos
leaned heavily on his Solicitor General to provide legal
underpinnings of his official acts. Reflective of the tremendously
enhanced power of the official and the position was Executive
Order No. 454 enacted on September 23, 1975, conferring upon
the Solicitor General the rank of a member of the Cabinet "with
all the rights, honors and privileges pertaining to the position."
Said executive order was superseded by Executive Order No.

473 dated August 12, 1976 "making the Solicitor General a

member of the Cabinet." These executive orders were capped
by Executive Order No. 552 dated August 14, 1979 elevating
the OSG into a Ministry with the same powers and functions
defined in P.D. Nos. 478 and 1347.
P.D. 478 became, as it were, the Magna Carta of the Office of
the Solicitor General. After the change of administration, or on
July 25, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law
Executive Order No. 292 instituting the Administrative Code of
1987. Under Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof, the Office of
the Solicitor General is described as an "independent and
autonomous office attached to the Department of Justice."
Headed by the Solicitor General, "who is the principal law officer
and legal defender of the Government," the Office shall have a
Legal Staff composed of fifteen (15) Assistant Solicitors General
and such number of Solicitors and Trial Attorneys "as may be
necessary to operate the Office which shall divided into fifteen
(15) divisions. 43 Among its powers and functions are the
following which are relevant to the issues:
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. The office
of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies
and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation,
proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services
of a lawyer. When authorized by the
President or head of the office concerned, it
shall also represent government owned or
controlled corporations. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law
office of the Government, and, as such, shall
discharge duties requiring the services of a
lawyer. (Emphasis supplied.) It shall have the
following specific powers and functions:
(1)
Represent
the
Government
in
the
Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals in all
criminal
proceedings;
represent
the
Government
and
its
officers in the Supreme
Court,
the
Court
of
Appeals, and all other
courts or tribunals in all
civil actions and special
proceedings in which the
Government or any officer
thereof in his official
capacity is a party.
(2) Investigate, initiate
court action, or in any
manner proceed against
any person, corporation
or
firm
for
the
enforcement
of
any
contract,
bond,
guarantee,
mortgage,
pledge or other collateral
executed in favor of the
Government.
Where
proceedings are to be
conducted outside of the
Philippines, the Solicitor
General
may
employ
counsel to assist in the
discharge
of
the
aforementioned
responsibilities.

xxx xxx xxx

(8) Deputize legal officers
of
government
departments,
bureaus,
agencies and offices to
assist
the
Solicitor
General and appear or
represent
the
Government
in
cases
involving their respective
offices, brought before
the courts and exercise
supervision and control
over such legal Officers
with respect to such
cases.
(9)
Call
on
any
department,
bureau,
office,
agency
or
instrumentality
of
the
Government
for
such
service, assistance and
cooperation as may be
necessary in fulfilling its
function
and
responsibilities and for
this purpose enlist the
services
of
any
government official or
employees in the pursuit
of his tasks.
Departments,
bureaus,
agencies,
offices,
instrumentalities
and
corporations to whom the
Office of the Solicitor
General
renders
legal
services are authorized to
disburse funds from their
sundry
operating
and
other funds for the latter
Office. For this purpose,
the Solicitor General and
his staff are specifically
authorized
to
receive
allowances as may be
provided
by
the
Government
offices,
instrumentalities
and
corporations concerned,
in addition to their regular
compensation.
(10) Represent, upon the
instructions
of
the
President of the Republic
of the Philippines in
international
litigations,
negotiations
or
conferences where the
legal position of the
Republic
must
be
defended or presented.
(11) Act for the Republic
and/or the people before
any court, tribunal, body
or commission in any
matter,
action
or
proceeding which, in his

10

opinion , affects the

welfare of the people as
the ends of justice may
require; and
(12) Perform such other
functions as may be
provided by law. 44
In thus tracing the origins of the Office of the Solicitor General
to gain a clear understanding of the nature of the functions and
extent of the powers of the Solicitor General himself, it is
evident that a policy decision was made in the early beginnings
to consolidate in one official the discharge of legal functions and
services in the government. These took the form mostly of
representing the Government in various legal proceedings.
The rationale behind this step is not difficult to comprehend.
Sound government operations require consistency in legal
policies and practices among the instrumentalities of the State.
Moreover, an official learned in the law and skilled in advocacy
could best plan and coordinate the strategies and moves of the
legal battles of the different arms of the government. Surely,
the economy factor, too, must have weighed heavily in arriving
at such a decision.
It is patent that the intent of the lawmaker was to give the
designated official, the Solicitor General, in this case, the
unequivocal mandate to appear for the government in legal
proceedings. Spread out in the laws creating the office is the
discernible intent which may be gathered from the term "shall,"
which is invariably employed, from Act No. 136 (1901) to the
more recent Executive Order No. 292 (1987).
Under the principles of statutory construction, so familiar even
to law students, the term "shall" is nothing if not mandatory.
In common or ordinary parlance and in its
ordinary significance, the term "shall" is a
word of command, and one which has always
and which must be given a compulsory
meaning, and it is generally imperative or
mandatory. It has the invariable significance
of operating to impose a duty which may be
enforced, particularly if public policy is in
favor of this meaning or when public interest
is involved, or where the public or persons
have rights which ought to be exercised or
enforced, unless a contrary intent appears. 45
The presumption is that the word "shall" in a
statute is used in an imperative, and not in a
directory, sense. If a different interpretations
if sought, it must rest upon something in the
character of the legislation or in the context
which will justify a different meaning. 46
Exactly what is the signification of the mandate for the OSG
"to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies
and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigations or matter requiring the
services of the lawyer?"
To "represent" is standing in place, supplying
the place, or performing the duties or
exercising
the
rights,
of
the
party
represented; to speak or act with authority
on behalf of another; to conduct and control
proceedings in court on behalf of another. 47

The decision of this Court as early as 1910 with respect to the

duties of Attorney-General well applies to the Solicitor General
under the facts of the present case. The Court then declared:
In this jurisdiction, it is the duty of the
Attorney General "to perform the duties
imposed upon him by law" and "he shall
prosecute all causes, civil and criminal, to
which the Government of the Philippines
Islands, or any officer thereof, in his official
capacity, is a party . . ." 48
Being a public officer, the Solicitor General is "invested with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to
be exercised by him for the benefit of the public." 49 Another
role of the Solicitor General is an officer of the Court, in which
case he is called upon "to share in the task and responsibility of
dispensing justice and resolving disputes;" therefore, he may be
enjoined in the same manner that a special prosecutor was
sought enjoined by this Court from committing any act which
may tend to "obstruct, pervert or impede and degrade the
administration of justice." 50
In one case where a fiscal manifested before the trial court that
he would not prosecute the case in court for insufficiency of
evidence after his motion to dismiss had been denied, this Court
granted a petition for mandamusto compel him to prosecute the
case. We declared:
Notwithstanding his personal convictions or
opinions, the fiscal must proceed with his
duty of presenting evidence to the Court to
enable the court to arrive at its own
independent judgment as to the culpability
of the accused. The fiscal should not shirk
from his responsibility much less leave the
prosecution of the case at the hands of a
private prosecutor . . . In the trial of criminal
cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor
to appear for the government since an
offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of
the State . . . This is so because "the
prosecuting officer is the representative not
of an ordinary party to a controversy but of a
sovereignty where obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligations
to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in criminal prosecution is not that
it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the
two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer. 51
Undoubtedly, the above arguments apply equally well to the
Solicitor General who is sought to be compelled to appear
before the different courts to ensure that the case of the
Republic of the Philippines against those who illegally amassed
wealth at the expense the people maybe made to account for
their misdeeds and return said wealth.
Like the Attorney-General of the United States who has absolute
discretion in choosing whether to prosecute or not to prosecute
or to abandon a prosecution already started, 52 our own Solicitor
General may even dismiss, abandon, discontinue or
compromise suit either with or without stipulations with other
party. 53 Abandonment of a case, however, does not mean that
the Solicitor General may just drop it without any legal and valid
reason for the discretion given him is not unlimited. 54 Its
exercise must be, not only within the parameters set by law but
with the best interest of the State as the ultimate goal. Such are
reflected in its policies, thus:

11

The discretionary power of the attorney for

the United States in determining whether a
prosecution
shall
be
commenced
or
maintained may well depend upon matters
of policy wholly apart from any question of
probable cause. Although as member of the
bar, the Attorney for the United States is an
officer of the court, he is nevertheless an
executive official of the Government, and it is
as an officer of the executive department
that he exercises a discretion as to whether
or not there shall be a prosecution in a
particular case. . . . 55
The first executive order ever issued by President Aquino on
February 28, 1986, created the PCGG. It announced the
government's policy of recovering all ill-gotten wealth amassed
by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and
close associates. It charged the PCGG with the "task of assisting
the President" in regard to the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth,
investigation of "such cases of graft and corruption as the
President may assign" to it, and the adoption of safeguards to
ensure that corruption may not be again committed with
impunity.
This issuance was followed by Executive Order No. 2 dated
March 12, 1986 freezing all assets and properties of Marcos, his
family and cronies; prohibiting their transfer, conveyance,
encumbrance or concealment, and requiring all persons in and
outside of the Philippines who are in possession of said
properties to make full disclosure of the same to the PCGG.
On April 11, 1986, the PCGG promulgated its Rules and
Regulations. A pertinent provision states:
Sec. 10. Findings of the Commission.
Based on the evidence adduced, the
Commission shall determine whether there is
reasonable ground to believe that the asset,
property or business enterprise in question
constitute ill-gotten wealth as described in
Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2. In the event
of an affirmative finding, the Commission
shall certify the case to the Solicitor General
for appropriate action in accordance with
law. Business, properties, funds, and other
assets found to be lawfully acquired shall be
immediately released and the writ of
sequestration, hold or freeze orders lifted
accordingly. (Emphasis supplied)
Thereafter, or on May 7, 1986, Executive Order No. 14 defining
the jurisdiction over cases involving such ill-gotten wealth was
issued, it contains the following provisions:
Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding,
the
Presidential
Commission on Good Government, with the
assistance of the Solicitor General and other
government agencies, is hereby empowered
to file and prosecute all cases investigated
by it under Executive Order No. 1, dated
February 28, 1986, and Executive Order No.
2, dated March 12, 1986, as may be
warranted by its finding.
Sec. 2. The Presidential Commission on Good
Government shall file all such cases, whether
civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan,
which shall have exclusive and original
jurisdiction thereof.

Sec. 3. Civil suits for restitution, reparation of

damages,
or
indemnification
for
consequential
damages,
forfeiture
proceedings provided for under Republic Act
No. 1379, or any other civil actions under the
Civil Code or other existing laws, in
connection with Executive Order No. 2 dated
March 12, 1986, may be filed separately
from and proceed independently of any
criminal proceedings and may be proved by
a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis
supplied).
All these legal provisions ineluctably lead to no other conclusion
but that under the law of its creation and the complementary
Rules, the law office of the PCGG, as it is for the rest of the
Government, is the Office of the Solicitor General. Although the
PCGG is "empowered to file and prosecute all cases investigated
by it" under Executive Orders No. 1 and 2, it does not thereby
oust the Office of the Solicitor General from its lawful mandate
to represent the Government and its agencies in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a
lawyer. Moreover, such express grant of power to PCGG does
not imply that it may abdicate such power and turn over the
prosecution of the cases to private lawyers whom it may decide
to employ. In those instances where proceedings are to be
conducted outside of the Philippines, the Solicitor General,
continuing to discharge his duties, may employ counsel to assist
him, 56 particularly because he may not be licensed to appear
before the courts in a foreign jurisdiction.
Under its own Rules and Regulations, specifically the provision
aforequoted, the PCGG certifies to the Solicitor General the
cases for which it had found reasonable ground to believe that
certain assets and properties are ill-gotten under Executive
Order Nos. 1 and 2. The Solicitor General shall then proceed "in
accordance with law."
Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General
exercises his discretion in the management of the case. He may
start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action
in court or he may opt not to file the case at all. He may do
everything within his legal authority but always conformably
with the national interest and the policy of the government on
the matter at hand.
After filing a case, he may even move for its dismissal in the
event that, along the way, he realizes that prosecuting the case
would not serve the government's purposes. In other words,
because he was appointed to the position on account of his
qualification as a man "learned in the law," the Solicitor General
is obligated to perform his functions and to perform them well.
He may not, however, abdicate his function through an arbitrary
exercise of his discretion. We find that a withdrawal of
appearance on flimsy or petty grounds is tantamount to
withdrawing on no grounds at all and to a dereliction of duty.
The Office of the Solicitor General repeatedly invoked the ruling
in Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, 57 which hardly constitutes
authority to uphold its position with respect to the withdrawal of
the Solicitor General in the instant case. On the contrary, in said
case, this Court struck down private respondent's motion to
disqualify the OSG from appearing for petitioner Department of
Transportation and Communications Secretary Orbos. At the risk
of being repetitious, the parties were reminded that under
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478
The
Office
of
the
Solicitor
General shall represent the Government of
the
Philippines,
its
agencies
and
instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in
any
litigation,
proceeding,

12

investigation, or matter requiring the

services of a lawyer. (Emphasis supplied)
This Court clarified that even when "confronted with a situation
where one government office takes an adverse position against
another government agency, as in this case, the Solicitor
General should not refrain from performing his duty as the
lawyer of the government. It is incumbent upon him to present
to the court what he considers would legally uphold the best
interest of the government although it may run counter to a
client's position. In such an instance, the government office
adversely affected by the position taken by the Solicitor
General, if it still believes in the merit of its case may appear in
its own behalf through its legal personnel or representative."
The Court further pointed out that it is not entirely impossible
that the Office of the Solicitor General may take a position
adverse to his clients like the Civil Service Commission and the
National Labor Relations Commission, among others, and even
the People of the Philippines. In such instances, however, it is
not proper for the Solicitor General to simply decline to handle
the case or arbitrarily withdraw therefrom. The Court enjoins
him to "nevertheless manifest his opinion and recommendations
to the Court which is an invaluable aid in the disposition of the
case." 58
However, in those cases where a government agency declines
the services of the Solicitor General or otherwise fails or refuses
to forward the papers of the case to him for appropriate action,
the Court categorically held that ". . . this practice should be
estopped." 59 By the same token, the Solicitor General should
not decline to appear in court to represent a government
agency without just and valid reason, especially the PCGG which
is under the Office of the President, he being a part of the
Executive Department.
In the case at bar, the reason advanced by the Solicitor General
for his motion to withdraw his appearance as lawyer for the
PCGG is that he has been, more than once embarrassed in court
and thereby made "a laughing stock in its (his) professionalism."
Examples are when the OSG lawyers betrayed ignorance in
open court of certain moves taken by the PCGG, such as the
lifting of a sequestration of an asset or when it was under the
impression that an asset had mysteriously disappeared only to
be informed that "a PCGG Commissioner had earlier by
resolution authorized the disposition of said asset."
The last straw, as it were, was the public announcement
through media made by the PCGG that it had "dispensed with or
otherwise did not need the legal services of the lawyer of the
government." 60 It is evident that the withdrawal of the Solicitor
General was precipitated by institutional pique, the lawyers
concerned having allowed their collective pride to prevail over
their sense of duty in protecting and upholding the public
interest.
One wistfully wishes that the OSG could have been as zealous in
representing the PCGG as it was in appearing for the head of
their office, the Solicitor General, in a civil suit for damages filed
against him in a Regional Trial Court arising from allegedly
defamatory remarks uttered by him.
Such enthusiasm, according to this Court, was misplaced. For
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478 which authorizes the
OSG to represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in
any litigation, admits of an exception, and that it is, it stops
short of representing "a public official at any stage of a criminal
case or in a civil suit for damages arising from a felony." 61
In instances such as the above, the OSG can, with reason,
withdraw its representation even if it has already entered its

appearance. But the Solicitor General, as the officiallymandated lawyer of the government, is not empowered to take
a similar step on the basis of a petty reason like
embarrassment, as that to which the individual lawyers
assigned to appear for their office were subjected. Had they not
been too preoccupied with their personal feelings, they could
have checked themselves in time. For a sense of professional
responsibility and proper decorum would dictate that they
distinguish between the institution which, from the very
beginning, had been constituted as the law office of the
Government and the individuals through whom its powers and
duties are exercised. No emotions, of whatever kind and degree,
should be allowed to becloud their high sense of duty and
commitment to country and people.
The OSG itself admitted refraining from citing other incidents as
additional bases for the Solicitor General's withdrawal "as they
are not of meat and substance" but apparently, their
overwhelming sense of shame overcame them as the OSG was
"rendered thereby a laughing stock in its professionalism." 62
Now a word on the incidents that allegedly caused humiliation
to the OSG lawyers, thus provoking the Solicitor General into
withdrawing his appearance as counsel for the PCGG. No
litigation can be assured of success if counsel does not enjoy
the confidence of his client. This is manifested by, among other
things, holding regular, constant and untrammeled consultation
with each other. Who can say but that if the communication
lines had been kept open between the OSG and PCGG, no
surprises would have been sprung on the former by the latter in
open court?
Petitioner's claim that the Solicitor General could not withdraw
his appearance as lawyer of PCGG inasmuch as he had neither
the consent of his client nor the authority from the court,
applying the pertinent provision of the Rules of Court, is not
well-taken. Here is no ordinary lawyer-client relationship. Let it
be remembered that the client is no less than the Republic of
the Philippines in whom the plenum of sovereignty resides.
Whether regarded as an abstract entity or an ideal person, it is
to state the obvious that it can only act through the
instrumentality of the government which, according to the
Administrative Code of 1987, refers to the "corporate
governmental entity through which the functions of government
are exercised throughout the Philippines . . ." 63And the OSG is,
by law, constituted the law office of the Government whose
specific powers and functions include that of representing the
Republic and/or the people before any court in any action which
affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may
require.
Indeed, in the final analysis, it is the Filipino people as a
collectivity that constitutes the Republic of the Philippines. Thus,
the distinguished client of the OSG is the people themselves of
which the individual lawyers in said office are a part.
In order to cushion the impact of his untimely withdrawal of
appearance which might adversely affect the case, the Solicitor
General has offered "to submit his comment/observation on
incidents/matters pending with this Honorable Court, if called
for by circumstances in the interest of the government or if he is
so required by the court." However, as correctly pointed out by
the petitioner, while the Solicitor General may be free to
express his views and comments before the Court in connection
with a case he is handling, he may not do so anymore after he
has formally expressed his refusal to appear therein. For by
then, he has lost his standing in court. Unless his views are
sought by the court, the Solicitor General may not voluntarily
appear in behalf of his client after his withdrawal from the case;
otherwise, such reappearance would constitute a blatant
disregard for court rules and procedure, and that, on the part of
one who is presumed to be "learned in the law."

13

In the face of such express refusal on the part of the Solicitor

General to continue his appearance as counsel of the PCGG in
the cases to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Filipino people
from the Marcoses and their cronies, the PCGG has had to
employ the service of a group of private attorneys lest the
national interest be prejudiced. Were this Court to allow such
action to remain unchallenged, this could well signal the laying
down of the novel and unprecedented doctrine that the
representation by the Solicitor General of the Government
enunciated by law is, after all, not mandatory but merely
directory. Worse, that this option may be exercised on less than
meritorious grounds; not on substance but on whimsy,
depending on the all too human frailties of the lawyers in the
OSG assigned to a particular case. Under such circumstances, it
were better to repeal the law than leave the various
government agencies, all dependent on the OSG for legal
representation, in a condition of suspenseful uncertainty. With
every looming legal battle, they will be speculating whether
they can rely on the Solicitor General to defend the
Government's interest or whether they shall have to depend on
their own "in-house" resources for legal assistance.
The Court is firmly convinced that, considering the spirit and the
letter of the law, there can be no other logical interpretation of
Sec. 35 of the Administrative Code than that it is, indeed,
mandatory upon the OSG to "represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials
and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of a lawyer."
Sound management policies require that the government's
approach to legal problems and policies formulated on legal
issues be harmonized and coordinated by a specific agency. The
government owes it to its officials and their respective offices,
the political units at different levels, the public and the various
sectors, local and international, that have dealings with it, to
assure them of a degree of certitude and predictability in
matters of legal import.
From the historical and statutory perspectives detailed earlier in
this ponencia, it is beyond cavil that it is the Solicitor General
who has been conferred the singular honor and privilege of
being the "principal law officer and legal defender of the
Government." One would be hard put to name a single legal
group or law firm that can match the expertise, experience,
resources, staff and prestige of the OSG which were
painstakingly built up for almost a century.
Moreover, endowed with a broad perspective that spans the
legal interests of virtually the entire government officialdom,
the OSG may be expected to transcend the parochial concerns
of a particular client agency and instead, promote and protect
the public weal. Given such objectivity, it can discern,
metaphorically speaking, the panoply that is the forest and not
just the individual trees. Not merely will it strive for a legal
victory circumscribed by the narrow interests of the client office
or official, but as well, the vast concerns of the sovereign which
it is committed to serve.
In light of the foregoing, the Solicitor General's withdrawal of his
appearance on behalf of the PCGG was beyond the scope of his
authority in the management of a case. As a public official, it is
his sworn duty to provide legal services to the Government,
particularly to represent it in litigations. And such duty may be
enjoined upon him by the writ of mandamus. And such duty
may be enjoined upon him by the writ of mandamus. Such
order, however, should not be construed to mean that his
discretion in the handling of his cases may be interfered with.
The Court is not compelling him to act in a particular
way. 64 Rather, the Court is directing him to prevent a failure of
justice 65resulting from his abandonment in midstream of the
cause of the PCGG and the Republic and ultimately, of the
Filipino people.

In view of the foregoing, there need be no proof adduced that

the petitioner has a personal interest in the case, as his petition
is anchored on the right of the people, through the PCGG and
the Republic, to be represented in court by the public officer
duly authorized by law. The requirement of personal interest is
satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen and
hence, part of the public which possesses the right. 66
The writ of prohibition, however, may not be similarly treated
and granted in this petition. The said writ, being intended to
prevent the doing of some act that is about to be done, it may
not provide a remedy for acts which are already fait
accompli. 67 Having been placed in a situation where it was
constrained to hire private lawyers if the Republic's campaign to
legally recover the wealth amassed by the Marcoses, their
friends and relatives was to prosper, the PCGG's action is
justified. However, it was not entirely blameless. Its failure to
coordinate closely with the Solicitor General has spawned the
incidents which culminated in the withdrawal of the latter from
appearing as counsel in its cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of mandamus is hereby
GRANTED. The Solicitor General is DIRECTED to immediately reenter his appearance in the cases wherein he had filed a motion
to withdraw appearance and the PCGG shall terminate the
services of the lawyers it had employed but not before paying
them the reasonable fees due them in accordance with rules
and regulations of the Commission on Audit.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10558

February 23, 2015

MICHAEL
RUBY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ERLINDA B. ESPEJO and ATTY. RUDOLPH DILLA
BAYOT, Respondents.
D E C I S I O NREYES, J.:
This is an administrative complaint 1 filed by Michael Ruby
(complainant) with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Erlinda
B. Espejo (Atty. Espejo) and Atty. Rudolph Dilla Bayot (Atty.
Bayot) (respondents) for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The Facts
The complainant alleged that he and his mother, Felicitas Ruby
Bihla (Felicitas), engaged the services of the respondents in
connection with a case for cancellation and nullification of
deeds of donation. Pursuant to the retainer agreement 2 dated
August 29, 2009, the complainant and Felicitas would pay Atty.
Espejo
the
amount
ofP100,000.00
as
acceptance
fee, P70,000.00 of which was actually paid upon the signing of
the agreement and the remaining P30,000.00 to be paid after
the hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO). The complainant and Felicitas likewise
agreed to pay the amount of P5,000.00 as appearance fee for
every hearing, which was apparently later reduced
to P4,000.00.
On September 15, 2009, the complainant gave Atty. Espejo the
amount of P50,000.00 as payment for filing fee. 3On September
16, 2009, Atty. Espejo filed the complaint for nullification and
cancellation of deeds of donation with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 219. However, the actual filing fee

14

that was paid by her only amounted to 7,561.00; 4 she failed to

account for the excess amount given her despite several
demand letters5 therefor.

He also denied any knowledge as to the P20,000.00 that was

paid to Atty. Espejo purportedly for "representation fee" that
would be used to file a new petition for the issuance of a TRO. 16

On September 23, 2009, Atty. Espejo allegedly asked the

complainant to give Atty. Bayot the amount ofP30,000.00 the
remaining balance of the acceptance fee agreed upon
notwithstanding that the prayer for the issuance of a TRO has
yet to be heard. The complainant asserted that the same was
not yet due, but Atty. Espejo told him that Atty. Bayot was in dire
need of money. The complainant gave Atty. Bayot the amount
of P8,000.00 supposedly as partial payment for the balance of
the acceptance fee and an additional P4,000.00 as appearance
fee for the September 22, 2009 hearing.6

Atty. Bayot admitted that he was the one who drafted the
motion to serve summons through publication, but pointed out
that it was Atty. Espejo who signed and filed it in the RTC. He
also admitted that he was the one who was supposed to attend
the hearing of the said motion, but claimed that he was only
requested to do so by Atty. Espejo since the latter had another
commitment. He denied requesting from the complainant the
amount ofP4,000.00 as appearance fee, alleging that it was the
latter who insisted on depositing the same in his bank
account.17

On September 25, 2009, Atty. Espejo called the complainant

informing him of the need to file a separate petition for the
issuance of a TRO. She allegedly asked for P50,000.00 to be
used as "representation fee." The complainant was able to
bargain with Atty. Espejo and gave her P20,000.00 instead.7

During the said hearing, Atty. Bayot claimed that when he

checked the courts calendar, he noticed that their motion was
not included. Allegedly, the clerk of court told him that she
would just tell the judge to consider their motion submitted for
resolution.18

Meanwhile, on September 24, 2009, the RTC issued an

Order8 denying the complainants prayer for the issuance of a
TRO. The complainant alleged that the respondents failed to
apprise him of the denial of his prayer for the issuance of a TRO;
that he only came to know of said denial on November 3, 2009
when he visited the RTC.9

On the other hand, Atty. Espejo, in her Answer, 19 denied asking

for P50,000.00 from the complainant as filing fees. She insisted
that it was the complainant who voluntarily gave her the money
to cover the filing fees. She further alleged that she was not
able to account for the excess amount because her files were
destroyed when her office was flooded due to a typhoon. She
also denied having asked another P50,000.00 from the
complainant as "representation fee," asserting that the said
amount was for the payment of the injunction bond once the
prayer for the issuance of a TRO is issued.

On October 23, 2009, the complainant deposited the amount

of P4,000.00 to the bank account of Atty. Bayot as appearance
fee for the hearing on the motion to serve summons through
publications, which was set at 2:00 p.m. on even date. However,
Atty. Bayot allegedly did not appear in court and instead met
with the complainant at the lobby of the Quezon City Hall of
Justice, telling them that he already talked to the clerk of court
who assured him that the court would grant their motion. 10
Thereafter, the complainant alleged, the respondents failed to
update him as to the status of his complaint. He further claimed
that Atty. Bayot had suddenly denied that he was their counsel.
Atty. Bayot asserted that it was Atty. Espejo alone who was the
counsel of the complainant and that he was merely a
collaborating counsel.
In its Order11 dated January 7, 2010, the IBP-CBD directed the
respondents to submit their respective answers to the
complaint.
In his Answer,12 Atty. Bayot claimed that he was not the counsel
of the complainant; that he merely assisted him and Atty.
Espejo. He averred that Atty. Espejo, with the complainants
consent, sought his help for the sole purpose of drafting a
complaint. He pointed out that it was Atty. Espejo who signed
and filed the complaint in the RTC.13
Atty. Bayot further pointed out that he had no part in the
retainer agreement that was entered into by the complainant,
Felicitas, and Atty. Espejo. He also denied having any knowledge
as to the P50,000.00 that was paid to Atty. Espejo as filing
fees.14
As to the P12,000.00 that was given him, he claimed that he
was entitled to P4,000.00 thereof since the said amount was his
appearance fee. He pointed out that he appeared before the
RTCs hearing for the issuance of a TRO on September 22, 2009.
On the other hand, the P8,000.00 was paid to him as part of the
acceptance fee, which was then already due since the RTC had
already heard their prayer for the issuance of a TRO. 15

Findings of the Investigating Commissioner

On May 3, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating
Commissioner issued a Report and Recommendation, 20which
recommended the penalty of censure against the respondents.
The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Atty. Bayot
and the complainant had a lawyer-client relationship
notwithstanding that the former was not the counsel of record in
the case. That his admission that he was a collaborating counsel
was sufficient to constitute a lawyer client relationship.
Moreover, considering that Atty. Bayot initially received the
amount ofP12,000.00 from the complainant, the Investigating
Commissioner opined that he can no longer deny that he was
the lawyer of the complainant. The Investigating Commissioner
further found that: Parenthetically, Respondents had asked and
demanded prompt payment of their attorneys fees or
appearance fees and even asked for amounts for dubious
purposes yet they, just the same, performed their duties to their
clients leisurely and lethargically. Worse, when the trusting
Complainant had noticed that his case was headed for disaster
and wanted Respondents to explain their obviously slothful and
listless services, they disappeared or became evasive thus
fortifying the conclusion that they indeed have performed and
carried out their duties to Complainant way below the standards
set by the Code of [P]rofessional Responsibility. 21 Nevertheless,
the Investigating Commissioner found that the complainant
failed to prove that he indeed suffered injury as a result of the
respondents conduct and, accordingly, should only be meted
the penalty of censure.
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Resolution,22 which adopted and approved the recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner, albeit with the modification
that the penalty imposed upon Atty. Espejo and Atty. Bayot was
increased from censure to suspension from the practice of law
for a period of one year.

15

Atty. Bayot moved to reconsider the Resolution dated March 20,

2013 issued by the IBP Board of Governors. 23The complainant
likewise filed a motion for reconsideration, asking the IBP Board
of Governors to order the respondents to refund to him the
amount he paid to the respondents.24 In the meantime, Atty.
Espejo passed away.25
On March 22, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Resolution,26 which dismissed the case insofar as Atty. Espejo in
view of her demise. The IBP Board of Governors affirmed Atty.
Bayots suspension from the practice of law for a period of one
year.

relationship.29 Accordingly, as regards the case before the RTC,

the complainant had two counsels Atty. Espejo and Atty. Bayot.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENTTHAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.

On December 3, 2014, the Court issued a Resolution, 27 which,

inter alia, considered the case closed and terminated as to Atty.
Espejo on account of her death. Accordingly, the Courts
disquisition in this case would only be limited to the liability of
Atty. Bayot.

Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client

separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by
him.

The Issue

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH

COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. x x x x

The issue in this case is whether Atty. Bayot violated the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which would warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanction.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted

to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.

Ruling of the Court

After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the
parties and the circumstances of this case, the Court modifies
the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP
Board of Governors.

Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the

status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to
the clients request for information.

Atty. Bayot claimed that he is not the counsel of record of the

complainant in the case before the RTC.1wphi1 He pointed out
that he had no part in the retainer agreement entered into by
the complainant and Atty. Espejo. Thus, Atty. Bayot claimed, the
complainant had no cause of action against him.

Accordingly, Atty. Bayot owes fidelity to the cause of the

complainant and is obliged to keep the latter informed of the
status of his case. He is likewise bound to account for all money
or property collected or received from the complainant. He may
be held administratively liable for any inaptitude or negligence
he may have had committed in his dealing with the
complainant.

The Court does not agree.

In Del Mundo v. Capistrano,30 the Court emphasized that:

It is undisputed that Atty. Espejo was the counsel of record in

the case that was filed in the RTC. Equally undisputed is the fact
that it was only Atty. Espejo who signed the retainer agreement.
However, the evidence on record, including Atty. Bayots
admissions, points to the conclusion that a lawyer-client
relationship existed between him and the complainant.

Indeed, when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that

he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latters rights.
Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention
expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer
unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and makes
him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal
profession, the courts and society. His workload does not justify
neglect in handling ones case because it is settled that a
lawyer must only accept cases as much as he can efficiently
handle.

Atty. Bayot was the one who prepared the complaint that was
filed with the RTC. He was likewise the one who prepared the
motion to serve summons through publication. He likewise
appeared as counsel for the complainant in the hearings of the
case before the RTC. He likewise advised the complainant on the
status of the case.
More
importantly,
Atty.
Bayot
admitted
that
he
received P8,000.00, which is part of the acceptance fee
indicated in the retainer agreement, from the complainant. It is
true that it was Atty. Espejo who asked the complainant to give
Atty. Bayot the said amount. However, Atty. Bayot admitted that
he accepted from the complainant the saidP8,000.00 without
even explaining what the said amount was for.
The foregoing circumstances clearly established that a lawyerclient relationship existed between Atty. Bayot and the
complainant. "Documentary formalism is not an essential
element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be
express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that
the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received
in any matter pertinent to his profession." 28 Further, acceptance
of money from a client establishes an attorney-client

Moreover, a lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client

that may come to his possession.1wphi1 As trustee of such
funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his
own. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as
for the filing and processing of a case if not utilized, must be
returned immediately upon demand. Failure to return gives rise
to a presumption that he has misappropriated it in violation of
the trust reposed on him. And the conversion of funds entrusted
to him constitutes gross violation of professional ethics and
betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. 31 (Citations
omitted)
Nevertheless, the administrative liability of a lawyer for any
infractions of his duties attaches only to such circumstances,
which he is personally accountable for. It would be plainly unjust
if a lawyer would be held accountable for acts, which he did not
commit.

16

The Investigating Commissioners findings, which was adopted

by the IBP Board of Governors, did not make a distinction as to
which specific acts or omissions the respondents are each
personally responsible for. This is inequitable since either of the
respondents may not be held personally liable for the infractions
committed by the other.
Atty. Bayot may not be held liable for the failure to account for
and return the excess of the P50,000.00 which was paid by the
complainant for the filing fees. The evidence on record shows
that it was Atty. Espejo alone who received the said amount and
that she was the one who paid the filing fees when the
complaint was filed with the RTC. That Atty. Bayot had no
knowledge of the said amount paid by the complainant for the
filing fees is even admitted by the complainant himself during
the proceedings before the IBP-CBD, viz:
ATTY. BAYOT: So, Atty. Espejo ask you for P50,000[.00]
as filing fee.
MR. RUBY: Admitted.
ATTY. BAYOT: That when he asked you about that, Atty.
Bayot was not present.
MR. RUBY: Admitted.
xxxx
ATTY. BAYOT: That later on you gave Atty. Espejo
the P50,000[.00].
MR. RUBY: Admitted.
ATTY. BAYOT: That Atty. Bayot was not also present at
that time.

On the other hand, Atty. Bayot is legally entitled to

the P8,000.00 he received from the complainant on September
23, 2009, the same being his share in the acceptance fee
agreed to by the complainant in the retainer agreement. He is
likewise legally entitled to the P4,000.00 from the complainant
on even date as it is the payment for his appearance fee in the
hearing for the issuance of a TRO on September 22, 2009.
However, Atty. Bayot is not entitled to the P4,000.00 which the
complainant deposited to his bank account on October 23,
2009. Atty. Bayot admitted that there was no hearing scheduled
on the said date; their motion to serve summons through
publication was not included in the RTCs calendar that day.
Accordingly, Atty. Bayot is obliged to return the said amount to
the complainant.
As regards the complainants charge of gross neglect against
Atty. Bayot, the Court finds the same unsubstantiated. The
Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment
proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption
of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. 33
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for gross misconduct
or for transgressions defined by the rules as grounds to strip a
lawyer of professional license. Considering, however, the
serious consequences of either penalty, the Court will exercise
its power to disbar or suspend only upon a clear, convincing,
and satisfactory proof of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing of a lawyer as an officer of the court and as member of
the bar.
The complainant merely alleged that, after the hearing on the
motion to serve summons through publication, the respondents
had "made themselves scarce" and failed to update him on the
status of the case before the RTC. However, other than his bare
allegations, the complainant failed to present any evidence that
would show that Atty. Bayot was indeed remiss in his duties to
the complainant.

MR. RUBY: Admitted.

xxxx
ATTY. BAYOT: That never did Atty. Bayot ask you or
followed-up from you the P50,000[.00] that Atty.
Espejo was asking as filing fee?
MR. RUBY: Admitted.
xxxx
MR.
RUBY:
You
have
nothing
to
the P50,000[.00] that was Atty. Espejo.32

do

with

Further, in her Answer, Atty. Espejo admitted that she was the
one who failed to account for the filing fees, alleging that the
files in her office were destroyed by flood. Likewise, the demand
letters written by the complainant, which were seeking the
accounting for the P50,000.00 filing fee, were all solely
addressed to Atty. Espejo. Clearly, Atty. Bayot may not be held
administratively liable for the failure to account for the filing
fees.
Atty. Bayot cannot also be held liable for the P20,000.00 which
Atty. Espejo asked from the complainant for "representation
fee." The complainant failed to adduce any evidence that would
establish that Atty. Bayot knew of and came into possession of
the said amount paid by the complainant.

However, the complainants November 4, 2009 letter 34 to Atty.

Espejo tells a different story. In the said letter, the complainant
asked Atty. Espejo to withdraw as being the counsel of record in
the case before the RTC in favor of Atty. Bayot since he was the
one who actually prepared the pleadings and attended the
hearings of their motions. In any case, the charge of neglect
against Atty. Bayot was premature, if not unfair, considering
that, at that time, the case before the RTC was still in the early
stages; the pre-trial and trial have not even started yet. That
they lost their bid for the issuance of a TRO is not tantamount to
neglect on the part of Atty. Bayot.
However, Atty. Bayot is not entirely without fault. This
administrative complaint was brought about by his intervention
when the complainant sought the legal services of Atty. Espejo.
Atty. Bayot undertook to prepare the complaint to be filed with
the RTC and the motion to serve summons through publication,
attended the hearings, and advised the complainant as to the
status of the case without formally entering his appearance as
counsel of record. He was able to obtain remuneration for his
legal services sans any direct responsibility as to the progress of
the case. Atty. Bayot is reminded to be more circumspect in his
dealings with clients. WHEREFORE, Atty. Rudolph Dilla Bayot is
hereby ADMONISHED to exercise more prudence and
judiciousness in dealing with his clients. He is also ordered to
return to Michael Ruby within fifteen (15) days from notice the
amount of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) representing his
appearance fee received from the latter on October 23, 2009
with a warning that failure on his part to do so will result in the
imposition of stiffer disciplinary action.
SO ORDERED.

17

A.C. No. 9537

(Formerly CBD Case No. 09-2489)

June

10,

2013

DR.
TERESITA
LEE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. AMADOR L. SIMANDO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment 1 dated July 21, 2009 filed
by Dr. Teresita Lee (Dr. Lee) against respondent Atty. Amador L.
Simando (Atty. Simando) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as
CBD Case No. 09-2489, now A.C. No. 9537, for violation of the
Code of Judicial Ethics of Lawyers.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Atty. Simando was the retained counsel of complainant Dr. Lee
from November 2004 until January 8, 2008, with a monthly
retainer fee of Three Thousand Pesos (Php3,000.00).2
Sometime during the above-mentioned period, Atty. Simando
went to see Dr. Lee and asked if the latter could help a certain
Felicito M. Mejorado (Mejorado) for his needed funds. He
claimed that Mejorado was then awaiting the release of his
claim for informer's reward from the Bureau of Customs.
Because Dr. Lee did not know Mejorado personally and she
claimed to be not in the business of lending money, the former
initially refused to lend money. But Atty. Simando allegedly
persisted and assured her that Mejorado will pay his obligation
and will issue postdated checks and sign promissory notes. He
allegedly even offered to be the co-maker of Mejorado and
assured her that Mejorado's obligation will be paid when due.
Atty. Simando was quoted saying: "Ipapahamak ba kita, kliyente
kita"; "Sigurado ito, kung gusto mo, gagarantiyahan ko pa ito, at
pipirma din ako"; "Isang buwan lang, at hindi hihigit sa
dalawang buwan ito, bayad ka na." 3
Due to Atty. Simando's persistence, his daily calls and frequent
visits to convince Dr. Lee, the latter gave in to her lawyer's
demands, and finally agreed to give Mejorado sizeable amounts
of money. Respondent acted as co-maker with Mejorado in
various cash loans, to wit:4

Date:

Amount

November 11, 2006

Php 400,000.00

November 24, 2006

200,000.00

November 27, 2006

400,000.00

December 7, 2006

200,000.00

December 13, 2006

200,000.00

Total:

Php1,400,000.00

When the said obligation became due, despite Dr. Lee's

repeated demands, Mejorado failed and refused to comply with
his obligation. Since Atty. Simando was still her lawyer then, Dr.
Lee instructed him to initiate legal action against Mejorado. Atty.
Simando said he would get in touch with Mejorado and ask him
to pay his obligation without having to resort to legal action.
However, even after several months, Mejorado still failed to pay
Dr. Lee, so she again asked Atty. Simando why no payment has
been made yet. Dr. Lee then reminded Atty. Simando that he
was supposed to be the co-maker of the obligation of Mejorado,
to which he replied: "Di kasuhan din ninyo ako!" 5

Despite complainant's repeated requests, respondent ignored

her and failed to bring legal actions against Mejorado. Thus, in
January 2008, complainant was forced to terminate her contract
with Atty. Simando.
Subsequently, complainant's new lawyer, Atty. Gilbert
Morandarte, sent a demand letter dated June 13, 2008 to Atty.
Simando in his capacity as the co-maker of some of the loans of
Mejorado.
In his Letter dated June 30, 2008, respondent denied his liability
as a co-maker and claimed that novation had occurred because
complainant had allegedly given additional loans to Mejorado
without his knowledge.6
Dr. Lee then accused Atty. Simando of violating the trust and
confidence which she gave upon him as her lawyer, and even
took advantage of their professional relationship in order to get
a loan for his client. Worse, when the said obligation became
due, respondent was unwilling to help her to favor Mejorado.
Thus, the instant petition for disbarment against Atty. Simando.
On August 12, 2009, the IBP-CBD ordered respondent to submit
his Answer on the complaint against him.7
In his Answer8 dated September 17, 2009, Atty. Simando
claimed that complainant, who is engaged in lending money at
a high interest rate, was the one who initiated the financial
transaction between her and Mejorado. He narrated that
complainant asked him if it is true that Mejorado is his client as
she found out that Mejorado has a pending claim for informer's
reward with the Bureau of Customs. When he affirmed that
Mejorado is his client, complainant signified that she is willing to
give money for Mejorado's financial needs while awaiting for the
release of the informer's reward. Eventually, parties agreed that
Mejorado will pay double the amount and that payment shall be
made upon receipt by Mejorado of the payment of his claim for
informer's reward.9
Meanwhile, Atty. Simando stressed that Dr. Lee gave Mejorado a
total of Php700,000.00 as an investment but he signed as comaker in all the receipts showing double the amount or
Php1,400,000.00.10
Respondent claimed that complainant is a money-lender
exacting high interest rates from borrowers. 11 He narrated
several instances and civil cases where complainant was
engaged in money-lending where he divulged that even after
defendants had already paid their loan, complainant still
persists in collecting from them.12Respondent asserted that he
knew of these transactions, because he was among the four
lawyers who handled complainant's case. 13
Respondent averred that from the time that Mejorado and Dr.
Lee had become close to each other, the latter had given
Mejorado additional investments and one (1) Silverado Pick-up
at the price of P500,000.00 and fifty (50) sacks of old clothings.
He claimed that the additional investments made by Dr. Lee to
Mejorado were given without his knowledge.
Atty. Simando further alleged that with Dr. Lee's investment of
around P2 Million which included the Silverado Pick-up and the
fifty (50) sacks of old clothings, the latter required Mejorado to
issue five (5) checks with a total value of P7,033,500.00, an
amount more than the actual value which Mejorado received. 14
Atty. Simando added that while Dr. Lee and Mejorado agreed
that the issued checks shall be presented to the bank only upon
payment of his informer's reward, Dr. Lee presented the checks
to the bank despite being aware that Mejorado's account had no
funds for said checks. Atty. Simando further denied that he

18

refused to take legal action against Mejorado. He claimed that

complainant never instructed him to file legal action, since the
latter knew that Mejorado is obligated to pay only upon receipt
of his informer's reward.
Finally, Atty. Simando insisted that he did not violate their
lawyerclient relationship, since Dr. Lee voluntarily made the
financial investment with Mejorado and that he merely
introduced complainant to Mejorado. He further claimed that
there is no conflict of interest because he is Mejorado's lawyer
relative to the latter's claim for informer's reward, and not
Mejorado's lawyer against Dr. Lee. He reiterated that there is no
conflicting interest as there was no case between Mejorado and
Dr. Lee that he is handling for both of them. 15
In her Reply dated October 30, 2009, Dr. Lee denied that what
she entered into was a mere investment. She insisted that she
lent the money to Mejorado and respondent, in his capacity as
co-maker and the transaction was actually a loan. 16 To prove her
claim, Dr. Lee submitted the written loan agreements/receipts
which categorically stated that the money received was a loan
with due dates, signed by Mejorado and respondent as comaker.17She further claimed that she did not know Mejorado and
it was respondent who brought him to her and requested her to
assist Mejorado by lending him money as, in fact, respondent
even vouched for Mejorado and agreed to sign as co-maker.
Complainant further emphasized that what she was collecting is
the payment only of the loan amounting to One Million Four
Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php1,400,000.00) which respondent
had signed as co-maker. Thus, respondent's claim that his
obligation was already extinguished by novation holds no water,
since what was being collected is merely his obligation
pertaining to the loan amounting to Php1,400,000.00 only, and
nothing more.
Finally, complainant lamented that respondent, in his
comments, even divulged confidential informations he had
acquired while he was still her lawyer and even used it against
her in the present case, thus, committing another unethical
conduct. She, therefore, maintained that respondent is guilty of
violating the lawyer-client confidentiality rule.
Both parties failed to appear during the mandatory conference
on January 15, 2010. Both parties requested for resetting of the
mandatory conference, however, both failed to agree on a
certain date. Hence, the IBP, so as not to delay the disposition
of the complaint, terminated the mandatory conference and
instead required the parties to submit their respective position
papers.18
On March 18, 2010, the IBP-CBD found Atty. Simando guilty of
violating
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility.
It
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for six (6) months.
On December 29, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD
to suspend Atty. Simando from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months.
Respondent moved for reconsideration.
On March 10, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors granted
respondent's motion for reconsideration for lack of sufficient
evidence to warrant the penalty of suspension. The Resolution
dated December 29, 2010 was reversed and the case against
respondent was dismissed.
RULING

We reverse the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors.

Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a
lawyer is guilty of representing conflicting interest:
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue
or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose
that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyers argument for
one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for
the other client, there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of
the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client
or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the
lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a
former client any confidential information acquired through their
connection or previous employment.19
In the instant case, we find substantial evidence to support
respondent's violation of the above parameters, as established
by the following circumstances on record:
First, it is undisputed that there was a lawyer-client relationship
between complainant and Atty. Simando as evidenced by the
retainer fees received by respondent and the latter's
representation in certain legal matters pertaining to
complainant's business;
Second, Atty. Simando admitted that Mejorado is another client
of him albeit in a case claiming rewards against the Bureau of
Customs;
Third, Atty. Simando admitted that he was the one who
introduced complainant and Mejorado to each other for the
purpose of entering into a financial transaction while having
knowledge that complainant's interests could possibly run in
conflict with Mejorado's interests which ironically such client's
interests, he is duty-bound to protect;
Fourth, despite the knowledge of the conflicting interests
between his two clients, respondent consented in the parties'
agreement and even signed as co-maker to the loan agreement;
Fifth, respondent's knowledge of the conflicting interests
between his two clients was demonstrated further by his own
actions, when he:
(a) failed to act on Mejorado's failure to pay his
obligation to complainant despite the latter's
instruction to do so;
(b) denied liability despite signing as co-maker in the
receipts/promissory notes arising from the loan
agreement between his two clients;
(c) rebutted complainant's allegations against
Mejorado and him, and even divulged informations he
acquired while he was still complainant's lawyer.
Clearly, it is improper for respondent to appear as counsel for
one party (complainant as creditor) against the adverse party
(Mejorado as debtor) who is also his client, since a lawyer is
prohibited from representing conflicting interests. He may not,
without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel
for a person whose interest conflict with that of his present or
former client.

19

Respondent's assertion that there is no conflict of interest

because complainant and respondent are his clients in
unrelated cases fails to convince. His representation of opposing
clients in both cases, though unrelated, obviously constitutes
conflict of interest or, at the least, invites suspicion of doubledealing.20 Moreover, with the subject loan agreement entered
into by the complainant and Mejorado, who are both his clients,
readily shows an apparent conflict of interest, moreso when he
signed as co-maker.
Likewise, respondent's argument that the money received was
an investment and not a loan is difficult to accept, considering
that he signed as co-maker. Respondent is a lawyer and it is
objectionable that he would sign as co-maker if he knew all
along that the intention of the parties was to engage in a mere
investment. Also, as a lawyer, signing as a co-maker, it can be
presupposed that he is aware of the nature of suretyship and
the consequences of signing as co-maker. Therefore, he cannot
escape liability without exposing himself from administrative
liability, if not civil liability. Moreover, we noted that while
complainant was able to show proof of receipts of various
amounts of money loaned and received by Mejorado, and
signed by the respondent as co-maker, the latter, however,
other than his bare denials, failed to show proof that the money
given was an investment and not a loan.
It must be stressed that the proscription against representation
of conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting
interests arise with respect to the same general matter however
slight the adverse interest may be. It applies even if the conflict
pertains to the lawyers private activity or in the performance of
a function in a non-professional capacity. In the process of
determining whether there is a conflict of interest, an important
criterion is probability, not certainty, of conflict. 21
We likewise note that respondent offered several excuses in
order to avoid payment of his liability.1wphi1 First, in his
Answer to complainant's demand letter, he claimed there was
novation which extinguished his liability; Secondly, he claimed
that the amount received by Mejorado for which he signed as
co-maker was merely an investment and not a loan. Finally, he
alleged that it was agreed that the investment with profits will
be paid only after Mejorado receives the payment for his claim
for reward which complainant violated when she presented the
checks for payment prematurely. These actuations of Atty.
Simando do not speak well of his reputation as a lawyer. 22
Finally, we likewise find respondent guilty of violating Rule 21.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 23 In his last-ditch
effort to impeach the credibility of complainant, he divulged
informations24 which he acquired in confidence during the
existence of their lawyer-client relationship.
25

We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez that the termination of the

relation of attorney and client provides no justification for a
lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that
of the former client. The reason for the rule is that the clients
confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the expiration
of the professional employment. Consequently, a lawyer should
not, even after the severance of the relation with his client, do
anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any
matter in which he previously represented him nor should he
disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the
previous relation.
Accordingly, we reiterate that lawyers are enjoined to look at
any representation situation from "the point of view that there
are possible conflicts," and further, "to think in terms of
impaired loyalty" that is to evaluate if his representation in any
way will impair loyalty to a client.26

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves to ADOPT

the findings and recommendation of the IBP in Resolution No.
XIX-20 10-733 suspending respondent Atty. Amador L. Simando
for six ( 6) months from the practice of law, with a WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a
more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of
the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant
is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to respondent's
record as member of the Bar.
Atty. Simando is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his
receipt of this Decision so that we can determine the reckoning
point when his suspension shall take effect.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 258

December 21, 1963

RUFINA BAUTISTA, complainant-petitioner,

vs.
ATTY.
BENJAMIN
O.
BARRIOS, defendantrespondent.BENGZON, C.J.:
Rufina Bautista complains that Atty. Barrios committed
malpractice in that having drafted a deed of partition at her
request, and as her attorney, he afterwards suit to enforce it,
refused to appear for her, and what is worse, he appeared
instead as counsel for the other to the deed of partition and
opposed her rights thereunder.
The evidence shows that in August 1955, Rufina Bautista
engaged the services of respondent Atty. Barrios to draft an
extra-judicial partition between Rufina Bautista and her brother
and sisters on one side and Federico Rovero on the other. The
deed distributed the conjugal properties of Rovero and his
deceased wife Maria Bautista who was a sister of the Bautista's
and who intestate in 1952. The deed was prepared by said
Barrios and was accordingly signed. Thereafter, in September of
the same year, because Rovero refused to comply the terms of
the deed, Rufina Bautista sued him (Civil Case No, K-689, Capiz
Court of First Instance) to deliver the properties awarded to her
in the said extra-judicial partition. She asked respondent Barrios
to represent her; but upon her refusal, Rufina was compelled to,
and did engaged the services of Atty. Artemio S. Arrieta.
Thereafter, Atty. Barrios appeared for Federico Rovero, and
opposed the demand of Rufina Bautista.
In an attempt to clear himself, respondent Barrios declared that
it was not Rufina Bautista who had solicited his services in the
preparation of the deed of partition, but that it was Federico
Rovero.
As against the contrary assertions of Rufina Bautista, the
defense of Atty. Barrios cannot prevail, for the reason that he
himself in his answer to the complaint in this Court, admitted
that he had prepared the deed "upon the joint request of
Federico Rovero, Rufina Bautista and Fransisco Bautista."
Furthermore, the circumstance that upon refusal of Rovero to
comply with the terms of the deed, Rufina went to ask Barrios to
enforce it he admits Rufina went to see him by filing a
complaint against Rovero, strongly corroborates Rufina's
testimony that she had actually engaged his services to draft
the partition. Indeed, when she asked him to file the complaint,
and he refused, he did not tell her that he had been engaged by
Rovero to draft the partition. He merely told her she had no
case, and that she was reluctant "to take up a lost cause."

20

On this issue of fact, that Solicitor General finds against

respondent. And we agree with said official.
Furthermore, even supposing that, as claimed by Atty. Barrios,
he was employed by both Rovero and the Bautista brothers to
draft the partition, it is doubtful whether he could appear for
one as against the other in a subsequent litigation. At most, if
he could appear for one client, it should be for him who seeks to
enforce the partition as drafter. Yet he appeared for Rovero who
sought to avoid compliance with it, asserting that it did not
contain all the terms of the agreement, that it was subject to
certain modifications, etc. Moreover, in his defense of Rovero,
he raised issues which obviously violated Rufina's confidence,
because he alleged in behalf of Rovero that the
undisclosed modifications were known to Rufina at the time of
execution of the partition.lawphil.net
The inconsistent positions taken by the respondent coupled with
some flimsy arguments he had advanced1 , do not favorably
impress this Court with his alleged good faith in the matter.
Corrective measures are called for, and, in accordance with the
Solicitor General's recommendation, Atty. Barrios is hereby
suspended from the practice of his profession for a period of two
years from the time this becomes final. So ordered.
A.C. No. 2285 August 12, 1991
MARIA
vs.
ATTY. AMADO OCAMPO, respondent.

TIANIA complainant,

A.C. No. 2302 August 12, 1991

FELICIDAD
LLANOS
ANGEL
ANGEL, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. AMADO OCAMPO, respondent.

and

ALFONSO

PER CURIAM:p
These disbarment proceedings against Attorney Amado Ocampo
were filed by Maria Tiania, docketed as Administrative Case No.
2285, and by Spouses Felicidad Angel and Alfonso Angel
(hereinafter referred to as the Angel Spouses), docketed as
Administrative Case No. 2302.
Both cases were consolidated upon the instance of Atty. Amado
Ocampo who, in his answer, denied the imputations.

Maria Tiania claims in her verified complaint that respondent

Amado Ocampo who has been her "retaining (sic) counsel" in all
her legal problems and court cases as early as 1966, has always
had her unqualified faith and confidence.
In 1972, one Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock sued Tiania for
ejectment 2 from a parcel of land described as "Lot 4131, TS308." Ocampo appeared for Tiania and also for Blaylock. Tiania
confronted Ocampo about this but the latter reassured Tiania
that he will take care of everything and that there was no need
for Tiania to hire a new lawyer since he is still Tiania's lawyer.
Ocampo prepared the answer in the said ejectment case, which
Tiania signed. Then Ocampo made Tiania sign a Compromise
Agreement 3 which the latter signed without reading.
Two years from the submission of the Compromise Agreement,
Tiania was shocked when she received an order to vacate 4 the
property in question. To hold off her ejectment for another two
years, Ocampo advised Tiania to pay him a certain amount for
the sheriff. 5
Ocampo denied the charges in detail. Although he handled
some legal problems and executed some notarial deeds for
Tiania from 1966-1971, Tiania had also engaged the services of
various counsel to represent her in several criminal and civil
cases, involving violations of municipal ordinances and estafa.
Thus, he could not be the complainant's "retaining counsel" in
all her legal problems and court cases.
Ocampo then insisted that he appeared on behalf of Mrs.
Blaylock, and not as counsel of Tiania, in Civil Case No. 1104-0.
He never saw or talked to Tiania from the time the said civil
case was filed up to the pre-trial and as such could not have
discussed with her the complaint, the hiring of another lawyer,
and more so the preparation of the answer in the said case. He
admitted that during the pre-trial of the said case, Tiania
showed to him a document which supported her claim, over the
property in question. Ocampo, after going over the document,
expressed his doubts about it authenticity. This convinced Tiania
to sign a Compromise Agreement and to pay the acquisition
cost to Blaylock over a period of six (6) months. 6
But Tiania never fulfilled any of her obligations. She moreover
made the situation worse by selling the contested property to a
third party even after an alias writ of execution had ordered the
transfer of the possession of the disputed property to Blaylock. 7
Significantly, the petition was filed five years after Tiania
allegedly suffered "terrible shock" upon receiving the Notice to
Vacate.

The complaints in Adm. Case No. 2285 and Adm. Case No. 2302
were filed on July 14, 1981 and August 10, 1981, respectively.

Citing Arboleda v. Gatchalian, 8 Ocampo said that the overdue

filing of a complaint against a lawyer should already create a
suspicion about the motives of the complainant or the merit of
the complaint.

On January 27, 1982, after Atty. Ocampo filed his comment, the
Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report, and recommendation as provided, then, by Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. 1

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 2302

It was only on April 25, 1990, more than eight years later, that
the Office of the Solicitor General returned the entire records of
Adm. Cases Nos. 2285 and 2302 with the accompanying
complaint for disbarment.
Hence, the administrative complaint for disbarment in both
cases was filed.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 2285

The Angel spouses, complainants in A.C. No. 2302, allege that

sometime in 1972, they sold their house in favor of Blaylock
(the same Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock in A.C. No. 2285) for the
amount of seventy thousand pesos, (P70,000.00). Ocampo (the
same respondent Atty. Amado Ocampo), acted as their counsel
and prepared the Deed of Sale of a Residential House and
Waiver of Rights Over a Lot.
With the money paid by Blaylock, the Angel spouses bought
another parcel of land. Again, Ocampo prepared the Deed of
Sale which was signed by the vendor, a certain Laura Dalanan,
and the Angel spouses, as the vendees. In addition, Ocampo

21

allegedly made the Angel spouses sign two (2) more documents
which, accordingly, were made parts of the sale transaction.

represented the interests in advance over a period of five years

in which the loan would be paid.

Those two (2) documents later turned out to be a Real Estate

Mortgage of the same property purchased from Laura Dalanan
and a Promissory Note, 9 both in favor of Blaylock.

When the monthly amortizations became due, the Angel

spouses never paid any of it despite repeated demands from
Blaylock. Blaylock assigned the promissory note to the
Commercial Credit Corporation which later on filed a civil case
against the Angel spouses.

The Angel spouses never realized the nature of the said

documents until they received a complaint naming them as
defendants in a collection suit 10 filed by Ocampo on behalf of
the plaintiff, Commercial Corporation of Olongapo, a firm
headed by Blaylock.
The Angel spouses added that Ocampo reassured them that
there was no need for them to engage the services of a new
lawyer since he will take care of everything. Ocampo even
appeared as counsel for the Angel spouses in a civil case 11 they
filed sometime in 1976. However, in 1978, a Notice to
Vacate, 12 on the basis of the two (2) documents they signed in
1972, was served on them.
These acts, the complainants charge, violate the ethics of the
legal profession. They lost their property as a result of the
respondent's fraudulent manipulation, taking advantage of his
expertise in law against his own unsuspecting and trusting
clients.
As in the first
explanation.

case,

Ocampo

presented

an

elaborate

Ocampo alleged that it was his client, Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock,

who introduced to him the Angel spouses in 1972. Blaylock
wanted Ocampo to check the background of the Angel spouses
in connection with the loan they were seeking from Blaylock.
In his interview with Mrs. Angel, Ocampo learned that the
amount of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) to be loaned to
the Angel spouses from Blaylock would be used to repurchase
the property at 39 Fendler Street, Olongapo City, which the
Angel spouses had originally owned. In turn, the Angel spouses
should sell the same to Blaylock.
Ocampo himself facilitated the transfer by delivering to the
complainants the P20,000.00 for the repurchase of the Fendler
property.
This
in
turn
was
sold
to
Blaylock. 13
Since the sale of the Fendler property would render the Angel
spouses homeless, they suggested to Blaylock that they would
need an additional loan of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) to
purchase from Laura Dalanan another property located at #66
Kessing Street, Olongapo City, which was mortgaged in favor of
a certain Salud Jimenez.
To expedite the transfer of the Kessing property from Dalanan to
the Angel spouses, Ocampo himself delivered to Salud Jimenez
twenty two thousand (P22,000.00) pesos from Blaylock in
payment of the mortgage debt of Dalanan. The balance of
eighteen thousand (P18,000.00) pesos was then delivered to
Mrs. Angel upon the execution of the final documents between
the Angel spouses and Dalanan. 14
Ocampo explained that simultaneously he executed a Real
Estate Mortgage over the Kessing property and a Promissory
Note for the Angel spouses in favor of Blaylock for the amount
of seventy-four thousand seventy five (P74,075.00) pesos.
Although only forty thousand (P40,000.00) was received by Mrs.
Angel and Dalanan, the difference between seventy-four
thousand seventy five pesos and forty thousand pesos

The Angel spouses never filed an answer and were declared in

default. Upon execution, the Kessing property was levied on and
sold at public auction followed by a Notice to Vacate.
Ocampo admits appearing for the Angel spouses in Civil Case
No. 1458, filed July 26, 1976, but only because he had his client
Blaylock's interest foremost in his mind.
Blaylock, through Ocampo, had sued one Benedicto Hermogeno
a lessee of Blaylock's property, in an ejectment case. But before
the institution of the ejectment case, Hermogeno leased out the
same premises to Mrs. Angel on June 14, 1976. Four days later,
Hermogeno without the knowledge and consent of Mrs. Angel,
regained possession of the leased premises. Thus, Ocampo, in
filing a complaint against Hermogeno on behalf of Blaylock, was
also doing so for Mrs. Angel.
These explanations notwithstanding, the Solicitor General
charged the respondent Atty. Amado Ocampo with malpractice
and gross misconduct punishable under Section 27 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court of the Philippines and violation of his oath
of office as an attorney for the following acts:
a) Administrative Case No. 2285
At the pre-trial of Civil Case No. 11 04-0, the
respondent appeared as counsel for the
plaintiff and while appearing for the same,
gave advice and warnings to the defendant
which paved the way for an amicable
settlement and which may have prejudiced
the defendant's rights.
b) Administrative Case No. 2302
(1) Respondent while acting as counsel for
Mrs.
Concepcion
Blaylock
and
her
Commercial Credit Corporation; also acted as
counsel of the complainant Mrs. Angel when
he prepared the Deed of Sale of a Residential
House and Waiver of Rights Over a Lot for
Mrs. Angel in favor of Zenaida Blaylock,
daughter of Concepcion Blaylock.
(2) Respondent, while acting as counsel for
Mrs.
Concepcion
Blaylock
and
her
Commercial Credit Corporation, also acted as
counsel of Mrs. Angel when he proceeded to
Cavite and paid Salud Jimenez the sum of
twenty two thousand pesos (P22,000.00) for
Dalanan's Kessing Property.
(3) Respondent was representing conflicting
interests when he simultaneously prepared
the Deed of Sale of the Kessing property in
favor of Mrs. Angel and the Real Estate
Mortgage for the same property to be signed
by Mrs. Angel in favor of Mrs. Blaylock and
her Commercial Credit Corporation.

22

(4) Respondent used Mrs. Angel by

pretending to protect her interest as his
client in Civil Case No. 2020-0, when
admittedly he was only "forced to help and
assist Mrs. Angel in said case to protect the
property of Mrs. Blaylock."
Was the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests?
The specific law applicable in both administrative cases is Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interest except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.
We prohibit the representation of conflicting interests not only
because the relation of attorney and client is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the
principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the
duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent
him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused, the
entire profession suffers. 15
The test of the conflict of interest in disciplinary cases against a
lawyer is whether or not the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness
or
double-dealing
in
the
performance
thereof. 16 Considering this criterion and applying it to the
present administrative cases, we find no cogent reason to
disturb the findings of the Solicitor General upholding the
complaints against the respondent. Indeed, the aforementioned
acts of the respondent in representing Blaylock, and at the
same time advising Tiania, the opposing party, as in the first
administrative case, and once again representing Blaylock and
her interest while handling the legal documents of another
opposing party as in the second case, whether the said actions
were related or totally unrelated, constitute serious misconduct.
They are improper to the respondent's office as attorney.
However, taking into consideration the advanced age of the
respondent, who would have reached seventy three (73) years,
as of this date, the Court, while uncompromisingly firm in its
stand against erring lawyers, nonetheless appreciates the
advance years of the respondent in his favor.
WHEREFORE, finding the respondent Atty. Amado Ocampo guilty
of malpractice and gross misconduct in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, we hereby SUSPEND him from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
Let this Decision be spread upon the personal records of the
respondent and copies thereof furnished to all courts and to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
A.C. No. 9395

November 12, 2014

DARIA
O.
DAGING, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZ TINGALON L. DAVIS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION

before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Benguet

Chapter,2 against Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis (respondent).
Antecedents
Complainant was the owner and operator of Nashville Country
Music Lounge. She leased from Benjie Pinlac (Pinlac) a building
spaGe located at No. 22 Otek St., Baguio City where she
operated the bar.
Meanwhile, complainant received a Retainer Proposal 3 from
Davis & Sabling Law Office signed by respondent and his
partner Atty. Amos Saganib Sabling (Atty. Sabling). This
eventually resulted in the signing by the complainant, the
respondent and Atty. Sabling of a Retainer Agreement 4 dated
March 7, 2005.
Because complainant was delinquent in paying the monthly
rentals, Pinlac terminated the lease. Together with Novie
Balageo (Balageo) and respondent, Pinlac went to complainant's
music bar, inventoried all the equipment therein, and informed
her that Balageo would take over the operation of the bar.
Complainant averred that subsequently respondent acted as
business partner of Balageo in operating the bar under her
business name, which they later renamed Amarillo Music Bar.
Complainant likewise alleged that she filed an ejectment case
against Pinlac and Balageo before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Baguio City. At that time, Davis &
Sabling Law Office was still her counsel as their Retainer
Agreement remained subsisting and in force. However,
respondent appeared as counsel for Balageo in that ejectment
case and filed, on behalf of the latter, an Answer with
Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.5
In his Comment,6 respondent denied participation in the
takeover or acting as a business partner of Balageo in the
operation of the bar. He asserted that Balageo is the sole
proprietress of the establishment. He insisted that it was Atty.
Sabling, his partner, who initiated the proposal and was in fact
the one who was able to convince complainant to accept the
law office as her retainer. Respondent maintained that he never
obtained any knowledge or information regarding the business
of complainant who used to consult only Atty. Sabling.
Respondent admitted though having represented Balageo in the
ejectment case, but denied that he took advantage of the
Retainer Agreement between complainant and Davis and
Sabling Law Office. Thus:
3.a Prior to the engagement of the Complainant of the
DAVIS and SABLING LAW OFFICE as her retainer, Novie
Balageo was already one of the Clients of Respondent
in several cases;
3.b Sometime in the last week of the month of May
2005, while Respondent was in his office doing some
legal works, Novie Balageo called up Respondent
informing the latter that his assistance is needed for
purposes of conducting an inventory of all items at the
former Nashville Country Music Lounge;
3.c Respondent [asked] Novie Balageo [the purpose
of] the inventory [to which] the latter x xx responded x
xx that she entered into a lease contract with the
present administrator of the building, Benjie Pinlac;

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This administrative complaint for disbarment arose from an
Affidavit Complaint1 filed by Daria O. Daging (complainant)

3.d Respondent, to his disbelief requested Novie

Balageo to go [to] the LAW OFFICE for further
clarification of the matter. Thereafter, Respondent was
later informed that the business of Complainant was

23

taken over and operated by Mr. Benjie Pinlac for seven

days. Furthermore, Mr. Benjie Pinlac offered the said
place to Novie Balageo which the latter readily
accepted;
3.e [Left] with no recourse, Respondent requested one
of his staff to assist Novie Balageo in conducting an
inventory. Furthermore, Respondent never acted as
partner of Novie Balageo in operating the former
Nashville Country Music Lounge;
3.f When Complainant filed the civil case for Ejectment
against Novie Balageo and Benjie Pinlac, Respondent
represented the former thereof without taking
advantage of the retainership contract between the
DA VIS and SABLING LAW OFFICE [and] Complainant
as Respondent has no knowledge or information of any
matters related by complainant to Atty. Sabling
regarding the former' s business;
3.g While the Complaint was pending, respondent was
xx x informed by Novie Balageo and Benjie Pinlac of
the truth of all matters x x x which x x x Respondent
[was unaware of];
3.h However, for the interest of justice and fair play, x
x x Respondent [deemed it prudent] to xx x withdraw
as Counsel for Novie Balageo. Hence, Respondent filed
his Motion to Withdraw As Counsel. x x x
3.i The civil case was subsequently dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction over the [Complaint's] subject matter. x
x x7
On October 15, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner rendered
a Report and Recommendation8 finding respondent guilty of
betrayal of his client's trust and for misuse of information
obtained from his client to the disadvantage of the latter and to
the advantage of another person. He recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice oflaw for a period of
one year.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.9 Upon motion of the respondent, it
reduced the penalty imposed to six months suspension
considering that there is no proof that respondent actually
handled any previous legal matters involving complainant. 10
Our Ruling
It is undisputed that complainant entered into a Retainer
Agreement dated March 7, 2005 with respondent's law firm.
This agreement was signed by the respondent and attached to
the rollo of this case. And during the subsistence of said
Retainer Agreement, respondent represented and defended
Balageo, who was impleaded as one of the defendants in the
ejectment case complainant filed before the MTCC of Baguio
City. In fact, respondent filed on behalf of said Balageo an
Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction dated July 11, 2005. It was only on
August 26, 2005 when respondent withdrew his appearance for
Balageo.
Based on the established facts, it is indubitable that respondent
transgressed Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.1wphi1 It provides:

Rule 15.03 -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests

except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
"A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional
misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts
with that of his present or former client." 11 The prohibition
against representing conflicting interests is absolute and the
rule applies even if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with
no intention to represent conflicting interests. 12 In Quiambao v.
Atty. Bamba,13 this Court emphasized that lawyers are expected
not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only
then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration
of justice.14
Respondent argues that while complainant is a client of Davis &
Sabling Law office, her case is actually handled only by his
partner Atty. Sabling. He was not privy to any transaction
between Atty. Sabling and complainant and has no knowledge of
any information or legal matter complainant entrusted or
confided to his law partner. He thus inveigles that he could not
have taken advantage of an information obtained by his law
firm by virtue of the Retainer Agreement. We are not impressed.
In Hilado v. David,15 reiterated in Gonzales v. Atty. Cabucana,
Jr.,16this Court held that a lawyer who takes up the cause of the
adversary of the party who has engaged the services of his law
firm brings the law profession into public disrepute and
suspicion and undermines the integrity of justice. Thus,
respondent's argument that he never took advantage of any
information acquired by his law finn in the course of its
professional dealings with the complainant, even assuming it to
be true, is of no moment. Undeniably aware of the fact that
complainant is a client of his law firm, respondent should have
immediately informed both the complainant and Balageo that
he, as well as the other members of his law firm, cannot
represent any of them in their legal tussle; otherwise, they
would be representing conflicting interests and violate the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Indeed, respondent could have
simply advised both complainant and Balageo to instead
engage the services of another lawyer.
The penalty for representing conflicting interests may either be
reprimand or suspension from the practice of law ranging from
six months to two years. 17 We thus adopt the recommendation
of the IBP Board of Governors.
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and AFFIRMS the January 15,
2012 Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors. Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis is found GUILTY of
violating Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months effective upon receipt of this
Resolution. He is warned that a commission of the same or
similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a
stiffer penalty.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered into the records of Atty.
Riz Tingalon L. Davis and furnished to the Office of the Clerk of
Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their information
and guidance.
Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis is DIRECTED to inform the Court of
the date of his receipt of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10567

February 25, 2015

24

WILFREDO
ANGLO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE MA. V. VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE MA. J. CIOCON,
ATTY. PHILIP Z. DABAO, ATTY. LILY UYV ALENCIA, ATTY.
JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ATTY. CRIS G. DIONELA, ATTY.
RAYMUNDO
T.
PANDAN,
JR.,* ATTY.
RODNEY
K.
RUBICA,** and
ATTY.
WILFRED
RAMON
M.
PENALOSA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case stemming from a complaintaffidavit1 dated December 4, 2009 filed by complainant Wilfredo
Anglo (complainant) charging respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V.
Valencia (Atty. Valencia), Jose Ma. J. Ciocon (Atty. Ciocon ), Philip
Z. Dabao (Atty. Dabao ), Lily Uy-Valencia (Atty. Uy-Valencia), Joey
P. De La Paz (Atty. De La Paz), Cris G. Dionela (Atty. Dionela),
Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr. (Atty. Pandan, Jr.), Rodney K. Rubica
(Atty. Rubica), and Wilfred Ramon M. Penalosa (Atty. Penalosa;
collectively, respondents) of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), specifica1ly the rule against conflict of
interest.
The Facts
In his complaint-affidavit, complainant alleged that he availed
the services of the law firm Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia De
La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office(law firm), of which
Attys. Valencia, Ciocon, Dabao, Uy-Valencia, De La Paz, Dionela,
Pandan, Jr., and Rubica were partners, for two (2) consolidated
labor cases2 where he was impleaded as respondent. Atty.
Dionela, a partner of the law firm, was assigned to represent
complainant. The labor cases were terminated on June 5, 2008
upon the agreement of both parties. 3
On September 18, 2009, a criminal case4 for qualified theft was
filed against complainant and his wife by FEVE Farms
Agricultural Corporation (FEVE Farms) acting through a certain
Michael Villacorta (Villacorta). Villacorta, however, was
represented by the law firm, the same law office which handled
complainants labor cases. Aggrieved, complainant filed this
disbarment case against respondents, alleging that they
violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR, 5 to wit:
CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH
HIS CLIENTS.
xxxx
RULE 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
xxxx
CANON 21 A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES
AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEYCLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.
In their defense,6 respondents admitted that they indeed
operated under the name Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La
Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office, but explained that their
association is not a formal partnership, but one that is subject to
certain "arrangements." According to them, each lawyer
contributes a fixed amount every month for the maintenance of
the entire office; and expenses for cases, such as
transportation, copying, printing, mailing, and the like are

shouldered by each lawyer separately, allowing each lawyer to

fix and receive his own professional fees exclusively. 7 As such,
the lawyers do not discuss their clientele with the other lawyers
and associates, unless they agree that a case be handled
collaboratively. Respondents claim that this has been the
practice of the law firm since its inception. They averred that
complainants labor cases were solely and exclusively handled
by Atty. Dionela and not by the entire law firm. Moreover,
respondents asserted that the qualified theft case filed by FEVE
Farms was handled by Atty. Pealosa, a new associate who had
no knowledge of complainants labor cases, as he started
working for the firm after the termination thereof. 8 Meanwhile,
Atty. Dionela confirmed that he indeed handled complainants
labor cases but averred that it was terminated on June 13,
2008,9 and that complainant did not have any monthly retainer
contract.10 He likewise explained that he did not see the need to
discuss complainants labor cases with the other lawyers as the
issue involved was very simple, 11 and that the latter did not
confide any secret during the time the labor cases were pending
that would have been used in the criminal case with FEVE
Farms. He also claimed that the other lawyers were not aware of
the details of complainants labor cases nor did they know that
he was the handling counsel for complainant even after the said
cases were closed and terminated.12 The IBPs Report and
Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation 13 dated September 26, 2011,
the IBP Commissioner found respondents to have violated the
rule on conflict of interest and recommended that they be
reprimandedtherefor, with the exception of Atty. Dabao, who
had died on January 17, 2010.14 The IBP found that complainant
was indeed represented in the labor cases by the respondents
acting together as a law firm and not solely by Atty. Dionela.
Consequently, there was a conflict of interest in this case, as
respondents, through Atty. Pealosa, having been retained by
FEVE Farms, created a connection that would injure complainant
in the qualified theft case. Moreover, the termination of
attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to
represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the
former client.15
In a Resolution16 dated February 12, 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the IBP Commissioners
Report and Recommendation with modification. Instead of the
penalty of reprimand, the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the
case with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.
Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration 17 thereof, which
the IBP Board of Governors granted in its Resolution 18 dated
March 23, 2014 and thereby (a) set aside its February 12, 2013
Resolution and (b) adopted and approved the IBP
Commissioners
Report
and
Recommendation,
with
modification, (1) reprimanding the respondents for violation of
the rule on conflict of interest; (2) dismissing the case against
Atty. Dabao in view of his death; and (3) suspending Atty.
Dionela from the practice of law for one year, being the
handling counsel of complainants labor cases.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondents
are guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of the
pertinent provisions of the CPR.
The Courts Ruling
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR provide:
CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH
HIS CLIENTS.

25

xxxx
RULE 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
xxxx
CANON 21 A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES
AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEYCLIENT RELATIONSHIP IS TERMINATED.
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,19 the Court explained the concept of
conflict of interest in this wise:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent
interests
of
two
or
more
opposing
parties.1wphi1 The test is "whether or not in behalf of one
client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it
is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues
for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he
argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have been confided, but
also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the
new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his
new relation to use against his first client any knowledge
acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.20
As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients
whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner,
whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally
unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of
public policy and good taste. 21 In this case, the Court concurs
with the IBPs conclusions that respondents represented
conflicting interests and must therefore be held liable. As the
records bear out, respondents law firm was engaged and, thus,
represented complainant in the labor cases instituted against
him. However, after the termination thereof, the law firm agreed
to represent a new client, FEVE Farms, in the filing of a criminal
case for qualified theft against complainant, its former client,
and his wife. As the Court observes, the law firms unethical
acceptance of the criminal case arose from its failure to
organize and implement a system by which it would have been
able to keep track of all cases assigned to its handling lawyers
to the end of, among others, ensuring that every engagement it
accepts stands clear of any potential conflict of interest. As an
organization of individual lawyers which, albeit engaged as a
collective, assigns legal work to a corresponding handling
lawyer, it behooves the law firm to value coordination in
deference to the conflict of interest rule. This lack of
coordination, as respondents law firm exhibited in this case,
intolerably renders its clients secrets vulnerable to undue and
even adverse exposure, eroding in the balance the lawyer-client
relationships primordial ideal of unimpaired trust and
confidence. Had such system been institutionalized, all of its
members, Atty. Dionela included, would have been wary of the
above-mentioned conflict, thereby impelling the firm to decline
FEVE Farms subsequent engagement. Thus, for this
shortcoming, herein respondents, as the charged members of
the law firm, ought to be administratively sanctioned. Note that
the Court finds no sufficient reason as to why Atty. Dionela
should suffer the greater penalty of suspension. As the Court
sees it, all respondents stand in equal fault for the law firms
deficient organization for which Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and

Canon 21 of the CPR had been violated. As such, all of them are
meted with the same penalty of reprimand, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt
with more severely.
As a final point, the Court clarifies that respondents' pronounced
liability is not altered by the fact that the labor cases against
complainant had long been terminated. Verily, the termination
of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer
to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the
former client. The client's confidence once reposed should not
be divested by mere expiration of professional employment. 22
WHEREFORE, respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia, Jose Ma. J.
Ciocon, Lily Uy-Valencia, Joey P. De La Paz, Cris G. Dionela,
Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr., Rodney K. Rubica, and Wilfred Ramon
M. Penalosa are found GUILTY of representing conflicting
interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and are therefore
REPRIMANDED for said violations, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt with
more severely. Meanwhile, the case against Atty. Philip Dabao is
DISMISSED in view of his death.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to respondents' personal records as
attorneys. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10687, July 22, 2015
MABINI COLLEGES, INC. REPRESENTED BY MARCEL N.
LUKBAN, ALBERTO I. GARCIA, JR., AND MA. PAMELA
ROSSANA
A.
APUYA, Complainant, v. ATTY.
JOSE
D.
PAJARILLO, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a verified complaint1 for disbarment against
respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo for allegedly violating Canon
15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
prohibits a lawyer from representing conflicting interests and
Canon 15 of the same Code which enjoins a lawyer to observe
candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions
with
clients.
The salient facts of the case follow:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In 1995, the complainant, Mabini Colleges, Inc., had a Board of
Trustees which was divided into two opposing factions. The first
faction, called the Adeva Group, was composed of Romulo M.
Adeva, Lydia E. Cacawa, Eleodoro D. Bicierro, and Pilar I.
Andrade. The other faction, called the Lukban Group, was
composed of Justo B. Lukban, Luz I. Garcia, Alice I. Adeva, and
Marcel
N.
Lukban.
In 1996, the complainant appointed the respondent as its
corporate secretary with a total monthly compensation and
honorarium
of
P6,000.
On March 29, 1999, the Adeva Group issued an unnumbered
Board Resolution which authorized Pilar I. Andrade, the
Executive Vice President and Treasurer of the complainant at
that time, and Lydia E. Cacawa, the Vice President for
Administration and Finance, to apply for a loan with the Rural

26

Bank of Paracale (RBP), Daet Branch, Camarines Norte in favor

of
the
complainant.
On May 12, 1999, the Lukban Group sent a letter to RBP to
oppose the loan application because the Adeva Group
appointed Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano, who were
allegedly not registered as stockholders in the Stock and
Transfer Book of the complainant, as members of the Board of
Trustees. The Lukban Group also alleged that the complainant
was
having
financial
difficulties.

the complainant merely appointed him as its corporate

secretary. The Investigating Commissioner also held that the
personality of complainant's representatives to file this
administrative case is immaterial since proceedings for
disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken
by the Supreme Court motu proprio or by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person.

On May 14, 1999, respondent sent a letter to RBP to assure the

latter of complainant's financial capacity to pay the loan.

On June 21, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued

Resolution No. XX-2013-770 4 which affirmed the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner and imposed a penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one year against
respondent.

On July 13, 1999, RBP granted the loan application in the

amount of P200,000 which was secured by a Real Estate
Mortgage
over
the
properties
of
the
complainant.

On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued

Resolution No. XXI-2014-2905 which denied the motion for
reconsideration
filed
by
respondent.

On September 27, 1999, the Securities and Exchange

Commission (SEC) issued an Order which nullified the
appointment of Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano by the Adeva
Group as members of the Board of Trustees of the complainant.
As a result, complainant sent a letter to RBP to inform the latter
of
the
SEC
Order.

The issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of

representing conflicting interests when he entered his
appearance as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of
mortgage
filed
by
complainant
against
RBP.

On October 19, 1999, RBP sent a letter to the complainant

acknowledging receipt of the SEC Order and informing the latter
that the SEC Order was referred to RBP's legal counsel, herein
respondent. The complainant alleged that it was only upon
receipt of such letter that it became aware that respondent is
also
the
legal
counsel
of
RBP.
On April 18, 2000, complainant and RBP increased the loan to
P400,000.
On April 23, 2002, RBP moved to foreclose the Real Estate
Mortgage.
On May 28, 2002, complainant filed a complaint for Annulment
of Mortgage with a Prayer for Preliminary Injunction against RBP.
Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for RBP.
On September 2, 2011, complainant filed the present complaint
for disbarment against the respondent for allegedly
representing conflicting interests and for failing to exhibit
candor,
fairness,
and
loyalty.
Respondent raised three defenses against the complaint for
disbarment. First, respondent argued that Marcel N. Lukban,
Alberto I. Garcia Jr., and Ma. Pamela Rossana Apuya cannot
represent the complainant in this disbarment case because they
were not duly authorized by the Board of Directors to file the
complaint. Second, respondent claimed that he is not covered
by the prohibition on conflict of interest which applies only to
the legal counsel of complainant. Respondent argued that he
merely served as the corporate secretary of complainant and
did not serve as its legal counsel. Third, respondent argued that
there was no conflict of interest when he represented RBP in the
case for annulment of mortgage because all the documents and
information related to the loan transaction between RBP and the
complainant were public records. Thus, respondent claimed that
he could not have taken advantage of his position as the mere
corporate
secretary
of
the
complainant.
On February 14, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner issued a
Report and Recommendation2 finding respondent guilty of
representing conflicting interests and recommending that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for at least
one year. The Investigating Commissioner noted that
respondent appeared for RBP in the case for annulment of
mortgage filed by his former client, the complainant herein. The
Investigating Commissioner cited cash vouchers 3 from 1994 to
2001 showing that respondent was paid by complainant for his
retained legal services. According to the Investigating
Commissioner, these vouchers debunk respondent's claim that

We rule in the affirmative. We thus affirm the Report and

Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and
Resolution Nos. XX-2013-770 and XXI-2014-290 of the IBP Board
of Governors. Indeed, respondent represented conflicting
interests in violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall
not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."
This rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose
interests oppose those of a former client in any manner,
whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally
unrelated cases.6 Based on the principles of public policy and
good taste, this prohibition on representing conflicting interests
enjoins lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice. 7 In Maturan v.
Gonzales8 we further explained the rationale for the
prohibition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney
and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highest
degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected
with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak points
of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must
be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity
must be given him to take advantage of the client's secrets. A
lawyer must have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the
confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss
thereof.
Meanwhile, in Hornilla v. Salunat,9 we explained the test to
determine
the
existence
of
conflict
of
interest:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test
is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty
to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for
the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is
conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him
and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to
use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity

27

and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or

double dealing in the performance thereof.
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest applies to situations
wherein a lawyer would be representing a client whose interest
is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. 10 It
also applies when the lawyer represents a client against a
former client in a controversy that is related, directly or
indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in
which he appeared for the former client. 11This rule applies
regardless of the degree of adverse interests. 12 What a lawyer
owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client's
confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will
injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously
represented him.13 A lawyer may only be allowed to represent a
client involving the same or a substantially related matter that
is materially adverse to the former client only if the former
client consents to it after consultation. 14chanrobleslaw
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, we find that
respondent represented conflicting interests when he served as
counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by
the complainant, respondent's former client, against RBP.
The finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent
was compensated by complainant for his retained legal services
is supported by the evidence on record, the cash vouchers from
1994 to 2001. Clearly, complainant was respondent's former
client. And respondent appeared as counsel of RBP in a case
filed by his former client against RBP. This makes respondent
guilty of representing conflicting interests since respondent
failed to show any written consent of all concerned (particularly
the complainant) given after a full disclosure of the facts
representing
conflicting
interests. 15chanrobleslaw
We also note that the respondent acted for the complainant's
interest on the loan transaction between RBP and the
complainant when he sent a letter dated May 14, 1999 to RBP
to assure the latter of the financial capacity of the complainant
to pay the loan. But as counsel for RBP in the case for
annulment of mortgage, he clearly acted against the interest of
the
complainant,
his
former
client.
Contrary to the respondent's claim, it is of no moment that all
the documents and information in connection with the loan
transaction between RBP and the complainant were public
records. In Hilado v. David,16 we laid down the following
doctrinal pronouncements:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged
to represent a client from thereafter appearing on behalf of the
client's opponent applies equally even though during the
continuance of the employment nothing of a confidential nature
was revealed to the attorney by the client. (Christian vs.
Waialua Agricultural Co., 30 Hawaii, 553, Footnote 7, C. J. S.,

828.)
Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party in
litigation, had formerly represented the adverse party with
respect to the same matter involved in the litigation, the court
need not inquire as to how much knowledge the attorney
acquired from his former client during that relationship, before
refusing to permit the attorney to represent the adverse party.
(Brown vs. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286, F. 994.)
In order that a court may prevent an attorney from appearing
against a former client, it is unnecessary that the court
ascertain in detail the extent to which the former client's affairs
might have a bearing on the matters involved in the subsequent
litigation on the attorney's knowledge thereof. (Boyd vs. Second
Judicial
Dist.
Court,
274
P.,
7;
51
Nev.,
264.)
This rule has been so strictly enforced that it has been held that
an attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot thereafter
act as counsel against his client in the same general matter,
even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no
knowledge which could operate to his client's disadvantage in
the subsequent adverse employment. (Pierce vs. Palmer [1910],
31 R. I., 432; 77 Atl., 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S, 181.)
Thus, the nature and extent of the information received by the
lawyer from his client is irrelevant in determining the existence
of
conflict
of
interest.
Finally, we agree with the Investigating Commissioner that a
complaint for disbarment is imbued with public interest which
allows for a liberal rule on legal standing. Under Section 1, Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court, "[proceedings for the disbarment,
suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person."
Thus, in the present case, we find that Marcel N. Lukban,
Alberto I. Garcia Jr., and Ma. Pamela Rossana A. Apuya can
institute the complaint for disbarment even without authority
from
the
Board
of
Directors
of
the
complainant.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Resolution No. XX-2013770 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-290 of the IBP Board of
Governors imposing a penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for one year against respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

28