Safety In Process Design

General Principles
The Design of Safety Into a Process is the Responsibility of the
Process Design Engineer.
Every Design Must be Safe Against Reasonable Causes of Failure.
Adequate Facilities Must be Incorporated Into the Design to Prevent
Fires, Explosions, and Accidents and to Minimise Releases.
All Process Designs (Grass-Roots and Revisions) are Subject to
HAZOP Review and by pertinent Safe Operations Committees to
Ensure that Safety Standards are Being Followed.
The Need for OIMS Compliance

Slide 12.2

References For Safety In Process Design

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

API Recommended Practices 520, Parts I and II, and 521.

ASME Code, ANSI Standard B31.3
PC Models Available for Network Analyses.
Air Pollution Calculations - Dispersion Models
Within ExxonMobil:
ExxonMobil Design Practices, Section XV,
Global Practices
Local Engineering Standards

Slide 12.3

Whats a Contingency?
z

Abnormal events that cause an emergency situation

A units safety facilities are designed to handle the load resulting from the limiting
contingency.

To develop a contingency, consider all direct effects. For example:

If loss of instrument air causes a valve in the cooling water circuit to fail closed...then both
the air failure and loss of cooling water must be considered simultaneously.

Multiple units may be effected:

Power Failure
Reformer upset causing loss of hydrogen, etc.

Slide 12.4

Contingency Evaluation Assumptions

z

Consider only one contingency at a time. Assuming two unrelated contingencies

will occur simultaneously is not warranted.

Immediately prior to an emergency, plant was in a normal operating condition.

All normally operating equipment continues to function if it is not directly part of the
contingency.

Blowdown valves and pressure control valves normally closed should not be
assumed to be operable in a emergency and credit should not be taken for their
capacity when determining relief rates.

Normally open valves not directly part of the contingency are assumed to remain
open -- Okay to take credit to reduce relief rate.

Slide 12.5

Contingency Types
Two types:
z

Design Contingencies - Fire, Utility Failure, Mechanical Failure or Operator Error

Remote Contingencies - Abnormal events with an extremely low probability that

are not considered a design contingency. Examples include:

Interrelated double contingencies which could develop pressures or temperatures

sufficient to cause catastrophic failure, or result in large releases

Heat exchanger tube failure

Inadvertent closure of car sealed open (CSO) valve

Inadvertent opening of car sealed closed (CSC) valve

A control valve failing open with its bypass fully open

Upside down rupture disk

Plugging of a fixed bed catalyst bed

Slide 12.6

More on Remote Contingencies

z

ASME code does not directly address remote

contingencies, so they should not be the sizing
contingency for the PR valve.

Remote contingencies are not part of the design

basis, but equipment must be checked to ensure
it wont fail during a remote contingency.

Equipment allowed to exceed the design

pressure by 1.5 times, or to the hydrotest
pressure, whichever is less.

If the PR valve relief area for the remote

contingency calculated based on the "1.5 Times
Rule" exceeds that calculated for design
contingency, size the valve based on the remote
contingency.

Slide 12.7

Interpretation of PRV Sizing for Remote Contingencies

If remote contingency sizes safety PR

valve, increase normal contingency rate
until normal contingency sizes PR valve.
Basis (DP XV-C p. 25)
"Remote Contingency Rule" - The additional load caused by the remote contingency (to which the Remote
Contingency Rule" is applied) need not be considered in calculations of flare and PR valve radiant heat levels. For
situations where the required relief area calculated for the remote contingency on the basis of the "Remote
Contingency Rule" exceeds the relief area installed for the limiting design contingency, or when the remote contingency
is the only overpressure scenario applicable to a pressure relief valve, the required PR valve relief area must be
calculated on the basis of considering the situation which would otherwise be considered a remote contingency as a
design contingency. The ASME Code does not recognize remote contingencies; hence, a remote contingency is not an
acceptable basis for the design/installation of PR devices stamped to the ASME Code (where the accumulation in the
protected system is limited to 10% of the Design Pressure of the system for single PR devices or 16% for multiple PR
devices.)

Slide 12.8

Design Contingencies - Fire

z

STRATEGY:

Set up fire zones within an onsite unit where

equipment is separated by at least 20 feet (6.1
m) in all directions (In calculating fire loads, it is
assumed that all of the equipment in a single
fire zone is exposed to fire).

Calculate heat transferred into the equipment

(see next slide)

Then calculate the PRV load based on the

latent heat of the liquid.

Basis (DP XV-C p. 29)

The Fire Risk Area for the purpose of determining overpressure protection are established by the provision of
accessways or clear spacing at least 20 ft wide on all sides with drainage to catch basins located with in the Fire
Risk Area, which permit fire fighting attach into all parts of the area and which limit the spread of fire. Clear space
under pipebands, if more than 20 ft wide is considered as acceptable separation between Fire Risk Areas for the
purpose of determining overpressure protections. The selection of single Fire Risk Areas within a plan or unit must,
in addition, consider the design of the drainage system and the equipment layout.. These should be selected to
limit the extent of the Fire Risk Area to no more than 5000 ft

Slide 12.9

Calculating Fire Loads

HEAT INPUT
For equipment with good drainage, use the equation:
Q = 21,000 F A0.82

(customary)

Q = 43.2 F A0.82

(metric)

Where:

Q = Total heat absorbed by the equipment Btu/hr (kW)

A = Total wetted surface of the equipment which absorbs heat, ft2 (m2)
F = Environmental factor

For facilities that lack good drainage the equation changes to:
Q = 34,000 F A0.82

(customary)

Q = 70.9 F A0.82

(metric)

VAPOR LOAD
z

Calculate the vapor load by converting the heat input to the equipment to vapor
load using the following equation:
W=Q/L
Where:

Slide 12.10

W = Vapor generated, lb/hr (kg/s)

L = Latent heat of vaporization, Btu/lb (kJ/kg)

Calculating Fire Loads (Cont.)

WETTED SURFACE AREA
Total wetted surface within 25 ft (7.5 m) of grade or other surface which could sustain
a fire (e.g. solid platform). In the case of vessels containing a variable level of liquid,
use the HLL.
z

Horizontal Drums
For vessel elevations up to 25 ft (7.5 m) above grade
use total vessel wetted surface up to high liquid level.
For vessel elevations more than 25 ft (7.5 m) above
grade use total wetted surface to high liquid level or up
to vessel centerline, whichever is less.

Vertical Drums
The wetted surface within 25 ft (7.5 m) of grade, based
on high liquid level, is used. If the entire vessel is more
than 25 ft (7.5 m) above grade, then only the surface of
the bottom head need be included.

Slide 12.11

Calculating Fire Loads (Cont.)

z

Fractionators and other Towers

An equivalent "tower dumped" level is calculated by
adding liquid holdup on the trays to the liquid at high liquid
level hold up at the tower bottom. If the entire vessel is
more than 25 ft (7.5 m) above grade, then only the surface
of the bottom head need be included.

Storage Spheres and Spheroids

The total exposed area within 25 ft (7.5 m) of
grade, or up to the elevation of the centerline,
whichever is greater.

Heat Exchangers, Air Fins and Piping

The surface area of a tower reboiler and its
interconnected piping should be included in the
wetted surface of exposed vessels in the risk area.
The fin area of air fin exchangers and piping area,
other than that for reboilers, are not normally
included in the wetted surface area.

Slide 12.12

Calculating Latent Heat of Vaporization

z

Calculate at different % vaporized

Can take adjustment for changing wetted area, if applicable
See DP XV-C Appendix A
Automatically calculated in PEGASYS
Note this is not a true Heat of Vaporization because it includes heat to raise
the temperature of the bulk fluid, but is the correct value to use

z
z

Fire Release Calculation

Calculated in PEGASYS, Safety Valve Sizing Module
250

Heat of Vaporization (Btu/lb)

Release Rate (klb/h)

200

150

100

50

Maximum Release

0
0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4
% Vaporized

Slide 12.13

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

Design Contingencies - Utility Failures

The most common utility failures are:

Electric Power
Cooling Water
Steam
Instrument
Air
Fuel
Nitrogen

Utility failures can have unexpected consequences. It is necessary to consider all of

the possible effects and interrelationships.

Slide 12.14

Emergency Conditions Example Of Utility Failure

(C.W.)
PRV

Assume: Stays in
Normal Position
Water

Gas

Prod
Overhead Condenser Water Failure
Slide 12.15

Plant Cooling Water Failures For PRV Sizing

Cooling Water Supply
Remote
Contingency

++Closure
Closureof
of
gate
valve(s)
gate valve(s)isis
aanormal
normal
contingency
contingency
++Line
Linebreak
breakisis
usually
usually aa
remote
remote
contingency
contingency

*
Normal
Contingency

Unit

Unit

Unit

Slide 12.16

Cooling
Water
Return

Failures

Design Contingency - Equipment Failure

and Operator Error
Equipment is subject to individual mechanical failure; contingencies include:

pumps
compressors
fans
mixers
instruments
control valves (which might fail open or closed)

Operator or human error, such as opening or closing

the wrong valve, is considered a design contingency.
Operator error is most likely to occur when the unit is
upset and the operators are very busy.

Slide 12.17

Emergency Conditions, Example Of Equipment Failure

(Blowthrough)
PRV

Atmos. or Flare

1. Assume bypass 50% of

CV normal operating Cv,
CV fully open - limit tower
to 110% of design pres
(normal contingency)

Fails Open

Bypass Valve

Slide 12.18

2. Assume bypass and CV full

open - limit tower overpressure
to lower of 150% of DP or test
pressure (remote contingency)

Tower

3. Assume bypass closed;

CV fully open; tower
blocked in; gas flow only
limit tower to 110% of
design pres (startup
condition)

Emergency Conditions Example Of Operating Failure

Set at
300 psig

D.P.=550 psig

Slide 12.19

D.P.=550 psig

Liquid
Discharge
PRV

D.P.=550 psig

Pump Shutoff P = 500 psi

Max. Suction Pressure = 50 psig
Max. Discharge Pressure = 550 psig

Desalter
D.P.=300 psig

Design Contingency - Exothermic Reactor

z

Usually protected by high-temperature cutouts that automatically depressure the

reactor system when the temperature reaches a predetermined level. The
protection system may be initiated by situations in addition to high reactor
temperature, such as loss of feed flow. (We will discuss this later.)

Protection may also be achieved by responses other than depressurization. These

responses depend on the configuration of the individual unit, and may include:
shutting off the flow of reactants
tripping feed and/or treat gas heaters

Slide 12.20

a2

Design Contingencies - Liquid Overfill

z

PR valves are often located in the vapor space of partially filled liquid vessels such as towers,
drums, etc. which could overfill during a plant upset. If overfill can result in a pressure above
the design pressure of the vessel, the PR must be sized for overpressure from liquid overfill
considering the higher of:

stoppage of liquid outflow with maximum operational fill rates

increased liquid fill rates with outflows at turndown rates

The overfill must be considered as a design contingency unless all of the following are
provided:

The vessel has an safety critical independent high level alarm (LHA).*

The vessel vapor space above the LHA is equivalent to a minimum of 30-minute holdup
with a design inlet rate and the outlet rate stopped.

The vessel has a safety critical high-level cut-out (LHCO) on all liquid feeds designed to
prevent overfill*. Level Instruments for LHCO are independent from the LHA and normal
controls.

The total safety critical LHA/LHCO system should have a high overall availability (99+%),
with at least one component (LHA or LHCO) achieving 97% availability.

* LHA and LHCO will be designed to GP-15-07-02 standards and will function for all possible process conditions and will function
during all instance where liquid discharge from the PR device is possible (including startup and shutdown)

Slide 12.21

Slide 21
a2

I summarized the 7 criteria from pages 36 of DP VX-C (2008) to 4 points.

ashotru, 10/1/08

Thermal Expansion
z

Lines or equipment which can be left full of liquid under non-flow conditions and
which can be heated while completely blocked-in must have some means of
relieving pressure that may build up due to thermal expansion of the contained
liquid.

Protection against thermal expansion may be provided by one of the following

methods:
Installation of a PR valve.
Installation of a small permanently open CSO bypass around one of the block
valves per GP 03-02-04. An alternative could be a drilled hole in all of the
block valves (or check valve) as long as the leakage is acceptable and
accounted for in the design. *
Safety critical procedures ensuring that blocked in equipment is drained of
liquid. *
(* These may not be permitted by local codes.)

Slide 12.22

Heat Exchanger Tube Splits

z

Tube splits, unlike the other special contingencies

discussed previously, are considered a remote
contingency.

In a shell and tube exchanger, the tubes are subject

to failure from a number of causes, including:
thermal shock
vibration
corrosion

Whatever the cause, the possibility of overpressuring equipment on the low

pressure side of the exchanger is the result. Since it is a remote contingency, the
1.5 rule applies.

In this case, the low pressure side of the exchanger must be protected by pressure
relief devices if the design pressure on the high pressure side is more than 1.5
times the design pressure on the low pressure side and the low pressure side
cannot handle the discharge from a split tube without exceeding 1.5 times the
design pressure on the low pressure side.

Slide 12.23

Tube Split Primer

z

z
z

When possible, design low pressure side for minimum 2/3 of high pressure side
Meets 2/3 rule, so no analysis is required
Logic: maximum pressure achievable is 150% of design (remote contingency)
If low pressure side does not meet 2/3 rule:
Verify low pressure side does not exceed 150% of design pressure during tube split
z Calculate high pressure fluid rate entering low pressure side for tube split
1 tube (two severed tubes ends) for most cases
10 tubes if 1000 psi (70 kg/cm2) pressure difference and an active corrosion
mechanism
z Adiabatically flash leaked high pressure fluid to 150% of low pressure design
pressure
z Compare:
New low pressure piping velocity (of leaked high pressure fluid)
Low pressure fluid velocity before leak occurred
z If velocity had to increase, pressure relief is required
Some exceptions exist for double pipes, tubular reactors, and low stress tubes
Always check for (6.4 mm) tube leak as a normal contingency, including when taking
HX out of service

Slide 12.24

Heat Exchanger Leak

z

Provide PR valve if leak would overpressure low pressure side during:

Normal operation
Operational upset could block in low pressure side
Downstream valve (control, EBV, block) could block in low pressure side
z Exception for manual block valve at exchanger if:
Low pressure side is also cold side
HX meets 2/3 rule
Warning signs installed preventing blocking before high pressure side
is blocked

Slide 12.25

Explosion Caused By Operating Error (Closing The Drain On a

Blocked-in, Unblinded Exchanger, with tube leak)
7 psig
D

Leaks
A

P/S
Crude 425 psig
Crude Leak in No. 1 Cooler
Operator Closed C & D (LP Hot Side)
Operator Closed A & B (HP Cold Side)
Operator Opened Drain on Shell Side
Operator Closed Drain on Shell Side

Exchanger Blew Up (high pressure crude

leaked through valve and into low pressure
side and overpressured shell)
Slide 12.26

B
2

Requirements For PRVs (Contd)

Pumps
PRVs are required on discharge when downstream facilities can be over-pressured. Typically
it is not permitted to discharge the PRV back to the suction source of the pump as
demonstrated here, but it may be the solution for debottlenecking.

Set @ 60 psig

P1=20 psig

Conventional PSV
Set @ 150 psig
i.e. Spring DP=130 psig

On air failure P1 rises to 66 psig and a

conventional PRV will not open until P2
Reaches 66 + 130=196 psig well over the
permitted 150 psig!

P2=125 psig
A Bellows or Pilot PRV may be acceptable in this situation.
Slide 12.27

PRV

Requirements For PRVs (Contd)

Furnaces
If There is a Restriction or Valve in the Outlet Line, PRVs are Required. If the Outlet Valve
is Car Sealed Open (CSO), a PRV MIGHT be Avoided. However, an outlet block valve is not
normally necessary

PRV

- Normally Preferred
-Required if Feed is All Vapor
(To Provide Continued Flow)

Slide 12.28

PRV

- Only When Feed Contains Liquid, and:

- PRV Would Coke on Outlet
- PRV Cannot be Purged

Blowthrough
25
PSIG

FLARE
VACUUM CRUDE O/H
0 PSIG
120 F
VACUUM
COMPRESSOR
OR FURNACE

NC

6"

OIL PUMPS

Slide 12.29

Blowthrough (Contd)
25
PSIG

FLARE
VACUUM CRUDE O/H
0 PSIG
120 F
VACUUM
COMPRESSOR
OR FURNACE

NC

CSC
6"

OIL PUMPS

Slide 12.30

Special Contingencies
Presence of Highly Volatile Materials (e.g. Water in Feed)
z Difficult to apply PR valve protection
z Design /operation should minimize likelihood
Chemical Reactions
z Temperature runaway
z Decomposition reactions
Thermal Expansion
z Piping blocked in and heated by steam tracing or solar
radiation
z Heat exchanger blocked in on cold side with flow
continuing on the hot side

Slide 12.31

Pressure Relief Valves

z

Last resort to protect equipment from overpressuring

Required by codes (i.e. ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Codes, ANSI B31.3
(Petroleum Refinery Piping), and ANSI B16.5 (Flanges & Flanged Fittings).

These codes specify:

All pressure vessels subject to overpressure shall be protected by a PRV

z

Some locations may require all vessels have PRV

Liquid filled vessels or piping subject to thermal expansion must be protected by a thermal
relief device.

Multiple vessels may be protected by a single PRV provided there is a clear, unobstructed
path to the device.
z

No flame/detonation arresters, normally no control valves

At least one PRV must be set at or below the design pressure.

Slide 12.32

Requirements For Pressure Relief Valves

Vessel
+ Any Vessel that can be Overpressured Must Be Protected by a PRV
PRV

No Valves
Between
Vessels

PRV

+ Per ASME Code Case 2211 allows vessels less than or equal to 2 ft in diameter made of piping components
that are not stamped, ASME coded vessels to be protected by system design (i.e. no PSV).
Slide 12.33

Multiple Pressure Relief Valves

z

When to use multiple PRVs:

If the valve area required is larger than the largest available PRV
To better match contingency flow rates with valve capacity to avoid potential "chattering".
If multiple PRVs are more economical than one very large valve due to mechanical design
considerations.

PRV design and set point when two or more valves are used:

One of the PRVs must be set at the design pressure (or MAWP); additional valves can be
set up to 5% above the design pressure (or MAWP).
Non-fire contingency, design valves based on 16% accumulated pressure in the vessel.
Fire contingency, a supplemental valve designed to handle the fire load can be set as high
as 10% above the design pressure, and the capacity should be calculated based on 21%
accumulation

Slide 12.34

Conventional Relief Valve

z

The conventional relief valve is used

for the majority of refinery and
chemical plant services.

This spring loaded, top-guided, high

lift, nozzle-type pressure relief valve
can handle a maximum built-up back
pressure of 10% of set pressure
(except for fire, where 21% is
acceptable).

Slide 12.35

Conventional Relief Valve Operation

Slide 12.36

The operation and

characteristics of a conventional
PRV are shown graphically.

This figure conforms to the

requirements of Section VII of
the ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code. The pressure
conditions shown here are for
pressure relief valves installed
on a pressure vessel. Allowable
set-pressure tolerances will be in
accordance with the applicable
codes.

Differences Between PRVs in Vapor and Liquid

Service
z

VAPOR
PRVs are specifically designed for "pop" action. (i.e. they move to the full open
position at only a slight overpressure). The valve remains fully open as the
pressure builds to the permissible maximum, when the rated capacity is fully
discharged.

LIQUID
PRVs are designed to lift progressively with rising pressure until the full open
position is reached.

Slide 12.37

Balanced Bellows Pressure Relief Valve

z

Balanced bellows PR valves are similar

to conventional PR valves, but are
designed to minimize the effect of back
pressure on valve performance.

Back pressure affects conventional and

balanced bellows valves differently.

Slide 12.38

Conventional vs Balanced Bellows PRVs

z
z

Conventional valve. Back pressure

increases set pressure.
When back pressure fluctuates on a
conventional valve, the valve may open at
too low a pressure or permit the vessel to
exceed equipment rating, depending upon
the back pressure adjustment and spring
pressure adjustment.

Slide 12.39

z
z

Balanced bellows valve. Back pressure

has little effect on set pressure.
The balanced bellows achieves balancing
of the valve disc by venting the interior of
the bellows thorough the bonnet chamber
to the atmosphere. Venting arrangements
must be carefully designed, because any
bellows failure or leakage will permit
process fluid from the discharge side to be
released to the atmosphere.

When to Specify Bellows Valves

z

High / Fluctuating Back Pressure: Back pressure has little effect on balanced
bellows set pressure. When back pressure fluctuates on a conventional valve, the
valve may open at too low a pressure or permit the vessel to exceed equipment
rating.

Fouling or Corrosive Service: Balanced bellows PRVs are used in these

services because the bellows shields the spring from the process fluid.

High Back Pressure: The balanced bellows PRVs can be used at considerably
higher back pressure than conventional PRVs:
z

Total back pressure (super imposed plus build-up back pressure) up to 50% of PRV
set pressure.

In retrofits, the back pressure may rise up to 75% of the set pressure, but will result in
reduced capacity (contact PRV vendor).

Slide 12.40

Pilot Operated Relief Valve

z

Pilot operated relief valves have

a main valve that is combined
with and controlled by a selfactuated auxiliary PR valve (or
pilot valve). These valves use
process pressure instead of a
spring to keep the valve closed.

Slide 12.41

Pilot Operated Relief Valve: Advantages

Pilot operated relief valves have several advantages, summarized below.
z

Retrofits
They may be used in retrofit situations where there is less margin between
operating and design pressure, because simmer does not start until about 98% of
set pressure.

Less Chattering
They are less subject to chattering, because they can be designed as
modulating, only opening as much as is necessary. This is especially important
for a liquid PR valve with a long inlet line.

High Back Pressure

They can be used with backpressures as high as 50% to 75% of set pressure, if
the backpressure is accounted for in sizing the valve.

Depressuring Device
They can be used as a depressuring device. Using a remote bleed valve, pressure
may be bled from the piston chamber, causing the valve to open at less than
the set pressure.

Slide 12.42

Pilot Operated Relief Valve: Disadvantages

z

In smaller sizes, pilot operated relief valves are more costly than spring operated
PRVs.
Other disadvantages are:
Not recommended for fouling or dirty services, because of plugging of the pilot
valve and small bore piping.
Vapor condensation and liquid accumulation above the piston (or diaphragm)
may interfere with adequate lift and cause the valve to malfunction, unless
special designs are used.

Slide 12.43

a4

Slide 43
a4

This information may be mis leading, Anderson Greenwood Crosby mentioned that the cost of a pilot operating PSV is less than a
conventional for valves larger than a 4P6. Because of the cost of steel.
ashotru, 10/1/08

PRV Applications
The following table summarizes relief valve applications.

Temps > 400 F (205 C)

Conventional

Balanced
Bellows

Dirty/Corrosive Service

Pilot

Temperature Above Autoignition

Clean Service < 400 F (205 C)

Varying Backpressure

High Built-up Backpressure

Operating Close to Set Pressure

Slide 12.44

Chatter
z

Causes of chatter include:

Excessive inlet pressure drop
Excessive built-up back pressure
Oversized valve (The oversized valve must have at least 25% of capacity
utilized.)
Valve handling widely differing rates
Excessive inlet line length, especially for liquid service

Non-piping solutions to preventing chatter include:

Installing a smaller PRV
Installing a different type of PRV
Increasing blowdown

Slide 12.45

Rupture Discs
z

A rupture disc (RD) is a thin disc, usually made of

solid metal, that is designed to rupture (or burst)
at a designated pressure.

Unlike PR valves, a RD is non-reclosing; the burst

RD provides a permanent open path into the
discharge system. The discharge system may
either be the atmosphere or a closed system such
as a flare header.

There are five major types of RDs described in

DP Section XV-C. One type is shown here.

Slide 12.46

Advantages of Rupture Discs

z

No simmering or leakage - Unless the RD is corroded or damaged, there is no

simmering or leakage prior to bursting.

Open fully, rapidly - RD's open fully very rapidly, so they are good for
overpressure caused by an internal deflagration or sudden pressurization (for
example, as a result of a tube failure in a high pressure exchanger).

Less expensive corrosion resistance - It is less expensive to provide corrosion

resistance for a rupture disc than for a conventional or balanced bellows relief
valve. RDs can be made of or coated with a variety of corrosion resistant
materials.

Less fouling or plugging - There is less tendency for a rupture disc to foul or
plug. The RD opening is essentially equal to the piping bore.

Overpressure/depressure use - RD's can provide both overpressure and

depressuring protection.

Lower cost - A rupture disc can be provided at a lower initial cost than an
equivalent service PR.

Slide 12.47

Disadvantages of Rupture Discs

z

Sensitivity to temperature - Since burst pressure depends on disc material

properties, the temperature at the time of burst will cause the burst pressure to
vary. The choice of material has a great influence on sensitivity to pressure, as the
graph shows.

Non-reclosing - If the burst RD is the only protective device, it must be replaced

before operations continue. If the RD is used in series with a PR valve, operations
can continue without replacing the burst disc. However, the extra protection
afforded by the RD is lost until the burst disc is replaced.

Destructively tested - Non-destructive testing of the RD burst pressure cannot be

accomplished. Unlike PR valves, which can be adjusted, the accuracy of the burst
pressure is solely based on manufacturers tests from the same lot.

Require periodic replacement - Require periodic replacement. Most vendors

suggest RD replacement annually, but under more severe conditions more
frequent replacement may be necessary.

Easily damaged - Rupture discs are more sensitive to mechanical damage than
other pressure relief devices.

Slide 12.48

Rupture Pins
z

A rupture pin is designed to be a nonreclosing pressure relief device, similar

to a rupture disc. A piston is held in the
closed position with a buckling pin that
precisely senses axial force, and will
fail at a set pressure according to
Euler's Law. An O-ring on the piston is
used to make a bubble tight seal.

Slide 12.49

Types of Rupture Pin Devices

Slide 12.50

SAFETY VALVES FILM

Slide 12.51

Sizing Vapor Valves:

Determining if Critical Flow Exists
z

The formulas used to size vapor PR valves depend upon whether the valves
operate with critical or choked flow. This condition occurs when the flow through
the nozzle equals the speed of sound or sonic velocity.

Equation 3 in DP XV-C (shown below) can be used to determine whether a valve

has critical flow.

There will be sonic flow if the pressure relief valve's outlet pressure is equal to or
less than Px.

Slide 12.52

Sizing Vapor Valves

z

The following equation is used to calculate the required orifice area regardless
of whether the flow is critical or subcritical or PV type (conventional or
balanced) provided that the correct back pressure correction factor and
discharge coefficient are used.
Note: Pegasys may also be used to size these valves.

Slide 12.53

Sizing Liquid Valves

z

PR valves in liquid service have no critical pressure limiting the flow of through a
PR valve orifice, as is the case for vapor service. The discharge rate for nonflashing liquid through the PR valve is a function of the pressure drop across the
valve, but sizing equations depend on the valve type:

Certified valves. This new type of valve is recommended for all services where the
fluid is a non-flashing liquid except for fire. These valves will reach full capacity at
no more than 10% accumulation.

Older type valves. These valves are recommended for all services where the fluid
may contain some vapor at times. They were used for all liquid services prior to
about 1985. They do not fully lift until 25% accumulation is reached.

Pegasys may be used to size both certified and the older type valves.

Slide 12.54

Mixed Phase and Flashing Liquid Valves

z

Liquid flashing through a PR valve quickly reaches a choking condition. This

condition can be reached when the downstream pressure is 80 to 90% of the
upstream pressure. Even a small amount of flashing is sufficient to significantly
reduce the flow through the valve.

Vapors, alone, on the other hand, do not usually reach a choking condition until the
downstream pressure drops to 55 to 65% of the upstream pressure.

Design Practices, Section XV-C provides the basis for sizing these valves.
Pegasys may be used.

Slide 12.55

PROBLEM #11

Slide 12.56

Selecting the PR Valve

Table III-2 in DP XV-C shows the valve models available as a function of temperature,
flange rating and orifice size. The table provides model numbers for Crosby and Farris
valves, which are the most common types.

Slide 12.57

Designing Inlet Piping

z

PRESSURE DROP
Less than 3% of set pressure (psig) at safety valve rated capacity

SIZING
At least size of PR valve inlet
For multiple PR valves, cross-sectional area of manifold line equal to sum of
all inlets

ORIENTATION
Must drain freely back to source of fluid (no traps)

PREVENTION OF PLUGGING
Heat tracing if plugging by ice or wax
For coking, provide continuous purge of clean fluid

REMOVAL OF PR VALVE DURING OPERATION

Install bleeder between inlet block valve and PR valve

Slide 12.58

Valve Discharge Location

z

PR valves can discharge to:

a closed system (This can be a flare system, or the discharge may be returned to the
process.)

the atmosphere

Discharge to the atmosphere is permitted in only a few instances:

PR valve handling vapor only at valve inlet AND

Liquid overfill is a remote contingency AND

z

See also new requirements preventing liquid discharges to atmosphere

Potential liquid release is water or similar non-hazardous liquid at a temperature below

150F (65C) AND

Discharge to closed system not otherwise required AND

Local regulations are followed. AND

It is preferable for PR valves to discharge to a closed system when:

The vapors discharged would be significant contributors to atmospheric pollution, but do

not fall into any of the "required" categories.

Connecting to an adjacent closed header (providing that capacity is available) is less

costly than an atmospheric discharge line to a safe location.

Slide 12.59

Outlet Line Back Pressure Constraints

z

For single or multiple PRV releases discharging under a single-risk contingency:

Built-up back pressure is limited to:
z

10% of set pressure for conventional type PR valves for operating contingencies

21% of set pressure for conventional type PR valves for fire contingencies

Total back pressure (built-up + superimposed) is limited to 50% of set

pressure for balanced bellows type PR valves for either operating or fire
contingencies and 70% for pilots
z

Superimposed back pressure on the non-discharging PR valves in the system

during a maximum system release (single contingency) shall not exceed:

25% of lowest set pressure for conventional type PR valves

75% of lowest set pressure for balanced bellows / 80% pilot PR valves

Mechanical design of the PR valve shall take into account any limitations imposed
by the back pressure

Slide 12.60

Outlet Piping Design Additional Constraints

z

Discharge line size should not be less than safety valve outlet flange size

Velocity in discharge piping should not exceed 75% of sonic

Discharge piping should not contain any restrictions or liquid traps and should
slope downwards to the collection header/blowdown drum.

Atmospheric Discharge Riser need to be:

10 ft (3 m) above top platform

50 ft (15 m) horizontal distance from other equipment

Discharge vertically

No restrictions: check valves, flame arrestors or orifice plates

Maximum velocity = 75% of sonic

Minimum velocity = 100 ft/s (30 m/s) if flammable, at 25% of rated capacity

Install snuffing steam if relief to atmosphere at a temperature above auto ignition.

Install Toroidal Ring if relieving Hydrogen or Methane to atmosphere

CSO valves must have stems horizontal or vertical downwards.

Slide 12.61

PRV Discharge Piping

PRV

PRV
Pres Normally 0 psig

z
z

Set at
100 psig

Set at
400 psig
Both Valves are Relieving

For Conventional Safety Valve, Max Pres @ A = 10 psig

High Outlet Line Pressure Drop Will Cause Valve Chatter

For Balanced Bellows Valve, Max Pres @ A = 50 psig

Discharge Line Size should not be less than Safety Valve Outlet Flange size

Velocity in Discharge Piping should not Exceed 75% of Sonic

Discharge Piping should not contain any liquid traps and should slope
downwards to the Collection Header

Slide 12.62

Other Back Pressure Considerations In Discharge

Circuit
- For Conventional Safety Valve, Max Pres @ A = 25 psig
- For Balanced Bellows Valve, Max Pres @ A = 75 psig

A
PRV

PRV
Pres Normally 0 psig

Set at
100 psig

Set at
400 psig
PR Valve at A is Not Relieving

Slide 12.63

Emergency Isolation, Depressuring And Shutdown

Systems
Facilities to Stop the Uncontrolled Release of Toxic or
Flammable Materials (Minimising the Damage):
Emergency Isolation
Emergency De-pressuring
Emergency Shutdown
Water Flooding Provisions

Slide 12.64

Emergency Isolation and EBVs

z

There are four types of EBVs, designated A, B, C, and D. The design specification
designates which type of valve should be installed for each service. The types vary
with respect to the:
minimum distance from the equipment protected (at equipment to 40 ft or 12m
away)
means of activation ( manual to push button at various locations)
maximum elevation and accessibility

However, all of these valves must be capable of being stopped in mid-travel and
returned to normal position.

Slide 12.65

Types of EBVs
REQUIREMENT

APPLICABLE RESTRICTIONS FOR VALVE TYPE

A

> 25 ft (7.5 m) (1)(4)

VALVE LOCATION

Horizontal distance from source

of potential leak

At equipment

Maximum elevation above grade

At equipment

VALVE SIZE & FLANGE

RATINGS

15 ft (4.5 m)

(2)

> 25 ft (7.5 m)
15 ft (4.5 m)

(1)(4)

No restrictions

(2)

No restrictions

All sizes and classes

= 8 in. (200 mm) or

(3)
Class 300 and lower

> 8 in. (200 mm) or

(3)
Above Class 300

Recommended for

All sizes and classes

PUSH-BU1TON FOR ACTIVATION

Push-button location

Not applicable

Not applicable

At valve

Operable from

Not applicable

Not applicable

Grade or platform

Maximum elevation above grade

Not applicable

Not applicable

15 ft (4.5 m)

(2)

At grade
Not applicable

> 40 ft (12 m) from

(4)
source of leak
Grade

ACCESSIBILITY

Valve can be reached without

passing the source of potential
leak closer than

Not applicable

25 ft (7.5 m) (4)

25 ft (7.5 m)

(4)

Push-button can be operated

without passing the source of
potential leak closer than

Not applicable

Not applicable

25 ft (7.5 m)

(4)

40 ft (12 m)

(4)(5)

Notes:
(1) This distance increases to 40 ft (12 m) for manually operated block valves in process, fuel and pilot gas lines to fired heaters.
(2) If the valve is more than 75 ft (23 m) horizontally from source of potential leak, or identified as Battery Limit (BL) valve, there are
no restrictions on elevation or flange class.
(3) EBV's located at Battery Limits normally are either Type B or C. Type C EBV's are required at the battery limit only in flammable or
toxic services for valves larger than 8 in. (200 mm).
(4) For marine pier facilities, this distance is 100 ft (30 m)
(5) For pressurized and refrigerated storage facilities (e.g., LPG) the push-button should be located outside
of the dike.

Slide 12.66

Equipment Requiring EBV's

The following equipment often require EBV's:
z

Compressors of 200 HP (150 kW) and higher handling flammable or toxic gases
require EBV's in suction and discharge.

Pumps require EBV's in the suction lines when:

The inventory in the suction vessel is over 2000 gals (7.5 m3) of flammable or
4000 gals (15 m3) of combustible liquid.
Toxic liquid released from a seal failure would result in an excessive
concentration at the fence line.

Vessels may require EBVs on certain connections depending on the type and
amount of inventory in the vessel.

Fired heaters, boilers and other combustion devices generally require EBV's
on the fuel line and on lines carrying flammable process fluids to the fired heater
coils.

Slide 12.67

Equipment Requiring EBV's (Cont.)

z

Vulnerable equipment such as graphite exchangers containing flammable or toxic

materials, which are exceptionally vulnerable to fracture and uncontrolled release
as a result of thermal or mechanical shock, generally require EBV's.

Battery limits EBV's are generally required for all process and utility streams
entering or leaving battery limits if the line is normally pressurized.
Battery limits are the boundaries of the smallest geographical boundaries of a
processing equipment area which are separated by at least 50 ft (15 m) from
adjacent facilities, and which contain either a process or a group of integrated
processes which may be shut down together for a turnaround.

Slide 12.68

EBVs summary (see charts on DP XV-F)

z
z

z
z
z

z
z

EBV(A): Normal block valve installed at equipment nozzle.

EBV(B): Normal block valve 25 (7.5m) from equipment. Must be 8 and 300# or less, not higher
than 15 (4.5m) of grade. BLBV can be higher flange rating and size for non-flammable/non-toxic,
and higher elevation.
EBV(C): Motor operated valve 25 from equipment not higher than 15 of grade. Button at valve.
EBV(D): Motor operated. Button at grade 40 (12m) from equipment. Recommend button in control
house also. Fireproof valve if within 25 of fire source.
Toxic Materials
EBV(D) w/control house button if small connection or flange leak exceeds fence line
concentration limit. Applies even to piping.
Compressors
EBV(D) on suction and discharge for 200 hp (150 kW) handling flammable or toxic gases
Pumps
Depends on vessel size, liquid flammability or toxicity, and EBV location
z 2,000 (7.5 m3) and 4,000 (15 m3) gallon break points
z Some piping large enough to be considered
Vessels
Depends on vessel size, liquid vapor pressure or toxicity, and line size
z Most 2 and smaller lines below liquid level will require EBV(A)
Place EBV directly on vessel nozzle
1,000 (3.8 m3) and 10,000 (38 m3) gallon break points
Furnaces
EBV(B) required for all feeds and fuels, EBV(D) if within 40 or above 15 elevation

Slide 12.69

Emergency Depressuring
z

Quick Removal of the Flammable Inventory Reduces the Duration of a Fire. Vapor
Blowdown facilities are used for the Purpose.

Equipment Requiring Vapor Blowdown Facilities:

z

Operating above 150 psig (10.5 kg/cm2g) where vapor is in continuous phase and
there is no liquid inventory, e.g. Powerformer Reactor.

Operating above 250 psig (17.6 kg/cm2g) when the flammable liquid and vapor
contents of a vessel would exceed 200,000 ft3 (5600 m3) when expanded to
atmospheric pressure.

Blowdown connection shall have Type D EBV actuated from control room and should
discharge to the flare system.

Connection is typically sized to reduce equipment pressure from its operating value to
50% of its design pressure in 15 minutes for fire emergency.

Oversizing should be avoided as this can result in excessive flare or lifting of a catalyst
bed.

Blowdown connections may discharge into closed release system header or into
separate vapor depressurising header to the flare.
Slide 12.70

EMERGENCY DEPRESSURE GUIDELINES DP XV-F

Slide 12.71

Emergency Shutdown Systems

z

Provide a Quick Remote Way of Shutting Down Equipment

ESDs are Independent of Controls (Cannot be Emphasised Enough!)

Shutdown Controls Must be Designed with Suitable Guards and for Onstream
Testing Without Shutting Down the Equipment.

Emergency Shutdown Systems are Required for:

Drivers
z

All Compressors > 200 HP (150 kW)

Steam-Driven Pumps and Compressors that Handle Flammable Materials

Fired Heaters
Air injection / Oxidiser Streams to Process
Refrigerated Liquid/Gas Facilities
Claus Plants, Gas Turbines, Air Preheaters, Reactors such as Hydrocracking
with Potential for Runaway
Slide 12.72

Water Flooding Provisions

z

Protects against uncontrolled release of flammable material at the vessel bottom

connections or at the pump withdrawing liquid from it.

Injected water displaces the liquid hydrocarbon up the vessel, so that only water
escapes.

Water is required at a pressure higher than the vessel pressure plus the static
head.

Vessel temperature to be not below 40F (5C) or Above 200 F (93C).

Water flooding to be considered for large non-refrigerated volatile inventories, e.g.

LPG Spheres.

Slide 12.73

Types of Vapor Discharge Systems

z

Closed System -- Conventional Flare

Handles the majority of releases from PRVs

Also used to drain K.O. Drums, Emergency vapor

blow downs / liquid pull downs, vapor liquid
diversion, etc.

To Atmosphere via Condensable Blowdown

Drum (totally condensed and > 32F or 0C).

Segregated H2S Flaring System - used for

continuous (greater than 30 minutes) release of
H2S. Some risk of plugging problems.

Other Segregated Closed Systems

Slide 12.74

Components of a Typical System

Flare headers collect the effluent from various
PR valves and sends them to the blowdown
Drum.
In addition, drain headers receive drainage from
other hydrocarbon containing vessels such as
fuel gas knockout drums, compressor drums,
reactors, etc. and send it to the blowdown drum.

The ignitor or pilot ignites gas

flowing through the flare stack.

The flare header and drains discharge in the blowdown

drum. This drum:
z Separates the liquid from the vapor before the vapor
is send to the seal drum.
z Collects hydrocarbon liquid and water.
There are two types of blowdown drums:
z Non-condensable blowdown drum
z Condensable blowdown drum

Slide 12.75

Flare disposes of vapor streams

by safely by burning under
controlled conditions. Three types
of flares are available:
z Elevated Flare
z Ground Flare
z Burning Pit
The elevated flare is the most
commonly used in refineries and
chemical plants.

Flare gas from the blowdown drum is sent to the seal

drum, where flare gases are discharge under water to
provide a seal to prevent flashback in the event that a
combustible mixture was present. A continuous flow of
water is maintained to the seal drum to sure that the seal
will always present.

Typical Non-Condensable Blowdown Drum

Slide 12.76

Flare Types
COMPARISON FACTORS
Pollution Characteristics
Smoke

ELEVATED FLARE

MULTIJET FLARE

BURNING PIT FLARE

Can be made smokeless

except at high loads.
Noisy, due to steam used for
smoke reduction (compromise
necessary).
High, but can be reduced with
steam.
Best obtainable, if elevation is
adequate.

Relatively smokeless

Poor

Relatively quiet

Relatively quiet

Some

Some

Poor dispersion, because of

low elevation; severe problems
if poor combustion or flameout.

Poor

Other Factors

High cost if high elevation.

Visual and noise pollution.
Radiation requires wide
spacing.

High cost.
High maintenance
requirement.
Odor pollution at low elevation.
Hazardous if flameout occurs.

Low-cost and simple; but

pollution is not
acceptable in most cases.
Wide spacing required.

Application

General choice for total flare

load, or as over-capacity flare
in conjunction with multijet
flare.
Generally the only acceptable
flare where products of
combustion or partial
combustion are toxic or
malodorous.

Use for base load or partial

flaring rates if noise and visual
pollution are critical.
Suitable only for "clean
burning" gases, i.e. where
products of combustion are not
toxic or malodorous.
Not suitable upwind of
residential areas.

Remote locations where no

pollution requirements apply
and space is available.

Noise
Luminosity
Air Pollution (odor)

Slide 12.77

Flare Design Considerations

The location, spacing and height of the flare is set by considering:
z

the radiant heat densities.

possible burning of liquid fallout.

possible pollution problems

Slide 12.78

Radiant Heat Densities

z

This table shows radiant heat density

limits:

Btu/hr-ft2

kW/m2

Property Line

500

1.6

At Grade Below Flare

3000

9.5

10,000

31.5

LOCATION

Equipment
z

DP XV-E, Appendix A shows the amount

of time personnel can spend as a function
of the heat density.

Slide 12.79

Heat Density Requirements

Flares should be as high as any platform or building within
500 ft (150 m), and in no case less than 50 ft (15 m).
Flare location and height must meet all applicable
regulatory standards for noise requirements.

Any source of ignitable hydrocarbons such as

separators or floating roof tanks should be at
least 200 ft (61 m) of the base of the flare.

Slide 12.80

Flares must be 200 ft (61 m) from property

lines and not exceed a heat density of 500
Btu/hr-ft2 at the property lines.

Glossary
z

AUTOIGNITION TEMPERATURE - The lowest temperature required to cause selfsustaining combustion, without ignition by spark or flame. (Typical 600F).

FLAMMABLE (EXPLOSIVE) LIMITS - Minimum and maximum concentrations of

flammable vapor in air which support combustion.

FLASH POINT - Lowest temperature at which liquid exposed to air gives off
sufficient vapor to form a flammable mixture.

FLAMMABLE LIQUID - Liquids with Closed-cup Flash Point below 100F or liquid
with flash above 100F when temperature is above or within 15F of flash point.

COMBUSTIBLE LIQUID - Liquids with Closed-cup Flash Point above 100F when
temperature is less than (Flash Point - 15F).

HIGH FLASH STOCKS - Flash points 100F or greater.

LOW FLASH STOCKS - Flash points less than 100F or stocks at temperatures
above or within 15F of its flash point.

LIGHT ENDS - Material having an RVP > 15 psia. (Reid vapor pressure, i.e.,
vapor pressure @ 100F) (e.g. pentane and lighter).

Slide 12.81

Glossary (Continued)
z

PYROPHORIC MATERIAL - A material that is spontaneously combustible when

exposed to air at ambient temperature.

TOXIC MATERIAL - A material capable of causing injury on reaching sites in or on

the human body. (i.e., Phenol, H2S, HF Acid, Benzene, NH3, etc.)

FIRE ZONE - Area containing the smallest group of equipment that can be
approached from all sides by fire-fighting equipment and personnel. Regardless of
accessibility, vessels with a horizontal distance of 20 feet of each other are in the
same fire zone. Maximum area normally limited to 5,000 Sq. Ft.

MAWP - The highest pressure to which a vessel may be subjected continuously.

MAWP is determined based on vessel wall thickness selected.

DESIGN PRESSURE - That is used as a basis for determining minimum shell

thickness, usually the same as MAWP (MAWP Design Pressure).

CONTINGENCY - An abnormal event that is the cause of an emergency condition.

(e.g., Loss of cooling water).

SINGLE RISK - The equipment affected by a single contingency. (e.g., Fire).

Slide 12.82

Glossary (Continued)
z

SET PRESSURE - The inlet pressure at which the pressure relief valve is set to
open.

ACCUMULATION - The pressure increase over MAWP during discharge through a

pressure relief valve.

OVERPRESSURE - The pressure increase over set pressure during discharge

through a pressure relief valve.

BACK PRESSURE - The pressure on the discharge side of a pressure relief valve.

SUPERIMPOSED BACK PRESSURE - The pressure on the discharge side of a

pressure relief valve before it opens.

BUILT-UP BACK PRESSURE - Increase in pressure at valve discharge resulting

from flow through that valve.

DIFFERENTIAL SPRING PRESSURE - Set pressure minus the superimposed

back pressure for a conventional valve. For pilot operated and balanced bellows
valves, the spring pressure equals the set pressure.

Slide 12.83