THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES

De Leon v. Esguerra Case Digest

De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987
(En Banc), J. Melencio-Herrera
Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together
with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay,
Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known
as Barangay Election Act of 1982. On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a
Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin
Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay
Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of
the same Barangay and Municipality. Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject
Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited
by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen. Petitioners
maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their
terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue
until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their position that
with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer
has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive
officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the
Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that
the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six
years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the
Provisional Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made
during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.
Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8,
1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a
plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have
superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2,
Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part: "Sec. 8. The term of
office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years. Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw,
therefore, the term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should
still govern.
Petitioner: Ramon A. Gonzalez / Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA)
Respondent: Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
FACTS: This case is composed of consolidated cases filed separately by Petitioner Gonzalez and
PHILCONSA assailing for the declaration of nullity of RA. No. 4913 and R.B.H. No. 1 and 3. On
March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions
(Resolution of Both Houses/R.B.H.):
1. R.B.H No. 1: Proposes that Sec 5, Art VI of Constitution be amended so as to increase the
membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120 in accordance with the
present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among several provinces and
that each province shall have at least one (1) member.
2. R.B.H. No. 2: Calls for a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, which will
be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in
the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November 1971.
3. R.B.H. No. 3: Proposes that Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution be amended so as to authorize
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the
aforementioned constitutional convention, without the need to forfeit their respective seats in
Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which became RA No. 4913, providing that the
amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be
submitted, for approval by the people at the general elections on November 14, 1967. This act
fixes the date and manner of elevtion for the proposed amendments to be voted upon by the
people, and appropriates funds for said election. Petitioners assail the validity/constitutionality
of RA No. 4913 and for the prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain COMELEC from
implementing or complying with the said law. PHILCONSA also assails R.B.H No. 1 and 3.

ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not RA No. 4913 is unconstitutional.
2.) Whether or not the issue involves a political question.
HELD:
1.) Pursuant to Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this
provision that states that the election referred to is special, different from the general election.
The Congress deemed it best to submit the amendments for ratification in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments
for ratification in general elections. Petition is therefore DENIED.
2.) SC also noted that the issue is a political question because it attacks the wisdom of the
action taken by Congress and not the authority to take it. A political question is not subject to
review by the Court.
IMBONG VS COMELEC
doctrine: competence of congress acting as constituent assembly: authority to call
constitutional convention as Constituent Assembly in enacting implementing details. Manuel
Imbong and Raul Gonzles, both members of the Bar, assail the constitutionality of RA 6132
Sec. 19 because it prejudices their rights as sec 19. Petition for declaratory relief - any person
interested candidates for delegates of the whose rights are affected of
Constitutional Convention. Provions of this act, bring an action Sec. 2: apportionment of
delegates: constitutional convention should be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among
the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants.
Provided that each district is entitled to at least two delegates. Sec. 4: all public officers &
employees are considered resigned upon filing certificates of candidacy. Sec. 5: disqualifies
any elected delegate from running for a public office while Con Con is ongoing. Sec. 8:
prohibits political parties or other organizations from helping Con Con delegates during
campaign period.
ISSUE: WON RA 6132 is valid?
HELD: Yes.RATIO:1. SEC. 4 is valid in accordance with Constitutional prohibition on public
employees/officials running for election. It does not deny them of due process or equal
protection.2. Law was enacted in Congress capacity as a legislative body exercising its broad
lawmaking authority. They can grant powers and fix the qualifications and other requirements
needed such as in the case of the Con Con delegates.3. Congress has right to apportion the
number of delegates per district. They can limit it if there are economic restraints. IN this case,
they were correct in using the preliminary population census taken by the Bureau of Census &
Statistics. This method is fair. Though only provisional, it is still credible. We cant really effect
an absolutely proportional representation.

Occena v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981
Fernando, C.J.
Facts:
Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and
former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution,
are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that
the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Issue:
What is the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments and
how may it be exercised? More specifically as to the latter, what is the extent of the changes
that may be introduced, the number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and the
standard required for a proper submission?
Held:

The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as

pertinent it reads thus: The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its
Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and
disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the
Members thereof. One of such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973
Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to
propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its
members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. When, therefore,
the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E.
Marcos, met as a constituent body its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and
did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed. It may be
observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occena is concerned, the question of the
authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not new. Considering
that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution extending the
retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts from sixty-five (65)
to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the 1935
Constitution and has been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are
unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment.
Issue:
Were the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go far
beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as Successor
of the Interim National Assembly? Was there revision rather than amendment?
Held:
Whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the
Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new
Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because
the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people,
there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present
Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one is no argument against the validity
of the law because amendment includes the revision or total overhaul of the entire
Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or
totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign
people.
Issue:
What is the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for
proper submission?
Held:
The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose
amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible
proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body
applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be
proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not
a requirement either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its
constituent power to propose amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the
requirement of three- fourth votes applies, such extraordinary majority was obtained. It is not
disputed that Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential
purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency,
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1
abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on
Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. Where then is the alleged infirmity? As to the
requisite standard for a proper submission, the question may be viewed not only from the
standpoint of the period that must elapse before the holding of the plebiscite but also from the
standpoint of such amendments having been called to the attention of the people so that it
could not plausibly be maintained that they were properly informed as to the proposed
changes. As to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be resolved.
There is no ambiguity to the applicable provision: Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which
shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or
revision. The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a
constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date

of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the
Constitution.
TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-34150, October 16 1971, 41 SCRA 702
FACTS:
The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions of
the Congress approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of
calling a convention to proposeamendments to the Constitution. After election of delegates
held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. In the
morning of September 28, 1970, theConvention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which is
entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION SO AS
TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18." On September 30, 1971, the COMELEC "resolved" to
follow the mandate of the Convention, that it will hold the said plebiscite together with the
senatorial elections on November 8, 1971. Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for
prohibition, its main thrust being that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the necessary
implementing resolutions subsequently approved have no force and effect as laws in so far as
they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial elections, on the
ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged
exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and may not be exercised by the Convention, and
that, under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the proposed amendment in question
cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all
other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971Constitutional Convention violative
to the Constitution.
HELD:
NO. All the amendments to be proposed by the same Conventionmust be submitted to the
people in a single "election" or plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of a
Constitutional amendment may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient
time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of thenature of the amendment per se but as
well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious
whole. In the present context, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits,
if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any
single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement.
Sanidad v Comelec
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for
the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial
law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its
existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers.
Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the
previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of
voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of
Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the
same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted
to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its
whereas clauses that the peoples continued opposition to the convening of the interim
National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a
constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be
submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. On September 27,
1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission
on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare
without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose
amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs
the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the ReferendumPlebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to
propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite
on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is
political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.

HELD: The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question.
This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending
process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is
seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of
transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly
in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of
the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal
course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute
itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of
amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the
people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure
for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended,
raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033,
which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus
the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of
this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: All cases
involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and
decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be
declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. The Supreme
Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the
Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form
a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that
authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits. This petition
is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was
able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time.
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997
FACTS:
In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend Constitution, to lift term
limits of elective officials, by peoplesinitiative. Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and
supervise said peoples initiative the signature-gathering all over the country. The proposition
is: Do you approve of lifting the term limits of all elective government officials, amending for
the purpose Sections 4 ) and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article 8 of
Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution? Said Petition forInitiative will first be submitted
to the people, and after it is signed by at least 12% total number of registered voters in the
country, it will be formally filed with the COMELEC. COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for
publication of the petition. Petitioners Sen. Roco et al moved for dismissal of the Delfin Petition
on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
a. Constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed.b.Republic Act
No. 6735 provides for 3 systems on initiative but failed to provide
anysubtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. This
deliberate omission indicates matter of peoples initiative was left to some future law.c.
COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of peoples initiative.
Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.d.
Peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof.
Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision.e.Congress nor any government agency
has not yet appropriated funds for peoplesinitiative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the people can directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735
It was intended to include or cover peoples initiative on amendments to the Constitution but,
as worded, it does not adequately cover such intiative. Article XVII Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution providing for amendments to Constitution, is not self-executory. While the
Constitution has recognized or granted the right of the people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution via PI, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does
not provide for its implementation.

FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest
an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word Constitution
therein was a delayed afterthought. The word is not relevant to the section which is silent as to
amendments of the Constitution.
SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the
contents of a petition for initiative onthe Constitution. Sec 5(c) does not include the provisions
of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to
the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national
and local laws. The argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is not
accepted to be subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it
is national in scope. Under Subtitle II and III, the classification is not based on the scope of
the initiative involved, but on its nature and character.
National initiative what is proposed to be enacted is a national law, or a law which
only Congress can pass.
Local initiative what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance or resolution
which only legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays can pass.
Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The
recognized exceptions to the rule are: [1] Delegation of tariff powers to the President; [2]
Delegation of emergency powers to the President; [3] Delegation to the people at large; [4]
Delegation to local governments; and [5] Delegation to administrative bodies.
COMELEC
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi judicial functions, to
promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority. In every case
of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid
only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. Republic Act No. 6735 failed to satisfy both requirements in
subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300
Insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct ofinitiative on amendments to the
Constitution is void. COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement
the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under Republic Act
No. 6735.
Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely
intended to obtain an order: (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b)
instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfins movement and volunteers in
establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of the unsigned
proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
DELFIN PETITION
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. Even if it be conceded ex gratia that RA 6735 is a full
compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional
amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate
legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the requirednumber of voters. Without the
required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated. The COMELEC requires
jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory
pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA6735 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The petition was
merely entered as UND, meaning undocketed. It was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper,
which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12
December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda to
file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
Therefore, Republic Act No. 6735 did not apply to constitutional amendment.

Republic Act No. 6735

August 4, 1989
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
I. General Provisions
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act."
Section 2. Statement of Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution,
laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to
propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution;
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation;
and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional,
provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to
Congress or the local legislative body for action.
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an
election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or
part thereof, passed by Congress; and
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or
ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.
(e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or
rejected by the people.
(f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required number of
signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined by and submitted to the Commission on
Elections, hereinafter referred to as the Commission.
(g) "Local government units" refers to provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
(h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang
Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, and Sangguniang Nayon.
(i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal Mayors and Punong
Barangay, as the case may be.
Section 4. Who may exercise. The power of initiative and referendum may be exercised by
all registered voters of the country, autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays.
Section 5. Requirements. (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten
per centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which every legislative
district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall
sign a petition for the purpose and register the same with the Commission.
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum
(12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended
or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly
written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the legislative
assembly of an autonomous region, province or city is deemed validly initiated if the petition
thereof is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the province or
city, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%)
of the registered voters therein; Provided, however, That if the province or city is composed
only of one (1) legislative district, then at least each municipality in a province or each

barangay in a city should be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters therein.
(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be deemed validly
initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered
voters in the municipality, of which every barangay is represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly initiated
if signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in said barangay.
Section 6. Special Registration. The Commission on Election shall set a special registration
day at least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative or referendum.
Section 7. Verification of Signatures. The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the
basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the
immediately preceding election.
II. National Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. The Commission shall call and
supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum.
Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall, upon
determining the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino and English at least
twice in newspapers of general and local circulation and set the date of the initiative or
referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days but not later than ninety (90)
days from the determination by the Commission of the sufficiency of the petition.
Section 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. (a) The Proposition of the
enactment, approval, amendment or rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and
approved by a majority of the votes cast by all the registered voters of the Philippines.
If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes
cast, the national law proposed for enactment, approval, or amendment shall become effective
fifteen (15) days following completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. If, as certified by the Commission, the
proposition to reject a national law is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the said
national law shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall become effective fifteen (15) days
following the completion of publication of the proposition and the certification by the
Commission in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be rejected or
amended shall remain in full force and effect.
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast
in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an
election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and
proclamation by the Commission.
Section 10. Prohibited Measures. The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or
referendum petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically vested in
Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its
effectivity.
Section 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law,
may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other
legislative bodies. The petition shall contain a summary of the chief purposes and contents of
the bill that the organization proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature.
The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the enactment of any
legislative measure before the House of Representatives except that the said initiative bill shall
have precedence over the pending legislative measures on the committee.
Section 12. Appeal. The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency or
insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court
within thirty (30) days from notice thereof.
III. Local Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. (a) Not less than two thousand (2,000) registered
voters in case of autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of provinces and cities,
one hundred (100) in case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of barangays, may file a
petition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative body, respectively, proposing the
adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution.
(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30) days from its
presentation, the proponents through their duly authorized and registered representative may
invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned.
(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). The Secretary of Local
Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the
proposition.

(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.

(e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of autonomous regions,
ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of municipalities, and
thirty (30) days in case of barangays, from notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect
the required number of signatures.
(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated representative,
in the presence of a representative of the proponent, and a representative of the regional
assemblies and local legislative bodies concerned in a public place in the autonomous region
or local government unit, as the case may be. Signature stations may be established in as
many places as may be warranted.
(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on Elections, through its
office in the local government unit concerned shall certify as to whether or not the required
number of signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain the required number is a defeat of
the proposition.
(h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission shall then set a date
for the initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the
local government unit concerned for their approval within ninety (90) days from the date of
certification by the Commission, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of autonomous
regions, sixty (60) days in case of the provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of
municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative shall then be held on
the date set, after which the results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the
Commission on Elections.
Section 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. If the proposition is approved by a majority of
the votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification by the Commission as if
affirmative action thereon had been made by the local legislative body and local executive
concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of votes, the proposition is considered defeated.
Section 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local initiative shall not be
exercised more than once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the
local legislative bodies to enact.
(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the
proposition presented, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such action
may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner herein provided.
Section 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. Any proposition or ordinance or
resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall
not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6)
months from the date therefrom, and may be amended, modified or repealed by the local
legislative body within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its
members: Provided, however, that in case of barangays, the period shall be one (1) year after
the expiration of the first six (6) months.
Section 17. Local Referendum. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 hereof, any local
legislative body may submit to the registered voters of autonomous region, provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays for the approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly
enacted or approved.
Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission within sixty
(60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and
thirty (30) days in case of barangays.
The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.
Section 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper
courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation
of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.
IV. Final Provisions
SECTION 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus Election Code and
other election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all initiatives
and referenda.
Section 20. Rules and Regulations. The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Section 21. Appropriations. The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial
implementation of this Act shall be charged against the Contingent Fund in the General
Appropriations Act of the current year. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the full
implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 22. Separability Clause. If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid or
unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.
Section 23. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

Bacani v. NACOCO Digest

G.R. No. L-9657 Nov. 29, 1956

Two-fold Function of the Government
FACTS:
1. Bacani and Matoto are court stenographers both assigned in the CFI of Manila. During the
pendency of another civil case (Civil Case No. 2293 entitled 'Francisco Sycip vs. NACOCO'),
Alikpala, counsel for NACOCO(Natl Coconut Corporation) , requested the said stenographers
for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing.
Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript
containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their
fees. The NACOCO paid the amount of P564 to Bacani and P150 to Matoto for said transcript
at the rate of P1 per page.
3.
Subsequently, the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts by
virtue of a DOJ circular which stated that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt
from the payment of the fees in question.
4.
Petitioners countered that NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of
section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court while the defendants set up as a defense that the
NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917 hence, exempt from paying the stenographers fees under Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not NACOCO is a government entity.
No, it is not.
1. GOCCs do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the
classification of municipal or public corporation. While NACOCO was organized for the purpose
of adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the United
States and of providing Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper
utilization of coconut by-products, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to
promote the coconut industry. It was given a corporate power separate and distinct from the
government, as it was made subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as its
corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4,
Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private
corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government.
2.
There are functions which our government is required to exercise to promote its
objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of
sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and
prosperity of the people.
3.
President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as follows:
(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence
and robbery.
(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children.
(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the
determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime.
(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.
(5) The definition and punishment of crime.
(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.
(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens.
(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external
danger or encroachment and the advancement of its international interests.
4. The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education, public
charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The principles
deter mining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional functions
are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital
would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do these things which by its
very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private
individual or group of individuals.
PVTA v CIR Digest

Facts:
This case involves the expanded role of the
government necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare. In
1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services and
the petitioners failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with CA No. 444.
Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction. Judge Martinez issued an order, directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for

certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental functions and is therefore
exempt from Commonwealth Act No. 444.
PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising
governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No.
444.
Issue: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.
YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government
has become obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of its people.
RA No. 2265 providing for a distinction between constituent and the
ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of the present time: The growing
complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of
government obsolete. The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to
them deserve scant consideration. There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a
governmental agency. As such, the petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in
the leading ACCFA case. The objection of private respondents with its overtones of the
distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani
v. Nacoco, is futile. It does not necessarily follow, that just because petitioner is engaged in
governmental rather than proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was beyond the
jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner
does not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive. A reference to the
pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear the differentiation that
exists. If as a result of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne by
petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not have required private respondents to render
overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of
personnel. That would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that
such an objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat,
respondent Court must be sustained.
Government v. Monte De Piedad Digest

Facts:
1. Spain paid $400,000 into the treasury of the Philippine Islands for the relief of those
damaged by an earthquake.
2. Upon the petition of Monte de Piedad, an institution under the control of the church, the
Philippine Government directed its treasurer to give $80,000 of the relief fund in Four (4)4
installments. As a result, various petitions were filed, including the heirs of those entitled to
the allotments. All prayed for the State to bring suit against Monte de Piedad, and for it to pay
with interest.
3. The Defendant appealed since all its funds have been exhausted already on various jewelry
loans.
Issue: Whether the government is the proper authority to the cause of action
YES.
The Philippine government, as a trustee towards the funds could maintain the action since
there has been no change of sovereignty. The state, as a sovereign, is the parens patriae of the
people. These principles are based upon public policy. The Philippine Government is not a mere
nominal party because it was exercising its sovereign functions or powers and was merely
seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands was ceded to the
United States. Finally, if said loan was for ecclesiastical pious work, then Spain would not
exercise its civil capacities.
Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh

75 PHIL 131

FACTS: Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus which prays that the respondent judge be
ordered to continue the proceeding which was initiated under the regime of the so-called
Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation. It is based on
the proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas McArthur which had the effect of invalidating and
nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines. Furthermore, it
was contended that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue
judicial proceedings pending the court of the defunct republic in the absence of enabling law.

ISSUES: Whether the government established in the said Japanese occupation is in fact a de
facto government.
Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in the Philippines under the
Philippine Executive Commission were good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation
of the Philippines by the US Forces.
HELD: In political and international law, all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive
and judicial department of a de facto government is valid. Being a de facto government,
judicial acts done under its control, when they are not political in nature, to the extent that
they effect during the continuance and control of said government remain good.
All judgment and judicial proceedings which are not of political complexion were good and
valid before and remained as such even after the occupied territory had come again into the
power of true and original sovereign.
Wherefore, the respondent judge is directed to take cognizance of the civil case (3012) and
continue the proceedings.
People v gozo
Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which is
within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the
Mayors Office and some neighbors, she demolished the house without acquiring the necessary
permits and then later on erected another house. She was then charged by the City Engineers
Office for violating Mun. Ord No. 14 Series of 1964 which requires her to secure permits for any
demolition and/or construction within the City. She was convicted in violation thereof by the
lower court. She appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has no administrative
jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a foreign country.
ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base?
HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part
of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed
therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential
but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only
jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military
authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence,
in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the City of Olongapo does have
administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base.
LAUREL V. MISA
FACTS:
A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel. He claims that a Filipino citizen who
adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot
be prosecuted for the crime of treason for the reasons that the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in the Philippines and consequently the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizen
thereto were then suspended; and that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands
upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE ABSOLUTE ALLEGIANCE OF A FILIPINO CITIZEN TO THE GOVERNMENT
BECOMES SUSPENDED DURING OCCUPATION
HELD:
No. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the
enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred
thereby to the occupier. It remains vested in the legitimate government. What may be
suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the
territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. The political laws which
prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are
suspended in abeyance during military occupation.
DISSENT:
During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were
suspended. This is full harmony with the generally accepted principles of the international law
adopted by our Constitution [ Art. II, Sec. 3 ] as part of law of the nation. The inhabitants of the
occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the invading power

whose interest and requirements are naturally in conflict with those of displaced government,
if it is legitimate for the military occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabit ants such
obedience as may be necessary for the security of his forces, for the maintenance of the law
and order, and for the proper administration of the country.
Petitioners: Ramon Ruffy, et al.
Respondents: The Chief of Staff, et al.
FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at
designated camps or military bases all over the country. Japanese forces went to Mindoro thus
forcing petitioner and his band move up the mountains and organize a guerilla outfit and call it
the "Bolo area". A certain Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their position
and duties in the "Bolo area" by the new authority vested upon him because of the recent
change of command. Capt. Beloncio was thus allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow
petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense was
committed, which was at the time of war and the Japanese occupancy.
HELD: The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military law since members of
the Armed Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War and other laws
even during an occupation. The act of unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman is considered
as a defiance of 95th Article of War held petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and trial.
Moreover, they were operating officers, which makes them even more eligible for the military
court's jurisdiction.
In consideration of the foregoing, the petition has no merit and should be dismissed. Thus, the
petition is hereby DENIED.
PEOPLE
Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration
GR L-21289, 4 October 1971
Fact of the case: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. She was
permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y,
Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen
Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized
period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration. After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13
February 1962. On 25 January 1962,she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the
Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate
deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction
with preliminary injunction. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the
prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
Issue:
Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino
citizen.
Held:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born
or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of
the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien
who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the
moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4.Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the
naturalization proceedings, Section 15is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of
an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to
go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it
should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. Every time
the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case,
Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again
and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a
Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo
Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

G.R. No. L-32398 January 27, 1992

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF PO YO BI TO BE ADMITTED AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES: PO YO BI, petitionerappellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent-appellant.
Gualberto C. Opong for petitioner-appellee.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In this appeal from the Order 1 of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Iloilo dated 8 January 1966 in
Naturalization Case No. 85 allowing the petitioner-appellee to take his oath as a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to its decision 2 of
15 October 1963, appellant Republic of the Philippines urges this Court to overturn both the decision and the order because the trial
court erred:
I
. . . in not finding that the amended petition for naturalization was not published in accordance with the
requirements of section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.
II
. . . in not finding that the amended petition failed to allege that petitioner is a person of good moral character.
III
. . . in not finding that the amended petition for naturalization does not state petitioners' former residence in Manila.
IV
. . . in not finding that petitioner is not exempt from the filing of a declaration of intention.
V
. . . in not finding that petitioner's character witnesses are not credible persons within the contemplation of section
7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.
VI
. . . in not finding that petitioner failed to submit a permission to renounce his Chinese citizenship from the Minister
of Interior of the Republic of China. 3
The factual and procedural antecedents which gave rise to this appeal are not controverted.
On 9 February 1957, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization, attaching thereto, among other documents, the joint affidavit of two
(2) of his character witnesses, Atty. Pablo Oro and Dr. Rafael Jarantilla, and the joint affidavit of his other character witnesses, Dr.
Antonio San Agustin and Uy Chong. 4
On 5 March 1959, the trial court, through the Deputy Clerk of Court, issued a Notice of Petition for Philippine Citizenship setting the
hearing of the petition to 18 January 1960 5 and ordering the publication and posting of the notice.
Petitioner filed a motion to amend his petition 6 on 15 January 1960, citing as among the reasons therefor the fact that important
allegations had been overlooked in the original petition. Attached to the motion was the Amended Petition. 7
On 18 January 1960, the trial court, through the Deputy Clerk of Court, issued an Amended Notice of Petition 8setting the hearing of
the petition to 12 October 1960 and ordering the publication of the said notice once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in the
Official Gazette and in the YUHUM, a newspaper of general circulation in the province/city of Iloilo, and its posting in a public and
conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the trial court.
Subsequently, on 19 June 1961, petitioner once again moved 9 to amend his petition. A copy of the Amended Petition,10 to which is in
reality the Second amended petition, was attached to the motion. This second Amended Petition contains the following
amendments:
1. In the third paragraph, insertions of the clause "From said employment I am now receiving a salary of P350.00 a
month;" of the figure P1,900.00 as the annual average income of his wife from the Chinese Commercial School in
Iloilo City and of his capital investment in the Bio Guan Company in the amount of P39,943.71 as of 31 December
1960;
2. In the Seventh paragraph, incorporation of the following information: he had resided continuously in Iloilo City
for 23 years preceding the date of the Amended Petition and up to the present time; although he stayed in Manila
(Salazar Street) when he studied in the Chiang Kai Shek High School from June 1939 to 1942, he did not consider

this as interruption of the continuity of his residence in Iloilo City because he always returned to Iloilo City during
all the summers, Christmases and New Year's day celebration within said period.
3. In the Eighth paragraph, insertion of the word "read" between the words speak and write in reference to the
English language and to Hiligaynon, the latter being one (1) of the principal Philippine languages.
4. In the Ninth paragraph, insertion of the opening sentence: "My children are enrolled in the following schools:
Alice Po (eldest) at the Chinese Commercial School, Iloilo City, and presently Grade II; My second child, Enrique
Po, is enrolled in the same school but only in the Kindergarten Department of the same for he is only 5 years old;
my youngest and third child, Floresca Po, is not yet of school age."
5. In the Eleventh paragraph, insertion of the sentence "My children, except only the youngest who is not of school
age, are all enrolled in the proper school contemplated by the Naturalization Laws of the Philippines as hereinafter
alleged."
6. In the Twelfth paragraph, insertion of the words "and freely" between mingled socially and with the Filipinos.
In none of the above petitions did petitioner state that he is a person of good moral character.
On 26 June 1961, the trial court, through the Deputy Clerk of Court, issued an Amended Notice of Petition for Philippine Citizenship
setting the hearing of the petition to 26 February 1962 11 and directing the publication of the order in the Official Gazette and in the
GUARDIAN, a newspaper of general circulation in the province/city of Iloilo. This amended notice of petition was published in the 10,
17 and 24 July 1961 (nos. 28, 29 and 30, vol. 57) 12 issues of the Official Gazette and in the 1, 8 and 15 July 1961 issues of the
GUARDIAN. 13
The second Amended Petition itself was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the province
and city of Iloilo. There is, as well, no evidence of its posting in a public and conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court or
in the building where such office is located.
The Record on Appeal fails to disclose any order of the trial court granting the first and the second motions to amend or directing the
publication of the second amended petition.
After trial, the court a quo, per Judge F. Imperial Reyes, handed down on 15 October 1963 its decision 14 granting the petition, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
POR TANTO, encontrando satisfactoria mente probadas las alegaciones de la solicitud enmendada, se dicta
esta decision;
a) Declarando al solicitante Po Yo Bi como Ciudadano filipino; y
b) Ordenado que, una vez firme esta decision, se expida por el Escribano de este Juzgado el
Certificado de Naturalizacion correspondiente que, oportunamente, se inscribira en la Oficina
del Registro Civil.
Esta decision no adquirira caracter firme hasta despues del transcurso de dos (2) aos a contar desde esta fecha
y, previa vista, se encuentre a satisfaccion del Juzgado que el solicitante, durante dicho periodo de tiempo dos
aos a contar desde esta fecha (1) no ha salido de Filipinas; (2) se ha dedicado continuamente a un trabajo o
profesion licita (lawful); (3) no ha sido convicto de algun delito o infraccion de reglamentos promulgados por el
govierno; y (4) no ha cometido algun acto prejudicial a los intereses del pais o contrario a la politica anunciada por
el gobierno.
The facts upon which the trial court based its decision are as follows:
Se ha probado que el solicitante es un ciudadano chino, nacido de padres chinos en esta Ciudad el 31 de agosto
de 1923; que ahora reside en la Calle Arroyo, No. 169, de esta Ciudad; que, antes de ahora, el ha residido en la
misma calle, No. 29, que fue cambaido despues con el No. 157; que desde su nacimiento hasta ahora solo se ha
susentado de Filipinas una sola vez, de 1933 a 1938, cuando se fue a China; que esta casado con aida Lee Chiu
(Exh. M), con quien tiene tres hijos llamados Alice, Enrique y Florence, apellidados "Po", todos nacidos en el St.
Mary's Hospital de esta Ciudad (Exhs. DD, EE y FF); que los tres fueron bautizados en esta Ciudad (Exhs. GG,
HH, y II); que su esposa o hijos viven con el en la Calle Arroyo, No. 169, de esta Ciudad; que esta registrado
como ciudadano chino en la Embajada de la Republica de China en Manila (Exh. O); que esta provisto de un
Alien Certificate of Registration No. 238247, expedido por el Buro de Inmigracion, ciudad de Iloilo, el 17 de Julio
de 1950, el cual lleva su fotografia (Exh. V); que esta igualmente provisto de un Immigrant Certificate of
Residence No. 102653, tambien expedido por el Buro de Inmigracion, Manila, el 23 de enero de 1952, el cual
lleva igualmente su fotografia (Exh. W); que esta tambien provisto de un Check-Up Certificate, Serial No. 115747,
expedido por el Comandante Provincial de la Constabularia de Iloilo el 2 de septiembre de 1954 (Exh. BB); que
estudio sus cursos elementarios y secondarios en la Iloilo Chinese Commercial High School ed esta Ciudad y en
la Chiang Kai Shek High School de Manila, respectivamente (Exhs. JJ y KK); que las dos escuelas en las que so
ensean Philippine History, Philippine Government y Philippine Civics estan reconocidas por el gobierno; que en
las mismas se admiten estudiantes sin tener en cuenta su raza, color o religion; que despues de terminar sus
cursos secondarios, el estudio el Comercio en el Iloilo City Colleges de esta Ciudad (Exh. LL); que el ultimo
Colegio tambien esta reconocido por el gobierno; que en el mismo se admiten igualmente estudiantes sin tener
en cuenta su raza, color o religion; que sus hijos Alice y Enrique, apellidados "Po", estan ahora estudiando en la
Iloilo Chinese Commercial High School de esta Ciudad (Exh. MM), la misma escuela donde estudio sus cursos
elementarios (Exh. JJ); que so hija, Florence, no ha llegado aun a la edad escolar; que habla, lee y escribe el
ingles tan es asi que declaro perfectamente en dicho lenguaje en la vista de su solicitud enmendada; que tambien
habla, lee y escribe bien el dialecto Ilongo (Exh. III); que es fundador, socio y gerente auxiliar de Bio Guan
Company de esta Ciudad (Importers & General Merchants), recibiendo un sueldo de P500.00 al mes, libre casa y

comida, incluyendo los miembros de su familia (Exh. AAA); que su capital invertido en dicha compaia hasta el
ao 1962 asciendo a la suma de P43,810.83 (Exh. ZZ-1); que su esposa es "property custodian" de la Iloilo
Chinese Commercial High School de esta Ciudad con un sueldo de P1900.00 al ao (Exh. BBB); que suele
cometer su income tax returns (Exhs. QQ, RR y SS), pagando constantemente su income Tax correspondiente
(Exhs. RR-1 y SS-1); que no debe al gobierno por contribuciones (Exh. H); que ha pagado su individual residence
certificates A y B (Exhs. OO y PP); que su solicitud de fecha 31 de enero de 1959, que fue enmendada el 13 de
enero de 1960 y el 17 de junio de 1961 (Exh. A) es la primera que habia presentado; que esta exente de
presentar una declaracion de intencion para ser naturalizado como ciudadano filipino por haber nacido en este
pais y por haber enviado a sus hijos de edad escolar a escuelas debidamente reconocida por el gobierno donde
se ensean Philippine History, Philippine Government y Philippine Civics (sic) y on las que se admited estudiantes
sin tener en cuenta su raza, color o religion; y que da contribuciones para fines sociales y caritativos (Exhs. S, S-1
al S-12).
Se han probado igualmente que el solicitante no esta opuesto a todo gobierno organizado, ni esta afiliado a
alguna asociacion o grupo de personas que sostiene o ensea doctrinas subversivas; no defiendo ni ensea la
necesidad o propiedad de la violencia ni del atentado contra las personas, ni del asesinato para el exito y
prodominio de su ideales; no es poligamo, ni cree en la practica de la poligamia; nunca ha sido acusado o
convicto de algun delito que envuelva torpeza moral (Exhs. I, J y K); no padeco de enagenacion mental o de
alguna enfermedad incurable o contagiosa (Exh. L); que durante todo el periodo de su residencia en Filipinas
siempre se ha asociado con los filipinos y ha alentado el sincero deseo de estudiar y abrazar las costumbres,
tradiciones e ideales de estos; que es su intencion renunciar absoluta y completamente a su lealtad y fidelidad a
la Republica de China; y que su pais, China (Nacionalista), no esta en guerra con la Republica de Filipinas y
cuenta con leyes que conceden a los Filipinos igual privilegio de permitir a estos a ser ciudadanos o subditos
chinos (Exh. N); . . . 15
On 30 October 1963, the Assistant City Fiscal of Iloilo, Vicente P. Gengos, on behalf of the Solicitor General, filed a motion to
reconsider the above decision 16 contending therein that petitioner is not exempt from filing his declaration of intention, has not
complied with Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law and that his witnesses are not competent and credible persons within the
contemplation of law.
However, on 11 December 1963, Assistant City Fiscal Gengos, on behalf of the Solicitor General, filed a Motion to Withdraw 17 the
motion for reconsideration alleging therein that after a deliberate study of the grounds alleged, he believes that he cannot
substantially establish the same.
The Record on Appeal again fails to indicate what action the trial court took on this motion to withdraw.
Petitioner filed a motion on 1 December 1965 alleging therein that more than two (2) years had elapsed since the rendition of the
decision and that he has complied with all the conditions and requisites imposed by Republic Act No. 530; he then prays that after
hearing, the decision be executed and he be allowed to take his oath as a Filipino citizen. On 5 January 1966, Assistant City Fiscal
Gengos filed an opposition to this motion, 18 reiterating therein the grounds he earlier alleged in the motion to reconsider the
decision.
On 8 January 1966, the trial court handed down the order quoted earlier, now challenged in this appeal.
For reasons known only to him, petitioner did not file his Brief and, in the resolution of 12 October 1972, this Court considered the
case submitted for decision without such Brief. 19
On 27 January 1988, the parties were required to move in the premises and were informed that should they fail to make the proper
manifestation within a period of thirty (30) days from notice, the case shall be considered terminated and closed and entry of
judgment shall accordingly be made. 20 Only the Republic filed such a manifestation praying therein that the case be decided in
accordance with the prayer contained in its Brief 21 and informing the Court that on 10 June 1975, petitioner, pursuant to the
provisions of Letter of Instruction No. 270, filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization of the Office of the Solicitor General a
petition for naturalization, docketed as SCN No. 011317, which is pending consideration before the committee.
All the assigned errors are impressed with merit. We shall discuss them in the order they are presented.
1. As correctly pointed out by the Republic, the second amended petition was not published. Neither were the original and the
amended petitions. What the Office of the Clerk of Court did was to prepare and issue notices of the petition. It was said notices
alone which were ordered to be published and posted. In respect to the second amended petition, the notice was published in the
10, 17 and 24 July 1961 issues of the Official Gazette and the 1, 8 and 15 July 1961 issues of the GUARDIAN.
Section 9 of the Revised Naturalization Law 22 requires that the petition itself must be published. It reads in part as follows:
Sec. 9. Notification and appearance. Immediately upon the filing of a petition, it shall be the duty of the clerk of
court to publish the same at petitioner's expense, once a week for three consecutive weeks, in the Official
Gazette, and in one of the newspapers of general circulation in the province where the petitioner resides, and to
have copies of said petition and a general notice of hearing posted in a public and conspicuous place in his office
or in the building where said office is located, setting forth in such notice the name, birthplace and residence of the
petitioner, the date and place of his arrival in the Philippines, the names of the witnesses whom the petitioner
proposes to introduce in support of his petition, and the date of the hearing of the petition, which hearing shall not
be held until after six months from the date of the last publication of the notice. . . .
As early as 29 November 1958, or four (4) years, eight (8) months and sixteen (16) days before the trial court handed down its
challenged decision, this Court, in Co y Quing Reyes vs. Republic, 23 ruled that the above-quoted Section 9 requires that the petition
for naturalization be published "once a week, for three (3) consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette." This provision demands
compliance with the following requirements, namely: (1) the publication must be weekly; (2) it must be made three (3) times; (3) and
these must be "consecutive." The Court further ruled that the publication is a jurisdictional requirement. Thus:

In short, non-compliance with the requirements thereof, relative to the publication of the petition,affects the
jurisdiction of the court. It constitutes a fatal defect, for it impairs the very root or foundation of the authority to
decide the case, regardless of whether the one to blame therefor is the clerk of court or the petitioner or his
counsel. Failure to raise this question in the lower court would not cure such defect. (emphasis supplied).
That there was in fact, in the instant case, a notice of petition which was published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks and
that the same made references to some date in the petition and stated the date and place of hearing, did not save the day for both
the petitioner and the trial court. The publication of the notice did not constitute substantial compliance with the cited section. In Ngo
vs. Republic, 24 We stated:
The first assignment of error is predicated upon the undisputed fact that, in violation of Section 9 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, which provides that
xxx xxx xxx
the petition herein has not been so published. Although a notice of the filing of said petition, making reference to
some data therein contained, and stating the date and place of the hearing thereof was published, this is not
sufficient compliance with said legal provision. As a consequence, the lower court acquired no jurisdiction to hear
this case and the decision appealed from is null and void.
In Sy vs. Republic, supra., this Court held that the requirement of Section 9 of C.A. No. 473, as amended, that a copy of the petition
to be posted and published should be a textual or verbatim restatement of the petition as filed, is jurisdictional. Non-compliance
therewith nullifies the proceedings in the case, including the decision rendered in favor of the applicant.
2. For reasons also known only to him and his counsel, and despite two (2) amendments to the original petition, petitioner did not
allege in any of his petitions that he is of good moral character. The third of the six (6) qualifications to become a citizen of the
Philippines, as provided for in Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law, is:
Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution,
and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence
in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is
living; . . .
In the Twelfth paragraph of the second amended petition, petitioner practically copied all the words in the section except for the
opening clause on good moral character; thus, he alleges:
Twelfth. I believe in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. I have conducted myself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of my residence in the Philippines in my relations with the
constituted Government as well as with the community in which I am living.
In Dy vs. Republic, 25 the petition filed therein was denied because, inter alia, the said petition did not specifically allege that
petitioner is of good moral character pursuant to the requirement under Section 7, in relation to paragraph 3 of Section 2 of the law
above-quoted. In Chua Bong Chiong vs. Republic, 26 this Court explicitly ruled that:
1. The law requires that he should allege specifically each of the six qualifications for naturalization prescribed
under Sec. 2 of Com. Act No. 473 (Sec. 7 of Com. Act No. 473). The petition does not contain the specific
averment that he is of good moral character, which omission inevitably nullifies his petition. (emphasis supplied).
A reading of the transcripts of the stenographic notes of petitioner's testimony on direct examination reveals that he was not asked
about his good moral character. Neither did he refer to it in any manner in the answers he gave.
3. Petitioner alleges that he completed his senior year of high school at the Chiang Kai Shek High School in Manila. In both the
original and amended petitions, however, he did not reveal the specific place in Manila where he resided during that time. In his
second amended petition, he declares that he stayed in Manila from June 1939 to 1942, giving his address as "(Salazar Street)".
This is not sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law that the petitioner must allege
therein his present and former places of residence. The purpose of the requirement is to facilitate the checking up on the activities of
the petitioner which are material to the proceedings. "(Salazar Street)" is vague and uncertain. Since neither the given name of
Salazar nor its initial is mentioned, considering that Manila is a big and thickly populated metropolis, and that there is no proof that
only one (1) street in Manila is named after a Salazar, it is obvious that petitioner deliberately suppressed vital information to make it
extremely difficult for the government authorities to locate his place of residence and check on his activities therein during such time.
Besides, a careful reading of the transcripts of the testimony of petitioner on direct examination 27 reveals that petitioner did not
mention Salazar Street at all. Thus, on this ground alone, his petition should fail.
4. We likewise agree with the Republic that petitioner was not exempt from filing a declaration of intention. His claim for exemption is
anchored on his having been born in the Philippines; his having completed his primary and secondary education in schools
recognized by the Philippine government wherein enrollment is not limited to any race or nationality and where Philippine Civics,
Philippine History and Philippine Government are prescribed and taught as part of the school curriculum; and that his children,
except the youngest who is not of school age, are all enrolled in the schools contemplated by law. He testified that he completed his
primary education at the Chinese Commercial School in Iloilo City and his secondary education at the Chiang Kai Shek High School
in Manila. Unfortunately, only his self-serving declaration supports his claim that these schools are not limited to any race or
nationality.
The certification of one James King, Director of the Iloilo Chinese Commercial High School 28 dated 14 August 1963 and merely
identified by petitioner, does not make any categorical statement that during the time that petitioner studied in said school until 1939
when he allegedly finished his elementary course, the school was not limited to any race or nationality. The certification makes no
reference to the past only the present. It states: "This school is not limited to any race, nationality, creed or religion." Mr. King was
not presented to testify that prior to and during 1939, the school was not limited to any race or nationality. The certification should not
have been admitted inevidence and given credit as such constitutes hearsay.

In respect to petitioner's high school education, the certification of the Director-Principal of the Chiang Kai Shek High School, dated
12 January 1962, merely states that petitioner "was enrolled in the Third year, Senior High School in Chinese Instruction in this
school during the school year 1941-1942. He was graduated from the Chinese Senior High School before the closing of that school
year as a result of the outbreak of World War II. 29 It was petitioner himself who identified this certification. The Director-Principal was
not even presented as a witness to be cross-examined. Clearly, this certification does not prove that petitioner did in fact finish his
senior year. The "senior high school" stated therein refers to Chinese Instruction, and not to a general secondary education.
Petitioner never attempted to explain the term "Third Year" and this only casts serious doubts as to his educational attainment at that
time. There is then no proof of completion of a full secondary education. Furthermore, the certification does not state that in 19411942, the school was not limited to a particular race or nationality. Accordingly, he cannot claim exemption from filing the declaration
of intention. 30
5. On the fifth assigned error, the Republic asserts that:
Petitioner's character witness Antonio San Agustin admitted in (sic) the witness stand that he had no contact with
petitioner during the period the latter studied in Manila (pp. 10-11, t.s.n., October 8, 1963) and during the
Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945 (pp. 10-11, t.s.n., August 21, 1963). The other character witness Pablo
Oro also admitted that he came to know the petitioner only since 1944 (p. 19, t.s.n., August 21, 1963). Thus, San
Agustin could not vouch for petitioner's moral character and conduct from 1939 to 1942 when petitioner studied in
Manila and from 1942 to 1945 during the Japanese occupation, or a continuous period of some six (6) years; and
Oro since petitioner's return to the Philippines from China in 1938 until 1944 (p. 24, t.s.n., October 7, 1963).
In addition to the foregoing observation of the Republic, which is supported by the evidence, this Court notes that in respect to the
good moral character or good repute of the petitioner, this is all that the witness said:
Q Now, because of your long and close association with the petitioner, could you tell us whether
he was (sic) of good moral character?
A He is of good moral character and many people say that he is of good repute. 31
He clearly made a distinction between good moral character and good repute. As to the latter, he did not venture any
personal opinion, but merely mentioned what others had been saying. Yet, in his affidavit, 32 he explicitly stated that he has
"personal knowledge that the petitioner aforesaid is and during all aforesaid periods of his stay in the Philippines,
been (sic) a person of good repute and morally irreproachable." The periods referred to by him are: (a) from birth of the
petitioner in 1923 to 1933, when petitioner left the Philippines and (b) from 1938 when petitioner returned to the Philippines,
"to the present." As to the latter period, it is quite obvious that, vis-a-vis the aforequoted observation by the Republic, the
witness did not hesitate to breach the boundaries of truth to help the petitioner.
In respect to witness Pablo Oro, all that he could state as regards the petitioner's reputation and moral character is:
Q Now, during the period of your acquaintanceship (sic) of the petitioner and your close contact
with him as you have testified, could you tell us whether the petitioner is of good repute and
morally irreproachable?
A Yes, because among the young people in the Chinese community he is one of the best in
moral conduct and also he is one of the brightest young man (sic) I have encountered.33
This answer was never amplified to enlighten the trial court as to its factual basis. Moreover, it can be easily noted that
the yes answer is actually a qualified one and is not fully responsive. It is limited to good moral conduct, which is but a part of moral
irreproachability. A part is not the whole. The latter means character of the highest order excellent character. 34 Moreover, there is
an apparent attempt to emphasize such conduct within the Chinese community. The third paragraph of Section 2 of the Revised
Naturalization Law explicitly provides the applicant must have such qualifications during the entire period of his residence in the
Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living. That community is not
confined to the Chinese community; it applies to the community in general for the reason that he is required to mingle socially with
the Filipinos. One who fails to do so is disqualified to be naturalized under Section 4 (f) of the law. This witness did not likewise
categorically answer the "good repute" aspect of the question; instead, he mentioned the intellectual qualities of the petitioner. Not
all "bright" persons are of good repute, and not all persons of good repute are bright.
It has been held that to establish the qualifications that the applicant must be of good moral character and must have conducted
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence, the character witnesses must be in a
position to testify on the character and good moral conduct of the applicant during the entire period of the latter's stay in the
Philippines as provided by law. 35
In the instant case, the witnesses utterly failed to do that.
6. Section 12 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires that before a certificate of naturalization is issued, the petitioner shall
renounce "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty." It is settled that a
Chinese national cannot be naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines unless he has complied with the laws of Nationalist China
requiring previous permission of its Minister of Interior for the renunciation of his nationality. 36 In the instant case, petitioner did not
offer any evidence to prove that he obtained such permission. The sixth assigned error then is well-taken.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the decision of the court below of 15 October 1963
and SETTING ASIDE its Order of 8 February 1966 in Naturalization Case No. 85, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
TERRITORY

REPUBLIC ACT No. 3046

(as amended by RA 5446)
AN ACT DEFINE THE BASELINES OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE PHILIPPINES.
WHEREAS, the Constitution of the Philippines describes the national territory as comprising all the territory ceded to the United
States by the Treaty of Paris concluded between the United States and Spain on December 10, 1898, the limits of which are set
forth in Article III of said treaty, together with all the islands embraced in the treaty concluded at Washington, between the United
States and Spain on November 7, 1900, and in the treaty concluded between the United States and Great Britain on January 2,
1930, and all the territory over which the Government of the Philippine Islands exercised jurisdiction at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
WHEREAS, all the waters within the limits set forth in the above-mentioned treaties have always been regarded as part of the
territory of the Philippine Islands;
WHEREAS, all the waters around, between and connecting the various islands of the Philippines archipelago, irrespective of their
width or dimension, have always been considered as necessary appurtenances of the land territory, forming part of the inland or
internal waters of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, all the waters beyond the outermost islands of the archipelago but within the limits of the boundaries set forth in the
aforementioned treaties comprise the territorial sea of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the baselines from which the territorial sea of the Philippines is determined consist of straight lines joining appropriate
points of the outermost islands of the archipelago; and
WHEREAS, the said baselines should be clarified and specifically defined and described for the information of all concerned; Now,
therefor,
Section 1. The baselines for the territorial sea of the Philippines are hereby defined and described specifically as follows:

N. Latitude

E. Longitude

Asimuth

Distance in
Meters

Y'ami Island (E)

Line 1 (Yami I. (E.) Tumaruk Rk.)

2107'03"

12157'24"

35327'

71,656

Tumaruk Rk.
Line 2 (Tumaruk Rk. Balintang Is.)

2028'28"

12202'06"

34713'

58,105

Balintang Island
Line 3 (Balingtang Is. Didicas Rk.)

1957'45"

12209'28"

37505'

97,755

Didicas Rk.
Line 4 (Didicas Rk. - Iligan Pt.)

1904'50"

12212'18"

35039'

86,155

Iligan Pt.
Line 5 (Iligan Pt. - Ditolong Pt.)

1818'45"

12220'15"

35123'

136,030

Ditolong Pt.
Line 6 (Ditolong Pt. - Diviuisa Pt.)

1705'50"

12231'44"

1656'

34,378

Diviuisa Pt.
Line 7 (Diviuisa Pt. - Dijohan Pt.)

1648'00"

12226'06"

2101'

57,781

Dijohan Pt.
Line 7a (Dijohan Pt. - Bulubalik Pt.)

1618'45"

12214'28"

1052'

142,360

Bulubalik Pt.
Line 8 (Bulubalik Pt. - Tinaga I.)

1502'56"

12159'30"

30015'

120,986

Tinaga I.
Line 9 (Tinaga I. - Horadaba Rks.)

1429'45"

12257'40"

28627'

148,690

Horadaba Rks.
Line 10 (Horadaba Rks. Matulin Rk.)

1406'41"

12416'54"

30634'

1,083

Matulin Rk.
Line 11 (Matulin Rk. - Atalaya Pt.)

1406'20"

12417'23"

33146'

178,480

Atalaya Pt.
Line 11a (Atalaya Pt. - Finch Rk.)

1240'59"

12504'02"

31330'

22,268

Finch Rk.
Line 12 (Finch Rk. - SE of Manjud Pt.)

1232'40"

12512'57"

31356'

12,665

SE Manjud pt.
Line 12a (SE of Manjud Pt. - Sora Cay)

1227'54"

12517'59"

32227'

14,225

Sora Cay
Line 13 (Sora Cay - Bunga Pt.)

1221'47"

12522'46"

32103'

22,793

Bunga Pt.
Line 13a (Bunga Pt. - Tubabao I.)

1212'10"

12530'40"

33150'

12,686

Tubabao I.
Line 14 (Tubabao I. - Tugnug Pt.)

2306'06"

12533'58"

35522'

83,235

Tugnug Pt.
Line 15 (Tugnug Pt. - Suluan I.)

1121'06"

12537'40"

33103'

75,326

Suluan Island
Line 16 (Suluan I. - Tuason Pt.)

1045'20"

12557'40"

34751'

107,070

Tuason Pt.
Line 17 (Tuason Pt. - Cauit Pt.)

948'33"

12610'00"

35525'

55,415

Cauit Pt.
Line 18 (Cauit Pt. Arangasa Is.)

918'35"

12612'25"

34244'

49,703

Arangasa Is.
Line 19 Arangasa Is. - Quinablangan I.)

852'50"

12620'28"

34840'

131,330

Quinablangan I.
Line 19a (Quinablangan I. - Above Languyan R.)

742'58"

12634'30"

35308'

25,619

Above Languyan R.
Line 20 (Above Languyan R. Pusan Pt.)

729'10"

12636'10"

35652'

22,489

Pusan Pt.
Line 21 (Pusan Pt. - Tuguban Pt.)

716'59"

12636'50"

2639'

36,259

Tuguban Pt.
Line 22 (Tuguban Pt. - Cape S. Agustin N.)

659'24"

12628'00"

2033'

83,350

Cape San Agustin (N)

Line 22a (Cape S. Agustin (N) Cape San Agustin (S)

617'03"

12612'08"

3016'

1,707

Cape San Agustin (S)

Line 23 (Cape S. Agustin (S) Panguil Bato Pt.)

616'15"

12611'40"

3923'

125,100

Panguil Bato Pt.

Line 23a (Panguil Bato Pt. - Tapundo Pt.)

523'45"

12528'42"

6632'

7,484

Tapudo Pt.
Line 24 (Tapundo Pt. - Manamil I.)

522'08"

12524'59"

8919'

7,667

Manamil I.
Line 24a (Manamil I. - Balut I. (W)

522'05"

12520'50"

13901'

3,051

Balut I. (W)
Line 25 (Balut I. (W) - Middle of 3 Rk. Awash)

523'20"

12519'45"

12447'

149,840

Middle of 3 Rk. Awash

Line 26 (Middle of 3 Rk. Awash Tongquil I.)

609'39"

12413'02"

8618'

259,400

Tongquil I.
Line 27 (Tongquil I. - Sumbasumba I.)

600'15"

12152'45"

6129'

115,950

Sumbasumba I.
Line 28 (Sumbasumba I. - Kinapusan Is.)

530'10"

12057'35"

4319'

44,445

Kinapusan Is.
Line 29 (Kinapusan Is. - Manuk Manka I.)

512'37"

12041'05"

6314'

101,290

Manuk Manka I.
Line 30 (Manuk Manka I. - Frances Reef)

447'50"

11952'10"

5830'

80,847

Frances Reef
Line 31 (Frances Reef - Bajapa Reef)

424'54"

11914'54"

13434'

29,330

Bajapa Reef
Line 32 (Bajapa Reef) - Panguan I.)

436'04"

11903'36"

16405'

13,480

Panguan I.
Line 33 (Panguan I. - Omapoy I.)

443'06"

11901'36"

23848'

42,470

Omapoy I.
Line 34 (Omapoy I. - Sanga-Sanga I.)

455'02"

11921'15"

24611'

51,005

Sanga-Sanga I.
Line 35 (Sanga-Sanga I. - Pearl Bank)

506'12"

11946'30"

17005'

80,200

Pearl Bank
Line 36 (Pearl Bank - Baguan I.)

549'04"

11939'01"

10313'

137,050

Baguan I
Line 36a (Banguan I. - Taganak I.)

606'00"

11826'42"

7652'

15,535

Taganak I.
Line 37 (Taganak I. - Gt. Bakkungaan O

604'05"

11818'30"

11839'

24,805

Gt. Bakkungaan
Line 37a (Gt. Bakkungaan - Sibaung I.)

610'32"

11806'42"

13604'

18,470

Sibaung I.
Line 38 (Sibaung - I. Muligi I.

617'45"

11759'45"

21536'

79,915

Mulugi I.
Line 39 (Mulugi I. - Mangsee Is.)

653'00"

11825'00"

11914'

140,541

Mangsee Is.
Line 39a (Mangsee Is. - Cape Melville)

730'10"

11718'20"

13450

48,815

Cape Melville
Line 40 (Cape Melville - Ligas Pt.)

748'50"

11659'30"

15354'

15,665

Ligas Pt.
Line 41 (Ligas Pt. - Cay)

756'28"

11655'45"

17040'

5,666

Cay
Line 41a (Cay-Secam I.)

759'30"

11655'15"

20452'

22,925

Secam I.
Line 42 (Secam I. - N. of Canipan Bay)

810'47"

11700'30"

20909'

54,900

N. of Canipan Bay
Line 43 (N. of Canipan Bay Tatub Pt.)

836'50"

11715'06"

21857'

18,570

Tatub Pt.
Line 44 (Tatub Pt. - Punta Baja)

844'40"

11721'28"

22204'

45,125

Punta Baja
Line 45 (Punta Baja - Malapackun I.)

902'50"

11737'58"

22330'

32,194

Malapackun I.
Line 46 (Malapackun I. - Piedras Pt.)

915'30"

11750'04"

22550'

148,260

Piedras Pt.
Line 47 (Piedras Pt. - Tapuitan I.)

1011'28"

11848'18"

20319'

124,900

Tapuitan I.
Line 48 (Tapuitan I. - Pinnacle Rk.)

1113'40"

11915'28"

20847'

136,590

Pincle Rk.
Line 49 (Pinnacle Rk. - Cape Calavite

1218'34"

11951'45"

20040'

134,230

Cape Calavite
Line 50 (Cape Calavite - Cabra I.)

1326'40"

12018'00"

14812'

58,235

Cabra I.
Line 51 (Cabra I. - Capones Is.)

1353'30"

12000'58"

17926'

113,400

Capones Is.
Line 52 (Capones Is. - Pa-Lauig Pt.)

1455'00"

12000'20"

16809'

58,100

Palauig Pt.
Line 53 (Palauig. - Hermana Mayor I.)

1525'50"

11953'40"

16417'

40,870

Hermana Mayor I.
Line 53a (Hermana Mayor Tambobo Pt.)

1547'10"

11947'28"

16710'

20,490

Tambobo Pt.
Line 54 (Tambobo Pt. - Rena Pt.)

1558'00"

11944'55"

18143'

22,910

Rena Pt.
Line 54a (Rena Pt. - Cape Bolinao

1610'25"

11945'18"

19139'

18,675

Cape Bolinao
Line 55 (Cape Bolinao - Darigayos Pt.)

1620'20"

11947'25"

22620'

80,016

Darigayos Pt.
Line 56 (Darigayos Pt. - Dile Pt.)

1650'15"

12020'00"

17958'

81,616

Dile Pt.
Line 56a (Disle Pt. - Pinget I.)

1734'30"

12019'58"

18827'

12,060

Pinget I.
Line 56b (Pinget I. - Badoc I.)

1740'58"

12020'58"

19246'

27,170

Badoc I.
Line 57 (Badoc I. - Cape Bojeador)

1755'20"

12024'22"

19503'

65,270

Cape Bojeador
Line 58 (Cape Bojeador - Dalupiri I.)

1829'30"

12034'00"

22216'

101,740

Dalupiri I.
Line 59 (Dalupiri I. - Catanapan Pt.)

1910'15"

12113'02"

21329'

25,075

Catanapan Pt.
Line 60 (Catanapan Pt. - Dequey I.)

1921'35"

12120'56"

20227'

116,870

Dequey I.
Line 61 (Dequey I. - Raile)

2920'06"

12146'35"

18047'

42,255

Raile
Line 62 (Raile - Y'ami I. (W)

2043'00"

12146'55"

20030'

48,140

Y'ami I.(W)
Line 63 (Y'ami I. (W) - Y'ami I. (M)

2107'26"

12156'39"

23840'

237

Y'ami I. (M)
Line 64 (Y'ami I.(M) - Y'ami I. (E)

2107'30"

12156'46"

30708'

1,376

Y'ami I. (E)

2107'03"

12157'24"

Section 2. All waters within the baselines provided for in Section one hereof are considered inland or internal waters of the
Philippines.
Section 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Republic Act No. 5446
as amended by R.A. 9522

September 18, 1968

AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION ONE OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX, ENTITLED "AN
ACT TO DEFINE THE BASELINES OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE PHILIPPINES"
Section 1. To correct typographical errors, Section one of Republic Act numbered thirty hundred and forty-six is amended to read as
follows:
"SECTION 1. The baselines for the territorial sea of the Philippines are hereby defined and described specifically as
follows:

N. Latitude

Yami Island (E)

210703"

E. Longitude

Line 2 (Tumaruk Rk. - Balintang Is.)

202828"

Distance (In
Meters)

1215724"

Line 1 (Yami I. (E.) - Tumaruk Rk.)

Tumaruk Rk.

Azimuth

35327

71,656

34713

58,105

1220206"

Balintang Islands

195745"

1220928"

Line 3 (Balintang Is. - Didicas Rk.)

Didicas Rk.

190450"

181845"

170550"

164800"

161845"

150256"

142945"

140641"

140620"

2101

57,781

1052

142,360

30015

120,980

28627

148,690

30634

1,083

1241654"

Line 10 (Horadaba Rks. - Matulin Rk.)

Matulin Rk.

34,375

1225740"

Line 9 (Tinaga I. - Horadaba Rks.)

Horadaba Rks.

1656

1215930"

Line 8 (Bulubalik Pt. - Tinaga I.)

Tinaga I.

136,030

1221428"

Line 7a (Dijohan Pt. - Bulubalik Pt.)

Bulubalik Pt.

35123

1222606"

Line 7 (Diviuisa Pt. - Dijohan Pt.)

Dijohan Pt.

86,155

1223144"

Line 6 (Ditolong Pt. - Diviuisa Pt.)

Diviuisa Pt.

35039

1222015"

Line 5 (Iligan Pt. - Ditolong Pt.)

Ditolong Pt.

97,755

1221218"

Line 4 (Didicas Rk. - Iligan Pt.)

Iligan Pt.

35705

1241723"

Line 11 (Matulin Rk. - Atalaya Pt.)

Atalaya Pt.

124059"

123240"

122754"

122147"

121210"

120606"

111206"

104520"

Line 17 (Tuason Pt. - Cauit Pt.)

94833"

32103

22,761

33150

12,646

35522

83,225

33103

75,326

34751

107,070

35525

55,415

1253740"

Line 16 (Suluan I. - Tuason Pt.)

Tuason Pt.

14,225

1253740"

Line 15 (Tugnug Pt. - Suluan I.)

Suluan Island

32227

1253358"

Line 14 (Tubabao I. - Tugnug Pt.)

Tugnug Pt.

12,663

1253040"

Line 13a (Bunga Pt. - Tubabao I.)

Tubabao I.

31356

1252246"

Line 13 (Sora Cay - Bunga Pt.)

Bunga Pt.

22,263

1251759"

Line 12a (SE of Manjud Pt. - Sora Cay)

Sora Cay

31330

1251257"

Line 12 (Finch Rk. - SE of Manjud Pt.)

SE Manjud Pt.

178,480

1250402"

Line 11a (Atalaya Pt. - Finch Rk.)

Finch Rk.

33146

1261000"

Cauit Pt.

91835"

1261225"

Line 18 (Cauit Pt. Arangasa Is.)

Arangasa Is.

85250"

74258"

72910"

71659"

65924"

61703"

61615"

52345"

52208"

2639

36,259

2033

83,350

3016

1,707

3923

125,100

6632

7,484

1252842"

Line 23a (Panguil Bato Pt. - Tapundo Pt.)

Tapundo Pt.

22,489

1261140"

Line 23 (Cape S. Agustin (S) - Panguil Bato Pt.)

Panguil Bato Pt.

35652

1261208"

Line 22a (Cape S. Agustin (N) - Cape San Agustin (S)

Cape San Agustin (S)

25,619

1262800"

Line 22 (Tugubun Pt. - Cape S. Agustin N.)

Cape San Agustin (N)

35308

1263650"

Line 21 (Pusan Pt. - Tugubun Pt.)

Tugubun Pt.

131,330

1263610"

Line 20 (Above Languyan R. - Pusan Pt.)

Pusan Pt.

34840

1263430"

Line 19a (Quinablangan I - Above Languyan R.)

Above Languyan R.

49,703

1262028"

Line 19 (Arangasa Is. - Quinablangan I.)

Quinablangan I.

34244

1252459"

Line 24 (Tapundo Pt. - Manamil I.)

Manamil I.

52205"

52320"

60939"

60015"

53010"

51237"

44750"

42454"

Line 32 (Bajapa Reef - Panguan I.)

43604"

6129

115,950

4319

44,445

6314

101,290

5830

80,847

13434

29,330

16405

13,480

1191454"

Line 31 (Frances Reef - Bajapa Reef)

Bajapa Reef

259,400

1195210"

Line 30 (Manuk Manka I. - Frances Reef)

Frances Reef

8618

1204105"

Line 29 (Kinapusan Is. - Manuk Manka I.)

Manuk Manka I.

149,840

1205735"

Line 28 (Sumbasumba I. - Kinapusan Is.)

Kinapusan Is.

12447

1215245"

Line 27 (Tongquil I. - Sumbasumba I.)

Sumbasumba I.

3,051

1241302"

Line 26 (Middle of 3 Rk. Awash - Tongquil I.)

Tongquil I.

13901

1251945"

Line 25 (Balut I. (W) - Middle of 3 Rk. Awash)

Middle of 3 Rk. Awash

7,667

1252050"

Line 24a (Manamil I. - Balut I. (W)

Balut I. (W)

8919

1190336"

Panguan I.

44306"

1190136"

Line 33 (Panguan I. - Omapoy I.)

Omapoy I.

45502"

50612"

54904"

60600"

60405"

61032"

61745"

65300"

73010"

7652

15,535

11839

24,805

13604

18,470

21536

79,915

11914

140,541

1182500"

Line 39 (Muligi I. - Mangsee Is.)

Mangsee Is.

137,050

1175945"

Line 38 (Sibaung - I. Muligi I.)

Muligi I.

10313

1180642"

Line 37a (Gt. Bakkungaan-Sibaung I.)

Sibaung I.

80,200

1181830"

Line 37 (Taganak I. - Gt. Bakkungaan)

Gt. Bakkungaan

17005

1182642"

Line 36a (Baguan I. - Taganak I.)

Taganak I.

51,003

1193901"

Line 36 (Pearl Bank - Baguan I.)

Baguan I.

24611

1194630"

Line 35 (Sanga-Sanga I. - Pearl Bank)

Pearl Bank

42,470

1192115"

Line 34 (Omapoy I. - Sanga-Sanga I.)

Sanga-Sanga I.

23848

1171820"

Line 39a (Mangsee Is. - Cape Melville)

Cape Melville

74850"

75628"

75930"

81047"

83650"

84440"

90250"

91530"

Line 47 (Piedras Pt. - Tapiutan I.)

101128"

20909

54,990

21857

18,570

22204

45,125

22330

32,195

22550

148,260

20319

124,900

1175004"

Line 46 (Malapackun I. - Piedras Pt.)

Piedras Pt.

22,925

1173758"

Line 45 (Punta Baja - Malapackun I.)

Malapackun I.

20452

1172128"

Line 44 (Tatub Pt. - Punta Baja)

Punta Baja

5,666

1171506"

Line 43 (N. of Canipan Bay-Tatub Pt.)

Tatub Pt.

17040

1170030"

Line 42 (Secam I. - N. of Canipan Bay)

N. of Canipan Bay

15,665

1165515"

Line 41a (Cay-Secam I.)

Secam I.

15354

1165545"

Line 41 (Ligas Pt. - Cay)

Cay

48,815

1165930"

Line 40 (Cape Melville - Ligas Pt.)

Ligas Pt.

13450

1184818"

Tapiutan I.

111340"

1191528"

Line 48 (Tapiutan I. - Pinnacle Rk.)

Pinnacle Rk.

121834"

132640"

135330"

145500"

152550"

154710"

155800"

161025"

162020"

16809

58,100

16417

40,870

16710

20,490

18143

22,910

19139

18,675

1194518"

Line 54a (Rena Pt. - Cape Bolinao)

Cape Bolinao

113,400

1194455"

Line 54 (Tambobo Pt. - Rena Pt.)

Rena Pt.

17926

1194728"

Line 53a (Hermana Mayor I. - Tambobo Pt.)

Tambobo Pt.

58,235

1195340"

Line 53 (Palauig. - Hermana Mayor I.)

Hermana Mayor I.

14812

1200020"

Line 52 (Capones Is. - Palauig Pt.)

Palauig Pt.

134,230

1200058"

Line 51 (Cabra I. - Capones Is.)

Capones Is.

20040

1201800"

Line 50 (Cape Calavite-Cabra I.)

Cabra I.

136,590

1195145"

Line 49 (Pinnacle Rk. - Cape Calavite)

Cape Calavite

20847

1194725"

Line 55 (Cape Bolinao - Darigayos Pt.)

Darigayos Pt.

165015"

173430"

174058"

175520"

182930"

191015"

192135"

202006"

Line 62 (Raile - Yami I. (W)

204300"

19503

65,270

22216

101,740

21329

25,075

20227

116,870

18047

42,255

20030

48,140

1214635"

Line 61 (Dequey I. - Raile)

Raile

27,170

1212056"

Line 60 (Catanapan Pt. - Dequey I.)

Dequey I.

19246

1211302"

Line 59 (Dalupiri I. - Catanapan Pt.)

Catanapan Pt.

12,060

1203400"

Line 58 (Cape Bojeador - Dalupiri I.)

Dalupiri I.

18827

1202422"

Line 57 (Badoc I. - Cape Bojeador)

Cape Bojeador

81,616

1202058"

Line 56b (Pinget I. - Badoc I.)

Badoc I.

17958

1201958"

Line 56a (Dile Pt. - Pinget I.)

Pinget I.

80,016

1202000"

Line 56 (Darigayos Pt. - Dile Pt.)

Dile Pt.

22620

1214655"

Yami I. (W)

210726"

1215639"

Line 63 (Yami I. (W) - Yami I. (M)

Yami I. (M)

210730"

210703"

237

30708

1,376

1215646"

Line 64 (Yami I. (M) - Yami I. (E)

Yami I. (E)

23840

1215724"

Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without
prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which
the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
Section 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1599
ESTABLISHING AN EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, an exclusive economic zone extending to a distance of two hundred nautical miles from the baselines from which the
territorial sea is measured is vital to the economic survival and development of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, such a zone is now a recognized principle of international law;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby decree and order:
Section 1. There is hereby established a zone to be known as the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. The exclusive
economic zone shall extend to a distance of two hundred nautical miles beyond and from the baselines from which the territorial sea
is measured: Provided, That, where the outer limits of the zone as thus determined overlap the exclusive economic zone of an
adjacent or neighboring state, the common boundaries shall be determined by agreement with the state concerned or in accordance
with pertinent generally recognized principles of international law on delimitation.
Section 2. Without prejudice to the rights of the Republic of the Philippines over it territorial sea and continental shelf, it shall have
and exercise in the exclusive economic zone established herein the following;
(a) Sovereignty rights for the purpose of exploration and exploitation, conservation and management of the natural
resources, whether living or non-living, both renewable and non-renewable, of the sea-bed, including the subsoil and the
superjacent waters, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the resources of the
zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds;
(b) Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with respect to the establishment and utilization of artificial islands, off-shore terminals,
installations and structures, the preservation of the marine environment, including the prevention and control of pollution,
and scientific research;
(c) Such other rights as are recognized by international law or state practice.
Section 3. Except in accordance with the terms of any agreement entered into with the Republic of the Philippines or of any license
granted by it or under authority by the Republic of the Philippines, no person shall, in relation to the exclusive economic zone:
(a) explore or exploit any resources;
(b) carry out any search, excavation or drilling operations:
(c) conduct any research;
(d) construct, maintain or operate any artificial island, off-shore terminal, installation or other structure or device; or
(e) perform any act or engage in any activity which is contrary to, or in derogation of, the sovereign rights and jurisdiction
herein provided.
Nothing herein shall be deemed a prohibition on a citizen of the Philippines, whether natural or juridical, against the performance of
any of the foregoing acts, if allowed under existing laws.

Section 4. Other states shall enjoy in the exclusive economic zone freedoms with respect to navigation and overflight, the laying of
submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea relating to navigation and communications.
Section 5. (a) The President may authorize the appropriate government office/agency to make and promulgate such rules and
regulations which may be deemed proper and necessary for carrying out the purposes of this degree.
(b) Any person who shall violate any provision of this decree or of any rule or regulation promulgated hereunder and
approved by the President shall be subject to a fine which shall not be less than two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) nor be
more than one hundred thousand pesos (100,000.00) or imprisonment ranging from six (6) months to ten (10) years, or
both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. Vessels and other equipment or articles used in connection
therewith shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture.
Section 6. This Decree shall take effect thirty (30) days after publication in the Official Gazette.
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-eight day of July, two thousand eight.
Republic Act No. 9522

March 10, 2009

AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446, TO
DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3046, entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines", as
amended by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5446, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 1. The baselines of the Philippines archipelago are hereby defined and described specifically as follows:

Basepoint
Number

Station
Name

Location

World Geodetic System of 1984

(WGS 84)
Coordinates

Latitude (N)

Distance to
next
basepoint
(M)

Longitude (E)

1 PAB-01

Amianan Is.

21657.73"

1215727.71"

70.08

2 PAB-02

Balintang Is.

195738.19"

122946.32"

99.17

3 PAB-04

Bigan Pt.

181835.30"

1222019.07"

71.83

4 PAB-05A

Ditolong Pt.

17716.30"

1223128.34"

1.05

5 PAB-05B

Ditolong Pt.

17614.79"

1223143.84"

0.39

6 PAB-05

Ditolong Pt.

17551.31"

1223142.66"

3.29

7 PAB-06

Spires Is.

17236.91"

122313.28"

9.74

8 PAB-06B

Digollorin Pt.

165918.03"

1222756.61"

3.51

9 PAB-06C

Digollorin Rk.

164956.11"

1222650.78"

2.40

10 PAB-07

Divimisa Pt.

164738.86"

122264.40"

30.94

11 PAB-08

Dinoban Pt.

161844.33"

1221406.69"

116.26

12 PAB-10A

Tinaga Is.

142954.43"

1225751.15"

80.29

13 PAB-11

Horodaba Rk.

146.29.91"

1241659.21"

0.54

14 PAB-12

Matulin Rk.

146.10.40"

1241726.28"

96.04

15 PAB-13

Atalaya Pt.

12416.37"

125353.71"

6.79

16 PAB-13A

Bacan Is.

123618.41"

125850.19"

5.52

17 PAB-14

Finch Rk.

1232.33.62"

1251259.70"

0.80

18 PAB-14A

Cube Rk.

1231.57.45"

1251332.37"

4.90

19 PAB-14D

NW Manjud Pt.

122836.42"

1251712.32"

1.30

20 PAB-15

SE Manjud Pt.

122737.51"

125185.23"

7.09

21 PAB-16A

S Sorz Cay

122141.64"

125237.41"

5.68

22 PAB-16B

Panablihon

121727.17"

125270.12"

5.21

23 PAB-16C

Alugon

121321.95"

1253019.47"

1.94

24 PAB-16D

N Bunga Pt.

121148.16"

1253130.88"

0.54

25 PAB-17

E Bunga Pt.

121120.67"

1253148.29"

5.71

26 PAB-18A

SE Tobabao Is.

1267.00"

1253411.94"

83.94

27 PAB-19C

Suluan Is.

104516.70"

125588.78"

56.28

28 PAB-19D

N Tuason Pt.

94959.58"

126106.39"

57.44

29 PAB-20A

Arangasa Is.

85316.62"

1262048.81"

40.69

30 PAB-21B

Sanco Pt.

81311.53"

1262853.25"

30.80

31 PAB-22

Bagoso Is

74245.02"

1263429.08"

12.95

32 PAB-22C

Languyan

72949.47"

1263559.24"

0.54

33 PAB-23

Languyan

72916.93"

1263559.50"

0.76

34 PAB-23B

Languyan

72830.97"

1263557.30"

1.2

35 PAB-23C

N Baculin Pt.

72729.42"

1263551.31"

10.12

36 PAB-24

Pusan Pt.

71719.80"

1263618.26"

1.14

37 PAB-24A

S Pusan Pt.

71614.43"

1263557.20"

63.28

38 PAB-25B

Cape San Agustin

61714.73"

1261214.40"

1.28

39 PAB-25

Cape San Agustin

6168.35"

1261135.06"

67.65

40 PAB-26

SE Sarangani Is.

52334.20"

1252842.11"

0.43

41 PAB-27

Pangil Bato Pt.

52321.80"

1252819.59"

3.44

42 PAB-28

Tapundo Pt.

62155.66"

1262511.21"

3.31

43 PAB-29

W Calia Pt.

52158.48"

1252152.03"

0.87

44 PAB-30

Manamil Is.

5222.91"

1252059.73"

1.79

45 PAB-31

Marampog Pt.

52320.18"

1251944.29"

78.42

46 PAB-32

Pola Pt.

698.44"

1241542.81"

122.88

47 PAB-33A

Kantuan Is

62647.22"

12213.34.50"

29.44

48 PAB-34A

Tongguil Is.

6233.77"

1215636.20"

2.38

49 PAB-35

Tongquil Is

618.51"

1215441.45"

1.72

50 PAB-35A

Tongquil Is.

6017.88"

1216311.17"

85.94

51 PAB-38A

Kirapusan Is

512.8.70"

1204138.14"

55.24

52 PAB-39

Manuk Manka Is.

44739.24"

1195158.08"

43.44

53 PAB-40

Frances Reef

42453.84"

1191450.71

0.61

54 PAB-40A

Frances Reef

4253.83"

1191415.15"

15.48

55 PAB-41A

Bajapa Reef

436"9.01"

119322.75"

6.88

56 PAB-42A

Paguan Is.

44252.07"

119144.04"

8.40

57 PAB-43

Alice Reef

44555.25"

119315.19"

2.28

58 PAB-44

Alice Reef

4475.36"

119512.94"

18.60

59 PAB-45

Omapoy Rk.

45510.45"

119221.30

23.37

60 PAB-46

Bukut Lapis Pt.

5223.73"

1194418.14"

44.20

61 PAB-47

Pearl Bank

54635.15"

1193951.77"

75.17

62 PAB-48

Bagnan Is.

6558.41"

1182657.30"

8.54

63 PAB-48A

Taganak Is

6414.08"

1181833.33"

13.46

64 PAB-49

Great Bakkungaan Is.

6114.65"

118654.15"

3.97

65 PAB-50

Libiman Is.

61339.90"

118352.09"

5.53

66 PAB-51

Sibaung Is.

61743.99"

11805.44"

41.60

67 PAB-52

Muligi Is.

65214.53"

1182340.49"

75.06

68 PAB-53

South Mangsee Is.

73026.05"

1171833.75"

26.00

69 PAB-54

Balabac Is.

74830.69"

1165939.18"

6.08

70 PAB-54A

Balabac Great Reef

75127.17"

1165417.19"

1.18

71 PAB-54B

Balabac Great Reef

75219.86"

1165328.73"

2.27

72 PAB-55

Balabac Great Reef

75436.35"

1165316.64"

5.42

73 PAB-60

Ada Reef

820.26"

1165410.04"

10.85

74 PAB.61

Secam Is.

81118.36"

1165951.87"

30.88

75 PAB-62

Latua Pt.

88756.37"

1171551.23"

7.91

76 PAB-63

SW Tatub Pt.

84417.40"

1172039.37"

11.89

77 PAB-63A

W Sicud Pt.

85332.20"

1172815.78"

13.20

78 PAB-64

Tarumpitao Pt.

92.57.47"

1173738.88"

81.12

79 PAB.64B

Dry Is.

95922.54"

1183653.61"

82.76

80 PAB-65C

Sinangcolan Pt.

111319.82"

1191517.74"

74.65

81 PAB-67

Pinnacle Rk.

121935.22"

1195056.00

93.88

82 PAB-68

Cabra Is

135324.45"

12015.86"

115.69

83 PAB-71

Hermana Mayor Is.

154843.61"

1194656.09"

9.30

84 PAB-72

Tambobo Pt.

155761.67"

1194455.32"

12.06

85 PAB-72B

Rena Pt.

16957.90"

11945.15.76"

0.25

86 PAB-73

Rena Pt.

161012.42"

1194511.95"

6.43

87 PAB-74

Rocky Ledge

161634.46"

1194619.50"

0.65

88 PAB-74A

Piedra Pt.

163712.70"

1194628.62"

1.30

89 PAB-75

Piedra Pt.

161829.49"

1194644.94"

1.04

90 PAB-75C

Piedra Pt.

161928.20"

119477.69"

0.63

91 PAB-75D

Piedra Pt.

16204.38"

1194720.48"

80.60

92 PAB-76

Dile Pt.

173424.94"

1202033.36"

6.86

93 PAB-77

Pinget Is.

174117.56"

120212.20"

14.15

94 PAB-78

Baboc Is.

17554.13"

1202440.56"

35.40

95 PAB-79

Cape Bojeador

182932.42"

1203342.41"

1.77

96 PAB-79B

Bobon

183052.88"

1203455.35"

58.23

97 PAB-80

Calagangan Pt.

191014.78"

1211252.64"

98.07

98 PAB-82

Itbayat Is.

204315.74"

1214657.80"

25.63

99 PAB-83

Amianan Is

21717.47"

1215643.85"

0.08

100 PAB-84

Amianan Is.

21718.41"

1215648.79"

0.25

101 PAB-85

Amianan Is.

21712.04"

121573.65"

0.44

Section 2. The baseline in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be
determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.
Section 3. This Act affirms that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion, sovereignty and jurisdiction over all portions of the
national territory as defined in the Constitution and by provisions of applicable laws including, without limitation, Republic Act No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended.
Section 4. This Act, together with the geographic coordinates and the chart and maps indicating the aforesaid baselines, shall be
deposited and registered with the Secretary General of the United Nations.
Section 5. The National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) shall forthwith produce and publish charts and
maps of the appropriate scale clearly representing the delineation of basepoints and baselines as set forth in this Act.
Section 6. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be provided in a supplemental budyet or included in
the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law.
Section 7. If any portion or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid the other portions or provisions hereof which
are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Section 8. The provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as amended by Republic Act No. 5446, and all other laws, decrees, executive
orders, rules and issuances inconsistent with this Act are hereby amended or modified accordingly.
Section 9. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any two (2) newspaper of
general circulation.
Magalona v ermita
The Case
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522)
adjusting the countrys archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
The Antecedents
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
archipelagic State.3 This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958
(UNCLOS I),4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their territorial sea, the breadth of which, however,
was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved
futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act
No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the
need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),5 which the
Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984.6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of
baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines7 and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental
shelf.8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the
Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as
regimes of islands whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a
legislator, in their respective capacities as citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators,9 as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of

RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the
Philippine states sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of
Paris11 and ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the countrys waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all
vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and
damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.13 In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522s
treatment of the KIG as regime of islands not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of
subsistence fishermen.14 To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded
and included its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS IIIs framework of regime of islands
to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal. Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised
threshold issues questioning (1) the petitions compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on
petitioners alleged lack of locus standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of
RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as the countrys compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving
Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the countrys security,
environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines claim over Sabah. Respondents also question the normative force,
under international law, of petitioners assertion that what Spain ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the
islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris. We left unacted
petitioners prayer for an injunctive writ.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1.

Preliminarily

1.

Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and

2.

Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.

2.

On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional

The Ruling of the Court

On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari
and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522
unconstitutional.
On the Threshold Issues
Petitioners Possess Locus
Standi as Citizens
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition alleges neither
infringement of legislative prerogative15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by the passage and implementation of RA 9522.
Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of
the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar
nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit,
thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing.17
The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition
Are Proper Remedies to Test
the Constitutionality of Statutes
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs of
certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners.18

Respondents submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial
review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the
constitutionality of statutes,19 and indeed, of acts of other branches of government.20 Issues of constitutional import are sometimes
crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of
this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, noncompliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is one such law.
RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool
to Demarcate the Countrys
Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Delineate Philippine Territory
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 dismembers a large portion of the national territory 21 because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III
demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national
territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or
statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the
Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris technical
description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago,
embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.22
Petitioners theory fails to persuade us.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use
rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from
the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III
delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating
the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority
over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts. On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are
enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either
straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf.
Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:

Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf. The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance
with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the
international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties
exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction
to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to
exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article
77).
Even under petitioners theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within
the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn
in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III.
The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the
Treaty of Paris, but from the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago.24
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners
claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose)
territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription,25 not by executing multilateral treaties on the
regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and
continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the
rules on general international law.26
RA 9522s Use of the Framework
of Regime of Islands to Determine the
Maritime Zones of the KIG and the

Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent

with the Philippines Claim of Sovereignty
Over these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522s use of UNCLOS IIIs regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the
breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, weakens our territorial claim over that area.27 Petitioners add that the KIGs
(and Scarborough Shoals) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of about 15,000 square nautical
miles of territorial waters, prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.28 A comparison of the configuration of the baselines
drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the text
of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis--vis the Philippines obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view.
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped
by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of
one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS IIIs limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA
9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable
cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines claim
over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.
Petitioners assertion of loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in
fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines total maritime space
(covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles, as shown in the table
below:29

Extent of maritime area using RA

Extent of maritime area

3046, as amended, taking into

using RA 9522, taking into

account the Treaty of Paris

account UNCLOS III (in

delimitation (in square nautical

square nautical miles)

miles)

Internal or
archipelagic
waters

Territorial Sea

166,858

171,435

274,136

32,106

Exclusive
Economic
382,669

Zone

TOTAL

440,994

586,210

Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the
waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping exclusive

economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with
UNCLOS III.30
Further, petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not
enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines continued claim of sovereignty
and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:

SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises
sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as Regime of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines
consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects
would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of
UNCLOS III requires that [t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration
of the archipelago. Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical
miles, save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles. 31
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG32 and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these
outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago,33 such that any
straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably depart to an appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago.
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize the foregoing during
the Senate deliberations:

What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the
Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might
be accused of violating the provision of international law which states: The drawing of such baseline shall not
depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. So sa loob ng ating baseline,
dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa
atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own.
This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the orange
line which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is
Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating
archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang
circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it should
follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS IIIs limits. The need to shorten this baseline,
and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by respondents:]
][T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime
zones including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as
amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit:
1.

The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical
miles x x x. This exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which states that
The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number
of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles.

2.

The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the baselines
system. This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.

3.

Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic survey methods.
Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later found to
be located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47.35

Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision to
classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as Regime[s] of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines
consistent with Article 12136 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine States responsible observance of its pacta
sunt servandaobligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any naturally formed area of land,
surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide, such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category
of regime of islands, whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.37
Statutory Claim Over Sabah under
RA 5446 Retained

Petitioners argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines claim over Sabah in North Borneo is
also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:

Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in
this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of
Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not
Incompatible with the Constitutions
Delineation of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally converts internal waters
into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including
overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime
pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution.38
Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article I of the Constitution39 or as archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III
(Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space
over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil.
1.

The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the

archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters,
regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.

2.

This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their
bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.

xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects
affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic
State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources
contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law
norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of
maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of
freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent
discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to
regulate innocent and sea lanes passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now
pending in Congress.41
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to
grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys limitations and
conditions for their exercise.42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law,43 thus
automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to
absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking
retaliatory measures from the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent
passage and sea lanes passage45 does not place them in lesser footing vis--vis continental coastal States which
are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through
international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a
concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their
baselines,regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial
sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States archipelago and the waters enclosed by their
baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS
III.46 Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more
than 24 nautical miles beyond the States territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other
States under UNCLOS III.47
Petitioners invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and
State Policies)48 must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere
legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x
x.49 Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in
interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran50 treated the right to a healthful
and balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to
substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of
marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 251) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 752), are not
violated by RA 9522.

In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone,
reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a
maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III.
If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will
refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui
generis maritime space the exclusive economic zone in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III
grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical
miles.53 UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this
zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
RA 9522 and the Philippines Maritime Zones
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522.54 We have
looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III55 and we find petitioners reading plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing
this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent
an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable
baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted
disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and
submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the countrys case in any international dispute over Philippine
maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522,
allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is
therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our
national interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
GOVERNMENT

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO(G.R. No. 73748 - May
22, 1986)FACTS:
1.On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcingthat
she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.2.On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was
issued providing the basis of the Aquinogovernment assumption of power by stating that
the "new government was installed througha direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people
assisted by units of the New ArmedForces of the Philippines."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the
realmof politics where only the people are the judge.The Court further held that:1.The people
have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entirecountry;
2. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.
Issue:
The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent
produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was
also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women
without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.
Facts:
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police,
took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and
knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were
signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia
Street, in the district of Sampaloc. That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the
respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their
jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1)
They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or
(2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons
could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to
show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.

Held:
The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each,
plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the
chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private
citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon
to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under
no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe
the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and
has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has
inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has
illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason
why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of
law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must
necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents,
within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by
forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the
person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty
may not thus be easily evaded.
SOVEREIGNTY
G.R. No. L-49

November 12, 1945

WILLIAM F. PERALTA, petitioner,

vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
William F. Peralta in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General Taada for respondent.
City Fiscal Mabanag as amicus curiae.
FERIA, J.:
Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged with the supervision and control of the
production, procurement and distribution of goods and other necessaries as defined in section 1 of Act No. 9 of the National
Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, was prosecuted for the crime of robbery as defined and penalized by section
2 (a) of Act No. 65 of the same Assembly. He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, which he commenced to serve on
August 21, 1944, by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, created in section 1 of Ordinance No. 7 promulgated
by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Constitution and
laws of the said Republic. And the procedure followed in the trial was the summary one established in Chapter II of Executive Order
No. 157 of the Chairman of the Executive Commission, made applicable to the trial violations of said Act No. 65 by section 9 thereof
and section 5 of said Ordinance No. 7.
The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by
Ordinance No. 7 "was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of which
are repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United States of
America, and therefore, null and void ab initio," that the provisions of said Ordinance No. 7 are violative of the fundamental laws of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines and "the petitioner has been deprived of his constitutional rights"; that the petitioner herein is
being punished by a law created to serve the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, and "that the
penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code."
The Solicitor General, in his answer in behalf of the respondent, states that, in his own opinion, for the reasons expressed in his brief
in the case of People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Benedicto Jose y Santos, defendant-appellee, G. R. No. L-22 (p.
612, post), the acts and proceedings taken and had before the said Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which
resulted in the conviction and imprisonment of the herein petitioner, should now be denied force and efficacy, and therefore the
petition for habeas corpus should be granted. The reasons advanced by the Solicitor General in said brief and in his reply
memorandum in support of his contention are, that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created, and the
summary procedure prescribed therefor, by said Ordinance No. 7 in connection with Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the
Executive Commission are tinged with political complexion; that the procedure prescribed in Ordinance No. 7 does not afford a fair
trial, violates the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and impairs the Constitutional rights of accused persons under their legitimate
Constitution. And he cites, in support of this last proposition, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases of
Texas vs. White (7 Wall., 700, 743); Horn vs. Lockart (17 Wall., 570, 581); United States vs. Home Insurance Co. (22 Wall., 99, 104);
Sprott vs.United States (20 Wall., 459).
The City Fiscal of Manila appeared before this Court as amicus curiae. In his memorandum he submits that the petition for habeas
corpus be denied on the following grounds: That the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction and the Acts, Ordinances
and Executive Orders, creating it are not of a political complexion, for said Court was created, and the crimes and offenses placed
under its jurisdiction were penalized heavily, in response to an urgent necessity, according to the preamble of Ordinance No. 7; that
the right to appeal in a criminal case is not a constitutional right; and that the summary procedure established in said Ordinance No.
7 is not violative of the provision of Article III, section 1 (18) of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, to the effect that no person
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself, nor of the provision of section 1 (1) of the same Article that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
The features of the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, assailed by the petitioner and the Solicitor General as
impairing the constitutional rights of an accused are: that court may interrogate the accused and witnesses before trial in order to

clarify the points in dispute; that the refusal of the accused to answer the questions may be considered unfavorable to him; that if
from the facts admitted at the preliminary interrogatory it appears that the defendant is guilty, he may be immediately convicted; and
that the sentence of the sentence of the court is not appealable, except in case of death penalty which cannot be executed unless
and until reviewed and affirmed by a special division of the Supreme Court composed of three Justices.
Before proceeding further, and in order to determine the law applicable to the questions involved in the present case, it is necessary
to bear in mind the nature and status of the government established in these Islands by the Japanese forces of occupation under the
designation of Republic of the Philippines.
In the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (G. R. No. L-5, pp. 113, 127, ante), recently decided, this Court,
speaking through the Justice who pens this decision, held:
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippines Executive Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1,
issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the military
forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. It was not different from the government
established by the British in Castine, Maine, or by the United States in Tanpico, Mexico. As Halleck says, "the government
established over an enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to
the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It is of little consequence
whether such government be called a military or civil government. Its character is the same and the source of its authority
the same. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war and so far as it concerns the inhabitants of such
territory or the rest of the world those laws alone determine the legality or illegality of its acts." (vol. 2 p. 466.) The fact that
the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by
Japanese nationals is of no consequence.
And speaking of the so-called Republic of the Philippines in the same decision, this Court said:
The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any
other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent occupant or
the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate
source of its authority was the same the Japanese military authority and government. As General MacArthur stated in his
proclamation of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted, "under enemy duress, a so-called
government styled as the 'Republic of the Philippines' was established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free
expression of the peoples" will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States.' Japan had no legal power to grant
independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of
the Filipino people, before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and
permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations.
As the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de facto government of the second kind (of paramount force), as the government
established in Castine, Maine, during its occupation by the British forces and as that of Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war
with that the country by the United State Army, the question involved in the present case cannot be decided in the light of the
Constitution of the Commonwealth Government; because the belligerent occupant was totally independent of the constitution of the
occupied territory in carrying out the administration over said territory; and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the cases involving the validity of judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate States, considered as de
factogovernments of the third kind, does not apply to the acts of the so-called Republic of the Philippines which is a de
facto government of paramount force. The Constitution of the so-called Republic of the Philippines can neither be applied, since the
validity of an act of a belligerent occupant cannot be tested in the light of another act of the same occupant, whose criminal
jurisdiction is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations.
In the case of United States vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 246), the Supreme Court of the United States held that, by the military occupation
of Castine, Maine, the sovereignty of the United States in the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of the United States
could no longer be rightfully enforced there or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the belligerent
occupant. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to the British government, and were bound by such
laws, and such only, as it chose to recognize and impose. And Oppenheim, in his Treatise on International Law, says that, in carrying
out the administration over the occupied territory and its inhabitants, "the (belligerent) occupant is totally independent of the
constitution and the laws of the territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare, and the maintenance and safety of his forces, and
the purpose of war, stand in the foreground of his interest and must be promoted under all circumstances or conditions. (Vol. II, Sixth
Edition, Revised, 1944, p. 342.)
The doctrine laid down in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States (in the cases of Texas vs.White, 7 Wall., 700;
Horn vs. Lockart, 17 Wall., 570; Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U. S., 176 United States vs. Home Insurance Co., 20 Wall., 249;
Sprott vs. United States, 20 Wall., 459, and others) that the judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate States which impaired the
rights of the citizens under the Constitution of the United States or of the States, or were in conflict with those constitutions, were null
and void, is not applicable to the present case. Because that doctrine rests on the propositions that "the concession (of belligerency)
made to the Confederate Government . . . sanctioned no hostile legislation . . . and it impaired in no respect the rights of loyal and
citizens as they existed at the commencement of hostilities" (Williams vs. Bruffy, supra);that the Union is perpetual and indissoluble,
and the obligation of allegiance to the to the estate and obedience to her laws and the estate constitution, subject to the Constitution
of the United States, remained unimpaired during the War of Secession (Texas vs. White, supra) and that the Confederate States "in
most, if not in all instances, merely transferred the existing state organizations to the support of a new and different national head.
the same constitution, the same laws for the protection of the property and personal rights remained and were administered by the
same officers." (Sprott vs. United States, supra). In fine, because in the case of the Confederate States, the constitution of each
state and that of the United States or the Union continued in force in those states during the War of Secession; while the Constitution
of the Commonwealth Government was suspended during the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces of the
belligerent occupant at regular war with the United States.
The question which we have to resolve in the present case in the light of the law of nations are, first, the validity of the creation of the
Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the summary procedure adopted for that court; secondly, the validity of
the sentence which imprisonment during the Japanese military occupation; and thirdly, if they were then valid, the effect on said
punitive sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government.

(1) As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. 7, the only factor to
be considered is the authority of the legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance. It is well established in International
Law that "The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the
conquering or conquered state, it is drawn entirely form the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. The authority thus
derived can be asserted either through special tribunals, whose authority and procedure is defined in the military code of the
conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and authorities of the occupied district." (Taylor, International Public Law, p. 598.)
The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant, had therefore the power
or was competent to create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not a
court is of political complexion, for it is mere a governmental agency charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling within
its jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be of political complexion, or not depending upon the nature or character of the law
so applied. There is no room for doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of the court in question.
With respect to the Summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, and followed in the trial of the case which resulted in the
conviction of the herein petitioner, there is also no question as to the power or competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate
the law providing for such procedure. For "the invader deals freely with the relations of the inhabitants of the occupied territory
towards himself . . . for his security also, he declares certain acts, not forbidden by the ordinary laws of the country, to be
punishable; and he so far suspends the laws which guard personal liberty as is required for the summary punishment of any one
doing such acts." (Hall's International Law, seventh ed., p. 5000). A belligerent "occupant may where necessary, set up military
courts instead of the ordinary courts; and in case, and in so far as, he admits the administration of justice by the ordinary courts, he
may nevertheless, so far as is necessary for military purposes, or for the maintenance of public order and safetytemporarily alter the
laws, especially the Criminal Law, on the basis of which justice is administered as well as the laws regarding procedure."
(Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. II, sixth edition, 1944, p.349.)
No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the precepts of our Commonwealth Constitution relating to
the rights of accused under that Constitution, because the latter was not in force during the period of the Japanese military
occupation, as we have already stated. Nor may said Constitution be applied upon its revival at the time of the re-occupation of the
Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminium because "a constitution should operate prospectively only, unless the words
employed show a clear intention that it should have a retrospective effect" (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, seventh edition, page
97, and cases quoted and cited in the footnote), especially as regards laws of procedure applied to cases already terminated
completely.
The only restrictions or limitations imposed upon the power of a belligerent occupant to alter the laws or promulgate new ones,
especially the criminal law as well as the laws regarding procedure, so far as it is necessary for military purposes, that is, for his
control of the territory and the safety and protection of his army, are those imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages
established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience. It is obvious that the summary
procedure under consideration does not violate those precepts. It cannot be considered as violating the laws of humanity and public
conscience, for it is less objectionable, even from the point of view of those who are used to the accusatory system of criminal
procedure than the procedural laws based on the semi-inquisitorial or mixed system prevailing in France and other countries in
continental Europe.
(2) The validity of the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which imposes life
imprisonment upon the herein petitioner, depends upon the competence or power of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No.
65 which punishes the crime of which said petitioner was convicted.
Westlake says that Article XLIII, Section III, of the Hague Conventions of 1907 "indicates that the laws to be enforced by the
occupant consist of, first, the territorial law in general, as that which stands to the public order and social and commercial life of the
district in a relation of mutual adaptation, so that any needless displacement of it would defeat the object which the invader is
enjoined to have in view, and secondly, such variations of the territorial law as may be required by real necessity and are not
expressly prohibited by any of the rules which will come before us. Such variations will naturally be greatest in what concerns the
relation of the communities and individuals within the district to the invading army and its followers, it being necessary for the
protection of the latter, and for the unhindered prosecution of the war by them, that acts committed to their detriment shall not only
lose what justification the territorial law might give them as committed against enemies, but shall be repressed more severely than
the territorial law would repress acts committed against fellow subjects. Indeed the entire relation between the invaders and the
invaded, so far as it may fall within the criminal department whether by the intrinsic nature of the acts done or in consequence of the
regulations made by the invaders, may be considered as taken out of the territorial law and referred to what is called martial law."
(Westlake, International Law, Part II, War, p. 96.)
According to Hyde (International Law, Vol. II, p. 386), the term "martial law," in so far as it is used to describe any fact in relation to
belligerent occupation, does not refer to a particular code or system of law, or to a special agency entrusted with its administration.
The term merely signifies that the body of law actually applied, having the sanction of military authority, is essentially martial. All law,
by whomsoever administered, in an occupied district martial law; and it is none the less so when applied by civil courts in matters
devoid of special interest to the occupant. The words "martial law" are doubtless suggestive of the power of the occupant to share
the law as he sees fit; that is, to determine what shall be deemed lawful or unlawful acts, to establish tests for ascertaining the guilt
of offenders, to fix penalties, and generally to administer justice through such agencies as the found expedient.
And the United States Rules of Land Warfare provide that the belligerent occupant may promulgate such new laws and regulations
as military necessity demands, and in this class will be included those laws which come into being as a result of military rule; that is,
those which establish new crimes and offenses incident to a state of war and are necessary for the control of the country and the
protection of the army, for the principal object of the occupant is to provide for the security of the invading army and to contribute to
its support and efficiency and the success of its operations. (Pub. 1940, pp. 76, 77.)
From the above it appears clear that it was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate, through the
National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, Act No. 65 of the said Assembly, which penalizes the crimes of
robbery and other offenses by imprisonment ranging from the maximum period of the imprisonment prescribed by the laws and
ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic as minimum, to life imprisonment or death as maximum.
Although these crimes are defined in the Revised Penal Code, they were altered and penalized by said Act No. 65 with different and
heavier penalties, as new crimes and offenses demanded by military necessity, incident to a state of war, and necessary for the
control of the country by the belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of the army of occupation, its support and efficiency, and
the success of its operations.

They are not the same ordinary offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The criminal acts penalized by said Act No. 65
are those committed by persons charged or connected with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and
distribution of foods and other necessaries; and the penalties imposed upon the violators are different from and much heavier than
those provided by the Revised Penal Code for the same ordinary crimes. The acts penalized by said Act were taken out of the
territorial law or Revised Penal Code, and referred to what is called martial law by international jurists, defined above by Hyde, in
order, not only to prevent food and other necessaries from reaching the "guerrillas" which were harassing the belligerent occupant
from every nook and corner of the country, but also to preserve the food supply and other necessaries in order that, in case of
necessity, the Imperial Japanese forces could easily requisition them, as they did, and as they had the right to do in accordance with
the law of nations for their maintenance and subsistence (Art. LII, Sec. III, Hague Conventions of 1907). Especially taking into
consideration the fact, of which this court may take judicial notice, that the Imperial Japanese Army had depended mostly for their
supply upon the produce of this country.
The crimes penalized by Act No. 65 as well as the crimes against national security and the law of nations, to wit: treason,
espionage, inciting war, violation of neutrality, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, piracy; and the crimes
against public order, such as rebellion, sedition and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms and other, penalized by Ordinance No. 7
and placed under jurisdiction of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction are all of a political complexion, because
the acts constituting those offenses were punished, as are all political offenses, for public rather than private reasons, and were acts
in aid or favor of the enemy and against the welfare, safety and security of the belligerent occupant. While it is true that these
offenses, when committed against the Commonwealth or United States Government, are defined and also penalized by the territorial
law Revised Penal Code, they became inapplicable as crimes against the occupier upon the occupation of the Islands by the
Japanese forces. And they had to be taken out of the territorial law and made punishable by said Ordinance No. 7, for they were not
penalized before under the Revised Penal Code when committed against the belligerent occupant or the government established by
him in these Island. They are also considered by some writers as war crimes in a broad sense. In this connection Wheaton observes
the following:
"Of 'war crimes' the number is naturally indefinite, depending as they do on the acts from time to time ordered to be done or
forbidden to be done in the martial law proclamation or regulations of the invading or occupying commander. Thus, in the Anglo-Boer
war, the British military authorities proclaimed the following to be offenses against their martial law; Being in possession of arms,
ammunition, etc.; traveling without a permit; sending prohibited goods; holding meetings other than those allowed; using seditious
language; spreading alarmist reports; overcharging for goods; wearing uniforms without due authority; going out of doors between
certain hours; injuring military animals or stores; being in possession, without a permit, of horses, vehicles, cycles, etc.; hindering
those in execution of military orders; trespassing on defense works. Such offenses, together with several others, were specified in
the Japanese regulations made in the Russo-Japanese war." (Wheaton's International Law, War, seventh edition, 1944, p. 242.)
It is, therefore, evident that the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction against the petitioner,
imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment, was good and valid, since it was within the admitted power or competence of
the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law penalizing the crime of which petitioner was convicted.
(3) The last question is the legal effect of the reoccupation of the Philippines and restoration of the Commonwealth Government; that
is whether or not, by the principle of postliminy, the punitive sentence which petitioner is now serving fell through or ceased to be
valid from that time.
In order to resolve this last question, it is not necessary to enter into an elaborate discussion on the matter. It is sufficient to quote
the opinion on the subject of several international jurists and our recent decision in the case ofCo Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and
Dizon, supra.
Hall, commenting on the effect of the principle of postliminy upon sentences of the tribunals continued or created by the belligerent
occupant, opines "that judicial acts done under this control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done,
to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same time by private
persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. . . . Political acts on the other hand fall through as of course, whether
they introduce any positive change into the organization of the country, or whether they only suspend the working of that already in
existence. The execution also of punitive sentences ceases as of course when they have had reference to acts not criminal by the
municipal law of the state, such for example as acts directed against the security or control of the invader." (Hall's International Law,
seventh edition, p. 518.)
Westlake, speaking of the duration of the validity of punitive sentences for offenses such as the one in question, which is within the
admitted power or competence of the belligerent occupant to punish, says that: "To the extent to which the legal power of the
occupant is admitted he can make law for the duration of his occupation. Like any other legislator he is morally subject to the duty of
giving sufficient notice of his enactments or regulations, not indeed so as to be debarred from carrying out his will without notice,
when required by military necessity and so far as practically carrying out his will can be distinguished from punishment, but always
remembering that to punish for breach of a regulation a person who was justifiably ignorant of it would be outrageous. But the law
made by the occupant within his admitted power, whether morally justifiable or not, will bind any member of the occupied population
as against any other member of it, and will bind as between them all and their national government, so far as it produces an effect
during the occupation. When the occupation comes to an end the authority of the national government is restored, either by the
progress of operations during the war or by the conclusion of a peace, no redress can be had for what has been actually carried out
but nothing further can follow from the occupant's legislation. A prisoner detained under it must be released, and no civil right
conferred by it can be further enforced. The enemy's law depends on him for enforcement as well as for enactment. The invaded
state is not subject to the indignity of being obliged to execute his commands. (Westlake, International Law, Part II, War, pp. 97, 98.)
And Wheaton, who, as above stated, considers as war crimes such offenses as those penalized in Ordinance No. 7 and Act No. 65,
says: "In general, the cast of the occupant possess legal validity, and under international law should not be abrogated by the
subsequent government. But this rule does not necessarily apply to acts that exceed the occupant's power (e.g., alienation of the
domains of the State or the sovereign), to sentences for 'war treason' and 'war crimes,' to acts of a political character, and to those
that beyond the period of occupation. When occupation ceases, no reparation is legally due for what has already been carried out."
(Wheaton's International Law, supra, p. 245.)
We have already held in our recent decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra, that all judgments of
political complexion of the courts during the Japanese regime, ceased to be valid upon the reoccupation of the islands by virtue of
the principle or right of postliminium. Applying that doctrine to the present case, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a

crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation or liberation of the
Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur.
It may not be amiss to say in this connection that it is not necessary and proper to invoke the proclamation of General Douglas
MacArthur declaring null and void all laws, among them Act No. 65, of the so-called Republic of the Philippines under which
petitioner was convicted, in order to give retroactive effect to the nullification of said penal act and invalidate sentence rendered
against petitioner under said law, a sentence which, before the proclamation, had already become null and of no effect.
We therefore hold that the punitive sentence under consideration, although good and valid during the military occupation of the
Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation of these Island and the
restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government.
In view of all the foregoing, the writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby granted and it is ordered that the petitioner be released
forthwith, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Jaranilla, Pablo and Bengzon, JJ., concur.
Moran, C.J., concurs in the result.
Reagan v cir
Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark Air Base to help provide technical assistance to the US Air Force. In April 1960 Reagan
imported a 1960 Cadillac car valued at $6443.83. Two months later, he got permission to sell the same car provided that he would
sell the car to a US citizen or a member of the USAF. He sold it to Willie Johnson Jr for $6600.00 as shown by a Bill of Sale. The
sale took place within Clark Air Base. As a result of this transaction, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue calculated the net
taxable income of Reagan to be at P17912.34 and that his income tax would be P2797.00. Reagan paid the assessed tax but at the
same time he sought for a refund because he claims that he is exempt. Reagan claims that the sale took place in foreign soil since
Clark Air Base, in legal contemplation is a base outside the Philippines. Reagan also cited that under the Military Bases Agreement,
he, by nature of his employment, is exempt from Philippine taxation.
ISSUE: Is the sale considered done in a foreign soil not subject to Philippine income tax?
HELD: The Philippines is independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion
thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and
everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. On the other
hand, there is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends support to Reagans assertion. The Base has not become foreign
soil or territory. This countrys jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been preserved, the
Philippines merely consents that the US exercise jurisdiction in certain cases this is just a matter of comity, courtesy and
expediency. It is likewise noted that he indeed is employed by the USAF and his income is derived from US source but the income
derived from the sale is not of US source hence taxable.

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOAAD). This Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement of Peace of 2001 is a codification of consensus points reached between GRP and
MILF Peace Panel and of the aspiration of the MILF to have a Bangasmoro Homeland. According
to the stipulations in the MOA-AD, Ownership of the Bangasmoro Homeland is vested to the
Bangasmoro people. MOA-AD describes the Bangasmoro people as the first nation with defined
territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce
with foreign nations. The Bangasmoro Juridical Entity (BJE) is granted by the MOA-AD the
authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain andAncestral Lands of the Bangasmoro. It
was also stipulated that BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its internal
waters.
Issues:
1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic
2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
4. Whether there is a violation of the peoples right to information on matters of public
concern.
5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
BINDING itself.
6. cralawWhether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of
Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the
areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and
7. cralawWhether MOA-AD is constitutional
Held:
Issue 1:

The court believes that the petitions in the case at bar provide an exception to the moot and
academic principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the
exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case
is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Issue 2:
Yes. Any alleged violation of the consti by any branch of the government is a proper matter for
judicial review. In the case at bar, the failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected amounts to a departure from the mandate under
E.O. No. 3 and the fact that the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of
guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution, rendered the petition ripe for adjudication.
Issue 3:
The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law
notwithstanding, respondents almost consummated act ofguaranteeing amendments to the
legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse
lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a
state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the
sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution.
Issue 4:
Yes, there is a violation of the peoples right to information.An essential element of this right is
to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the
people.The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public
interest in the highest order.
The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to
information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal
provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived
such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOAAD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.
Issue 5:
No. The MOA-AD is not a document that can bind the Philippines under international law. It
would have been signed by representatives of States and international organizations not
parties to the Agreement, this would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under
international law.
Issue 6:
Yes. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the Provinces of North
Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and
Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in the
future as respondents actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. These petitions
afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine immediately referred to as what
it had done in a number of landmark cases.
Issue 7:
Yes. The MOA-AD is unconstitutional because it cannot be reconciled with the present
constitution. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them. The
associative relationship between the GRP and the BJE is unconstitutional because the concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to
independence.
The court denied the respondents motion to dismiss and granted the main and intervening
petitions.
STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR
G.R. No. L-30671, November 28 1973, 54 SCRA 84
FACTS:
On July 3, 1961, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of
respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation,
and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award subject of Special
Proceedings. On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order
declaring the aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of
Rizal Province, Quezon City [as well as] Manila to execute the said decision. Pursuant to the
said Order, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. On the strength of the aforementioned Alias Writ of Execution, the respondent Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served notices of
garnishment with several Banks, specially on the `monies due the Armed Forces of
the Philippines in the form of deposits, sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the
said Writ of Execution; the Philippine Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment.
The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with

the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public
funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay
andallowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. Petitioner then alleged that respondent Judge, Honorable
Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of
execution against the properties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, hence, the Alias Writ of
Execution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and void." In
the answer filed by respondents, the facts set forth were admitted with the only qualification
being that the total award was in the amount of P2,372,331.40.
ISSUE: Whether or not the notices of garnishment are null and void.
HELD: The Republic of the Philippines did right in filing this certiorari and prohibition
proceeding. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the
Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept
of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its
consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: "A
sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on
the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends." Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not
dissimilar. This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit in
the revised charter. It is therein expressly provided: "The State may not be sued without its
consent." A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from such a basic concept is that
public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued
had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged.
G.R. Nos. 109095-109107 February 23, 1995
ELDEPIO LASCO, RODOLFO ELISAN, URBANO BERADOR, FLORENTINO ESTOBIO, MARCELINO MATURAN, FRAEN
BALIBAG, CARMELITO GAJOL, DEMOSTHENES MANTO, SATURNINO BACOL, SATURNINO LASCO, RAMON LOYOLA,
JOSENIANO B. ESPINA, all represented by MARIANO R. ESPINA, petitioner,
vs.
UNITED NATIONS REVOLVING FUND FOR NATURAL RESOURCES EXPLORATION (UNRFNRE) represented by its
operations manager, DR. KYRIACOS LOUCA, OSCAR N. ABELLA, LEON G. GONZAGA, JR., MUSIB M. BUAT,
Commissioners of National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City and IRVING PETILLA,
Labor Arbiter of Butuan City, respondents.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the Resolution dated January 25, 1993 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City.
We dismiss the petition.
I
Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural
Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations. The UNRFNRE is involved
in a joint project of the Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island.
Petitioners are the complainants in NLRC Cases Nos. SRAB 10-03-00067-91 to 10-03-00078-91 and SRAB 10-07-00159-91 for
illegal dismissal and damages.
In its Motion to Dismiss, private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since it
enjoyed diplomatic immunity pursuant to the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. In support
thereof, private respondent attached a letter from the Department of Foreign Affairs dated August 26, 1991, which acknowledged its
immunity from suit. The letter confirmed that private respondent, being a special fund administered by the United Nations, was
covered by the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of which the Philippine Government was an
original signatory (Rollo, p. 21).
On November 25, 1991, respondent Labor Arbiter issued an order dismissing the complaints on the ground that private respondent
was protected by diplomatic immunity. The dismissal was based on the letter of the Foreign Office dated September 10, 1991.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus, an appeal was filed with the NLRC, which affirmed the dismissal of the
complaints in its Resolution dated January 25, 1993.
Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari without first seeking a reconsideration of the NLRC resolution.
II

Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, provides that decisions of the NLRC are final and executory. Thus,
they may only be questioned through certiorari as a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Ordinarily, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal,
to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors (Liberty Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 37 [1993]).
In the case at bench, petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration is fatal to the instant petition. Moreover, the petition lacks
any explanation for such omission, which may merit its being considered as falling under the recognized exceptions to the necessity
of filing such motion.
Notwithstanding, we deem it wise to give due course to the petition because of the implications of the issue in our international
relations.
Petitioners argued that the acts of mining exploration and exploitation are outside the official functions of an international agency
protected by diplomatic immunity. Even assuming that private respondent was entitled to diplomatic immunity, petitioners insisted
that private respondent waived it when it engaged in exploration work and entered into a contract of employment with petitioners.
Petitioners, likewise, invoked the constitutional mandate that the State shall afford full protection to labor and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all (1987 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 3).
The Office of the Solicitor General is of the view that private respondent is covered by the mantle of diplomatic immunity. Private
respondent is a specialized agency of the United Nations. Under Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations:
1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for
the fulfillment of its purposes.
2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy
such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with
the organization.
Corollary to the cited article is the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, to
which the Philippines was a signatory (Vol. 1, Philippine Treaty Series, p. 621). We quote Sections 4 and 5 of Article III thereof:
Sec. 4. The specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held shall
enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case they have expressly
waived their immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of
execution (Emphasis supplied).
Sec. 5. The premises of the specialized agencies shall be inviolable. The property and assets of the specialized
agencies, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation,
expropriation and any other form of interference, whether by executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action
(Emphasis supplied).
As a matter of state policy as expressed in the Constitution, the Philippine Government adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law (1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2). Being a member of the United Nations and a party to the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, the Philippine Government adheres to the doctrine of
immunity granted to the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Both treaties have the force and effect of law.
In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242, (1972), we had occasion to rule that:
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers thatdiplomatic
immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the
executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of
immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General or other
officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their
jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in
conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that "in such cases the judicial department of (this)
government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic
jurisdiction (Emphasis supplied).
We recognize the growth of international organizations dedicated to specific universal endeavors, such as health, agriculture,
science and technology and environment. It is not surprising that their existence has evolved into the concept of international
immunities. The reason behind the grant of privileges and immunities to international organizations, its officials and functionaries is
to secure them legal and practical independence in fulfilling their duties (Jenks, International Immunities 17 [1961]).
Immunity is necessary to assure unimpeded performance of their functions. The purpose is "to shield the affairs of international
organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of
member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions" (International Catholic Migration
Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]).
In the International Catholic Migration Commission case, we held that there is no conflict between the constitutional duty of the State
to protect the rights of workers and to promote their welfare, and the grant of immunity to international organizations. Clauses on
jurisdictional immunity are now standard in the charters of the international organizations to guarantee the smooth discharge of their
functions.

The diplomatic immunity of private respondent was sufficiently established by the letter of the Department of Foreign Affairs,
recognizing and confirming the immunity of UNRFNRE in accordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations where the Philippine Government was a party. The issue whether an international organization is entitled to
diplomatic immunity is a "political question" and such determination by the executive branch is conclusive on the courts and quasijudicial agencies (The Holy See v. Hon. Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr., G.R. No. 101949, Dec. 1, 1994; International Catholic Migration
Commission v. Calleja, supra).
Our courts can only assume jurisdiction over private respondent if it expressly waived its immunity, which is not so in the case at
bench (Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, Art. III, Sec. 4).
Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in the Philippines. Its presence here is by virtue of a joint project entered
into by the Philippine Government and the United Nations for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. Its mission is not to exploit our
natural resources and gain pecuniarily thereby but to help improve the quality of life of the people, including that of petitioners.
This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized
Agencies of the United Nations states that "each specialized agency shall make a provision for appropriate modes of settlement of:
(a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

SEAFDEC VS. NLRC

G.R. Nos. 97468-70, September 2 1993, 241 SCRA 580
FACTS:
Two labor cases were filed by the herein private respondents against the petitioner, Southeast
Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City. In these cases, the private
respondents claim having been wrongfully terminated from their employment by the
petitioner. The petitioner, who claims to be an international inter-government
organization composed of various Southeast Asian countries, filed a Motion to Dismiss,
challenged the jurisdiction of the public respondent in taking cognizance of the above cases.
The private respondents, as well as respondent labor arbiter, allege that the petitioner is not
immune from suit and assuming that if, indeed, it is an international organization, it has,
however, impliedly, if not expressly, waived its immunity by belatedly raising the issue of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit.
HELD: The Court ruled for the petitioner. It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is an
international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. It has already been held in Southeast Asian
Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department vs. National Labor Relations
Commission (G.R. No. 86773, 206 SCRA 283/1992). Petitioner Southeast Asian
Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an
international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. Being an
intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional
independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located. One
of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e.,
that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country
where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization
to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host
government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and
decisions of the organization; besides, such objection to local jurisdiction would impair the
capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its memberstates.
CALLADO VS. IRRI
G.R. No. 106483, May 22 1995, 244 SCRA 210
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Callado was employed as a driver at the International Rice Research
Institute (IRRI). On February 11, 1990,while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident. After
evaluating petitioner's answer, explanations and other evidence by IRRI's Human
Resource Development Department Manager, the latter issued a Notice of Termination to
petitioner on December 7, 1990. Petitioner then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for
illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees. Private respondent likewise informed the Labor Arbiter, through counsel, that
the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree

No. 1620, and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international
organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same. However, the
Labor Arbiter finds private respondent IRRI to have waived its immunity considered the
defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not IRRI waived its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an
employer-employee relationship.
HELD: The Court ruled in the negative and vote to dismiss the petition. Theres no merit in
petitioner's arguments, thus IRRI's immunity from suit is undisputed. Presidential Decree No.
1620, Article 3 provides: Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from
any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been
expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its DirectorGeneral is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity. On the matter of
waiving its immunity from suit, IRRI had, early on, made its position clear. Through counsel, the
Institute wrote the Labor Arbiter categorically informing him that the Institute will not waive its
diplomatic immunity.
TEST TO DETERINE IF SUIT IS AGAINST THE STATE
Del Mar vs Philippine Veterans Administration [G.R. L-27299] June 27, 1973
Facts: del Mar, the petitioner, was was relieved with honorable discharge with permanent total physical disability. Philippine Veterans
administration granted him pension but was soon discontinued because he received the same pension under the United States
Veterans Administration.
Issue: The PVA decided that:
(1) Petitioner is barred from receiving any pension from the Philippine Veterans Administration.
The PVA reiterated its contention that del Mars receipt of a similar pension from the United States Government effectively barred
him from claiming and receiving from the Philippine Government the monthly life pension granted him as well as the monthly
allowances he claimed for his five living unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age.
(2) The filing of the case is premature.
the action of del Mar was premature because of his failure to exhaust administrative remedies before invoking judicial intervention
(3) The case is a suit against the state.
the court a quo was without jurisdiction to try the case as del Mar demand partakes of a money claim against the PVA a mere
agency of the Philippine Government and, in effect, of a suit against the Government which is not suitable without its consent.
(4) It was discretionary on the part of PVA to discontinue pension.
Held:
(1) When a case is a suit against the state:
As a general proposition, the rule well-settled in this jurisdiction on the immunity of the Government from suit without its
consent holds true in all actions resulting in adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or
loss of property.
(2) Suits against the state must be dismissed
(3) When a case is not a suit against the state:
where a claimant institutes an action against a functionary who fails to comply with his statutory duty to release the amount claimed
from the public funds already appropriated by statute for the benefit of the said claimant.
(4) The case is not premature. Administrative liability is not required.
Suffice it to state that where a case as in the present controversy involves a question solely of a legal nature, there arises no
need for the litigant to resort to all administrative remedies available to him before seeking judicial relief.
(5) The act committed by the PVA, in suspending a provision of law, is against the constitution.
the Constitution limits the authority of the President, in whom all executive power resides, to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. No lesser administrative executive office or agency then can, contrary to the express language of the Constitution, assert
for itself a more extensive prerogative. Necessarily, it is bound to observe the constitutional mandate. There must be strict
compliance with the legislative enactment. Its terms must be followed. The statute requires adherence to, not departure from, its
provisions. No deviation is allowable.

VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 91359, September 25 1992, 214 SCRA 286
FACTS:
Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. (VMPSI) alleges that the provisions under
Section 4 and 17 of Republic Act No. 5487 or the Private Security Agency Law violate the
1987 Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of
trade, and tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and
Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an interest in
more than one security agency. Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph
3, subparagraph (g) of the Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and
Private Security Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by
then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that all private
security agencies/company security forces must register as members of any PADPAO Chapter
organized within the Region where their main offices are located.... As such membership
requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates legal and constitutional
provisions against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade.
A Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the
minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per day at
P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila. Odin Security
Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition by
undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks
and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer lower than the standard minimum
rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986. PADPAO found VMPSI
guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee on Discipline recommended
the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of its license to operate a security
agency. The PC-SUSIA affirmed the findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of
VMPSIs license. As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to
VMPSI. VMPSI made a request letter to the PC Chief to set aside or disregard the findings of
PADPAO and consider VMPSIs application for renewal of its license, even without a certificate
of membership from PADPAO.
ISSUE:
Whether or not VMPSIs complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State
without its consent.
HELD:
Yes. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts
in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for
which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed as
part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be
had against them in their private capacities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court agrees with
the Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not
constitute an implied consent by the State to be sued. The consent of the State to be sued
must emanate from statutory authority, hence, a legislative act, not from a mere
memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquired jurisdiction over the
public respondents. Petition for review is denied and the judgment appealed from is affirmed in
toto.
SUIT AGAINST GOVT. AGENCY
PNB v. CIR
Facts:
Petitioners motion to quash a notice of garnishment was denied for lack of merit. What was
sought to be garnished was the money of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation
deposited at petitioner's branch in Quezon City, to satisfy a decision of respondent Court which
had become final and executory. A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V.
Manansala had previously been issued. He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United
Homesite Employees and Laborers Association. The validity of the order assailed is challenged
on two grounds: (1) that the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized
deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law and (2) that the funds subject
of the garnishment "may be public in character. "The order of August 26, 1970 of respondent
Court denying the motion to quash, subject of this certiorari proceeding, reads as follows: "The
Philippine National Bank moves to quash the notice of garnishment served upon its branch in
Quezon City by the authorized deputy sheriff of this Court. It contends that the service of the

notice by the authorized deputy sheriff of the court contravenes Section11 of Commonwealth
Act No. 105, as amended which reads:" 'All writs and processes issued by the Court shall
be served and executed free of charge by provincial or city sheriffs, or by any person
authorized by this Court, in the same manner as writs and processes of Courts of First
Instance.' Following the law, the Bank argues that it is the Sheriff of Quezon City, and not the
Clerk of this Court who is its Ex-Officio Sheriff, that has the authority to serve the notice of
garnishment, and that the actual service by the latter officer of said notice is therefore not
in order. The Court finds no merit in this argument. Republic Act No. 4201 has, since June 19,
1965, already repealed Commonwealth Act No. 103, and under this law, it is now the Clerk of
this Court that is at the same time the Ex-Officio Sheriff. As such Ex-Officio Sheriff, the Clerk
of this Court has therefore the authority to issue writs of execution and notices of garnishment
in an area encompassing the whole of the country, including Quezon City, since his area of
authority is coterminous with that of the Court itself, which is national in nature. ... At this
stage, the Court notes from the record that the appeal to the Supreme Court by individual
employees of PHHC which questions the award of attorney's fees to Atty. Gabriel V. Manansala,
has already been dismissed and that the same became final and executory on August 9, 1970.
There is no longer any reason, therefore, for withholding action in this case. [Wherefore], the
motion to quash filed by the Philippine National Bank is denied for lack of merit. The said Bank
is therefore ordered to comply within five days from receipt with the 'notice of Garnishment'
dated May 6, 1970."
5 There was a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner, but in a resolution dated
September 22, 1970, it was denied. Hence, this certiorari petition.
Issue:WON the funds mentioned may be garnished
Ruling:No
Rationale:
National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. court of Industrial Relations is squarely in point. As
was explicitly stated in the opinion of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion: "The
allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the government, and
that, as such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for, as a
government owned and controlled corporation. the NASSCO has a personality of its own,
distinct and separate from that of the Government. It has pursuant to Section 2 of Executive
Order No. 356, dated October 23, 1950 ..., pursuant to which the NASSCO has been
established 'all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law ...' Accordingly, it
may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation
(Section 13, Act No. 1459), as amended. "In a 1941 decision, Manila Hotel Employees
Association v. Manila Hotel Company, this Court, through Justice Ozaeta, held: "On the other
hand, it is well settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons
its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. (Bank of the United
States v. Planters' Bank, Wheat, 904, 6 L.ed. 244). By engaging in a particular business thru
the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign
character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private
corporations. "Both the Palacio and the Commissioner of Public Highways decisions, insofar as
they reiterate the doctrine that one of the coronaries of the fundamental concept of nonsuability is that governmental funds are immune from garnishment. It is an entirely different
matter if, according to Justice Sanchez in Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations, the office or
entity is "possessed of a separate and distinct corporate existence." Then it can sue and be
sued. Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or garnished.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCHITA AYALDE, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a petition before the Social Security Commission, Margarita Tana, widow of the late Ignacio Tana, Sr., alleged that her
husband was, before his demise, an employee of Conchita Ayalde as a farmhand in the two (2) sugarcane plantations she owned
(known as Hda. No. Audit B-70 located in Pontevedra, La Carlota City) and leased from the University of the Philippines (known as
Hda. Audit B-15-M situated in La Granja, La Carlota City). She further alleged that Tana worked continuously six (6) days a week,
four (4) weeks a month, and for twelve (12) months every year between January 1961 to April 1979. For his labor, Tana allegedly
received a regular salary according to the minimum wage prevailing at the time. She further alleged that throughout the given
period, social security contributions, as well as medicare and employees compensation premiums were deducted from Tanas
wages. It was only after his death that Margarita discovered that Tana was never reported for coverage, nor were his
contributions/premiums remitted to the Social Security System (SSS). Consequently, she was deprived of the burial grant and
pension benefits accruing to the heirs of Tana had he been reported for coverage.

Hence, she prayed that the Commission issue an order directing:

1. respondents Conchita Ayalde and Antero Maghari as her administrator to pay the premium contributions of the
deceased Ignacio Tana, Sr. and report his name for SSS coverage; and
2. the SSS to grant petitioner Margarita Tana the funeral and pension benefits due her.[1]
The SSS, in a petition-in-intervention, revealed that neither Hda. B-70 nor respondents Ayalde and Maghari were registered
members-employers of the SSS, and consequently, Ignacio Tana, Sr. was never registered as a member-employee. Likewise, SSS
records reflected that there was no way of verifying whether the alleged premium contributions were remitted since the respondents
were not registered members-employers. Being the agency charged with the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of
the Social Security Law, as amended, the SSS asked the Commissions leave to intervene in the case.[2]
In his answer, respondent Antero Maghari raised the defense that he was a mere employee who was hired as an overseer of
Hda. B-70 sometime during crop years 1964-65 to 1971-72, and as such, his job was limited to those defined for him by the
employer which never involved matters relating to the SSS. Hence, he prayed that the case against him be dismissed for lack of
cause of action.[3]
For her part, respondent Ayalde belied the allegation that Ignacio Tana, Sr. was her employee, admitting only that he was hired
intermittently as an independent contractor to plow, harrow, or burrow Hda. No. Audit B-15-M. Tana used his own carabao and other
implements, and he followed his own schedule of work hours. Ayalde further alleged that she never exercised control over the
manner by which Tana performed his work as an independent contractor. Moreover, Ayalde averred that way back in 1971, the
University of the Philippines had already terminated the lease over Hda. B-15-M and she had since surrendered possession thereof
to the University of the Philippines. Consequently, Ignacio Tana, Sr. was no longer hired to work thereon starting in crop year 197172, while he was never contracted to work in Hda. No. Audit B-70. She also prayed for the dismissal of the case considering that
Ignacio Tana, Sr. was never her employee.[4]
After hearing both parties, the Social Security Commission issued a Resolution on January 28, 1988, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
After a careful evaluation of the testimonies of the petitioner and her witnesses, as well as the testimony of the respondent together
with her documentary evidences, this Commission finds that the late Ignacio Tana was employed by respondent Conchita Ayalde
from January 1961 to March 1979. The testimony of the petitioner which was corroborated by Agaton Libawas and Aurelio Tana, coworkers of the deceased Ignacio Tana, sufficienty established the latters employment with the respondent.
As regards respondent Antero Maghari, he is absolved from liability because he is a mere employee of Conchita Ayalde.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Commission finds and so holds that the late Ignacio Tana had been employed continuously from
January 1961 to March 1979 in Hda. B-70 and Hda. B-15-M which are owned and leased, respectively, by respondent Conchita
(Concepcion) Ayalde with a salary based on the Minimum Wage prevailing during his employment.
Not having reported the petitioners husband for coverage with the SSS, respondent Conchita (Concepcion) Ayalde is, therefore,
liable for the payment of damages equivalent to the death benefits in the amount of P7,067.40 plus the amount of P750.00
representing funeral benefit or a total of P7,817.40.
Further, the SSS is ordered to pay to the petitioner her accrued pension covering the period after the 5-year guaranteed period
corresponding to the employers liability.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Respondent Ayalde filed a motion for reconsideration [6]which the Commission denied for lack of merit in an Order dated
November 3, 1988.[7]
Not satisfied with the Commissions ruling, Ayalde appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 16427,
raising the following assignment of errors:
I

The Social Security Commission erred in not finding that there is sufficient evidence to show that:
(a) The deceased Ignacio Tana, Sr. never worked in the farmland of respondent-appellant situated in Pontevedra, La Carlota City,
otherwise known as Hacienda No. Audit B-70, (Pontevedra B-70 Farm for short), in any capacity, whether as a daily or monthly
laborer or as independent contractor;
(b) During the time that respondent-appellant was leasing a portion of the land of the University of the Philippines, otherwise known
as Hacienda Audit No. B-15-M, (La Granja B-15 Farm for short), the deceased Ignacio Tana, Sr. was hired thereat on a pakyaw
basis, or as an independent contractor, performing the services of an arador (Plower), for which he was proficient, using his own
carabao and farming implements on his own time and discretion within the period demanded by the nature of the job contracted.

II

The Social Security Commission erred in holding that there is no evidence whatsoever to show that respondent-appellant was no
longer leasing La Granja B-15 Farm.
III

The Social Security Commission erred in not holding that the deceased Ignacio Tana, having been hired as an independent
contractor on pakyaw basis, did not fall within the coverage of the Social Security Law.[8]
The Court of Appeals rendered judgment in favor of respondent-appellant Conchita Ayalde and dismissed the claim of
petitioner Margarita Tan.
The SSS, as intervenor-appellee, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on the ground that the arguments
advanced are mere reiterations of issues and arguments already considered and passed upon in the decision in question which are
utterly insufficient to justify a modification or reversal of said decision.[9]
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari on the following assigned errors:
1) The Court of Appeals was in error in ruling that an employee working under the pakyaw system is considered under
the law to be an independent contractor.
2) The Court of Appeals was in error in not giving due consideration to the fundamental tenet that doubts in the
interpretation and implementation of labor and social welfare laws should be resolved in favor of labor.
3) The Court of Appeals was in error in disregarding the settled rule that the factual findings of administrative bodies on
matters within their competence shall not be disturbed by the courts.
4) The Court of Appeals was in error in ruling that even granting arguendo that Ignacio Tana was employed by Conchita
Ayalde, such employment did not entitle him to compulsory coverage since he was not paid any regular daily wage or
basic pay and he did not work for an uninterrupted period of at least six months in a year in accordance with Section
8(j) (1) of the SS Law.
The pivotal issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not an agricultural laborer who was hired on pakyaw basis can
be considered an employee entitled to compulsory coverage and corresponding benefits under the Social Security Law.
Petitioner, Social Security System (or SSS), argues that the deceased Ignacio Tana, Sr., who was hired by Conchita Ayalde on
pakyaw basis to perform specific tasks in her sugarcane plantations, should be considered an employee; and as such, his heirs are
entitled to pension and burial benefits.
The Court of Appeals, however, ruled otherwise, reversing the ruling of the Social Security Commission and declaring that the
late Ignacio Tana, Sr. was an independent contractor, and in the absence of an employer-employee relationship between Tana and
Ayalde, the latter cannot be compelled to pay to his heirs the burial and pension benefits under the SS Law.
At the outset, we reiterate the well-settled doctrine that the existence of an employer-employee relationship is ultimately a
question of fact.[10] And while it is the general rule that factual issues are not within the province of the Supreme Court, said rule is
not without exception. In cases, such as this one, where there are conflicting and contradictory findings of fact, this Court has not
hesitated to scrutinize the records to determine the facts for itself. [11] Our disquisition of the facts shall be our guide as to whose
findings are supported by substantial evidence.
The mandatory coverage under the SSS Law (Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by PD 1202 and PD 1636) is premised on
the existence of an employer-employee relationship, and Section 8(d) defines an employee as any person who performs services
for an employer in which either or both mental and physical efforts are used and who receives compensation for such services
where there is an employer-employee relationship. The essential elements of an employer-employee relationship are: (a) the
selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the power of control with
regard to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished, with the power of control being the most determinative
factor.[12]
There is no question that Tana was selected and his services engaged by either Ayalde herself, or by Antero Maghari, her
overseer. Corollarily, they also held the prerogative of dismissing or terminating Tanas employment. The dispute is in the question
of payment of wages. Claimant Margarita Tana and her corroborating witnesses testified that her husband was paid daily wages
per quincena as well as on pakyaw basis. Ayalde, on the other hand, insists that Tana was paid solely on pakyaw basis. To
support her claim, she presented payrolls covering the period January of 1974 to January of 1976;[13] and November of 1978 to May
of 1979.[14]
A careful perusal of the records readily show that the exhibits offered are not complete, and are but a mere sampling of
payrolls. While the names of the supposed laborers appear therein, their signatures are nowhere to be found. And while they cover
the years 1975, 1976 and portions of 1978 and 1979, they do not cover the 18-year period during which Tana was supposed to have

worked in Ayaldes plantations. Also an admitted fact is that these exhibits only cover Hda. B70, Ayalde having averred that all her
records and payrolls for the other plantation (Hda. B-15-M) were either destroyed or lost.[15]
To our mind, these documents are not only sadly lacking, they are also unworthy of credence. The fact that Tanas name does
not appear in the payrolls for the years 1975, 1976 and part of 1978 and 1979, is no proof that he did not work in Hda. B70 in the
years 1961 to 1974, and the rest of 1978 and 1979. The veracity of the alleged documents as payrolls are doubtful considering that
the laborers named therein never affixed their signatures to show that they actually received the amounts indicated corresponding to
their names. Moreover, no record was shown pertaining to Hda. B-15-M, where Tana was supposed to have worked. Even Ayalde
admitted that she hired Tana as arador and sometimes as laborer during milling in Hda. B-15-M. [16] In light of her incomplete
documentary evidence, Ayaldes denial that Tana was her employee in Hda. B-70 or Hda. B-15-M must fail.
In contrast to Ayaldes evidence, or lack thereof, is Margarita Tanas positive testimony, corroborated by two (2) other
witnesses. On the matter of wages, they testified as follows:
Margarita Tana:
Q.

During the employment of your late husband, was he paid any wages?

A.

Yes, he was paid.

Q.

What was the manner of payment of his salary, was it on pakyaw or daily basis?

A.

Daily basis.

Q.

How many times did he receive his salary in a months time?

A.

2 times.

Q.

You mean, payday in Hda. B-70 is every 15 days?

A.

Yes, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ATTY. GALVAN:
To prove that it is material to the main question because if ever the hacienda maintains complete payrolls of their employees,
then the burden of proof lies in the petitioner..
HEARING OFFICER:
Let the witness answer, if she knows.
WITNESS:
There was no payroll, only pad paper.
ATTY. GALVAN: (continuing)
Q.

Were the names of workers of the hacienda all listed in that pad paper every payday?

A.

Yes, we just sign on pad paper because we have no payroll to be signed.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q.

What do you understand by payroll?

A.

Payroll is the list where the whole laborers are listed and receive their salaries.

Q.

And how did that differ from the pad paper which you said you signed?

A.

There is a difference.

Q.

What is the difference?

A.

In the payroll, at the end there is a column for signature but in the pad paper, we only sign directly.

Q.

Did it contain the amount that you receive?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And the date corresponding to the payroll pad?

A.

I am not sure but it only enumerates our names and then we were given our salaries.

Q.

Now, did you have a copy of that?

ATTY. GALVAN:
Objection, Your Honor, it is not the petitioner who had a copy, it is usually the owner because the preparation of the payrolls is
done by the employer who..
ATTY. UNGCO:
That is why Im asking ..
HEARING OFFICER:
Let the witness answer. Objection overruled.
WITNESS:
I dont have.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q.

When you are receiving daily wage of P4.00 how much was your quincenal together with your husband?

A.

The highest salary I received for my own was P30.00 in one quincena.

Q.

What about the salary of your husband, how much?

A.

The same.

Q.

Was this P30.00 per quincena later on increased?

A.

There was an increase because formerly it was P4.00 now it is P8.00.

Q.

In 1979 how much was your husbands salary per quincena?

A.

In one quincena my husband receives P60.00 while I only receive P30.00.[17]

AGATON LIBAWAS:
Q.

During your employment, do you sign payrolls everytime you draw your salary?

A.

We sign on intermediate pad.

Q.

You mean, the practice of the hacienda is to have the names of the laborers receiving that salaries listed on that
intermediate pad?

A.

Yes, sir.[18]

AURELIO TANA:
Q.

By the way, how many times did you receive your salaries in a month?

A.

We receive our wages twice a month that is, every 15 days.

Q.

Did you sign payrolls everytime you received your salaries?

A.

In the pad paper as substitute payroll.

Q.

Do you know if all the workers of the hacienda were listed in that payrolls?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Who was in charge in giving your salaries?

A.

Antero Maghari.[19]

These witnesses did not waver in their assertion that while Tana was hired by Ayalde as an arador on pakyaw basis, he was
also paid a daily wage which Ayaldes overseer disbursed every fifteen (15) days. It is also undisputed that they were made to
acknowledge receipt of their wages by signing on sheets of ruled paper, which are different from those presented by Ayalde as
documentary evidence. In fine, we find that the testimonies of Margarita Tana, Agaton Libawas and Aurelio Tana prevail over the
incomplete and inconsistent documentary evidence of Ayalde.
In the parallel case of Opulencia Ice Plant and Storage v. NLRC, the petitioners argued that since Manuel P. Esitas name does
not appear in the payrolls of the company it necessarily means that he was not an employee. This Court held:
Petitioners further argue that complainant miserably failed to present any documentary evidence to prove his employment. There
was no timesheet, pay slip and/or payroll/cash voucher to speak of. Absence of these material documents are necessarily fatal to
complainants cause.
We do not agree. No particular form of evidence is required to prove the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Any
competent and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted. For, if only documentary evidence would be required to
show that relationship, no scheming employer would ever be brought before the bar of justice, as no employer would wish to come
out with any trace of the illegality he has authored considering that it should take much weightier proof to invalidate a written
instrument. Thus, as in this case where the employer-employee relationship between petitioners and Esita was sufficiently proved
by testimonial evidence, the absence of time sheet, time record or payroll has become inconsequential.[20] (Underscoring ours)
Clearly, then, the testimonial evidence of the claimant and her witnesses constitute positive and credible evidence of the
existence of an employer-employee relationship between Tana and Ayalde. As the employer, the latter is duty-bound to keep faithful
and complete records of her business affairs, not the least of which would be the salaries of the workers. And yet, the documents
presented have been selective, few and incomplete in substance and content. Consequently, Ayalde has failed to convince us that,
indeed, Tana was not her employee.
The argument is raised that Tana is an independenent contractor because he was hired and paid wages on pakyaw
basis. We find this assertion to be specious for several reasons.
First, while Tana was sometimes hired as an arador or plower for intermittent periods, he was hired to do other tasks in
Ayaldes plantations. Ayalde herself admitted as much, although she minimized the extent of Tanas labors. On the other hand, the
claimant and her witnesses were direct and firm in their testimonies, to wit:
MARGARITA TANA:
Q.

Was your late husbands work continuous or not?

A.

His work was continuous except on Sundays.

Q.

Mrs. Witness, in January 1961, how many days in a week did your late husband work?

A.

4 weeks in January 1961.

Q.

And how many months for that year did he work?

A.

12 months.

Q.

Is this working pattern of your husband, considering that you testified that he worked continuously, the same all throughout
his employment from 1961 to 1978?

A.

Yes, he worked continuously from 1961 to 1978 for 6 days a week, 4 weeks a month and 12 months each year.

Q.

Mrs. Witness, how many months did your husband work in 1979 considering that he died in 1979?

A.

3 months.

Q.

What was the nature of the work of your late husband from 1961 until his death in 1979?

A.

Cutting canes, hauling canes with the use of canecarts, plowing, hauling fertilizers, weeding and stubble cleaning.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q.

Now, the other co-workers of yours, you said they were Agaton Libawas, Narciso Dueas, Juan Dueas, and Aurelio Tana,
what were their jobs?

A.

Hauling canes by the use of bull carts and cutting canes. Their works are the same with that of my husbands.

Q.

But you mentioned among the duties of your husband as arador meaning plowing the fields?

A.

Yes, he was also plowing because that is one of his duties.[21]

AGATON LIBAWAS:
Q.

How about petitioner Margarita Tana and the late Ignacio Tana, were they regular workers, or extra workers?

A.

They were regular workers.

Q.

In your case, Mr. Witness, considering that according to you, you are only a relief worker, please inform the Commission
how many months each year from 1961 to 1984 did you work in Hda. B-70 and Hda. B-15M with Conchita Ayalde?

A.

During milling season, I worked 2 months, during cultivation if they are short of plowers then they would call me to work for
at least 3 months as a plower.

Q.

So, all in all, each year, from 1961 to 1984 your average working months in Hda. B-70 and B-15M are 5 months each year?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Mr. Witness, to prove that you have worked there, will you please inform at least 5 laborers of Hda. B-70 and B-15M of
Conchita Ayalde?

A.

Juan Dueas, Narciso Dueas, Aurelio Tana, Ignacio and Margarita Tana.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q.

Will you please inform the Commission if the deceased Ignacio Tana which is according to you, was a regular worker of the
2 haciendas, if how many months did he work during lifetime from 1961 until he died in 1979?

A.

His work was continuous.

Q.

And by continuous you mean he worked straight 12 months each year except in 1979?

A.

He worked only for 10 months because the 2 months are already preparation for cultivation.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q.

And according to you, in a years time, you worked only for at least 5 months in Hda. B-70 and B-15M, is that correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And during this time that you are working in your riceland you will agree with me that you do not know whether the laborers
of this Hda. B-70 and Had B-15M are really working because you are devoting your time in your riceland, is that correct?

A.

I knew because the place of their work is just near my house, it is along the way.

Q.

How about when the canes are already tall, can you actually see the workers in Hda. B-70 and B-15M when you are busy at
your riceland?

A.

Yes, because they have to pass in my house.

Q.

Is there no other passage in that hacienda except that road in front of your house?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Are you sure about that?

A.

Yes, I am sure.[22]

AURELIO TANA:

Q.

Do you know what is the work of the petitioner during the time when you were together working in the field?

A.

We were working together, like cutting and loading canes, hoeing, weeding, applying fertilizers, digging canals and plowing.

Q.

During your employment in the said hacienda where were you residing?

A.

There inside the hacienda.

Q.

What about the petitioner?

A.

The same.

Q.

How far is your house from the house of the petitioner?

A.

About 20 arms-length.

Q.

How far is Hda. B-70 from Hda. B-15.

A.

It is very near it is divided by the road.

Q.

What road are you referring to?

A.

Highway road from Barangay Buenavista to La Granja.

Q.

During your employment will you please inform the Commission the frequency of work of the late Ignacio Tana?

A.

4 weeks a month, 6 days a week, 12 months a year.

Q.

Why is it that you are in a position to inform the Commission about the period of employment of Ignacio Tana?

A.

Because we were together working.[23]

It is indubitable, therefore, that Tana worked continuously for Ayalde, not only as arador on pakyaw basis, but as a regular
farmhand, doing backbreaking jobs for Ayaldes business. There is no shred of evidence to show that Tana was only a seasonal
worker, much less a migrant worker. All witnesses, including Ayalde herself, testified that Tana and his family resided in the
plantation. If he was a mere pakyaw worker or independent contractor, then there would be no reason for Ayalde to allow them to
live inside her property for free. The only logical explanation is that he was working for most part of the year exclusively for Ayalde,
in return for which the latter gratuitously allowed Tana and his family to reside in her property.
The Court of Appeals, in finding for Ayalde, relied on the claimants and her witnesses admission that her husband was hired
as an arador on pakyaw basis, but it failed to appreciate the rest of their testimonies. Just because he was, for short periods of
time, hired on pakyaw basis does not necessarily mean that he was not employed to do other tasks for the remainder of the
year. Even Ayalde admitted that Tana did other jobs when he was not hired to plow. Consequently, the conclusion culled from their
testimonies to the effect that Tana was mainly and solely an arador was at best a selective appreciation of portions of the entire
evidence. It was the Social Security Commission that took into consideration all the documentary and testimonial evidence on
record.
Secondly, Ayalde made much ado of her claim that Tana could not be her employee because she exercised no control over his
work hours and method of performing his task as arador. It is also an admitted fact that Tana, Jr. used his own carabao and
tools. Thus, she contends that, applying the control test, Tana was not an employee but an independent contractor.
A closer scrutiny of the records, however, reveals that while Ayalde herself may not have directly imposed on Tana the manner
and methods to follow in performing his tasks, she did exercise control through her overseer.
Be that as it may, the power of control refers merely to the existence of the power. It is not essential for the employer to
actually supervise the performance of duties of the employee; it is sufficient that the former has a right to wield the power.
[24]
Certainly, Ayalde, on her own or through her overseer, wielded the power to hire or dismiss, to check on the work, be it in
progress or quality, of the laborers. As the owner/lessee of the plantations, she possessed the power to control everyone working
therein and everything taking place therein.
Jurisprudence provides other equally important considerations which support the conclusion that Tana was not an independent
contractor. First, Tana cannot be said to be engaged in a distinct occupation or business. His carabao and plow may be useful in
his livelihood, but he is not independently engaged in the business of farming or plowing. Second, he had been working exclusively
for Ayalde for eighteen (18) years prior to his demise. Third, there is no dispute that Ayalde was in the business of growing
sugarcane in the two plantations for commercial purposes. There is also no question that plowing or preparing the soil for planting is
a major part of the regular business of Ayalde.

Under the circumstances, the relationship between Ayalde and Tana has more of the attributes of employer-employee than that
of an independent contractor hired to perform a specific project. In the case of Dy Keh Beng v. International Labor,[25] we cited our
long-standing ruling in Sunripe Coconut Products Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, to wit:
When a worker possesses some attributes of an employee and others of an independent contractor, which make him fall within an
intermediate area, he may be classified under the category of an employee when the economic facts of the relations make it more
nearly one of employment than one of independent business enterprise with respect to the ends sought to be
accomplished. (Underscoring Ours)[26]
We find the above-quoted ruling to be applicable in the case of Tana. There is preponderance of evidence to support the
conclusion that he was an employee rather than an independent contractor.
The Court of Appeals also erred when it ruled, on the alternative, that if ever Tana was an employee, he was still ineligible for
compulsory coverage because he was not paid any regular daily wage and he did not work for an uninterrupted period of at least six
months in a year in accordance with Section 8(j) (I) of the Social Security Law. There is substantial testimonial evidence to prove
that Tana was paid a daily wage, and he worked continuously for most part of the year, even while he was also occasionally called
on to plow the soil on a pakyaw basis. As a farm laborer who has worked exclusively for Ayalde for eighteen (18) years, Tana
should be entitled to compulsory coverage under the Social Security Law, whether his service was continuous or broken.
Margarita Tana alleged that SSS premiums were deducted from Tanas salary, testifying, thus:
Q.

Were there deductions from the salaries of your husband while he was employed with the respondent from 1961 to 1979?

A.

Yes, there were deductions but I do not know because they were the ones deducting it.

Q.

Why do you know that his salaries were deducted for SSS premiums?

A.

Because Antero Maghari asked me and my husband to sign SSS papers and he told us that they will take care of
everything.

Q.

How much were the deductions every payday?

A.

I do not know how much because our daily wage was only P4.00.[27]

Agaton Libawas, also testified:

Q.

Mr. Witness, in your 15-day wages do you notice any deductions from it?

A.

There were deductions and we were informed that it was for SSS.

Q.

Mr. Witness, since when were there deductions from your salaries?

A.

Since 1961.

Q.

Up to when?

A.

Up to 1979.

Q.

Mr. Witness, are you a member of the SSS?

A.

No.

Q.

How about petitioner, if you know?

A.

No, also.

Q.

What happened to the deductions did you not ask your employer?

A.

We asked but we were answered that we were being remitted for our SSS.

Q.

Did you not verify?

A.

No, because I just relied on their statement.[28]

Ayalde failed to counter these positive assertions. Even on the assumption that there were no deductions, the fact remains
that Tana was and should have been covered under the Social Security Law. The circumstances of his employment place him
outside the ambit of the exception provided in Section 8(j) of Republic Act No. 1611, as amended by Section 4 of R.A. 2658.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 16427 and the Resolution
dated June 14, 1991 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Social Security Commission in SSC Case No.
8851 is REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

RAYO vs. CFI of BULACAN

Facts:
1. During the height of typhoon Kading, the National Power Corporations plant superintendent
Chavez opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam.
2. As a direct and immediate result, several towns in Bulacan were flooded ( particularly
Norzagaray ). About a hundred of its residents died and properties worth million of pesos were
destroyed.
3. The petitioners, who are among the unfortunate victims of the man-caused flood, filed
several complaints for damages against NPC and the plant superintendent.
4. NPC claimed, as its defense, that in the operation of the Angat Dam, it is performing
a purely governmental function. Thus, it cannot be sued without the express consent of the
State.
5. The petitioners opposed the claim of NPC and claimed that it is performing not
governmental but merely proprietary functions and that based on the organic charter (charter
- a legal document that provides for thecreation of a corporate entity ) of NPC, it can be sued
and be sued in any court.
Issue: Whether or not the power of NPC to sue and be sued under its organic charter includes
the power to be suedfor tort.
Held: The government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it
to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. NPC, as a government owned and controlled
corporation, has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. In
any court, NPC can sue and be sued for tort. The petition of the petitioners was granted.
Notes : Government-owned and controlled corporations have a personality of their own,
separate and distinct from the government. Therefore, although they are considered to be
public in character, they are not exempt from garnishment legal proceedings
Malong vs. PNR, G.R. No. L-49930
G.R. No. L-49930
August 7, 1985
FRANCISCO MALONG and ROSALINA AQUINO-MALONG petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, Lingayen
Branch 11, respondents.
Ponente: AQUINO, J.
Facts
The Petitioners, Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that on October 30, 1977 their son,
Jaime Aquino, a paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR train while it was
between Tarlac City and Capas. The said train was overloaded with passengers and baggage in
view of the proximity of All Saints Day. The Malong spouses prayed that the PNR be ordered to
pay them damages totalling P136,370. The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that it
had no jurisdiction because the PNR, being a government instrumentality, the action was a suit
against the State. The petitioners appealed to SC pursuant to RA No. 5440.
Issue W/N the PNR is immune from suit?
NO.

Although the PNR is a government instrumentality under Republic Act No. 4156, as amended
by Republic Act No. 6366 and Presidential Decree No. 741, it was held that the State divested
itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from its
predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. It did
not remove itself from the operation of articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common
carriers. However, as held in precedents, the correct rule is that "not all government entities,
whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined
by the character of the objectives for which the entity was organized. The Manila Hotel case
also relied on the following rulings: By engaging in a particular business through the
instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign
character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private
corporations. The order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings, costs against the Philippine National Railways. It would be
unjust if the heirs of the victim of an alleged negligence of the PNR employees could not sue
the PNR for damages. Like any private common carrier, the PNR is subject to the obligations of
persons engaged in that private enterprise. It is not performing any governmental function.
Notes
Abad Santos, J., concurring:
The claim that Philippine National Railways is immune from suit because it is an
instrumentality of the government is so outlandish that it deserves slight consideration. He
mentioned the Central Bank of the Philippines as an example of government instrumentality
that is not immune from suit for it also performs proprietary functions. He also contended the
use of the immunity from suit on the part of the government corporations to deny justice that
is due to the people they are to serve.
G.R.

No. 180564 JESUS P. DISINI, Petitioner v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, as represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG), Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DISSENTING OPINION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Today, the Court rules that the petitioner a vital resource holding credible information sufficient and competent to establish a
strong case against against Herminio T. Disini (Herminio) and Herminios companies in the action pending before the
Sandiganbayan should not be compelled to stand as a witness in that action. The Court opines that the Government should not be
allowed to double-cross the petitioner by compelling him to testify against Herminio and the latters companies after he had
performed his part under his agreement with the Government.

The decision inflicts a severe blow to the faltering effort of the Government to recover ill-gotten wealth from Herminio and
his companies. I insist that the States effort to recover ill-gotten wealth from whoever holds or hides it should not be obstructed or
stymied. If there is going to be any double cross, the victims will be the Government and the long-suffering Filipino people, not the
petitioner, and only because the petitioner is now permitted to shirk from his obligation to testify truthfully in the action against
Herminio and his companies.

I dissent.

Antecedents

The petitioner assails the resolutions on August 16, 2007 and October 10, 2007 by the Sandiganbayan issued in Civil Case
No. 0013 entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Herminio T. Disini, et al.,[1] as well as Resolution No. 2007-031 adopted by the
PCGG,[2] alleging that the Sandiganbayan and PCGG thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Essentially, the petitioner desires to stop PCGG from calling him as a witness against Herminio, a defendant in Civil
Case No. 0013, or from compelling the petitioner to give testimony in any other case involving Herminio, on the ground that (a) the
Immunity Agreement he had entered into with PCGG covered such testimony, and (b) he acted as an attorney on the matters of the
proposed testimony.

I submit that the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) validly revoked the Immunity Agreement between
the Government and the petitioner, and that the Sandiganbayan correctly upheld the revocation by refusing to quash the subpoena
issued to the petitioner to compel him to testify against Herminio and the latters companies.

Before I state my reasons for my submission, let us look at the following background facts.

On February 16, 1989, the petitioner and the Government executed an Immunity Agreement,[3] whereby he agreed to appear
and testify in Civil Case No. 88-5150 (entitledRepublic of the Philippines, et al v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, et al.) pending
in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey and in the arbitration proceedings No. 6404/BGD and No.
6423/BGD (entitled Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. National Power Corporation, Republic of the Philippines and Burns & Roe
Enterprises v. National Power Corporation, Republic of the Philippines) in the International Chamber of Commerce Court of
Arbitration.
The Immunity Agreement provided in its paragraph 1 that:
1. Jesus P. Disini agrees to appear and to testify truthfully in the civil
matter captioned Republic of the Philippines, et al v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, et al. (now pending as
No. 88-5150
in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (or any jurisdiction to which it
may be transferred) and in the arbitration proceedings captioned Westinghouse International Projects Company,
Westinghouse Electric S.A., Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. National Power Corporation, Republic of the
Philippines and Burns & Roe Enterprises vs National Power Corporation, Republic of the Philippines (now
pending as Nos. 6401/BGD and 6423/BGD, respectively in the International Chamber of Commerce Court of
Arbitration); to provide to the attorneys for the Republic of the Philippines all documents in his possession or under
his control related to the subject matter of said action; to submit to interviews by those attorneys upon reasonable
notice; to provide affidavits regarding his knowledge of the subject matter of said actions; and to cooperate
truthfully with the Republic of the Philippines and its attorneys in the prosecution of this action, subject to the
provision set forth in this paragraph and at paragraph 3, below. The parties acknowledge that the Republic of
the Philippines is or may become a party to other proceedings relating to circumstances as to which Jesus P.
Disini may have knowledge. The Republic of the Philippines by this instrument agrees that it shall not compel the
testimony of Jesus P. Disini in any proceeding, domestic or foreign, other than this civil matter and these
arbitration proceedings and, in the event this civil matter or any portion thereof is referred for arbitration, then and
in that event, in said arbitration proceeding resulting from said reference.[4]

In return for the petitioners undertaking, the Government ostensibly agreed not to compel his testimony in any proceeding,
domestic or foreign, other than in the mentioned civil and arbitration cases. The Government further bound itself not to call him as a
witness to testify in any case brought by the Government against Herminio. In that regard, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Immunity
Agreement stated:
2. The Republic of the Philippines agrees that it shall not institute, prosecute or maintain any criminal, civil
or administrative proceeding, audit or investigation against Jesus P. Disini, for or in connection with any conduct
directly or indirectly relating to or arising out of the construction of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant in Bataan,
Philippines or Jesus P. Disinis former employment by Herminio T. Disini or any company in which Herminio T.
Disini owned any interest prior to July 1, 1984; or any claim or matter, civil, criminal or administrative, known or
unknown, arising under the Internal Revenue Code of the Philippines which exists as of the date of this
agreement; and it further agrees that it shall not use, directly or indirectly, against Jesus P. Disini, any information,
lead or document obtained from him pursuant to this agreement.
3. Should the Republic of the Philippines name Herminio T. Disini a defendant in any of the abovereferenced matters, or in any resulting arbitration proceeding, or any other proceeding ancillary to said matters,
the Republic of the Philippines shall not call Jesus P. Disini to testify as a witness in said matters on any claim
brought by the Republic of the Philippines against Herminio T. Disini. Nothing herein shall affect Jesus P. Disinis
obligation to provide truthful information or testimony.[5]

At the instance of the Government as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 0013 entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Herminio T.
Disini, Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, and Rodolfo Jacob,[6] the Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena duces tecum and/or ad
testificandum to compel the petitioner to appear and testify therein.

Instead of appearing on the scheduled date, the petitioner moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum and/or ad
testificandum on March 6, 2007, invoking the Immunity Agreement. The Sandiganbayan ignored the petitioners motion to quash,
because the motion was not set for hearing.

The petitioner amended his motion to quash by setting it for hearing. He reiterated the arguments of his original motion.

The petitioners failure to comply with the subpoena of the Sandiganbayan prompted PCGG to issue on July 19, 2007 its
assailed Resolution No. 2007-031,[7] to wit:
NOW, THEREFORE, be it RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED, that the Immunity Agreement dated
16 February 1989 between Mr. Jesus P. Disini and the Republic of the Philippines, be, as it is hereby, REVOKED
and NULLIFIED insofar as it prohibits the Republic of the Philippines from presenting Jesus P. Disini in cases
brought against Herminio T. Disini in the Philippines.
RESOLVED, FURTHER, that copies of this resolution be furnished to Mr. Jesus P. Disini and the Honorable
Sandiganbayan for their guidance.

On August 16, 2007, the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner's amended motion to quash, holding:
It is evident that the Agreement dated February 16, 1989 is the only reason that Atty. Jesus Disini refuses to
heed the subpoena issued him by the Court. He invokes the binding effect thereof on him, and especially on
plaintiff and argues that the latter cannot now renege on its commitment after he had complied with the terms and
conditions thereof. However, even by his own admission, the immunity granted to him was not absolute
considering that the same agreement carried the qualification regarding Atty. Disini's obligation to provide truthful
information or testimony which is not thereby affected. Thus, Section 3 thereof reads as follows:
3. Should the Republic of the Philippines name Herminio T. Disini a defendant in any of the abovereference matters, or in any resulting arbitration proceedings, or any other proceeding ancillary to said
matters, the Republic of the Philippines shall not call Jesus P. Disini to testify as a witness in said
matters on any claim brought by the Republic of the Philippines against Herminio Disini. Nothing
herein shall affect Jesus Disini's obligation to provide truthful information or
testimony. (emphasis supplied)
Even assuming that the said foregoing proviso in the immunity agreement prohibits plaintiff from calling on
Jesus Disini to testify in any case brought by the Republic against Herminio Disini without any qualification, the
same however, cannot be invoked nor be relied upon by Atty. Jesus Disini to quash the subpoena herein issued
considering that the immunity granted was consummated only in February 1989, or long after the instant case was
filed in 1987.Without any provision therein respecting retroactive application or making an exception to the instant
case, the agreement cannot be the basis for immunity for cases that had already been filed before this Court. As it
is, there is no such provision in the Immunity Agreement, hence, none could also be assumed and the
presumption is that it can only apply prospectively to cases explicitly stated therein and not to those cases over
which this Court had already acquired jurisdiction.
Moreover, in view of the revocation and nullification by the PCGG of Section 3 of the immunity agreement,
which is a power of the PCGG that Atty. Jesus Disini himself recognizes, there is no point of quashing the
subpoena issued by the Court for him to testify in this case since he can already be compelled to testify sans any
restrictions or qualifications.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Amended Motion to Quash Subpoena filed by Atty. Jesus Disini
and all related motions to quash that he filed are hereby denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[8]

The petitioner sought the reconsideration of the resolution, but the Sandiganbayan denied his motion for reconsideration
on October 10, 2007 through the second assailed resolution.[9]

Hence, on December 4, 2007, the petitioner commenced this special civil action, contending that the denial of his motion to
quash constituted a clear grave abuse of discretion amounting to an excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan.

Parties Positions

The petitioner insists that the Sandiganbayan erroneously interpreted the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the Immunity
Agreement to mean that the Government could opt to forego its undertaking not to call him as a witness in connection with any claim
brought by the Government against Herminio; that such interpretation defeated the very essence of paragraph 3 as a reciprocal
exchange between him and the Government; and that paragraph 3 should not be read in isolation from the rest of the agreement,
but should be construed as referring to his reciprocal obligation to testify truthfully in the cases mentioned in paragraph 1 of the
Immunity Agreement.

He argues that PCGG through its Resolution No. 2007-031 could not unilaterally revoke the Immunity Agreement, being a
contract mutually entered into between him and the Government; that Resolution No. 2007-031 was void for violating the principle of
mutuality of contracts; that the fact that Civil Case No. 0013 was filed prior to the execution of the Immunity Agreement and before
the cases enumerated therein had been filed did not exclude Civil Case No. 0013 from coverage in light of the last two sentences of
paragraph 1; that paragraph 3 also extended the concession in favor of the petitioner to any claim brought by the Republic of the
Philippines against Herminio T. Disini; that the Immunity Agreement contemplated the claims already filed against Herminio prior to
its execution (including Civil Case No. 0013); that he was further disqualified from testifying in Civil Case No. 0013 regarding matters
learned in confidence from Herminio, who was also then his client; that he acceded to paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement
precisely because he needed to protect the privileged communication made to him by Herminio as his client; and that his
employment as a lawyer working for Herminio necessarily included Herminios availment of his legal knowledge and advice
whenever called for.

The Government counters that the Sandiganbayan correctly interpreted the plain meaning of the clear and unambiguous
terms of the Immunity Agreement; that PCGG was justified in revoking paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement, as it was contrary to
public policy; that the Supreme Court has time and again acknowledged that the recovery of ill-gotten wealth is not only a State
policy (Executive Order No. 1, Section 2(a)), but also a duty on its part (Tanchanco v. Sandiganbayan, 476 SCRA 202 [2005]
and BASECO v. PCGG, 150 SCRA 181 [1987]); and that the 1987 Constitution (Section 15, Article XI) even provides that the right
of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees,
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.

The Government points out that the petitioner himself acknowledged, in his reply dated July 10, 2007 [10] filed in the
Sandiganbayan, the authority of PCGG to repudiate the Immunity Agreement, stating in paragraph 19 of the reply [11] that only
PCGG en banc could repudiate it; and that the petitioner was thus estopped from challenging PCGGs authority to nullify paragraph
3 of the Immunity Agreement.

The Government maintains that the Sandiganbayan correctly found the Immunity Agreement to apply prospectively to the
cases specifically enumerated therein, in the absence of any express provision giving it retroactive effect.

The Government submits that the petitioners claim that the attorney-client privilege precluded him from testifying in Civil
Case No. 0013 was belied by the admission in his affidavit dated February 22, 1989 that his knowledge of Herminios transactions
was not acquired in his capacity as a lawyer of Herminio but as an executive of Herdis Group Inc., a company co-owned by
Herminio and former President Ferdinand Marcos.

In reply, the petitioner insisted that the Immunity Agreement did not violate public policy; that Executive Orders No. 14 and No.
14-A expressly allowed the power to grant immunity to PCGG; that the concession vested in him under the Immunity Agreement did
not prevent the Government from prosecuting Herminio in order to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses; that the
Government already presented several pieces of evidence and witnesses against Herminio in Civil Case No. 0013; that the
Government cannot validly revoke the Immunity Agreement after having benefited from petitioners testimony in several cases in
Geneva, Switzerland and in the United States of America; that it is a well-settled rule that a compromise becomes binding upon the
parties upon its perfection and has the effect and authority of res judicata even if not judicially approved; and that the Constitutional
provision preventing the State from being estopped by the acts of its agents applies only to irregular acts of its officials, not to the
Immunity Agreement which was freely executed between the parties.
Issue

Can PCGG compel the petitioner to testify against Herminio in Civil Case No. 0013 and in all other cases filed by the
Government against him?

Submission

As I made clear at the outset, the petition lacks merit.

A.
PCGG validly issued Resolution No. 2007-031
revoking and nullifying Paragraph 3
of the Immunity Agreement

Section 5 of Executive Order No. 14 vests in PCGG the authority to grant immunity from criminal prosecution, to wit:
Section 5. The Presidential Commission on Good Government is authorized to grant immunity from criminal
prosecution to any person who provides information or testifies in any investigation conducted by such
Commission to establish the unlawful manner in which any respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or
accumulated the property or properties in question in any case where such information or testimony is necessary
to ascertain or prove the latter's guilt or his civil liability. The immunity thereby granted shall be continued to protect
the witness who repeats such testimony before the Sandiganbayan when required to do so by the latter or by the
Commission.

Aside from its aforementioned statutory authority to grant immunity from criminal prosecution, PCGG has the authority to grant
civil immunity to anyone who aids the Government in its efforts to recover all ill-gotten wealth. [12] In exchange for the immunity from
civil or criminal prosecution given by the Government, the grantee should agree to testify and to give up his right to remain silent.
[13]

Thus, paragraph 2 of the Immunity Agreement granted the petitioner immunity from civil and criminal prosecution in exchange for

his undertaking to testify truthfully in the civil and arbitration cases pending before the U.S. District Court and the International
Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration. The Government respected its undertaking and refrained from prosecuting him.

Now, however, the petitioner is invoking not just his immunity from civil and criminal prosecution, but his immunity from
testifying against Herminio pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement.

It is grossly wrong and unfair to sustain the petitioner.

Firstly: The grant of immunity from testifying against Herminio pursuant to paragraph 3 contravened the essential purpose
behind PCGGs establishment as explicitly embodied in Executive Order No. 1, thus:
Section 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the
following matters:
a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad,
including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during
his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their
powers, authority influence, connections or relationship.
xxx

The objective of PCGGs granting immunity from civil or criminal prosecution has been to encourage individuals to divulge
their knowledge of the unlawful acquisition of Government property without fear of self-incrimination, in order to enable the
Government to recover illegally acquired assets as soon as possible. In direct contrast, the immunity granted under paragraph 3
prevented the petitioner from disclosing any knowledge he might have regarding Herminio, a crony of the Marcoses. Considering
that his affidavit dated February 22, 1989[14] and his supplemental affidavit dated March 1, 1989[15] revealed that the petitioner had
been privy to the various business transactions between Herminio, who had conducted business through Herdis Group, Inc., and
former President Marcos, who had owned two-thirds of Herdis Group, Inc., the petitioners refusal to testify because of paragraph 3
would effectively deprive the Government of the opportunity to successfully prosecute Herminio and his companies in the actions
already pending in the Sandiganbayan since 1987 yet.

We must not ignore that Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides: The right of the State to recover
properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees from them or from their nominees, or transferees, shall not be barred
by prescription, laches or estoppel. In revoking and nullifying paragraph 3, PCGG simply acknowledged paragraph 3s inherent
inefficaciousness under this constitutional edict. The petitioner cannot consequently invoke estoppel to prevent PCGG from issuing
Resolution No. 2007-031.

Secondly: In upholding the revocation by PCGG of the immunity of the petitioner from testifying against Herminio and his
companies, the Sandiganbayan cited threegrounds in its assailed resolution of August 16, 2007[16] for rejecting the petitioners
motion to quash, namely:
(a) The petitioner himself had admitted that the immunity thereby granted to him was not absolute due to the
qualification prescribing his obligation to provide truthful information or testimony; hence, he could not argue
that the Government could not call him as a witness by virtue of his having already complied with the terms
and conditions of the Immunity Agreement;
(b) Assuming that the immunity was unqualified, the Immunity Agreement, which had been consummated only
in February 16, 1989, did not apply retroactively to Civil Action No. 0013 which had been pending since 1987
in the absence of any provision for retroactive application or making any exception. The Immunity Agreement
could apply only prospectively to the cases explicitly enumerated therein, not to cases over which the
Sandiganbayan had already acquired jurisdiction; and
(c) There was no point in quashing the subpoena issued to the petitioner, considering that the petitioner himself
recognized the power of PCGG to revoke and nullify paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement.

The Sandiganbayan was correct, and should be sustained.

In the first place, even the petitioner conceded that his immunity under paragraph 3 was not absolute, but was subject of
the qualification that he should provide truthful information or testimony. As such, PCGGs revocation of the qualified immunity could
not be successfully challenged.

Moreover, his own admission barred the petitioner from assailing PCGGs authority to repudiate paragraph 3. He had
acknowledged PCGGs authority to repudiate the Immunity Agreement in paragraph 19 of his reply dated July 10, 2007,[17] which he
had personally signed and submitted to the Sandiganbayan,[18] as follows:
xxx
19. The immunity agreement of undersigned having been approved by the PCGG en banc in accordance
with its rules, only the Commission en banc could repudiate the agreement. The lawyers of plaintiff could not on
their own strike down the agreement. xxx[19]
xxx

Lastly, the language and intent of paragraph 3, viz:

xxx
3. Should the Republic of the Philippines name Herminio T. Disini a defendant in any of the abovereferenced matters, or in any resulting arbitration proceeding, or any other proceeding ancillary to said matters,
the Republic of the Philippines shall not call Jesus P. Disini to testify as a witness in said matters on any claim
brought by the Republic of the Philippines against Herminio T. Disini. Nothing herein shall affect Jesus P. Disinis
obligation to provide truthful information or testimony.[20]
xxx

plainly indicate the prospective application of paragraph 3, that is, the immunity applied only to cases filed against
Herminio after February 16, 1989, not to those already pending as of said date.

Thirdly: The petitioner cannot also validly plead that the mutuality of contracts prohibited the revocation of paragraph 3.
Although parties to an agreement are free to enter into whatever terms they deem proper, and that entering into a compromise
agreement necessarily contemplates mutual concessions and mutual gains to put an end to litigation, [21]it is still indispensable that
such terms be not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. [22] However, paragraph 3 was contrary to the
States policy on the urgent need to recover all the illegally acquired wealth amassed by President Marcos, his immediate family,

relatives, and close associates; [23] hence, it was void and inefficacious. Needless to stress, such policy was the reason why
paragraph 3 carried the qualification, viz:
xxx Nothing herein shall affect Jesus P. Disini's obligation to provide truthful information or testimony.

B.
Attorney-Client privilege did not disqualify
petitioner from testifying against Herminio

The petitioners other contention, that the attorney-client privilege disqualified him from testifying against Herminio, has no
merit.

For the attorney-client privilege to apply, the following requisites must be present:
1.

Relationship of lawyer and client;

2.

Communication made by the client to the attorney, or advice given by the latter to the former;

3. Communication or advice must have been made confidentially.

4.

Such communication must have been made in the course of professional employment.[24]

An examination of the petitioners situation indicates that he did not establish the concurrence of the requisites.

To begin with, the petitioners contention that his employment necessarily included the rendering of legal advice to Herminio
as his employer deserves scant consideration, mainly because it was not substantiated. The relationship between the petitioner and
Herminio was one between an employee and his employer; hence, no lawyer-client relationship existed between them. On the
contrary, the petitioner himself admitted in his affidavits dated February 22, 1989 and March 18, 1989 that his personal knowledge of
Herminios business operations had been acquired by virtue of his employment as an executive in Herminios companies from May
1971 to July 1984.
It is axiomatic that the party asserting the privilege carries the burden of proving that the privilege applies. [25] Thus, the
petitioners mere assertion of the attorney-client privilege was not enough.[26]

That the petitioner was a lawyer did not automatically mean that the communications of Herminio to him (or vice versa) were
covered by the attorney-client privilege. The petitioner was a mere employee of Herminio or of his companies, not their retained
counsel. A communication is not privileged only because it is made by or to a person who happens to be a lawyer. [27] There are
many cases, indeed, in which attorneys are employed in transacting business, not properly professional, and where the business
may be transacted by another agent. In such cases, the fact that the agent sustains the character of an attorney does not protect
the communications attending the transactions with the privilege; hence, the communications may be testified to by him as by any
other agent.[28]

And, secondly, assuming that he then acted as a lawyer of Herminio, the petitioner did not show that the communications
between him and Herminio had been made in confidence by a client to a lawyer, or that the communications had been specifically
made in the course of a professional relationship between them. The lawyer-client privilege cannot be extended to communications
made to a corporate secretary and general counsel where there is no evidence which hat he is wearing when he receives the
communications.[29] Moreover, the privilege does not apply where the legal services are so intertwined with the business activities
that a clearer distinction between the two is impossible to discern.[30]

It is worth pointing out that evidentiary and testimonial privileges, being exceptions to the general rule, are not lightly created or
expansively construed, because they are in derogation of the search for truth. It is appropriate to recognize privilege only to a very

limited extent, such that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has the public good transcending normally the
predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.[31]
C.
Sandiganbayan and PCGG were
not guilty of grave abuse of discretion

The following requisites must concur in order that the petition for certiorari may prosper, namely: (a) that the writ is directed
against a tribunal, a board, or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [32] Without jurisdiction means that the tribunal,
board, or officer acted with absolute lack of authority. There is excess of jurisdiction when the public respondent transcends its
power or acts without any statutory authority. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; otherwise stated, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. [33]
Certiorari does not lie. The Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed resolutions
dated August 16, 2007 and October 10, 2007, which were correct and in accord with the Constitution and the pertinent law.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari and prohibition for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 104269 November 11, 1993

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., respondents.
Roy Lago Salcedo for private respondents.

VITUG, J.:
For consideration are the incidents that flow from the familiar doctrine of non-suability of the state.
In this petition for certiorari, the Department of Agriculture seeks to nullify the Resolution, 1 dated 27 November 1991, of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City, denying the petition for injunction, prohibition
and mandamus that prays to enjoin permanently the NLRC's Regional Arbitration Branch X and Cagayan de Oro City Sheriff from
enforcing the decision 2 of 31 May 1991 of the Executive Labor Arbiter and from attaching and executing on petitioner's property.
The Department of Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract 3 on 01 April 1989 for security
services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Save for the increase in the monthly rate of the guards, the
same terms and conditions were also made to apply to another contract, dated 01 May 1990, between the same parties. Pursuant to
their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Agency in the various premises of the petitioner.
On 13 September 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of
13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages, 4 before the
Regional Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro City, docketed as NLRC Case No. 10-09-00455-90 (or 10-10-00519-90, its original
docket number), against the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency.
The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May finding herein petitioner and jointly and severallyliable with Sultan
Security Agency for the payment of money claims, aggregating P266,483.91, of the complainant security guards. The petitioner and
Sultan Security Agency did not appeal the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the decision became final and executory.
On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. 5 commanding the City Sheriff to enforce and execute the judgment
against the property of the two respondents. Forthwith, or on 19 July 1991, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of
the petitioner, i.e. one (1) unit Toyota Hi-Ace, one (1) unit Toyota Mini Cruiser, and one (1) unit Toyota Crown. 6 These units were put
under the custody of Zacharias Roa, the property custodian of the petitioner, pending their sale at public auction or the final
settlement of the case, whichever would come first.
A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the petitioner with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Cagayan de Oro, alleging, inter alia, that the writ issued was effected without the
Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner, and that, therefore, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and

void and all actions pursuant thereto should be deemed equally invalid and of no legal, effect. The petitioner also pointed out that the
attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize petitioner's governmental functions to the prejudice of the public
good.
On 27 November 1991, the NLRC promulgated its assailed resolution; viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the following orders are issued:
1. The enforcement and execution of the judgments against petitioner in NLRC RABX Cases Nos. 10-10-0045590; 10-10-0481-90 and 10-10-00519-90 are temporarily suspended for a period of two (2) months, more or less,
but not extending beyond the last quarter of calendar year 1991 to enable petitioner to source and raise funds to
satisfy the judgment awards against it;
2. Meantime, petitioner is ordered and directed to source for funds within the period above-stated and to deposit
the sums of money equivalent to the aggregate amount. it has been adjudged to pay jointly and severally with
respondent Sultan Security Agency with the Regional Arbitration Branch X, Cagayan de Oro City within the same
period for proper dispositions;
3. In order to ensure compliance with this order, petitioner is likewise directed to put up and post
sufficient surety and supersedeas bond equivalent to at least to fifty (50%) percent of the total monetary award
issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Supreme Court or by the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental to answer for the satisfaction of the money claims in case of failure or default on the part of
petitioner to satisfy the money claims;
4. The City Sheriff is ordered to immediately release the properties of petitioner levied on execution within ten (10)
days from notice of the posting of sufficient surety or supersedeas bond as specified above. In the meanwhile,
petitioner is assessed to pay the costs and/or expenses incurred by the City Sheriff, if any, in connection with the
execution of the judgments in the above-stated cases upon presentation of the appropriate claims or vouchers and
receipts by the city Sheriff, subject to the conditions specified in the NLRC Sheriff, subject to the conditions
specified in the NLRC Manual of Instructions for Sheriffs;
5. The right of any of the judgment debtors to claim reimbursement against each other for any payments made in
connection with the satisfaction of the judgments herein is hereby recognized pursuant to the ruling in the Eagle
Security case, (supra). In case of dispute between the judgment debtors, the Executive Labor Arbiter of the
Branch of origin may upon proper petition by any of the parties conduct arbitration proceedings for the purpose
and thereby render his decision after due notice and hearings;
7. Finally, the petition for injunction is Dismissed for lack of basis. The writ of preliminary injunction previously
issued is Lifted and Set Aside and in lieu thereof, a Temporary Stay of Execution is issued for a period of two (2)
months but not extending beyond the last quarter of calendar year 1991, conditioned upon the posting of a surety
or supersedeas bond by petitioner within ten (10) days from notice pursuant to paragraph 3 of this disposition. The
motion to admit the complaint in intervention isDenied for lack of merit while the motion to dismiss the petition filed
by Duty Sheriff is Noted
SO ORDERED.
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of
execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the
cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a
service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that "(t)he State may not be sued without its consent," 7 reflects nothing less than a
recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the
jurisdiction of courts. 8 It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. As has been aptly observed, by Justice Holmes, a sovereign is
exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be
no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. 9 True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is
derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because it grants the state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim
against it by simply invoking its non-suability. 10 We have had occasion, to explain in its defense, however, that a continued
adherence to the doctrine of non-suability cannot be deplored, for the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the
performance of its multifarious functions would be far greater in severity than the inconvenience that may be caused private parties,
if such fundamental principle is to be abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy is not to be accordingly restricted. 11
The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstances. On the
contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued without its consent;" its clear import then is that
the State may at times be sued. 12 The States' consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through
a general law 13 or a special law. 14 In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No.
3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from
contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." 15 Implied consent, on the other
hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim 16 or when it enters into a
contract. 17 In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have
divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied upon by the NLRC and the private respondents, is not, however, without
qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made
between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. 18

In the Unites States of America vs. Ruiz, 19 where the questioned transaction dealt with improvements on the wharves in the naval
installation at Subic Bay, we held:
The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent
or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States.
However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And
because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign
and governmental acts ( jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary act ( jure gestionisis). The result is
that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the
rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in Western Europe.
xxx xxx xxx
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a state may
be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its consent
to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contracts relates to the
exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted
to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the
highest order; they are not utilized for not dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a
governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in
character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e. for underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other
items, arising from the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State
to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, . . . Pursuant, however, to
Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1145, the money claim first be brought to the
Commission on Audit. Thus, inCarabao, Inc., vs. Agricultural Productivity Commission, 20 we ruled:
(C)laimants have to prosecute their money claims against the Government under Commonwealth Act 327, stating
that Act 3083 stands now merely as the general law waiving the State's immunity from suit, subject to the general
limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that "no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court
against the Government of the (Philippines), and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing
money claims against the Government must be strictly observed."
We fail to see any substantial conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of C.A. No. 327 and the Labor Code with respect to
money claims against the State. The Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the State liability but the
prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in C.A.
No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445.
When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does thereby necessarily consent to unrestrained execution against it. tersely put,
when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has
a liability. 21 In Republic vs. Villasor 22 this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has explained, thus
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special
law, it may limit the claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution"
and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties
may not be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated
by law. 23
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 27 November 1991, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
writ of execution directed against the property of the Department of Agriculture is nullified, and the public respondents are hereby
enjoined permanently from doing, issuing and implementing any and all writs of execution issued pursuant to the decision rendered
by the Labor Arbiter against said petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

SUIT AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS

Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. v. CA

G.R. No. 91359, September 25, 1992
Grino-Aquino, J.
Facts:
The constitutionality of the following provisions of R.A. 5487(otherwise known as the Private
Security Agency Law), as amended, is questioned by VMPSI in its complaint:
SEC. 4. Who may Organize a Security or Watchman Agency. - Any Filipino citizen or a
corporation, partnership, or association, with a minimum capital of five thousand pesos, one
hundred per cent of which is owned and controlled by Filipino citizens may organize a security
or watchman agency: Provided, That no person shall organize or have aninterest in, more than

one such agency except those which are alreadyexisting at the promulgation of this Decree: x
x x. (As amended by P.D. Nos. 11 and 100.)
SEC. 17. Rules and Regulations by Chief, Philippine Constabulary. -The Chief of the Philippine
Constabulary, in consultation with thePhilippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency
Operators,Inc. and subject to the provision of existing laws, is hereby authorized to issue the
rules and regulations necessary to carry out the purpose of this Act.
VMPSI alleges that the above provisions of R.A. No. 5487 violate the provisions of the 1987
Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and
tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency
Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one
security agency. Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3,
subparagraph (g) of the Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and
Private Security Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by
then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that all private
security agencies/company security forces must register as members of any PADPAO Chapter
organized within the Region where their main offices are located.... As such membership
requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates legal and constitutional
provisions against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade. On
May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which
fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per
day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila.
On June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI
of cut-throat competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer lower than
the standard minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986.
PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee on
Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of its
license to operate a security agency (Annex D, Petition). The PC-SUSIA made similar findings
and likewise recommended the cancellation of VMPSIs license. As a result, PADPAO refused to
issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI when it requested one. VMPSI wrote the
PC Chief on March 10, 1988, requesting him to set aside or disregard the findings of PADPAO
and consider VMPSIs application for renewal of its license, even without a certificate of
membership from PADPAO
Issue: whether or not VMPSIs complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against
the State without its consent
Held:
Yes. The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987
Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that, being
instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primarily governmental function of
regulating the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen, or security guard
agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued without the
Governments consent, especially in this case because VMPSIs complaint seeks not only to
compel the public respondents to act in a certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual
and compensatory damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the same
amount, and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees from said public respondents. Even if its action
prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced because the State did not
consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose. While the doctrine of state
immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them
in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will
require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must
be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. A public
official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith,
or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PC
Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed by them as part
of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had
against them in their private capacities. The correct test for the application of state immunity
is not the conclusion of a contract by the State but the legal nature of the act. The restrictive
application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus
be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into a business
contract. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
In the instant case, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and PADPAO

was intended to professionalize the industry and to standardize the salaries of security guards
as well as the current rates of security services, clearly, a governmental function. The
execution of the said agreement is incidental to the purpose of R.A.5487, as amended, which is
to regulate the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen or security guard
agencies.
G.R. No. 92432 February 23, 1995
T/SGT ALDORA LARKINS, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. IRINEO BERNARDO, DANIEL HERRERA, MARIETTA DE GUZMAN,
JOSELITO CATACUTAN, JOSEPH GALANG, ROBERTO HERRERA, DELPIN PECSON, CARLOS CORTEZ, JAIME CORTEZ,
ARSENIO DIAZ, ROBERTO SAGAD and MARCELO LOZANO, respondents.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the Resolutions dated August 31, 1989 and
February 5, 1990 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. RAB- III-08-0572-88.
We grant the petition.
I
Petitioner was a member of the United States Air Force (USAF) assigned to oversee the dormitories of the Third Aircraft Generation
Squadron (3 AGS) at Clark Air Base, Pampanga.
On August 10, 1988, 3 AGS terminated the contract for the maintenance and upkeep of the dormitories with the De Guzman
Custodial Services. The employees thereof, including private respondents, were allowed to continue working for 3 AGS. It was left to
the new contractor, the JAC Maintenance Services owned by Joselito Cunanan, to decide whether it would retain their services.
Joselito Cunanan, however, chose to bring in his own workers. As a result, the workers of the De Guzman Custodial Services were
requested to surrender their base passes to Lt. Col. Frankhauser or to petitioner.
On August 12, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint with the Regional Arbitration Branch No. III of the NLRC, San Fernando,
Pampanga, against petitioner, Lt. Col. Frankhauser, and Cunanan for illegal dismissal and underpayment of wages (NLRC Case No.
RAB-III-08-0572-88). On September 9, 1988, private respondents amended their complaint and added therein claims for emergency
cost of living allowance, thirteenth-month pay, service incentive leave pay and holiday premiums.
The Labor Arbiter, with the conformity of private respondents, ordered Cunanan dropped as party respondent.
Petitioner and Lt. Col. Frankhauser failed to answer the complaint and to appear at the hearings. They, likewise, failed to submit their
position paper, which the Labor Arbiter deemed a waiver on their part to do so. The case was therefore submitted for decision on the
basis of private respondents' position paper and supporting documents.
On November 21, 1988, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision granting all the claims of private respondents. He found both Lt. Col.
Frankhauser and petitioner "guilty of illegal dismissal" and ordered them to reinstate private respondents with full back wages, or if
that is no longer possible, to pay private respondents' separation pay (Rollo, p. 78).
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC claiming that the Labor Arbiter never acquired jurisdiction over her person because no summons or
copies of the complaints, both original and amended, were ever served on her. In her "Supplemental Memorandum to Memorandum
of Appeal," petitioner argued that the attempts to serve her with notices of hearing were not in accordance with the provisions of the
R.P. U.S. Military Bases Agreement of 1947 (Rollo, pp. 35-37).
On August 31, 1989, NLRC issued a Resolution affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter, but declared that:
In the event this decision is executed and/or enforced, and considering our finding that the real party respondent is
the United States Government through its Armed Forces stationed at Clark Air Base, let such execution be made
subject to existing international agreements diplomatic protocol (Rollo, p. 95).
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which NLRC denied on February 5, 1990 (Rollo, p. 101).
Petitioner then elevated the matter to us.
On July 11, 1990, the Office of the solicitor General filed a Manifestation stating that it "cannot legally support the decision of the
Labor Arbiter" and therefore prayed that it be relieved from the responsibility of filing the required Comment for the public
respondents (Rollo, pp. 117-118). In view of this Manifestation, on July 18, 1990, we resolved to require NLRC to file its own
comment to the petition, which NLRC did on November 29, 1990 (Rollo, pp. 120, 133-139).
II
It is petitioner's contention that the questioned resolutions are null and void because respondent Labor Arbiter did not acquire
jurisdiction to entertain and decide the case. Petitioner alleges that she never received nor was served, any summons or copies of

the original and amended complaints, and therefore the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over her person under Article XIV of the
R.P. U.S. Military Bases Agreement.
We agree.
The "Agreement Between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America Concerning Military Bases," otherwise
known as the R.P. U.S. Military Bases Agreement, governed the rights, duties, authority, and the exercise thereof by Philippine
and American nationals inside the U.S. military bases in the country.
Article XIV thereof, governing the procedure for service of summons on persons inside U.S. military bases, provides that:
. . . [N]o process, civil or criminal, shall be served within any base except with the permission of the commanding
officer of such base; but should the commanding officer refuse to grant such permission he shall forthwith take the
necessary steps . . . . to serve such process, as the case may be, and to provide the attendance of the server of
such process before the appropriate court in the Philippines or procure such server to make the necessary
affidavit or declaration to prove such service as the case may require.
Summonses and other processes issued by Philippine courts and administrative agencies for United States Armed Forces personnel
within any U.S. base in the Philippines could be served therein only with the permission of the Base Commander. If he withholds
giving his permission, he should instead designate another person to serve the process, and obtain the server's affidavit for filing
with the appropriate court.
Respondent Labor Arbiter did not follow said procedure. He instead, addressed the summons to Lt. Col. Frankhauser and not the
Base Commander (Rollo, p. 11).
Respondents do not dispute petitioner's claim that no summons was ever issued and served on her. They contend, however, that
they sent notices of the hearings to her (Rollo, pp. 12-13).
Notices of hearing are not summonses. The provisions and prevailing jurisprudence in Civil Procedure may be applied by analogy to
NLRC proceedings (Revised Rules of the NLRC, Rule I, Sec. 3). It is basic that the Labor Arbiter cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent without the latter being served with summons (cf. Vda. de Macoy v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 244
[1992]; Filmerco Commercial Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 149 SCRA 193 [1987]). In the absence of service of
summons or a valid waiver thereof, the hearings and judgment rendered by the Labor Arbiter are null and void (cf. Vda. de Macoy v.
Court of Appeals,supra.)
Petitioner, in the case at bench, appealed to the NLRC and participated in the oral argument before the said body. This, however,
does not constitute a waiver of the lack of summons and a voluntary submission of her person to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
She may have raised in her pleadings grounds other than lack of jurisdiction, but these grounds were discussed in relation to and as
a result of the issue of the lack of jurisdiction. In effect, petitioner set forth only one issue and that is the absence of jurisdiction over
her person. If an appearance before the NLRC is precisely to question the jurisdiction of the said agency over the person of the
defendant, then this appearance is not equivalent to service of summons (De los Santos v. Montera, 221 SCRA 15 [1993]).
Be that as it may, on the assumption that petitioner validly waived service of summons on her, still the case could not prosper. There
is no allegation from the pleadings filed that Lt. Col. Frankhauser and petitioner were being sued in their personal capacities for
tortious acts (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). However, private respondents named 3 AGS as one of the
respondents in their complaint (Rollo, p. 10).
It is worth noting that NLRC admitted that:
At the outset, let it be made clear that We are aware as to who is the real party respondent in this case; it is the
Government of the United States of America which is maintaining military facilities in the Philippines, one of which
is located inside Clark Air Base. The 3 AGS where the appellees previously worked as dormitory attendants is just
one of the various units of the United States Armed Forces (USAF) inside the said military base. While individual
respondents, particularly Lt. Col. William Frankhauser and T/Sgt. Aldora Larkins, are mere elements of the USAF
assigned to the 3 AGS. Thus, whatever awards, monetary or otherwise, the appellees are entitled to by virtue of
this case are the primary liabilities of their real employer, the United States Government (Rollo, pp. 91-92).
Private respondents were dismissed from their employment by Lt. Col. Frankhauser acting for and in behalf of the U.S. Government.
The employer of private respondents was not Lt. Col. Frankhauser nor petitioner. The employer of private respondents, as found by
NLRC, was the U.S. Government which, by right of sovereign power, operated and maintained the dormitories at Clark Air Base for
members of the USAF (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]; United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487
[1985]).
Indeed, assuming that jurisdiction was acquired over the United States Government and the monetary claims of private respondents
proved, such awards will have to be satisfied not by Lt. Col. Frankhauser and petitioner in their personal capacities, but by the
United States government (Sanders v. Veridiano II, 162 SCRA 88 [1988]).
Under the "Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of
America Relating to the Employment of Philippine Nationals in the United States Military Bases in the Philippines" otherwise known
as the Base Labor Agreement of May 27, 1968, any dispute or disagreement between the United States Armed Forces and Filipino
employees should be settled under grievance or labor relations procedures established therein (Art. II) or by the arbitration process
provided in the Romualdez-Bosworth Memorandum of Agreement dated September 5, 1985. If no agreement was reached or if the
grievance procedure failed, the dispute was appealable by either party to a Joint Labor Committee established in Article III of the
Base Labor Agreement.

Unquestionably therefore, no jurisdiction was ever acquired by the Labor Arbiter over the case and the person of petitioner and the
judgment rendered is null and void (Filmerco Commercial Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,supra.; Sy v. Navarro, 81 SCRA 458
[1978]).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.

Shauf v. CA
Loida Q. Shauf & Jacob Shauf, petitioners v. Hon. CA, Don E. Detwiler & Anthony Persi,
respondents
Second Division
Doctrine: official v. personal capacity
Keywords: void for overbreadth
Date: November 27, 1990
Ponente: Justice Regalado
Facts:
Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the US Air
Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark
Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified.
By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal employment
opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer)
and Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by reason of her nationality
and sex. Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser
for a 180-day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically
selected to fill the vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released but
will be selected to fill a future vacancy if shes available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that
time, Mrs. Mary Abalateos was about to vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateos appointment
was extended thus, Shauf was never appointed to said position. She claims that the Abalateos
stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint
that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of the
management & it was in accordance of with the applicable regulation. Shauf filed for damages
and other relief in different venues such as the Civil Service Commission, Appeals Review
Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court, etc. RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to
pay $39,662.49 as actual damages + 20% of such amount as attorneys fees + P100k as moral
& exemplary damages. Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the
damages to be collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the
defense that they are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in
performance of their official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases
Agreement of 1947. They claim that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case
because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim that
petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA
reversed RTC decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit. Shauf claims
that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is not a suit against the
US government which would require consent. Respondents still maintain their immunity from
suit. They further claim that the rule allowing suits against public officers & employees for
criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines & is not part of international
law. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces
Held:
No they are not immune.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 17932 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents are hereby
ORDERED, jointly and severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages,
P20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.
Ratio:
They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked
where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary
citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed
the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the
public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him.

It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad
faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction Director of the Bureau of
Telecommunications vs. Aligaen Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its
officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an
action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by
such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of
immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or
suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that,
while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of
the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does
not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may
not be sued without its consent."The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state
immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. In the case at bar,
there is nothing in the record which suggests any arbitrary, irregular or abusive conduct or
motive on the part of the trial judge in ruling that private respondents committed acts of
discrimination for which they should be held personally liable. There is ample evidence to
sustain plaintiffs' complaint that plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf was refused appointment as Guidance
Counselor by the defendants on account of her sex, color and origin. She received a Master of
Arts Degree from the University of Santo Tomas, Manila, in 1971 and has completed 34
semester hours in psychology? guidance and 25 quarter hours in human behavioral science.
She has also completed all course work in human behavior and counselling psychology for a
doctoral degree. She is a civil service eligible. More important, she had functioned as a
Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS-1710-9 level for approximately four years
at the time she applied for the same position in 1976. In filling the vacant position of Guidance
Counselor, defendant Persi did not even consider the application of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, but
referred the vacancy to CORRO which appointed Edward B. Isakson who was not eligible to the
position. Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State shall afford full
protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. This is a carry-over from Article
II, Section 9, of the 1973 Constitution ensuring equal work opportunities regardless of sex,
race, or creed. There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler, in committing
the acts complained of have, in effect, violated the basic constitutional right of petitioner Loida
Q. Shauf to earn a living which is very much an integral aspect of the right to life. For this,
they should be held accountable Respondents alleged that petitioner Loida Q. Shauf failed to
avail herself of her remedy under the United States federal legislation on equality of
opportunity for civilian employees, which is allegedly exclusive of any other remedy under
American law, let alone remedies before a foreign court and under a foreign law such as the
Civil Code of the Philippines. SC: Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf is not limited to these remedies, but
is entitled as a matter of plain and simple justice to choose that remedy, not otherwise
proscribed, which will best advance and protect her interests. There is, thus, nothing to enjoin
her from seeking redress in Philippine courts which should not be ousted of jurisdiction on the
dubious and inconclusive representations of private respondents on that score.
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Edilberto G. Sandoval, RTC of Manila, Branch 9,
Caylao et.alG. R. No. 84607, March 19, 2003
FACTS:
The doctrines of immunity of the government from suit is expressly provided in the
Constitution underArticle XVI, Section 3. It is provided that the State may not be sued without
its consent. Some instances whena suit against the State is proper are: (1) When the Republic
is sued by name; (2) When the suit is against anunincorporated government agency; (3) When
the suit is, on its face, against a government officer but thecase is such that ultimate liablity
will belong not to the officer but to the government.With respect to the incident that happened
in Mendiola on January 22, 1987 that befell twelverallyists, the the case filed against the
military officers was dismissed by the lower court. The defendantswere held liable but it would
not result in financial responsibility to the government. The petitioner (CaylaoGroup) filed a
suit against the State that for them the State has waived its immunity when the
MendiolaCommission recommended the government to indemnify the victims of the Mendiola
incident and the acts andutterances of President Aquino which is sympathetic to the cause is
indicative of State's waiver of immunityand therefore, the government should also be liable
and should be compensated by the government . Thecase has been dismissed that State has
not waived its immunity. On the other hand, the Military Officer filed apetition for certiorari
to review the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit and therefore should the State be
liablefor the incident?
HELD:

No. The recommendation made by the Mendiola Commission regarding the indemnification of
theheirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident does not in any way mean liability
authomaticallyattaches to the State. The purpose of which is to investigate of the disorders
that took place and therecommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State. The acts
and utterances of President Aquino doesnot mean admission of the State of its liability.
Moreover, the case does not qualify as suit against the State.While the Republic in this case is
sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government.The military officials
are held liable for the damages for their official functions ceased the moment they
haveexceeded to their authority. They were deployed to ensure that the rally would be
peaceful and orderly andshould guarantee the safety of the people. The court has made it
quite clear that even a high position in thegovernment does not confer a license to persecute
or recklessly injure another. The court rules that there isno reversible error
and no grave abuse of dicretion commited by the respondent Judge in issuing thequestioned
orders.
CONSENT TO BE SUED
ACT NO. 3083 - AN ACT DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY BE SUED

Section 1. Complaint against Government. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Government of
the Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving
liability arising from contract, expressed or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action
between private parties.
Sec. 2. A person desiring to avail himself of the privilege herein conferred must show that he has
presented his claim to the Insular Auditor 1 and that the latter did not decide the same within two
months from the date of its presentation.
Sec. 3. Venue. Original actions brought pursuant to the authority conferred in this Act shall be
instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the province were the claimant
resides, at the option of the latter, upon which court exclusive original jurisdiction is hereby conferred
to hear and determine such actions.
Sec. 4. Actions instituted as aforesaid shall be governed by the same rules of procedure, both original
and appellate, as if the litigants were private parties.
Sec. 5. When the Government of the Philippine Island is plaintiff in an action instituted in any court of
original jurisdiction, the defendant shall have the right to assert therein, by way of set-off or
counterclaim in a similar action between private parties.
Sec. 6. Process in actions brought against the Government of the Philippine Islands pursuant to the
authority granted in this Act shall be served upon the Attorney-General 2 whose duty it shall be to
appear and make defense, either himself or through delegates.
Sec. 7. Execution. No execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any court against the
Government of the Philippine Islands under the provisions of this Act; but a copy thereof duly certified
by the clerk of the Court in which judgment is rendered shall be transmitted by such clerk to the
Governor-General, 3 within five days after the same becomes final.
Sec. 8. Transmittal of Decision. The Governor-General, 4 at the commencement of each regular
session of the Legislature, 5 shall transmit to that body for appropriate action all decisions so received
by him, and if said body determine that payment should be made, it shall appropriate the sum which
the Government has been sentenced to pay, including the same in the appropriations for the ensuing
year.
Sec. 9. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved: March 16, 1923.
Merit v govt.of the phil islands
The facts of the case took place in the 1910s. E. Merritt was a constructor who was excellent
at his work. One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he was
bumped by a government ambulance. The driver of the ambulance was proven to have been
negligent. Because of the incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he was severely injured

beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could never perform his job the way he used to and
that he cannot even earn at least half of what he used to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later
authorized Merritt to sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An
Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and
authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit). The lower court then
determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver of the
ambulance.
HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its
liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of
law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts
performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because
neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization
of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. The State can only be liable
if it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are
employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise
of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and
being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. In the case at
bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer acting as a
special agent hence, there can be no liability from the government. The Government does not
undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs,
since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and
losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.
Case of People of the R.P. vs. Purisima
GR Nos. L-42050-66 20November1978
FACTS OF THE CASE:
There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines
represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as
they involve one basic question of law. Before those courts, Informations were filed charging
the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential
Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above
issued in the respective cases filed before them the details of which will be recounted below
an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the
Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree
No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the
offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for
short) No. 9?
There are two elements to the the offense: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any
bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a
livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to
abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality,
chaos, or public disorder.
The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous weapon outside
of the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory construction.
HELD:
COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS
MADE BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGES.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:
The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute, it becomes
necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among
others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify
the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that

undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a

construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequence
IMPLIED CONSENT
US Vs. Ruiz 136 SCRA 487
Facts:
The usa had a naval base in subic, zambales. The base was one of those provided in the
military bases agreement between phils. and the US. Respondent alleges that it won in the
bidding conducted by the US for the constrcution of wharves in said base that was merely
awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for specific preformance was filed by him
against the US.
Issue: Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions
to be able to invoke state immunity.
Held:
The traditional role of the state immunity excempts a state from being sued in the courts of
another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle
of indepemndence and equality of states. Howecer, the rules of international law are not
petrified; they are continually and evolving and because the activities of states have
multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental
acts and private, commercial and proprietory acts. The result is that state immunity now
extends only to sovereign and governmental acts. The restrictive application of state immunity
is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. A state may be descended to the level
of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Only
when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the conracts relates the
exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the project are integral part of the naval base
which is devoted to the defense of both US and phils., indisputably, a function of the
government of highest order, they are not utilized for , nor dedicated to commercial or
business purposes.
AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA [43 SCRA 360; G.R. No. L-26400; 29 Feb. 1972]

Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of
her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of
any right or interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the
government used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
On 1958, Amigables counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the
portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement.
Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and
Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of
ownership and possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the action was premature
because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right
of action for the recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not
given its consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of actionagainst the defendants.
Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the
government.
Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the
government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may
properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in
favor of the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not
executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, then she
remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land
anytime, becausepossession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since such action
is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is
for the government to make due compensationprice or value of the lot at the time of the
taking.
G.R. No. 108813 December 15, 1994

JUSMAG PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division) and FLORENCIO SACRAMENTO, Union President,
JPFCEA, respondents.
Juan, Luces, Luna and Associates for petitioner.
Galutera & Aguilar Law Offices for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:
The immunity from suit of the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the Republic of the Philippines (JUSMAG-Philippines)
is the pivotal issue in the case at bench.
JUSMAG assails the January 29, 1993 Resolution of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (public respondent), in
NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-03-02092-92, reversing the July 30, 1991 Order of the Labor Arbiter, and ordering the latter to assume
jurisdiction over the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by FLORENCIO SACRAMENTO (private respondent) against petitioner.
First, the undisputed facts.
Private respondent was one of the seventy-four (74) security assistance support personnel (SASP) working at JUSMAGPhilippines. 1 He had been with JUSMAG from December 18, 1969, until his dismissal on April 27, 1992. When dismissed, he held
the position of Illustrator 2 and was the incumbent President of JUSMAG PHILIPPINES-FILIPINO CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (JPFCEA), a labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. His services were
terminated allegedly due to the abolition of his position. 2 He was also advised that he was under administrative leave until April 27,
1992, although the same was not charged against his leave.
On March 31, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and Employment on the ground that he was
illegally suspended and dismissed from service by JUSMAG. 3 He asked for his reinstatement.
JUSMAG then filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking its immunity from suit as an agency of the United States. It further alleged lack of
employer-employee relationship and that it has no juridical personality to sue and be sued. 4
In an Order dated July 30, 1991, Labor Arbiter Daniel C. Cueto dismissed the subject complaint " for want of jurisdiction." 5 Private
respondent appealed 6 to the National Labor Relations Commission (public respondent), assailing the ruling that petitioner is immune
from suit for alleged violation of our labor laws. JUSMAG filed its Opposition, 7 reiterating its immunity from suit for its noncontractual, governmental and/or public acts.
In a Resolution, dated January 29, 1993, the NLRC 8 reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter as it held that petitioner had lost its right
not to be sued. The resolution was predicated on two grounds: (1) the principle of estoppel that JUSMAG failed to refute the
existence of employer-employee relationship under the "control test"; and (2) JUSMAG has waived its right to immunity from suit
when it hired the services of private respondent on December 18, 1969.
The NLRC relied on the case of Harry Lyons vs. United States of America, 9 where the "United States Government (was considered
to have) waived its immunity from suit by entering into (a) contract of stevedoring services, and thus, it submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the local courts."
Accordingly, the case was remanded to the labor arbiter for reception of evidence as to the issue on illegal dismissal.
Hence, this petition, JUSMAG contends:
I
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
A. IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER AND IN NOT AFFIRMING THE
DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT IT BEING A SUIT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA WHICH HAD NOT GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED; AND
B. IN FINDING WAIVER BY JUSMAG OF IMMUNITY FROM SUIT;
II
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
A. WHEN IT FOUND AN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUSMAG AND
PRIVATE RESPONDENT; AND
B. WHEN IT CONSIDERED JUSMAG ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IS ITS EMPLOYEE FOR FAILURE TO PRESENT PROOF TO THE
CONTRARY.

We find the petition impressed with merit.

It is meet to discuss the historical background of the JUSMAG to determine its immunity from suit.
JUSMAG was created pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement 10 dated March 21, 1947, between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America. As agreed upon, JUSMAG shall consist of Air,
Naval and Army group, and its primary task was to advise and assist the Philippines, on air force, army and naval matters. 11
Article 14 of the 1947 Agreement provides, inter alia, that "the cost of all services required by the Group, including compensation
of locally employed interpreters, clerks, laborers, and other personnel, except personal servants, shall be borne by the Republic of
the Philippines."
This set-up was to change in 1991. In Note No 22, addressed to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) of the Philippines, dated
January 23, 1991, the United States Government, thru its Embassy, manifested its preparedness "to provide funds to cover the
salaries of security assistance support personnel" and security guards, the rent of JUSMAG occupied buildings and housing, and the
cost of utilities. 12 This offer was accepted by our Government, thru the DFA, in Note No. 911725, dated April 18, 1991. 13
Consequently, a Memorandum of Agreement 14 was forged between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and JUSMAG-Philippines,
thru General Lisandro C. Abadia and U.S. Brigadier General Robert G. Sausser. The Agreement delineated the terms of the
assistance-in-kind of JUSMAG for 1991, the relevant parts of which read:
a. The term salaries as used in this agreement include those for the security guards currently contracted between
JUSMAG and A' Prime Security Services Inc., and the Security Assistance Support Personnel (SASP). . . . .
b. The term Security Assistance Support Personnel (SASP) does not include active duty uniformed members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines performing duty at JUSMAG.
c. It is understood that SASP are employees of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Therefore,the AFP
agrees to appoint, for service with JUSMAG, no more than 74 personnel to designated positions with JUSMAG.
d. SASP are under the total operational control of the Chief, JUSMAG-Philippines. The term "Operational Control"
includes, but is not limited to, all personnel administrative actions, such as: hiring recommendations; firing
recommendations; position classification; discipline; nomination and approval of incentive awards; and payroll
computation. Personnel administration will be guided by Annex E of JUSMAG-Philippines Memo 10-2. For the
period of time that there is an exceptional funding agreement between the government of the Philippines and the
United States Government (USG), JUSMAG will pay the total payroll costs for the SASP employees. Payroll costs
include only regular salary; approved overtime, costs of living allowance; medical insurance; regular contributions
to the Philippine Social Security System, PAG-IBIG Fund and Personnel Economic Relief Allowance (PERA); and
the thirteenth-month bonus. Payroll costs do not include gifts or other bonus payments in addition to those
previously defined above. Entitlements not considered payroll costs under this agreement will be funded and paid
by the AFP.
e. All SASP employed as of July 1, 1990 will continue their service with JUSMAG at their current rate of pay and
benefits up to 30 June 1991, with an annual renewal of employment thereafter subject to renewal of their
appointment with the AFP (employees and rates of pay are indicated at Enclosure 3). No promotion or transfer
internal to JUSMAG of the listed personnel will result in the reduction of their pay and benefits.
f. All SASP will, after proper classification, be paid salaries and benefits at established AFP civilian rates. Rules for
computation of pay and allowances will be made available to the Comptroller, JUSMAG, by the Comptroller, GHQ,
AFP. Additionally, any legally mandated changes in salary levels or methods of computation shall be transmitted
within 48 hours of receipt by Comptroller, GHQ to Comptroller, JUSMAG.
g. The AFP agrees not to terminate SASP without 60 days prior written notice to Chief, JUSMAG-Philippines. Any
termination of these personnel thought to be necessary because of budgetary restrictions or manpower ceiling will
be subject to consultations between AFP and JUSMAG to ensure that JUSMAG's mission of dedicated support to
the AFP will not be degraded or harmed in any way.
h. The AFP agrees to assume the severance pay/retirement pay liability for all appointed SASP. (Enclosure 3 lists
the severance pay liability date for current SASP). Any termination of services, other than voluntary resignations or
termination for cause, will result in immediate payments of AFP of all termination pay to the entitled employee.
Vouchers for severance/retirement pay and accrued bonuses and annual leave will be presented to the
Comptroller, GHQ, AFP, not later than 14 calendar days prior to required date of payment.
i. All SASP listed in Enclosure 3 will continue to participate in the Philippine Social Security System.
A year later, or in 1992, the United States Embassy sent another note of similar import to the Department of Foreign Affairs (No. 227,
dated April 8, 1992), extending the funding agreement for the salaries of SASP and security guards until December 31, 1992.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was performing a governmental
function on behalf of the United States pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated March 21, 1947. Hence, we agree with
petitioner that the suit is, in effect, one against the United States Government, albeit it was not impleaded in the complaint.
Considering that the United States has not waived or consented to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot not prosper.
In this jurisdiction, we recognize and adopt the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land. 15 Immunity of State from suit is one of these universally recognized principles. In international law, "immunity" is commonly
understood as an exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state. 16 This is anchored on the

principle of the sovereign equality of states under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the
maxim par in parem non habet imperium (an equal has no power over an equal). 17
Under the traditional rule of State immunity, a state cannot be sued in the courts of another State, without its consent or waiver.
However, in Santos, et al., vs. Santos, et al., 18 we recognized an exception to the doctrine of immunity from suit by a state, thus:
. . . . Nevertheless, if, where and when the state or its government enters into a contract, through its officers or
agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby
mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, and if the law granting the
authority to enter into such contract does not provide for or name the officer against whom action may be brought
in the event of a breach thereof, the state itself may be sued, even without its consent, because by entering into a
contract, the sovereign state has descended to the level of the citizen and its consent to be sued is implied from
the very act of entering into such contract. . . . . (emphasis ours)
It was in this light that the state immunity issue in Harry Lyons, Inc., vs. United States of America 19 was decided.
In the case of Harry Lyons, Inc., the petitioner entered into a contract with the United States Government for stevedoring services at
the U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, Philippines. It then sought to collect from the US government sums of money arising from the
contract. One of the issues posed in the case was whether or not the defunct Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the
defendant United States, a sovereign state which cannot be sued without its consent. This Court upheld the contention of Harry
Lyons, Inc., that "when a sovereign state enters into a contract with a private person, the state can be sued upon the theory that it
has descended to the level of an individual from which it can be implied that it has given its consent to be sued under the contract."
The doctrine of state immunity from suit has undergone further metamorphosis. The view evolved that the existence of a contract
does not, per se, mean that sovereign states may, at all times, be sued in local courts. The complexity of relationships between
sovereign states, brought about by their increasing commercial activities, mothered a more restrictive application of the
doctrine. 20 Thus, in United States of America vs. Ruiz, 21 we clarified that our pronouncement in Harry Lyons, supra, with respect to
the waiver of State immunity, was obiter and "has no value as an imperative authority."
As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign orgovernmental
activities ( jure imperii). 22 The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts ( jure
gestionis). As aptly stated by this Court (En banc) in US vs. Ruiz, supra:
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions
of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to
have descended to the level of an individual and thus can be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be
used only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of
its sovereign functions. (emphasis ours)
We held further, that the application of the doctrine of state immunity depends on the legal nature of the act. Ergo, since
a governmental function was involved the transaction dealt with the improvement of the wharves in the naval installation at Subic
Bay it was held that the United States was not deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
Then came the case of United States vs. Hon. Rodrigo, et al. 23 In said case, Genove was employed as a cook in the Main Club
located at U.S. Air Force Recreation Center, John Hay Air Station. He was dismissed from service after he was found to have
polluted the stock of soup with urine. Genove countered with a complaint for damages. Apparently, the restaurant services offered at
the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the United States government in
its proprietary capacity. The Court then noted that the restaurant is well known and available to the general public, thus, the services
are operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity. Speaking through Associate Justice Isagani Cruz, the Court
(En Banc) said:
The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the
dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. Such defense will not prosper even if it be established that
they were acting as agents of the United States when they investigated and later dismissed Genove. For the
matter, not even the United States government itself can claim such immunity. The reason is that by entering into
the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its
sovereign immunity from suit. (emphasis ours)
Conversely, if the contract was entered into in the discharge of its governmental functions, the sovereign state cannot be deemed to
have waived its immunity from suit. 24 Such is the case at bench. Prescinding from this premise, we need not determine whether
JUSMAG controls the employment conditions of the private respondent.
We also hold that there appears to be no basis for public respondent to rule that JUSMAG is stopped from denying the existence of
employer-employee relationship with private respondent. On the contrary, in its Opposition before the public respondent, JUSMAG
consistently contended that the (74) SASP, including private respondent, working in JUSMAG, are employees of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines. This can be gleaned from: (1) the Military Assistance Agreement, supra, (2) the exchange of notes between our
Government, thru Department of Foreign Affairs, and the United States, thru the US Embassy to the Philippines, and (3) the
Agreement on May 21, 1991,supra between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and JUSMAG.
We symphatize with the plight of private respondent who had served JUSMAG for more than twenty (20) years. Considering his
length of service with JUSMAG, he deserves a more compassionate treatment. Unfortunately, JUSMAG is beyond the jurisdiction of
this Court. Nonetheless, the Executive branch, through the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
can take the cudgel for private respondent and the other SASP working for JUSMAG, pursuant to the aforestated Military Assistance
Agreement.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Accordingly, the impugned Resolution dated January 29,
1993 of the National Labor Relations Commission is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Santiago vs. Republic (Consti1)

Ildefonso Santiago, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Alfredo T. Santiago, petitioner, vs. The
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Director, Bureau of Plant
Industry, and the Regional Director, Region IX, Zamboanga City, repondent.
Facts:
Petitioner Ildefonso Santiago donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of Plant Industry on the
terms that the Bureau should construct a building and install lighting facilities on the said lot.
When time passed and there were still no improvements on the lot, Santiago filed a case
pleading for the revocation of such contract of donation but the trial court dismissed the
petition claiming that it is a suit against the government and should not prosper without the
consent of the government.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent government has waived its immunity from suit.
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:
The government's waiver of immunity was implied by virtue of the terms provided in the deed
of donation. The government is a beneficiary of the terms of the donation but it did not comply
with such terms. Thus, the donor Santiago has the right to be heard in the court. Also, to not
allow the donor to be heard would be unethical and contrary to equity which the government
so advances. The Court of First Instance is hereby directed to proceed with the case.
G.R. No. L-9791, Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., 103 Phil. 473
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
April 28, 1958
G.R. No. L-9791
FERNANDO A. FROILAN, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING Co., defendant and appellee;
COMPANIA MARITIMA, intervenor-appellee;
LOURDES REYES VDA. DE CAGUIAT, Commissioner-appellee.
Rafael Dinglasan, Enrique Caguiat and Quisumbing and Associates for appellant.
Luis A. Jose for appellee.
PARAS, C. J.:
On February 3, 1951, the plaintiff filed a complaint, in the Court of First Instance of Manila
against the defendant, Pan Oriental Shipping Co., for the delivery of a ship known as FS-197.
On August 6, 1952, the Compania Maritima filed a complaint in intervention, alleging that it is
in possession of and the one operating the ship, having purchased it from the plaintiff. On
September 4, 1952, the defendant filed an amended answer to the complaint and to the
complaint in intervention, setting up counterclaims against the plaintiff and the intervenor. On
April 7, 1954, the defendant filed a motion for reference to a commissioner of the issues of fact
involved in its counterclaims. After an opposition had been filed by the plaintiff and the
intervenor, the motion for reference was denied. However, upon ex-parte motion of the
defendant, the lower court in its order of September 3, 1954, Appointed Enrique Caguiat as
commissioner to examine the accounts involved in the counterclaims. The latter did not notify
the plaintiff and the intervenor or their attorneys about the meeting time and place of the
parties as regards the examinations of the accounts. On December 1, 1954, the commissioner
filed a motion for approval of his fees to which the plaintiff and the intervenor filed their
answer alleging that there was no showing whatsoever as to the time, nature and extent of the
commissioner's services; that the amount charged is excessive; and that as provided by rules
of Court No. 34, section 13, the compensation of the commissioner shall be taxed as costs
against the defeated party and the court not having as yet made any pronouncement on the
point, "the motion is premature". The motion was accordingly held in abeyance. On December
21, 1954, the commissioner filed a motion for reconsideration without notice of hearing to the
plaintiff and the intervenor. The court in its order of July 29, 1950, granted ex-parte the
aforesaid motion and ordered that the amount of P4,670 be paid by the plaintiff and the
intervenor in equal shares, as compensation for services rendered by the commissioner.
Plaintiff Froilan appeals from the said, order. The appellant assails the validity of the
commissioner's proceedings in the examination of the accounts in question, on the ground said
proceedings were held without notice to and in the absence of the appellant and the
intervenor. It is noteworthy, however, that the order of the lower court appointing the appellee

as commissioner solely directed the latter to "examine the long accounts involved in the
defendant's first, second and third counterclaims alleged in its answer to the complaint in
intervention of the Compania Maritima and the amended answer to the complaint of appellant
Fernando A. Froilan, dated September 4, 1954." For such purpose, and in the absence of a
judicial directive to hold hearings, the commissioner did, not need the presence of the parties.
Section 3, Rule 34, of the Rules of Court, speaking of the authority that may be granted to a
commissioner, provides that the recorder may specify or limit the powers of the commissioner,
and may direct him to report only upon particular issues, to do or perform particular acts, or to
receive and report evidence only and may fix the date for beginning and closing the hearings
and for the filing of his report." Under this reglementary provision, the commissioner may be
required to perform only a particular task, such as the examination of records of account
without hearings, specially when unnecessary. The next criticism made by the appellant is that
the appellee did not personally, make the examination of the accounts in question and prepare
the corresponding report, and that his service consisted merely of what the appellee termed
"reviewing Mr. Estanislao's work". While personal attention was perhaps preferable or even
desirable, the same is not essential or required. The paramount consideration is that the
commissioner assumes full responsibility for whatever is submitted to the court.
In granting, however, appellee's motion for reconsideration filed on December 21, 1954, and
ordering the appellant and the intervenor to pay P4,670 in shares, without notice and hearing,
the lower court irregularly. In view of the fact that the appellant and the intervenor had
previously registered their stand that there was no showing as to the alleged service rendered
by the appellee, that the compensation sought was excessive, and that the approval and
payment of the commisioner's fees were premature, a hearing became indispensable.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and the lower court is ordered to set
the incident in question for hearing. So ordered without pronouncement as to costs.
SCOPE OF CONSENT
G.R. No. L-34548 November 29, 1988
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PACIFICO P. DE CASTRO and PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION,respondents
Meer, Meer & Meer for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

CORTES, J.:
The crux of the instant controversy dwells on the liability of a bank for releasing its depositor's funds upon orders of the court,
pursuant to a writ of garnishment. If in compliance with the court order, the bank delivered the garnished amount to the sheriff, who
in turn delivered it to the judgment creditor, but subsequently, the order of the court directing payment was set aside by the same
judge, should the bank be held solidarily liable with the judgment creditor to its depositor for reimbursement of the garnished funds?
The Court does not think so.
In Civil Case No. Q-12785 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch IX entitled "Badoc Planters, Inc. versus
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, et al.," which was an action for recovery of unpaid tobacco deliveries, an Order (Partial
Judgment) was issued on January 15, 1970 by the Hon. Lourdes P. San Diego, then Presiding Judge, ordering the defendants
therein to pay jointly and severally, the plaintiff Badoc Planters, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "BADOC") within 48 hours the
aggregate amount of P206,916.76, with legal interests thereon.
On January 26,1970, BADOC filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for a Writ of Execution of the said Partial Judgment which was
granted on the same day by the herein respondent judge who acted in place of the Hon. Judge San Diego who had just been
elevated as a Justice of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the Branch Clerk of Court on the very same day, issued a Writ of
Execution addressed to Special Sheriff Faustino Rigor, who then issued a Notice of Garnishment addressed to the General Manager
and/or Cashier of Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as RCBC), the petitioner in this case, requesting a
reply within five (5) days to said garnishment as to any property which the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (hereinafter
referred to as "PVTA") might have in the possession or control of petitioner or of any debts owing by the petitioner to said defendant.
Upon receipt of such Notice, RCBC notified PVTA thereof to enable the PVTA to take the necessary steps for the protection of its
own interest [Record on Appeal, p. 36]
Upon an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion dated January 27, 1970 filed by BADOC, the respondent Judge issued an Order granting the ExParte Motion and directing the herein petitioner "to deliver in check the amount garnished to Sheriff Faustino Rigor and Sheriff Rigor
in turn is ordered to cash the check and deliver the amount to the plaintiff's representative and/or counsel on record." [Record on
Appeal, p. 20; Rollo, p. 5.] In compliance with said Order, petitioner delivered to Sheriff Rigor a certified check in the sum of P
206,916.76.
Respondent PVTA filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated February 26,1970 which was granted in an Order dated April 6,1970,
setting aside the Orders of Execution and of Payment and the Writ of Execution and ordering petitioner and BADOC "to restore,
jointly and severally, the account of PVTA with the said bank in the same condition and state it was before the issuance of the

aforesaid Orders by reimbursing the PVTA of the amount of P 206, 916.76 with interests at the legal rate from January 27, 1970 until
fully paid to the account of the PVTA This is without prejudice to the right of plaintiff to move for the execution of the partial judgment
pending appeal in case the motion for reconsideration is denied and appeal is taken from the said partial judgment." [Record on
Appeal, p. 58]
The Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order of April 6, 1970 filed by herein petitioner was denied in the Order of respondent
judge dated June 10, 1970 and on June 19, 1970, which was within the period for perfecting an appeal, the herein petitioner filed a
Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals from the said Orders.
This case was then certified by the Court of Appeals to this Honorable Court, involving as it does purely questions of law.
The petitioner raises two principal queries in the instant case: 1) Whether or not PVTA funds are public funds not subject to
garnishment; and 2) Whether or not the respondent Judge correctly ordered the herein petitioner to reimburse the amount paid to
the Special Sheriff by virtue of the execution issued pursuant to the Order/Partial Judgment dated January 15, 1970.
The record reveals that on February 2, 1970, private respondent PVTA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order/ Partial
Judgment of January 15, 1970. This was granted and the aforementioned Partial Judgment was set aside. The case was set for
hearings on November 4, 9 and 11, 1970 [Rollo, pp. 205-207.] However, in view of the failure of plaintiff BADOC to appear on the
said dates, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the case against PVTA for failure to prosecute [Rollo, p. 208.]
It must be noted that the Order of respondent Judge dated April 6, 1970 directing the plaintiff to reimburse PVTA t e amount of
P206,916.76 with interests became final as to said plaintiff who failed to even file a motion for reconsideration, much less to appeal
from the said Order. Consequently, the order to restore the account of PVTA with RCBC in the same condition and state it was
before the issuance of the questioned orders must be upheld as to the plaintiff, BADOC.
However, the questioned Order of April 6, 1970 must be set aside insofar as it ordered the petitioner RCBC, jointly and severally with
BADOC, to reimburse PVTA.
The petitioner merely obeyed a mandatory directive from the respondent Judge dated January 27, 1970, ordering petitioner 94 "to
deliver in check the amount garnished to Sheriff Faustino Rigor and Sheriff Rigor is in turn ordered to cash the check and deliver the
amount to the plaintiffs representative and/or counsel on record." [Record on Appeal, p. 20.]
PVTA however claims that the manner in which the bank complied with the Sheriffs Notice of Garnishment indicated breach of trust
and dereliction of duty on the part of the bank as custodian of government funds. It insistently urges that the premature delivery of
the garnished amount by RCBC to the special sheriff even in the absence of a demand to deliver made by the latter, before the
expiration of the five-day period given to reply to the Notice of Garnishment, without any reply having been given thereto nor any
prior authorization from its depositor, PVTA and even if the court's order of January 27, 1970 did not require the bank to immediately
deliver the garnished amount constitutes such lack of prudence as to make it answerable jointly and severally with the plaintiff for the
wrongful release of the money from the deposit of the PVTA. The respondent Judge in his controverted Order sustained such
contention and blamed RCBC for the supposed "hasty release of the amount from the deposit of the PVTA without giving PVTA a
chance to take proper steps by informing it of the action being taken against its deposit, thereby observing with prudence the fiveday period given to it by the sheriff." [Rollo, p. 81.]
Such allegations must be rejected for lack of merit. In the first place, it should be pointed out that RCBC did not deliver the amount
on the strength solely of a Notice of Garnishment; rather, the release of the funds was made pursuant to the aforesaid Order of
January 27, 1970. While the Notice of Garnishment dated January 26, 1970 contained no demand of payment as it was a mere
request for petitioner to withold any funds of the PVTA then in its possession, the Order of January 27, 1970 categorically required
the delivery in check of the amount garnished to the special sheriff, Faustino Rigor.
In the second place, the bank had already filed a reply to the Notice of Garnishment stating that it had in its custody funds belonging
to the PVTA, which, in fact was the basis of the plaintiff in filing a motion to secure delivery of the garnished amount to the sheriff.
[See Rollo, p. 93.]
Lastly, the bank, upon the receipt of the Notice of Garnishment, duly informed PVTA thereof to enable the latter to take the
necessary steps for the protection of its own interest [Record on Appeal, p. 36]
It is important to stress, at this juncture, that there was nothing irregular in the delivery of the funds of PVTA by check to the sheriff,
whose custody is equivalent to the custody of the court, he being a court officer. The order of the court dated January 27, 1970 was
composed of two parts, requiring: 1) RCBC to deliver in check the amount garnished to the designated sheriff and 2) the sheriff in
turn to cash the check and deliver the amount to the plaintiffs representative and/or counsel on record. It must be noted that in
delivering the garnished amount in check to the sheriff, the RCBC did not thereby make any payment, for the law mandates that
delivery of a check does not produce the effect of payment until it has been cashed. [Article 1249, Civil Code.]
Moreover, by virtue of the order of garnishment, the same was placed in custodia legis and therefore, from that time on, RCBC was
holding the funds subject to the orders of the court a quo. That the sheriff, upon delivery of the check to him by RCBC encashed it
and turned over the proceeds thereof to the plaintiff was no longer the concern of RCBC as the responsibility over the garnished
funds passed to the court. Thus, no breach of trust or dereliction of duty can be attributed to RCBC in delivering its depositor's funds
pursuant to a court order which was merely in the exercise of its power of control over such funds.
... The garnishment of property to satisfy a writ of execution operates as an attachment and fastens upon the
property a lien by which the property is brought under the jurisdiction of the court issuing the writ. It is brought
into custodia legis, under the sole control of such court [De Leon v. Salvador, G.R. Nos. L-30871 and L-31603,
December 28,1970, 36 SCRA 567, 574.]
The respondent judge however, censured the petitioner for having released the funds "simply on the strength of the Order of the
court which. far from ordering an immediate release of the amount involved, merely serves as a standing authority to make the
release at the proper time as prescribed by the rules." [Rollo, p. 81.]

This argument deserves no serious consideration. As stated earlier, the order directing the bank to deliver the amount to the sheriff
was distinct and separate from the order directing the sheriff to encash the said check. The bank had no choice but to comply with
the order demanding delivery of the garnished amount in check. The very tenor of the order called for immediate compliance
therewith. On the other hand, the bank cannot be held liable for the subsequent encashment of the check as this was upon order of
the court in the exercise of its power of control over the funds placed in custodia legis by virtue of the garnishment.
In a recent decision [Engineering Construction Inc., v. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. L-34589, June 29, 1988] penned by the
now Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan, this Court absolved a garnishee from any liability for prompt compliance with its order for the
delivery of the garnished funds. The rationale behind such ruling deserves emphasis in the present case:
But while partial restitution is warranted in favor of NPC, we find that the Appellate Court erred in not absolving
MERALCO, the garnishee, from its obligations to NPC with respect to the payment of ECI of P 1,114,543.23, thus
in effect subjecting MERALCO to double liability. MERALCO should not have been faulted for its prompt
obedience to a writ of garnishment. Unless there are compelling reasons such as: a defect on the face of the writ
or actual knowledge on the part of the garnishee of lack of entitlement on the part of the garnisher, it is not
incumbent upon the garnishee to inquire or to judge for itself whether or not the order for the advance execution of
a judgment is valid.
Section 8, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provides:
Effect of attachment of debts and credits.All persons having in their possession or under their
control any credits or other similar personal property belonging to the party against whom
attachment is issued, or owing any debts to the same, all the time of service upon them of a
copy of the order of attachment and notice as provided in the last preceding section, shall be
liable to the applicant for the amount of such credits, debts or other property, until the
attachment be discharged, or any judgment recovered by him be satisfied, unless such property
be delivered or transferred, or such debts be paid, to the clerk, sheriff or other proper officer of
the court issuing the attachment.
Garnishment is considered as a specie of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor and
owing to him from a stranger to the litigation. Under the above-cited rule, the garnishee [the third person] is
obliged to deliver the credits, etc. to the proper officer issuing the writ and "the law exempts from liability the
person having in his possession or under his control any credits or other personal property belonging to the
defendant, ..., if such property be delivered or transferred, ..., to the clerk, sheriff, or other officer of the court in
which the action is pending. [3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court 34 (1970 ed.)]
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, MERALCO, as garnishee, after having been judicially compelled to pay the amount of the
judgment represented by funds in its possession belonging to the judgment debtor or NPC, should be released from all
responsibilities over such amount after delivery thereof to the sheriff. The reason for the rule is self-evident. To expose garnishees to
risks for obeying court orders and processes would only undermine the administration of justice. [Emphasis supplied.]
The aforequoted ruling thus bolsters RCBC's stand that its immediate compliance with the lower court's order should not have been
met with the harsh penalty of joint and several liability. Nor can its liability to reimburse PVTA of the amount delivered in check be
premised upon the subsequent declaration of nullity of the order of delivery. As correctly pointed out by the petitioner:
xxx xxx xxx
That the respondent Judge, after his Order was enforced, saw fit to recall said Order and decree its nullity, should
not prejudice one who dutifully abided by it, the presumption being that judicial orders are valid and issued in the
regular performance of the duties of the Court" [Section 5(m) Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court]. This should
operate with greater force in relation to the herein petitioner which, not being a party in the case, was just called
upon to perform an act in accordance with a judicial flat. A contrary view will invite disrespect for the majesty of the
law and induce reluctance in complying with judicial orders out of fear that said orders might be subsequently
invalidated and thereby expose one to suffer some penalty or prejudice for obeying the same. And this is what will
happen were the controversial orders to be sustained. We need not underscore the danger of this as a precedent.
xxx xxx xxx
[ Brief for the Petitioner, Rollo, p. 212; Emphasis supplied.]
From the foregoing, it may be concluded that the charge of breach of trust and/or dereliction of duty as well as lack of prudence in
effecting the immediate payment of the garnished amount is totally unfounded. Upon receipt of the Notice of Garnishment, RCBC
duly informed PVTA thereof to enable the latter to take the necessary steps for its protection. However, right on the very next day
after its receipt of such notice, RCBC was already served with the Order requiring delivery of the garnished amount. Confronted as it
was with a mandatory directive, disobedience to which exposed it to a contempt order, it had no choice but to comply.
The respondent Judge nevertheless held that the liability of RCBC for the reimbursement of the garnished amount is predicated on
the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Public Highways v. Hon. San Diego [G.R. No. L-30098, February 18,
1970, 31 SCRA 616] which he found practically on all fours with the case at bar.
The Court disagrees.
The said case which reiterated the rule in Republic v. Palacio [G.R. No. L-20322, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 899] that government
funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgment is definitely distinguishable
from the case at bar.

In the Commissioner of Public Highways case [supra], the bank which precipitately allowed the garnishment and delivery of the
funds failed to inform its depositor thereof, charged as it was with knowledge of the nullity of the writ of execution and notice of
garnishment against government funds. In the aforementioned case, the funds involved belonged to the Bureau of Public Highways,
which being an arm of the executive branch of the government, has no personality of its own separate from the National
Government. The funds involved were government fundscovered by the rule on exemption from execution.
This brings us to the first issue raised by the petitioner: Are the PVTA funds public funds exempt from garnishment? The Court holds
that they are not.
Republic Act No. 2265 created the PVTA as an ordinary corporation with all the attributes of a corporate entity subject to the
provisions of the Corporation Law. Hence, it possesses the power "to sue and be sued" and "to acquire and hold such assets and
incur such liabilities resulting directly from operations authorized by the provisions of this Act or as essential to the proper conduct of
such operations." [Section 3, Republic Act No. 2265.]
Among the specific powers vested in the PVTA are: 1) to buy Virginia tobacco grown in the Philippines for resale to local bona fide
tobacco manufacturers and leaf tobacco dealers [Section 4(b), R.A. No. 2265]; 2) to contracts of any kind as may be necessary or
incidental to the attainment of its purpose with any person, firm or corporation, with the Government of the Philippines or with any
foreign government, subject to existing laws [Section 4(h), R.A. No. 22651; and 3) generally, to exercise all the powers of a
corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act [Section 4(k), R.A. No.
2265.]
From the foregoing, it is clear that PVTA has been endowed with a personality distinct and separate from the government which
owns and controls it. Accordingly, this Court has heretofore declared that the funds of the PVTA can be garnished since "funds of
public corporation which can sue and be sued were not exempt from garnishment" [Philippine National Bank v. Pabalan, G.R. No. L33112, June 15, 1978, 83 SCRA 595, 598.]
In National Shipyards and Steel Corp. v. CIR [G.R. No. L-17874, August 31, 1964, 8 SCRA 781], this Court held that the allegation to
the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the government and that as such, the same may not be garnished,
attached or levied upon is untenable for, as a government-owned or controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct
and separate from that of the government. This court has likewise ruled that other govemment-owned and controlled corporations
like National Coal Company, the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), the National Coconut Corporation
(NACOCO) the National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) and the Price Stabilization Council (PRISCO) which possess attributes
similar to those of the PVTA are clothed with personalities of their own, separate and distinct from that of the government [National
Coal Company v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 46 Phil. 583 (1924); Bacani and Matoto v. National Coconut Corporation et al., 100
Phil. 471 (1956); Reotan v. National Rice & Corn Corporation, G.R. No. L-16223, February 27, 1962, 4 SCRA 418.] The rationale in
vesting it with a separate personality is not difficult to find. It is well-settled that when the government enters into commercial
business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation [Manila Hotel Employees' Association v.
Manila Hotel Co. and CIR, 73 Phil. 734 (1941).]
Accordingly, as emphatically expressed by this Court in a 1978 decision, "garnishment was the appropriate remedy for the prevailing
party which could proceed against the funds of a corporate entity even if owned or controlled by the government" inasmuch as "by
engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign
character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations" [Philippine National Bank v. CIR,
G.R No. L-32667, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 314, 319.]
Furthermore, in the case of PVTA, the law has expressly allowed it funds to answer for various obligations, including the one sought
to be enforced by plaintiff BADOC in this case (i.e. for unpaid deliveries of tobacco). Republic Act No. 4155, which discounted the
erstwhile support given by the Central Bank to PVTA, established in lieu thereof a "Tobacco Fund" to be collected from the proceeds
of fifty per centum of the tariff or taxes of imported leaf tobacco and also fifty per centum of the specific taxes on locally
manufactured Virginia type cigarettes.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 4155 provides that this fund shall be expended for the support or payment of:
1. Indebtedness of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration and the former Agricultural Credit and
Cooperative Financing Administration to FACOMAS and farmers and planters regarding Virginia tobacco
transactions in previous years;
2. Indebtedness of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration and the former Agricultural Credit and
Cooperative Financing Administration to the Central Bank in gradual amounts regarding Virginia tobacco
transactions in previous years;
3. Continuation of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration support and subsidy operationsincluding the
purchase of locally grown and produced Virginia leaf tobacco, at the present support and subsidy prices, its
procurement, redrying, handling, warehousing and disposal thereof, and the redrying plants trading within the
purview of their contracts;
4. Operational, office and field expenses, and the establishment of the Tobacco Research and Grading Institute.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Inasmuch as the Tobacco Fund, a special fund, was by law, earmarked specifically to answer obligations incurred by PVTA in
connection with its proprietary and commercial operations authorized under the law, it follows that said funds may be proceeded
against by ordinary judicial processes such as execution and garnishment. If such funds cannot be executed upon or garnished
pursuant to a judgment sustaining the liability of the PVTA to answer for its obligations, then the purpose of the law in creating the
PVTA would be defeated. For it was declared to be a national policy, with respect to the local Virginia tobacco industry, to encourage
the production of local Virginia tobacco of the qualities needed and in quantities marketable in both domestic and foreign markets, to
establish this industry on an efficient and economic basis, and to create a climate conducive to local cigarette manufacture of the
qualities desired by the consuming public, blending imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco to improve the quality of locally
manufactured cigarettes [Section 1, Republic Act No. 4155.]

The Commissioner of Public Highways case is thus distinguishable from the case at bar. In said case, the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) as custodian of funds belonging to the Bureau of Public Highways, an agency of the government, was chargeable with
knowledge of the exemption of such government funds from execution and garnishment pursuant to the elementary precept that
public funds cannot be disbursed without the appropriation required by law. On the other hand, the same cannot hold true for RCBC
as the funds entrusted to its custody, which belong to a public corporation, are in the nature of private funds insofar as their
susceptibility to garnishment is concerned. Hence, RCBC cannot be charged with lack of prudence for immediately complying with
the order to deliver the garnished amount. Since the funds in its custody are precisely meant for the payment of lawfully-incurred
obligations, RCBC cannot rightfully resist a court order to enforce payment of such obligations. That such court order subsequently
turned out to have been erroneously issued should not operate to the detriment of one who complied with its clear order.
Finally, it is contended that RCBC was bound to inquire into the legality and propriety of the Writ of Execution and Notice of
Garnishment issued against the funds of the PVTA deposited with said bank. But the bank was in no position to question the legality
of the garnishment since it was not even a party to the case. As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, it had neither the personality
nor the interest to assail or controvert the orders of respondent Judge. It had no choice but to obey the same inasmuch as it had no
standing at all to impugn the validity of the partial judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff or of the processes issued in execution
of such judgment.
RCBC cannot therefore be compelled to make restitution solidarily with the plaintiff BADOC. Plaintiff BADOC alone was responsible
for the issuance of the Writ of Execution and Order of Payment and so, the plaintiff alone should bear the consequences of a
subsequent annulment of such court orders; hence, only the plaintiff can be ordered to restore the account of the PVTA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the petitioner is ABSOLVED from any liability to respondent PVTA for
reimbursement of the funds garnished. The questioned Order of the respondent Judge ordering the petitioner, jointly and severally
with BADOC, to restore the account of PVTA are modified accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-61744 June 25, 1984
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL, BULACAN, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan, The
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Bulacan, MARGARITA D. VDA. DE IMPERIO, ADORACION IMPERIO, RODOLFO IMPERIO,
CONRADO IMPERIO, ERNESTO IMPERIO, ALFREDO IMPERIO, CARLOS IMPERIO, JR., JUAN IMPERIO and SPOUSES
MARCELO PINEDA and LUCILA PONGCO, respondents.
Pascual C. Liatchko for petitioner.
The Solicitor General and Marcelo Pineda for respondents.

RELOVA, J.:
In Civil Case No. 604-B, entitled "Margarita D. Vda. de Imperio, et al. vs. Municipal Government of San Miguel, Bulacan, et al.", the
then Court of First Instance of Bulacan, on April 28, 1978, rendered judgment holding herein petitioner municipality liable to private
respondents, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant Municipal Government of San Miguel Bulacan, represented by Mayor Mar Marcelo G. Aure and its
Municipal Treasurer:
1. ordering the partial revocation of the Deed of Donation signed by the deceased Carlos Imperio in favor of the
Municipality of San Miguel Bulacan, dated October 27, 1947 insofar as Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, Block 11 of
Subdivision Plan Psd-20831 are concerned, with an aggregate total area of 4,646 square meters, which lots are
among those covered and described under TCT No. T-1831 of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan in the name of
the Municipal Government of San Miguel Bulacan,
2. ordering the defendant to execute the corresponding Deed of Reconveyance over the aforementioned five lots
in favor of the plaintiffs in the proportion of the undivided one-half () share in the name of plaintiffs Margarita D.
Vda. de Imperio, Adoracion, Rodolfo, Conrado, Ernesto, Alfredo, Carlos, Jr. and Juan, all surnamed Imperio, and
the remaining undivided one-half () share in favor of plaintiffs uses Marcelo E. Pineda and Lucila Pongco;
3. ordering the defendant municipality to pay to the plaintiffs in the proportion mentioned in the immediately
preceding paragraph the sum of P64,440.00 corresponding to the rentals it has collected from the occupants for
their use and occupation of the premises from 1970 up to and including 1975, plus interest thereon at the legal
rate from January 1970 until fully paid;
4. ordering the restoration of ownership and possession over the five lots in question in favor of the plaintiffs in the
same proportion aforementioned;
5. ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P3,000.00 for attomey's fees; and to pay the cost of suit.
The counterclaim of the defendant is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of evidence presented to substantiate the
same.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 11-12, Rollo)

The foregoing judgment became final when herein petitioner's appeal was dismissed due to its failure to file the record on appeal on
time. The dismissal was affirmed by the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-12118 and by this Court in G.R. No. 59938.
Thereafter, herein private respondents moved for issuance of a writ of execution for the satisfaction of the judgment. Respondent
judge, on July 27, 1982, issued an order, to wit:
Considering that an entry of judgment had already been made on June 14, 1982 in G. R. No. L-59938 and;
Considering further that there is no opposition to plaintiffs' motion for execution dated July 23, 1983;
Let a writ of execution be so issued, as prayed for in the aforestated motion. (p. 10, Rollo)
Petitioner, on July 30, 1982, filed a Motion to Quash the writ of execution on the ground that the municipality's property or funds are
all public funds exempt from execution. The said motion to quash was, however, denied by the respondent judge in an order dated
August 23, 1982 and the alias writ of execution stands in full force and effect.
On September 13, 1982, respondent judge issued an order which in part, states:
It is clear and evident from the foregoing that defendant has more than enough funds to meet its judgment
obligation. Municipal Treasurer Miguel C, Roura of San Miguel, Bulacan and Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan
Agustin O. Talavera are therefor hereby ordered to comply with the money judgment rendered by Judge Agustin
C. Bagasao against said municipality. In like manner, the municipal authorities of San Miguel, Bulacan are likewise
ordered to desist from plaintiffs' legal possession of the property already returned to plaintiffs by virtue of the alias
writ of execution.
Finally, defendants are hereby given an inextendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this order by
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan within which to submit their written compliance, (p. 24, Rollo)
When the treasurers (provincial and municipal) failed to comply with the order of September 13, 1982, respondent judge issued an
order for their arrest and that they will be release only upon compliance thereof.
Hence, the present petition on the issue whether the funds of the Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan, in the hands of the provincial
and municipal treasurers of Bulacan and San Miguel, respectively, are public funds which are exempt from execution for the
satisfaction of the money judgment in Civil Case No. 604-B.
Well settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution. The reason for this was explained in the case of
Municipality of Paoay vs. Manaois, 86 Phil. 629 "that they are held in trust for the people, intended and used for the accomplishment
of the purposes for which municipal corporations are created, and that to subject said properties and public funds to execution would
materially impede, even defeat and in some instances destroy said purpose." And, in Tantoco vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil.
52, it was held that "it is the settled doctrine of the law that not only the public property but also the taxes and public revenues of
such corporations Cannot be seized under execution against them, either in the treasury or when in transit to it. Judgments rendered
for taxes, and the proceeds of such judgments in the hands of officers of the law, are not subject to execution unless so declared by
statute." Thus, it is clear that all the funds of petitioner municipality in the possession of the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, as
well as those in the possession of the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan, are also public funds and as such they are exempt from
execution.
Besides, Presidential Decree No. 477, known as "The Decree on Local Fiscal Administration", Section 2 (a), provides:
SEC. 2. Fundamental Principles. Local government financial affairs, transactions, and operations shall be
governed by the fundamental principles set forth hereunder:
(a) No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of a lawful appropriation or other specific
statutory authority.
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise stated, there must be a corresponding appropriation in the form of an ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang Bayan
before any money of the municipality may be paid out. In the case at bar, it has not been shown that the Sangguniang Bayan has
passed an ordinance to this effect.
Furthermore, Section 15, Rule 39 of the New Rules of Court, outlines the procedure for the enforcement of money judgment:
(a) By levying on all the property of the debtor, whether real or personal, not otherwise exempt from execution, or
only on such part of the property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing cost, if he has more than
sufficient property for the purpose;
(b) By selling the property levied upon;
(c) By paying the judgment-creditor so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the judgment and accruing costs; and
(d) By delivering to the judgment-debtor the excess, if any, unless otherwise, directed by judgment or order of the
court.
The foregoing has not been followed in the case at bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted and the order of respondent judge, dated July 27, 1982, granting issuance of a writ of
execution; the alias writ of execution, dated July 27, 1982; and the order of respondent judge, dated September 13, 1982, directing
the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan and the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, Bulacan to comply with the money judgments, are
SET ASIDE; and respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing the writ of execution.
SO ORDERED.
Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. Nos. 89898-99 October 1, 1990

Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private
respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of Makati
determined the cost of the said land which the petitioner must pay to the private respondents
amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the
corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the
petitioner which was deposited in PNB. However, such order was opposed by petitioner
through a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be
garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public
funds without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of
the Philippines v. Palacio.The RTC dismissed such motion, which was appealed to the Court of
Appeals; the latter affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed this petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment and
levy upon execution.
Held: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge involved the
net amount of P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by respondent sheriff are in excess
of P99,743.94, which are public fund and thereby are exempted from execution without the
proper appropriation required under the law. There is merit in this contention. In this
jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution,
unless otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and
market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the
governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a
showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating the said
amount from its public funds deposited in their PNB account, no levy under execution may be
validly effected. However, this court orders petitioner to pay for the said land which has been
in their use already. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal
obligation arising from expropriation of land they are already enjoying. The State's power of
eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.
NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION VS. CA- EASEMENT AND JUST COMPENSATION
When a land, originally public land is awarded to a provate individual, a legal easement may
be constituted and thus no just compensation is required. It would be otherwise if the land
were originally private property, in which case, just compensation must be paid for the taking
of a part thereof for public use as an easement of a right of way.
FACTS:
A free patent over three (3) hectares of land, situated in the province of Cagayan was issued in
the name of Vicente Manglapus, and registered under OCT No. P-24814. The land was granted
subject to the following proviso expressly stated in the title:
"... it shall not be subject to any encumbrance whatsoever in favor of any corporation,
association or partnership except with the consent of the grantee and the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and solely for educational, religious or
charitable purposes or for a right of way; and subject finally to all conditions and public
easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed by law especially those mentioned in
sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended..."
Subsequently, respondent Manglapus acquired the lot from Vicente Manglapus by absolute
sale.
Sometime in 1982, NIA was to construct canals in Amulung, Cagayan and Alcala, Cagayan. NIA
then entered a portion of Manglapus' land and made diggings and fillings thereon. Manglapus
filed a complaint for damages against NIA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NIA should pay Manglapus just compensation for the taking of a portion of
his property for use as easement of a right of way.

RULING: No.
The transfer certificate of title contains such a reservation. It states that title to the land shall
be:
". . . subject to the provisions of said Land Registration Act and the Public Land Act, as well as
those of Mining Laws, if the land is mineral, and subject, further to such conditions contained in
the original title as may be subsisting."
Under the Original Certificate of Title, there was a reservation and condition that the land is
subject to "to all conditions and public easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed by
law especially those mentioned in Sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114, Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended." This reservation, unlike the other provisos imposed on the grant,
was not limited by any time period and thus is a subsisting condition.
Section 112, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provides that lands granted by patent,
"shall further be subject to a right of way sot exceeding twenty meters in width for public
highways, railroads, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, telegraphs and telephone lines, and similar
works..."
We note that the canal NIA constructed was only eleven (11) meters in width. This is well
within the limit provided by law. Manglapus has therefore no cause to complain.
Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that, "Easements are established either by law or by the
will of the owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements." In the
present case, we find and declare that a legal easement of a right-of-way exists in favor of the
government.
The land was originally public land, and awarded to respondent Manglapus by free patent. The
ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally private property, in which case, just
compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an easement of a
right of way.
PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
SECTION 2
Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949
I.

THE FACTS

Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military
Commission of war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the
National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He
contended the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations
covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and
international.
II.

THE ISSUES

Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?

III. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]
YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day
including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of
international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian
who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the
commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the
laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor.
Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of
the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of
international law which are part of the our Constitution.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for
acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the
Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be
denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and
are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules

and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State and Japan who
were signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law
of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them
for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not
confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as contained in treaties to
which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
AGUSTIN vs EDU, G.R. NO. L-49112, February 2, 1979 (88 SCRA 195)
Facts:
The letter of instruction providing for an early warning device for motor vehicles is being
assailed in the case at bar as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process.
Petitioner contends that they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and
unconscionable to the motoring public;" 13 are "onesided, onerous and patently illegal and
immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the
expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the socalled early warning device at
the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." 14 are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the
precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part
of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a
better substitute to the specified set of EWD's."
Held:
Petitioners contention is erroneous because the Letter of Instruction was issued in the exercise
of the police power which is nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in
every sovereignty. In the leading case ofCalalang v. Williams, Justice Laurel identified police
power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order for the general comfort, health and
prosperity of the state. This doctrine was later reiterated again in Primicias v. Fugoso which
referred police power as the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept was
set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society. Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the
times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past
may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What are critical or urgent
changes with the time. The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far
from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing
upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to
enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of
such salutary measures calculated to communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
ICHONG V HERNANDEZ
Constitutional Law Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police
Power
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business
opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and
his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in
June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the
purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong
then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several
treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause
(pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in
the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal
opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted
principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there
is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The
equal protection of the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause
is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified

class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. For the
sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute
then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which,
being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.
Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city
market.
GONZALES V HECHANOVA
Constitutional Law Treaty vs Executive Agreements Statutes Can Repeal Executive
Agreements
Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and
Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a
certification from the Natl Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals.
Hence, Hechanova authorized the importation of 67000 tons of rice from abroad to the
detriment of our local planters. Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, because RA 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and
corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by
Macapagal.
HELD: Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the
latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that
have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event
of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail,
is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the
contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive
agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle
of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our
constitutional set up. As regards the question whether an executive or an international
agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the
Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be
deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or
writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of
inferior courts in All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question. In other words, our Constitution
authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but,
also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
In Re Garcia 2 SCRA 985
Facts:
Arturo E. Garcia,has applied for admission to the practice of law in the phils. without
submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers among others
that he is a filipino citizen born in bacolod city of filipino parentage. He finished Bachillerato
Superior in spain. He was allowed to practice law profession in spain under the provision of the
treaty on academic degrees and the exercise of profession between the republic of the phils.
Issue: Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the phil. bar.
Held: The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on academic degrees
between the republic of the phils and spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant said
treaty was intende to govern filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in spain. The
treaty could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission
to the practice of law in the phils for the reason the executive may not encroach upon the
constitutional prerogative of the supreme court to promulgate rules for admission to the
practice of the law in the phils. The power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being
reserved only to the congress of the phils.

SECTION 4

People v lagman

Political Law Defense of State

In 1936, Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Section 60 of
Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do
so because he has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does not wish to kill or
be killed. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said law. www.uberdigests.info
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.
HELD: The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through
an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this
duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist
therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military
service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful
compliance therewith. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the
fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil
service.

SECTION 6
Case DIgest: Aglipay vs Ruiz
Facts of the Case:
The Director of Posts announced on May 1936 in Manila newspapers that he would order the
issuance of postage stamps for the commemoration of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress celebration in the City of Manila. The said event was organized by the Roman
Catholic Church. Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the petitioner, is the Supreme Head of the
Philippine Independent Church, requested Vicente Sotto who is a member of the Philippine Bar
to raise the matter to the President. The said stamps in consideration were actually issued
already and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the
stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress
Held:
No, the respondent did not violate the Constitution by issuing and selling the commemorative
postage stamps. Ruiz acted under the provision of Act No. 4052, which contemplates no
religious purpose in view, giving the Director of Posts the discretion to determine when the
issuance of new postage stamps would be advantageous to the Government. Of course, the
phrase advantageous to the Government does not authorize the violation of the Constitution.
In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not intended by Ruiz to favor a
particular church or denomination. The stamps did not benefit the Roman Catholic Church, nor
were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of issuing
of the stamps was to actually take advantage of an international event considered to be a
great opportunity to give publicity to the Philippines and as a result attract more tourists to the
country. In evaluating the design made for the stamp, it showed the map of the Philippines
instead of showing a Catholic chalice. The focus was on the location of the City of Manila, and
it also bore the inscription that reads Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,
1937. In considering these, it is evident that there is no violation of the Constitution therefore
the act of the issuing of the stamps is constitutional.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to
costs.
SECTION 10 & 11
Calalang v Williams
Facts: Pursuant to the power delegated to it by the Legislature, theDirector of Public Works
promulgated rules and regulationspertaining to the closure of Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue
to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles for a year in prohibition against respondent-public officers.
Among others, the petitioners aver that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon
constitutional precept on the promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic
security of all people.
Issue: Whether or not the rules and regulation promote social justice.

Held: Yes. The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not through a mistaken sympathy
towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism,
nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic force
by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption
by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in
the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est
suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should
be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic
life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the
health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the
greatest number."
JOSE ALMEDA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011
GR # 121013 July 16 1998
FACTS: Petitioner Jose Almeda filed a notice of appeal which was disapproved by the trial court
due to it being filed five (5) days late beyond the reglementary period and subsequently
denied of motion for reconsideration. Respondent court dismissed the petition contending that
the requirement regarding perfection of an appeal was not only mandatory but jurisdictional
such that the petitioners failure to comply therewith had the effect of rendering the judgment
final. Subsequently, petitioner motions for reconsideration and is denied. Also, it was found
that there was lack of merit in the petitioners reason for the late filing of the notice of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not failure to comply with the requirement regarding perfection of an appeal
within reglementary period would render a judgment final and executory.
HELD: Yes, the period to appeal is prescribed not only by the Rules of Court but also by statute,
particularly Sec 39 of BP 129, which provides: Sec.39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final
orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen
(15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision
appealed from. The right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of it must
strictly comply with the statutes or rules as they are considered indispensable interdictions
against needless delays and for an orderly discharge of judicial business. Due to petitioners
negligence of failing to perfect his appeal, there is no recourse but to deny the petition thus
making the judgment of the trial court final and executory.
G.R. No. L-47178 May 16, 1980
ESTRELLA B. ONDOY, petitioner,
vs.
VIRGILIO IGNACIO, Proprietor M/B LADY ESTRELLITA and/or IMPERIAL FISHING ENTERPRISES and/or THE SECRETARY
OF LABOR and/or THE COMPENSATION APPEALS AND REVIEW STAFF, Department of Labor, respondents.
Fernardo R. Moreno for petitioner.
Feliciano Tumale for private respondents.
E. V. Espanol for public respondent.

FERNANDO, C.J.:t.hqw
The undisputed facts argue strongly for the granting of the claim for compensation filed by petitioner, the mother of one Jose Ondoy,
who was drowned while in the employ of private respondent, Virgilio Ignacio. Whatever be the cause for the failure to do so, it is
admitted that there was no controversion. Such omission, fatal in character, was sought to be minimized by the filing of a motion to
dismissed based on the alleged absence of an employment relationship. What cannot be ignored, however, is that subsequently, in
the hearing of such claim private respondent submitted affidavits executed by the chief engineer and oiler of the fishing vessel that
the deceased a fisherman, was in that ship, undeniably a member of the working force, but after being invited by friends to a drinking
spree, left the vessel, and thereafter was found dead. The referee summarily ignored the affidavit of the chief-mate of respondent
employer to the effect "that sometime in October, 1968, while Jose Ondoy, my co-worker, was in the actual performance of his work
with said fishing enterprises, he was drowned and died on October 22, 1968. That the deceased died in line of Duty." 1 The hearing
officer or referee dismissed the claim for lack of merit. 2 A motion for reconsideration was duly filed, but in an order dated August 29,

1977, the then Secretary of Labor, now Minister Blas F. Ople, denied such motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. 3 Hence this
petition for review.
1. In La Mallorca v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 4 this Court explicitly held that the failure to controvert "is fatal to any
defense that petitioner could interpose. So we have held in a host of decisions in compliance with the clear and express language of
the Workmen's Compensation Act. Any Assertion to the contrary is doomed to futility. 5 The opinion noted thirty decisions starting
from Bachrach Motor Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 6 to Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission. 7 Thereafter, in Regal Auto Works, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 8 such a doctrine was reaffirmed. It
was further noted that nine more decisions had been rendered by this Court starting from Republic v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission 9 to Abong v. Workmen's Compensation Commission. 10 By the time respondent secretary of Labor denied the motion
for reconsideration, a host of decisions that speaks to the same effect had been promulgated. 11 It clearly, appears, therefore, that
the failure of the referee to grant the award ought to have been remedied and the motion for reconsideration granted.
2. The deceased in this case met his death because of drowning. In Camotes Shipping Corporation v. Otadoy, 12there was not even
any direct testimony that the deceased was drowned while in the performance of his duty. All that could be alleged was that he "was
lost at sea while in the employ of petitioner. 13 Nonetheless, the award for compensation was sustained. Likewise, the ruling
in Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v. Villanueva 14 was cited with approval. Thus: "The fact that the employee was found missing while on board the
petitioner's vessel MV 'Caltex Mindanao' became known to the captain of the vessel on 10 October 1956 but it was only on 6
November 1956 when the petitioner transmitted to the respondent Compensation WCC For in No. 3 stating that the employee was
'Lost at sea and presumed dead as of October 10, 1956,' and that it was controverting the respondent's claim. 15 In the present case,
there is evidence of the fact of death due to drowning. That was not controverted. Under the circumstances, the failure to grant the
claim finds no justification in law.
3. It bears repeating that there is evidence, direct and categorical, to the effect that the deceased was drowned while "in the actual
performance of his work" with the shipping enterprise of private respondent. Even without such evidence, the petitioner could have
relied on the presumption of compensability under the Act once it is shown that the death or disability arose in the course of
employment, with the burden of overthrowing it being cast on the person or entity resisting the claim. Time and time again this Court
has stressed such statutory provision. It suffices to mention cases decided from January to April of this year. 16 An appraisal of the
counter-affidavits submitted by two employees of private respondent and thereafter beholden to him to the effect that the deceased
left the vessel for a drinking spree certainly cannot meet the standard required to negate the force of the presumption of
compensability.
4. Nor is an affirmance of the finding of the referee adverse to the claim warranted because of the doctrine that the findings of facts
of an administrative agency must be accorded due weight and consideration. An excerpt from the recent case of Uy v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission 17 finds pertinence: "The claim merits scant consideration for this Court is authorized to inquire into the
facts when the conclusions are not supported by substantial or credible evidence. 18
5. This Court, in recognizing the right of petitioner to the award, merely adheres to the interpretation uninterruptedly followed by this
Court resolving all doubts in favor of the claimant. So it has been since the first leading case of Francisco v. Conching 19 decided a
year after the 1935 Constitution took effect. What was said inVictorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 20 is
not amiss: "There is need, it seems, even at this late date, for [private respondent] and other employers to be reminded of the high
estate accorded the Workmen's Compensation Act in the constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor. 21 Further:
"No other judicial attitude may be expected in the face of a clearly expressed legislative determination which antedated the
constitutionally avowed concern for social justice and protection to labor. It is easily understandable why the judiciary frowns on
resort to doctrines, which even if deceptively plausible, would result in frustrating such a national policy. 22 Lastly, to quote from the
opinion therein rendered: "To be more specific, the principle of social justice is in this sphere strengthened and vitalized. A realistic
view is that expressed in Agustin v. Workmen's Compensation Commission: 'As between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and
the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter stricter compliance.
Social justice in these cases is not equality but protection.' 23
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted and petitioner Estrelita B. Ondoy is awarded the sum of, P6,000.00 as
compensation for the death of her son, Jose Ondoy; P300.00 for burial expenses; and P600.00 as attorney's fees. This decision is
immediately executory. Costs against private respondent Virgilio Ignacio.
G.R. No. L-47088 July 10, 1981
CONSOLACION DUQUE SALONGA, assisted by her husband WENCESLAO SALONGA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JULITA B. FARRALES, and THE SHERIFF OF OLONGAPO CITY, defendants-appellees.

FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals 1 from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Zambales and
Olongapo City, Third Judicial District, Branch III, Olongapo City, in Civil Case No. 1144-0, entitled "Consolacion Duque Salonga,
assisted by her husband, Wenceslao Salonga, Plaintiff, versus Julita B. Farrales, and The Sheriff of Olongapo City, Defendants," the
dispositive part of which reads:
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiff's complaint, as well as defendants'
counterclaim.
Costs against plaintiff.
SO ORDERED. 2

The records disclose that on January 2, 1973; the appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga assisted by her husband, filed a complaint
against Julita B. Farrales and the Sheriff of Olongapo City with the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Third
Judicial District, Branch III, Olongapo City, seeking the following relief:
WHEREFORE, plaintiff most respectfully prays for the following relief:
a) Ordering defendant Julita Farrales to sell to plaintiff the parcel of land containing an area of 156 Square Meters,
more or less, where the house of strong materials of plaintiff exists.
b) Ordering the defendants not to disturb nor interfere in the peaceful possession or occupation of the land by
plaintiff, until a final decision is rendered in this case.
c) Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay costs; and
d) Granting plaintiff such other relief conformable to law, justice and equity.
Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, December 28, 1972. 3
that on January 9, 1973, plaintiff-appellant, Salonga filed an urgent petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which
was duly amended on January 16, 1973, 4 with the following prayer:
WHEREFORE, plaintiff assisted by counsel most respectfully prays the Hon. Court the following relief:
a) That a restraining order be issued pending resolution of the instant petition for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction enjoining defendants, particularly the Sheriff of Olongapo City to restrain from enforcing the Writ of
Execution issued in connection with the judgment rendered in Civil Case 650 for ejectment in the City Court of
Olongapo City;
b) That after due hearing of the present amended petition, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction conditioned upon a
reasonable bond be issued enjoining the defendants, particularly, the Sheriff of Olongapo City, to restrain from
enforcing the Writ of Execution issued in connection with the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 650 for
ejectment in the City Court of Olongapo City, in order to maintain the status of the parties; in order to prevent the
infliction of irreparable injury to plaintiff; and in order that whatever judgment may be rendered in this case, may
not become moot, academic, illusory and ineffectual, and
c) Granting plaintiff such other relief conformable to law, justice and equity;
that on January 22, 1973, the court a quo issued an order temporarily restraining the carrying out of the writ of execution issued
pursuant to the judgment rendered by the City Court of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 650, a suit for ejectment filed by defendantappellee Farrales against five defendants, among whom the herein appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga; 5 that on January 23,
1973, defendant-appellee Farrales filed a motion to deny the motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction for being vague and
her answer with counterclaim to the complaint; 6 that an opposition to the amended petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction was also filed by the defendant-appellee Farrales on January 25, 1973; 7 that in an order dated January 20, 1973, the
court a quo denied the petition for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and lifted the restraining order issued on January 22,
1973; 8 that plaintiff-appellant moved for reconsideration of the order denying the motion for issuance of a preliminary injunction on
January 5, 1973; 9 which was also denied by the court a quo on February 21, 1973; 10 that after the trial on the merits of Civil Case
No. 1144-0, the trial court rendered the judgment under review, dismissing plaintiff's complaint; 11 that on August 13, 1973, the
plaintiff, Consolacion Duque Salonga, appealed from the said decision to the Court of Appeals; 12 that on February 25, 1974, the
plaintiff-appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga, filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction in aid of appeal; 13 that in a resolution dated March 6, 1974, the Court of Appeals denied the said motion on the ground
that "the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for being intended to restrain the enforcement of the writ of execution issued in Civil
Case No. 650 for Ejectment, which is not involved in this appeal, and there being no justification for the issuance of the writ ...
" 14 that on January 13, 1975, the defendant-appellee Julita B. Farrales filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the
appeal has become moot and academic because "the house of the plaintiffs-appellants, subject matter of this appeal was
demolished on October 21, 1974, Annex "A", Sheriff's return and the land where this house was built was delivered to her and she is
now the one in possession ... ; 15 that the plaintiffs-appellants having failed to comment on the said motion to dismiss when required
by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated January 16, 1975, 16the Court of Appeals resolved to submit the motion for decision in
a resolution dated April 17, 1975; 17 and that, likewise, the plaintiffs-appellants having failed to show cause why the case should not
be submitted for decision without the benefit of appellant's reply brief when required to do so in a Court of Appeals resolution dated
May 14, 1975, 18 the Court of Appeals resolved on July 8, 1975 to submit the case for decision without the benefit of appellants' reply
brief. 19
In a resolution promulgated on September 15, 1977 the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court because the issue
raised in the appeal is purely legal. 20
The plaintiffs-appellants assign the following errors:
I THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT AND IN DENYING
SAID APPELLANTS' RELIEF TO PURCHASE FROM DEFENDANT-APPELLEE JULITA FARRALES THE PIECE
OF LAND IN QUESTION.
II THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING TO THE SUIT AT BAR, SECTION 6, UNDER
ARTICLE 11 OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION, WHICH CONTROLS, DELIMITS AND REGULATES PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND PRIVATE GAINS. 21

The main legal question involved in this appeal is whether or not the court a quo erred in dismissing the complaint for specific
performance or the ground that there exists no legally enforceable compromise agreement upon which the defendant-appellee
Farrales can be compelled to sell the piece of land in question to plaintiff-appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga.
The facts, as found by the trial court, are:
At the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated on the following facts (1) THAT the personal circumstances of the parties as alleged in the complaint are admitted:
(2) THAT defendant Farrales is the titled owner of a parcel of residential land situated in Sta. Rita, Olongapo City,
Identity of which is not disputed, formerly acquired by her from one Leoncio Dytuco who, in turn, acquired the
same from the Corpuz Family of which only 361 square meters, more or less, not actually belong to said
defendant after portions thereof had been sold to Marciala Zarsadias, Catalino Pascual and Rosanna Quiocson*;
(*Per Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit B, the vendee is actually Dionisio Quiocson);
3) THAT even prior to the acquisition by defendant Farrales (if the land aforesaid, plaintiff was already in
possession as lessee of some 156 square meters thereof, on which she had erected a house, paying rentals
thereon first to the original owners and later to defendant Farrales.
(4) THAT, sometime prior to November, 1968, defendant Farrales filed an ejectment case for non-payment of
rentals against plaintiff and her husband-jointly with other lessees of other portions of the land, to wit, Jorge
Carvajal, Catalino Pascua, Marciala Zarsadias, and the spouses Cesar and Rosalina Quiocson - Civil Case No.
650 of the Olongapo City Court, Branch 1, in which, on November 20, 1968, and reiterated on February 4, 1970, a
decision was rendered in favor of defendant Farrales and ordering the therein defendants, including plaintiff herein
and her husband, to vacate the portion occupied by them and to pay rentals in arrears, attorney's fees and costs;
(5) THAT the decision aforesaid was elevated on appeal to the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo
City, Civil Case No. 581-0 thereof, and, in a Decision dated November 11, 1971 of Branch III thereof, the same
was affirmed with modification only as to the amount of rentals arrears to be paid;
(6) THAT the affirmatory decision of the Court of First Instance aforesaid is now final and executory the records of
the case had been remanded to the Court for execution, and the corresponding writ of execution had been issued
partially satisfied, as far as plaintiff herein is concerned, by the payment of all rentals in arrears although the
removal of said plaintiff's house from the land still remains to be carried out by defendant Sheriff: and
(7) THAT, even before the rendition of the affirmatory decision of the Court of First Instance, by common consent
amongst themselves defendant sold to Catalino Pascua, Marciala Zarsadias and the spouses Cesar and Rosalina
Quiocson the areas respectly occupied by them; while, with respect to Jorge Carvajal, in a suit thereafter filed
between him and defendant Farrales, a compromise. agreement was entered into whereunder said defendant
undertook to pay for Carvajal's house on her land, so that the decision aforesaid is now being executed, as far as
ejectment is concerned, only against plaintiff herein. (Pre-Trial Order, May 17, 1973, pp. 2-5) 22
The lower court explained its conclusion thus:
... From the very allegations of the complaint, it is clearly admitted 5. That plaintiff herein, in view of the sale to three tenants defendants of the portions of land occupied by each of
said three tenant-defendants, by defendant Julita B. Farrales, also offered to purchase from said defendant the
area of One Hundred Fifty-Six (156) Square Meters, more or less, where plaintiff's house of strong materials
exists, but, defendant Julita B. Farrales, despite the fact that said plaintiff's order to purchase was just, fair and
reasonable persistently refused such offer, and instead insisted to execute the judgment rendered in the ejectment
case, before the City Court of Olongapo City, thru the herein defendant Sheriff of Olongapo City, with the sole and
only purpose of causing damage and prejudice to the plaintiff (Complaint, p. 3 emphasis supplied).
Being a judicial admission, the foregoing binds plaintiff who cannot subsequently take a position contradictory
thereto or inconsistent therewith (Section 2, Rule 129, Rules of Court; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 44 Phil. 248
Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil., 227). Hence, if plaintiff's offer to purchase was, as aforesaid persistently refused by
defendant, it is obvious that no meeting of the and, took place and, accordingly, no contract, either to sell or of
sale, was ever perfected between them. This is only firmed up even more by plaintiff's admission on the witness
stand that no agreement respecting the purchase and sale of the disputed land was finalized because, while
defendant Farrales purportedly wanted payment in cash, plaintiff did not have any money for that purpose and
neither were negotiations ever had respecting any possible arrangement for payment in installments. On all fours
to the case at bar, therefore, is Velasco et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al, G.R. No. L-31018, June 29, 1973, which
was a case for specific performance to compel the therein respondent Magdalena Estate, Inc. to sell a parcel of
land to petitioner per an alleged contract of sale in which the Supreme Court ruled:
It is not difficult to glean from the aforequoted averments that the petitioners themselves admit
that they and the respondent still had to meet and agree on how and when the down payment
and the installment payments were to be paid. Such being the situation, it cannot, therefore be
said that a definite and firm sales agreement between the parties had been perfected over the
lot in question. Indeed this Court has already ruled before that a definite agreement on the
manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential element in the formation of a binding
and enforceable contract of sale.
Since contracts are enforceable only from the moment of perfection (Articles 1315 and 1475, Civil Code of the
Philippines; Pacific Oxygen and Acetylene Co. vs. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-21881, March 1, 1968; Atkins, Kroll
and Co., Inc. vs. B. Cua Hian Teck G.R. No. L-9817, January 31, 1958), and there is here no perfected contract at

all, it goes without saying that plaintiff has absolutely nothing to enforce against defendant Farrales, and the fact
that defendant Farrales previously sold portions of the land to other lessees similarly situated as plaintiff herein,
does not change the situation because, as to said other lessees, a perfected contract existed - which is not the
case with plaintiff. 23
The trial court found as a fact that no compromise agreement to sell the land in question was ever perfected between the defendantappellee as vendor and the plaintiffs-appellants as vendees. 24
It is elementary that consent is an essential element for the existence of a contract, and where it is wanting, the contract is nonexistent. The essence of consent is the conformity of the parties on the terms of the contract, the acceptance by one of the offer
made by the other. The contract to sell is a bilateral contract. Where there is merely an offer by one party, without the acceptance of
the other, there is no consent. 25
It appears in this case that the offeree, the defendant-appellee Julita B. Farrales not only did not accept, but rejected the offer of
plaintiffs-appellants, spouses Salonga to buy the land in question. There being no consent there is. therefore, no contract to sell to
speak of.
Likewise, it must be borne in mind that the alleged compromise agreement to sell the land in question is unenforceable under the
Statute of Frauds, 26 and thus, renders all the more ineffective the action for specific performance in the court a quo.
Moreover, as correctly found by the trial court, the plaintiffs-appellants, as lessees, are neither builders in good faith nor in bad faith.
Their rights are governed not by Article 448 but by Art. 1678 of the New Civil Code. 27 As lessees, they may remove the
improvements should the lessor refuse to reimburse them, but the lessee does not have the right to buy the land. 28
Anent the appellants' claim that since the appellee sold to the three (3) other defendants in the ejectment suit the three (3) portions
of the land in question occupied by them, it follows that "she must also sell that portion of the land where appellants' residential
house was found to appellants" is unmeritorious. The trial court correctly ruled that the fact that defendant-appellee sold portions of
the land to the other lessees similarly situated as plaintiffs-appellants Salonga does not change the situation because as to said
other lessees, a perfected contract of sale existed which, as previously shown was not the case with the plaintiff. 29
As to the contention that Sec. 6, Article II of the New Constitution is applicable to the case at bar, it must be remembered that social
justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to
protection. The social justice consecrated in our constitution was not intended to take away rights from a person and give them to
another who is not entitled thereto. Evidently, the plea for social justice cannot nullify the law on obligations and contracts, and is,
therefore, beyond the power of the Court to grant.
There is no showing that the trial court committed any reversible error.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
SECTION 12
Meyer v. State of Nebraska (No. 325)
Argued: February 23, 1923
Decided: June 4, 1923
107 Neb. 657, reversed.

Syllabus
Opinion, Mcreynolds
Syllabus
A state law forbidding, under penalty, the teaching in any private, denominational, parochial or public school, of any modern
language, other than English, to any child who has not attained and successfully [p391] passed the eighth grade, invades the liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and exceeds the power of the State. P. 399.
So held where the statute was applied in punishment of an instructor who taught reading in German, to a child of ten years, in a
parochial school.
ERROR to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Nebraska affirming a conviction for infraction of a statute against teaching of foreign
languages to young children in schools.[p396]

TOP

Opinion
MCREYNOLDS, J., Opinion of the Court
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiff in error was tried and convicted in the District Court for Hamilton County, Nebraska, under an information which charged
that, on May 25, 1920, while an instructor in Zion Parochial School, he unlawfully taught the subject of reading in the German
language to Raymond Parpart, a child of ten years, who had not attained [p397] and successfully passed the eighth grade. The
information is based upon "An act relating to the teaching of foreign languages in the State of Nebraska," approved April 9, 1919,
which follows [Laws 1919, c. 249.]:
Section 1. No person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in any private, denominational, parochial or public school, teach any subject
to any person in any language other than the English language.
Sec. 2. Languages, other than the English language, may be taught as languages only after a pupil shall have attained and
successfully passed the eighth grade as evidenced by a certificate of graduation issued by the county superintendent of the county
in which the child resides.
Sec. 3. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction, shall
be subject to a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars ($25), nor more than one hundred dollars ($100) or be confined in the county
jail for any period not exceeding thirty days for each offense.
Sec. 4. Whereas, an emergency exists, this act shall be in force from and after its passage and approval.
The Supreme Court of the State affirmed the judgment of conviction. 107 Neb. 657. It declared the offense charged and established
was "the direct and intentional teaching of the German language as a distinct subject to a child who had not passed the eighth
grade," in the parochial school maintained by Zion Evangelical Lutheran Congregation, a collection of Biblical stories being used
therefor. And it held that the statute forbidding this did not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment, but was a valid exercise of the
police power. The following excerpts from the opinion sufficiently indicate the reasons advanced to support the conclusion.
The salutary purpose of the statute is clear. The legislature had seen the baneful effects of permitting foreigners, [p398] who had
taken residence in this country, to rear and educate their children in the language of their native land. The result of that condition was
found to be inimical to our own safety. To allow the children of foreigners, who had emigrated here, to be taught from early childhood
the language of the country of their parents was to rear them with that language as their mother tongue. It was to educate them so
that they must always think in that language, and, as a consequence, naturally inculcate in them the ideas and sentiments foreign to
the best interests of this country. The statute, therefore, was intended not only to require that the education of all children be
conducted in the English language, but that, until they had grown into that language and until it had become a part of them, they
should not in the schools be taught any other language. The obvious purpose of this statute was that the English language should
be and become the mother tongue of all children reared in this state. The enactment of such a statute comes reasonably within the
police power of the state. Pohl v. State, 132 N.E. (Ohio) 20; State v. Bartels, 181 N.W. (Ia.) 508.
It is suggested that the law is an unwarranted restriction, in that it applies to all citizens of the state and arbitrarily interferes with the
rights of citizens who are not of foreign ancestry, and prevents them, without reason, from having their children taught foreign
languages in school. That argument is not well taken, for it assumes that every citizen finds himself restrained by the statute. The
hours which a child is able to devote to study in the confinement of school are limited. It must have ample time for exercise or play.
Its daily capacity for learning is comparatively small. A selection of subjects for its education, therefore, from among the many that
might be taught, is obviously necessary. The legislature no doubt had in mind the practical operation of the law. The law affects few
citizens, except those of foreign lineage. [p399] Other citizens, in their selection of studies, except perhaps in rare instances, have
never deemed it of importance to teach their children foreign languages before such children have reached the eighth grade. In the
legislative mind, the salutary effect of the statute no doubt outweighed the restriction upon the citizens generally, which, it appears,
was a restriction of no real consequence.
The problem for our determination is whether the statute, as construed and applied, unreasonably infringes the liberty guaranteed to
the plaintiff in error by the Fourteenth Amendment. "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration
and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Slaughter-House
Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co.,111 U.S. 746; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356; Minnesota v.
Barber, 136 U.S. 313;Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S.
590; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312; Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S.
525;Wyeth v. Cambridge Board of Health, 200 Mass. 474. The established doctrine is that this liberty may not be
interfered [p400] with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable
relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect. Determination by the legislature of what constitutes proper
exercise of police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to supervision by the courts. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137.

The American people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which
should be diligently promoted. The Ordinance of 1787 declares,
Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of
education shall forever be encouraged.
Corresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life,
and nearly all the States, including Nebraska, enforce this obligation by compulsory laws.
Practically, education of the young is only possible in schools conducted by especially qualified persons who devote themselves
thereto. The calling always has been regarded as useful and honorable, essential, indeed, to the public welfare. Mere knowledge of
the German language cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful. Heretofore it has been commonly looked upon as helpful and
desirable. Plaintiff in error taught this language in school as part of his occupation. His right thus to teach and the right of parents to
engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within the liberty of the Amendment.
The challenged statute forbids the teaching in school of any subject except in English; also the teaching of any other language until
the pupil has attained and successfully passed the eighth grade, which is not usually accomplished before the age of twelve. The
Supreme Court of the State has held that "the so-called ancient or dead languages" are not "within the spirit or the purpose
of [p401] the act." Nebraska District of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie, 187 N.W. 927. Latin, Greek, Hebrew are not
proscribed; but German, French, Spanish, Italian and every other alien speech are within the ban. Evidently the legislature has
attempted materially to interfere with the calling of modern language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge,
and with the power of parents to control the education of their own.
It is said the purpose of the legislation was to promote civic development by inhibiting training and education of the immature in
foreign tongues and ideals before they could learn English and acquire American ideals, and "that the English language should be
and become the mother tongue of all children reared in this State." It is also affirmed that the foreign born population is very large,
that certain communities commonly use foreign words, follow foreign leaders, move in a foreign atmosphere, and that the children
are thereby hindered from becoming citizens of the most useful type, and the public safety is imperiled.
That the State may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally, is
clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to
those who speak other languages as well as to those born with English on the tongue. Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all
had ready understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the Constitution -- a
desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.
For the welfare of his Ideal Commonwealth, Plato suggested a law which should provide:
That the wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children are to be common, and no parent is to know his own
child, [p402] nor any child his parent. . . . The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and there
they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when they
chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, unknown place, as they should be.
In order to submerge the individual. and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the males at seven into barracks and intrusted
their subsequent education and training to official guardians. Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of
great genius, their ideas touching the relation between individual and State were wholly different from those upon which our
institutions rest, and it hardly will be affirmed that any legislature could impose such restrictions upon the people of a State without
doing violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution.
The desire of the legislature to foster a homogeneous people with American ideals prepared readily to understand current
discussions of civic matters is easy to appreciate. Unfortunate experiences during the late war and aversion toward every
characteristic of truculent adversaries were certainly enough to quicken that aspiration. But the means adopted, we think, exceed the
limitations upon the power of the State and conflict with rights assured to plaintiff in error. The interference is plain enough, and no
adequate reason therefor in time of peace and domestic tranquility has been shown.
The power of the State to compel attendance at some school and to make reasonable regulations for all schools, including a
requirement that they shall give instructions in English, is not questioned. Nor has challenge been made of the State's power to
prescribe a curriculum for institutions which it supports. Those matters are not within the present controversy. Our concern is with the
prohibition approved by the Supreme Court. Adams v. [p403] Tanner, supra, p. 594, pointed out that mere abuse incident to an
occupation ordinarily useful is not enough to justify its abolition, although regulation may be entirely proper. No emergency has
arisen which renders knowledge by a child of some language other than English so clearly harmful as to justify its inhibition with the
consequent infringement of rights long freely enjoyed. We are constrained to conclude that the statute as applied is arbitrary and
without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the State.
As the statute undertakes to interfere only with teaching which involves a modern language, leaving complete freedom as to other
matters, there seems no adequate foundation for the suggestion that the purpose was to protect the child's health by limiting his
mental activities. It is well known that proficiency in a foreign language seldom comes to one not instructed at an early age, and
experience shows that this is not injurious to the health, morals or understanding of the ordinary child.
The judgment of the court below must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)

Pierce v. Society of Sisters
Nos. 583, 584
Argued March 16, 17, 1925
Decided June 1, 1925
268 U.S. 510
APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
Syllabus
1. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments of this Union rest excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. P. 268 U. S. 535.
2. The Oregon Compulsory Education Act (Oreg. Ls., 5259) which, with certain exemptions, requires every parent, guardian or
other person having control of a child between the ages of eight and sixteen years to send him to the public school in the district
where he resides, for the period during which the school is held for the current year, is an unreasonable interference with the liberty
of the parents and guardians to direct the upbringing of the children, and in that respect violates the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 268
U. S. 534.
3. In a proper sense, it is true that corporations cannot claim for themselves the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,
and, in general, no person in any business has such an interest in possible customers as to enable him to restrain exercise of proper
power by the State upon the ground that he will be deprived of patronage;
4. But where corporations owning and conducting schools are threatened with destruction of their business and property through the
improper and unconstitutional compulsion exercised by this statute upon parents and guardians, their interest is direct and
immediate, and entitles them to protection by injunction. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33. P. 268 U. S. 535.
5. The Act, being intended to have general application, cannot be construed in its application to such corporations as an exercise of
power to amend their charters. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45. P. 268 U. S. 535.
6. Where the injury threatened by an unconstitutional statute is present and real before the statute is to be effective, and will
Page 268 U. S. 511
become irreparable if relief be postponed to that time, a suit to restrain future enforcement of the statute is not premature. P. 268 U.
S. 536.
296 Fed. 928, affirmed.
APPEALS from decrees of the District Court granting preliminary injunctions restraining the Governor, and other officials, of the
State of Oregon from threatening or attempting to enforce an amendment to the school law -- an initiative measure adopted by the
people November 7, 1922, to become effective in 1926 -- requiring parents and others having control of young children to send them
to the primary schools of the State. The plaintiffs were two Oregon corporations owning and conducting schools.

Page 268 U. S. 529

MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
These appeals are from decrees, based upon undenied allegations, which granted preliminary orders restraining
Page 268 U. S. 530
appellants from threatening or attempting to enforce the Compulsory Education Act *adopted November 7, 1922, under the initiative
provision of her Constitution by the voters of Oregon. Jud.Code, 266. They present the same points of law; there are no
controverted questions of fact. Rights said to be guaranteed by the federal Constitution were specially set up, and appropriate
prayers asked for their protection.
The challenged Act, effective September 1, 1926, requires every parent, guardian or other person having control or charge or
custody of a child between eight and sixteen years to send him "to a public school for the period of time a public school shall be held
during the current year" in the district where the child resides, and failure so to do is declared a misdemeanor. There are
Page 268 U. S. 531
exemptions not specially important here -- for children who are not normal, or who have completed he eighth grade, or who reside at
considerable distances from any public school, or whose parents or guardians hold special permits from the County Superintendent.
The manifest purpose is to compel general attendance at public schools by normal children, between eight and sixteen, who have
not completed the eighth grade. And without doubt enforcement of the statute would seriously impair, perhaps destroy, the profitable
features of appellees' business and greatly diminish the value of their property.
Appellee, the Society of Sisters, is an Oregon corporation, organized in 1880, with power to care for orphans, educate and instruct
the youth, establish and maintain academies or schools, and acquire necessary real and personal
Page 268 U. S. 532
property. It has long devoted its property and effort to the secular and religious education and care of children, and has acquired the
valuable good will of many parents and guardians. It conducts interdependent primary and high schools and junior colleges, and
maintains orphanages for the custody and control of children between eight and sixteen. In its primary schools, many children
between those ages are taught the subjects usually pursued in Oregon public schools during the first eight years. Systematic
religious instruction and moral training according to the tenets of the Roman Catholic Church are also regularly provided. All courses
of study, both temporal and religious, contemplate continuity of training under appellee's charge; the primary schools are essential to
the system and the most profitable. It owns valuable buildings, especially constructed and equipped for school purposes. The
business is remunerative -- the annual income from primary schools exceeds thirty thousand dollars -- and the successful conduct of
this requires long-time contracts with teachers and parents. The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 has already caused the
withdrawal from its schools of children who would otherwise continue, and their income has steadily declined. The appellants, public
officers, have proclaimed their purpose strictly to enforce the statute.
After setting out the above facts, the Society's bill alleges that the enactment conflicts with the right of parents to choose schools
where their children will receive appropriate mental and religious training, the right of the child to influence the parents' choice of a
school, the right of schools and teachers therein to engage in a useful business or profession, and is accordingly repugnant to the
Constitution and void. And, further, that, unless enforcement of the measure is enjoined the corporation's business and property will
suffer irreparable injury.
Appellee, Hill Military Academy, is a private corporation organized in 1908 under the laws of Oregon, engaged

Page 268 U. S. 533

in owning, operating and conducting for profit an elementary, college preparatory and military training school for boys between the
ages of five and twenty-one years. The average attendance is one hundred, and the annual fees received for each student amount
to some eight hundred dollars. The elementary department is divided into eight grades, as in the public schools; the college
preparatory department has four grades, similar to those of the public high schools; the courses of study conform to the
requirements of the State Board of Education. Military instruction and training are also given, under the supervision of an Army
officer. It owns considerable real and personal property, some useful only for school purposes. The business and incident good will
are very valuable. In order to conduct its affairs, long time contracts must be made for supplies, equipment, teachers and pupils.
Appellants, law officers of the State and County, have publicly announced that the Act of November 7, 1922, is valid, and have
declared their intention to enforce it. By reason of the statute and threat of enforcement, appellee's business is being destroyed and
its property depreciated; parents and guardians are refusing to make contracts for the future instruction of their sons, and some are
being withdrawn.
The Academy's bill states the foregoing facts and then alleges that the challenged Act contravenes the corporation's rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and that, unless appellants are restrained from proclaiming its validity and threatening to
enforce it, irreparable injury will result. The prayer is for an appropriate injunction.
No answer was interposed in either cause, and, after proper notices, they were heard by three judges (Jud.Code 266) on motions
for preliminary injunctions upon the specifically alleged facts. The court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed appellees
against the
Page 268 U. S. 534
deprivation of their property without due process of law consequent upon the unlawful interference by appellants with the free choice
of patrons, present and prospective. It declared the right to conduct schools was property, and that parents and guardians, as a part
of their liberty, might direct the education of children by selecting reputable teachers and places. Also, that these schools were not
unfit or harmful to the public, and that enforcement of the challenged statute would unlawfully deprive them of patronage, and
thereby destroy their owners' business and property. Finally, that the threats to enforce the Act would continue to cause irreparable
injury, and the suits were not premature.
No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them,
their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral
character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be
taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.
The inevitable practical result of enforcing the Act under consideration would be destruction of appellees' primary schools, and
perhaps all other private primary schools for normal children within the State of Oregon. These parties are engaged in a kind of
undertaking not inherently harmful, but long regarded as useful and meritorious. Certainly there is nothing in the present records to
indicate that they have failed to discharge their obligations to patrons, students or the State. And there are no peculiar circumstances
or present emergencies which demand extraordinary measures relative to primary education.
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
Page 268 U. S. 535
under their control: as often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which
has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all
governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept

instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
Appellees are corporations, and therefore, it is said, they cannot claim for themselves the liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees. Accepted in the proper sense, this is true. Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U. S. 243, 203 U. S. 255; Western
Turf Association v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359, 204 U. S. 363. But they have business and property for which they claim protection.
These are threatened with destruction through the unwarranted compulsion which appellants are exercising over present and
prospective patrons of their schools. And this court has gone very far to protect against loss threatened by such action. Truax v.
Raich, 239 U. S. 33; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197.
The courts of the State have not construed the Act, and we must determine its meaning for ourselves. Evidently it was expected to
have general application, and cannot be construed as though merely intended to amend the charters of certain private corporations,
as in Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45. No argument in favor of such view has been advanced.
Generally it is entirely true, as urged by counsel, that no person in any business has such an interest in possible customers as to
enable him to restrain exercise of proper power of the State upon the ground that he will be deprived
Page 268 U. S. 536
of patronage. But the injunctions here sought are not against the exercise of any proper power. Plaintiffs asked protection against
arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful interference with their patrons and the consequent destruction of their business and property.
Their interest is clear and immediate, within the rule approved in Truax v. Raich, Truax v. Corrigan and Terrace v. Thompson,
supra, and many other cases where injunctions have issued to protect business enterprises against interference with the freedom of
patrons or customers. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229; Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S.
443; American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184; Nebraska District v. McKelvie, 262 U. S. 404; Truax
v. Corrigan, supra, and cases there cited.
The suits were not premature. The injury to appellees was present and very real, not a mere possibility in the remote future. If no
relief had been possible prior to the effective date of the Act, the injury would have become irreparable. Prevention of impending
injury by unlawful action is a well recognized function of courts of equity. The decrees below are
Affirmed.
*
"Be it Enacted by the People of the State of Oregon:"
"Section 1. That Section 5259, Oregon Laws, be and the same is hereby amended so as to read as follows:"
"Sec. 5259. Children Between the Ages of Eight and Sixteen Years -- Any parent, guardian or other person in the State of Oregon,
having control or charge or custody of a child under the age of sixteen years and of the age of eight years or over at the
commencement of a term of public school of the district in which said child resides, who shall fail or neglect or refuse to send such
child to a public school for the period of time a public school shall be held during the current year in said district, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and each day's failure to send such child to a public school shall constitute a separate offense; provided, that, in the
following cases, children shall not be required to attend public schools:"
"(a) Children Physically Unable -- Any child who is abnormal, subnormal or physically unable to attend school."
"(b) Children Who Have Completed the Eighth Grade -- Any child who has completed the eighth grade, in accordance with the
provisions of the state course of study."

"(c) Distance from school -- Children between the ages of eight and ten years, inclusive, whose place of residence is more than one
and one-half miles, and children over ten years of age whose place of residence is more than three miles, by the nearest traveled
road, from public school; provided, however, that, if transportation to and from school is furnished by the school district, this
exemption shall not apply."
"(d) Private Instruction -- Any child who is being taught for a like period of time by the parent or private teacher such subjects as are
usually taught in the first eight years in the public school; but before such child can be taught by a parent or a private teacher, such
parent or private teacher must receive written permission from the county superintendent, and such permission shall not extend
longer than the end of the current school year. Such child must report to the county school superintendent or some person
designated by him at least once every three months and take an examination in the work covered. If, after such examination, the
county superintendent shall determine that such child is not being properly taught, then the county superintendent shall order the
parent, guardian or other person, to send such child to the public school the remainder of the school year."
"If any parent, guardian or other person having control or charge or custody of any child between the ages of eight and sixteen years
shall fail to comply with any provision of this section, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction thereof, be subject
to a fine of not less than $5, nor more than $100, or to imprisonment in the county jail not less than two nor more than thirty days, or
by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court."
"This Act shall take effect and be and remain in force from and after the first day of September, 1926."

Official Supreme Court caselaw is only found in the print version of the United States Reports. Justia caselaw is provided for general
informational purposes only, and may not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We make no warranties or
guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or information linked to from
this site. Please check official sources.

People v. Ritter 194 SCRA 690

FACTS: On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in a
hotel room in Olongapo. Ritter masturbated Jessie and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he
inserted a foreign object to the vagina of Rosario. The next morning, Ritter gave Jessie 200,
and Rosario 300. Rosario told Jessie that Ritter inserted an object inside her vagina. Sometime
the following day, Rosario said that the object has already been removed from her vagina. On
May 14, 1987, Alcantara saw Rosario with bloody skirt, foul smelling. Rosario was brought and
confined to Olongapo City general Hospital. An OB-Gyne tried to remove the object inside her
vagina using forceps but failed because it was deeply embedded and covered by tissues. She
was having peritonitis. She told the attending physician that a Negro inserted the object to her
vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was made liable for rape with homicide.
ISSUE: W/N Ritter was liable for rape and homicide
HELD: No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only 12 years old when the incident
with Ritter happened. And that Rosario prostituted herself even at the tender age. As evidence,
she received 300 from Ritter the following morning. A doctor/specialist also testified that the
inserted object in the vagina of Rosario Baluyot by Ritter was different from that which caused
her death. As evidence, Rosario herself said to Jessie the following day that the object has
been removed already. She also told the doctor that a Negro inserted it to her vagina 3 months
ago. Ritter was a Caucasian. Ritter was also acquitted for the criminal case of rape with
homicide. However, it does not exempt him for the moral and exemplary damages he must
award to the victims heirs. It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from
civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Ritter was deported.
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL
MEASUREMENT, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, respondents.

Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) is entitled to take it again.
The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule thath) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a
student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.
The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.
But first the facts.
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner
claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. 1 When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his
application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his
admission to the test.
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. By
agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome
of his petition. 2 In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12,
Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the
petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education
through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. 3
We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical
schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano declared for a unanimous Court:
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing
of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully
approached by recalling that the regulation of the pratice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized
as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control
the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice
medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to
practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid
exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements-i.e.,
the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-for admission to the medical profession, has
also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in the
instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted
earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality
of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical
schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other
things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and
eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our
professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current state of our social and economic
development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving
its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the
quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for
instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite
probably, in other countries with far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account
the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is
reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is
useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in
those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case was not applicable. Her reason was that it upheld only
the requirement for the admission test and said nothing about the so-called "three-flunk rule."
We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue raised in both cases is the
academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more reliability, by
the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the

means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. 5
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility
of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives
and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The
three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not
qualified to be doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other
calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the
responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These
resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of
satisfaction.
A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better
as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may
not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to
take a course in nursing, however appropriate this career may be for others.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen
has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements. 6
The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. Where even those who have
qualified may still not be accommodated in our already crowded medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who, like
him, have been tested and found wanting.
The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. A law does not have to operate with
equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students and other students who are not subjected to
the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for
this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to an equally respectable
profession, does not hold the same delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly treated.
There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified
are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection requires is equality among equals.
The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show
that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. 7 While his
persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.
No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is
not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical
profession, but for another calling that has not excited his interest.
In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding. It is
for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his
latent talents toward what may even be a brilliant future.
We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the farm and engineers who should
have studied banking and teachers who could be better as merchants.
It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to the
course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity,"
in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January 13, 1989, is REVERSED, with costs
against the private respondent. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-47841 March 21, 1978
FRANCISCO VIRTOUSO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF MARIVELES, BATAAN, and CHIEF OF POLICE OF MARIVELES, BATAAN,respondents.
RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:

Petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., who filed an application for the writ of habeas corpus on February 23, 1978, premised his plea for
liberty primarily on the ground that the pre examination which led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him was a useless
formality as respondent Municipal Judge of Mariveles, Bataan, 1 failed to meet the strict standard required by the Constitution to
ascertain whether there was a probable cause. 2 He likewise alleged that aside from the constitutional infirmity that tainted the
procedure followed in the preliminary examination, the bail imposed was clearly excessive. 3 It was in the amount of Pl6,000.00, the
alleged robbery of a TV set being imputed to petitioner. As prayed for, the Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to it on
Wednesday, March 15, 1978. Respondent Judge, in his return filed on March 8, 1978, justified the issuance of the warrant of arrest,
alleging that there was no impropriety in the way the preliminary examination was conducted. As to the excessive character of the
bail, he asserted that while it was fixed in accordance with the Revised Bail Bond Guide issued by the Executive Judge of Bataan in
1977, he nevertheless reduced the amount to P 8,000.00.
Petitioner's counsel and respondent Municipal Judge orally argued the matter on March 15, 1978. In the course of intensive
questioning by the members of this Court, especially Justices Barredo, Aquino and Santos, it was ascertained that petitioner is a
seventeen-year old minor entitled to the protection and benefits of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. 4 a youthful offender being
defined therein as "one who is over nine years but under eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense." 5 As
such, he could be provisionally released on recognizance in the discretion of a court. 6 According accordingly, after the hearing, the
Court issued the following resolution: "Acting on the verbal petition of counsel for petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., the Court
Resolved pursuant to section 191 of Presidential Decree No. 603, petitioner being a 17-year old minor, to [order] the release of the
petitioner on the recognizance of his parents Francisco Virtouso, Sr. and Manuela Virtouso and his counsel, Atty. Guillermo B.
Bandonil, who, in open court, agreed to act in such capacity, without prejudice to further proceedings in a pending case against
petitioner being taken in accordance with law." 7 This Court should, whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and
Welfare Code, which is an implementation of this specific constitutional mandate: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in
nation-building and shall promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being." 8
Thus was the petition resolved, without the need of passing upon the issue of whether or not the procedure by respondent Judge in
ascertaining the existence of probable cause was constitutionally deficient. Nonetheless, it must ever be kept in mind by occupants
of the bench that they should always be on the alert lest by sloth or indifference or due to the economic or social standing of the
alleged offended party, as was intimated in this petition, the rights of an accused, instead of being honored, are disregarded. There
is much more importance attached to the immunities of an individual during a period of martial law, which in itself is a creature of the
Constitution as a mode of coping with grave emergency situations. It is equally pertinent to state that there should be fealty to the
constitutional ban against excessive bail being required. There is relevance to this excerpt from De la Camara v. Enage: 9
Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive.
So the Constitution commands. It is understandable why. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail
becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in the
fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that that United States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against
excessive bail. As construed in the latest American decision, 'the sole permissible function of money bail is to
assure the accused's presence at trial, and declared that "bail set at a higher figure than an amount reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose is 'excessive' under the Eighth Amendment. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in accordance with the terms of the Resolution of this Court of March 15, 1978 as set forth
above.
SECTION 16

OPOSA VS. FACTORAN

G.R. No. 1010183, July 30, 1993
FACTS:
The principal petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a
domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural
resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The complaint was
instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
thenatural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." This instant petition
was filed to seek for the cancelation of all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements.
Minor petitioners contend that continued granting of timber license constitutes a
misappropriation or impairment of the natural resourceproperty and violates their
constitutional right to a balanced andhealthful ecology (Art. II, Sec. 16, 1987 Constitution) and
the protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Petitioners likewise rely on the
respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's
right to a healthfulenvironment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.
2. Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
HELD:

1. The Court finds no difficulty in ruling that they can file a class suit because
they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means
the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia,
the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as future generations. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.
Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes,
at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for
the generations to come.
2. The Court does not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege
with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed,
and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified
data. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law (Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution).
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not underthe Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. The
right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. EO 192 and Admin Code of 1987 define the powers and functions
of DENR, under whose authority and office the complaint falls. The petitioners right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENRs duty to protect and advance the said
right. The petitioners personality to sue in behalf of their own as well as the future
generations behalf can only be based on the concept of intergenerational esponsibility insofar
as the said right is concerned.
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals
Posted on November 18, 2012
G.R.No. 120865-71
December 7, 1995
Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order to
execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to
accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
provinces and towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have shown that
the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same. EO 927 further
defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and enumerated the towns, cities
and provinces encompassed by the term Laguna de Bay Region. Upon implementation of RA
7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed exclusive jurisdiction &
authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof
provides: Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery privileges in the
municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore Big fishpen operators took
advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the consternation of the LLDA.
The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and
the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the
lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological
stress of Laguna Lake. The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens,
cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are
declared illegal; (2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task
Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and (3) owners of those declared illegal shall be
criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813. A month later,
the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and
other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures otherwise
demolition shall be effected.
Issues:
1.Which agency of the government the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the
region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the

issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?

2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?
Held:
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of
EONo.927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits
for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region. On
the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant
fishery privileges on municipal waters. The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the
laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and
the lake region.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter should prevail
since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute.The special law is to
be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a
contrary conclusion. Implied repeals are not favored and, as much as possible, effect must be
given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or
altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. The power of LGUs to issue fishing
privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On the other hand, the power of the LLDA to
grant permits for fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of
effectively regulating & monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake control
and management. It partakes of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, least
limitable and most demanding of all state powers including the power of taxation.
Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power should
prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution
cases with authority to issue a cease and desist order and on matters affecting the
construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.
Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, as
amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of
fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated thereinand
the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.
SECTION 19
Garcia vs. Board of Investments (BOI)
191 SCRA 288
November 1990

FACTS:
Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, formed by a group of Taiwanese
investors, was granted by the BOI its have its plant site for the products naphta cracker and naphta to based in Bataan. In
February 1989, one year after the BPC began its production in Bataan, the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant site
transferred from Bataan to Batangas. Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and others, the BOI granted
private respondent BPCs application, stating that the investors have the final choice as to where to have their plant site because
they are the ones who risk capital for the project.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application of the investors without considering the
national interest
COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this case, and ordered the original application of
the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the product naphta as feedstock maintained. The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first
stated the Courts judicial power to settle actual controversies as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution
before he wrote the reasons as to how the Court arrived to its conclusion. He mentioned that nothing is shown to justify the BOIs
action in letting the investors decide on an issue which, if handled by our own government, could have been very beneficial to the
State, as he remembered the word of a great Filipino leader, to wit: .. he would not mind having a government run like hell by
Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation. Justice Grio Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the petition was not
well-taken because the 1987 Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of a certain project, as well as any decision of the
BOI regarding the amended application. She stated that the fact that petitioner disagrees with BOI does not make the BOI wrong in
its decision, and that petitioner should have appealed to the President of the country and not to the Court, as provided for by Section
36 of the 1987 Investment Code. Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated that the Constitution does not vest
in the Court the power to enter the realm of policy considerations, such as in this case.
SECTION 21
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE
A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J.
SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J.
PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO,
CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER,petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989
ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D.
TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners,
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, respondents.
G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989
INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO
AVANCENA and ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.
G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989
NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for his life on his way to Mycenae after
performing his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules flung his adversary to the ground thinking him dead, but
Antaeus rose even stronger to resume their struggle. This happened several times to Hercules' increasing amazement. Finally, as
they continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could never die as long as any part of his
body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned, Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the sustaining
soil, and crushed him to death.
Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus weakened and died.
The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental forces of life and death, of men and
women who, like Antaeus need the sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay alive.
"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource among our
people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent
demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.
Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and economic security
of all the people," 1 especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State
shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership
and profits." 2 Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at
emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil." 3
The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article
XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common
people. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the
just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress
may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment
of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The
State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by the Congress
of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated principles. This was substantially superseded almost a decade
later by P.D. No. 27, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition
of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners.
The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized the thrust for agrarian reform. Thus, on July 17,
1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27
and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was
followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and
E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation.

Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power from the President
and started its own deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result,
after almost a year of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned
enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. 4
The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions, including serious challenges to
the constitutionality of the several measures mentioned above. They will be the subject of one common discussion and resolution,
The different antecedents of each case will require separate treatment, however, and will first be explained hereunder.
G.R. No. 79777
Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife
and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full
owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process,
equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid
also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover,
it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.
In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same may be made only by a court of
justice and not by the President of the Philippines. They invoke the recent cases of EPZA v. Dulay 5and Manotok v. National Food
Authority. 6 Moreover, the just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money or in cash and not in the form of
bonds or other things of value.
In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights
as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the
agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties.
The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them,
E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem
because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld in the earlier cases ofChavez v.
Zobel, 7 Gonzales v. Estrella, 8 and Association of Rice and Corn Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform
Council. 9 The determination of just compensation by the executive authorities conformably to the formula prescribed under the
questioned order is at best initial or preliminary only. It does not foreclose judicial intervention whenever sought or warranted. At any
rate, the challenge to the order is premature because no valuation of their property has as yet been made by the Department of
Agrarian Reform. The petitioners are also not proper parties because the lands owned by them do not exceed the maximum
retention limit of 7 hectares.
Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P.D. No. 27 does not provide for retention limits on tenanted lands
and that in any event their petition is a class suit brought in behalf of landowners with landholdings below 24 hectares. They
maintain that the determination of just compensation by the administrative authorities is a final ascertainment. As for the cases
invoked by the public respondent, the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 was merely assumed in Chavez, while what was decided
in Gonzales was the validity of the imposition of martial law.
In the amended petition dated November 22, 1588, it is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 (except Sections 20 and
21) have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657. Nevertheless, this statute should itself also be declared unconstitutional
because it suffers from substantially the same infirmities as the earlier measures.
A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of a 1. 83- hectare land, who
complained that the DAR was insisting on the implementation of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 despite a compromise agreement he
had reached with his tenant on the payment of rentals. In a subsequent motion dated April 10, 1989, he adopted the allegations in
the basic amended petition that the above- mentioned enactments have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79310
The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner
Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation
of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution
belongs to Congress and not the President. Although they agree that the President could exercise legislative power until the
Congress was convened, she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming
that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be
annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and equal protection.
They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides:
Agrarian Reform Fund.-There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the Agrarian Reform Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY
BILLION PESOS (P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the estimated cost of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to

1992 which shall be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust and Receipts of sale of illgotten wealth received through the Presidential Commission on Good Government and such other sources as government may
deem appropriate. The amounts collected and accruing to this special fund shall be considered automatically appropriated for the
purpose authorized in this Proclamation the amount appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. The money needed to cover the cost of the
contemplated expropriation has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at this time.
Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e.,
with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On the contrary, Section 6, thereof
provides that the Land Bank of the Philippines "shall compensate the landowner in an amount to be established by the government,
which shall be based on the owner's declaration of current fair market value as provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain
controls to be defined and promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council." This compensation may not be paid fully in
money but in any of several modes that may consist of part cash and part bond, with interest, maturing periodically, or direct
payment in cash or bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be prescribed or
approved by the PARC.
The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to make a careful study of the sugar
planters' situation. There is no tenancy problem in the sugar areas that can justify the application of the CARP to them. To the extent
that the sugar planters have been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, although they are a separate group with
problems exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been violated.
A motion for intervention was filed on August 27,1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters (NASP) which claims a
membership of at least 20,000 individual sugar planters all over the country. On September 10, 1987, another motion for intervention
was filed, this time by Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. Both motions were granted by the Court.
NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian Reform Program and that, in any event, the appropriation
is invalid because of uncertainty in the amount appropriated. Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229
provide for an initial appropriation of fifty billion pesos and thus specifies the minimum rather than the maximum authorized amount.
This is not allowed. Furthermore, the stated initial amount has not been certified to by the National Treasurer as actually available.
Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to wit, the failure to establish by clear and convincing evidence the necessity for
the exercise of the powers of eminent domain, and the violation of the fundamental right to own property.
The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the expropriation of the said land for an amount
equal to the government assessor's valuation of the land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the landowner declares his own
valuation he is unjustly required to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the uniformity rule.
In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General first invokes the presumption of constitutionality in favor of Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. No. 229. He also justifies the necessity for the expropriation as explained in the "whereas" clauses of the Proclamation and
submits that, contrary to the petitioner's contention, a pilot project to determine the feasibility of CARP and a general survey on the
people's opinion thereon are not indispensable prerequisites to its promulgation.
On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class
and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands
and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be
premature.
The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition is against the payment of public money without the
corresponding appropriation. There is no rule that only money already in existence can be the subject of an appropriation law.
Finally, the earmarking of fifty billion pesos as Agrarian Reform Fund, although denominated as an initial amount, is actually the
maximum sum appropriated. The word "initial" simply means that additional amounts may be appropriated later when necessary.
On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his own behalf, assailing the constitutionality of E.O. No.
229. In addition to the arguments already raised, Serrano contends that the measure is unconstitutional because:
(1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP;
(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the title;
(3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on July 2, 1987; and
(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National Treasury did not originate from the House of
Representatives.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due process and the requirement for
just compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were
subsequently issued to the private respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him.
On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land transfer and
asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents. He claims that on
December 24, 1986, his petition was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration, which had
not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued. These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because
they directly effected the transfer of his land to the private respondents.
The petitioner now argues that:

(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines.
(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken
without due process or just compensation.
(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress convened is anomalous and arbitrary,
besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers. The legislative power granted to the President under the Transitory Provisions
refers only to emergency measures that may be promulgated in the proper exercise of the police power.
The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of law and to the retention of his small
parcels of riceholding as guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution. He likewise argues that, besides denying him
just compensation for his land, the provisions of E.O. No. 228 declaring that:
Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 shall be considered as
advance payment for the land.
is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It is also his contention that the inclusion of even small landowners in the
program along with other landowners with lands consisting of seven hectares or more is undemocratic.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is premature because the motion for reconsideration filed with the
Minister of Agrarian Reform is still unresolved. As for the validity of the issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, he argues that they were
enacted pursuant to Section 6, Article XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.
On the issue of just compensation, his position is that when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated on October 21. 1972, the tenant-farmer of
agricultural land was deemed the owner of the land he was tilling. The leasehold rentals paid after that date should therefore be
considered amortization payments.
In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner maintains that the motion he filed was resolved on December 14, 1987. An
appeal to the Office of the President would be useless with the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, which in effect sanctioned
the validity of the public respondent's acts.
G.R. No. 78742
The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven
hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but
are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his
farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been
determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of
Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the
Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.
In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from
persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial,
industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners do not
fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10,
1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular
No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981
(Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their
Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention
under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right.
The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case notwithstanding the pendency of their
appeal to the President of the Philippines. Moreover, the issuance of the implementing rules, assuming this has not yet been done,
involves the exercise of discretion which cannot be controlled through the writ of mandamus. This is especially true if this function is
entrusted, as in this case, to a separate department of the government.
In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than
seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said
measures are nevertheless not in force because they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this Court
in Tanada v. Tuvera. 10 As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have
repealed the presidential decree.
I

Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three departments of the government, the judiciary
is nonetheless vested with the power to annul the acts of either the legislative or the executive or of both when not conformable to
the fundamental law. This is the reason for what some quarters call the doctrine of judicial supremacy. Even so, this power is not
lightly assumed or readily exercised. The doctrine of separation of powers imposes upon the courts a proper restraint, born of the
nature of their functions and of their respect for the other departments, in striking down the acts of the legislative and the executive
as unconstitutional. The policy, indeed, is a blend of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is that before the act
was done or the law was enacted, earnest studies were made by Congress or the President, or both, to insure that the Constitution
would not be breached.
In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the
concurrence of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations and voted on the issue during
their session en banc. 11 And as established by judge made doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question
only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an
actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must
have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the
case itself. 12
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, we hold that the same is satisfied by the
petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the
acts or measures complained of. 13 And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide
discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious
constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 14 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several
executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were invoking only an indirect and general interest shared in common
with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to
the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure." We have since then applied this exception in many other cases. 15
The other above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present petitions.
In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues like the ones now
before it, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion,
its only criterion will be the Constitution as God and its conscience give it the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose.
Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decision. Blandishment is as ineffectual as
intimidation.
For all the awesome power of the Congress and the Executive, the Court will not hesitate to "make the hammer fall, and heavily," to
use Justice Laurel's pithy language, where the acts of these departments, or of any public official, betray the people's will as
expressed in the Constitution.
It need only be added, to borrow again the words of Justice Laurel, that
... when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn
and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution. 16
The cases before us categorically raise constitutional questions that this Court must categorically resolve. And so we shall.
II
We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary issues before resolving the more serious challenges to the constitutionality of
the several measures involved in these petitions.
The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law has already been sustained
in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to
promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution, quoted above.
The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the Philippines was formally
convened and took over legislative power from her. They are not "midnight" enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature
because E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued
on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any
statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does
not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President
Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as long as she
possessed it.
Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged
measures and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its
provisions. 17 Indeed, some portions of the said measures, like the creation of the P50 billion fund in Section 2 of Proc. No. 131, and
Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229, have been incorporated by reference in the CARP Law.18
That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the requirements of a valid
appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide

for the creation of said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of
which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury.19 The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective
of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked, to wit, Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article VI, are not
applicable. With particular reference to Section 24, this obviously could not have been complied with for the simple reason that the
House of Representatives, which now has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures, had not yet been convened when
the proclamation was issued. The legislative power was then solely vested in the President of the Philippines, who embodied, as it
were, both houses of Congress.
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for
retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such
limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section declares:
Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly,
any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable familysized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five
(5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following
qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly
managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27
shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees
or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain
the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be expressed in its
title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if
the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. 20
The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever name it was called, had the
force and effect of law because it came from President Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence, it is futile to argue, as the
petitioners do in G.R. No. 79744, that LOI 474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was only a letter of
instruction. The important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos, whose word was law during that time.
But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply with the requirement for publication
as this Court held in Tanada v. Tuvera. 21 Hence, unless published in the Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil
Code, they could not have any force and effect if they were among those enactments successfully challenged in that case. LOI 474
was published, though, in the Official Gazette dated November 29,1976.)
Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the
performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government. That is true as a general proposition but
is subject to one important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge
of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action
only but not specific action.
Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercise of
such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of
mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is
purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only. For example, if an inferior court, public
official, or board should, for an unreasonable length of time, fail to decide a particular question to the great
detriment of all parties concerned, or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly
gave it jurisdiction mandamus will issue, in the first case to require a decision, and in the second to require that
jurisdiction be taken of the cause. 22
And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as there is still a plain, speedy and adequate remedy available
from the administrative authorities, resort to the courts may still be permitted if the issue raised is a question of law. 23
III
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application
of both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, 24 for example, where a law
required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court
held that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome and intended for a public
use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of
collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public
morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which
requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.
In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 25 Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the police power in a famous aphorism:
"The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as
a taking." The regulation that went "too far" was a law prohibiting mining which might cause the subsidence of structures for human
habitation constructed on the land surface. This was resisted by a coal company which had earlier granted a deed to the land over
its mine but reserved all mining rights thereunder, with the grantee assuming all risks and waiving any damage claim. The Court held
the law could not be sustained without compensating the grantor. Justice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in which he argued that there
was a valid exercise of the police power. He said:
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives the owner of some
right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property without making

compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not
a taking. The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted
remains in the possession of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely
prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public. Whenever the use
prohibited ceases to be noxious as it may because of further changes in local or social conditions the
restriction will have to be removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy his property as heretofore.
Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and the power of eminent domain, with
the latter being used as an implement of the former like the power of taxation. The employment of the taxing power to achieve a
police purpose has long been accepted. 26 As for the power of expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of the University of Illinois
College of Law (referring to the earlier case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, which sustained a zoning law under the
police power) makes the following significant remarks:
Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the Police and eminent domain powers on different
planets. Generally speaking, they viewed eminent domain as encompassing public acquisition of private property
for improvements that would be available for public use," literally construed. To the police power, on the other
hand, they assigned the less intrusive task of preventing harmful externalities a point reflected in the Euclid
opinion's reliance on an analogy to nuisance law to bolster its support of zoning. So long as suppression of a
privately authored harm bore a plausible relation to some legitimate "public purpose," the pertinent measure need
have afforded no compensation whatever. With the progressive growth of government's involvement in land use,
the distance between the two powers has contracted considerably. Today government often employs eminent
domain interchangeably with or as a useful complement to the police power-- a trend expressly approved in the
Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker, which broadened the reach of eminent domain's "public use"
test to match that of the police power's standard of "public purpose." 27
The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the improvement of blighted areas in the District of Columbia as a proper
exercise of the police power. On the role of eminent domain in the attainment of this purpose, Justice Douglas declared:
If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as
sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is
clear.
For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. 28
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 29 decided by a 6-3 vote in 1978, the U.S Supreme Court sustained the
respondent's Landmarks Preservation Law under which the owners of the Grand Central Terminal had not been allowed to construct
a multi-story office building over the Terminal, which had been designated a historic landmark. Preservation of the landmark was
held to be a valid objective of the police power. The problem, however, was that the owners of the Terminal would be deprived of the
right to use the airspace above it although other landowners in the area could do so over their respective properties. While insisting
that there was here no taking, the Court nonetheless recognized certain compensatory rights accruing to Grand Central Terminal
which it said would "undoubtedly mitigate" the loss caused by the regulation. This "fair compensation," as he called it, was explained
by Prof. Costonis in this wise:
In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status, Penn Central was authorized to transfer to neighboring
properties the authorized but unused rights accruing to the site prior to the Terminal's designation as a landmark the rights which
would have been exhausted by the 59-story building that the city refused to countenance atop the Terminal. Prevailing bulk
restrictions on neighboring sites were proportionately relaxed, theoretically enabling Penn Central to recoup its losses at the
Terminal site by constructing or selling to others the right to construct larger, hence more profitable buildings on the transferee
sites. 30
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that
the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the
regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the
power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of
the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial
rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power
of eminent domain.
Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the several measures before us are challenged as
violative of the due process and equal protection clauses.
The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299 on the ground that no retention limits are prescribed has already been
discussed and dismissed. It is noted that although they excited many bitter exchanges during the deliberation of the CARP Law in
Congress, the retention limits finally agreed upon are, curiously enough, not being questioned in these petitions. We therefore do not
discuss them here. The Court will come to the other claimed violations of due process in connection with our examination of the
adequacy of just compensation as required under the power of expropriation.
The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also
become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also
the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on
the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to
the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from
each other in these same particulars. 31 To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on

substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. 32 The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures
here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and
the liabilities imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment.
The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land
reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those
who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a
valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused
to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.
It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the
lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular
class require the interference of the State and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment
of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 34 As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform
have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be
examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal.
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify
the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping
with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest
moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an
individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a, person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a
majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right.
That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. With regard to his
property, the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation.
This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.
IV
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for
public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the
owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may
be agreed upon by the parties. 35 It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other
conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount
authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible
demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare
of the people is the supreme law.
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The
limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation"
and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper
exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.
Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State should first distribute public agricultural
lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform instead of immediately disturbing property rights by forcibly acquiring private agricultural
lands. Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP as the Constitution calls
for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event, the decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner
prescribed by the CARP was made by the legislative and executive departments in the exercise of their discretion. We are not
justified in reviewing that discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused.
A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when they decide what is known as the
political question. As explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in the case of Taada v. Cuenco: 36
The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to
"those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with the enlargement of judicial power, which now includes
the authority of the courts "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 37 Even so, this should not be construed as a license for
us to reverse the other departments simply because their views may not coincide with ours.
The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in the CARP the redistribution of private
landholdings (even as the distribution of public agricultural lands is first provided for, while also continuing apace under the Public
Land Act and other cognate laws). The Court sees no justification to interpose its authority, which we may assert only if we believe
that the political decision is not unwise, but illegal. We do not find it to be so.
In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company, 38 it was held:
Congress having determined, as it did by the Act of March 3,1909 that the entire St. Mary's river between the
American bank and the international line, as well as all of the upland north of the present ship canal, throughout its
entire length, was "necessary for the purpose of navigation of said waters, and the waters connected therewith,"

that determination is conclusive in condemnation proceedings instituted by the United States under that Act, and
there is no room for judicial review of the judgment of Congress ... .
As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the Constitution itself No less than the 1987
Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason why private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the
prescribed maximum retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an
elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the State adopt the necessary measures "to encourage and undertake the just
distribution of all agricultural lands to enable farmers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till." That public
use, as pronounced by the fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.
The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a longer and more thoughtful examination.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. 39 It has been
repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss.40 The word "just" is used to intensify
the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be
real, substantial, full, ample. 41
It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use of private
lands under the police power. We deal here with an actual taking of private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of
their property and deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation mandated by the
Constitution.
As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is compensable taking when the following conditions concur: (1) the
expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under
warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.
Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its taking possession of the condemned
property, as "the compensation is a public charge, the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of
taxation may be employed in raising the amount." 43 Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARP Law provides that:
Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in
LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the
proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is entrusted to the administrative
authorities in violation of judicial prerogatives. Specific reference is made to Section 16(d), which provides that in case of the
rejection or disregard by the owner of the offer of the government to buy his land... the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by
requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for
the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter
is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for
decision.
To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may not be usurped by any
other branch or official of the government. EPZA v. Dulay 44 resolved a challenge to several decrees promulgated by President
Marcos providing that the just compensation for property under expropriation should be either the assessment of the property by the
government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever was lower. In declaring these decrees unconstitutional, the Court
held through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under this Constitution
is reserved to it for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to determine the just
compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the
lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would
be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to
satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a
judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees during the
proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the
valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court
cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could
substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.
xxx
In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the courts under P.D. No.
1533, which contains the same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power
and authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to
appoint commissioners for such purpose.
This time, we answer in the affirmative.

xxx
It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is
unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a
minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert
commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been
presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously
evaluated.
A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the arbitrariness that rendered the challenged
decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although the proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and other interested
parties are nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. But more importantly, the
determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any means final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other
interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides:
Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.
The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice
will still have the right to review with finality the said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.
The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as easily resolved.
This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:
SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as
may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in
Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just
compensation for the land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:
(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is
concerned Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in
government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares
Thirty percent (30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial
instruments negotiable at any time.
(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below Thirty-five percent (35%)
cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at
any time.
(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred shares, physical assets or
other qualified investments in accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;
(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:
(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten percent
(10%) of the face value of the bonds shall mature every year from the date of
issuance until the tenth (10th) year: Provided, That should the landowner
choose to forego the cash portion, whether in full or in part, he shall be paid
correspondingly in LBP bonds;
(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the
landowner, his successors-in- interest or his assigns, up to the amount of their
face value, for any of the following:
(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government, including
assets under the Asset Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed by
government financial institutions in the same province or region where the
lands for which the bonds were paid are situated;
(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or controlled
corporations or shares of stock owned by the government in private
corporations;
(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of accused
persons, or for performance bonds;

(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided the
proceeds of the loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise, preferably
in a small and medium- scale industry, in the same province or region as the
land for which the bonds are paid;
(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to government: Provided, That the use
of these bonds for these purposes will be limited to a certain percentage of
the outstanding balance of the financial instruments; Provided, further, That
the PARC shall determine the percentages mentioned above;
(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder
in government universities, colleges, trade schools, and other institutions;
(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in
government hospitals; and
(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.
The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above provision is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of
the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money, which is the only medium of payment allowed.
In support of this contention, they cite jurisprudence holding that:
The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just
compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the
money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete
equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the
expropriation . 45 (Emphasis supplied.)
In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, 46 this Court held:
It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking.
Anything beyond that is more, and anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the
expropriating entity. The market value of the land taken is the just compensation to which the owner of condemned
property is entitled, the market value being that sum of money which a person desirous, but not compelled to buy,
and an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received for such
property. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has been derived, the weight of authority is also to the effect
that just compensation for property expropriated is payable only in money and not otherwise. Thus
The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The condemnor cannot compel the owner to
accept anything but money, nor can the owner compel or require the condemnor to pay him on any other basis
than the value of the property in money at the time and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and the
statutes. When the power of eminent domain is resorted to, there must be a standard medium of payment, binding
upon both parties, and the law has fixed that standard as money in cash. 47 (Emphasis supplied.)
Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things, be regarded as a reliable and
constant standard of compensation. 48
"Just compensation" for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent in money, which must be paid at
least within a reasonable time after the taking, and it is not within the power of the Legislature to substitute for
such payment future obligations, bonds, or other valuable advantage. 49 (Emphasis supplied.)
It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other. And
so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the
traditional excercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively
limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose.
What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess
of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular
community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the
impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond in
time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of
Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as we are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a
richer and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be forgotten
that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for "a just distribution" among the
farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now become the key at least to their deliverance.
Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land subject to
expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the
amount of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present standards. Such amount is in fact not
even fully available at this time.

We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority
project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also
intended that the just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical method.
There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of the government and had no illusions that there would be
enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may therefore assume
that their intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the
balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other things of
value. We may also suppose that what they had in mind was a similar scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D. No. 27, which
was the law in force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which they presumably agreed in principle.
The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical agreement among the members regarding
the meaning to be given the concept of just compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform program being
contemplated. There was the suggestion to "fine tune" the requirement to suit the demands of the project even as it was also felt that
they should "leave it to Congress" to determine how payment should be made to the landowner and reimbursement required from
the farmer-beneficiaries. Such innovations as "progressive compensation" and "State-subsidized compensation" were also
proposed. In the end, however, no special definition of the just compensation for the lands to be expropriated was reached by the
Commission. 50
On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions we are making of the general
sentiments and intention of the members on the content and manner of the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the
magnitude of the expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator.
With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the aforequoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of
pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities
and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to
see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these
disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing
the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless
countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, we find further that the
proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the
lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in
money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in
bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment
are "negotiable at any time." The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable
because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent
to the amount of just compensation.
Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small, not a little inconvenience. As
already remarked, this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is devoutly hoped that these countrymen of ours, conscious as we know
they are of the need for their forebearance and even sacrifice, will not begrudge us their indispensable share in the attainment of the
ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise, our pursuit of this elusive goal will be like the quest for the Holy Grail.
The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not seem to be viable any more as it
appears that Section 4 of the said Order has been superseded by Section 14 of the CARP Law. This repeats the requisites of
registration as embodied in the earlier measure but does not provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or refusal to register the
land, the valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city assessor for tax purposes. On the contrary, the CARP Law
says that the just compensation shall be ascertained on the basis of the factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner
provided for in Section 16.
The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just
compensation, in contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent domain.
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full
payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic
jurisdictions. Thus:
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgment fixing just
compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnor's title relates back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent
Domain Act, or the commissioner's report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed.51
... although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to the property taken remains
in the owner until payment is actually made. 52 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 53 the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to property does not pass to the
condemnor until just compensation had actually been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be uniformly to this effect. As early as
1838, in Rubottom v. McLure, 54 it was held that "actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a condition precedent
to the investment of the title to the property in the State" albeit "not to the appropriation of it to public use." In Rexford v. Knight, 55 the
Court of Appeals of New York said that the construction upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment
of the compensation although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy
further said that "both on principle and authority the rule is ... that the right to enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as
the property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not pass from the owner
without his consent, until just compensation has been made to him."
Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, 56 that:

If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be
apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance
that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is
paid ... . (Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be
deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be
actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was
understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional
requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by
virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.)
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the
farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its
Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer- beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of
ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the land."
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible
bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. 57 No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for
must also be rejected.
It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228,
are retained by him even now under R.A. No. 6657. This should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law
that "the landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally
retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original
homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."
In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal filed by the petitioners with the Office
of the President has already been resolved. Although we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies need
not preclude immediate resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet to be examined on the administrative level,
especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474 because they do not own other agricultural lands than the
subjects of their petition.
Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention
rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657,
which in fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted by the decree.
V
The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the subject of bitter attack from those who point to
the shortcomings of these measures and ask that they be scrapped entirely. To be sure, these enactments are less than perfect;
indeed, they should be continuously re-examined and rehoned, that they may be sharper instruments for the better protection of the
farmer's rights. But we have to start somewhere. In the pursuit of agrarian reform, we do not tread on familiar ground but grope on
terrain fraught with pitfalls and expected difficulties. This is inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the
contrary, to use Justice Holmes's words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so we learn as we venture forward,
and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot expect perfection although we should strive for it by all means. Meantime, we
struggle as best we can in freeing the farmer from the iron shackles that have unconscionably, and for so long, fettered his soul to
the soil.
By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are removed, to clear the
way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse the day he will be released not only from want but also from the
exploitation and disdain of the past and from his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended
forever. At last the farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of the Mother Earth that will give him not only the staff
of life but also the joy of living. And where once it bred for him only deep despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a
more fulfilling future. Now at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dark resentments and "rebuild in it the
music and the dream."
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the
constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to
their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention
rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.

5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

SECTION 22
CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY CITYMAYOR REINALDO A.BAUTISTA,
JR., vs ATTY. BRAIN S. MASWENG,G.R. No. 188913, February 19, 2014
Facts:In pursuance of the final Decision in G.R. No. 180206, petitioner issued the subject
demolition advicesfor the enforcement of Demolition Order No. 33, Series of 2005 against
Alexander Ampaguey, Sr.et.al; Demolition Order No. 83, Series of 1999 against Julio Daluyen,
Sr., et.al, all in Busol Watershed,Baguio City. As it is, the aforesaid individuals filed a petition for
injunction (Case No. 31-CAR-09)while Magdalena Gumangan, et al. filed a petition for
identification, delineation and recognition ofancestral land claims with prayer for temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction(Case No. 29-CAR-09).Respondent in his
capacity as the Regional Hearing Officer of the National Commission on IndigenousPeoples,
Cordillera Administrative Region (NCIP-CAR) issued the following separate
temporaryrestraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction in both cases orders:(1) 72Hour Temporary Restraining Order dated July 27, 2009, Order dated July 31, 2009 and Writ
ofPreliminary Injunction4 in NCIP Case No. 31-CAR-09; and(2)72-Hour Temporary Restraining
Order dated July 27, 2009, Order dated July 31, 2009 and Writ ofPreliminary Injunction7 in NCIP
Case No. 29-CAR-09.Hence, this petition asserting that the restraining orders and writs of
preliminary injunction wereissued in willful disregard, disobedience, defiance and resistance of
this Courts Decision in G.R. No.180206 which dismissed the previous injunction case.
Petitioner contends that respondents act of enjoining the execution of the demolition orders
and demolition advices is tantamount to allowingforum shopping since the implementation of
the demolition orders over the structures in the BusolForest Reservation had already been
adjudicated and affirmed by this Court.Respondent claims that he issued the restraining orders
and writs of preliminary injunction in NCIPCase Nos. 31-CAR-09 and 29-CAR-09 because his
jurisdiction was called upon to protect andpreserve the rights of the petitioners (in the NCIP
cases) who were undoubtedly members of theindigenous cultural communities/indigenous
peoples. In addition, he maintains that the orders andwrits he issued did not disregard the
earlier ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 180206 because the Courthas in fact affirmed the power
of the NCIP to issue temporary restraining orders and writs ofinjunction without any prohibition
against the issuance of said writs when the main action is forinjunction.Issue:Whether the
respondent should be cited in contempt of court for issuing the subject temporaryrestraining
orders and writs of preliminary injunction.Held:The court ruled in affirmative. The said orders
clearly contravene the courts ruling in G.R. No. 180206 that Elvin Gumangan, et.al.
who are owners of houses and structures covered by the demolition orders issued by petitioner
arenot entitled to the injunctive relief previously granted by respondent.The court finds that
petitioners and private respondents present the very same arguments andcounter-arguments
with respect to the writ of injunction against the fencing of the Busol WatershedReservation.
The same legal issues are thus being litigated in G.R. No.180206 and in the case at bar,except
that different writs of injunction are being assailed. While res judicata does not apply on
account of the different subject matters of the case at bar andG.R. No. 180206 (they assail
different writs of injunction, albeit issued by the same hearing officer),the court is constrained
by the principle of stare decisis in granting the instant petition.Petitioner City Government of
Baguio in issuing the demolition advices are simply enforcing theprevious demolition orders
against the same occupants or claimants or their agents and successors-in- interest, only to be
thwarted anew by the injunctive orders and writs issued by respondent. Despite the Courts
pronouncement in G.R. No. 180206 that no such clear legal right exists in favor ofthose
occupants or claimants to restrain the enforcement of the demolition orders issued
bypetitioner, and hence there remains no legal impediment to bar their implementation,
respondentstill issued the temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction.
Respondent has willfully disregarded and defies the Courts ruling on a matter submitted for
the second time before his office. Hence Atty. Masweng is guilty of indirect contempt under
Section 7 ofRule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, in relation to Section 3(b) of
Rule 71 of the Rule.
SECTION 25
Basco v pagcor
Municipal Corporation Local Autonomy imperium in imperio
On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under PD 1869 to enable the Government to regulate
and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Basco
and four others (all lawyers) assailed the validity of the law creating PAGCOR on constitutional
grounds among others particularly citing that the PAGCORs charter is against the
constitutional provision on local autonomy.

Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to
impose taxes and legal fees; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as
the franchise holder from paying any tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as
fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local is violative of the local
autonomy principle.
ISSUE: Whether or not PAGCORs charter is violative of the principle of local autonomy.
HELD: NO. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to
levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress
may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges
shall accrue exclusively to the local government.
A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing
powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines
and limitation as Congress may provide.
Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose
taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed
that municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress which has the power to create
and abolish municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers. Congress,
therefore, has the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City
of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take
back the power.
Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original
charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. Otherwise,
its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.
This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over local
governments.
Limbona vs. Mangelin (170 SCRA 786)
Facts: Petitioner was appointed member of the Sanguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous
Government and was later elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly. Congressman
Datu invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly for consulations and
dialogues on the recent and present political developments and other issues affecting Regions
IX and XII hopefully resulting to chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as
envisioned and may prod the President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative
Commission as mandated by the Commission. Consistent with the said invitation, Petitioner
addressed all Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as our presence in the
house committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending business in
batasang pampook . In defiance of Petitioners advice, After declaring the presence of a
quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to
declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the
affirmative.
Issue: Is the expulsion valid? Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they
are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is
the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?
Held: Firstly, We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of
the petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so
minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary
requirements of due process. And while it is within the discretion of the members of the
Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the
moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse
the Decree PD 168 established internal autonomy in the two regions [w]ithin the framework
of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its
Constitution, with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and
responsibilities specified therein Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central
government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
base of government power and in the process to make local governments more responsive
and accountable, and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress. At
the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and
enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises general supervision

over them, but only to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the
favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention
from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power
amounts to self-immolation, since in that event, the autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. An autonomous government
that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to
the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of
autonomy. On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we
noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is
autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in
perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are
beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes
unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise
autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of selfimmolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that [t]he President
shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions. In the
second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly
administrative services
Hence, we assume jurisdiction.
SECTION 28
Legaspi v. CSC
G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987
Cortes, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier
denied Legaspis request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons
employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees,
Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service
eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
Issue:
whether or not Legaspis request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain
persons employed must be granted on the basis of his right to information
Held:
Yes. Article III, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution reads:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis. for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by law. These
constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which the right
to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford
access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be
asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary
act of the Legislature. What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions
and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the
declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.
However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the
Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable
by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a
mandamus proceeding such as this one. Government agencies are without discretion in
refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose sight of
the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public
records on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the public. The
authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power
to prohibit. A distinction has to be made between the discretion to refuse outright the
disclosure of or access to a particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in
which the access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation upon the availability of access to the
information sought, which only the Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution).
The second pertains to the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its

authority to regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of,
public records may be avoided, undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be
prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the same constitutional right by other
persons shall be assured. Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject
to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose
the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be
discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made
contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. The constitutional guarantee to information
on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all
information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are subject to
limitations as may be provided by law (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may
therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting
national security. It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public
record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public
concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee.
Issue:
whether or not petitioner has legal personality to bring the mandamus suit
Held:
Yes. The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. When the question is one
of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty,
the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result,
it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the
laws.
When a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of
personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore,
part of the general public which possesses the right. The petitioner, being a citizen who, as
such is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of
the public right.
Issue:
whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern
Held:
The above question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired
information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any
discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the
burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public
concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To
safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency
concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled
by a writ of Mandamus. The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the
claim of certain government employees that they are civil service eligibles for the positions to
which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly declares as a State policy that:
Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be
determined, as far as practicable, and except as to positions which are policy determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical, by competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2.[2]).
But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For mandamus to lie
in a given case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny
the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law
which would limit the petitioners right to know who are, and who are not, civil service
eligibles. The names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations
and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is
nothing secret about ones civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioners request is,
therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government
employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a
right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.
Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA 211)
DECISION

PADILLA, J.:
I. THE FACTS
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the
mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas,
for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order,
and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of
the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC
installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners Atty. Ricardo
Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and
Advocates For Peoples Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that
respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be
directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the
people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to
make searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution.
II.
THE ISSUE
Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable
search and seizures?
III.
THE RULING
[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]
NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which
are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. Where, for example, the
officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to
pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order
for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to
destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may
take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency
movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by
NPA sparrow units, not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming
rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media,
most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions which all sum up to what one
can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the
state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a
warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. True,
the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in
the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during
these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay
for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
G.R. No. 92541 November 13, 1991
MA. CARMEN G. AQUINO-SARMIENTO, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO (in his capacity as Chairman of the MTRCB) and the MOVIE & TELEVISION REVIEW AND
CLASSIFICATION BOARD, respondents.
Araullo, Zambrano, Gruba, Chua Law Firm for petitioner.
Francisco Ma. Chanco for respondents.

BIDIN, J.:p
At issue in this petition is the citizen's right of access to official records as guaranteed by the constitution.

In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB),
wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by
the individual board members after a review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are
either banned, cut or classified accordingly.
Acting on the said request, the records officer informed petitioner that she has to secure prior clearance from respondent Manuel
Morato, as chairman of MTRCB, to gain access to the records sought to be examined.
Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in
judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such,
are purely and completely private and personal. It is the submission of respondents that the individual voting slips is the exclusive
property of the member concerned and anybody who wants access thereto must first secure his (the member's) consent, otherwise,
a request therefor may be legally denied.
Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the records she wishes to examine are public in character and other than providing for
reasonable conditions regulating the manner and hours of examination, respondents Morato and the classification board have no
authority to deny any citizen seeking examination of the board's records.
On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by
petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17) members of the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified
documents which rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter, respondent Morato
denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. However, it was only much later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board
issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the
voting slips of the members.
Petitioner brought the matter to the attention of the Executive Secretary, which in turn, referred the same to respondent Morato for
appropriate comment.
Another incident which gave rise to this petition occurred in a board meeting held on June 22, 1989. In that meeting, respondent
Morato told the board that he has ordered some deletions on the movie "Mahirap ang Magmahal" notwithstanding the fact that said
movie was earlier approved for screening by the Board with classification "R-18 without cuts". He explained that his power to
unilaterally change the decision of the Review Committee is authorized by virtue of MTRCB Resolution No. 88-1-25 (dated June
22,1988) which allows the chairman of the board "to downgrade a film (already) reviewed especially those which are controversial."
Petitioner informed the Board, however, that respondent Morato possesses no authority to unilaterally reverse a decision of the
review committee under PD 1986 (Creating the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board).
After the matter was referred by the Deputy Executive Secretary to the Justice Secretary, the latter opined that PD 1896 does not
vest respondent Morato any authority to unilaterally reverse the decision of the review committee but declined to comment on the
constitutionality of Res. No. 10-89 on the ground that the resolution thereof is a judicial prerogative (Rollo, pp. 38-42).
The Justice Secretary's opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, respondent Morato opted to ignore it.
Hence, this petition anchored on the following:
A. MORATO AND THE MTRCB BY APPROVING AND ENFORCING RESOLUTION NO. 10-89 ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE SAME VIOLATES ARTICLE III SECTION 7 OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION.
B. MTRCB RESOLUTION NO. 88-1-25 HAS NO LEGAL BASIS AND CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF
DISCRETIONARY POWERS.
C. MORATO AND THE MTRCB BY REFUSING TO ABIDE BY OPINION NO. 1 SERIES OF 1990 OF THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE AND BY INSISTING ON THE VALIDITY OF RESOLUTION NO. 88-1-25 ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY, ARBITRARILY, IN BAD
FAITH, IN EXCESS OF THEIR JURISDICTION, AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Petitioner therefore seeks the nullification of 1) MTRCB Resolution No. 88-1-25 which allows the Chairman of the Board to
unilaterally downgrade a film (already) reviewed especially those which are controversial and 2) MTRCB RESOLUTION No. 10-89
(dated July 27, 1989) declaring as strictly confidential, private and personal a) the decision of a reviewing committee which
previously reviewed a certain film and b) the individual voting slips of the members of the committee that reviewed the film.
Respondents argue at the outset that the instant petition should be dismissed outright for having failed to comply with the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
We disagree. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrate remedies simply provides that before a party litigant is allowed resort to the
courts, he is required to comply with all administrative remedies available under the law (Rosales v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA
344 [1988]). The rationale behind this salutory principle is that for reasons of practical considerations, comity and convenience, the
courts of law will not entertain a case until all the available administrative remedies provided by law have been resorted to and the
appropriate authorities have been given ample opportunity to act and to correct the errors committed in the administrative level. If
the error is rectified, judicial intervention would then be unnecessary.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute. The applicability of the principle admits of certain
exceptions, such as: 1) when no administrative review is provided by law; 2) when the only question involved is one of law
(Valmonte v. Valmonte, 170 SCRA 256 [1989], citing Aguilar v. Valencia, 40 SCRA 210 [1971]; Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA
359 [1984]; Bagatsing v. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306; Del Mar v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 51 SCRA 340 [1973]; Pascual v.
Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466 [1959]; 3) where the party invoking the doctrine is guilty of estoppel (Vda. de Tan v. Veterans'
Backpay Commission [1969]; 4) where the challenged administrative action is patently illegal, arbitrary and oppressive (Azur v.

Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]; National Development Co. v. Collector of Customs of Manila, 9 SCRA 429 [1963]; 5) where
there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that would greatly prejudice the complainant (Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742
[1967]; Azuelo v. Arnaldo, 108 Phil. 293 [1960]; 6) where to exhaust administrative review is impractical and unreasonable (Cipriano
v. Marcelino, 43 SCRA 291); and 7) where the rule of qualified political agency applies (Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil. 237
[1906]).
The issue raised in the instant petition is one of law, hence the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedy relied upon by
respondents is inapplicable and cannot be given any effect. At any rate, records are replete with events pointing to the fact that
petitioner adhered to the administrative processes in the disposition of the assailed resolutions of public respondents prior to filing
the instant petition by, among others, writing the Executive Secretary and bringing the matter to the attention of the Office of the
President (Rollo, pp. 145-147). Respondents' claim that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies must therefore fail.
Having disposed of the procedural objection raised by respondents, We now proceed to resolve the issues raised by petitioner. In
this regard, We find respondents' refusal to allow petitioner to examine the records of respondent MTRCB, pertaining to the
decisions of the review committee as well as the individual voting slips of its members, as violative of petitioner's constitutional right
of access to public records. More specifically, Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution provides that:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law. (emphasis supplied)
As We held in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission (150 SCRA 530 [1987]), this constitutional provision is self-executory and
supplies "the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 167
[1927]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right
therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the
Legislature (Id. at 165). What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to
be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State Policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving
public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28)." (See also Taada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 [1985]; Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170
SCRA 256 [1989]).
Respondents contend, however, that what is rendered by the members of the board in reviewing films and reflected in their
individual voting slip is their individual vote of conscience on the motion picture or television program and as such, makes the
individual voting slip purely private and personal; an exclusive property of the member concerned.
The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person, company, or interest"; whereas, public
means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at large" (People v. Powell, 274 NW 372 [1937]).
May the decisions of respondent Board and the individual members concerned, arrived at in an official capacity, be considered
private? Certainly not. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt
that its very existence is public is character; it is an office created to serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no
valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or
officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties (See Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., supra.) There can be no invasion of
privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing official
functions. To declare otherwise would be to clothe every public official with an impregnable mantle of protection against public
scrutiny for their official acts.
Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant
to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore,
public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land. Being a public right,
the exercise thereof cannot be made contingent on the discretion, nay, whim and caprice, of the agency charged with the custody of
the official records sought to be examined. The constitutional recognition of the citizen's right of access to official records cannot be
made dependent upon the consent of the members of the board concerned, otherwise, the said right would be rendered nugatory.
As stated by this Court in Subido v. Ozaeta (80 Phil. 383 [1948]):
Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examinations is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not
believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and
objects of the person seeking access to the records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which the
records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the
contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to
devise a remedy. (emphasis supplied)
It is significant to point out that this Court in the 1948 case of Subido v. Ozaeta, supra, upheld the right to information based on the
statutory right then provided in Sec. 56 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496, as amended). Consequently, We see no cogent reason
why said right, now constitutionalized, should be given less efficacy and primacy than what the fundament law mandates.
The Court is not unaware of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) which provides,
among others, certain exceptions as regards the availability of official records or documents to the requesting public, e.g., closed
door Cabinet sessions and deliberations of this Court. Suffice it to state, however, that the exceptions therein enumerated find no
application in the case at bar. Petitioner request is not concerned with the deliberations of respondent Board but with its documents
or records made after a decision or order has been rendered. Neither will the examination involve disclosure of trade secrets or
matters pertaining to national security which would otherwise limit the right of access to official records (See Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission,supra).
We are likewise not impressed with the proposition advanced by respondents that respondent Morato is empowered by PD 1986 to
unilaterally downgrade or upgrade a film reviewed especially those which are controversial. The pertinent provisions of said decree
provides:
Sec 4. Decision. The decision of the BOARD either approving or disapproving for exhibition in the Philippines a
motion picture, television program, still and other pictorial advertisement submitted to it for examination and

preview must be rendered within a period of ten (10) days which shall be counted from the date of receipt by the
BOARD of an application for the purpose . . .
For each review session, the Chairman of the Board shall designate a sub-committee composed of at least three
BOARD members to undertake the work of review. Any disapproval or deletion must be approved by a majority of
the sub-committee members so designated. After receipt of the written decision of the sub-committee, a motion for
reconsideration in writing may be made, upon which the Chairman of the Board shall designate a sub-committee
of five BOARD members to undertake a second review session, whose decision on behalf of the Board shall be
rendered through a majority of the sub-committee members so designated and present at the second review
session. This second review session shall be presided over by the Chairman, or the Vice-Chairman. The decision
of the BOARD in the second review session shall be rendered within five (5) days from the date of receipt of the
motion for reconsideration.
Every decision of the BOARD disapproving a motion picture, television program or publicity material for exhibition
in the Philippines must be in writing, and shall state the reasons or grounds for such disapproval. No film or motion
picture intended for exhibition at the moviehouses or theaters or on television shall be disapproved by reason of its
topic, theme or subject matter, but upon the merits of each picture or program considered in its entirety.
The second decision of the BOARD shall be final, with the exception of a decision disapproving or prohibiting a
motion picture or television program in its entirety which shall be appealable to the President of the Philippines,
who may himself decide the appeal, or be assisted either by an ad hoe committee he may create or by the
Appeals Committee herein created.
An Appeals Committee in the Office of the President of the Philippines is hereby created composed of a Chairman
and four (4) members to be appointed by the President of the Philippines, which shall submit its recommendation
to the President. The Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs shall serve as the Secretariat of the
Appeals Committee.
The decision of the President of the Philippines on any appealed matter shall be final.
Implementing Rules and Regulations
Sec 11. Review by Sub-Committee of Three. a) A proper application having been filed, the Chairman of the
Board shall, as the exigencies of the service may permit, designate a Sub-Committee of at least three Board
Members who shall meet, with notice to the applicant, within ten days from receipt of the completed application.
The Sub-Committee shall then preview the motion picture subject of the application.
b) Immediately after the preview, the applicant or his representative shall withdraw to await the results of the
deliberation of the Sub-Committee. After reaching a decision, the Sub-Committee shall summon the applicant or
his representative and inform him of its decision giving him an opportunity either to request reconsideration or to
offer certain cuts or deletions in exchange for a better classification. The decision shall be in writing, stating, in
case of disapproval of the film or denial of the classification rating desired or both, the reason or reasons for such
disapproval or denial and the classification considered by the Sub-Committee member dissenting from the
majority opinion may express his dissent in writing.
c) The decision including the dissenting opinion, if any, shall immediately be submitted to the Chairman of the
Board for transmission to the applicant.
Sec 12. Review by Sub-Committee of Five. Within five days from receipt of a copy of the decision of the SubCommittee referred to in the preceding section, the applicant may file a motion for reconsideration in writing of that
decision. On receipt of the motion, the Chairman of the Board shall designate a Sub-Committee of Five Board
Members which shall consider the motion and, within five days of receipt of such motion, conduct a second
preview of the film. The review shall, to the extent applicable, follow the same procedure provided in the preceding
section.
Sec 13. Reclassification. An applicant desiring a change in the classification rating given his film by either the
Sub-Committee of Three? or Committee of Five mentioned in the immediately preceeding two sections may reedit such film and apply anew with the Board for its review and reclassification.
Sec 14. Appeal. The decision of the Committee of Five Board Members in the second review shall be final, with
the exception of a decision disapproving or prohibiting a motion picture in its entirety which shall be appealable to
the President of the Philippines who may himself decide the appeal or refer it to the Appeals Committee in the
Office of the President for adjudication.
On the other hand, the powers and functions of the MTRCB Chairman are found in Section 5 of the same decree as follows:
Sec. 5. Executive Officer. The Chairman of the BOARD shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the BOARD. He
shall exercise the following functions, powers and duties:
(a) Execute, implement and enforce the decisions, orders, awards, rules and regulations issued by the BOARD;
(b) Direct and supervise the operations and the internal affairs of the BOARD;
(c) Establish the internal organization and administrative procedures of the BOARD, and recommend to the
BOARD the appointment of the necessary administrative and subordinate personnel; and

(d) Exercise such other powers and functions and perform such duties as are not specifically lodged in the
BOARD.
It is at once apparent from a reading of the above provisions of PD 1986 that respondent Morato, as Chairman of the MTRCB, is not
vested with any authority to reverse or overrule by himself alone a decision rendered by a committee which conducted a review of
motion pictures or television programs.
The power to classify motion pictures into categories such as "General Patronage" or "For Adults Only" is vested with the respondent
Board itself and not with the Chairman thereof (Sec. 3 [e], PD 1986). As Chief Executive Officer, respondent Morato's function as
Chairman of the Board calls for the implementation and execution, not modification or reversal, of the decisions or orders of the
latter (Sec. 5 [a], Ibid.). The power of classification having been reposed by law exclusively with the respondent Board, it has no
choice but to exercise the same as mandated by law, i.e., as a collegial body, and not transfer it elsewhere or discharge said power
through the intervening mind of another. Delegata potestas non potest delegari a delegated power cannot be delegated. And
since the act of classification involves an exercise of the Board's discretionary power with more reason the Board cannot, by way of
the assailed resolution, delegate said power for it is an established rule in administrative law that discretionary authority cannot be a
subject of delegation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Resolution Nos. 10-89 and 88-1-25 issued by the respondent Board are hereby
declared null and void.
SEPARATION OF POWERS

In Re: Rodolfo Manzano

Facts:
Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur Governor
Rodolfo Farinas as the member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created
pursuant to a Presidential Order. He petitioned that his membership in the Committee will not
in any way amount to an abandonment to his present position as Executive Judge of Branch
XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region and as a member of judiciary.
Issue:
What is an administrative agency? Where does it draw the line insofar as administrative
functions are concerned?
Ruling:
The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the Judiciary
to any agency performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions (Sec.12,Art.VIII, 1987
Constitution). Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from
participating in the work of any Administrative Agency which adjudicates disputes &
controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. Administrative functions are
those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct & affairs of individuals for their
own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
Legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence. Administrative functions as used in Sec. 12 refers to the Governments executive
machinery and its performance of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions,
determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make
government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control.
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct
and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to
better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative
agency by the organic law of its existence we can readily see that membership in the
Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or control over the
conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and
regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. A member
of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as
long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases
particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants-or detainees, pools the expertise and
experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or
rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function
involved in their implementation.
Angara vs. Electoral Commission Digested
Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139
DOCTRINE OF SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION
FACTS:
In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua,
Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.

On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the
National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec. 3, 1935, the
National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election
protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest"
against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected
Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified. On Dec. 9,
1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of
protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction
upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the
National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
RULING:
In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict
of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on one hand, and
the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it
is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not
subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of
the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law
between departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by
the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases. The court has jurisdiction over
the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to
the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." The Electoral Commission was
created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in
matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and
impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied
denial in the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a
restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.
Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of
its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been
lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved
a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore,
the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it
appear that said body had actually been organized.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the
election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was
still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as
depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be
"the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.
The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua
against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the
National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest
against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor
prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might
prescribe. The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby
denied, with cost against the petitioner.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V POEA
Posted by kaye lee on 5:21 PM
G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988 [Non delegation of legislative power; subordinate legislation]
FACTS:

A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for charges against the Eastern Shipping
Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for the
family of overseas workers. ESL questioned the validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation of
legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such
authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers.
RULING:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. ... "The governing Board of
the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of
the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)." It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law
cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be.
The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature to the delegate. The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature
has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general
provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation." With this power, administrative bodies may implement
the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules
issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law. There are two
accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the
shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
Casibang v. Aquino
G.R. No. L-38025 August 20, 1979
Makasiar, J.
Facts:
Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local
elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, who seasonably filed a protest against the election of the
former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation, counting
and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5)
excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code. In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law;
and two months thereafter, more or less, or specifically on November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention passed and
approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the same was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign
people of the Republic of the Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, the Supreme Court declared that there is no
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect. Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which
time petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence and in fact had rested his case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the
election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution by reason of which principally) Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI a political
question has intervened in the case. Respondent Yu contended that ... the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local
governments have been superseded by the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to our parliamentary
form of government. This is clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI. He further submitted that local elective officials
(including mayors) have no more four-year term of office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodied in
the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article XVII. The thrust of the political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973
Constitution, through Section 9 of Article XVII thereof, protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its ratification and
effectivity and are the only ones authorized to continue in office and their term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure of,
as the same has been entrusted or committed to, the incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative Department; and that
Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure by the
enactment of a local government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the necessity and expediency of which are outside the
range of judicial review. In short, for the respondent Judge to still continue assuming jurisdiction over the pending election protest of
petitioner is for him to take cognizance of a question or policy in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the Legislative or Executive branch of the government.
Issue:
whether the issue involves a political question and therefore beyond judicial ambit
Held:

No. Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic pending election protest cases. The
constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent
officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately
encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or
contest and that subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither
was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of
a candidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings
beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elects right to the contested office. The
right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of Article XVII of the
New Constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the November
8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their respective positions and consequently, have no
right to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to
enjoy the indefinite term of office given to them by said constitutional provision. Until a subsequent law or presidential decree
provides otherwise, the right of respondent (protestee) to continue as mayor rests on the legality of his election which has been
protested by herein petitioner. Should the court decide adversely against him the electoral protest, respondent (protestee) would
cease to be mayor even before a law or presidential decree terminates his tenure of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII
of the 1973 Constitution. There is a difference between the term of office and the right to hold an office. Aterm of office is the
period during winch an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and
emoluments. A right to hold a public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office.
In other words, the term refers to the period, duration of length of time during which the occupant of an office is .entitled to stay
therein whether such period be definite or indefinite. Hence, although Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term
of the petitioners indefinite, it did not foreclose any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an election protest, of the right of the
private respondents to continue holding their respective office. What has been directly affected by said constitutional provision is the
term to the office, although the right of the incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive with the term thereof,
and that it is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of the private
respondents expired, and that they are now holding their respective offices under a new term. They hold their respective offices still
under the term to which they have been elected, although the same is now indefinite. The New Constitution recognized the
continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear, try and decide election protests: Section 7 of Article XVII of the New
Constitution provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, modified or
repealed by the National Assembly. And there has been no amendment, modification or repeal of Section 220 of the Election Code
of 1971 which gave the herein petitioners the right to file an election contest against those proclaimed elected, and according to
Section 8, Article XVII of the New Constitution all courts existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue and
exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts
shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in force. Consequently, the Courts of First Instance presided over by the
respondent-Judges should continue and exercise their jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the election protests filed by herein
petitioners. While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly as well as elective provincial and city officials (par. 2 of
Sec. 2, Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution), such power does not extend to electoral contests concerning municipal elective
positions. General Order No. 3, issued by the President of the Philippines merely reiterated his powers under Section 9 of Article
XVII of the New Constitution. The President did not intend thereby to modify the aforesaid constitutional provision. General Order
No. 3, as amended by General Order No. 3-A, does not expressly include electoral contests of municipal elective positions as
among those removed from the jurisdiction of the courts; for said General Order, after affirming the jurisdiction of the Judiciary to
decide in accordance with the existing laws on criminal and civil cases, simply removes from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court certain
crimes specified therein as well as the validity, legality or constitutionality of any decree, order or acts issued by the President or his
duly designated representative or by public servants pursuant to his decrees and orders issued under Proclamation No. 1081. In the
light of the foregoing pronouncements, the electoral protest case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political
question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to
be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term political question connotes
what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure. The term has been made applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction or
to an issue involved in a case appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which there has been a prior legislative or executive
determination to which deference must be paid. Political questions should refer to such as would under the Constitution be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority is vested either in the President or
Congress. It is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass upon.

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA et al. v. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.

OCHOA JR. et al., G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013
Constitutional Law; Validity of the pork barrel system. The Court defines the Pork Barrel System
as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum,
discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective
participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members.
The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds: the
Congressional Pork Barrel and the Presidential Pork Barrel.
Congressional pork barrel; Separation of powers. Post-enactment measures which govern the
areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that
properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing,

legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in as Guingona, Jr.
puts it the various operational aspects of budgeting, including the evaluation of work and
financial plans for individual activities and the regulation and release of funds in violation of
the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in
Abakada, cannot be overstated from the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is
thus unconstitutional. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature
does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore
abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the
guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents reliance on the
same falters altogether.
Congressional pork barrel; Non-delegability of Legislative Power. The Court observes that the
2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to
individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which as settled in
Philconsa is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only
through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
states that: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law. To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the
Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor (Bengzon), held that the power of
appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for
(b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are
given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such
fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As
these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in
Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the
same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the
Constitution does not, however, allow.
Congressional pork barrel; Checks and Balances; Accountability. The lump-sum/post-enactment
legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget
which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs
the Presidents power of item veto. The fact that individual legislators are given postenactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become
disinterested observers when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of
the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on
activities in which they themselves participate. Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the
various phases of project implementation a matter before another office of government
renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
Congressional pork barrel; Local autonomy. The Court finds an inherent defect in the system
which actually belies the avowed intention of making equal the unequal. In particular, the
Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact
of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on
genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken
into consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets
the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which
would be relatively underdeveloped compared to the former.
Presidential pork barrel; Malampaya Fund and Presidential Social Fund are valid
appropriations.An appropriation made by law under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or
determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose.
These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the very definition of
the word appropriation, which means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or
purpose, and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to
appropriate exists. As the Constitution does not provide or prescribe any particular form of
words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be
made, except that it be made by law, an appropriation law may according to Philconsa be
detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be for as long as the intent to appropriate may
be gleaned from the same.
Analyzing the legal text vis--vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be concluded
that (a) Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a Special Fund comprised of all fees, revenues, and
receipts of the [Energy Development] Board from any and all sources (a determinable amount)
to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President (a

specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which
similarly sets aside, [a]fter deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty
(50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of [PAGCOR], or 60%
[,] if the aggregate gross earnings be less than P150,000,000.00 (also a determinable amount)
to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the
Office of the President of the Philippines (also a specified public purpose), are legal
appropriations under Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Presidential pork barrel; Malampaya Fund; Undue delegation. While the designation of a
determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal
appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the
same law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive either for the purpose of (a) filling
up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b)
ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation, referred to as contingent rulemaking. There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for
delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the completeness
test. Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the second test is
called the sufficient standard test. Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient
standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To
be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegates authority, announce the
legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for
which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide
latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows
him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.
That the subject phrase may be confined only to energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government under the principle of ejusdem generis,
meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include or be restricted to
things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is
belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government states a singular and general class and hence,
cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase
for such other purposes may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it
represents, namely energy development programs of the government; and, third, the
Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes
under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents own position that it is limited
only to energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government. Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test
since the policy of energy development is early deducible from its text, the phrase and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President under the same provision
of law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law.
Presidential pork barrel; Presidential Social Fund; Financing priority infrastructure development
projects an undue delegation. The Presidential Social Fund may be used to first, finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the restoration of damaged
or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines. The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose
adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for
restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated purpose, however, gives
him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so
determine as a priority. Verily, the law does not supply a definition of priority infrastructure
development projects and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the
same. In fine, the phrase to finance the priority infrastructure development projects must be
stricken down as unconstitutional since similar to the above-assailed provision under Section
8 of PD 910 it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law.
As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
remains legally effective and subsisting.
Operative fact doctrine. All declarations of unconstititionality must only be treated as
prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.
Daza v. Singson

G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989

Cruz, J.
Facts:
The House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP,
thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members.

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on Appointments by
withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber
elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis
C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP. The petitioner came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the
Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and
injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary restraining order that same day to prevent both the petitioner and the
respondent from serving in the Commission on Appointments. Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be
removed from the Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is permanent. His claim is that the reorganization of
the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly
registered political party and has not yet attained political stability.
Issue:
whether the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
Held:
No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is not a discretionary act of the House of
Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the
wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments. The term political
question connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, it refers to
those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us
was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now
covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

ABAKADA GURO PARTYLIST VS. PURISIMA- ATTRITION ACT OF 2005, R.A. NO. 9335

FACTS:
Petitioners question the Attrition Act of 2005 and contend that by establishing a system of rewards and incentives when they exceed
their revenue targets, the law (1) transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters;
(2) violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection as it limits the scope of the law to the BIR and BOC; (3) unduly delegates
to the President the power to fix revenue targets without sufficient standards; and (4) violates the doctrine of separation of powers by
creating a Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the laws implementing rules.

ISSUE:
Is R.A. No. 9335 constitutional?

HELD:
YES. R.A. No. 9335 is constitutional, except for Section 12 of the law which creates a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to
review the laws IRR. That RA No. 9335 will turn BIR and BOC employees and officials into bounty hunters and mercenaries is
purely speculative as the law establishes safeguards by imposing liabilities on officers and employees who are guilty of negligence,
abuses, malfeasance, etc. Neither is the equal protection clause violated since the law recognizes a valid classification as only the
BIR and BOC have the common distinct primary function of revenue generation. There are sufficient policy and standards to guide
the President in fixing revenue targets as the revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected of the
BIR and the BOC. However, the creation of a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for the purpose of reviewing the IRR

formulated by agencies of the executive branch (DOF, DBM, NEDA, etc.) is unconstitutional since it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers since Congress arrogated judicial power upon itself.

DELEGATION OF POWERS

G.R. No. 100883 December 2, 1991

CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA (Second District of Bataan), petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, THE BOARD OF
INVESTMENTS, THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, and THE BUREAU OF TRADE REGULATION AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION, respondents.
Senator VICENTE T. PATERNO and PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF BATTERY MANUFACTURERS, intervenors.
Abraham C. La Vina for petitioner.
Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar and Asuncion Law Firm for PABMA.
Demaree J.B. Raval and Jhosep Y. Lopez for Sen. V. Paterno

CRUZ, J.:p
The petitioner challenges RA 7042 on the ground that it defeats the constitutional policy of developing a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos and the protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and
trade practices. He claims that the law abdicates all regulation of foreign enterprises in this country and gives them unfair
advantages over local investments which are practically elbowed out in their own land with the complicity of their own government.
Specifically, he argues that under Section 5 of the said law a foreign investor may do business in the Philippines or invest in a
domestic enterprise up to 100% of its capital without need of prior approval. All that it has to do is register with the Securities and
Exchange Commission or the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection in the case of a single proprietorship. The said
section makes certain that "the SEC or BTRCP, as the case may be, shall not impose any limitations on the extent of foreign
ownership in an enterprise additional to those provided in this Act."
Furthermore, Section 7 provides that "non-Philippine nationals may own up to one hundred percent (100%) of domestic market
enterprises unless foreign ownership therein is prohibited or limited by existing law or the Foreign Investment Negative List under
Section 8 hereof." The provision for a Foreign Investment Negative List in Section 8 does not satisfy the constitutional mandate for
the government to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments. The system of negative list abandons the positive
aspect of regulation and exercise of authority over foreign investments. In effect, it assumes that so long as foreign investments are
not in areas covered by the list, such investments are not detrimental to but are good for the national economy.
The petitioner attacks List A as not a true negative list in the strict sense of the term. It would merely enumerate areas of activities
already reserved to Philippine nationals by mandate of the Constitution and specific laws. List B would contain areas of activities and
enterprises already regulated according to law and includes small and medium-sized domestic market enterprises or export
enterprises which utilize raw materials from depleting natural resources with paid-in equity capital of less than the equivalent of
US$500,000.00. In other words, "small to medium" are reserved to Philippine nationals; in effect Filipinos are not encouraged to go
big. List C would merely contain areas of investment m which "existing enterprises already serve adequately the needs of the
economy and the consumers and do not need further foreign investments." The category of "existing enterprises" should be qualified
by the term "Filipino." Otherwise, List C would protect existing foreign enterprises as well.
The petitioner also attacks Section 9 because if a Philippine national believes that an area of investment should be included in list C,
the burden is on him to show that the criteria enumerated in said section are met.
It is alleged that Articles 2, 32, & 35 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1982 are done away with by RA 7042. It is also argued that
by repealing Articles 49, 50, 54 and 56 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code, RA No. 7042 further abandons the regulation of
foreign investments by doing away with important requirements for doing business in the Philippines.
Finally, the petitioner claims that the transitory provisions of RA 7042, which allow practically unlimited entry of foreign investments
for three years, subject only to a supposed Transitory Foreign Investment Negative List, not only completely deregulates foreign
investments but would place Filipino enterprises at a fatal disadvantage in their own country.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General counters that the phrase "without need of prior approval" applies to equity restrictions alone.
This is well explained by the fact that prior to the effectivity of RA 7042, Article 46 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (EO No.
226), provided that a non-Philippine national could, without need of prior authority from the Board of Investments (BOI), invest in: (1)
any enterprise registered under Book I (Investments with Incentives); and (2) enterprises not registered under Book I, to the extent
that the total investment of the non-Philippine national did not exceed 40% of the outstanding capital. On the other hand, under
Article 47 thereof, if an investment by a non-Philippine nationals in an enterprise not registered under Book I was such that the total
participation by non-Philippine nationals in the outstanding capital thereof exceeded 40%, prior authority from the BOI was required.

With the effectivity of RA 7042, a certain layer of bureaucracy has been removed, specifically, the case-to-case authorization by BOI.
Furthermore, with the introduction of the Negative List under Sections 8 & 15, the areas of investments not open to foreign investors
are already determined and outlined; hence, registration with the SEC or BTRCP, as the case may be, is now the initial step to be
taken by foreign investors.
This registration constitutes regulation and exercise of authority over foreign investments. Under SEC and BTRCP rules and
regulations, foreign investors must first comply with certain requirements before they can be issued a license to do business in the
Philippines. The SEC has PD 902-A, as amended, and BP 68 for its governing laws. Pertinent provisions of these laws are
contained in the SEC Licensing Procedure of Foreign Corporations. For BTRCP, the applicable laws are EO No. 133 in conjunction
with EO No. 913.
Section 7 of RA 7042 allows non-Philippine nationals to own up to 100% of domestic market enterprises only in areas of investments
outside the prohibitions and limitations imposed by law to protect Filipino ownership and interest. Furthermore, the Foreign
Investment Negative List under Section 8 reserves to Filipinos sensitive areas of investments. List C prohibits foreign investors from
engaging in areas of activities where existing enterprises already serve adequately the needs of the economy and the consumer.
The Act opens the door to foreign investments only after securing to Filipinos their rights and interests over the national economy.
The provisions of the Constitution and other specific laws (which would be used as a basis for List A) regulate or limit the extent of
foreign ownership in enterprises engaged in areas of activity reserved for Filipinos. To insist otherwise would be tantamount to
saying that those laws are useless and should therefore be erased from the statute books.
The fact that List B contains areas already regulated pursuant to law already makes it clear that it is regulatory. It channels efforts at
promoting foreign investments to bigger enterprises where there is an acute lack of Filipino capital. However, this should not be
construed as a scheme to discourage Filipino enterprises from going into big enterprises. On the contrary, the scheme is for foreign
investments to supplement Filipino capital in big enterprises.
Activities which do not adequately meet-the needs of the consumers should not be included in list C so as to allow healthy
competition. Otherwise, consumers would be at the mercy of unscrupulous producers. Foreign corporations already doing business
in the Philippines under a valid license prior to the enactment of RA 7042 necessarily come within the protection of the law.
The Solicitor General adds that Section 9 provides for the criteria to be used by NEDA in determining the areas of investment for
inclusion in List C. The petition for inclusion therein requires "a public hearing at which affected parties will have the opportunity to
show whether the petitioner industry adequately serves the economy and the consumers." But this does not mean that the Act is
shifting the burden of proof to Filipino enterprises while deregulating foreign investments at the same time. On the contrary, this
provision is designed to protect the consumers as not all existing enterprises satisfy the criteria inclusion in List C. The requisite
proof and public hearing under Section 9 are, therefore, necessary to prevent detriment to the economy and the consumers.
Regarding the alleged elimination of certain rules in the Code, the Solicitor General stresses that Section 16 of the provides that only
"Articles forty-four (44) to fifty-six (56) Book II of EO No. 226 are repealed." The approval by the BOI and the other regulatory
requirements set forth in the aforementioned articles were purposely removed because the determination of the areas of investment
open to foreign investors is made easy by the Foreign Investment Negative List formulated and recommended by NEDA following
the process and criteria provided in Sections 8 & 9 of the Act.
Concluding, he argues that the Transitory Foreign Investment Negative List is not imaginary. In fact, it practically includes the same
areas of investment reserved to Filipino under Section 5. Moreover, during the transitory period, "SEC shall disallow registration of
the applying non-Philippine national if the existing joint venture enterprises, particularly the Filipino partners therein, can reasonably
prove they are capable to make the investment needed for the domestic market activities to be undertaken by the competing
applicant."
Allowed to intervene, Senator Vicente T. Paterno,** raises substantially the same points stressed by the Solicitor General in defense
of the Act and amplifies the argument that the Act does not deregulate foreign investments to the disadvantage of the Filipino
entrepreneur. He discusses at length the different regulatory requirements for doing business in the Philippines and explains the
over-all strategy embodied in the Act to develop a self-reliant economy, as well as the provisions designed to promote full
employment for Filipinos. He also suggests that the constitutional challenge should be rejected outright for noncompliance with the
requisites of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the
constitutional question must be raised by a proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case. 1
The court has carefully gone over the petition and wryly observes that it could have been pruned and limited to the strictly legal
principles involved in the interest of a speedier disposition of the case. A considerable portion of the petition, and this is also true of
the reply (if not more so), sounds too much like speechifying that is better addressed to a political audience than to a court of justice.
Much valuable time would have been saved in the presentation of a leaner, strictly legal tract.
Coming first to the procedural objections to the petition, we agree that there is at this point no actual case or controversy, particularly
because of the absence of the implementing rules that are supposed to carry the Act into effect. A controversy must be one that is
appropriate or "ripe" for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory. We hold, however, that the petitioner, as a citizen and
taxpayer, and particularly as a member of the House of Representatives, comes under the definition that a proper party is one who
has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. 2 We will also hold that the constitutional
question has not been raised tardily but in fact, as just remarked, prematurely.
On the merits, we find that the constitutional challenge must be rejected for failure to show that there is an indubitable ground for it,
not to say even a necessity to resolve it. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that
the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to
sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect
for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has
been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.

In the case at bar, the law is challenged on broad constitutional principles and the proposition that the Filipino investor is unduly
discriminated against in his own land. Due process is invoked. The provisions on nationalism are cited. Economic dependency is
deplored. In the light, however, of the explanation given by the Solicitor General and of the Intervenor in their respective Comments,
we hold that the cause of unconstitutionality has not been proved by the petitioner. On the contrary, we are satisfied that the Act
does not violate any of the constitutional provisions the petitioner has mentioned.
What we see here is a debate on the wisdom or the efficacy of the Act, but this is a matter on which we are not competent to rule. As
Cooley observed: "Debatable questions are for the legislature to decide. The courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting
issues." 3 In Angara v. Electoral Commission, 4 Justice Laurel made it clear that "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." And fittingly so for in the exercise of judicial power, we are allowed only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," 5 and may not annul an act of the political
departments simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical. It is true that, under the expanded concept of the political question,
we may now also "determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 6 We find, however, that irregularity does not exist in the case at
bar.
The petitioner is commended for his high civic spirit and his zeal in the protection of the Filipino investors against unfair foreign
competition. His painstaking study and analysis of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 reveals not only his nationalistic fervor but
also an impressive grasp of this complex subject. But his views are expressed in the wrong forum. The Court is not a political arena.
His objections to the law are better heard by his colleagues in the Congress of the Philippines, who have the power to rewrite it, if
they so please, in the fashion he suggests.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
People v vera
Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC
remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is
innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The
IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by Cu Unjieng allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The
City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11
Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to
convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that
only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution
provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue
delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon
because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.
ISSUE: Whether or not equal protection is violated when the Probation Law provides that only in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer may the probation system be applied.
HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is
undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out
a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of
the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No.
4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer
shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.This only means that only
provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean
to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation. The SC declared the
old probation law as unconstitutional.

Ynot v IAC
Restituto Ynot Vs IAC GR NO 74457 March 20 1987 CASE DIGEST
Facts
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo
for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the
constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the
merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the
constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate
Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
Issue:
Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling:
The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A
amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the
Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no

less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one
province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there. The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A
unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not
properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police
station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and
pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due
process.

Tablarin vs. Gutierrez [G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987]

Facts: The petitioners seek admission into colleges or schools of medicine. However the petitioners either did not take or did not
successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT).Republic Act 2382 as amended by R.A. 4224 and 5946, known as
the Medical Act of 1959 created, among others, the Board of Medical Education (BME) whose functions include "to determine and
prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine" (Sec. 5 (a). Section 7 of the same Act requires from
applicants to present a certificate of eligibility for entrance (cea) tomedical school from the BME. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985,
issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, established a uniform admission test called National
Medical Admission Test as additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility. Petitioners then filed with the RTC a
petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction seeking to
enjoin the Sec. of educ, BME from enforcing Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 and from requiring the taking and
passing of the NMAT as condition for securing (cea).
Issue: Whether or not Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 violate the constitution as they prescribe an unfair,
unreasonable and inequitable requirement
Held: The legislative and administrative provisions impugned in this case constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state.
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of
passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the
general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the
practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the
public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of
those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who
wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinationshave long ago been recognized as valid exercises of
governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed
courses in a recognized medical school-for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of
the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access
to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the
professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student
body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other
things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical
practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical
schools in particular, in the current state of our social and economic development, are widely known. The Court believes that the
government is entitled to prescribe anadmission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the
selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country."
G.R. No. 165299

December 18, 2009

PACIFIC STEAM LAUNDRY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 30 June 2004 and the Resolution dated 8 September 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75238.
The Facts

Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged in the business of laundry services. On 6 June 2001, the
Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) endorsed to respondent
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) the inspection report on the complaint of black smoke emission from petitioners plant
located at 114 Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City.3 On 22 June 2001, LLDA conducted an investigation and found that untreated
wastewater generated from petitioners laundry washing activities was discharged directly to the San Francisco Del Monte River.
Furthermore, the Investigation Report4 stated that petitioners plant was operating without LLDA clearance, AC/PO-ESI, and
Discharge Permit from LLDA. On 5 September 2001, the Environmental Quality Management Division of LLDA conducted
wastewater sampling of petitioners effluent.5 The result of the laboratory analysis showed non-compliance with effluent standards
particularly Total Suspended Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD), Oil/Grease Concentration and Color
Units.6 Consequently, LLDA issued to petitioner a Notice of Violation7dated 30 October 2001 which states:
THE GENERAL MANAGER
PACIFIC STEAM LAUNDRY, INC.
114 Roosevelt Avenue, Brgy. Paraiso
Quezon City
Subject: Notice of Violation
PH-01-10-303
Gentlemen:
This refers to the findings of the inspection and result of laboratory analysis of the wastewater collected from your firm last 5
September 2001. Evaluation of the results of laboratory analysis showed that your plants effluent failed to conform with the 1990
Revised Effluent Standard for Inland Water Class "C" specifically in terms of TSS, BOD, Oil/Grease and Color. (Please see attached
laboratory analysis)
In view thereof, you are hereby directed to submit corrective measures to abate/control the water pollution caused by your firm,
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this letter.
Furthermore, pursuant to Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. 984, PACIFIC STEAM LAUNDRY, INC. is hereby ordered to pay a
penalty of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per day of discharging pollutive wastewater to be computed from 5 September 2001,
the date of inspection until full cessation of discharging pollutive wastewater and a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) per
year for operating without the necessary clearance/permits from the Authority.
Very truly yours,
(signed)
CALIXTO R. CATAQUIZ
General Manager
Petitioner submitted its application for LLDA Clearance and Discharge Permit and informed LLDA that it would undertake the
necessary measures to abate the water pollution.8 On 1 March 2002, a compliance monitoring was conducted and the result of the
laboratory analysis9 still showed non-compliance with effluent standards in terms of TSS, BOD, Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD),
and Oil/Grease Concentration. It was reported that petitioners wastewater treatment facility was under construction. Subsequently,
another wastewater sampling was conducted on 25 April 2002 but the results10 still failed to conform with the effluent standards in
terms of Oil/Grease Concentration.
Meanwhile, on 15 April 2002, a Pollution Control and Abatement case was filed against petitioner before the LLDA. During the public
hearing on 30 April 2002, LLDA informed petitioner of its continuous non-compliance with the effluent standards. Petitioner
requested for another wastewater sampling which was conducted on 5 June 2002. The laboratory results11 of the wastewater
sampling finally showed compliance with the effluent standard in all parameters. On 9 August 2002, another public hearing was held
to discuss the dismissal of the water pollution case and the payment of the accumulated daily penalty. According to LLDA, the
penalty should be reckoned from 5 September 2001, the date of initial sampling, to 17 May 2002, the date LLDA received the
request for re-sampling. Petitioner manifested that its wastewater discharge was not on a daily basis. In its position paper12dated 25
August 2002, petitioner prayed that the Notice of Violation dated 30 October 2001 be set aside and the penalty and fine imposed be
reckoned from the date of actual hearing on 15 April 2002.1avvphil
On 16 September 2002, LLDA issued an Order to Pay,13 the pertinent portion of which reads:
Respondent prayed that the Notice of Violation issued on 30 October 2001 and its corresponding daily penalty be set aside and that
the imposable penalty be reckoned from the date of actual hearing and not on 5 September 2001. It is respondents position that the
Notice of Violation and the imposition of the penalty had no legal and factual basis because it had already installed the necessary
wastewater treatment to abate the water pollution.
This Public Hearing Committee finds respondents arguments devoid of merit. Presidential Decree No. 984 prohibits the discharge of
pollutive wastewater and any person found in violation thereof shall pay a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (PhP5,000.00)
[sic] for every day during which such violation continues. The mere discharge of wastewater not conforming with the effluent
standard is the violation referred to in PD No. 984. Sample of respondents effluent was collected on 5 September 2001 and the
results of laboratory analysis confirmed the quality thereof. Thus, a notice of violation was issued against the respondent after it was
established that its discharge was pollutive. The fact that the subsequent re-sampling reported compliance with the effluent standard

does not negate the 5 September 2001 initial sampling. Respondent passed the standard because it already implemented remedial
measures to abate the water pollution. It is therefore but just and proper that the penalty should be imposed from the date of initial
sampling, 5 September 2001, to 17 May 2002, the date the request for re-sampling was received by the Authority. The 5 June 2002
sampling confirmed that respondents effluent already complied with the standard showing that its water pollution has ceased.
Respondent did not submit any proof of its actual operation hence, the penalty shall be computed for five (5) working days per week,
excluding Saturdays and Sundays as well as legal holidays from 5 September 2001 to 17 May 2002, for a total of one hundred
seventy-two (172) days.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Pacific steam Laundry, Inc. is hereby ordered to pay the accumulated daily penalty
amounting to ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND (PhP172,000.00) PESOS within fifteen(15) days from receipt hereof as
a condition sine qua non for the dismissal of the above-captioned case.
SO ORDERED.14
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the LLDA denied in its Order15 dated 27 November 2002.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals denied
the petition, as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. Hence, this petition.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
The Court of Appeals held that LLDA has the power to impose fines, thus:
Concededly, the power to impose administrative fines in pollution abatement cases was expressly granted under Section 9 of P.D.
984 to the now defunct National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC), thus:
"Section 9. Penalties. - (a) Any person found violating or failing to comply with any order, decision or regulation of the Commission
for the control or abatement of pollution shall pay a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos per day for every day during which such
violation or default continues; and the Commission is hereby authorized and empowered to impose the fine after due notice and
hearing."
Nonetheless, it may be well to recall that the LLDA was created under R.A. 4850 with the end view of promoting and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, and carrying out the development of the
Laguna Lake Region with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the
quality of human life and ecological systems, and the preservation of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. To
correct deficiencies and clarify ambiguities that "impede the accomplishment of the Authorities goal," Former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos promulgated P.D. 813. Finally, to enable the LLDA to effectively perform its role, Former President Marcos further issued
E.O. 927, which granted the LLDA additional powers and functions, viz:
"Section 4. Additional Powers and Functions. - The authority shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx
(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and time within which such
continuance must be accomplished.
xxx
(i) Exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities under this
Executive order."
Indeed, the express grant of power to impose administrative fines as couched in the language of P.D. 984 was not reproduced in
E.O. 927, however, it can be logically implied from LLDAs authority to exercise the power to "make, alter or modify orders requiring
the discontinuance of pollution." In addition, the clear intendment of E.O. 927 to clothe LLDA not only with the express powers
granted to it, but also those implied, incidental and necessary for the exercise of its express powers can be easily discerned from the
grant of the general power to "exercise (such) powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties
and responsibilities."
This finds support in the wealth of authorities in American Jurisprudence, citing adherence of other courts to the principle that the
authority given to an agency should be liberally construed in order to permit the agency to carry out its statutory responsibilities. This
is especially true where the agency is concerned with protecting the public health and welfare, the delegation of authority to the
agency is liberally construed.
The LLDA, as an agency implementing pollution laws, rules and regulations, should be given some measures of flexibility in its
operations in order not to hamper it unduly in the fulfillment of its objectives. How could it effectively perform its role if in every act of
violation, it must resort to other venue for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal with it?
16
(Emphasis in the original)
The Issues

Petitioner raises two issues:

1. Does the respondent LLDA have the implied power to impose fines as set forth in PD 984?
2. Does the grant of implied power to LLDA to impose penalties violate the rule on non-delegation of legislative powers?17
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petition without merit.
Power of LLDA to Impose Fines
Petitioner asserts that LLDA has no power to impose fines since such power to impose penal sanctions, which was once lodged with
the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC), is now assumed by the Pollution Adjudication Board pursuant to Executive
Order No. 192 (EO 192).18
We disagree with petitioner.
Presidential Decree No. 984 (PD 984)19 created and established the NPCC under the Office of the President. EO 192, which
reorganized the DENR, created the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary which assumed the powers
and functions of the NPCC with respect to adjudication of pollution cases.
Section 19 of EO 192 provides:
SEC. 19. Pollution Adjudication Board. There is hereby created a Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the Secretary.
The Board shall be composed of the Secretary as Chairman, two (2) Undersecretaries as may be designated by the Secretary, the
Director of Environmental Management, and three (3) others to be designated by the Secretary as members. The Board shall
assume the powers and functions of the Commission/Commissioners of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to
the adjudication of pollution cases under Republic Act 3931 and Presidential Decree 984, particularly with respect to Section 6
letters e, f, g, j, k, and p of P.D. 984. The Environmental Management Bureau shall serve as the Secretariat of the Board. These
powers and functions may be delegated to the regional officers of the Department in accordance with rules and regulations to be
promulgated by the Board. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 6, paragraphs (e), (f), (g), (j), (k), and (p) of PD 984 referred to above states:
SEC. 6. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx
(e) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Decree and its implementing rules and
regulations only after proper notice and hearing.
(f) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which
such discontinuance must be accomplished.
(g) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be reasonable, for the prevention and
abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works
and industrial disposal system or parts thereof: Provided, however, the Commission, by rules and regulations, may require
subdivisions, condominium, hospitals, public buildings and other similar human settlements to put up appropriate central
sewerage system and sewage treatment works, except that no permits shall be required of any new sewage works or
changes to or extensions of existing works that discharge only domestic or sanitary wastes from a single residential
building provided with septic tanks or their equivalent. The Commission may impose reasonable fees and charges for the
issuance or renewal of all permits herein required.
xxx
(j) Serve as arbitrator for the determination of reparations, or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution.
(k) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or instrumentalities for the purpose of
enforcing this Decree and its implementing rules and regulations and the orders and decisions of the Commission.
xxx
(p) Exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities
under this Decree.
On the other hand, LLDA is a special agency created under Republic Act No. 4850 (RA 4850)20 to manage and develop the Laguna
Lake region, comprising of the provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan. RA

4850, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 (PD 813),21mandates LLDA to carry out the development of the Laguna Lake
region, with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human
life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.22
Under Executive Order No. 927 (EO 927),23 LLDA is granted additional powers and functions to effectively perform its role and to
enlarge its prerogatives of monitoring, licensing and enforcement, thus:
SECTION 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The Authority [LLDA] shall have the following powers and functions:
a) Issue standards, rules and regulations to govern the approval of plans and specifications for sewage works and industrial
waste disposal systems and the issuance of permits in accordance with the provisions of this Executive Order; inspect the
construction and maintenance of sewage works and industrial waste disposal systems for compliance to plans.
b) Adopt, prescribe, and promulgate rules and regulations governing the Procedures of the Authority with respect to
hearings, plans, specifications, designs, and other data for sewage works and industrial waste disposal system, the filing of
reports, the issuance of permits, and other rules and regulations for the proper implementation and enforcement of this
Executive Order.
c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Executive Order and its implementing rules
and regulations only after proper notice and hearing.
d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which
such discontinuance must be accomplished.
e) Issue, renew or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be reasonable, for the prevention and
abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works
and industrial disposal system or parts thereof: Provided, however, that the Authority, by rules and regulations, may require
subdivisions, condominiums, hospitals, public buildings and other similar human settlements to put up appropriate central
sewerage system and sewage treatment works, except that no permits shall be required of any new sewage works or
changes to or extensions of existing works that discharge only domestic or sanitary wastes from a single residential
building provided with septic tanks or their equivalent. The Authority may impose reasonable fees and charges for the
issuance or renewal of all permits herein required.
f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke, suspend or modify any permit issued under this Order
whenever the same is necessary to prevent or abate pollution.
g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or instrumentalities for the purpose of
enforcing this executive Order and its implementing rules and regulations and the orders and decision of the Authority.
h) Authorize its representative to enter at all reasonable times any property of the public dominion and private property
devoted to industrial, manufacturing processing or commercial use without doing damage, for the purpose of inspecting and
investigating conditions relating to pollution or possible or imminent pollution.
i) Exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities
under this Executive Order. (Emphasis supplied)
A comparison of the powers and functions of the Pollution Adjudication Board and the LLDA reveals substantial similarity. Both the
Pollution Adjudication Board and the LLDA are empowered, among others, to: (1) make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution; (2) issue, renew, or deny permits for the prevention and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of
sewage, industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal system; and (3) exercise such
powers and perform such other functions necessary to carry out their duties and responsibilities. The difference is that while Section
19 of EO 192 vested the Pollution Adjudication Board with the specific power to adjudicate pollution cases in general,24 the scope of
authority of LLDA to adjudicate pollution cases is limited to the Laguna Lake region as defined by RA 4850, as amended.
Thus, in Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals,25 the Court held that the adjudication of pollution cases generally
pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board, except where a special law, such as the LLDA Charter, provides for another forum.
Indeed, even PD 984 authorizes the LLDA to undertake pollution control activities within LLDAs development area. Section 10 of PD
984 provides:
SEC. 10. Jurisdiction. The Commission [NPCC] shall have no jurisdiction over waterworks or sewage system operated by the
Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System, but the rules and regulations issued by the Commission for the protection and
prevention of pollution under the authority herein granted shall supersede and prevail over any rules or regulations as may
heretofore have been issued by other government agencies or instrumentalities on the same subject.
In case of development projects involving specific human settlement sites or integrated regional or subregional projects, such as the
Tondo Foreshore Development Authority and the Laguna Lake Development Authority, the Commission shall consult with the
authorities charged with the planning and execution of such projects to ensure that their pollution control standards comply with
those of the Commission. Once minimum pollution standards are established and agreed upon, the development authorities
concerned may, by mutual agreement and prior consultation with the Commission, undertake the pollution control activities
themselves. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)1avvphi1

In this case, the DENRs Environmental Management Bureau endorsed to LLDA the pollution complaint against petitioner. Under
Section 16 of EO 192, the Environmental Management Bureau assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC except with respect
to adjudication of pollution cases, thus:
SEC. 16. Environmental Management Bureau. There is hereby created an Environmental Management Bureau. The National
Environmental Protection Council (NEPC), the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC) and the Environmental Center of the
Philippines (ECP), are hereby abolished and their powers and functions are hereby integrated into the Environmental Management
Bureau in accordance with Section 24(c) hereof, subject to Section 19 hereof. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The Environmental Management Bureau also serves as the Secretariat of the Pollution Adjudication Board, and its Director is one of
the members of the Pollution Adjudication Board. Clearly, by endorsing to LLDA the pollution complaint against petitioner, the
Environmental Management Bureau deferred to LLDAs jurisdiction over the pollution complaint against petitioner.
Although the Pollution Adjudication Board assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to adjudication of pollution
cases, this does not preclude LLDA from assuming jurisdiction of pollution cases within its area of responsibility and to impose fines
as penalty.
Thus, in the recent case of The Alexandra Condominium Corporation v. Laguna Lake Development Authority,26the Court affirmed the
ruling of the Court of Appeals which sustained LLDAs Order, requiring petitioner therein to pay a fine of P1,062,000 representing
penalty for pollutive wastewater discharge. Although petitioner in that case did not challenge LLDAs authority to impose fine, the
Court acknowledged the power of LLDA to impose fines, holding that under Section 4-A of RA 4850, as amended, LLDA is entitled to
compensation for damages resulting from failure to meet established water and effluent standards. Section 4-A of RA 4850, as
amended, reads:
SEC. 4-A. Compensation for damages to the water and aquatic resources of Laguna de Bay and its tributaries resulting from failure
to meet established water and effluent quality standards or from such other wrongful act or omission of a person, private or public,
juridical or otherwise, punishable under the law shall be awarded to the Authority to be earmarked for water quality control and
management.
Under Section 4(h) of EO 927, LLDA may "exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out
its duties and responsibilities." In Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court upheld the power of LLDA to
issue an ex-parte cease and desist order even if such power is not expressly conferred by law, holding that an administrative agency
has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. The Court ruled that LLDA, in the exercise of
its express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake
region, has the implied authority to issue a "cease and desist order." In the same manner, we hold that the LLDA has the power to
impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake
region.
No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
Petitioner contends that if LLDA is deemed to have implied power to impose penalties, then LLDA will have unfettered discretion to
determine for itself the penalties it may impose, which will amount to undue delegation of legislative power.
We do not agree. Contrary to petitioners contention, LLDAs power to impose fines is not unrestricted. In this case, LLDA
investigated the pollution complaint against petitioner and conducted wastewater sampling of petitioners effluent. It was only after
the investigation result showing petitioners failure to meet the established water and effluent quality standards that LLDA imposed a
fine against petitioner. LLDA then imposed upon petitioner a penalty of P1,000 per day of discharging pollutive wastewater.
The P1,000 penalty per day is in accordance with the amount of penalty prescribed under PD 984:
SEC. 8. Prohibitions. No person shall throw, run, drain, or otherwise dispose into any of the water, air and/or land resources of the
Philippines, or cause, permit, suffer to be thrown, run, drain, allow to seep or otherwise dispose thereto any organic or inorganic
matter or any substance in gaseous or liquid form that shall cause pollution thereof.
xxx
SEC 9. Penalties. x x x
(b) Any person who shall violate any of the previous provisions of Section Eight of this Decree or its implementing rules and
regulations, or any Order or Decision of the Commission, shall be liable to a penalty of not to exceed one thousand pesos each day
during which the violation continues, or by imprisonment of from two years to six years, or by both fine and imprisonment, and in
addition such person may be required or enjoined from continuing such violation as hereinafter provided.
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, there are adequate statutory limitations on LLDAs power to impose fines which obviates unbridled discretion in the exercise
of such power.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 30 June 2004 and the Resolution dated 8 September 2004 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75238.

SO ORDERED.
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
SECTION 1
Republic Act No. 6735

August 4, 1989

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
I. General Provisions
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act."
Section 2. Statement of Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations
through an election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal,
or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative
body for action.
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose.
It may be of two classes, namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by
Congress; and
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted
by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.
(e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people.
(f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required number of signatories. It shall be in a form
to be determined by and submitted to the Commission on Elections, hereinafter referred to as the Commission.
(g) "Local government units" refers to provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
(h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, and
Sangguniang Nayon.
(i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal Mayors and Punong Barangay, as the case may
be.
Section 4. Who may exercise. The power of initiative and referendum may be exercised by all registered voters of the country,
autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
Section 5. Requirements. (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per centum (10%) of the total number
of the registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters
thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same with the Commission.
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the
case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at
the top of every page of the petition.
(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the legislative assembly of an autonomous
region, province or city is deemed validly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the
registered voters in the province or city, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters therein; Provided, however, That if the province or city is composed only of one (1) legislative
district, then at least each municipality in a province or each barangay in a city should be represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be deemed validly initiated if the petition
therefor is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the municipality, of which every barangay is
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly initiated if signed by at least ten per
centum (10%) of the registered voters in said barangay.
Section 6. Special Registration. The Commission on Election shall set a special registration day at least three (3) weeks before
a scheduled initiative or referendum.
Section 7. Verification of Signatures. The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters,
voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
II. National Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. The Commission shall call and supervise the conduct of initiative
or referendum.
Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall, upon determining the sufficiency of the petition,
publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation and set the date of the initiative
or referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the
Commission of the sufficiency of the petition.
Section 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. (a) The Proposition of the enactment, approval, amendment or
rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and approved by a majority of the votes cast by all the registered voters of the
Philippines.
If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the national law proposed
for enactment, approval, or amendment shall become effective fifteen (15) days following completion of its publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. If, as certified by the Commission, the
proposition to reject a national law is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the said national law shall be deemed
repealed and the repeal shall become effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of publication of the proposition
and the certification by the Commission in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be rejected or amended shall remain in full force
and effect.
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall
become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall
become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation by the Commission.
Section 10. Prohibited Measures. The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution,
cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity.

Section 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for indirect
initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. The petition shall contain a summary of the chief purposes
and contents of the bill that the organization proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature.
The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the enactment of any legislative measure before the House of
Representatives except that the said initiative bill shall have precedence over the pending legislative measures on the committee.
Section 12. Appeal. The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative
or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice thereof.
III. Local Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. (a) Not less than two thousand (2,000) registered voters in case of autonomous
regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of
barangays, may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative body, respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment,
repeal, or amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution.
(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30) days from its presentation, the proponents
through their duly authorized and registered representative may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the
local legislative body concerned.
(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). The Secretary of Local Government or his designated
representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition.
(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.
(e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of autonomous regions, ninety (90) days in case of
provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays, from notice
mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number of signatures.
(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated representative, in the presence of a
representative of the proponent, and a representative of the regional assemblies and local legislative bodies concerned in a
public place in the autonomous region or local government unit, as the case may be. Signature stations may be established
in as many places as may be warranted.
(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on Elections, through its office in the local government
unit concerned shall certify as to whether or not the required number of signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain the
required number is a defeat of the proposition.
(h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission shall then set a date for the initiative at which the
proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned for their approval within
ninety (90) days from the date of certification by the Commission, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of
autonomous regions, sixty (60) days in case of the provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities, and
thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set, after which the results thereof shall
be certified and proclaimed by the Commission on Elections.
Section 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. If the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast, it shall take effect
fifteen (15) days after certification by the Commission as if affirmative action thereon had been made by the local legislative body
and local executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of votes, the proposition is considered defeated.
Section 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the local legislative bodies to
enact.
(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the proposition presented, the
initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner
herein provided.
Section 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. Any proposition or ordinance or resolution approved through the
system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative body
concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom, and may be amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative body
within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided, however, that in case of barangays, the
period shall be one (1) year after the expiration of the first six (6) months.
Section 17. Local Referendum. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 hereof, any local legislative body may submit to the
registered voters of autonomous region, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays for the approval or rejection, any ordinance
or resolution duly enacted or approved.
Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and
cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays.
The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.

Section 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any
proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the
said measure.
IV. Final Provisions
SECTION 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all initiatives and referenda.
Section 20. Rules and Regulations. The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Section 21. Appropriations. The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged
against the Contingent Fund in the General Appropriations Act of the current year. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for
the full implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 22. Separability Clause. If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or
provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.
Section 23. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
SECTION 5
REPUBLIC ACT No. 7941
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Party-List System Act."
Section 2. Declaration of part y. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House
of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and
who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall
develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadcast possible representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and
shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for
the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is
a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof
whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical
attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political
and/or election purposes.
Section 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System. Any party, organization, or coalition already registered with the
Commission need not register anew. However, such party, organization, or coalition shall file with the Commission, not later than
ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system.
Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the partylist system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or
secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition
of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals.
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for
decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
Section 7. Certified List of Registered Parties. The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before election, prepare a certified
list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have applied or who have manifested their desire to
participate under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places on election day.
The names of the part y-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list.
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC
not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall
be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The
list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately
preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been
submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated
in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of
Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of
the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of
the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office
until the expiration of his term.
Section 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first is a vote for candidate for member of the House
of Representatives in his legislative district, and the second, a vote for the party, organizations, or coalition he wants represented in
the house of Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sectoral organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for
shall not be counted: Provided, finally, That the first election under the party-list system shall be held in May 1998.
The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary information campaign for purposes of educating the electorate on the matter of the
party-list system.
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the
total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes : Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties,
organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list
representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the
total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.
Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the COMELEC based on
the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said
list.
Section 14. Term of Office. Party-list representatives shall be elected for a term of three (3) years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No party-list representatives shall serve
for more than three (3) consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation
during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6)
months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization.
Section 16. Vacancy. In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list representatives, the vacancy shall be automatically filled
by the next representative from the list of nominees in the order submitted to the COMELEC by the same party, organization, or
coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the party, organization coalition concerned shall submit
additional nominees.
Section 17. Rights of Party-List Representatives. Party-List Representatives shall be entitled to the same salaries and emoluments
as regular members of the House of Representatives.
Section 18. Rules and Regulations. The COMELEC shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of this Act.
Section 19. Appropriations. The amount necessary for the implementation of this Act shall be provided in the regular appropriations
for the Commission on Elections starting fiscal year 1996 under the General Appropriations Act.
Starting 1995, the COMELEC is hereby authorized to utilize savings and other available funds for purposes of its information
campaign on the party-list system.
Section 20. Separability Clause. If any part of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall
remain valid and effective.
Section 21. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.
Section 22. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, ET AL. vs. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ET AL.
Facts:
Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of the RA 7675 with title An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Same bill is now in question at
to its constitutionality by the petitioners by invoking their right as tax payers and residents of Mandaluyong.
With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for the the conversion of Mandaluyong to a highly
urbanized city ratifying RA 7675 and making it in effect.
Issues:
WON RA 7675 is in:
1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill rule".
2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of members of the Congress to 250 and reappropriating the
legislative districts.
Ruling:
Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of constitutionality pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should
be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title
expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject." As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause
"unless otherwise provided by law" was enforced justifying the act of the legislature to increase the number of the members of the
congress. Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted the bill reapportioning the legislative
district. In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS. COMELEC, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011
342 SCRA 247, October 6, 2000 (Constitutional Law Party List Representatives, 20% Allocation)
FACTS: Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering the proclamation of 38 additional party-list
representatives to complete the 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution and

RA 7941. On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the respondent parties, avers that the filling up of the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory,
wherein the twenty (20%) percent congressional seats for party-list representatives is filled up at all times.
ISSUE: Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory.
HELD: No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same declared therein a policy to promote proportional
representation in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties,
organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system
in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes. Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of
Representatives (sec 11(b) RA 7941).
Note:
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for
party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the partylist. We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
- x .20 = No. of party-list
.80 representatives
This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result
in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district representatives to
be elected during the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:
208
x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic question, however, is this: Does the
Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is No.
Bagong Bayani Labor Party v COMELEC G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001.
Facts: On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the COMELEC a Petition praying that "the names of [some of
herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in
the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an
alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be
proclaimed. On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and
Nomination against some of herein respondents. On April 18, 2001, the COMELEC required the respondents in the two
disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, but
subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the COMELEC, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
filed a Petition before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed COMELEC Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a nonextendible period of five days from notice. On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, docketed
as GR No. 147613, also challenging COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, the Court
ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their respective
Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the
COMELEC may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of
any winner therein, until further orders of the Court.

Issues: During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues:
1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and organizations.
4. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785."

Held:
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the COMELEC, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary
evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this
Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list elections, the COMELEC is directed to
begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the
House of Representatives. The COMELEC is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from

notice hereof. The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the COMELEC "to refrain from proclaiming any
winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the COMELEC itself will have complied and reported its
compliance with the foregoing disposition. This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt
thereof. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
In view of standing on COMELEC OR 3785
Petitioners attack the validity of COMELEC Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion,
insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution and the Rules
of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Moreover, the
assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was
possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The Court also notes that
Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of
herein respondents. The COMELEC, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan
Muna sought succor from this Court, for there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the
urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the COMELEC has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may
just be a formality because the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter quite
clear. In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy. It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, "where the issue
raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued
with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of
Representatives. Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this Court must
urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules."
Finally, when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only
adequate and speedy remedy available."
In view of the participation of political parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the party-list system is
the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution." For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation
of "major political parties." For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, . . .." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or
a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public
office."
In view of terms marginalized and underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party or any
organization or group for that matter may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizationsmust be consistent with
the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. "Proportional representation" here does not refer
to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical
strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as
exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals." However, it is not enough for
the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to
feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies
mentioned in Section 5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Finally, "lack of well-defined constituency"
refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of
government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented." In the
end, the role of the COMELEC is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and underrepresented" become
members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style. While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented
sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list
system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with,
and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the
meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.
In view of OSG contention
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that any party or group that is not
disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an
organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarias Village could participate in the party-list elections. Indeed,
the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of
Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them similarly defies
reason and common sense. It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who
wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted to give them not only genuine
hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies;
and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State.
In view of COMELECs grave abuse of discretion
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or the law,
its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasijudicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.
In view of the Courts assistance
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the COMELEC for the latter to determine, after summary evidentiary

hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the requirements of
the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to
assist the COMELEC in its work.
In view of the 2 systems of representation (Mendoza, J.)
Indeed, the two systems of representation are not identical. Party list representation is a type of proportional representation
designed to give those who otherwise cannot win a seat in the House of Representatives in district elections a chance to win if they
have sufficient strength on a nationwide basis. (In this sense, these groups are considered "marginalized and underrepresented.")
Under the party-list system, representatives are elected from multi-seat districts in proportion to the number of votes received in
contrast to the "winner-take-all" single-seat district in which, even if a candidate garners 49.9% of the votes, he gets no seat. Thus,
under the party-list system, a party or candidate need not come in first in order to win seats in the legislature. On the other hand, in
the "winner-take-all" single-seat district, the votes cast for a losing candidate are wasted as only those who vote for the winner are
represented. What the advocates of sectoral representation wanted was permanent reserved seats for "marginalized sectors" by
which they mean the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors. Under Art. VI, 5(2),
these sectors were given only one-half of the seats in the House of Representatives and only for three terms. On the other hand, the
"third or fourth placers" in district elections, for whom the party-list system was intended, refer to those who may not win seats in the
districts but nationwide may be sufficiently strong to enable them to be represented in the House. They may include Villacorta's
"marginalized" or "underprivileged" sectors, but they are not limited to them. There would have been no need to give the
"marginalized sectors" one-half of the seats for the party-list system for three terms if the two systems are identical. In sum, a
problem was placed before the Constitutional Commission that the existing "winner-take-all" one-seat district system of election
leaves blocks of voters underrepresented. To this problem of underrepresentation two solutions were proposed: sectoral
representation and party-list system or proportional representation. The Constitutional Commission chose the party-list system.
Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration yields support for the view that the party-list system is designed exclusively for
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors. For while the representation of
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is a basic purpose of the law, it is not its only purpose. As already explained, the aim of
proportional representation is to enable those who cannot win in the "winner-take-all" district elections a chance of winning. These
groups are not necessarily limited to the sectors mentioned in 5, i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, the elderly, the handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. These groups can
possibly include other sectors.
BANAT vs. COMELEC , GR 17927 [ April 21, 2009 ]
Facts: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the
recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELECs national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and
academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc, and declaredfurther in a resolution that the winning party list will be resolved
using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.
Issues:
(1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a
ceiling?
(2)

Is the 2% threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the same Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

(3) Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can major political
parties participate in the party-list elections?
Held:
(1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in
theConstitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House
of Representatives to Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot
be more then 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
(2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the
two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when the
available party-list seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of partylist representatives.We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the-broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.
(3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the
contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their
sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the Court decided tocontinue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

Aquino v comelec
On January 21, 1975, a petition for prohibition was filed to seek the nullification of some
Presidential Decrees. The first ground upon which the petition is predicated states that Marcos

does not hold any legal office nor possess any lawful authority under either the 1935
Constitution or the 1973 Constitution and therefore has no authority to issue the questioned
proclamations, decrees and orders. This challenges the title of the incumbent President to the
office of the Presidency and therefore is in the nature of a quo warranto proceedings, the
appropriate action by which the title of a public officer can be questioned before the courts.
Only the Solicitor General or the person who asserts title to the same office can legally file
such a quo warranto petition. The petitioners, however, do not claim such right to the office
and not one of them is the incumbent Solicitor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Marcos government is a lawful government.
HELD: First of, petitioners do not have the personality to file suit. On the issue at bar, the SC
affirmed the validity of Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081 issued on September 22, 1972 by
President Marcos because there was no arbitrariness in the issuance of said proclamation
pursuant to the 1935 Constitution; that the factual bases had not disappeared but had even
been exacerbated; that the question as to the validity of the Martial Law proclamation has
been foreclosed by Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution. Under the (1973)
Constitution, the President, if he so desires; can continue in office beyond 1973. While his term
of office under the 1935 Constitution should have terminated on December 30, 1973, by the
general referendum of July 27-28, 1973, the sovereign people expressly authorized him to
continue in office even beyond 1973 under the 1973 Constitution (which was validly ratified on
January 17, 1973 by the sovereign people) in order to finish the reforms he initiated under
Martial Law; and as aforestated, as this was the decision of the people, in whom sovereignty
resides . . . and all government authority emanates . . ., it is therefore beyond the scope of
judicial inquiry. The logical consequence therefore is that President Marcos is a de jure
President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Sema v comelec
Municipal Corporation Creation of LGUs by Autonomous Regions (ARMM) Population
Requirement
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of
Maguindanao but it is not part or ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a
plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district
comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with power to create
provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional
Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of
the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City. For
the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only
made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo
should be retained however just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be
called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration
from Congress as to Cotabatos status as a legislative district (or part of any). Sema was a
congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1stdistrict).
Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and
that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen
was from there and D was winning in fact he won). She contended that under the
Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains
legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect
Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR. COMELEC maintained that the
legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the
legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly
LGUs.
HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or
barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit
must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not
conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political

units affected. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create
local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate
to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable
standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact,
Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to
create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in
the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province. Note that in
order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a province,
once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to
have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato
City did not meet the population requirement so Semas contention is untenable. On the other
hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a
legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative
districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities
and provinces.
SECTION 6
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
248 SCRA 300
Facts:
March 8, 1995 Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor.
March 23, 1995 Montejo, incumbent of and candidate for the same position, filed a petition
for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC, alleging that Marcos did not meet the
residency requirement.
March 29, 1995 Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy in the
COMELECs head office in Intramuros claiming that her error in the first certificate was the
result of an honest misrepresentation and that she has always maintained Tacloban City
as her domicile or residence.
April 24, 1995 COMELEC Second Division by a vote of 2-1 came up with a Resolution that
found Montejos petition for disqualification meritorious, Marcos corrected certificate of
candidacy void, and her original certificate cancelled.
May 7, 1995 COMELEC en banc denied Marcos Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
drafted on April 24.
May 11, 1995 COMELEC issued another Resolution allowing Marcos proclamation to the
office should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes.
However, this was reversed and instead directed that the proclamation would be suspended
even if she did win.
May 25, 1995 In a supplemental petitition, Marcos declared that she was the winner of the
said Congressional election.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1)
WON plaintiff had established legal residency required to be a voter, and thus candidate, of the
first district of Leyte.
Yes. It is the fact if residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which out to be
decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency
qualification requirement (as intended by the framers of the constitution)2. The confusion of
the honest mistake made when filed her Certificate of Candidacy can be attributed to the
fact that the entry for residence is immediately followed by the entry for the number of years
and months in the residence where the candidate seeks to hold office immediately after the
elections. This honest mistake should not be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First
District. The instances (i.e. when Marcos lived in Manila and Ilocos after marrying her husband)
used by the COMELEC to disqualify Marcos were only actual residences incurred during their
marriage; and as such, she was required to change residences and apply for voters
registration in these cited locations. When she got married to the late dictator, it cannot be
argued that she lost her domicile of origin by operation of law stated in Article 110 of the CC3
and further contemplated in Article 1094 of the same code. It is the husbands right to transfer
residences to wherever he might see fit to raise a family. Thus, the relocation does not mean or
intend to lose the wifes domicile of origin. After the death of her husband, her choice of
domicle was Tacloban, Leyte as expressed when she wrote the PCGG chairman seeking
permission to rehabilitate their ancestral house in Tacloban and their farm in Olot, Leyte.

(2)
WON COMELEC the proper jurisdiction in disqualifying the plaintiff under Article 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code had already lapsed, thereby transmitting jurisdiction to the House of
Representatives.
Yes. The mischief in petitioners contention lies in the fact that our courts and other quasijudicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to
reach a decision within a given or prescribed period. In any event, Sections 6
2 As discussed during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution by Mr. Nolledo and Mr. Davide,
and Mrs. Rosario and Mr. De Los Reyes in the RECORD OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVETION July 22, 1986.
3 The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from
living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
4 The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support.
and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Sec. 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the respondent
Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under
Sec. 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
(3)
WON the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) had jurisdiction over the question
of the petitioners qualifications after the elections.
No. The HRETs jurisdiction of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications
of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives.
Puno, J. (Concurring):
All her life, Marcos domicile of origin was Tacloban. When she married the former dictator, her
domicile became subject to change by law and the right to change it was given by Article 110
of the CC. She has been in Tacloban since 1992 and has lived in Tolosa since August 1994. Both
places are within the First Congressional District of Leyte.
Francisco, J. (Concurring):
Residence for election purposes means domicile. Marcos has been in Tacloban since 1992 and
has lived in Tolosa since August 1994. Both places are within the First Congressional District of
Leyte.
Romero, J. (Separate):
Womens rights as per choosing her domicile after husbands death is evident in this case.
Marcos living in Leyte is sufficient to meet the legal residency requirement.
Vitug, J. (Separate):
It seems unsound to vote for someone who has already been declared disqualified. The Court
refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral
Tribunal on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their
exclusive domain. Voted for dismissal.
Mendoza, J. (Concurring):
The issue is whether or not the COMELEC has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground
that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. It has none and the
qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a
petition for quo warranto or an election protest in an appropriate forum (not necessarily
COMELEC, but the HRET).
Padilla, J. (Dissenting):
Provisions in the Constitution should be adhered to. The controversy should not be blurred by
academic disquisitions. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding the
petitioner disqualified. And the law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a
disqualified candidate shall not be counted.
Regalado, J. (Dissenting):
A woman loses her domicile of origin once she gets married. The death of her husband does
not automatically allow her domicile to shift to its original. Such theory is not stated in any of
the provisions of law.
Davide, Jr. J. (Dissenting):
A writ of certiorari may only be granted if a government branch or agency has acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction. The COMELECs resolutions are within the scope and jurisdiction of
this particular agencys powers. In agreement with Regalado, re: womans domicile.
Aquino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995
Agapito A. Aquino, Petitioner
Commission on Elections, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon and JuanitoIcaro, Respondents
Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.:
The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy is to
be preserved. In any challenge having the effect of reversing a democratic choice, expressed
through the ballot, this Court should be ever so vigilant in finding solutions which would give

effect to the will of the majority, for sound public policy dictates that all elective offices are
filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in an election. When a
challenge to a winning candidate's qualifications however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility
ought to be so noxious to the Constitution that giving effect to the apparent will of the people
would ultimately do harm to our democratic institutions.
FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for
the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political
party, and Mateo Bedon,Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy.Cembo, Makati City, filed a
petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification
as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a
period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art.VI of the Constitution.
HELD:
In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.
Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was
a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for
52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he
was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac
as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his
domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy
for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac. The intention not to establish a permanent
home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a
lease contract maybe indicative of petitioners intention to reside in Makati City, it does
notengender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of onesoriginal domicile.
Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makatiis a bare
assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effecta change of domicile,
petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actualchange of domicile; a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond withthe purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of
originshould be deemed to continue.
Co v. HRET (Re: Citizenship issue only) [consti1]
Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representative
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: citizenship
Date: July 30, 1991
Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.
Facts:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that respondent Jose
Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting
purposes. On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern
Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the
second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co
and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests
against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was,
however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
Issue:
WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio:
The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in the
Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar
on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work. As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able
to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration. The father of
the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te
to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. As
Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino
cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong
Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got
married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice. The couple bore eight children, one of
whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948. Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this
country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life
in Samar. The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was setup in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an
unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954. On April 28, 1955,
the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the
Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final
and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance. Pursuant to
said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of
naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years
old, finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the
records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the
local populace were concerned. After completing his elementary education, the private
respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary
and college education. Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the
CPA Board Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the
respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an
examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971,
his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His
status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in
drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the
basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full
brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the
meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1.
Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
2.
Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3.
Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4.
Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect
Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino
mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct
the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was
automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not,
under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born. Election becomes material because
Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino
mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. To
expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age
is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother
a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine
(9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969
electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election
through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one

who had been a citizen since he was nine years old. In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held
that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship The private respondent did more than merely
exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. Petitioners
alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his premature
taking of the oath of citizenship. SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of
stripping respondents father of his citizenship after his death. An attack on a persons
citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court
to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to respondents father as null and void would run
against the principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest.
SECTION 7
MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., SPEAKER, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
AND (HON. QUIRINO D. ABAD SANTOS, JR.) HON. CAMILO L. SABIO SECRETARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
RESPONDENT. RILLORAZA, AFRICA, DE OCAMPO & AFRICA AND ENRIQUE M. FERNANDO FOR PETITIONER.
EN BANC
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987
congressional elections. He took his oath of office on 9 January 1987 and thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and
privileges pertaining thereto.
On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional
Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The election was scheduled for 17 February 1990.
Upon being informed of this development by the Commission on Elections, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of
Representatives excluded petitioners name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67,
Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code. As reported by the Speaker in the session of 9 February 1990:
The Order of Business today carries a communication from the Commission on Elections which states that the Honorable
Mohammad Ali Dimaporo of the Second District of Lanao del Sur filed a certificate of candidacy for the regional elections in Muslim
Mindanao on February 17, 1990. The House Secretariat, performing an administrative act, did not include the name of the
Honorable Ali Dimaporo in the Rolls pursuant to the provision of the Election Code, Article IX, Section 67, which states: Any elective
official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for
President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso factoresigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
The word ipso facto is defined in Words and Phrases as by the very act itself by the mere act. And therefore, by the very act of
the (sic) filing his certificate of candidacy, the Honorable Ali Dimaporo removed himself from the Rolls of the House of
Representatives; and, therefore, his name has not been carried in todays Roll and will not be carried in the future Rolls of the
House.
Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter dated 28 June 1990 and addressed to respondent Speaker,
expressed his intention to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress. The record does not
indicate what action was taken on this communication, but it is apparent that petitioner failed in his bid to regain his seat in Congress
since this petition praying for such relief was subsequently filed on 31 January 1991.
In this petition, it is alleged that following the dropping of his name from the Roll, petitioner was excluded from all proceedings of the
House of Representatives; he was not paid the emoluments due his office; his staff was dismissed and disbanded; and his office
suites were occupied by other persons. In effect, he was virtually barred and excluded from performing his duties and from
exercising his rights and privileges as the duly elected and qualified congressman from his district.
Petitioner admits that he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of Muslim Mindanao. He, however,
maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under
the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.
In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of Representatives, as well as the
grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII
thereof provides that the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992; while Section 7, Article VI states: The Members of the House of
Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election. On the other hand, the grounds by which such term may be shortened may be
summarized as follows:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.

He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these
constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressmans term of office on a ground not provided for in the
Constitution. For if it were the intention of the framers to include the provisions of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 as among the
means by which the term of a Congressman may be shortened, it would have been a very simple matter to incorporate it in the
present Constitution. They did not do so. On the contrary, the Constitutional Commission only reaffirmed the grounds previously
found in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and deliberately omitted the ground provided in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881.
On the premise that the provision of law relied upon by respondents in excluding him from the Roll of Members is contrary to the
present Constitution, petitioner consequently concludes that respondents acted without authority. He further maintains that
respondents so-called administrative act of striking out his name is ineffective in terminating his term as Congressman. Neither
can it be justified as an interpretation of the Constitutional provision on voluntary renunciation of office as only the courts may
interpret laws. Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another
office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or
employment.
In sum, petitioners demand that his rights as a duly elected member of the House of Representatives be recognized, is anchored on
the negative view of the following issues raised in this petition:
A.
IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION?
B.
COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT, EXCLUDE THE
PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING
HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?
On the other hand, respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General contend that Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is still
operative under the present Constitution, as the voluntary act of resignation contemplated in said Section 67 falls within the term
voluntary renunciation of office enunciated in par. 2, Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. That the ground provided in Section 67
is not included in the Constitution does not affect its validity as the grounds mentioned therein are not exclusive. There are, in
addition, other modes of shortening the tenure of office of Members of Congress, among which are resignation, death and conviction
of a crime which carries a penalty of disqualification to hold public office.
Respondents assert that petitioners filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is an act of resignation which estops him from claiming
otherwise as he is presumed to be aware of existing laws. They further maintain that their questioned administrative act is a mere
ministerial act which did not involve any encroachment on judicial powers.
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity
except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
The precursor of this provision is the last paragraph of Section 2 of C.A. No. 666, which reads:
Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one for which he has been lastly elected, shall
be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Section 27 of Article II of Republic Act No. 180 reiterated this rule in this wise:
Sec. 27. Candidate holding office. Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for an office, other than the one which
he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
The 1971 Election Code imposed a similar proviso on local elective officials as follows:
Sec. 24. Candidate holding elective office. Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or municipal district officer
running for an office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Every elected official shall take his oath of office on the day his term of office commences, or within ten days after his proclamation if
said proclamation takes place after such day. His failure to take his oath of office as herein provided shall be considered forfeiture of
his right to the new office to which he has been elected unless his failure is for a cause or causes beyond his control.
The 1978 Election Code provided a different rule, thus:
Sec. 30. Candidates holding political offices. Governors, mayors, members of various sanggunians, or barangay officials, shall,
upon filing of a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.
It must be noted that only in B.P. Blg. 881 are members of the legislature included in the enumeration of elective public officials who
are to be considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of their certificates of candidacy for another office, except for
President and Vice-President. The advocates of Cabinet Bill No. 2 (now Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) elucidated on the
rationale of this inclusion, thus:
MR. PALMARES:

In the old Election Code, Your Honor, in the 1971 Election Code, the provision seems to be different I think this is in Section 24 of
Article III.
Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or municipal district officer running for an office other than the one which he is
holding in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate
of candidacy.
May I know, Your Honor, what is the reason of the Committee in departing or changing these provisions of Section 24 of the old
Election Code and just adopting it en toto? Why do we have to change it? What could possibly be the reason behind it, or the
rationale behind it?
MR. PEREZ (L.):
I have already stated the rationale for this, Mr. Speaker, but I dont mind repeating it. The purpose is that the people must be given
the right to choose any official who belongs to, let us say, to the Batasan if he wants to run for another office. However, because of
the practice in the past where members of the legislature ran for local offices, but did not assume the office, because of that
spectacle the impression is that these officials were just trifling with the mandate of the people. They have already obtained a
mandate to be a member of the legislature, and they want to run for mayor or for governor and yet when the people give them that
mandate, they do not comply with that latter mandate, but still preferred (sic) to remain in the earlier mandate. So we believe, Mr.
Speaker, that the peoples latest mandate must be the one that will be given due course.
Assemblyman Manuel M. Garcia, in answer to the query of Assemblyman Arturo Tolentino on the constitutionality of Cabinet Bill No.
2, said:
MR. GARCIA (M.M.):
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker, on the part of the Committee, we made this proposal based on constitutional grounds. We did not propose this
amendment mainly on the rationale as stated by the Gentlemen from Manila that the officials running for office other than the ones
they are holding will be considered resignednot because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily
because under our Constitution, we have this new chapter on accountability of public officers. Now, this was not in the 1935
Constitution. It states that (sic) Article XIII, Section 1 Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees shall serve with
the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain accountable to the people.
Now, what is the significance of this new provision on accountability of public officers? This only means that all elective public
officials should honor the mandate they have gotten from the people. Thus, under our Constitution, it says that: Members of the
Batasan shall serve for the term of 6 years, in the case of local officials and 6 years in the case of barangay officials. Now, Mr.
Speaker, we have precisely included this as part of the Omnibus Election Code because a Batasan Member who hold (sic) himself
out with the people and seek (sic) their support and mandate should not be allowed to deviate or allow himself to run for any other
position unless he relinquishes or abandons his office. Because his mandate to the people is to serve for 6 years. Now, if you allow a
Batasan or a governor or a mayor who was mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office other than the one he was elected to,
then, that clearly shows that he has not (sic) intention to service the mandate of the people which was placed upon him and
therefore he should be considered ipso facto resigned. I think more than anything that is the accountability that the Constitution
requires of elective public officials. It is not because of the use or abuse of powers or facilities of his office, but it is because of the
Constitution itself which I said under the 1973 Constitution called and inserted this new chapter on accountability.
Now, argument was said that the mere filing is not the intention to run. Now, what is it for? If a Batasan Member files the certificate of
candidacy, that means that he does not want to serve, otherwise, why should he file for an office other than the one he was elected
to? The mere fact therefore of filing a certificate should be considered the overt act of abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to
the people and that he should therefore resign if he wants to seek another position which he feels he could be of better service.
As I said, Mr. Speaker, I disagree with the statements of the Gentleman from Manila because the basis of this Section 62 is the
constitutional provision not only of the fact that Members of the Batasan and local officials should serve the entire 6-year term for
which we were elected, but because of this new chapter on the accountability of public officers not only to the community which
voted him to office, but primarily because under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must
serve their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition. And that is the reason, Mr. Speaker, why we opted to propose
Section 62 where candidates or elective public officers holding offices other than the one to which they were elected, should be
considered ipso factoresigned from their office upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
It cannot be gainsaid that the same constitutional basis for Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 remains written in the 1987
Constitution. In fact, Section 1 of Article XI on Accountability of Public Officers is more emphatic in stating:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Obviously then, petitioners assumption that the questioned statutory provision is no longer operative does not hold water. He failed
to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that such
officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their
tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with
the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they
have received from their constituents.
In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to
confuse term with tenure of office. As succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor General:

The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period
during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer.
Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office (see
Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is
deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its
unexpired portion.
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the
tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI
provides that (t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly
recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened
are not exclusive. As held in the case of State ex rel. Berge vs. Lansing, the expression in the constitution of the circumstances
which shall bring about a vacancy does not necessarily exclude all others. Neither does it preclude the legislature from prescribing
other grounds. Events so enumerated in the constitution or statutes are merely conditions the occurrence of any one of which the
office shall become vacant not as a penalty but simply as the legal effect of any one of the events. And would it not be preposterous
to say that a congressman cannot die and cut his tenure because death is not one of the grounds provided for in the Constitution?
The framers of our fundamental law never intended such absurdity.
The basic principle which underlies the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is that by enactment of
legislation, a constitutional measure is presumed to be created. This Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of
constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not to be applied with the same rigor in construing a constitution as a statute and
only those things expressed in such positive affirmative terms as plainly imply the negative of what is not mentioned will be
considered as inhibiting the power of legislature. The maxim is only a rule of interpretation and not a constitutional command. This
maxim expresses a rule of construction and serves only as an aid in discovering legislative intent where such intent is not otherwise
manifest.
Even then, the concept of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution is broad enough to include
the situation envisioned in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. As discussed by the Constitutional Commissioners:
MR. MAAMBONG:
Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? The term voluntary renunciation does not only appear in Section 3; it
appears in Section 6.
MR. DAVIDE:
Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG:
It is also a recurring phrase all over the constitution. Could the Committee please enlighten us exactly what voluntary renunciation
means? Is this akin to abandonment?
MR. DAVIDE:
Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent the restriction by merely resigning at any given time on the second
term.
MR. MAAMBONG:
Is the Committee saying that the term voluntary renunciation is more general than abandonment and resignation?
MR. DAVIDE:
It is more general, more embracing.
That the act, contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office constitutes
an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently being held is evident from this exchange between
then Members of Parliament Arturo Tolentino and Jose Rono:
MR. RONO:
My reasonable ground is this: if you will make the person my, shall we say, basis is that in one case the person is intending to run
for an office which is different from his own, and therefore it should be considered, at least from the legal significance, an intention to
relinquish his office.
MR. TOLENTINO:

Yes
MR. RONO:
And in the other, because he is running for the same position, it is otherwise.
MR. TOLENTINO:
Yes, but what I cannot see is why are you going to compel a person to quit an office which he is only intending to leave? A
relinquishment of office must be clear, must be definite.
MR. RONO:
Yes, sir. Thats precisely, Mr. Speaker, what Im saying that while I do not disagree with the conclusion that the intention cannot be
enough, but I am saying that the filing of the certificate of candidacy is an over act of such intention. Its not just an intention; its
already there.
In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving Section 27 of R.A. No. 180 above-quoted, this Court categorically pronounced that
forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment
and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or
appointment can restore the ousted official. Thus, as We had occasion to remark, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in Castro vs.
Gatuslao:
The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of the certificate of candidacy should be taken into account. The
law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable, since the vacating is
expressly made as of the moment of the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective
position being presently held, it is not necessary, as petitioner opines, that the other position be actually held. The ground for
forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg.
881, which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of the Constitution.
The legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office having been spelled out in Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881
itself, no statutory interpretation was indulged in by respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives in
excluding petitioners name from the Roll of Members. The Speaker is the administrative head of the House of Representatives and
he exercises administrative powers and functions attached to his office. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House
Secretary-General perform ministerial functions. It was their duty to remove petitioners name from the Roll considering the
unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the Commission on Elections communicated to the House of
Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no
choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. It was their ministerial duty to
do so. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The
reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all
cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been
declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey
it.
In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and benefit of the
people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of
any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Feleciano, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.
I believe that the Speaker and the Secretary of the House of Representatives have no power, in purported implementation of an
invalid statute, to erase from the Rolls of the House the name of a member duly elected by his sovereign constituents to represent
them in Congress.
The rejection of the bid of the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo to retain his seat in Congress may appear logical, politically
palatable, and and salutary to certain quarters. But I submit that it is in cases like the present petition where the Court should be
vigilant in preventing the erosion of fundamental concepts of the Constitution. We must be particularly attentive to violations which
are cloaked in political respectability, seemingly defensible or arguably beneficial and attractive in the short run.
It is a fundamental priciple in Constitutional Law that Congress cannot add by statute or administrative act to the causes for
disqualification or removal of constitutional officers. Neither can Congress provide a different procedure for disciplining Constitution.
This is a true for the President and the members of Congress itself. The causes and procedures for removal found in the

Constitution are not mere diciplinary measures. They are intended to protect constitutional officers in the unhampered and
indepedent discharge of their functions. It is for this reason that the court should ensure that what the Constitution provides must be
followed.
The Constitutuion provides how the tenure of members of Congress may be shortened:
A. Forefeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries (Art. VI, Section 13);
B. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior (Art. VI, Sec. 16[3]);
C. Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribubal in an election contest (Art. VI, Sec. 17);
D. Voluntary renunciation of office (Art. VI, Sec. 7, par. 2). (See Petition, p. 8)
The respondents would now add to the above provisions, an enactment of the defunct Batasang Pambansa promulgated long
before the present Constitution took effect. B.P. Blg. 881, Article IX, Section 67 provides:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity
except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy. (Petition, p. 8)
I take exception to the Solicitor Generals stand that the grounds for removal mentioned in the Constitution are not exclusive. They
are exclusive. The non-inclusion of physical causes like death, being permanently comatose on a hospital bed, or disappearance in
the sinking of a ship does not justify in the slightest an act of Congress expelling one of its members for reasons other than those
found in the Constitution. Resignation is provided for by the Constitution. It is voluntary renunciation. So is naturalization in a foreign
country or express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. Conviction of a crime carrying a penalty of disqualification is a
disqualification against running for public office. Whether or not the conviction for such a crime while the Congressman is in office
may be a ground to expel him from Congress is a matter which we cannot decide obiter. We must await the proper case and
controversy. My point is Congress cannot by statute or disciplinary action add to the causes for disqualification or removal of its
members. Only the Constitution can do it.
The citation of the precursors of B.P. 881 namely, Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 665, Section 27 of Article II of Rep. Act No.
180, the 1971 Election Code, and the 1978 Election Code does not help the respondents. On the contrary, they strengthen the
case of the petitioner.
It may be noted that all the earlier statutes about elective officials being considered resigned upon the filing of a certificate of
candidacy refer to non-constitutional officers. Congress has not only the power but also the duty to prescribe causes for the removal
of provincial, city, and municipal officials. It has no such power when it comes to constitutional officers.
It was not alone egoistic self-interest which led the legislature during Commonwealth days or Congress in the pre-martial law period
to exclude their members from the rule that the filing of a certificate of candidacy for another office meant resignation from ones
current position. It was also a recognition that such a provision could not be validly enacted by statute. It has to be in the
constitution.
Does running for another elective office constitute voluntary renunciation of ones public office? In other words, did the Speaker and
the House Secretary correctly interpret the meaning of voluntary renunciation as found in the Constitution?
From 1935 when the Constitution was promulgated up to 1985 when B.P. 881 was enacted or for fifty long years, the filing of a
certificate of candidacy by a Senator or member of the House was not voluntary renunciation of his seat in Congress. I see no
reason why the passage of a statute by the Batasang Pambansa should suddenly change the meaning and implications of the act of
filing and equate it with voluntary renunciation. Voluntary refers to a state of the mind and in the context of constitutional
requirements should not be treated lightly. It is true that intentions may be deduced from a persons acts. I must stress, however, that
for fifty years of ourconstitutional history, running for a local government position was not considered a voluntary renunciation.
Congressman Dimaporo is steeped in the traditions of earlier years. He has been engaged in politics even before some of his
present colleagues in Congress were born. Neither the respondents nor this Court can state that he intended to renounce his seat in
Congress when he decided to run for Regional Governor. I submit that we should not deny to him the privilege of an existing
interpretation of voluntary renunciation and wrongly substitute the interpretation adopted by the respondents.
In interpreting the meaning of voluntary renunciation, the Court should also be guided by the principle that all presumptions should
be in favor of representation.
As aptly stated by the petitioner:
We should not lose sight of the fact that what we are dealing with here is not the mere right of the petitioner to sit in the House of
Representatives, but more important, we are dealing with the political right of the people of the Second Legislative District of Lanao
del Sur to representation in Congress, as against their disenfranchisement by mere administrative act of the respondents.
Such being the case, all presumptions should be strictly in favor of representation and strictly against disenfranchisement.
And if disenfranchisement should there be, the same should only be by due process of law, both substantive and procedural, and
not by mere arbitrary, capricious, and ultra vires, administrative act of the respondents. (Reply to Comment, p. 5)
The invocation of the principle of accountability found in Article XI of the Constitution does not empower the legislature to add to the
grounds for dismissing its members. When Congressman Dimaporo ran for Regional Governor, he was not trifling with the mandate

of his people. He wanted to serve a greater number in an autonomous, more direct, and intimate manner. He claims (a mistaken
claim according to the Commission on Elections sustained by this Court) that he was cheated of victory during the elections for
regional officers. He wants to continue serving his people. I fail to see how the principle of accountability and faithfulness to a trust
could be applied to this specific cause of Congressman Dimaporo.
For the Foregoing reasons, I VOTE to GRANT the petition.
Padilla and Bidin, JJ., concur.
# Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.
I believe that the Speaker and the Secretary of the House of Representatives have no power, in purported implementation of an
invalid statute, to erase from the Rolls of the House the name of a member duly elected by his sovereign constituents to represent
them in Congress.
The rejection of the bid of the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo to retain his seat in Congress may appear logical, politically
palatable, and and salutary to certain quarters. But I submit that it is in cases like the present petition where the Court should be
vigilant in preventing the erosion of fundamental concepts of the Constitution. We must be particularly attentive to violations which
are cloaked in political respectability, seemingly defensible or arguably beneficial and attractive in the short run.
It is a fundamental priciple in Constitutional Law that Congress cannot add by statute or administrative act to the causes for
disqualification or removal of constitutional officers. Neither can Congress provide a different procedure for disciplining Constitution.
This is a true for the President and the members of Congress itself. The causes and procedures for removal found in the
Constitution are not mere diciplinary measures. They are intended to protect constitutional officers in the unhampered and
indepedent discharge of their functions. It is for this reason that the court should ensure that what the Constitution provides must be
followed.
The Constitutuion provides how the tenure of members of Congress may be shortened:
A. Forefeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries (Art. VI, Section 13);
B. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior (Art. VI, Sec. 16[3]);
C. Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribubal in an election contest (Art. VI, Sec. 17);
D. Voluntary renunciation of office (Art. VI, Sec. 7, par. 2). (See Petition, p. 8)
The respondents would now add to the above provisions, an enactment of the defunct Batasang Pambansa promulgated long
before the present Constitution took effect. B.P. Blg. 881, Article IX, Section 67 provides:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity
except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy. (Petition, p. 8)
I take exception to the Solicitor Generals stand that the grounds for removal mentioned in the Constitution are not exclusive. They
are exclusive. The non-inclusion of physical causes like death, being permanently comatose on a hospital bed, or disappearance in
the sinking of a ship does not justify in the slightest an act of Congress expelling one of its members for reasons other than those
found in the Constitution. Resignation is provided for by the Constitution. It is voluntary renunciation. So is naturalization in a foreign
country or express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. Conviction of a crime carrying a penalty of disqualification is a
disqualification against running for public office. Whether or not the conviction for such a crime while the Congressman is in office
may be a ground to expel him from Congress is a matter which we cannot decide obiter. We must await the proper case and
controversy. My point is Congress cannot by statute or disciplinary action add to the causes for disqualification or removal of its
members. Only the Constitution can do it.
The citation of the precursors of B.P. 881 namely, Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 665, Section 27 of Article II of Rep. Act No.
180, the 1971 Election Code, and the 1978 Election Code does not help the respondents. On the contrary, they strengthen the
case of the petitioner.
It may be noted that all the earlier statutes about elective officials being considered resigned upon the filing of a certificate of
candidacy refer to non-constitutional officers. Congress has not only the power but also the duty to prescribe causes for the removal
of provincial, city, and municipal officials. It has no such power when it comes to constitutional officers.
It was not alone egoistic self-interest which led the legislature during Commonwealth days or Congress in the pre-martial law period
to exclude their members from the rule that the filing of a certificate of candidacy for another office meant resignation from ones
current position. It was also a recognition that such a provision could not be validly enacted by statute. It has to be in the
constitution.
Does running for another elective office constitute voluntary renunciation of ones public office? In other words, did the Speaker and
the House Secretary correctly interpret the meaning of voluntary renunciation as found in the Constitution?

From 1935 when the Constitution was promulgated up to 1985 when B.P. 881 was enacted or for fifty long years, the filing of a
certificate of candidacy by a Senator or member of the House was not voluntary renunciation of his seat in Congress. I see no
reason why the passage of a statute by the Batasang Pambansa should suddenly change the meaning and implications of the act of
filing and equate it with voluntary renunciation. Voluntary refers to a state of the mind and in the context of constitutional
requirements should not be treated lightly. It is true that intentions may be deduced from a persons acts. I must stress, however, that
for fifty years of ourconstitutional history, running for a local government position was not considered a voluntary renunciation.
Congressman Dimaporo is steeped in the traditions of earlier years. He has been engaged in politics even before some of his
present colleagues in Congress were born. Neither the respondents nor this Court can state that he intended to renounce his seat in
Congress when he decided to run for Regional Governor. I submit that we should not deny to him the privilege of an existing
interpretation of voluntary renunciation and wrongly substitute the interpretation adopted by the respondents.
In interpreting the meaning of voluntary renunciation, the Court should also be guided by the principle that all presumptions should
be in favor of representation.
As aptly stated by the petitioner:
We should not lose sight of the fact that what we are dealing with here is not the mere right of the petitioner to sit in the House of
Representatives, but more important, we are dealing with the political right of the people of the Second Legislative District of Lanao
del Sur to representation in Congress, as against their disenfranchisement by mere administrative act of the respondents.
Such being the case, all presumptions should be strictly in favor of representation and strictly against disenfranchisement.
And if disenfranchisement should there be, the same should only be by due process of law, both substantive and procedural, and
not by mere arbitrary, capricious, and ultra vires, administrative act of the respondents. (Reply to Comment, p. 5)
The invocation of the principle of accountability found in Article XI of the Constitution does not empower the legislature to add to the
grounds for dismissing its members. When Congressman Dimaporo ran for Regional Governor, he was not trifling with the mandate
of his people. He wanted to serve a greater number in an autonomous, more direct, and intimate manner. He claims (a mistaken
claim according to the Commission on Elections sustained by this Court) that he was cheated of victory during the elections for
regional officers. He wants to continue serving his people. I fail to see how the principle of accountability and faithfulness to a trust
could be applied to this specific cause of Congressman Dimaporo.
For the Foregoing reasons, I VOTE to GRANT the petition.
SECTION 11

Jimenez v cabangbang
Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee
on National Defense. On 14 Nov 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter
addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three
operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some
civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists and
that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup dtat to place him as the
president. The planners allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise
and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet
such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation.
Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against
Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbangs statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the
case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the HOR he is immune from suit
and that he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not
even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to
members of Congress. Whether or not the said letter is libelous.
HELD: Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to
and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be
questioned in any other place. The publication of the said letter is not covered by said
expression which refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their
official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of
Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the
same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or
outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of
Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at
the time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the
letter was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said
letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not
performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee

thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said communication is not
absolutely privileged. The SC is satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support
Jimenez action for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of
the persons unnamed therein alluded to as planners, and that, having been handpicked by
Vargas, it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that it is of course possible that
plaintiffs are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge. In
other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs action is based explicitly indicates that
they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be
merely unwitting tools of the planners. The SC does not think that this statement is derogatory
to Jimenez to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers
of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that
the group therein described as planners include these two (2) high ranking officers. Petition
is dismissed.
PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary
while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that
he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for
his constituents to be represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights
arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any
reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot
compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will
virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Pobre v Santiago
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre
invites the Courts attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos
speech delivered on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal.
I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living
my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in
the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the
speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court
and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings
or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel,
does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those
statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being
part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its
committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open
controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred
that she wanted to expose what she believed to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council
[JBC], which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated

position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the
Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given
an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered
for the position of Chief Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section
11 of the Constitution, which provides: A Senator or Member of the House of Representative
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable
in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof. Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the provision, the Court,
in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished
in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its
purpose is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust
with firmness and success for it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest
liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however,
powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense. [1]
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience
and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative
department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate
into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the
uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the
public good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a
judgment against them based upon a judges speculation as to the motives. [2]
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the
institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost
sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable
this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and
denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts
do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions
in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the
falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not
destroy the privilege.[3] The disciplinary authority of the assembly[4] and the voters, not the
courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of
parliamentary immunity.[5]
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for
disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this
could not be the last word on the matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member
of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the
lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It
is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in
substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted to spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, and calling the Court a
Supreme Court of idiots.
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.[6] We draw her attention to the ensuing
passage in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first place:
x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe
that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own
hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed
to erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon
8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively
provide:

Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for
themselves. She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority
on constitutional and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected
senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer
of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and
to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith
and are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their
brethren in private practice.[7] Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive
individual, the impact her statements would make on the peoples faith in the integrity of the
courts.
As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting
remedial legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of
the insulting tenor of what she said. We quote the passage once more:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am
humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in
the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)
A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were
expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief
Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary
functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to
ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for
personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an
individual privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their
personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that
represents them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting
rhetoric and offensive personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiagos outburst was directly traceable to what she
considered as an unjust act the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the
position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions under the Courts supervision, its
individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBCs exofficiochairperson,[8] have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the
position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiagos
wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical
and defamatory words against all of them.
At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the
Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of the
law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)

The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the
Integrated Bar with the end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum,
from the assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its
integrity, impartiality and independence;
xxxx
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x. [9]
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,[10] we reiterated our
pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer[11] that the duty of attorneys to the courts
can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office
which they are bound to uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of thePhilippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that [i]t is the duty of a
lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. That
same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts
against unjust criticism and clamor. And more. The attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a
conduct that should be with all good fidelity x x x to the courts.
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v.
Cloribel[12] that:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to
which he owes fidelity, not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Faith in the
courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to
the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus has it
been said of a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help
build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration of justice. [13]
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict
Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and
dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official
duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer. [14]
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long
as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor, [15] a good character being
an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such
privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of
conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined to ones behavior exhibited in
connection with the performance of lawyers professional duties, but also covers any
misconduct, whichalbeit unrelated to the actual practice of their professionwould show
them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law
invest in them.[16]
This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the peoples faith in courts and trust in the rule of
law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent
purpose or personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with
the integrity of courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose
them. We have done it in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty.
Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang[17] who
repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most insolent manner.
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty.
Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part
towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however,
deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional
consideration dictates this kind of disposition.

We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senators offensive and disrespectful
language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part
to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this
Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to
members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but
to enable them, as the peoples representatives, to perform the functions of their office without
fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional
hall.[18] It is intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and
intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its
members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that
enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, offensive or improper language against
another Senator or against any public institution.[19] But as to Senator Santiagos
unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let
alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action,
as the Rules dictates under such circumstance. [20] The lady senator clearly violated the rules of
her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their
own rules on her.
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres motives in filing his complaint, stating that
disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree
with her more. We cannot overstress that the senators use of intemperate language to
demean and denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect
lawyers owe to the courts.[21]
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made
the statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not
categorically denied making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part
of her privilege speech. Her implied admission is good enough for the Court.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam DefensorSantiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution,DISMISSED.
SECTION 13

Bengzon v drilon
On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower
Courts General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court
providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for
the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of
Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations
bill is constitutional.
HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them
in accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside and override the
decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend
statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is
unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the
appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the
remaining portion of said item.
SECTION 14
PUYAT, ET. AL. vs. DE GUZMAN JR., ET. AL. G.R. No. L-51122, 25 March 1982 Case Digest
The suit is for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction poised against the Order of respondent Associate Commissioner
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Hon. Sixto T. J. De Guzman, Jr., granting Assemblyman Estanislao A.
Fernandez leave to intervene in a SEC Case.
FACTS:
On 14 May 1979, an election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries (IPI), a private corporation, was held six
of the elected directors were herein petitioners that may be called the Puyat Group, while the other five were herein respondents, the

Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI. On 25 May 1979, the Acero
Group instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings questioning the election. Conferences were held on 25-31 May 1979 and the
Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds the appearance of Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa, as counsel for the Acero group. Section 11, Article VIII, 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no
Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before xxx any administrative body" and SEC was an administrative body. The prohibition
being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance. When SEC Case was called on 31 May 1979, it turned out
that Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased on 15 May 1979 ten shares of IPI stock for Php200.00, but the deed of sale was
notarized only on 30 May 1979. He then filed on 31 May 1979 an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of 10
IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation, which motion was granted by the SEC Commissioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, in intervening in the SEC Case, is in effect appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before
an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision.
RULING:
The Court en banc ruled that ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be
appearing as counsel. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) IPI shares. However,
certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez. He had acquired a mere Php200.00
worth of stock in IPI. He acquired them "after the fact", that is, on 30 May 1979, after the contested election of Directors, after the
quo warranto suit had been filed, and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more, before
he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for the Acero group, but which was objected to by
petitioners Puyat group. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal
interest in the matter under litigation. Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an indirect appearance as counsel
before an administrative body, which is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to
enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the
constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a
minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly
prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or
impliedly prohibited. Thus, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case falls within the ambit of the prohibition
contained in the 1973 Constitution. Respondent Commissioner's Order granting Assemblyman Fernandez leave to intervene in the
SEC Case was reversed and set aside.
SECTION 16

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. GUINGONA

G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998
FACTS:
During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan
was declared the duly elected President of the Senate. The following were likewise elected:
Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader. Senator
Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only
other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained
that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who
had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority." During the discussion on
who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators
belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority
had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived
at. The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago
and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus,
but still failed to resolve the issue. On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body
chat he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that
they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate
President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition
for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully
holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to
them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position
of Senate minority leader
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the minority leader?
HELD:

FIRST ISSUE
The Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President,
since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in
the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;" and (2) because the resolution
of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a
quorum to hold a session and therein elect a Senate President(read Avelino vs. Cuenco about
the scope of the Court's power of judicial review). The Court ruled that the validity of the
selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political
question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary
authority," but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held that
not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection
proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
SECOND ISSUE
There was no violation. The Court finds that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no
clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of
the Upper House. The Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected
by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it however does not
provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority,"
who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the
defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. While the Constitution is
explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however,
dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that
the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary." The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative
of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
THIRD ISSUE
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one
without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the
proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust
the holder from its enjoyment. The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public
prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercise by another. In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful,
the person suing must show that he or she has a clearright to the contested office or to use or
exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In
this case, petitioners present not sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the
office of the Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown
to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.
FOURTH ISSUE
Grave abuse of discretion - such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility.
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as
Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. To recall, the
latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By
unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was
recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan
came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally
allowed to articulate their standpoints. Therefore, the Senate President cannot be accused of
"capricious orwhimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the
rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked,
grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their
competence and authority.

Osmena v pendatun
Then Congressman Osmea Jr filed a verified petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and
certiorari with preliminary injunction against Congressman Pendatun and others in their

capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution 59. He asked for
the annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement upon his parliamentary
immunity. He further asked that the respondents should not require him to substantiate his
charges against the president with the admonition that if he failed to do so he must show
cause why the House should not punish him. Said charges emanated from his one-hour
privileged speech entitled A Message to Garcia, which constituted a serious assault upon the
dignity of Garcia as the then President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeas immunity has been violated?
HELD: Section 15, Article 6 of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon
member s of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in
a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear
of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum
outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a
member therein. Therefore, Osmeas petition is dismissed.
Paredes v sandiganbayan
Political Law Suspension of a Member of Congress RA 3019
On 23 Jan 1990, Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a case
against Paredes (who was then the governor of the same province), Atty. Sansaet (counsel of
Paredes), and Honrada (the clerk of court). The three allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a
Notice of Arraignment and of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in
fact, no arraignment has ever been issued against him in a criminal proceeding against him.
Gelacio was able to produce a certification from the judge handling the case himself that the
criminal case against him never reached the arraignment stage because the prosecution was
dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment
but he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes claimed that Sansaet only changed his side
because of political realignment. Subsequently, the Office of the Ombudsman recommended
that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes appealed but was
eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, be suspended by order of the
Sandiganbayan.
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the
Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the
prerogatives of congress. The SC ruled. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution which deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to punish
its Members for disorderly behavior, and suspend or expel a Member by a vote of two-thirds
of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed,
should not exceed sixty days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on
petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.
Us v pons
Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On 5 Apr 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez
arrived at Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were
delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On the other hand,
the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not
delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted
an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of
opium. Since the ct of trading and dealing opium is against Act 2381, Pons and Beliso were
charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to
the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was not approved while the
Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the
said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission
was adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and
void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act
2381 was indeed made a as law on 28 Feb 1914.

HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused
to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the
Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they
are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of
the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses cannot be given due
weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The
journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles
the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals. The SC passed
upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.
Casco Philippine chemical co v gimenez
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues
used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea
and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign
Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its
Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To
supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the
procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in same
law. In compliance, Casco paid the fees but later moved for reimbursement as Casco
maintained that urea and formaldehyde are exempted from such fees. The CBP issued the
vouchers for refund (pursuant to Resolution 1529 of the CBP) but the banks auditor refused to
honor the vouchers since he maintained that this is in contrast to the provision of Sec 2, par 18
of RA 2609 which provides: The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the
provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the
importation of the following:
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by
and for the exclusive use of end-users. The Auditor General, Gimenez, affirmed the ruling of
CBPs auditor. Casco maintains that the term urea formaldehyde appearing in this provision
should be construed as urea and formaldehyde He further contends that the bill approved in
Congress contained the copulative conjunction and between the terms urea and,
formaldehyde, and that the members of Congress intended to exempt urea and
formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
glue called urea formaldehyde, not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view
the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said
House, by members thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and
formaldehyde.
HELD: Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain
conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in
water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for
use in the manufacture of plywood. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is
patently distinct and different from urea and formaldehyde, as separate articles used in
the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as urea formaldehyde The opinions of any
member of Congress does not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in
the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled that the enrolled bill
which uses the term urea formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde is conclusive
upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the
officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which the SC cannot speculate,
without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation,
not by judicial decree.
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, and RONALDO B.
ZAMORA, petitioners, vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called sin taxes (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and
sale of beer and cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents Jose de Venecia,
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners
claim are constitutionally mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September 12,
1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on
November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and
Senate versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a
recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after
which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to
adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair
(Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of aquorum.[1] Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was
defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order, following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep.
Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a
question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the
following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the
newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question that the Chair
asked the distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for approval of the report, and the
Chair called for the motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four oclock, Wednesday, next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four oclock, Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and
certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives
and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22,
1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyos interpellation: (1)
the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m.
on November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from the operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript
of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on
November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November
21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the
published version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound
recording the word approved, which appears on line 13 in the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certified
on November 21, 1996 the word no on line 17 appears only once, while in the other versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the
published version does not contain the sentence (Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum,
which appears in the other versions.
Petitioners allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no need to discuss this point as petitioners
have announced that, in order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit, without conceding, the correctness of the
transcripts relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this proceeding the word approved appears in
the transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 are in
question. Petitioners principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House; that these rules embody the constitutional mandate in Art. VI, 16(3) that each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the
certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, 35 and Rule XVII, 103 of the rules of the House, [2] the
Chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the House, did not call for the yeas or nays, but simply asked for its approval
by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, 112, [3] the

Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyos question, What is that . . . Mr. Speaker? and did not repeat Rep. Albanos motion to
approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, 97, [4] the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on
Rep. Albanos motion and afterward declared the report approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI, 123, and
Rule XVIII, 109,[5] the Chair suspended the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyos question which, it is alleged, is a point of
order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyos query should have been resolved upon the resumption of the session on
November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption of the
session.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill certified by
Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a
reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the House that the law had been properly
passed, considering the Courts power under Art. VIII, 1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other departments of
the government, and they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[6] which affirmed the conclusiveness of an
enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of the Court.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition, respondent De Venecia filed a supplemental
comment. Respondents defense is anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that
the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no justification for reconsidering the
enrolled bill doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, 16(3) for the adoption by each House of its rules of
proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as they implement constitutional requirements
such as that relating to three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed. At all events, respondents contend that, in
passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary precedents for approval of conference
committee reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and
contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the
House of Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being
no objection, the Body approved the Conference Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198. [7] This Journal was approved on
December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman.[8]
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of
discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are
merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 2627. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the
House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings[9] and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands
the principle on its head. In the decided cases,[10] the constitutional provision that each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to
conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial
review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations
that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation
of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun,[11] it was held: At any rate, courts have
declared that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no
concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,[12] the rule was stated thus: The Constitution empowers each house to determine its
rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of
the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that
a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is
exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute
and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.
In Crawford v. Gilchrist,[13] it was held: The provision that each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings does not
restrict the power given to a mere formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative matters; but
in the absence of constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a
determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power, in the
transaction of any business, or in the performance of any duty conferred upon it by the Constitution.
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore,[14] the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: The provision for reconsideration is
no part of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of the General Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be
regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of
many states, and also by the United States Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with
rules.
In State v. Savings Bank,[15] the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared itself as follows: The Constitution declares
that each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers necessary for a branch of the Legislature
of a free and independent state. Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and subject to its authority. This authority may
be abused, but when the House has acted in a matter clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the
independence of the legislative department for the court to set aside such action as void because it may think that the House has
misconstrued or departed from its own rules of procedure.
In McDonald v. State,[16] the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: When it appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry will be
permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have or have not complied strictly with their own rules in their procedure upon the bill,
intermediate its introduction and final passage. The presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We think no court has ever

declared an act of the legislature void for non-compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself , or the respective branches
thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at will. If there are any such adjudications, we decline to follow them.
Schweizer v. Territory[17] is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three readings on
separate days before a bill may be passed by each house of the legislature, with the proviso that in case of an emergency the house
concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court of violation of a law
punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling statute was not properly passed by the legislature because the
suspension of the rule on three readings had not been approved by the requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the
State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill in any particular manner. It may, then, read or
deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit, either in accordance with its own rules, or in violation thereof, or without making any rules. The
provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision for the direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed
measures. It receives its entire force from legislative sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of the legislature
to properly weigh and consider an act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty manner, might be reasons for the governor
withholding his signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown to be a violation of a rule which the legislature had made to
govern its own proceedings, could be no reason for the courts refusing its enforcement after it was actually passed by a majority of
each branch of the legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account
of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself to govern its deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In
re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N. W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S. E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S. W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on the power
of each House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject,
however, to this qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the legislative
body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights
are involved.[18]
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the
House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than
members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the others may
not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our system of
government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of
the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.
Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcions sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission,
contend that under Art. VIII, 1, nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the government] amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review.[19] Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an
acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, 5 and, therefore,
to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate constitutional questions such as those which arise in the
field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, 1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political
departments to decide, such as those relating to national security,[20] it has not altogether done away with political questions such as
those which arise in the field of foreign relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, 1, this Courts function
is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction,
not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is
apparent error.[21]
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with
rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has
gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII, 1 power.
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was railroaded. They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still
making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albanos motion approved.
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo
Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo
was asking, What is that . . . Mr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo
subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been
declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albanos motion for the approval of the conference
committee report should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the Members should have been taken. They
say that the method used in this case is a legislators nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the fact was that one or some
legislators opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as this involving approval
of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other
hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved
was by no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee report on the bills
which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and
Customs Code were approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House. The point was answered by Majority Leader
Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of the Chair. Mr. Tolentino said:

Mr. Tolentino. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is
concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if
somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in.
....
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude is now on his point of order. I
should just like to state that I believe that we have had a substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not one that
refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces
the vote by saying Is there any objection? and nobody objects, then the Chair announces The bill is approved on second
reading. If there was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not presented, we
assume that the House approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial compliance here, and if anybody wants a division of
the House he can always ask for it, and the Chair can announce how many are in favor and how many are against.[22]
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be better, more accurate and even more just.
The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for judicial consideration. [24] In the
words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure.
Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem
for the institution as a whole and for the constitutional command that the institution be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes
us from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem.[25]
[23]

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except
only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill,[26] at the request of one-fifth of the Members present,[27] and
in repassing a bill over the veto of the President.[28] Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of the
Members by yeas and nays had already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of the precipitate suspension and
subsequent adjournment of the session.[29] It would appear, however, that the session was suspended to allow the parties to settle
the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the
Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if
there was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he did not. The Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House shows:
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session adjourned until four oclock in the afternoon of
Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)
This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval except Rep. Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of submitting the proper motions for
the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyos question as an obstacle to the passage of the
bill. But Rep. Arroyos question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to precedence.
[30]
And even if Rep. Arroyos question were so, Rep. Albanos motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end
to any further consideration of the question.[31]
Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240,
respondent Speaker of the House be acted with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief
Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII, 1 extends to cases where
a branch of the government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.[32]
Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be
concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as
the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the
quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. [33] Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his
continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum.[34]
At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be present on November 21, 1996, only the
five, i.e., petitioners in this case, are questioning the manner by which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was
approved on that day. No one, except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to the manner by which the report was approved.
Rep. John Henry Osmea did not participate in the bicameral conference committee proceedings. [35] Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora
objected to the report[36] but not to the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if voting had been conducted, Rep. Taada would
have voted in favor of the conference committee report.[37]
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the
Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive
of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to
disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case[38] we went behind an enrolled bill and consulted
the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers of both
Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote
needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained, because a duly authenticated bill or resolution
imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. [39] This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which
embodies good, if old-fashioned, democratic theory:

The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They
have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher Legislature. But they
aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the
Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do
impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose
hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.[40]
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President contained provisions which had
been surreptitiously inserted in the conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than
another allegation that the Conference Committee surreptitiously inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should
decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the enrolled bill rule in such cases would be to
disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government.[41]
It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI, 26(2) of
the Constitution that upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed. [42]
In other cases,[43] this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by the presiding officers of
both Houses of Congress.
[44]

The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text writers here and abroad.
The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations:

. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of
State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the
President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect
due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises,
whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.[45]
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an
established rule of evidence.
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule, except to say that, with a change in the
membership of the Court, the three new members may be assumed to have an open mind on the question of the enrolled bill
rule. Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since our decision in the
EVAT cases and their places have since been taken by four new members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and
Torres, JJ.) Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the membership of the Court.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of November
21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8240, was approved on that
day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution. Art. VI, 16(4) provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its
judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present,
be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded therein.
With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive
effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons,[47] this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as public
memorials of the most permanent character, thus: They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should
be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at
some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals. As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No.
8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.
[46]

___________________
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative
action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the
political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has
not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be
acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a
case[48] may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of
R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the
good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.[49]
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

SECTION 17

Lazatin v hret
Lazatin filed the instant petition assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to annul his
proclamation after he had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and discharged the duties
of Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga. Lazatin claims that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all election

contests. Buan, Jr., and Timbol (Lazatins opposition), alleged that the instant petition has
become moot and academic because the assailed COMELEC Resolution had already become
final and executory when the SC issued a TRO on October 6, 1987. In the COMMENT of the SolGen, he alleges that the instant petition should be given due course because the proclamation
was valid. The Telex Order issued by the COMELEC directing the canvassing board to proclaim
the winner if warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code, was in effect a grant
of authority by the COMELEC to the canvassing board, to proclaim the winner. A Separate
Comment was filed by the COMELEC, alleging that the proclamation of Lazatin was illegal and
void because the board simply corrected the returns contested by Lazatin without waiting for
the final resolutions of the petitions of candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin himself,
against certain election returns.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRETs jurisdiction.
HELD: The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due course to the
petition. The petition is impressed with merit because petitioner has been proclaimed winner
of the Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as
such, and assumed his duties as Congressman. For this Court to take cognizance of the
electoral protest against him would be to usurp the functions of the House Electoral Tribunal.
The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC
itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the
protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to
the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.
Bondoc vs. Pineda
Facts: Pineda from the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates
for Rep of the 4th district of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner of the election. Bondoc filed protest to house of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The decision held that Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of 23 votes. The LDP
insisted a recount and the recount has increased Bondocs win by 107 votes. So congressman Camasura voted with the SC justices
and Congressman Cerilles proclaimed Bondoc the winner of the election.so Camasura being a member of the LDP revealed to the
chief congressman Conjuanco that he voted for Bondoc and he did so in view of what was in line with truth justice and self respect.
The revelation prompted efforts by the LDP to neutralize pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal. So on the eve of promulgation of
Bondocs win, Congress man Jose Conjuangco thru a letter stated that Camasura and Bautista were being expelled for the LDP for
allegedly helping in the organization ofPartido Pilipino of Danding cojuanco and for having members of LDP join said pol party. The
LDP informed Herrera that they were no longer part of LDP hence; his (Camasuras) vote in favor of Bondoc should be withdrawn.
The judges in HRET all wanted out cause of this distressing development. They were saying that unseating should be prevented in
all cost. They also said that the tribunal should not be hampered in doing its constitutional function by factors, which have nothing to
do with the merits of the cases before it. The Bondoc promulgation was cancelled because the decisionlack the concurrence of 5
members as required by Section 24 of the rules of the tribunal. Bondoc asked the court to annul the decision of the House in
rescinding Camasuras nomination and restrain the replacement of Camasura through a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus.
Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives is empowered to interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the
HReT by reorganizing the representation of the majority party in the tribunal?
Held: No. Section 17 Articles VI supplies the answer to this question.. So the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relation to the
election, returns and qualification of their respective members. The operative term found in the section was sole Judge. It (HRET)
was made to function as a non-partisan court although 2/3 of its members are politicians. Its suppose to provide an independent
and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office devoid of partisan consideration. So they cant just shuffle
and manipulate the political component for the electoral tribunal to serve the interests of party in power. Its independence would be
undermined if the removal of Camasura for as a punishment for party disloyalty for voting for Bondoc would allow them
to change the judgment of the HRET in the Bondoc case.If allowed so, then the HRET isnt really a sole judge of senatorial elections.
The members of the HRET are entitled to security of tenure just as the members of the judiciary are. They can only be replaced in
cases such as expiration, death, permanentdisability, resignation forms the political party, and formal affiliation with another party of
any valid cause hence mere disloyalty is not a valid cause for termination.

Chavez vs Comelec Case Digest

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
211 SCRA 315
Facts: On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a Resolution in GR No. 104704, disqualifying Melchor
Chavez, private respondent therein, from running for the Office of Senator in the May 11, 1992
elections. Petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate
through the fastest available means this Courts Resolution dated May 5, 1992 to all regional
election directors, provincial election supervisors, city and municipal election registrars, boards
of election inspectors, the six (6) accredited political parties and the general public; and (2)
order said election officials to delete the name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list
of candidates tally sheets, election returns and to count all votes cast for the disqualified
Melchor, Chavez in favor of Francisco I. Chavez. On May 8, 1992, the Comelec issued Res. No.

92-1322 which resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified
candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all Chavez votes in favor of petitioner
as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez name in the list of qualified candidates.
Issue: Whether or not the law allows pre-proclamation controversy involving the election of the
members of the Senate.
Held: A simple reading of the petition would readily show that petitioner has no cause of
action, the controversy presented being one in the nature of a pre-proclamation. While the
Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local
elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are
not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives. Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides: For purposes of the elections for
President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no preproclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of canvass, as the
case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing
body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors
in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.
G.R. No. 178413

March 13, 2008

AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC SITTING AS THE NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, THE SPECIAL
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR MAGUINDANAO CHAIRED BY ATTY. EMILIO S. SANTOS, and JUAN MIGUEL F.
ZUBIRI, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On 4 July 2007, petitioner Aquilino L. Pimentel III (Pimentel) filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus(with Urgent
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order).1
The Petition stemmed from the 14 May 2007 national elections for 12 senatorial posts. At the time of filing of the Petition, around two
months after the said elections, the 11 candidates with the highest number of votes had already been officially proclaimed and had
taken their oaths of office as Senators. With other candidates conceding, the only remaining contenders for the twelfth and final
senatorial post were Pimentel and private respondent Juan Miguel F. Zubiri (Zubiri). Public respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) en banc, acting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBC), continued to conduct canvass proceedings so as to
determine the twelfth and last Senator-elect in the 14 May 2007 elections.
Pimentel assailed the proceedings before the NBC and its constituted Special Provincial Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao
(SPBOC-Maguindanao) in which the Provincial and Municipal Certificates of Canvass (PCOC and MCOCs) from the province of
Maguindanao were respectively canvassed.
The SPBOC-Maguindanao was created because the canvass proceedings held before the original Provincial Board of Canvassers
for Maguindanao (PBOC-Maguindanao), chaired by Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) Lintang Bedol, were marred by
irregularities, and the PCOC (Bedol PCOC) and other electoral documents submitted by the said PBOC-Maguindanao were tainted
with fraud and statistical improbabilities. Hence, the Bedol PCOC was excluded from the national canvass then being conducted by
the NBC.
Task Force Maguindanao, headed by COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. and Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer,
retrieved and collected 21 MCOCs from the municipalities of Maguindanao, mostly copy 2, or the copy intended to be posted on the
wall. The SPBOC-Maguindanao was then tasked to re-canvass the MCOCs submitted by Task Force Maguindanao. The recanvassing of the Maguindanao MCOCs was conducted by the SPBOC-Maguindanao from 25 to 26 June 2007 at Shariff Aguak,
Maguindanao. Although PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Maguindanao (MBOCsMaguindanao) were present during the canvass proceedings before the SPBOC-Maguindanao, the candidates legal counsels were
not allowed to ask them any questions. Due to the consistent denial by the SPBOC-Maguindanao of the repeated and persistent
motions made by Pimentels counsel to propound questions to PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao
regarding the due execution and authenticity of the Maguindanao MCOCs, Pimentels counsel manifested her continuing objection
to the canvassing of the said MCOCs. In particular, Pimentels counsel objected to the Maguindanao MCOCs because:
a) the proceedings were illegal;
b) the MCOCs were palpably manufactured;
c) the results reflected in the MCOCs were statistically improbable;

d) there is no basis for saying the MCOCs were authentic because there were no other available copies for comparison
purposes;
e) in most of the MCOCs[,] no watcher signed;
f) there was no evidence or indication that the copy 2 MCOCs had been posted as intended by law;
g) the serial numbers of the MCOCs are not clearly stamped;
h) copy 2 of the MCOCs cannot be used for canvass;
i) that the MCOCs are therefore, improper, unworthy and unfit for canvass;
j) that the manner the "re-canvassing" which was being done where the parties are not allowed to ask questions was
patently illegal; and
k) that it has not been established that the other copies of the MCOCs have been lost.2
All of the foregoing observations, manifestations, and objections made by Pimentels counsel, as well as those made by the other
candidates counsels, were simply noted by the SPBOC-Maguindanao without specific action thereon.
On 29 June 2007, the SPBOC-Maguindanao submitted to the NBC the second PCOC for Maguindanao. In the proceedings before
the NBC, Pimentels counsel reiterated her request to propound questions to PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCsMaguindanao and the SPBOC-Maguindanao. The NBC, however, refused to grant her request. Pimentels counsel thereafter moved
for the exclusion of the second Maguindanao PCOC from the canvass, maintaining that the said PCOC did not reflect the true
results of the elections because it was based on the manufactured Maguindanao MCOCs, the authenticity and due execution of
which had not been duly established. The motion to exclude made by Pimentels counsel was once again denied by the NBC, and
she was ordered to sit down or she would be forcibly evicted from the session hall. The second Maguindanao PCOC was thus
included in the canvass proceedings conducted by the NBC and, resultantly, Pimentels lead over Zubiri was significantly reduced
from 133,000 votes to only 4,000 votes.
Pimentel averred that said canvass proceedings were conducted by the NBC and SPBOC-Maguindanao in violation of his
constitutional rights to substantive and procedural due process and equal protection of the laws, and in obvious partiality to Zubiri.
Pimentel thus filed the Petition at bar on 4 July 2007, anchored on the following grounds:
I. The petitioner [Pimentel] was denied his right to due process of law when the respondent SPBOC and the respondent
NBC adopted an unconstitutional procedure which disallowed the petitioner [Pimentel] the opportunity to raise questions on
the COCs subject of the canvass.
II. The petitioner [Pimentel] was denied his right to equal protection of the law when the respondent SPBOC and the
respondent NBC unconstitutionally adopted a procedure of "no questions" in the canvass of COCs from Maguindanao,
different from the procedure adopted in the canvass of COCs from other provinces/areas.
III. The respondent NBC acted with manifest grave abuse of discretion when it refused to exercise its broad, plenary
powers in fully or accurately ascertaining due execution, authenticity and fitness for the canvass of the MCOCs collected by
the Comelec in the exercise of such broad plenary powers. It violated its own rules when it deprived petitioner [Pimentel] of
the right to ventilate and prove his objections to the Maguindanao COCs.3
Pimentel seeks from this Court the following remedies:
1. Forthwith ISSUE A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER enjoining the respondent Commission on Elections en banc
sitting as the National Board of Canvassers for Senators for the May 14, 2007 elections ("NBC") from proceeding with any
proclamation (of the twelfth and last winner of the May 14, 2007 Elections for Senators) based on the on-going senatorial
canvass which includes the new/second Provincial Certificate of Canvass of Maguindanao, until further orders from this
Court, or, in the alternative, in the event that the proclamation of Respondent Zubiri is made before the application for a
TRO is acted upon,ISSUE A STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER requiring the parties to observe the status quo at the time of the
filing of the Petition, in order to maintain and preserve the situation of the parties at the time of the filing of this Petition, so
as not to render the issues raised in this Petition moot and academic;
2. After proper proceedings, RENDER JUDGMENT: (a) ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE for being unconstitutional and
illegal the proceedings and acts of respondent Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers for Senators for the May 14, 2007 elections ("NBC") of including, on June 29, 2007, in the national canvass of
votes for Senators the results from the Province of Maguindanao as reflected in its new/second Provincial Certificate of
Canvass as well as the proceedings and acts of the respondent Special Provincial Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao
("SPBOC") in canvassing or "re-canvassing" the collected MCOCs, on June 25, 26 and 27, 2007, leading to the preparation
of the new/second PCOC for Maguindanao, and (b) COMPELLING or ORDERING respondent NBC and its deputy, the
SPBOC, to perform their ministerial constitutional duty of fully determining the due execution and authenticity of the
MCOCs, including, but not limited to, allowing petitioner [Pimentel] to substantiate his claim of manufactured results and

propound questions to the officers concerned, primarily, the Chairpersons of the former PBOC and SPBOC of
Maguindanao and the Chairpersons of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Maguindanao.
Petitioner [Pimentel] also prays for other reliefs, just and equitable, under the premises.4
Pursuant to the Resolution5 dated 10 July 2007 issued by this Court, Zubiri filed his Comment6 on the Petition at bar on 12 July
2007; while the NBC and SPBOC-Maguindano, chaired by Atty. Emilio S. Santos, filed their joint Comment7 on even date. The
respondents Zubiri, NBC, and SPBOC-Maguindanao collectively sought the denial of Pimentels application for Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Status Quo Ante Order and the dismissal of the instant Petition.
Pimentels prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or Status Quo Ante Order was set for oral arguments on 13 July 2007. After hearing
the parties oral arguments, the Court voted seven for the grant and seven for the denial of Pimentels prayer for the issuance of a
TRO and/or Status Quo Ante Order; thus, said prayer was deemed denied for failure to garner the required majority vote. The
parties were then directed to submit their respective Memoranda, after which, the case would be deemed submitted for
resolution.8 All the parties complied, with Zubiri submitting his Memorandum9 on 31 July 2007; Pimentel,10 on 1 August 2007; and the
NBC and SPBOC-Maguindanao,11 on 10 August 2007.
In the meantime, without any TRO and/or Status Quo Ante Order from the Court, the canvass proceedings before the NBC
continued, and by 14 July 2007, Zubiri (with 11,004,099 votes) and Pimentel (with 10,984,807 votes) were respectively ranked as
the twelfth and thirteenth Senatorial candidates with the highest number of votes in the 14 May 2007 elections. Since the NBC found
that the remaining uncanvassed certificates of canvass would no longer materially affect Zubiris lead of 19,292 votes over Pimentel,
it issued Resolution No. NBC 07-67,12 dated 14 July 2007, proclaiming Zubiri as the twelfth duly elected Senator of the Philippines in
the 14 May 2007 elections, to serve for a term of six years beginning 30 June 2007 in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.
On 19 July 2007, Zubiri filed with this Court a Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss.13 Zubiri sought the dismissal of the Petition at bar
arguing that, in consideration of his proclamation pursuant to Resolution No. NBC 07-67 and his formal assumption of office on 16
July 2007, controversies involving his election and qualification as a Senator are now within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET).
Zubiri further informed the Court through a Manifestation,14 dated 16 August 2007, that Pimentel filed an Election Protest (Ex
Abudante Ad Cautelam) before the SET on 30 July 2007, docketed as SET Case No. 001-07, to which Zubiri filed his Answer Ad
Cautelam (With Special Affirmative Defenses, Counter-Protest and Petition for a Preliminary Hearing on the Affirmative Defenses) on
13 August 2007. In his election protest, Pimentel prays, among other remedies, for the annulment of Zubiris proclamation as the
twelfth winning Senator in the 14 May 2007 elections. Zubiri called the attention of the Court to the "glaring reality" that with G.R. No.
178413 before this Court and SET Case No. 001-07 before the SET, "there are now two cases involving the same parties with
practically the same issues and similar remedies sought filed before the two (2) separate courts/tribunals." Zubiri also pointed out
Pimentels ostensible failure to inform this Court of his institution of SET Case No. 001-07 and the subsequent developments therein.
On 23 August 2007, Pimentel filed before this Court his Comment/Opposition (to Private Respondents Manifestation with Motion to
Dismiss).15 Pimentel alleged that Zubiris Motion to Dismiss solely relied on Aggabao v. Commission on Elections.16 However,
Pimentel argued that Aggabao cannot be applied to the instant Petition because of the difference in the factual backgrounds of the
two cases. In Aggabao, therein petitioner Aggabao filed his Petition before this Court after the proclamation of therein private
respondent Miranda as Congressman for the Fourth District of Isabela; while in the present case, Pimentel already filed his Petition
before this Court prior to the proclamation of Zubiri as Senator. Moreover, Pimentel asserted that his Petition questioned not Zubiris
proclamation, but the conduct of the canvass proceedings before the NBC and SPBOC-Maguindanao. He maintained that his case
was one of first impression and no existing jurisprudence could be used as precedent for its summary dismissal. Pimentel then
reiterated his arguments in his Memorandum that Sections 37 and 38 of Republic Act No. 9369,17 amending Sections 30 and 15 of
Republic Act No. 7166,18 respectively, significantly affected and changed the nature of canvass proceedings, the nature of the duty of
canvassing boards, and the extent of allowable pre-proclamation controversies in Senatorial elections. Based on the foregoing,
Pimentel prayed for the denial of Zubiris Motion to Dismiss.
After a close scrutiny of the allegations, arguments, and evidence presented by all the parties before this Court, this Court rules to
dismiss the present Petition.
Pre-proclamation controversy/case
A pre-proclamation controversy has been defined by Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of
the Philippines, as follows:
SEC. 241. Definition. A pre-proclamation controversy is any question pertaining to or affecting the proceeding of the
board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties
before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to
the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appearance of the election returns.
Under Republic Act No. 7166, providing for synchronized national and local elections, pre-proclamation controversies refer to
matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appearance of election returns and certificates of canvass.19
Essentially reiterating Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code, but adding the reference to the certificates of canvass, COMELEC
Resolution No. 7859, dated 17 April 2007, identified the issues that may be subject of a pre-proclamation controversy, to wit:

SEC. 37. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. The following shall be proper issues that may be
raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:
1) Illegal composition or proceedings of the Board of Canvassers;
2) The canvassed election returns/certificates of canvass are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered
with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns/certificates or in the other authentic copies thereof as
mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code;
3) The election returns/certificates of canvass were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are
obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
4) When substitute or fraudulent election return/certificates of canvass were canvassed, the results of which materially
affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.
Pre-proclamation cases to resolve pre-proclamation controversies are allowed in local elections. According to Section 16 of Republic
Act No. 7166:
SEC. 16. Pre-proclamation Cases Involving Provincial, City and Municipal Offices. Pre-proclamation cases involving
provincial, city and municipal officer shall be allowed and shall be governed by Sections 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 hereof.
All pre-proclamation cases pending before the Commission shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the
office involved and the rulings of the boards of canvassers concerned shall be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the
filing of a regular election protest by the aggrieved party. However, proceedings may continue when on the basis of the
evidence thus far presented, the Commission determines that the petition appears meritorious and accordingly issues an
order for the proceeding to continue or when an appropriate order has been issued by the Supreme Court in a petition for
certiorari.
SEC. 17. Pre-proclamation Controversies: How Commenced. Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the
board of canvassers may be initiated in the board or directly with the Commission. However, matters raised under Sections
233, 234, 235 and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns, and the certificates of canvass shall be brought in the first instance before the board of
canvassers only.
However, as to elections for President, Vice-President, Senators, and Members of the House of Representatives, pre-proclamation
cases are prohibited. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166, prior to its amendment, read:
SEC. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and Member of the
House of Representatives. For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and Member of the
House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be. However, this
does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested
person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.
Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers may be initiated in the board or directly with
the Commission in accordance with Section 19 hereof.
Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of canvassers, or on the municipal certificates of
canvass before the provincial board of canvassers or district boards of canvassers in Metro Manila Area, shall be
specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.
As Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166 was then worded, it would appear that any pre-proclamation case relating to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass, was prohibited in elections for
President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the
proclamation of the winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. Proceedings which may
delay the proclamation of the winning candidate beyond the date20 set for the beginning of his term of office must be avoided,
considering that the effect of said delay is, in the case of national offices for which there is no hold over, to leave the office without
any incumbent.21
The law, nonetheless, recognizes an exception and allows the canvassing body motu proprio or an interested person to file a written
complaint for the correction of manifest errors in the election returns or certificates of canvass even in elections for President, VicePresident, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, for the simple reason that the correction of manifest error will
not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winner in the election.22 To be manifest, the errors must
appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been
made before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.23 The law likewise
permits pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives,
when these cases question the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers before the board itself or the COMELEC,
since such cases do not directly relate to the certificate of canvass or election returns.
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166, after the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 9369, now reads:

SEC. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases in Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and Member of the House of
Representatives. For purposes of the elections for president, vice-president, senator, and member of the House of
Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be, except as provided for in
Section 30 hereof. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon
written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.
Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers may be initiated in the board or directly with
the Commission in accordance with Section 19 hereof.
Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of canvassers, or on the municipal certificates of
canvass before the provincial board of canvassers or district board of canvassers in Metro Manila Area, shall be specifically
noticed in the minutes of their respective proceedings. (Emphasis supplied.)
Republic Act No. 9369 significantly amended Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166 by adding an excepting phrase to the general
prohibition against pre-proclamation controversies in elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives. According to the amended Section 15, no pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass shall be allowed in elections for
President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, except as provided by Section 30 of the
same statute.
Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, which was likewise amended by Republic Act No. 9369, provides:
SEC. 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the Election of President and Vice President:The
Commission en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of senators:Determination of Authenticity
and Due Execution of Certificates of Canvass. Congress and the Commission en banc shall determine the authenticity
and due execution of the certificate of canvass for president and vice-president and senators, respectively, as
accomplished and transmitted to it by the local board of canvassers, on a showing that: (1) each certificate of canvass was
executed, signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and members of the board of canvassers and transmitted or caused
to be transmitted to Congress by them; (2) each certificate of canvass contains the names of all of the candidates for
president and vice-president or senator, as the case may be, and their corresponding votes in words and figures; (3)
there exists no discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certificates of canvass or in any of its supporting documents
such as statement of votes by city/municipality/by precinct or discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and
figures in the certificate; and (4) there exists no discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the
certificate of canvass against the aggregate number of votes appearing in the election returns of precincts
covered by the certificate of canvass: Provided, That certified print copies of election returns or certificates of
canvass may be used for the purpose of verifying the existence of the discrepancy.
When the certificate of canvass, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province, city or district, appears to be
incomplete the Senate President or the Chairman of the Commission, as the case may be shall require the board of
canvassers concerned to transmit by personal delivery the election returns from polling places that were not included in the
certificate of canvass and supporting statements. Said election returns shall be submitted by personal delivery within two
(2) days from receipt of notice.
When it appears that any certificate of canvass or supporting statement of votes by city/municipality or by precinct bears
erasures or alterations which may cast doubt as to the veracity of the number of votes stated herein and may affect the
result of the election, upon request of the presidential, vice-presidential or senatorial candidate concerned or his party,
Congress or the Commission en banc, as the case may be, shall, for the sole purpose of verifying the actual number of
votes cast for President and Vice-Presidentor senator, count the votes as they appear in the copies of the election returns
submitted to it.
In case of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration as mentioned above, the procedure on preproclamation controversies shall be adopted and applied as provided in Sections 17, 18, 19 and 20 .
Any person who presents in evidence a simulated copy of an election return, certificate of canvass or statement of
votes, or a printed copy of an election return, certificate of canvass or statement of votes bearing a simulated
certification or a simulated image, shall be guilty of an election offense and shall be penalized in accordance with
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. (Emphasis supplied.)
The highlighted portions in the afore-quoted section identify the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 9369, specifically: (1)
the duty to determine the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass is now imposed, not only on Congress acting as
the NBC for the election for President and Vice-President, but also on COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC for the election for
Senators; (2) the third criterion for the determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass requires the
absence of discrepancy in comparison not only with other authentic copies of the said certificates, but also with the supporting
documents, such as the statements of votes; (3) a fourth criterion for the determination of the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass was added, mandating the absence of discrepancy between the number of votes of a candidate in a
certificate when compared with the aggregate number of votes appearing in the election returns of the precincts covered by the
same certificate; (4) pursuant to the exception now provided in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act
No. 9369, permissible pre-proclamation cases shall adopt and apply the procedure provided in Sections 17 to 20 of the same

statute; and (5) the use of a simulated copy of an election return, certificate of canvass, or statement of vote, or a printed copy of
said election documents bearing a simulated certification or image shall be penalized as an election offense.
Indeed, this Court recognizes that by virtue of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 9369 to Sections 15 and 30 of
Republic Act No. 7166, pre-proclamation cases involving the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass are now
allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, and Senators. The intention of Congress to treat a case falling under Section 30 of
Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, as a pre-proclamation case is apparent in the fourth paragraph of the
said provision which adopts and applies to such a case the same procedure provided under Sections 17,24 18,25 1926 and 2027 of
Republic Act No. 7166 on pre-proclamation controversies.
In sum, in elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the general rule still is
that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election
returns or certificates of canvass are still prohibited. As with other general rules, there are recognized exceptions to the prohibition,
namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers; and (3)
determination of the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9369.
The Petition at bar
Pimentels objections to the Maguindanao MCOCs delve into "matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation" of the said MCOCs by the SPBOC-Maguindanao. He suspects the authenticity and due execution of the Maguindanao
MCOCs used by the SPBOC-Maguindanao in its canvass, which were mostly copy 2 or the copy for the wall,28 because of the
supposed mysterious circumstances surrounding the loss or unavailability of any other copy of the said MCOCs. He decries the
denial by the SPBOC-Maguindanao and the NBC of the opportunity to question PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCsMaguindanao on "where did that copy 2 come from, what was the basis, when was it accomplished, how was it posted x x x";29 and
to substantiate his claim that the Maguindanao MCOCs are palpably manufactured and are not fit for canvass.30 He is raising issues
related to the tampering with, falsification of, or discrepancies in the Maguindanao MCOCs, which are properly the subject of a preproclamation controversy.31
Pimentel insists that the SPBOC-Maguindanao and the NBC should hear his observations, accept his evidence, and rule on his
objections to the Maguindanao MCOCs in what would undeniably be a pre-proclamation case. Ultimately, what Pimentel seeks is
that his pre-proclamation case be given due course by the boards of canvassers.
Respondents contend that Pimentel cannot initiate and pursue a pre-proclamation case before the SPBOC-Maguindanao or the
NBC, since such a case is prohibited in elections for Senators. Pimentel, however, argues that his pre-proclamation case is an
exception to the prohibition pursuant to Section 30, in relation to Section 15, of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act
No. 9369.
This Court rules for the respondents.
Proceedings before the SPBOC-Maguindanao
The SPBOC-Maguindanao, in the conduct of its canvass proceedings, properly refused to allow Pimentel to contest the
Maguindanao MCOCs at that stage by questioning PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and presenting
evidence to prove the alleged manufactured nature of the said MCOCs, for such would be tantamount to a pre-proclamation case
still prohibited by Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166, even after its amendment by Republic Act No. 9369.
The SPBOC-Maguindanao, as its name suggests, was constituted to be of the same stature and to perform the same function as the
PBOC-Maguindano: to canvass the Maguindanao MCOCs and prepare the Maguindanao PCOC to be submitted to the
NBC. Undeniably, the SPBOC-Maguindanao is not Congress nor COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC, specifically
charged by Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, with the duty to determine the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass submitted to it in accordance with the four given
criteria. There is no ambiguity in the said provision, at least, as to whom it imposes the duty, namely: (1) Congress as the NBC for
the election for President and Vice-President; and (2) COMELEC en banc as the NBC for the election for Senators. This is a case
where the law is clear. It speaks in a language that is categorical. It is quite explicit; it is too plain to be misread. No interpretation is
needed. All that is called for is to apply the statutory command.32
Even if there is still a need for this Court to construe Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, it
still cannot extend the scope of said provision to local boards of canvassers. A pre-proclamation case under Section 30 is allowed
only as an exception to the prohibition under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. According
to the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, are strictly, but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as
their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Where
a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication. 33 A
maxim of recognized practicality is the rule that the expressed exception or exemption excludes others. Exceptio firmat regulim in
casibus non exceptis. The express mention of exceptions operates to exclude other exceptions; conversely, those which are not
within the enumerated exceptions are deemed included in the general rule.34 And, in this case, the exception applies only to
Congress or the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC, and not to local boards of canvassers who must still be deemed
covered by the prohibition on pre-proclamation controversies.

It is also significant to note that Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, prohibits preproclamation cases in elections for President, Vice-President, Senators, and Members of the House of Representatives;
while Section 30 of the same statute, as amended, refers only to elections forPresident, Vice-President and Senators. The intent
of the Legislature to confine the application of Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, only to
Congress or the COMELEC en bancacting as the NBC thus becomes even more evident, considering that the said provision does
not apply to elections for Members of the House of Representatives. It must be borne in mind that only the votes for national elective
positions such as the President, Vice-President, and Senators are canvassed by the NBC. The canvassing of votes for local elective
positions, including those for Members of the House of Representatives, end with the local boards of canvassers. Therefore, it would
be contrary to the legislative intent to extend Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, even to
the canvass proceedings before local boards of canvassers.
This Court can only conclude that the canvass proceedings before local boards of canvassers in elections for Senators are
unaffected by the amendment of Republic Act No. 7166 by Republic Act No. 9369. They still remain administrative and summary in
nature, so as to guard against the paralyzation of canvassing and proclamation proceedings that would lead to a vacuum in so
important and sensitive office as that of Senator of the Republic.35
For the same reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs, the four criteria enumerated by Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9369, are not mandatory on local boards of canvassers in their determination of authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass submitted to them. It is already well-settled that the local boards of canvassers, as well as
the SPBOC-Maguindanao in this case, may proceed with the canvassing of the election returns or certificates of canvass for as long
as they appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face.36
Boards of canvassers are ad hoc bodies that exist only for the interim task of canvassing election returns. They do not have the
facilities, the time and even the competence to hear, examine and decide on alleged election irregularities, unlike regular courts or
the COMELEC itself or the electoral tribunals (Presidential, Senate, and House), which are regular agencies of government tasked
and equipped for the purpose. While this Court has time and again expressed its abhorrence of the nefarious "grab the proclamation
and prolong the protest" strategy of some candidates, nonetheless, it recognizes the very limited jurisdiction of MBOCs and PBOCs.
Unless Pimentel is able to show cogently and clearly his entitlement to the summary exclusion of clearly unacceptable certificates of
canvass, this Court must uphold the constitutional and legal presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions and
authenticity of official documents.37
The burden is upon Pimentel to establish that the Maguindanao MCOCs are manufactured, and that it is evident on the face thereof.
Pimentels insistence on being allowed to propound questions to PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and
SPBOC-Maguindanao reveals that, although he has his suspicions, he has yet no actual evidence that the Maguindanao MCOCs
were indeed manufactured.
Moreover, Pimentels main objection to the Maguindanao MCOCs used in the canvass by the SPBOC-Maguindanao is that they are
mostly copy 2 or the copy intended to be posted on the wall. According to Section 43 of COMELEC Resolution No. 7859, dated 17
April 2007, the MBOCs must transmit copy 1 of the MCOCs to the PBOC for use in the provincial canvassing of votes. The SPBOCMaguindanao was compelled to use copy 2 of the Maguindanao MCOCs in the absence of copy 1 thereof. The fact that copy 2 of
the Maguindanao MCOCs was not the copy meant for the PBOC-Maguindanao does not necessarily mean that copy 2 of the said
MCOCs was manufactured, falsified or tampered with. All the seven copies of the MCOCs required to be prepared by the MBOCs
should be considered duplicate originals.38 Just like copy 1 of the MCOCs, copy 2 should be afforded the presumption of authenticity
as an official document prepared by the MBOCs-Maguindanao in the regular performance of their official functions. Copy 2 is no less
authentic than all the other copies of the MCOCs although it may be more susceptible to manufacture, falsification, or tampering. If
the manufacture, falsification, or tampering of copy 2 of the MCOCs is not apparent on its face, the burden to prove the same falls
on the candidate making the allegation in a regular election protest. At least as far as the proceedings before the local boards of
canvassers are concerned, this Courts ruling in Pangarungan v. Commission on Elections39 still holds true: it is not required that all
the other copies of the election returns or certificates of canvass be taken into account and compared with one another before one of
them, determined to be authentic, may be used or included in the canvass.
The SPBOC-Maguindanao determined that copy 2 of the Maguindanao MCOCs is authentic and duly executed on its face, while
Pimentel insists otherwise. This issue involves the appreciation of copy 2 of the Maguindanao MCOCs by the SPBOC-Maguindanao,
the proper subject of a pre-proclamation controversy, which, as this Court already declared, is still prohibited in proceedings before
local boards of canvassers for elections for Senators.
The resolution of the issues raised by Pimentel as to the irregularities and suspicious circumstances surrounding the Maguindanao
MCOCs, which appear prima facie regular on their face, compels or necessitates the piercing of the veil of the said MCOCs. These
issues, however, are more appropriate in a regular election protest, wherein the parties may litigate all the legal and factual issues
raised by them in as much detail as they may deem necessary or appropriate.40
Proceedings before the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC for elections for Senators
Similarly, the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC for the election for Senators, did not violate Section 30 of Republic Act No.
7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, when it denied Pimentels request to question PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the
MBOCs-Maguindanao and SPBOC-Maguindanao, and his subsequent motion to exclude the second Maguindanao PCOC.
As already declared by this Court, the NBC has the duty to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass submitted to it in accordance with the four criteria enumerated in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by

Republic Act No. 9369. It has not been established to the satisfaction of this Court that the NBC failed to comply with its duty under
said provision.
Pimentel asserts that in the absence of all the other copies of the Maguindanao MCOCs, except copy 2, there is no way to apply the
third criterion under Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. According to this criterion for
authenticity and due execution of a certificate of canvass, there must exist no discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certificate
or in any of its supporting documents such as the statement of votes by city/municipality/precinct and no discrepancy in the votes of
any candidate in words and figures in the certificate. Pimentel posits that without any other copies available for comparison, then
copy 2 of the Maguindanao MCOCs cannot be deemed authentic and duly executed.
While it is true that having only one copy of the certificate of canvass may raise problems as to the determination by the NBC of its
authenticity and due execution since there are no other copies to compare it with, such is not the situation in the Petition at bar.
According to Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, Congress and the COMELEC en banc,
acting as the NBC, shall determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass for President, Vice-President
and Senators, respectively, as accomplished and transmitted to them by the local boards of canvassers. For the province of
Maguindanao, it is the PBOC which transmits the PCOC to the NBC. For the 14 May 2007 senatorial elections, the NBC excluded
from the national canvass the Bedol PCOC submitted by the PBOC-Maguindanao after it found the same to be tainted by
irregularities and statistical improbabilities. Thereafter, the SPBOC-Maguindanao was created, which re-canvassed the
Maguindanao MCOCs and prepared and submitted to the NBC the second Maguindanao PCOC.
Hence, the four criteria enumerated in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, must be applied
by the NBC to the second Maguindanao PCOC. The authenticity and due execution of the Maguindanao MCOCs, which had already
been determined by the SPBOC-Maguindanao, are no longer in issue before the NBC. To allow Pimentel to revive again before the
NBC the issue of authenticity and due execution of the Maguindanao MCOCs after a determination thereof by the SPBOCMaguindanao is like granting him an appeal, a remedy which is without any statutory or regulatory basis.
The SPBOC-Maguindanao prepared all seven copies of the second Maguindanao PCOC. It properly submitted the first copy to the
NBC for national canvassing of the votes for Senators. All the six other copies are in existence and have been distributed to the
intended recipients. There is no allegation or proof that there is a discrepancy among the seven authentic copies of the second
Maguindanao PCOC. Neither is it shown that the second Maguindanao PCOC contains any discrepancy when compared with its
supporting documents. It would thus appear to this Court that the second Maguindanao PCOC passed the third criterion for its
authenticity and due execution as provided in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. As for
the three other criteria, there is no sufficient allegation, much less proof, that the NBC did not apply them to the second
Maguindanao PCOC or that the second Maguindanao PCOC actually failed to meet any of them.
Given the foregoing, there is indeed no merit in Pimentels request before the NBC to still question PES Bedol and the Chairpersons
of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and SPBOC-Maguindanao regarding the Maguindanao MCOCs. There is also no reason to exclude
the second Maguindanao PCOC from the national canvass of votes for Senators after its authenticity and due execution had been
determined by the NBC in accordance with the criteria provided by the law.
Due process and equal protection of the law
Pimentel alleges that the proceedings before the NBC and the SPBOC-Maguindanao disallowing him from asking certain election
officials, such as PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and SPBOC-Maguindanao, questions regarding the
Maguindanao PCOC and MCOCs, deprived him of his right to due process.
In City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.,41 this Court already provided a discourse on due process, to wit:
The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "(N)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law x x x."
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action
should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. This standard is aptly
described as a responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice, and as such it is a
limitation upon the exercise of the police power.
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals; to
secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government, unrestrained by the established principles
of private rights and distributive justice; to protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments, from seizure,
forfeiture, and destruction without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure; and to secure to all
persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law.
The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and partnerships are "persons"
within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called "procedural due process"
and "substantive due process."

Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives
a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what
form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action.
Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away
a persons life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification
for the governments action. Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends
very much on the level of scrutiny used. For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied,
substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an
area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government will meet substantive due
process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.
This Court finds Pimentels argument of deprivation of due process problematic since he has not established what he is being
deprived of: life, liberty, or property. He was a candidate in the senatorial elections. At the time he filed the instant Petition, he might
have been leading in the canvassing of votes, yet the canvass proceedings were still ongoing, and no winner for the twelfth and last
senatorial post had been proclaimed. May he already claim a right to the elective post prior to the termination of the canvass
proceedings and his proclamation as winner, and may such a right be considered a property right which he cannot be deprived of
without due process? These were clearly substantial and weighty issues which Pimentel did not address. Unfortunately, this Court
cannot argue and settle them for him.
Pimentel only made a sweeping claim that in the canvass proceedings of the Maguindanao votes before the NBC and the SPBOCMaguindanao, he was deprived of his constitutional right to due process, both procedural and substantive. After going over his
allegations, however, and the definition of substantive due process, this Court finds that Pimentel cannot invoke denial of substantive
due process because he is not assailing any law, which, arbitrarily or without sufficient justification, supposedly deprived him of life,
liberty, or property.
At most, Pimentel can claim that he was denied procedural due process when he was not allowed by the NBC and the SPBOCMaguindanao to propound questions to certain election officials. But even on this point, Pimentel fails to convince this Court. Asking
election officials questions and confronting them with evidence are not part of the canvass proceedings. There is no statute or
regulation expressly providing for such a procedure.
Any objection or manifestation concerning a certificate of canvass before the NBC, as well as any contest involving the inclusion or
exclusion of an election return or certificate of canvass before a local board of canvassers, must be orally submitted to the
Chairperson of the NBC or the local board of canvassers, as the case may be. Simultaneous with the oral submission, the party
concerned must submit his written objection, manifestation, or contest in the form required. The objection, manifestation, or contest
shall also be recorded in the minutes of the canvass. In the event that the NBC or local board of canvassers shall determine that
there is a proper case for the objection, manifestation, or contest submitted, it shall automatically defer the canvass of the assailed
election return or certificate of canvass. Within 24 hours from the submission of the objection, manifestation, or contest, the party
concerned shall submit his evidence which shall be attached to his written objection, manifestation, or contest. Within the same 24hour period, any party may file a written and verified opposition to the objection, manifestation, or contest. Upon receipt of the
evidence, the NBC or the local board of canvassers shall take up the assailed election return or certificate of canvass, and after
considering the objection, manifestation or contest, together with the opposition thereto and the evidences submitted, shall
summarily and immediately rule thereon.42
The afore-described procedure does not provide any party the opportunity to question and confront election officials and other
witnesses. It may have been allowed on occasion by the boards of canvassers, but it does not necessarily ripen into a legally
demandable right. Again, canvass proceedings are administrative and summary in nature. As for local boards of canvassers, in
elections for Senators, they only need to determine the authenticity and due execution of the election returns or certificates of
canvass on the face thereof. As for the COMELEC en banc, acting as the NBC, the determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass shall be limited only to those submitted before it by the local boards of canvassers and in
accordance with the criteria provided in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. The limitations
on the powers and duties of the boards of canvassers are meant to avoid any delay in the proclamation of the elected official. Issues
whose resolution would require the presentation and examination of witnesses are more properly raised in a regular election protest.
And as a final observation on the matter of due process, this Court notes that although Pimentel was not able to propound questions
to the election officials involved in the preparation and canvassing of the Maguindanao MCOCs and PCOC, he was still able,
through his counsel, to state his observations, manifestations, and objections regarding the said certificates, which were duly
noted.43 He may not have received the response or action that he wanted with respect to his observations, manifestations, and
objections, but Pimentel cannot deny that these were heard and presented in the canvass proceedings. Pimentel further admitted
that he did not submit his written observations, manifestations, and objections as the rules of procedure before the NBC and the
local boards of canvassers require.44 He cannot now decry that his observations, manifestations, and objections were not given due
course when he himself failed to comply with the procedure governing the same.
Equally baseless is Pimentels averment that his right to equal protection of the laws was violated when the NBC and the SPBOCMaguindanao adopted a procedure of "no questions" in the canvass of the Maguindanao MCOCs, different from the procedure
adopted in the canvass of the certificates of canvass from other provinces/areas. Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees that no person shall be denied equal protection of the laws. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against
others.45 According to Pimentel, he was deprived of equal protection of the laws when he was not allowed to question the election
officials involved in the canvass proceedings for Maguindanao, although he was allowed to do so for other provinces or districts. In

support of his claim, Pimentel compared his own experiences in the canvass proceedings for different provinces or districts. This
Court, however, finds Pimentels assessment misplaced. What would have been essential for Pimentel to allege and prove was that
other senatorial candidates were allowed during the canvass proceedings to question the election officials involved in the
preparation and canvassing of the Maguindanao MCOCs and PCOC, while he was not; and that the other senatorial candidates
were given undue favor, while he was the only one unjustly discriminated against. It seems apparent to this Court that the position of
the SPBOC-Maguindanao and the NBC not to allow, during the canvass proceedings, the questioning of election officials involved in
the preparation and canvassing of the Maguindanao MCOCs and PCOC, was consistent for all senatorial candidates. Hence,
petitioner was similarly situated with all the other senatorial candidates and they were all treated alike insofar as the canvass
proceedings for Maguindanao were concerned.
Electoral protest before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET)
Pimentels Petition is for Certiorari and Mandamus, both governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
A special civil action for certiorari may be filed under the following circumstances:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.
In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden is on the part of petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing the impugned order. Grave abuse
of discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion
is not enough, it must be so grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.46
The extraordinary remedy of mandamus, on the other hand, may be availed of under the conditions provided below:
RULE 65, SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the
rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.
The writ of mandamus shall be issued only if the legal right to be enforced is well defined, clear and certain. It lies only to compel an
officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the
exercise of official discretion nor judgment.47
To avail of both special civil actions, there must be no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
available to the petitioner, and in this, Pimentels Petition falters.
It must be kept in mind that Zubiri was proclaimed the twelfth Senator-elect in the 14 May 2007 elections on 14 July 2007, and that
he formally assumed office on 16 July 2007. In accordance with this Courts ruling in Aggabao, Pimentels Petition must be
dismissed, for his recourse lies, not with this Court, but with the SET.
This Court elucidated in Aggabao48 that:
Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall
be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who
shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organization
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections we ruled that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals which are the "sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members, thereby
divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution over election cases pertaining
to the election of the Members of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress). It follows that the COMELEC is now bereft

of jurisdiction to hear and decide pre-proclamation controversies against members of the House of
Representatives as well as of the Senate.
The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
It is undisputed that Miranda has already been proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office on June 14, 2004. As such,
petitioners recourse would have been to file an electoral protest before the HRET. His remedy is not this petition for
certiorari. Thus:
Finally, the private respondent Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. has already been proclaimed as the winner in the
congressional elections in the fourth district of Quezon City. He has taken his oath of office and assumed his
duties as representative; hence, the remedy open to the petitioner was to have filed an electoral protest with the
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives.
The allegation that Mirandas proclamation is null and void ab initio does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction. Thus:
(I)n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of
office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for
this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional
bodies, with due regard to the peoples mandate.
In Lazatin v. Commission on Elections we ruled that, upon proclamation of the winning candidate and despite its alleged
invalidity, the COMELEC is divested of its jurisdiction to hear the protest. Thus:
The petition is impressed with merit because the petitioner has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional
elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as
Congressman. For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against him would be to usurp the
functions of the House Electoral Tribunal. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which has been previously
ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency
of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound
judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.
In this case, certiorari will not lie considering that there is an available and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceedings before the COMELEC. After the proclamation, petitioners remedy
was an electoral protest before the HRET. The resolution of the issues presented in this petition is best addressed to the
sound judgment and discretion of the electoral tribunal.
The afore-quoted pronouncements are likewise applicable to the Petition at bar, with the references therein to the jurisdiction of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal over election protests involving members of the House of Representatives also being
true for the SET as regards election protests involving Senators.
In Chavez v. Commission on Elections,49 this Court similarly ruled that the word "sole" in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution underscores the exclusivity of the electoral tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to their respective
members. It is therefore crystal clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for certiorari and mandamus on matters
which may be threshed out in an election contest. It is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of Pimentel
involving, as it does, a contest relating to the election of Zubiri, now a member of the Senate.
Pimentel attempts to bring his case outside the jurisprudential precedent set by Aggabao, but to no avail.
That Pimentel filed the present Petition prior to Zubiris proclamation is insignificant. Since Pimentels prayer for a TRO and/or Status
Quo Ante Order had been denied, Zubiri was proclaimed the twelfth winning Senator in the 2007 Senatorial Elections.
Pimentel further claims that he is not challenging Zubiris proclamation, but rather the conduct of the proceedings before the NBC
and the SPBOC-Maguindanao. This is just a roundabout argument. Pimentel cannot deny that he assails the canvass proceedings
because he believes that the annulment and setting aside thereof would result in his winning as the twelfth Senator in the 14 May
2007 elections; and if he is the rightful winner, then logically and necessarily, Zubiris proclamation must also be annulled and set
aside.
Finally, while Section 15, in relation to Section 30, of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, did introduce an
additional exception to the prohibition against pre-proclamation controversies in elections for President, Vice-President, and
Senators, this Court has already established in the preceding discussion that Pimentel cannot invoke the same in his Petition. The
provisions in question did not materially change the nature of canvass proceedings before the boards of canvassers, which still
remain summary and administrative in nature for the purpose of canvassing the votes and determining the elected official with as
little delay as possible and in time for the commencement of the new term of office.
This Court deems it necessary to stress that attempts to delay the canvass proceedings, except for the permissible pre-proclamation
controversies, must be shunned. Grounds which are proper for electoral protests should not be allowed to delay the proclamation of

the winners.50 It may well be true that public policy may occasionally permit the occurrence of "grab the proclamation and prolong the
protest" situations; that public policy, however, balances the possibility of such situations against the shortening of the period during
which no winners are proclaimed, a period commonly fraught with tension and danger for the public at large. For those who disagree
with that public policy, the appropriate recourse is not to ask this Court to abandon case law, which merely interprets faithfully
existing statutory norms, to engage in judicial legislation and in effect to rewrite portions of the Omnibus Election Code. The
appropriate recourse is, of course, to the Legislative Department of the Government and to ask that Department to strike a new and
different equilibrium in the balancing of the public interests at stake.51
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the present Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189466

February 11, 2010

DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE
LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 189506
CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET), DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., CRISTINA PALABAY,
RENATO M. REYES, JR., ERLINDA CADAPAN, ANTONIO FLORES and JOSELITO USTAREZ,Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to pass upon the eligibilities of
the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.
The Facts and the Case
In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the
House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.
Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, all registered voters, filed a petition
for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041. They
claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House
as a party-list nominee since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an
incumbent congressional district representative. She moreover lost her bid as party-list representative of the party-list organization
called An Waray in the immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004.
Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a
national multi-sectoral party-list organization representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she belonged
to the women sector. Abayon also claimed that although she was the second nominee of An Waray party-list organization during the
2004 elections, she could not be regarded as having lost a bid for an elective office.
Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto since respondent
Lucaban and the others with him collaterally attacked the registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization, a matter that fell
within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon
who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.
On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo but upholding its jurisdiction
over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon.1 The latter moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied the same on September 17,
2009,2 prompting Abayon to file the present petition for special civil action of certiorari.
In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007
elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes,
Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito Ustarez are members of some other party-list groups.

Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with respondent HRET a petition forquo warranto against
Bantay and its nominee, petitioner Palparan, in HRET Case 07-040. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit
in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former
rebels, and security guards. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan committed gross human rights violations against marginalized
and underrepresented sectors and organizations.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he,
that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantays
nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must
be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.
On July 23, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition against Bantay for the reason that the issue of the
ineligibility or qualification of the party-list group fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List System Act.
HRET, however, defended its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner Palparans qualifications.3 Palparan moved for
reconsideration but the HRET denied it by a resolution dated September 10, 2009,4 hence, the recourse to this Court through this
petition for special civil action of certiorari and prohibition.
Since the two cases raise a common issue, the Court has caused their consolidation.
The Issue Presented
The common issue presented in these two cases is:
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as
nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of Representatives that
such organizations won in the 2007 elections.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941, the Party-List System Act, vests in the
COMELEC the authority to determine which parties or organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of
Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought
the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but were chosen
by their respective organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their
qualifications as nominees.
If at all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority belongs to the COMELEC which already upheld her qualification as nominee of
Aangat Tayo for the women sector. For Palparan, Bantays personality is so inseparable and intertwined with his own person as its
nominee so that the HRET cannot dismiss the quo warranto action against Bantay without dismissing the action against him.
But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a
member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,5 identifies who the "members" of that House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area
in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: "members x x x who shall be elected from legislative
districts" and "those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations." This means that, from the Constitutions point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are "elected"
into office, not their parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-list system that
the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast their votes for the organizations or parties to
which such party-list representatives belong.
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like manner. They have the same
deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative
districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.
It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as "members of the House of
Representatives," thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State
shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party,

sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring supplied)
As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections,6 a party-list representative is in every
sense "an elected member of the House of Representatives." Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such
vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.
Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees.
Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution, states:
Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25)
years of age on the day of the election.1avvphi1
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on
the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed
to continue until the expiration of his term.
In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a
nominee must be a "bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent."7
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nomineethe need for him or her to be a bona fide
member or a representative of his party-list organizationin the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and
Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they
presumably embody.
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs
to the party or organization that nominated him. This is true, initially. The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and,
eventually, to choose five from among them after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them.8 But where an
allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list
representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out
of its hand.
Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC seems to believe, when it resolved the
challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has the power to do so as an incident of its authority to approve the registration of party-list
organizations. But the Court need not resolve this question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the parties.
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above,
party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET
has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of
the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs
own jurisdiction begins.10
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against
Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and
Palparan.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions and AFFIRMS the Order dated July 16, 2009 and Resolution 09183 dated September 17, 2009 in HRET Case 07-041 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal as well as its Order dated
July 23, 2009 and Resolution 09-178 dated September 10, 2009 in HRET Case 07-040.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191998

December 7, 2010

WALDEN F. BELLO and LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, Petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 192769

LIZA L. MAZA and SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, Petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN MIGUEL "MIKEY" ARROYO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 192832
BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST, represented by TEODORO CASIO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN MIGUEL "MIKEY" ARROYO of Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List,Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the three (3) consolidated1 special civil actions for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition that commonly aim to disqualify
respondent Juan Miguel "Mikey" Arroyo as the nominee of the Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List (AGPP) in the May 10, 2010 elections.
The Factual Antecedents
The common factual antecedents, gathered from the pleadings, are briefly summarized below.
On November 29, 2009, AGPP filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the
May 10, 2010 elections. Subsequently, on March 23, 2010, AGPP filed its Certificate of Nomination together with the Certificates of
Acceptance of its nominees.2
On March 25, 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 88073 which prescribed the rules of procedure applicable to petitions to
disqualify a party-list nominee for purposes of the May 10, 2010 elections.4
Section 6 of the Resolution provides that the party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence5 to duly prove
that the nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, and to the sectoral party, organization, political
party or coalition they seek to represent. It likewise provides that the COMELEC Law Department shall require party-list groups and
nominees to make the required documentary submissions, if not already complied with prior to the effectivity of the Resolution, not
later than three (3) days from the last day of filing of the list of nominees.6
Under Section 10 of the same Resolution, the COMELEC may motu proprio effect the disqualification of party-list nominees who
violate any of the limitations mentioned in Section 7 of the Resolution.7 Section 8 of Rule 32 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
also states that the COMELEC may cancel motu proprio the registration of any party registered under the party-list system for failure
to comply with applicable laws, rules or regulations of the Commission. Pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8646,8 in relation to
Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807, the deadline for submitting the requirements mentioned in Section 6 of the latter Resolution was
on March 29, 2010.9
On March 25, 2010, petitioners Liza L. Maza, Saturnino C. Ocampo, and Bayan Muna Party-List, represented by Teodoro Casio,
(collectively referred to as certiorari petitioners) filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification10 against Arroyo, pursuant to
Resolution No. 8696,11 in relation with Sections 2 and 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 794112 (the Party- List System Act).13
The certiorari petitioners argued that not only must the party-list organization factually and truly represent the marginalized and the
underrepresented; the nominee must as well be a Filipino citizen belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, citing in this regard the case of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC.14 On this basis, the
certiorari petitioners concluded that Arroyo cannot be considered a member of the marginalized and underrepresented sector,
particularly, the sector which the AGPP represents tricycle drivers and security guards because he is not only a member of the
First Family, but is also (a) an incumbent member of the House of Representatives; (b) the Chairman of the Houses Energy
Committee; and, (c) a member of key committees in the House, namely: Natural Resources, Aquaculture, Fisheries Resources,
Ethics and Privileges, Justice, National Defense and Security, Public Works and Highways, Transportation and Ways and Means.15
In his Answer, Arroyo counter-argued that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over issues involving the qualifications of party-list
nominees; Section 9 of RA 7941 merely requires that the party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election.16
When the COMELEC published on March 26, 2010 its initial "List of Political Parties/Sectoral Organizations/Coalitions Participating
in the May 10, 2010 elections with their respective Nominees," Arroyo was listed as AGPPs first nominee.
On March 30, 2010, the petitioner Bayan Muna Party-List, represented by Neri Colmenares, filed with the COMELEC another
petition for disqualification against Arroyo.17 It alleged that Arroyo is not qualified to be a party-list nominee because he (a) does not
represent or belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector; (b) has not been a bona fide member of AGPP ninety (90)
days prior to the May 10, 2010 elections; (c) is a member of the House of Representatives; and that (d) AGPP is not a legitimate and
qualified party-list group and has no authority to nominate him.18

In his Answer, Arroyo reiterated that the COMELEC does not have jurisdiction over cases involving the qualifications of party-list
nominees. He stated as well that he is a bona fide member of AGPP at least ninety (90) days prior to the elections. 19
Meanwhile, on April 6, 2010, petitioners Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales (mandamus petitioners) wrote the COMELEC
Law Department a letter requesting for a copy of the documentary evidence submitted by AGPP, in compliance with Section 6 of
Resolution No. 8807. On the same day, the COMELEC Law Department replied that as of that date, the AGPP had not yet submitted
any documentary evidence required by Resolution No. 8807.20
Through a letter dated April 7, 2010, the mandamus petitioners requested the COMELEC and its Law Department to act,
consistently with Section 10 of Resolution No. 8807, and declare the disqualification of the nominees of AGPP for their failure to
comply with the requirements of Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807.21 They also wrote the COMELEC on April 20, 2010, reiterating
their letter-request dated April 7, 2010. The COMELEC failed to respond to both letters.22
The COMELEC Second Division Ruling
In its May 7, 2010 Joint Resolution, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petitions for disqualification against Arroyo.23 It
noted that Section 9 of RA 7941 merely requires the nominee to be "a bona fide member [of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for] at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the elections."24 It found that Arroyo (a) became a member of
the party on November 20, 2009; (b) actively participated in the undertakings of AGPP and adhered to its advocacies; and, (c)
actively supported and advanced the projects and programs of the AGPP by regularly attending its meetings, livelihood and skills
program, and farmers day activities.25
The COMELEC en banc Ruling
The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Divisions ruling in its July 19, 2010 consolidated resolution.26 It held,
among others, that a Filipino citizen, in order to qualify as a party-list nominee, only needs to be a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent, for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and must likewise be at
least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.27 The COMELEC en banc also held that Section 6 of Resolution No.
8807 is ultra vires, since the requirement that a nominee belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector he seeks to
represent is not found in RA 7941.28 Thus, it concluded that Arroyo possessed all the requirements mandated by Section 9 of RA
7941.29
On May 7, 2010, the mandamus petitioners filed with this Court their Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction,30 docketed as G.R. No. 191998.31They sought to compel the COMELEC
to disqualify motu proprio the AGPP nominees for their failure to comply with Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807, and to enjoin the
COMELEC from giving due course to the AGPPs participation in the May 10, 2010 elections.
On July 23 and 29, 2010, the certiorari petitioners elevated their case to this Court via two (2) separate petitions for
certiorari,32 docketed as G.R. Nos. 19276933 and 192832,34 to annul the COMELEC Second Divisions May 7, 2010 joint resolution
and the COMELEC en bancs July 19, 2010 consolidated resolution that dismissed their petitions for disqualification against Arroyo
as AGPPs nominee.
In the interim, AGPP obtained in the May 10, 2010 elections the required percentage of votes sufficient to secure a single seat. This
entitled Arroyo, as AGPPs first nominee, to sit in the House of Representatives.35
On July 21, 2010, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, proclaimed Arroyo as AGPPs duly-elected party-list
representative in the House of Representatives.36 On the same day, Arroyo took his oath of office, as AGPPs
Representative,37 before Court of Appeals Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes. His name was, thereafter, entered in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives.38
On July 28 and 29, 2010, two (2) separate petitions for quo warranto39 were filed with the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) questioning Arroyos eligibility as AGPPs representative in the House of Representatives. On September 7, 2010,
the HRET took cognizance of the petitions by issuing a Summons directing Arroyo to file his Answer to the two petitions.40
The Petitions
The mandamus petitioners in G.R. No. 191998 argue that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion (a) in failing to order
the motu proprio disqualification of AGPP despite its failure to comply with the mandatory requirements under Section 6 of
Resolution No. 8807; and, (b) in giving due course to the participation of AGPP and its nominees in the May 10, 2010 elections.
On the other hand, the certiorari petitioners in G.R. Nos. 192769 and 192832 contend in common that the COMELEC en banc
gravely abused its discretion in failing to disqualify Arroyo as AGPPs nominee since: (1) he does not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector he claims to represent; (2) he is not a bona fide AGPP member for at least ninety (90) days preceding the
May 10, 2010 elections; (3) in light of these preceding reasons, he would not be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislations for the sector he seeks to represent; and (4) his nomination and acceptance of nomination as AGPPs
nominee violate AGPPs continuing undertaking upon which its petition for registration and accreditation was based and granted.
In G.R. No. 192832, the petitioner Bayan Muna Party-List also prays that the Court: (a) direct the COMELEC en banc to review all its
decisions in cases for disqualification of nominees and cancellation of registration of party-list groups filed in the May 10, 2010
elections, as well as those which have not been resolved, in line with the eight-point guidelines set forth in Ang Bagong

Bayani;41 and (b) order Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco and Elias R. Yusoph to explain
why they should not be cited in contempt for their open defiance of the Courts Decisions in Ang Bagong Bayani42 and Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. COMELEC.43
The Case for the Respondents
In G.R. Nos. 192769 and 192832, Arroyo counter-argues that the petitions should be dismissed outright because upon his
proclamation, oath and assumption to office as a duly elected member of the House of Representatives, the jurisdiction over issues
relating to his qualifications now lies with the HRET as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives.
Similarly, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), prays for the dismissal of the petitions in G.R. Nos.
192769 and 192832 for lack of jurisdiction in view of Arroyos proclamation and assumption to office as a Member of the House of
Representatives.
Despite notice, the OSG failed to comment on the G.R. No. 191998 petition.
We deemed the case ready for resolution on the basis of the parties submissions.
Issues
The core issues boil down to (1) whether mandamus lies to compel the COMELEC to disqualify AGPPs nominees motu proprio or to
cancel AGPPs registration; (2) whether the COMELEC can be enjoined from giving due course to AGPPs participation in the May
10, 2010 elections, the canvassing of AGPPs votes, and proclaiming it a winner; and (3) whether the HRET has jurisdiction over the
question of Arroyos qualifications as AGPPs nominee after his proclamation and assumption to office as a member of the House of
Representatives.
Our Ruling
We dismiss the petitions.
For a writ of mandamus to issue (in G.R. No. 191998), the mandamus petitioners must comply with Section 3 of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court,
to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason
of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
In the present case, the mandamus petitioners failed to comply with the condition that there be "no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law."
Under Section 2, in relation with Section 4, of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807 (quoted below), any interested party may file with the
COMELEC a petition for disqualification against a party-list nominee:
Section 2. Grounds for Disqualification. Any nominee (a) who does not possess all the qualifications of a nominee as provided for
by the Constitution, existing laws or (b) who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified
from continuing as a nominee.
Section 4. When to file Petition. The petition under item (a) of Section 2 shall be filed five (5) days after the last day for filing of the
list of nominees, while under item (b) thereof shall be filed any day not later than the date of proclamation.
Furthermore, under Section 6 of RA 7941, any interested party may file a verified complaint for cancellation of registration of a partylist organization:
SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested
party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
These provisions effectively provide the "plain, speedy and adequate remedy" that the mandamus petitioners should have taken.
Specifically, they should have filed the proper petition for disqualification, pursuant to Section 2(b) of Resolution No. 8807, any day
not later than the date of proclamation.
As to the remedy of filing a complaint for cancellation of registration, we note that neither Section 6 of RA 7941 nor Section 8, Rule
32 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure specifies the period within which a complaint for cancellation of registration should be filed.
Whether or not the mandamus petitioners can still file a petition for cancellation of AGPPs registration at this point in time, however,
is a question we are not prepared to rule upon; in fact, we need not resolve this question since it is not raised here and has not been
argued by the parties.
We note that in lieu of filing the above formal petition that Resolution No. 8807 and RA 7941 provide, the mandamus petitioners
opted to confine themselves to writing letters to ask the COMELEC to act in accordance with Section 10 of Resolution No. 8807.
While these moves are technically objections to Arroyo and to the AGPPs registration, they cannot in any way be considered formal
petitions for disqualification, unlike the present petition which is a formal petition (whose clear intent is similarly to disqualify Arroyo).
Unfortunately for the mandamuspetitioners, a petition for mandamus is not the correct remedy under the circumstances as the
immediately applicable remedy is a petition for disqualification or for cancellation filed with the COMELEC, as pointed out above.
In filing the present petition, the mandamus petitioners also violated the rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies. The rule
on exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies to give the administrative
agency an opportunity to decide and thus prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.44 While this is not an ironclad rule
as it admits of exceptions,45 the mandamus petitioners failed to show that any of the exceptions apply. The filing of a petition for
mandamus with this Court, therefore, was premature. It bears stressing that mandamus, as an extraordinary remedy, may be used
only in cases of extreme necessity where the ordinary forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief.46
Thus, we find the mandamus aspect of G.R. No. 191998 improperly filed under the standards of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
Even the substantive merits of the mandamus petition in G.R. No. 191998, i.e., its patent intent to disqualify Arroyo, fail to persuade
for the reasons more fully discussed below, in relation with the certiorari petitions in G.R. Nos. 192769 and 192832.
As to the prohibition aspect of G.R. No. 191998 i.e., to prevent the COMELEC from canvassing AGPPs votes, and from
proclaiming it a winner we find that this has been mooted by the supervening participation, election and proclamation of AGPP
after it secured the required percentage of votes in the May 10, 2010 elections. The prohibition issue has been rendered moot since
there is nothing now to prohibit in light of the supervening events. A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy
by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon (in this case, the prevention of the specified acts) can no longer be
done. Under the circumstances, we have to recognize the futility of the petition and to dismiss it on the ground of mootness since we
cannot provide the mandamus petitioners any substantial relief.47
We move on to the principal issue raised by the certiorari petitions in G.R. Nos. 192769 and 192832 whether jurisdiction over
Arroyos qualifications as AGPP nominee should now properly be with the HRET since Arroyo has been proclaimed and has
assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives.1avvphi1
This issue is far from novel and is an issue previously ruled upon by this Court. The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has
jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office; they are, for all
intents and purposes, "elected members" of the House of Representatives although the entity directly voted upon was their party. In
Abayon v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,48 the Court said:
But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a
member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, identifies who the "members" of that House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fiftymembers, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: "members x x x who shall be elected from legislative
districts" and "those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations." This means that, from the Constitutions point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are "elected"
into office, not their parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-list system that
the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast their votes for the organizations or parties to
which such party-list representatives belong.
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like manner. They have the same
deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative
districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.
It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as "members of the House of
Representatives," thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations
or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to
attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by
enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible. (Underscoring supplied)
As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections, a party-list representative is in every
sense "an elected member of the House of Representatives." Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such
vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.
The Court also held in the same case that:
In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a
nominee must be a "bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent."
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee the need for him or her to be a bona
fide member or a representative of his party-list organizationin the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and
Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they
presumably embody.
xxxx
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above,
party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET
has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of
the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs
own jurisdiction begins.
Similarly applicable is our ruling in Perez v. Commission on Elections49 where we acknowledged that the Court does not have
jurisdiction to pass upon the eligibility of the private respondent who was already a member of the House of Representatives. We
said:
As already stated, the petition for disqualification against private respondent was decided by the First Division of the COMELEC on
May 10, 1998. The following day, May 11, 1998, the elections were held. Notwithstanding the fact that private respondent had
already been proclaimed on May 16, 1998 and had taken his oath of office on May 17, 1998, petitioner still filed a motion for
reconsideration on May 22, 1998, which the COMELEC en bancdenied on June 11, 1998. Clearly, this could not be done. Sec. 6 of
R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the continuation of proceedings for disqualification even after the elections if the respondent has not been
proclaimed. The COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion because the proclamation of private respondent
barred further consideration of petitioners action. In the same vein, considering that at the time of the filing of this petition on June
16, 1998, private respondent was already a member of the House of Representatives, this Court has no jurisdiction over the same.
Pursuant to Art. VI, 17 of the Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive original jurisdiction
over the petition for the declaration of private respondents ineligibility. As this Court held in Lazatin v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. The exercise of the power by the
Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature." Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm "as full,
clear and complete." Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it

remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission. The same may be said
with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.50
In the present case, it is not disputed that Arroyo, AGPPs first nominee, has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as
a Member of the House of Representatives. We take judicial notice, too, of the filing of two (2) petitions for quo warranto against
Arroyo, now pending before the HRET. Thus, following the lead of Abayon and Perez, we hold that the Court has no jurisdiction over
the present petitions and that the HRET now has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and rule upon Arroyos qualifications as a
Member of the House of Representatives.
In light of these conclusions, we see no need to further discuss the other issues raised in the certiorari petitions.
WHEREFORE, we RESOLVE to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 191998 for prematurity and mootness. The petitions in G.R. Nos.
192769 and 192832 are likewise DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECTION 18

Daza v. Singson
G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989
Cruz, J.
Facts:
The House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned
from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly
reducing their former party to only 17 members.
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in
the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and
giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of
representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein
respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP. The petitioner came to the
Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the
assumption of his seat by the respondent. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and
injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary restraining order that same day
to prevent both the petitioner and the respondent from serving in the Commission on
Appointments. Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed
from the Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is permanent. His claim is
that the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a
permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and
has not yet attained political stability.
Issue:
whether the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
Held:
No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is not a
discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is
political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that
chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments. The term political
question connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. In other words, it refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. Even
if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still
not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now
covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution
clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Coseteng v Mitra G.R. No. 86649 Digest

Coseteng v. Mitra (Digest)

G.R. No. 86649 July 12, 1990
Topic: Commission on Appointments
Facts:
1. The congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in the election to the House of the
candidates of diverse political parties such as the PDP-Laban, Lakas ng Bansa (LB),
Liberal Party (LP), NP-Unido, Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL), Panaghiusa, Kababaihan
Para sa Inang Bayan (KAIBA), and some independents. Petitioner Anna Dominique M.L.
Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the banner of KAIB
2. Then, House , upon nomination by the Majority Floor Leader, Cong. Francisco Sumulong,
elected from the Coalesced Majority, eleven (11) out of twelve (12) congressmen to represent
the House in the Commission on Appointments (CA).
3. Upon nomination of the Minority Floor Leader, the House elected Honorable Roque Ablan, Jr.,
KBL, as the 12th CA member, representing the Coalesced Minority in the House.
4. A year later, the LDP was organized as a political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the
House affiliated with it the House committees, including the House representation in the CA,
had to be reorganized to conform with the new political alignments.
5. Petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as
representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the CA and HRET. Her request was
endorsed by nine (9) congressmen. After the reorganization, Congressman Ablan, KBL, was
retained as the 12th member representing the House minority.
6. Hence the petition of for Extraordinary legal writs by Coseteng to declare as null and void
the election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan,
Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the Commission on
Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents
from recognizing them as members of the Commission on Appointments on the theory that
their election to that Commission violated the constitutional mandate of proportional
representation on following grounds:
a. the New Majority (158 LDP members out of the 202 members of the House) is entitled to
only nine (9) seats out of the twelve to be filled by the House;
b. the members representing the political parties, or coalitions thereof, must be nominated
by their respective political parties or coalitions;
c.
the nomination and election of respondent Verano-Yap by the respondents as
representative of the minority was clearly invalid; and
d. that similarly invalid was the retention of respondent Ablan as Minority member in the
Commission because he was neither nominated nor elected as such by the minority party or
parties in the House.
7.
Petitioner Coseteng further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA as a
representative of the Minority because she has the support of nine (9) other congressmen and
congresswomen of the Minority .
8.
Respondents contention was that: (1) that the legality of the reorganization of the CA
is a political question, hence, outside the jurisdiction of this Court to decide, and (2) that in any
case, the reorganization was "strictly in consonance with Section 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution" i.e., on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties,
considering the majority coalition "as a form of a political party"
ISSUE: W/N the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided in Section
18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
YES.
1.
The Court held that the petition should be dismissed, not because it raises a political
question, (which it does not), but because the revision of the House representation in the CA is
based on proportional representation of the political parties therein as provided in Section 18,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, there is no merit in the petitioner's contention
that the House members in the CA should have been nominated and elected by their
respective political parties, as they were nominated by their respective floor leaders in the
House. They were elected by the House (not by their party) in accordance with the

Constitution. The validity of their election to the Commission on Appointments eleven (11)
from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority is unassailable.
2.
There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House
membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the
Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten
(10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent
Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent
Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this
apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was done "on
the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein.
3.
The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner's KAIBA (which is
presumably a member also of the Coalesced Majority), are bound by the majority's choices.
Even if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party, its lone member (petitioner
Coseteng) represents only .4% or less than 1% of the House membership, hence, she is not
entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the Commission on Appointments. To be able to claim
proportional membership in the Commission on Appointments, a political party should
represent at least 8.4% of the House membership, i.e., it should have been able to elect at
least 17 congressmen or congresswomen.
4.
The indorsements of the nine (9) congressmen and congresswomen in favor of the
petitioner's election to the Commission are inconsequential because they are not members of
her party and they signed identical indorsements in favor of her rival, respondent
Congresswoman Verano-Yap.
Guingona v Gonzales
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC
senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement
that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the
traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators
elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for
NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the
majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8
and that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also
pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected
members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKASNUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that
the compromise is against proportional representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys representation in the
CoA.
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional
membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political
parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other
manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of
the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership
into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect
Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership was correspondingly reduced
leaving the latters representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is
no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the
proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more
representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the
LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected
senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which
has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the
parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional representation
especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.
G.R. No. 180055

July 31, 2009

FRANKLIN M. DRILON as President and in representation of the LIBERAL PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES (LP), AND HON.
JOSEPH EMILIO A. ABAYA, HON. WAHAB M. AKBAR, HON. MARIA EVITA R. ARAGO, HON. PROCESSO J. ALCALA, HON.
ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, HON. MARY MITZI CAJAYON, HON. FREDENIL H. CASTRO, HON. GLENN ANG CHONG, HON.
SOLOMON R. CHUNGALAO, HON. PAUL RUIZ DAZA, HON. ANTONIO A. DEL ROSARIO, HON. CECILIA S. LUNA, HON.
MANUEL M. MAMBA, HON. HERMILANDO I. MANDANAS, HON. ALVIN SANDOVAL, HON. LORENZO R. TAADA III, HON.
REYNALDO S. UY, HON. ALFONSO V. UMALI JR., HON. LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, Petitioners,
vs.

HON. JOSE DE VENECIA JR. in his official capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; HON. ARTHUR D.
DEFENSOR, SR., in his official capacity as Majority Floor Leader of the House of Representatives, HON. MANUEL B.
VILLAR, in his official capacity as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments, ATTY. MA. GEMMA D.
ASPIRAS, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, HON. PROSPERO C. NOGRALES,
HON. EDGARDO C. ZIALCITA, HON. ABDULLAH D. DIMAPORO, HON. JOSE CARLOS V. LACSON, HON. EILEEN R. ERMITABUHAIN, HON. JOSE V. YAP, HON. RODOLFO T. ALBANO III, HON. EDUARDO R. GULLAS, HON. CONRADO M. ESTRELLA
III, HON. RODOLFO "OMPONG" PLAZA, HON. EMMYLOU J. TALIO-MENDOZA and HON. EMMANUEL JOEL J.
VILLANUEVA, in their individual official capacities as "elected" members of the Commission on
Appointments, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 183055

July 31, 2009

SENATOR MA. ANA CONSUELO A.S. MADRIGAL, Petitioner,

vs.
SENATOR MANUEL VILLAR in his capacity as Senate President and Ex-Officio Chairman of the Commission on
Appointments, REPRESENTATIVE PROSPERO NOGRALES in his capacity as the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
and THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In August 2007, the Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents to the Commission on
Appointments (CA).
The contingent in the Senate to the CA was composed of the following senators with their respective political parties:
Sen. Maria Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal PDP-Laban
Sen. Joker Arroyo KAMPI
Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano Lakas-CMD
Sen. Panfilo Lacson UNO
Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada PMP
Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile PMP
Sen. Loren Legarda NPC
Sen. Richard Gordon Lakas-CMD
Sen. Mar Roxas LP
Sen. Lito Lapid Lakas-CMD
Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago PRP
The members of the contingent of the House of Representatives in the CA and their respective political parties were as follows:
Rep. Prospero C. Nograles Lakas-CMD
Rep. Eduardo C. Zialcita Lakas-CMD
Rep. Abdullah D. Dimaporo Lakas-CMD
Rep. Jose Carlos V. Lacson Lakas-CMD
Rep. Eileen R. Ermita-Buhain Lakas-CMD
Rep. Jose V. Yap Lakas-CMD
Rep. Rodolfo T. Albano III KAMPI

Rep. Eduardo R. Gullas KAMPI

Rep. Rodolfo "Ompong" G. Plaza NPC
Rep. Conrado M. Estrella NPC
Rep. Emmylou J. Talio-Mendoza NP
Rep. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva CIBAC Party List
In the second week of August 2007, petitioners in the first petition, G.R. No. 180055, went to respondent then Speaker Jose de
Venecia to ask for one seat for the Liberal Party in the CA. Speaker Jose de Venecia merely said that he would study their demand.1
During the session of the House of Representatives on September 3, 2007, petitioner in the first petition, Representative Taada,
requested from the House of Representatives leadership2 one seat in the CA for the Liberal Party.3 To his request, Representative
Neptali Gonzales II4 begged the indulgence of the Liberal Party "to allow the Legal Department to make a study on the matter."5
In a separate move, Representative Taada, by letter of September 10, 2007, requested the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives the reconstitution of the House contingent in the CA to include one seat for the Liberal Party in compliance with the
provision of Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution.6 Representative Taada also brought the matter to the attention of then
Speaker De Venecia, reiterating the position that since there were at least 20 members of the Liberal Party in the 14th Congress, the
party should be represented in the CA.7
As of October 15, 2007, however, no report or recommendation was proffered by the Legal Department, drawing Representative
Taada to request a report or recommendation on the matter within three days.8
In reply, Atty. Grace Andres of the Legal Affairs Bureau of the House of Representatives informed Representative Taada that the
department was constrained to withhold the release of its legal opinion because the handling lawyer was directed to secure
documents necessary to establish some of the members party affiliations.9
Hence spawned the filing on October 31, 2007 of the first petition by petitioner former Senator Franklin M. Drilon (in representation
of the Liberal Party), et al., for prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order, against then Speaker De Venecia, Representative Arthur Defensor, Sr. in his capacity as Majority
Floor Leader of the House of Representatives, Senator Manuel B. Villar in his capacity as ex officio chairman of the CA, Atty. Ma.
Gemma D. Aspiras in her capacity as Secretary of the CA, and the individual members of the House of Representatives contingent
to the CA.10 The petition in G.R. No. 180055 raises the following issues:
a. WHETHER THE LIBERAL PARTY WITH AT LEAST TWENTY (20) MEMBERS WHO SIGNED HEREIN AS PETITIONERS, IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTITLED TO ONE (1) SEAT IN THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS.
b. WHETHER THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RESPONDENTS HAVE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CONSTITUTING THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS IN
CONTRAVENTION OF THE REQUIRED PROPORTIONAL CONSTITUTION BY DEPRIVING THE LIBERAL PARTY OF ITS
CONSTITUTIONAL ENTITLEMENT TO ONE (1) SEAT THEREIN.
c. WHETHER AS A RESULT OF THE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION COMMITTED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
RESPONDENTS, THE WRITS PRAYED FOR IN THIS PETITION BE ISSUED NULLIFYING THE CURRENT COMPOSITION OF
THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, RESTRAINING THE CURRENT HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE MEMBERS FROM
SITTING AND PARTICIPATING IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, OUSTING THE
AFFECTED RESPONDENTS WHO USURPED, INTRUDED INTO AND UNLAWFULLY HELD POSITIONS IN THE COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENTS AND REQUIRING THE RESPONDENTS TO RECONSTITUTE AND/OR REELECT THE MEMBERS OF SAID
COMMISSION.11 (Italics in the original)
And it prays that this Court:
a. Immediately upon the filing of the instant Petition, issue a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary
Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction, enjoining all Respondents and all persons under their direction, authority,
supervision, and control from further proceeding with their actions relating to the illegal and unconstitutional constitution of
the Commission on Appointments and to the unlawful exercise of its members functions, contrary to the rule on
proportional representation of political parties with respect to the House of Representatives contingent in the said
Commission;
b. After careful consideration of the merits of the case, render judgment making the injunction permanent and ordering
Respondents and all persons under their direction, authority, supervision, and control;
xxxx
c. Declare Respondents action in not allotting one (1) seat to Petitioners null and void for being a direct violation of Section
18, Article VI of the Constitution;

d. Declare the proceedings of the Commission on Appointments null and void, insofar as they violate the rule on
proportional representation of political parties in said Commission;
e. Oust the affected respondents, whoever they are, who usurped, intruded into and have unlawfully held positions in the
Commission on Appointments and
f. Require Respondents to alter, reorganize, reconstitute and reconfigure the composition of the Commission on
Appointments in accordance with proportional representation based on the actual numbers of members belonging to duly
accredited and registered political parties who were elected into office during the last May 14, 2007 Elections by, at the very
least, respecting and allowing Congressman Alfonso V. Umali, Jr. as the duly nominated Commission on Appointments
member of the Liberal Party of the Philippines to sit therein as such.12
Respondents Senator Villar and CA Secretary Aspiras filed their Comment13 on December 6, 2007, moving for the dismissal of the
petition on these grounds:
I. THE POWER TO ELECT MEMBERS TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS BELONGS TO EACH HOUSE OF
CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTION. AS SUCH, THE PETITION IS NOT DIRECTED AT THE HEREIN
RESPONDENTS.
II. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THE COMMISSION MUST HAVE COMPLETE MEMBERSHIP IN ORDER
THAT IT CAN FUNCTION. WHAT THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES IS THAT THERE MUST AT LEAST BE A MAJORITY OF ALL
THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION FOR IT TO VALIDLY CONDUCT ITS PROCEEDINGS AND TRANSACT ITS
BUSINESS.14 (Emphasis in the original)
Then Speaker De Venecia and Representative Defensor filed their Comment and Opposition15 on February 18, 2008, moving too for
the dismissal of the petition on these grounds:
I. THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF DO NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION THAT WILL JUSTIFY THE GRANT OF
THE EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF MANDAMUS. 16
II. THE LIBERAL PARTY DOES NOT POSSESS THE REQUISITE NUMBER OF MEMBERS THAT WOULD ENTITLE THE
PARTY TO A SEAT IN THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. IT IS, THEREFORE, NOT THE PROPER PARTY TO INSTITUTE
THE INSTANT PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO.17
III. THE PETITIONERS FAILED TO EXHAUST THE REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THEM. 18
IV. THE CONFLICTING CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES AS TO THE AFFILIATION OF THE MEMBERS NEED TO BE SETTLED IN A
TRIAL.19 (Emphasis in the original)
Meantime, Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal of PDP-Laban, by separate letters of April 17, 2008 to Senator Villar and
Speaker Prospero Nograles, claimed that the composition of the Senate contingent in the CA violated the constitutional requirement
of proportional representation for the following reasons:
1. PMP has two representatives in the CA although it only has two members in the Senate and thus [is] entitled only to one
(1) seat.
2. KAMPI has only one (1) member in the Senate and thus is not entitled to a CA seat and yet it is represented in the CA.
3. PRP has only one (1) member in the Senate and thus is not entitled to a CA seat and yet it is represented in the CA.
4. If Senators Richard Gordon and Pilar Juliana Cayetano are Independents, then Sen. Gordon cannot be a member of the
CA as Independents cannot be represented in the CA even though there will be three Independents in the CA.
5. If Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano is now NP, he still can sit in the CA representing NP.20
She also claimed that the composition of the House of Representatives contingent in the CA violated the constitutional requirement
of proportional representation for the following reasons:
1. Lakas-CMD currently has five (5) members in the Commission on Appointments although it is entitled only to four (4)
representatives and thus [is] in excess of a member;
2. KAMPI currently has three (3) members in the Commission on Appointments although it is entitled only to two (2)
representatives and thus is excess of a member;
3. Liberal Party is not represented in the Commission on Appointments although it is entitled to one (1) nominee; and
4. Party-List CIBAC has a representative in the Commission on Appointments although it only has two members in the
House of Representatives and therefore [is] not entitled to any seat.21

Senator Madrigal thus requested the reorganization of the membership of the CA and that, in the meantime, "all actions of [the] CA
be held in abeyance as the same may be construed as illegal and unconstitutional."22
By letter of May 13, 2008, Senator Madrigal again wrote Senator Villar as follows:
Today, I was advised that the Committee on Budget and Management of Senator Mar Roxas has endorsed the ad interim
appointment of Rolando G. Andaya as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management for approval by the CA in the
plenary. I believe it is imperative that the serious constitutional questions that I have raised be settled before the plenary acts on this
endorsement by the Committee on Budget and Management. Otherwise, like Damocles sword, a specter of doubt continues to be
raised on the validity of actions taken by the CA and its committees.23
Still later or on May 19, 2008, Senator Madrigal sent another letter to Senator Villar declaring that she "cannot in good conscience
continue to participate in the proceedings of the CA, until such time as [she] get[s] a response to [her] letters and until the
constitutional issue of the CAs composition is resolved by the leadership of the Commission,"24 and that without any such resolution,
she would be forced to invoke Section 20 of the CA rules against every official whose confirmation would be submitted to the body
for deliberation.25
The CA Committee on Rules and Resolutions, by letter-comment of May 26, 2008, opined that the CA has neither the power nor the
discretion to reject a member who is elected by either House, and that any complaints about the election of a member or members
should be addressed to the body that elected them.26
By letter of May 28, 2008, Senator Villar advised Senator Madrigal as follows:
xxxx
Noting your position that you will not continue to participate in the proceedings of the CA "until the constitutional issue of the CAs
composition is resolved by the leadership of the Commission" x x x, the Secretary of the Commission, upon my
instructions, transmitted the same to the CA Committee on Rules and Resolutions. It was my intention to have the Committee study
and deliberate on the matter and to recommend what step/s to take on your request that "all actions of the Commission be held in
abeyance" x x x.
In view however, of your manifestation during the May 26, 2008 meeting of the CA Committee on Rules and Resolutions, and of the
written comment of Sen. Arroyo that "If there is a complaint in the election of a member or members, it shall be addressed to the
body that elected them, namely the Senate and/or the House," I have given instructions to transmit the original copies of your letters
to the Senate Secretary for their immediate inclusion in the Order of Business of the Session of the Senate so that your concerns
may be addressed by the Senate in caucus and/or in plenary.27 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Undaunted, Senator Madrigal, by letter of June 2, 2008 addressed to Senator Villar, reiterated her request that all actions of the CA
be held in abeyance pending the reorganization of both the Senate and House of Representatives contingents.28
Senator Madrigal thereafter filed on June 13, 2008 the second petition, G.R. No. 183055, for prohibition and mandamus with prayer
for issuance of temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction against Senator Villar in his capacity as Senate President
and Ex-Officio Chairman of the CA, Speaker Nograles, and the CA,29alleging that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
A. . . . IN FAILING TO COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED PROPORTIONAL PARTY REPRESENTATION OF
THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS;
B. . . . IN CONTINUOUSLY CONDUCTING HEARINGS AND PROCEEDINGS ON THE APPOINTMENTS DESPITE THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL COMPOSITION WHICH MUST BE PROHIBITED BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT; and
C. . . . IN FAILING, DESPITE REPEATED DEMANDS FROM PETITIONER, TO RE-ORGANIZE THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATED PROPORTIONAL PARTY REPRESENTATION OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, WHICH REQUIREMENT MUST BE ENFORCED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.30 (Emphasis in the original)
She thus prayed for the
1. . . . issu[ance of] a temporary restraining order/a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Respondents from proceeding
with their illegal and unlawful actions as officials and members of the Commission on Appointments which composition is
unconstitutional, pending resolution of the instant Petition;
2. Declar[ation that] the composition of the Commission on Appointments [is] null and void insofar as it violates the
proportional party representation requirement mandated by Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution;
3. Issu[ance of] a Writ of Prohibition against respondents Senate President Manuel Villar, Speaker Prospero Nograles and
Secretary Gemma Aspiras to desist from further proceeding with their illegal and unlawful actions as officers of the
Commission on Appointments, the composition of which is null and void for being violative of the proportional party
representation requirement under Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution; and

4. Issu[ance of] a Writ of Mandamus commanding respondents Senate President Manuel Villar, Speaker Prospero Nograles
and Secretary Gemma Aspiras to reorganize and reconstitute the Commission on Appointments in accordance with the
1987 Constitution.31
The Court consolidated G.R. No. 18005532 and G.R. No. 183055 on July 1, 2008.
Petitioners in the first petition, G.R. No. 180055, later filed on August 15, 2008 a Motion with Leave of Court to Withdraw the
Petition,33 alleging that with the designation of Representative Alfonso V. Umali, Jr. of the Liberal Party as a member of the House of
Representatives contingent in the CA in replacement of Representative Eduardo M. Gullas of KAMPI, their petition had become
moot and academic.
In his Comment of August 19, 2008 on the second petition, respondent Senator Villar proffered the following arguments:
I.
Petitioner has no standing to file [the] petition.
II.
Petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort. Each House of Congress has the sole
function of reconstituting or changing the composition of its own contingent to the CA.
III.
Petitioner is estopped.
IV.
Presumption of regularity in the conduct of official functions.
V.
The extraordinary remedies of Prohibition and Mandamus and the relief of a TRO are not available to the
Petitioner.34 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
In his Comment and Opposition35 filed on September 3, 2008, Speaker Nograles proffered the following arguments:
A. WITH RESPECT TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE PETITIONS HAVE ALREADY BECOME MOOT AND
ACADEMIC UPON THE ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVE ALFONSO V. UMALI, JR., MEMBER OF THE LIBERAL PARTY, TO
THE HOUSE CONTINGENT TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. 36
B. THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF DO NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION THAT WILL JUSTIFY THE
ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION BY THE
HONORABLE COURT AND THE GRANT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY WRITS OF MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION. 37
C. THE REMEDY OF THOSE WHO SEEK TO RECONSTITUTE THE HOUSE CONTINGENT TO THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS RESTS, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, WITH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 38
D. CONSIDERING THE AFOREMENTIONED FACTS AND JURISPRUDENCE, IT IS SUBMITTED THAT SENATOR MADRIGAL
HAS NO STANDING TO PURSUE THE INSTANT CASE.
E. THE PETITION IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY A VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING AS
REQUIRED BY RULE 65 SECTIONS 2 AND 3 AND SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 28-91. (Emphasis and
underscoring in the original)
The first petition, G.R. No. 180055, has thus indeed been rendered moot with the designation of a Liberal Party member of the
House contingent to the CA, hence, as prayed for, the petition is withdrawn.
As for the second petition, G.R. No. 183055, it fails.
Senator Madrigal failed to show that she sustained direct injury as a result of the act complained of.39 Her petition does not in fact
allege that she or her political party PDP-Laban was deprived of a seat in the CA, or that she or PDP-Laban possesses personal and
substantial interest to confer on her/it locus standi.
Senator Madrigals primary recourse rests with the respective Houses of Congress and not with this Court. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction dictates that prior recourse to the House is necessary before she may bring her petition to court.40 Senator Villars

invocation of said doctrine is thus well-taken, as is the following observation of Speaker Nograles, citing Sen. Pimentel, Jr. v. House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:41
In order that the remedies of Prohibition and Mandamus may be availed of, there must be "no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law".lavvph!1
It is worth recalling that, in the 11th Congress, Senator Aquilino Pimentel advocated the allocation of a position in the Commission on
Appointments for the Party-List Representatives. Just like the Petitioner in the instant case, Senator Pimentel first wrote to the
Senate President, requesting that the Commission on Appointments be restructured to conform to the constitutional provision on
proportional representation. xxx Without awaiting final determination of the question xxx, Pimentel filed a Petition for Prohibition and
Mandamus with the Supreme Court. In the said case, the Honorable Court ruled:
"The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose
from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA.
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their
members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments.
Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits,
who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chambers respective electoral tribunal.
xxxx
Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common
nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not this
Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the House that they
possess the required strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of
the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek
recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House
is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioners direct recourse to this
Court is premature.
Following the ruling in Pimentel, it cannot be said that recourse was already had in the House of Representatives. Furnishing a copy
of Petitioners letter to the Senate President and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives does not constitute the primary
recourse required prior to the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Further, it is the Members of the House who claim
to have been deprived of a seat in the Commission on Appointments that must first show to the House that they possess the
required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the Commission on Appointments. Just like Senator Pimentel, demanding seats
in the Commission on Appointments for Congressmen, who have not even raised the issue of its present composition in the House,
is not Senator Madrigals affair.42 (Italics, underscoring, and emphasis supplied by Representative Nograles)
It bears noting that Senator Villar had already transmitted original copies of Senator Madrigals letters to the Senate Secretary for
inclusion in the Order of Business of the Session of the Senate to address her concerns. Senator Madrigals filing of the second
petition is thus premature.
Senator Madrigals suggestion that Senators Pilar Juliana Cayetano and Richard Gordon be considered independent senators
such that the latter should not be allowed to be a member of the CA,43 and that Senator Alan Peter Cayetano be considered a
member of the NP such that he may sit in the CA as his inclusion in NP will entitle his party to one seat involves a determination of
party affiliations, a question of fact which the Court does not resolve.
WHEREFORE, the Motion with Leave of Court to Withdraw the Petition in G.R. No. 180055 is GRANTED. The Petition
is WITHDRAWN. The Petition in G.R. No. 183055 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
SECTION 21 & 22
Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Digest

G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991

Padilla, J.:

Facts:
1. Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the government with the
Sandiganbayan for the alleged anomalous sale of Kokoy Romoaldez of several government
corporations to the group of Lopa, a brother-in-law of Pres. Aquino.
2.
By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to look into the
transactions, an investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and
testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
3.
At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may "unduly
prejudice" the defendants in civil case before the Sandiganbayan.

4.
Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the inquiry was beyond
the jurisdiction of the Senate. He contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in
excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. One of the defendants in the case before the
Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention. The Court granted it
and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in
intervention.
ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of legislation
NO.
1.
There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The purpose of the inquiry to be
conducted is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, it was conducted to
find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. Lopa had violated RA
3019 in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group.
2.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not
absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the Constitution. As provided therein,
the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify
against one's self.
3.
The civil case was already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the Committee to probe
and inquire into the same justiciable controversy would be an encroachment into the exclusive
domain of judicial jurisdiction that had already earlier set in. The issue sought to be
investigated has already been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan. To allow the inquiry to
continue would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between the legislative
committee and a judicial tribunal.
4.
Finally, a congressional committees right to inquire is subject to all relevant
limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action including the relevant
limitations of the Bill of Rights. One of these rights is the right of an individual to against selfincrimination. The right to remain silent is extended to respondents in administrative
investigations but only if it partakes of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a
criminal proceeding. Hence, the petitioners may not be compelled by respondent Committee
to appear, testify and produce evidence before it only because the inquiry is not in aid of
legislation and if pursued would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between
the legislative and the judicial departments of the government as ordained by the
Constitution.
In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of CAMILO L. SABIO v.
HON. SENATOR RICHARD J. GORDON, et al.
G.R. No. 174340 17 October 2006,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. (En Banc)
FACTS:
Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and
his Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by
the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the
same time invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all
PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.
RULING:
No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the
Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective
committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the committees and it
means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its
investigative functions are also available to the committees. It can be said that the Congress
power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The Courts
high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it
categorically ruled that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the
executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that the operation of

government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for

investigation and that the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI,
Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress power of
inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting
such exemption. The Congress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that
concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It
even extends to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are
within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish. PCGG belongs to this class.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to
enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its
purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles. Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O.
No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent with the constitutional
provisions on the Congress power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle of public
accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of
access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7). Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a
limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance
of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public
Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for
its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines,
through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government
Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource
speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire
tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent
from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive
privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public
interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the
necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive
branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it
must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking
said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
GUDANI VS. SENGA

Posted by kaye lee on 10:51 PM

GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 [Article VI Sec. 22: Congress' Power of Inquiry; Legislative
Investigation]
FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election
fraud and the surfacing of the Hello Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of
the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any
legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum,
prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee
without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact
that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments
for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the Chain of
Command. Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court
Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP
preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.

RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is
liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the
appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate
remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons
to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so
inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the
military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President
has the duty to faithfully execute. SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue
a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to
attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations
on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified
grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before
Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as
commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The
Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as
in executive privilege. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the
military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself
recognizes as one of the legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation.
Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as
commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with
Congresss right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this
petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is
aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior
consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize. The duty
falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of
the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the
notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless
obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.
Reghis romero v jinggoy Estrada

DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

At issue once again is Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

The Case
This is a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction under Rule
65, assailing the constitutionality of the invitations and other compulsory processes issued by the Senate Committee on Labor,
Employment, and Human Resources Development (Committee) in connection with its investigation on the investment of Overseas
Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) funds in the Smokey Mountain project.
The Facts
On August 15, 2006, petitioner Reghis Romero II, as owner of R-II Builders, Inc., received from the Committee an invitation,
[1]

signed by the Legislative Committee Secretary, which pertinently reads as follows:

Dear Mr. Romero:
Pursuant to P.S. Resolution No. 537, entitled: RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE LABOR COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, THE LIABILITY FOR PLUNDER OF THE FORMER PRESIDENT
RAMOS AND OTHERS, FOR THE ILLEGAL INVESTMENT OF OWWA FUNDS IN THE SMOKEY MOUNTAIN
PROJECT, CAUSING A LOSS TO OWWA OF P550.86 MILLION and P.S. Resolution No. 543, entitled:
RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, IN ITS ONGOING INQUIRY IN
AID OF LEGISLATION, ON THE ALLEGED OWWA LOSS OF P480 MILLION TO FOCUS ON THE CULPABILITY

OF THEN PRESIDENT FIDEL RAMOS, THEN OWWA ADMINISTRATOR WILHELM SORIANO, AND R-II
BUILDERS OWNER REGHIS ROMERO II, x x x the Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources
Development chaired by Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada will conduct a public hearing at 1:00 p.m. on the 23 rd day of
August 2006 at the Sen. G.T. Pecson Room, 2nd floor, Senate of the Philippines, Pasay City.
The inquiry/investigation is specifically intended to aid the Senate in the review and possible amendments
to the pertinent provisions of R.A. 8042, the Migrant Workers Act and to craft a much needed legislation
relative to the stated subject matter and purpose of the aforementioned Resolutions.
By virtue of the power vested in Congress by Section 21, Article VI of 1987
Constitution regarding inquiries in aid of legislation, may we have the privilege of inviting you to the said
hearing to shed light on any matter, within your knowledge and competence, covered by the subject matter and
purpose of the inquiry. Rest assured that your rights, when properly invoked and not unfounded, will be duly
respected. (Emphasis in the original.)

In his letter-reply[2] dated August 18, 2006, petitioner Romero II requested to be excused from appearing and testifying before
the Committee at its scheduled hearings of the subject matter and purpose of Philippine Senate (PS) Resolution Nos. 537 and 543.
He predicated his request on grounds he would later substantially reiterate in this petition for prohibition.
On August 28, 2006, the Committee sent petitioner Romero II a letter informing him that his request, being unmeritorious,
was denied.[3] On the same date, invitations were sent to each of the other six petitioners, then members of the Board of Directors of
R-II Builders, Inc., requesting them to attend the September 4, 2006 Committee hearing. The following day, Senator Jinggoy
Estrada, as Chairperson of the Committee, caused the service of a subpoena ad testificandum[4] on petitioner Romero
II directing him to appear and testify before the Committee at its hearing on September 4, 2006 relative to the aforesaid Senate
resolutions. The Committer later issued separate subpoenas[5] to other petitioners, albeit for a different hearing date.
On August 30, 2006, petitioners filed the instant petition, docketed as G.R. No. 174105, seeking to bar the Committee from
continuing with its inquiry and to enjoin it from compelling petitioners to appear before it pursuant to the invitations thus issued.
Failing to secure the desired TRO sought in the petition, petitioner Romero II appeared at the September 4, 2006 Committee
investigation.
Two days after, petitioner Romero II filed a Manifestation with Urgent Plea for a TRO [6] alleging, among others, that: (1) he
answered questions concerning the investments of OWWA funds in the Smokey Mountain project and how much of OWWAs original
investment had already been paid; (2) when Senator Estrada called on Atty. Francisco I. Chavez, as resource person, the latter
spoke of the facts and issues he raised with the Court in Chavez v. National Housing Authority,[7] none of which were related to the
subject of the inquiry; and (3) when Senator Estrada adjourned the investigation, he asked petitioners Romero II and Canlas to
return at the resumption of the investigation.
The manifestation was followed by the filing on September 19, 2006 of another urgent motion for a TRO in which
petitioners imputed to the Committee the intention to harass them as, except for petitioner Romero II, none of them had even been
mentioned in relation to the subject of the investigation.
Meanwhile, respondents, in compliance with our September 5, 2006 Resolution that ordered them to submit a comment on
the original plea for a TRO, interposed an opposition, [8] observing that the Senates motives in calling for an investigation in aid of
legislation were a political question. They also averred that the pendency of Chavez is not sufficient ground to divest the
respondents of their jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry into the matters alleged in the petition.
In this petition, petitioners in gist claim that: (1) the subject matter of the investigation is sub judice owing to the pendency of
the Chavez petition; (2) since the investigation has been intended to ascertain petitioners criminal liability for plunder, it is not in aid
of legislation; (3) the inquiry compelled them to appear and testify in violation of their rights against self-incrimination; and (4) unless
the Court immediately issues a TRO, some or all of petitioners would be in danger of being arrested, detained, and forced to give
testimony against their will, before the Court could resolve the issues raised in G.R. No. 164527.
In their Comment dated October 17, 2006,[9] respondents made a distinction between the issues raised in Chavez and the
subject matter of the Senate resolutions, nixing the notion of sub judice that petitioners raised at every possible turn. Respondents
averred that the subject matter of the investigation focused on the alleged dissipation of OWWA funds and the purpose of the probe
was to aid the Senate determine the propriety of amending Republic Act No. 8042 or The Migrant Workers Act of 1995 and enacting
laws to protect OWWA funds in the future. They likewise raised the following main arguments: (1) the proposed resolutions were a
proper subject of legislative inquiry; and (2) petitioners right against self-incrimination was well-protected and could be invoked when
incriminating questions were propounded.

On December 28, 2006, petitioners filed their Reply[10] reiterating the arguments stated in their petition, first and foremost of
which is: Whether or not the subject matter of the Committees inquiry is sub judice.
The Courts Ruling
The Court resolves to dismiss the instant petition.
The Subject Matter of the Senate Inquiry Is no Longer Sub Judice
Petitioners contend that the subject matter of the legislative inquiry is sub judice in view of the Chavez petition.

The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue,
influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of the sub judice rule may render one liable for indirect
contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. [11] The rationale for the rule adverted to is set out in Nestle Philippines v.
Sanchez:
[I]t is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues
of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence
produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies.[12]

Chavez, assuming for argument that it involves issues subject of the respondent Committees assailed investigation, is no
longer sub judice or before a court or judge for consideration. [13] For by an en banc Resolution dated July 1, 2008, the Court, in
G.R. No. 164527, denied with finality the motion of Chavez, as the petitioner in Chavez, for reconsideration of the Decision of the
Court dated August 15, 2007. In fine, it will not avail petitioners any to invoke the sub judice effect of Chavez and resist, on that
ground, the assailed congressional invitations and subpoenas. The sub judice issue has been rendered moot and academic by the
supervening issuance of the en banc Resolution of July 1, 2008 in G.R. No. 164527. An issue or a case becomes moot and
academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be without practical use and
value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the
dismissal of the petition.[14] Courts decline jurisdiction over such cases or dismiss them on the ground of mootness, save in certain
exceptional instances,[15] none of which, however, obtains under the premises.
Thus, there is no more legal obstacleon the ground of sub judice, assuming it is invocableto the continuation of the
Committees investigation challenged in this proceeding.
At any rate, even assuming hypothetically that Chavez is still pending final adjudication by the Court, still, such
circumstance would not bar the continuance of the committee investigation. What we said in Sabio v. Gordon suggests as much:
The same directors and officers contend that the Senate is barred from inquiring into the same issues
being litigated before the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution or
administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose.[16]

A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one hand, courts conduct
hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual controversies arising between adverse
litigants and involving demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to
enable the legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively; [17] and to determine whether there is a
need to improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation, [18] albeit the inquiry need not result in any potential legislation.
On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation. Standard Chartered Bank (Philippine
Branch) v. Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies (Standard Chartered Bank)provides the following
reason:
[T]he mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or quasi-judicial body should not
automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any
intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint.
Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential
component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or administrative investigation.
As succinctly stated in x x x Arnault v. Nazareno

[T]he power of inquirywith process to enforce itis an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the requisite informationwhich is not infrequently truerecourse must be
had to others who possess it.[19]

While Sabio and Standard Chartered Bank advert only to pending criminal and administrative cases before lower courts as
not posing a bar to the continuation of a legislative inquiry, there is no rhyme or reason that these cases doctrinal pronouncement
and their rationale cannot be extended to appealed cases and special civil actions awaiting final disposition before this Court.
The foregoing consideration is not all. The denial of the instant recourse is still indicated for another compelling reason. As
may be noted, PS Resolution Nos. 537 and 543 were passed in 2006 and the letter-invitations and subpoenas directing the
petitioners to appear and testify in connection with the twin resolutions were sent out in the month of August 2006 or in the past
Congress. On the postulate that the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate before and after it,
the aforesaid invitations and subpoenas are considered functos oficio and the related legislative inquiry conducted is, for all intents
and purposes, terminated. In this regard, the Court draws attention to its pronouncements embodied in its Resolution of September
4, 2008 in G.R. No. 180643 entitled Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations:
Certainly, x x x the Senate as an institution is continuing, as it is not dissolved as an entity with each
national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business,
the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate before it. The Rules of the Senate
itself confirms this when it states:
xxxx
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the
same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be
taken by the succeeding Congress as if present[ed] for the first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even
legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the
expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up
such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality
of such rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have
a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the
Senate of which they had no part. x x x (Emphasis added.)
Following the lessons of Neri, as reiterated in Garcillano v. The House of Representatives Committees on Public
Information, Public Order and Safety, et al.,[20] it can very well be stated that the termination of the assailed investigations has
veritably mooted the instant petition. This disposition becomes all the more impeccable, considering that the Senate of the present
Congress has not, per available records, opted to take up anew, as an unfinished matter, its inquiry into the investment of OWWA
funds in the Smokey Mountain project.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court need not belabor the other issues raised in this recourse. Suffice it to state that
when the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in connection with its investigation of the
aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Art.
VI, Sec. 21 of the Constitution, which was quoted at the outset. And the Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee from
requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure.[21] Sabio emphasizesthe importance of the duty of those subpoenaed to appear before the legislature,
even if incidentally incriminating questions are expected to be asked:
Anent the right against self-incrimination, it must be emphasized that [this right may be] invoked by the
said directors and officers of Philcomsat x x x only when the incriminating question is being asked, since they
have no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them. That this
right may possibly be violated or abused is no ground for denying respondent Senate Committees their power of
inquiry. The consolation is that when this power is abused, such issue may be presented before the courts.
xxxx
Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses x x x will be respected
by respondent Senate Committees, it [is] their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts
needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond
to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully with respect
to matters within the realm of proper investigation.[22] (Emphasis supplied.)

As a matter of long and sound practice, the Court refrains from touching on the issue of constitutionality except when it is
unavoidable and is the very lis mota[23] of the controversy. So it must be here. Indeed, the matter of the constitutionality of the

assailed Committee invitations and subpoenas issued vis--vis the investigation conducted pursuant to PS Resolution Nos. 537 and
543 has ceased to be a justiciable controversy, having been rendered moot and academic by supervening events heretofore
indicated. In short, there is no more investigation to be continued by virtue of said resolutions; there is no more investigation the
constitutionality of which is subject to a challenge.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SECTION 24

Tolentino v secretary of finance

Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the
Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not
exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of
the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3
readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the
1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed
its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have
done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in
that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the
text) of the HB. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate Bill.
ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.
HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was
consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version
originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that
the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before
where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and
other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been
accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing
that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been
done.
ALVAREZ V. GUINGONA G.R. NO. 118303 252 SCRA 695
Facts:
On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into
an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago, was filed in the House
of Representatives. Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, was filed in
the Senate. On March 22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the
action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.
Issue:
Does the passing of SB No. 1243, the Senates own version of HB No. 8817, into Republic Act
No. 7720 be said to have originated in the House of Representatives as required?
Held:
Yes. Although a bill of local application should originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243,
was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed
in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. The filing in
the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not
contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the
House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives
the House bill.
SECTION 25
Garcia vs. Mata

Facts: Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who wasreversed to inactive status. He filed
an action for mandamus to compel the DND and AFP to reinstate him to active service and
readjust his rank and pay emoluments.
Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is violation of RA 1600 which prohibits the
reversion of officers with at least 10 yearsof service. On the other hand, the AFP and DND
contend that the said provision of RA 1600 has no relevance or pertinence to the budget in
question or to any appropriation item therein. (RA 1600 was an appropriation law for 195657).

Issue: Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?

Held: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to
disclose the relevance to any appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the
operation of government while Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of
calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP. Hence
it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation of
the constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was indeed a
new and completely unrelated provision attached to the GAA. It also violates the rule on onebill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in the title of the act. When
an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject ofthe act, as
expressed in the title, such provisions are void, inoperative and without effect. SECTION 11 is
unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.
Demetria v alba
Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Alba,
then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree 1177 or the
Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of Section 44 of the
said PD. This Section provides that The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund,
appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive
Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment. Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the
1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Par 1, Sec 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.
HELD: Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however,
the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations. Par 1 of Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted
under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one
department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred
are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the
transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does
not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to
an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed,
such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and
void. HOWEVER, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the
GA Act may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer
from one department to another here.
PHILCONSA vs Enriquez
GR No. 113105, August 19, 1994
FACTS:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and
approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions
and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted
by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in
the pork barrels allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets. Pursuant
to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution,
Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval. On December
30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become
Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (GAA of 1994). On the same day,
the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he
vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly
done through the 1994 GAA. And that appropriations for payment of public debt, whether
foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and

Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292,
the Administrative Code of 1987.
2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and
maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges
(SUCs),
3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics
Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).
5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of
the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the Use of Fund, which requires the prior approval
of the Congress for the release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire
Special Provision No. 3 on the Specific Prohibition which states that the said Modernization
Fund shall not be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260
Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers
5. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension
and gratuity funds.
7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the
Congress
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi
2. Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a)
for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on
Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUS) and (f) State
Universities and Colleges (SUCs) are constitutional
3. Whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the
automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional.
HELD:
Locus Standi
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has
the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an
item in an appropriation bill.
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution
(Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 [1973]).
Veto of the Provisions
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process
(Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). There is, therefore, sound
basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning
the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution. The vetoed provision
on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign
Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court
in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the
appropriations law. In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue
discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar
provisions in other government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use
their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have
been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as
exceptions to the one-fund policy (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No.
902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget
and Managements Procurement Service). The veto of the second paragraph of Special
Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question
is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the
appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall
be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The Special Provision which
requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the formulary
embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an appropriate
provision. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases
of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also
vetoing the said item (Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 [1964]). The
requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the AFP modernization program
that the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its
approval, is an exercise of the congressional or legislative veto. However the case at bench
is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as
provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on
other grounds. Therefore, being inappropriate provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3
were properly vetoed. Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the

Modernization fund for payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which
have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the
passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts
entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension
fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is
violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. Regarding the
deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the challenged
Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to
defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in
1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such
purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it
abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of
the CAFGUs to be amended. On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions
relating to appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the
DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be
subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined
whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President
has the power to take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law (Schwartz,
On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]). These steps are the ones to be embodied in the
guidelines.
SECTION 26