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Cross-border Regionalism
through a 'South-east Asian'
Looking-glass
Carl Grundy-Warr
Published online: 25 Aug 2010.

To cite this article: Carl Grundy-Warr (2002) Cross-border Regionalism

through a 'South-east Asian' Looking-glass, Space and Polity, 6:2, 215-225, DOI:
10.1080/1356257022000003644
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Space & Polity, Vol. 6, No. 2, 215225, 2002

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Cross-border Regionalism through a South-east Asian

Looking-glass

CARL GRUNDY-WARR
[Paper received in nal form, April 2002]

Regional Discourses, Processes and Comparisons

How to read these papersbeyond Europe (?)in Singapore? What departures
and questions do they raise from this vantage-point? Scotts paper provides
insightful comments about various Euro-visions, based upon a new political
architecture that points to the construction of fundamentally new European
geographies. The European Union macro-regional plans and policies discussed
by Scott amount to potentially revolutionary spatial-political changes that challenge the territorialities, sovereignties and boundaries of nation-states. Scott
suggests that the changes taking place within the European Union space
amount to reconguring geographical scale in order to nd institutional arrangements that will meet the challenges and exploit the opportunities presented by globalisation (p. 150). Thus, we have plenty of reasons for wishing to
raise certain points of interregional comparison and contrast with other parts of
the world. First, what is new and distinctive about the Euro-regional visions and
regional spatial plans and developments? Secondly, are other parts of the global
political economy undergoing similar political-geographical recongurations, or
is the European experiment unique in terms of its visions, plans, scope and
contents? To attempt answers to these questions, I shall draw upon some
observations relating to the process of regionalisation in another part of the
globesouth-east Asiawith its own distinctive assemblages of political economic structures, agencies and actors and, like Europe, a great mix of national
identities, languages, religions and cultures.
Supranationalism, Trans- versus Inter-state Processes
Peter Taylors (1995) ideas relating to internationality, interstateness and
interterritoriality are useful when examining the issues of supra nationalism
and cross-border regionalism. Especially helpful is the distinction that Taylor
elaborates between trans and inter processes. If we agree that most so-called
international activity is often misrepresented and should be read as inter-state
relations, then any processes, ows, networks and activities that are not mostly
controlled, administered and monitored by states are effectively trans-state
Carl Grundy-Warr is in the Department of Geography, National University of Singapore, Singapore
117570. Fax: 65 777 3091. geocerg@nus.edu.sg.
13562576 Print/1470-123 5 Online/02/020215-1 1 2002 Taylor & Francis Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/135625702200000364 4

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Carl Grundy-Warr

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processes or tendencies in that they are in some way transcending the political
and territorial sovereignty of states. As Taylor (1995; 12) puts it
I suggest that a focus on trans-stateness, along with transnationality
and transterritoriality, should imply more than simply across: we need
to use the strong sense of the prex trans to mean beyond. In this
way our inter concepts are set against our trans concepts as polar
opposites: the former denes processes reproducing the states, nations
and territories, the latter processes that undermine them (Taylor, 1995,
p. 12).
Similarly, supranationalism, in spite of the inherent terminological confusion of
national to really mean state, implies that there must be certain trans,
outside or beyond state authorities. Nevertheless, just as globalisation involves contradictory inter and trans processes happening simultaneously, so
does the process of cross-border regionalism within the EU. Furthermore, the EU
mechanisms incorporate inter and trans elements, the former tending to dilute
the truly supranational character of the EU. Even though national agendas
and state-centred politics remain critical within European space, there is no
denying that, in terms of certain institutional features and politico-economic
visions, the EU goes beyond sovereign-state boundaries. Thus, Scott is able to
discuss new regional development strategies and ideas about the Europeanisation of national space and society, whilst Kramsch can argue that the forms of
regionalism taking shape in the EU are still along way from being beyond state
politics. The point is that both interpretations are valid. What is happening to
spaces and polities within Europe involves contradictory processes that act to
undermine, challenge, bolster and maintain aspects of interstateness and territoriality. Beyond the EU realm, most forms of regional co-operation still rely upon
multilateral and bilateral agreements, intergovernmental bodies and associations
made up of sovereign states.
Viewed from south-east Asia, the supranational aspects of intraEU regional
co-operation based upon explicit cross-border spatial planning concepts
specic programmes such as the schemes initiated under the Association of
European Border Regions (AEBR), the INTEREG initiatives and a host of
genuine trans-border mechanismsrepresent peculiar and distant prospects.
Scotts discussion of new interpretations of how space, territory, identity and
governance are being renegotiated (or reterritorialised) within Europe would
be hardly applicable in the south-east Asian context. Cross-border regionalisation in south-east Asia is a mostly topdown affair orchestrated by political
leaders, ministers and ofcials in the respective member-states (Abonyi, 1994;
Grundy-Warr and Perry, 1996). The most signicant regional body, the Association of south-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) is fundamentally based upon certain
cardinal principles of the Westphalian international system such as the
doctrines of non-interference, non-intervention and pacic settlement of disputes (Acharya, 2001, p. 63). Intraregional co-operation has largely been based
upon what is termed the ASEAN way, which involves a preference for dealing
with substantive regional matters through the networking of senior policy-makers and bureaucrats involved in consensus-building, non-confrontational bargaining procedures, discussing sensitive political issues behind closed-doors
and the use of soft diplomacy. There is nothing within ASEAN akin to the
European courts, parliaments or executive bodies. ASEAN remains a loose and

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A South-east Asian Looking-glass

217

informal grouping with decision-making rmly lying with national governments and the respective national branches of the ASEAN secretariat. Rather
than create new regional mechanisms, ASEAN has continued to rely on frequent
summits, on meetings of ministerial and bureaucratic counterparts from member-states and upon the constitution of ad hoc problem-solving committees to
direct the course of regional co-operation (Kumar and Siddique, 1994, p. 55).
Indeed, within south-east Asia, there appears to be aversion to the
institutionalisation of co-operation and a preference for forms of co-operation
requiring a minimum of formal legislative and institutional change (Acharya,
2001, pp. 6165). In this sense, trans-border regional initiatives in south-east Asia
have tended to be forms of functional integration managed by states with
relatively few changes to national regulatory or institutional frameworks and
minimal sovereignty compromises (Grundy-Warr et al., 1999).
Within Europe, the European Union may have no straightforward essence
in that it involves open contest between different representations of what it is
and is about (Sidaway, 2001, p. 772). But at least there is an essence to debate
that goes beyond the bounds of interstateness and into the realms of supranationalism. In contrast, there is no tangible beyond, trans or above interstateness essence or any equivalent notion of an ASEAN-isation of regional
development, national spaces and identities within south-east Asia. Eurocrats
may well think in terms of the kinds of new interpretations of space, territory,
identity and governance elaborated by Scott, but ASEANocrats are much more
likely to view regional co-operation through the prism of their respective
national interests. That said, it is clear that ASEAN is attempting to forge close
intraregional ties through the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) and
through a proliferation of cross-border initiatives, particularly the so-called
ASEAN growth triangles (see below).
Multilevel Forms of Governance and the Shape of Sub-national Cross-border
Co-operation
Within the EU, a large number of cross-border institutional mechanisms have
been established to facilitate linkages, exchanges and networks, thus to
inuence, initiate or implement policies in a variety of arenas (economic, social,
cultural and environmental) (Ganster et al., 1997). Undoubtedly, INTEREG,
VASAB and other initiatives are facilitating trans-border regionalism and supporting specic cross-border associations of one kind or another. Indeed, the
trans-boundary regional level has become an important dimension of the multitiered political arena of the EU.
Both Scott and Kramsch provide glimpses into the myriad of relations that
affect, inuence and shape cross-border politics, policies, actions and interactions within the EU. For example, Scott examines the direct lines between
sub-national and supranational levels in the denition of interests, strategies and
objectives (p. 153) relating to cross-border regional development and European
integration. Kramsch observes consultative and planning bodies spanning
national borders within the Euregio MaasRhein sub-areas of the Netherlands,
Germany and Belgium. Nevertheless, he also stresses the persistence of traditional forms of regional policy-making and the dominance of member-state
structures in matters such as industrial restructuring, scal and social security
policies, arguing that the Stichting (Foundation) for the Euregio has had limited

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Carl Grundy-Warr

success in achieving cross-border socioeconomic integration. In spite of such

limitations, the regular meetings between representatives of local government,
mayors, business people, trade unionists and others across political space and
through specic trans-border mechanisms, marks another critical area of distinction between forms of cross-border co-operation within the EU compared with
south-east Asia.
During the 1990s, there was a proliferation of cross-border projects involving
different parts of south-east Asia and member states of ASEAN. These included
the growth triangles of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (IMS); the northern
triangle involving northern Malaysia, southern Thailand and parts of Sumatra
(Indonesia); and the east ASEAN growth area (EAGA) incorporating parts of
Sabah (Malaysia), Brunei, Kalimantan (Indonesia) and the southern Philippines.
Research focusing on probably the most advanced of these initiatives, the IMS
triangle, reveals that the most important cross-border projectssuch as a large
industrial estate in Batam island, Indonesia, and a tourist resort complex in
neighbouring Bintan islandhave tended to be functional enclave developments
involving high-level political approval and a high input of political capital from
the respective central states, as well as co-operation between Singapore statelinked corporations and privileged Indonesian companies (Grundy-Warr et al.,
1999; Grundy-Warr and Perry, 2001). In contrast to the Euro-regions, there is
relatively little involvement of local agencies and actors in formalised cross-border co-operation and there tends to be a different arrangement in each of the
national components of the triangle. In federal Malaysia, the Johor state
authorities have been primarily concerned about forging closer links with
Singapore. In the strongly unitary city-state of Singapore, state-linked bodies
have taken the lead in growth triangle developments. Whereas, in Indonesia, the
dominant triangle initiatives were orchestrated from the central government
with the establishment of specic development agencies in the Riau border
province, which tended to bypass and restrict the role of local Riau authorities
in the cross-border initiatives.
Beyond the different growth triangles, there are other forms of cross-border
co-operation related to exploring, exploiting and managing shared natural
resources. These include the joint development zones for offshore hydrocarbon
sharing in disputed maritime border areas involving relevant state agencies and
corporate partners, such as the one between Thailand and Malaysia in the Gulf
of Thailand (Forbes, 2001, pp. 225242). Such agreements enable the respective
states to shelve tricky border questions and pool sovereignty for the functional
purpose of sharing the revenues of resource exploitation. A different form of
environmental resource co-operation are efforts to enhance the sustainable
management of resources in the lower Mekong River Basin under the Agreement on the Co-operation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River
basin signed in April 1995 by Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Laos, and
involving the intergovernmental Mekong River Commission (MRC) in various
policy recommendations, monitoring and consultative tasks. There are more
ambitious plans to develop the entire Greater Mekong Region (GMR) into a
massive zone of hydropower transfers and transnational road and rail corridors
under the auspices of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) acting as a broker for
transnational capital involved in the energy and transport projects (Chapman,
1995). Notwithstanding the signicant difculties involved in overcoming the
legacy of Cold War geopolitical divisions and long-standing historical rivalries

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219

between some of the states concerned, these forms of regional development tend
to involve powerful agencies setting policy agendas, with little or no direct
involvement of the communities most directly impacted by the projects. Thus
the politics of scale in the Mekong is largely about power over events that
affect peoples lives, livelihoods and environments (Mekong Update, 2000).
Clearly, the nature and character taken by formal cross-border co-operation
relate to issues of accountability, governance and sovereignty. The EU is helping
to promote new channels of communication and contact between sub-national
and supranational levels, although Kramsch reminds us not to exaggerate these
aspects due to the continued strength of national agencies, agendas and
approaches. Even so, we should also note that trans-sovereign contacts are
sometimes initiated by local agencies operating in cross-border regions. In earlier
papers, Scott (1993, 1997) has stressed how the development of trans-boundary
planning mechanisms was often the result of co-operative processes involving
local public, private and non-state bodies in order to tackle everyday cross-border concerns, regardless of whether or not the respective central states had given
ofcial blessing to such activities (see also Duchacek et al., 1988; Soldatos, 1993).
The subsequent institutional developments such as the DutchGerman EUREGIO with its unique parliament (Scott, 1997) and the Stichting of the Euregio
MaasRhein, whatever the geopolitical limitations of these bodies are, mean that
forms of trans-boundary governance are already rmly established within the
EU. In contrast, the ofcially sanctioned forms of cross-border regionalism
within south-east Asia are based upon interstate processes with fewer inputs
from local authorities, which reect the ASEAN way of fostering regional
co-operation with minimal challenges to national sovereignty (Thant and Tang,
1996).
The Political Map as Palimpsest, Differentiated TERRAINs of Power and de
facto Cross-border and Trans-national Territorialities
Kramsch raises the signicance of past geo-economic and geopolitical formations
with his analysis of the contradictory forces associated with Dutch imperialism
and the transnational prot imperative resulting in essentially new forms of
local governance in far-ung parts of the world. The boundary-making associated with dividing up colonial spheres of power and trade have continued
relevance for the way we perceive our political map todaywhich, as Parker
and Dikshit (1997, p. 187) observe, is in fact a palimpsest, containing features
that have been erased, partially hidden or altered, revealing evidences of earlier
geopolitical structures lying behind those of the contemporary world.
The geometries of wealth and power associated with the expansion of European states and capital resulted in forms of governance that were highly
differentiated. As Kramsch notes, initially the formal constitutional relationship
of the Dutch colonial state with its myriad indigenous societies varied enormously (p. 177), involving variations in shades of colonial political sovereignty
and local control by the multiple indigenous units of authority and juridical
domains that existed in what was becoming the Dutch East Indies in the
imperialist imagination. It was only later that the different forms of governance
were put together as a patchwork quilt under the uniform imposition of an
administrative Short Declaration (p. 180). The broader historical implications of
this have been examined by Benedict Anderson who notes that the Netherlands

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Carl Grundy-Warr

East Indies (Indonesia) stretch, incorporating thousands of islands, geographical fragmentation, religious variegation and ethnolinguistic diversity

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does not remotely correspond to any precolonial domain; on the

contrary, at least until General Suhartos brutal invasion of ex-Portuguese East Timor in 1975, its boundaries have been those left behind
by the last Dutch conquests (c.1910) (Anderson, 1991, p. 120).
Anderson goes on to examine how colonial administration, education, censuses,
mapping and monuments helped to create a totalizing classicatory grid
binding different peoples, regions, religions, languages together in new political territories, shaping the grammar which would in due course make possible
Burma and Burmese, Indonesia and Indonesian (Anderson, 1991, pp. 184
185). Whilst the reworked Dutch colonial politics of scale undoubtedly contains
many contradictions and indeterminancies, the post-colonial polities inherited
the boundaries and sovereign spaces from colonial powers, and in so doing have
embarked on enormous projects of nation-building and administering unity in
diversity. In this sense, the Europe of the regions and the myriad local, social,
cultural and political geographies that are part of the EU space today, are similar
to the imagined national communities of south-east Asia in that they all
require what Scott has termed new cartographies and spatial plans that help to
transcend older but still relevant political spaces.
In addition to the imperial spaces and power domains we should also
consider the legacy of boundaries on people and communities who live near
them and the polities that became effectively silenced by what were to become
the new national geo-bodies. Just as Europes long medieval-to-modern transition involved a territorialisation of politics, sharpening distinctions at the
borders of states and nations between internal and external, belonging and
not belonging, us and them (Anderson, 1995, p. 71), so too the pre-modern
to modern transition in south-east Asia has involved the territorialisation of
identities across sharp political boundaries. Modern geography replaced the
multiple, hierarchical and overlapping sovereignties that had existed for centuries, and removed the ancient mandala psychology of south-east Asian
geopolitics, in which power and sovereignty radiated outwards, albeit without
precise, continuous edges, from the centres of lowland kingdoms (Wolters,
1982). New international boundaries allowed no space for ambiguity over
sovereignty, no lands-in-the-cracks or places that belonged to no-one
(Suarez, 1999, pp. 261263) and the new geo-bodies became the most solid
foundation of nationhood as a whole (Thongchai, 1995, p. 17). Furthermore,
as Thongchai Winichakul has so eloquently put it
The grid of the modern mind renders the unfamiliarity of the indigenous polity and geography more familiar to us by translating them into
modern discourse. Consequently, these studies mislead us into considering only the point of view of those states which became modern
nations. Whenever the issue is raised, we hear only the claims of the
major nations. The fate of the tiny tributaries under dispute remains
virtually unknown. Their voices have not been heard. It is as if they
occupied a dead space with no life, no view, no voice, and thus no
history of their own (Thongchai, 1995, p. 96).
The purpose of raising these historical points about our political map is that the

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current concern about cross-border regionalism and intraregional co-operation

frequently takes place as if the main playerssovereign bodiesand the dominant national elements of ASEAN were the only agents and actors worth
considering, as if the de jure political map is indeed without contradictions and
ambiguities. On the contrary, there are numerous challenges to our taken-forgranted spatial sovereignties relating to past geopolitical formations and contemporary de facto geographies masked or partially hidden by our national
geo-bodies (Grundy-Warr, 1998, p. 2001). To mention a few of the complications: rst, there are numerous separatist, counter-nationalist movements in
different border regions of south-east Asia. In Burma alone, several political
organisations have long histories of resisting military rule from Rangoon and
full incorporation into a united national, mostly Burman-centred polity (Smith,
1999). These include, disparate ethnic political groups such as the Kachin
Independence Organisation (KIO), the Shan State Army (SSA), the Karenni
National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the Karen National Union (KNU), to
name but a few. All of these groups enjoyed considerable political autonomy in
the frontier areas of British colonial rule, although political sovereignty was
often uid, allegiances and loyalties waxed and waned, and there were no xed
territorial boundaries until the British insisted upon them. In a sense, it was the
xing of geopolitical boundaries that made these groups much more aware of
their new status as resident strangers within their mountainous homelands
(McVey, 1984; Lim, 1984).
Secondly, the various plans aimed at enhancing ofcial cross-border linkages
and trade in south-east Asia are complicated by the fact that not all the states
have managed to extend effective administrative, economic, political, legal or
even military control over all of their supposedly sovereign spaces. With the
obvious exception of the city-state of Singapore, all the other ASEAN states have
difcult terrestrial and/or maritime boundaries to administer. These boundaries
are highly permeable. Flows of undocumented goods and human beings continue to undermine the ongoing efforts to formalise and increase legal interstate
and intraregional trade. Two big problems in parts of the golden quadrangle of
Burma, Laos, Thailand and Yunnan (China) are the international trades in heroin
and amphetamines, and the problem of human trafcking (Grundy-Warr and
Wong, 2001). In addition, there are various threats and challenges to statecraft,
national identity and political sovereignty posed by large ows of undocumented, irregular and forced migrants (Grundy-Warr and Wong, 2002).
Thirdly, the existence of numerous ethnic groups straddling the terrestrial
borders of mainland south-east Asia has led to considerable issues of perceived
loyalty, assimilation and integration within the statenationcitizen domains
(Wijewardene, 1990; Grundy-Warr, 2001). These groups often have well-developed kith and kin networks and social spaces that pre-date and transcend
political boundaries (Dean, 2001). In addition, irredentist sentiments are never
far from the surface. This has long been the case with the Pattani Malays of
southernmost Thailand, particularly in the provinces of Satun, Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala. As I was writing this commentary, I noticed an alarmist report in
The Straits Times (20 March 2002), which was entitled Worry over gangs and
separatists in Thai south after violent attacks, and the report elaborated on
various rogue elements such as the Pattani United Liberation Organisation
(Pulo); its splinter group, New Pulo, the Guragan Mujahideen Islam Pattani, an
organisation with only 40 members but with suspected links with Al-Qaeda;

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Carl Grundy-Warr

and another group with similar links to the dispersed territorialities of transnational terrorism is said to be Wae Ka Raeh, an afliate of Guragan. To make
matters worse, the deep south of Thailand is also apparently a hotbed of
Chinese triads comprising Malaysians, Singaporeans and Hong Kong nationals involved in prostitution rackets, illegal gambling and loan sharking. The
point of mentioning this here is that we are also talking about a component of
one of the so-called ASEAN growth triangles mentioned earlier, where states are
busily trying to forge closer cross-border ties to foster the economic development
of contiguous cross-border national spaces. The media focus is misleading in
the sense that the vast majority of cross-border movements and relationships in
this border zone are related to the livelihoods and everyday trades of the local
border communities. Clearly, there are contradictions between different ofcial
and media representations of these border zones, reecting anxieties about de
facto trans-border criminality, the political loyalties of peoples in borderlands
where strong cultural, social and economic links exist across border space, and
the need for greater intraregional integration in an era of increasing transnational ows. This one example, and I could raise numerous others, illustrates
how past and present, old and new geopolitical formations and relationships
have merged within border spaces. It is somewhat similar to James Andersons
(1996, p. 149) observations on Europe, where there is now a complex mixture
of old, new, and hybrid formsterritorial, transterritorial and functional
forms of association and authority coexisting and interacting.
Finally, it is important to mention that both Europe and south-east Asia are
currently within an era of geopolitical transition following the end of the Cold
War. One implication of this has been the ability of both the EU and ASEAN to
overcome the former ideological and geostrategic iron and bamboo curtains
and enlarge their scope, membership and vision. In this context, I was a little
surprised that Scott did not discuss in any detail the issues of integrating EU
and non-EU border spaces where there are often sharp distinctions between
political administrative mindsets and approaches to regional development, as
well as pronounced socioeconomic asymmetries (Scott, 1997; Gruchman and
Walk, 1997). What does Europeanisation of space mean at these outer border
spaces of the EU? Also, it is interesting to speculate how cross-border regionalism will develop with the future expansion of the EU. Clearly, it would seem
that there are likely to be lengthy processes of territorial, symbolic and
institutional (re)shaping required (Paasi, 2001).
Similarly, ASEAN has quickly moved from six to ten member-states with the
admission of former Cold War foesVietnam, Laos and Cambodiaplus Burma
(Myanmar) whose membership continues to pose problems in EUASEAN ties
due to EU objections to Burmas poor record on human rights and the suppression of democracy (Tay and Goh, 1999). Interestingly, Burma and Vietnam
were admitted largely due to geopolitical concerns about the growing inuence
of a huge regional dragonChina. In this sense, the state-centred geopolitics of
regionalisation are signicant. In an another sense, it is at the borderlands of
south-east Asia and China where we can see that border regional perspectives
cause us not only to rethink our national sovereignties, but also our regional
perspectives. The Yunnansouth-east Asia borderlands contain many historical
overlaps, shared experiences, trans-border ethnicities, human movements, economic, social and cultural ties, and shared environmental concerns (Evans et al.,

A South-east Asian Looking-glass

223

2000; Dean, 2001), bringing into question the drawing of rigid spatial limits
around our quest for knowledge (van Schendel, 2001).

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LocalGlobal, NationalRegional, LocalRegional, RegionalGlobal, Global

Local. Cross-Inter-Trans-, Where Are the Border Spaces?
Scott and Kramsch have added very distinctive and valuable insights relating to
the EU and notions of cross-border regionalisation and integration. This commentary has not tried to comment too much on the contents of these contributions, but rather to use the opportunity to raise a few observations based upon
research in a different macro region. Border spaces are clearly central to
current discourses and debates about globalisation, glocalisation, the construction and politics of scale, territorialisation, reterritorialisation, inter- and transstateness, reconceptualisations of sovereignty and ideas concerning the future of
nation-states. One of the reasons for the centrality of border spaces is that
research often reveals contradictory processes, multiscalar politics and multiple
territorialities occurring within specic cross-border regions at the same time
Tuathails
(Sidaway, 2001; Grundy-Warr, 2001). Another reason relates to O
(1999, p. 140) observation about territory as a regime of practices triangulated
between institutionalisation of power, materialisations of place and idealisations
of the people. Within borderlands, these three aspects of the regime become
even more complex due to the interplay of different national, sub-national,
trans-national and cross-border agencies and actors, requiring detailed empirical
enquiry in order to be able to add to our broader theoretical understanding.
In conclusion, I would like to reiterate two points raised by the main papers
and relate them to the south-east Asian context. First, Kramsch argues that the
EU border regions are suspended between the promise of cross-border regional
self-determination and the disciplinary power of nation-state rule (p. 189). This
contrasts with south-east Asian cases where border and provincial authorities
are frequently only minor players in ofcial cross-border regionalism, although
they may be more active in de facto forms of cross-border relations, particularly
where central state authority is weak or where peripheral power domains are
vying with sovereign states for effective control over people, territory and
resources. Thus, whilst various locally initiated forms of trans-border contact
have gradually been institutionalised and made ofcial within the EU, de facto
and unregulated forms of beyond state politics continue to thrive in parts of
south-east Asia. Furthermore, research has shown that quite contrary state
policies can apply to different segments of a specic borderland depending upon
contingent interstate and de facto geopolitical relationships (Grundy-Warr, 2001).
Thus, general statements about the nature of cross-border relations can sometimes be quite misleading, even for a single border region.
The second point is the admission by Scott that, in spite of the grandiose
Euro-visions, there continue to exist multifarious local perspectives on European development (p. 162) and there is no room for a hegemonic project of
identity-formation (p. 163). Similarly, in south-east Asia, there is enormous
variation between different border regions, even between different parts of the
same border. All of this suggests that there is still plenty of scope to undertake
meaningful studies of border regions and, as I have tried to suggest, empirical
and theoretical comparative approaches to cross-border regionalism may well
yield fruitful ideas, dreams, departures and questions.

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