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Russia, America, and China Stealing the World One Byte at a Time
Dr. Matthew Crosston and Anonymous* May 27, 2016
Every month another story of cybertheft linked to China or Russia emerges. Recent data
breaches at Target, United Airlines, Blue Cross Blue Shield, and OPM have been linked back to
Russia, while theft of key technology across major Department of Defense contractors such as
Lockheed Martin and US government laboratories have been linked to China.
Neither China nor Russias government formally admit to leveraging the internet to steal secrets
from other countries but hacks have been linked directly to their intelligence services respective
buildings or individuals known to be under governmental influence. International cyber incidents
in Ukraine, Georgia, and Estonia have all been apparently linked back to Russia while the
Canadian government recently set up domestic cyber-protection programs after several major
corporations were hacked by Chinese intelligence. The US government struggles on how to
approach these cyber intrusions. Should they be ignored so that other foreign policy initiatives
can move forward? Are these initiatives acts of war or a new method of state gamesmanship? Do
these collections of vast amounts of information count as high treason/espionage or simple
economic theft? Environmental negotiations just about broke down several years ago when
President Obama called out China for hacking several governmental systems during the
negotiations. What does all of this signify as Russia and China become more important strategic
world partners, while still at least semi-maintaining long-held intelligence and military
adversarial attitudes toward the US? Welcome to the REAL cyber era, where multiple players try
to steal the world one byte at a time while pretending to do nothing of the sort.
The Chinese, American, and Russian intelligence services have no issue launching clandestine
internet attacks to pursue what they all consider to be legitimate national security and foreign
policy objectives. Sometimes the information collected is economic, directed against or about
important corporations; other times the information is military and political. In all cases the
information is highly strategic. While it is true that the information the Russian and Chinese
intelligence services are providing to their respective policymakers is much broader in scope
than the CIA or US Department of Defense, and is arguably much more domestically invasive
than the FBI or DEA, both Russia and China have successfully started campaigns questioning
the purity of purpose within American intelligence given the details of the Snowden scandal.
All of which begs questions: should American intelligence maneuvers match Chinese and
Russian cyber precedence? Is the American public aversion to cyber collection programs really
just a front for a private philosophy that already rivals China and Russia? Is there something
fundamentally important for states to consider in this style vs. substance cyber spy debate?
Crucial differences in intelligence organizational culture and mission make figuring these
questions out quite difficult. While the United States has been quick to leverage open-source
collection for its own programs, it has supposedly been hesitant to execute the power of its cyber
abilities in invasive, offensive, global scenarios (although this consideration is now being heavily
debated in the classified sector and some accuse it of already transpiring). This article will
attempt to determine if Chinese and Russian intelligence services have gained a tactical
advantage over the United States because of a political and bureaucratic blind spot, or if the
United States intelligence collection culture is different only at the superficial level and is largely
the same as its rivals in terms of true cyber substance.
The first important aspect in understanding the Grand Cyber Game is to understand how the
Russian, Chinese, and US intelligence communities are structured. The United States is known
for the big brothers of its IC, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and National Security Agency (NSA). However, there are actually 17
members of the US Intelligence Community. Some of these include intelligence offices for each
branch of the US military, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy,
Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). The first
five use intelligence collection as part of a law enforcement mission, while the NSA, NRO, and
NGA all harvest data and imagery collection. Traditionally, the CIA operates overseas and
cultivates human sources while conducting clandestine operations. The FBI traditionally
manages counterterrorism operations domestically, provides investigation support overseas when
American citizens are involved, and acts under an enforcement jurisdiction to maintain the law.
The NSA was established to provide cryptologic services and to protect US information systems
and signals intelligence. It supports military customers, national policymakers, and
The reality is, on an international level, the intelligence services of all three nations operate with
remarkably similar mission goals and objectives: they wish to protect the national interests of
their respective states and garner advantages for said states via the acquisition of important
information. While Hollywood has often focused on the political deviance and violence of
intelligence missions around the world, the less exciting reality is that intelligence is more often
utilized simply for political leverage. On the domestic level, the United States has long-held the
moral superiority card against rivals like Russia and China, largely based on the democratic
system in America supposedly being more altruistic and legally-minded than the so-called
autocratic-type regimes in Beijing and Moscow. Snowden and other details in the past several
years have started to make some at least wonder how much that moralism is built upon a
foundation of sand and not stone. Finally, the stylistic aspect of intelligence public relations is
significantly different between the three: the US decidedly tries to maintain an air of secrecy and
deniability over just about everything its Intelligence Community does or needs to do. Russia
and China, while revealing no secrets, tend to be a bit more unabashed about the role and
necessity intelligence plays for the furthering of state power and do not fear making public
statements to that effect anywhere, anytime. For them, therefore, the only difference between the
three great players in the Grand Cyber Spy Game is the costuming and marketing of their
respective goals, but NOT the ploys, initiatives, and overall desires. When it comes to winning, it
seems all three are set and determined to virtually steal, that is, obtain as much as possible. The
Grand Cyber Spy Game demands no less.
(*) Anonymous is currently a graduate student in International Security and Intelligence Studies
at Bellevue University and works within the US governmental system. The opinions expressed
are strictly personal and do not reflect a formal endorsement of or by the United States
government and/or Intelligence Community.
Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science, Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies
Program, and the Miller Chair at Bellevue University
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