You are on page 1of 4

The Grand Cyber Spy Game:

Russia, America, and China Stealing the World One Byte at a Time
Dr. Matthew Crosston and Anonymous* May 27, 2016

Every month another story of cybertheft linked to China or Russia emerges. Recent data
breaches at Target, United Airlines, Blue Cross Blue Shield, and OPM have been linked back to
Russia, while theft of key technology across major Department of Defense contractors such as
Lockheed Martin and US government laboratories have been linked to China.
Neither China nor Russias government formally admit to leveraging the internet to steal secrets
from other countries but hacks have been linked directly to their intelligence services respective
buildings or individuals known to be under governmental influence. International cyber incidents
in Ukraine, Georgia, and Estonia have all been apparently linked back to Russia while the
Canadian government recently set up domestic cyber-protection programs after several major
corporations were hacked by Chinese intelligence. The US government struggles on how to
approach these cyber intrusions. Should they be ignored so that other foreign policy initiatives
can move forward? Are these initiatives acts of war or a new method of state gamesmanship? Do
these collections of vast amounts of information count as high treason/espionage or simple
economic theft? Environmental negotiations just about broke down several years ago when
President Obama called out China for hacking several governmental systems during the

negotiations. What does all of this signify as Russia and China become more important strategic
world partners, while still at least semi-maintaining long-held intelligence and military
adversarial attitudes toward the US? Welcome to the REAL cyber era, where multiple players try
to steal the world one byte at a time while pretending to do nothing of the sort.
The Chinese, American, and Russian intelligence services have no issue launching clandestine
internet attacks to pursue what they all consider to be legitimate national security and foreign
policy objectives. Sometimes the information collected is economic, directed against or about
important corporations; other times the information is military and political. In all cases the
information is highly strategic. While it is true that the information the Russian and Chinese
intelligence services are providing to their respective policymakers is much broader in scope
than the CIA or US Department of Defense, and is arguably much more domestically invasive
than the FBI or DEA, both Russia and China have successfully started campaigns questioning
the purity of purpose within American intelligence given the details of the Snowden scandal.
All of which begs questions: should American intelligence maneuvers match Chinese and
Russian cyber precedence? Is the American public aversion to cyber collection programs really
just a front for a private philosophy that already rivals China and Russia? Is there something
fundamentally important for states to consider in this style vs. substance cyber spy debate?
Crucial differences in intelligence organizational culture and mission make figuring these
questions out quite difficult. While the United States has been quick to leverage open-source
collection for its own programs, it has supposedly been hesitant to execute the power of its cyber
abilities in invasive, offensive, global scenarios (although this consideration is now being heavily
debated in the classified sector and some accuse it of already transpiring). This article will
attempt to determine if Chinese and Russian intelligence services have gained a tactical
advantage over the United States because of a political and bureaucratic blind spot, or if the
United States intelligence collection culture is different only at the superficial level and is largely
the same as its rivals in terms of true cyber substance.
The first important aspect in understanding the Grand Cyber Game is to understand how the
Russian, Chinese, and US intelligence communities are structured. The United States is known
for the big brothers of its IC, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and National Security Agency (NSA). However, there are actually 17
members of the US Intelligence Community. Some of these include intelligence offices for each
branch of the US military, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy,
Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). The first
five use intelligence collection as part of a law enforcement mission, while the NSA, NRO, and
NGA all harvest data and imagery collection. Traditionally, the CIA operates overseas and
cultivates human sources while conducting clandestine operations. The FBI traditionally
manages counterterrorism operations domestically, provides investigation support overseas when
American citizens are involved, and acts under an enforcement jurisdiction to maintain the law.
The NSA was established to provide cryptologic services and to protect US information systems
and signals intelligence. It supports military customers, national policymakers, and

counterterrorism and counter-intelligence communities under the Department of Defense.


However, in a post-9/11 world, these explicitly defined roles have become more blurred and
opaque as global travel and transnational collections are intensely complicated by the internet.
Conversely, modern Chinese intelligence services have always had domestic and international
missions intertwined. Chinas Ministry of Public Security (MPS) was formed in 1954 as a
domestic law enforcement agency. It managed criminal investigations, security protection, public
information network security, traffic control, legal affairs, counter-terrorism, drug control, and
other anti-smuggling and anti-corruption duties. In 1983, the Ministry of State Security (MSS)
was established as the formal intelligence and security agency of China for non-military areas of
interests. It has the same authority to arrest or detain people as the MPS with a nearly identical
oversight mission by the courts, but it is also a separate, parallel network to the MPS. The MSS
mission is to ensure the security of the state through effective measures against enemy agents,
spies, and counter-revolutionary activities designed to sabotage or overthrow Chinas socialist
system. Similar to the CIA, the MSS gathers foreign intelligence from targets in various
countries overseas while the MPS gathers information domestically to protect against domestic
terrorism and political coups. Both heavily rely on cyber collection.
Russia operates with three principal intelligence services. The SVR focuses on foreign
intelligence collection, but mainly with civilian affairs. It is formally responsible for intelligence
and espionage activities outside the Russian Federation. The GRU is the main foreign military
intelligence directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. It is Russias largest foreign
intelligence agency, deploying at least six times as many agents as the formal KGB successor,
the SVR. The FSB operates in theory only across the former Soviet Republics and domestically,
but having had its operational portfolio increased in 2003 to include the Border Guard Service
and the Federal Agency of Government Communication and Information. The three intelligence
services often overlap and sometimes compete against one another in the recruitment and
collection of intelligence sources. Russia also established an Anti-Terrorist Center that falls
under full control of the FSB. The Centers mandate was to create a database for intelligence
sharing among the security services of all members of the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS). Although the SVR has promised not to spy within CIS territories, the FSB has not. As
such, it has become the de facto leading intelligence service for foreign collection activities for
Russia. Interestingly, Russia has often turned a blind eye to Central Asian intelligence service
activity within its borders, when Central Asian leaders are making moves against so-called
political enemies (these moves are usually abductions back to Central Asia for detainment).
These activities have included both the Chinese MSS and MSP. In 2001, the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, to work together against terrorism, separatism, and extremism. They
established their own Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) that became the mechanism of
choice for carrying out abductions across national boundaries, outside of standard judicial
procedures. RATS operations have been compared to the CIAs practice of extraordinary
rendition and allow members to detain suspects in the six participating states outside of any rule
of law. The members operators are not subject to criminal liability and they are immune from
arrest and detention within the six states.

The reality is, on an international level, the intelligence services of all three nations operate with
remarkably similar mission goals and objectives: they wish to protect the national interests of
their respective states and garner advantages for said states via the acquisition of important
information. While Hollywood has often focused on the political deviance and violence of
intelligence missions around the world, the less exciting reality is that intelligence is more often
utilized simply for political leverage. On the domestic level, the United States has long-held the
moral superiority card against rivals like Russia and China, largely based on the democratic
system in America supposedly being more altruistic and legally-minded than the so-called
autocratic-type regimes in Beijing and Moscow. Snowden and other details in the past several
years have started to make some at least wonder how much that moralism is built upon a
foundation of sand and not stone. Finally, the stylistic aspect of intelligence public relations is
significantly different between the three: the US decidedly tries to maintain an air of secrecy and
deniability over just about everything its Intelligence Community does or needs to do. Russia
and China, while revealing no secrets, tend to be a bit more unabashed about the role and
necessity intelligence plays for the furthering of state power and do not fear making public
statements to that effect anywhere, anytime. For them, therefore, the only difference between the
three great players in the Grand Cyber Spy Game is the costuming and marketing of their
respective goals, but NOT the ploys, initiatives, and overall desires. When it comes to winning, it
seems all three are set and determined to virtually steal, that is, obtain as much as possible. The
Grand Cyber Spy Game demands no less.
(*) Anonymous is currently a graduate student in International Security and Intelligence Studies
at Bellevue University and works within the US governmental system. The opinions expressed
are strictly personal and do not reflect a formal endorsement of or by the United States
government and/or Intelligence Community.

DR. MATTHEW CROSSTON


Senior Editor, Caspian Project Director

Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science, Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies
Program, and the Miller Chair at Bellevue University

http://moderndiplomacy.eu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=1455:the-grand-cyberspy-game-russia-america-and-china-stealing-the-world-one-byte-at-a-time&Itemid=488

You might also like