Notes on the Reception of American Pragmatism in Germany, 1899-1952

Author(s): Klaus Oehler

Source: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter, 1981), pp. 25-35
Published by: Indiana University Press
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Klaus Oehler

Noteson theReceptionof
in
American
Pragmatism
1899-1952*
Germany,
I.
Contact quickly arose between the American pragmatistsand German
scholars, whether by correspondenceor through personal encounter.
James,for example,was in touch with Ernst Mach, Wilhelm Wundt and
WilhelmJerusalem.His contact with Jerusalemwas to contributemuch
to the disseminationof pragmaticthoughtin Germany.
Jerusalemwas born in 1854 in Bohmen. After studying classical
philologyin Prague he taught at a gymnasium. In 1891 he completed
his "habilitation" at the Universityof Vienna and, after 29 years as a
university teacher there, was made associate professor of philosophy
and education in 1920. In his autobiographical Selbstdarstellung1
Jerusalemproudlyneglectsto mentionthe political circumstancesresponsible forhis belatedpreferment.His philosophicalthinkingwas influenced
at an earlystage by Spencer,leadingto a biologicalconceptionof psychical
processesand in particularof knowledge. This tendencywas reinforced
throughthe influenceof Ernst Mach, who was appointed to the chair in
Vienna in 1895, and integratedwith genetical and sociological elements
in Jerusalem'sthinking. In his epistemology,Jerusalemsingled mainly
phenomenalismand apriorismout for attack. He saw logic as a general
methodologyof dunking, the purpose of which is to discover a formal
descriptionof thoughtas it actually occurs in scientificand pre-scientific
experience. He termedthis project "empirical logic". In 1905 his book,
Der kritischeIdealismusuni die reine Logik providedsubtle justification
for Jerusalem's rejection of critical idealism and "pure" logic. In
Germany,whereuniversityphilosophywas dominatedby neo-Rantianism,
Jerusalem'scall went unheard. But not in England and America. In his
Jerusalemtells us that
Selbstdarstellungy

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26 Klaus Oehler
Prof. F. C. S. Schillerpublishedan article in the International
Journalof Ethics, in which he said that my conceptionof the
process of knowing and of truth was closely related to the
views of the pragmatists. And when William James, with
whom I had been correspondingfor a long time, sent me his
book on pragmatism in April 1907 I at once decided to
translate it myself into German, a plan which Ernst Mach
encouraged me to carry out. The translationappeared in the
same year,makingpragmatismknown in Germany.
Later, in 1926, similar considerationshad led Jerusalemto bring out a
German edition of Lvy-BruhPsLes Fonctions Mentales dans les Socits
Infrieures.Finally, the Selbstdarstellunginformsus, he was planning a
"sociological critique of human reason" in which he wanted "to be able
to describe the complex relationshipsbetween knowledge and society".
He died in Vienna in 1923.
Wilhelm Jerusalemwas one of those philosopherswho are out of step
with the age in which they live. His criticisms of epistemological
idealism,of phenomenalismand apriorism,and his biological and sociological approach to cognitive processesmarked him off,at least within
the German-speaking world, as one of the isolated precursorsand pathfindersof a movementthat would be able to find a footholdin German
philosophyonly decades later. His translationof James*Pragmatism:A
New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking is one of the indispensable
tools of German Jamesscholarship.
What might be describedas the officialstartingpoint of pragmatism's
influencein Germany was the III InternationalCongress for Philosophy
held from 1 to 5 September,1908, in Heidelberg, with Windelband as
president. Pragmatismwas the main object of discussion,runninglike a
red thread through all sections, as is shown by the proceedingsof the
congress,which were published in 1909.2 After Windelband's address,
Josiah Royce, from Harvard, who had been strongly influenced by
Peirce, gave the openingpaper on the subject of "The Problemof Truth
in the Light of Recent Discussion". In spite of the fact that Royce's
paper mentionsPeirce several times, and names him as the founder of
pragmatism,it was not Peirce's pragmatismthat was discussed,but that
of James,Schiller and Dewey - James attracting the most attention.
In his paper,Royce describeshis philosophyas "absolute pragmatism"by
which he means - so Jerusalemsays in his remarkson Royce's paper -

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Notes on Reception of AmericanPragmatismin Germany,1899-1952 27

a voluntaristicallyinterpretedconcept of truth. As we leaf through
the pages of the congress report,we find contributionsfrom Baldwin,
Ladd-Franklin, Lask, Schiller, Armstrong and Jerusalem. Paul Cams,
editor of the Monist is also representedwith a paper in which he makes
a sharp division between Peirce and the other pragmatists.
As a result of the 1908 Heidelberg philosophycongress,pragmatism
became known within German philosophy and stimulated lively discussion. Among the firsttreatmentswere Ludwig Stein's essay "Pragmatism"3and GntherJacoby'sDer Pragmatismus. Neue Bahnen in der
des Auslands. Eine Wrdigung* Jacoby,at the time
Wissenscbaftslehre
a young teacher of philosophyat the Universityof Greifswald,wrote
in the forewordof his book:
For years pragmatism,with its unusual concept of truth has
been the source of controversyin Anglo-Americanphilosophy,
and more recently also in Germany. Ultimately the debate
resolves into a disagreementabout words. It is essentiallya
matter of indifferencewhether we associate one opinion or
anotherwith the word "truth". On the other hand, it is not
a matter of indifferencewhich criteria we adopt for making
assertions:we can judge them to be true or false. This holds
especially for scientificpropositions. Pragmatismis by nature
a theoryof science. The aim of this work is to transform
the dispute over the pragmatic concept of truth into a discussion of the pragmatic conception of science. It is an
expression of the conviction that the pragmatic theory of
science is meaningfuland fruitful:though admittedlyits scope
can only be estimatedafterit has been testedin practice.
The outbreak of World War I abruptly broke off the developmentof
the pragmatismdebate that had begun to spread throughGermanyin the
pre-waryears. The fact that it was not resumedafter the war is one of
the most significant lacunae in the history of German philosophy.
Instead of a productive exchange of ideas there arose a long chain of
and misconceptionsof American pragmatism,origimisunderstandings
nating fromsome of the most eminentGerman philosophers,and passed
on with an amazingly uncritical self-assuranceto others.
The most fateful role was perhaps that played by Max Sender's
influentialtreatise"Erkenntnisund Arbeit. Eine Studie ber Wert und

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28 Klaus Oehler
Grenzendes pragmatischenMotivsin derErkcnntnisder Welt".5 Although
Scheler discusses Peirce's pragmatic maxim, there is every reason to
suppose that he knew only the Jamesianversion and had not actually
read Peirce. But even Scheler's critique of James is now desperatelyin
need of revision,and his assessmentof pragmatismin general betray
prejudices against American culture that were typical of cultivated
Europeans in the twenties,signs of a resistancetowards the strangeand
the unfamiliarin as far as it threatenedto expose the presuppositionson
which their own position rested. This remainedtypical of the German
attitude to pragmatismbetween the wars. Of course, there were exceptions. Gustav Mllcr's account of Peirce's thoughtin the Archiv fr
Geschichteder Philosophies193 1,8 shows not only insightinto the structure of Peirce's logic and metaphysics,but also discovers links with
German thought,in particularwith Hegel, Schelling and the romantics,
which might have done much to clear the way for a more sympathetic
Peirce reception. In practice, exceptions such as this had little effect
on the main development.
Not even the comparativelyabundant supply of translationsof works
by pragmatistswas sufficientto induce a change. James' The Will to
Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophyhad appeared as early as
1899 in a translationby Thomas Lorenz. In 1907 there followed the
translation into German of James' Varieties of Religious Experience
by Georg Wobbermin and in 1914 A Pluralistic Universe. F. C. S.
Schiller'sStudies in Humanism appeared in translationby Rudolf Eisler
as Humanismus: Beitrdge zu einer pragmatischenPhilosophie. Several
works by John Dewey were also translated into German immediately
after their appearance in the United States. Although pragmatism
became better known as a result of these effortsit was not destinedto
take root at that point in German history.
The most prominentvictim of Scheler's misguided interpretationof
pragmatismwas Max Horkheimer,whose critique of pragmatismwas
directlyinfluencedby Scheler.7 Like Scheler,Horkheimerhad probably
read nothing by Peirce. The impressionthat Horkheimer gave when
teachingwas that - even as an emigrin the United States- he had not
taken American philosophyseriously. That this was a characteristicof
membersof the FrankfurtSchool has been confirmedby Martin Jay's
The Dialectical Imagination.0 In New York the "Institu" pursued a
policy of separatism,motivated by a need to maintain its own identity
and survive as a consciouslyGerman entity.

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Notes on Receptionof AmericanPragmatismin Germany,1899-1952 29

The Institutesoutsiderstatus, despiteits connectionswith such
prestigiousbenefactorsas Columbia Universityand the American JewishCommittee,was thus secure. The costs this entailed
were obvious. Although often in some contact with the regular
faculty at Columbia, the FrankfurtSchool remainedgenerally
outside the mainstream of American academic life. This
allowed it to make assumptions,such as the equation of pragmatism with positivism, that lacked complete validity. It
also cut the Institut off from potential allies in the American
intellectual tradition,such as George Herbert Mead.9
As though by way of compensation,pragmatism- particularlyas
taught by James and Dewey - found an echo which has gone almost
unnoticed until the presentday, but which was nonethelessimportant,
in Arnold Gehlen's Der Menscb. Seine Natur uni seine Stellung in der
Welt.10 Two years previously there had appeared E. Baumgarten's

Der Pragmatismus.
R. W. Emerson,W. James,/. Dewey (1938), a

comprehensiveand informativestudy on which Gehlen was able to draw.

Gehlen was induced to look upon pragmatismas an ally by the fact
that it attributeda centralphilosophicalimportanceto action.
The idea of pragmatismwas to be conceived later on, by Mach
and Sorel for example, independentlyof the American movement beginningwith Peirce in 1878; in fact thereis a strong
basis forit in Aristotleand above all in Hobbes. As pragmatism
is the only philosophyto date that fundamentallysees man
as a being that acts, its standpoint is, at least at present,
preferableto any other.11
Correspondingly,Gehlen sees a major step forward in the basic pragmtist thesis that all psychical processes, including the pre-linguistic
ones, are communicative in nature. "James9 identificationof mental
processeswith action involving the anticipation of ends and means is
extended by Dewey, in as far as he shows that this anticipationis not
an isolatedprocess,but that the basic structureof all mental phenomena
is action directedtowards another.*'12A referenceto Mead would have
been appropriatehere. There is no doubt that Gehlen's Der Mensch is

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30 Klaus Oehler
the first large-scale application of pragmatic principles in German
thought. It is genuinely pragmatic; it was born from the spirit of
pragmatism.
In the thirtiesthere were already isolated signs of the beginningof
a new phase in the reception of pragmatism in Germany which has
continueduntil the presentday. Its main discoveryhas been that Charles
Sanders Peirce was the true father of American pragmatism. At the
beginning of this new development we find Heinrich Scholz's review
of the firstfive volumes of Peirce's Collected Papers in the Deutsche
Literaturzeitung(1934, 1936). There followed in 1937 a short article
in the Deutsches Aielsblatt. The author was Jrgenvon Kempski, and
the appearance in 1952 of his book Charles S. Peirce uni der Pragmatistnus13
marksthe real beginningof the modernphase in the reception
of pragmatismin Germany. Since then,James,Dewey and Schillerhave
come to be judged increasinglyin relation to Peirce.
II.
That the receptionof pragmatism,and particularlyPeirce's thinking,
should - with the above noted exceptions - have proved such a
laborious process in Germany is not without irony. Some years ago,
Heidegger's Sein uni Xeit (1927) was translatedinto English,14making
his existentialontology accessible to American philosophersas a whole
for the firsttime. Since then it has been interestingto note that many
of them have reacted by pointingout the similaritiesbetween this form
of existentialphilosophyand pragmatismas it arose and developed in
America. This is not the result of a misconceptionon the part of the
Americans. Over forty years ago, qualified opinion - particularly
among emigrant German philosophers- had drawn attention to this

parallelism,and many today still believe that the sensationalreception

accorded to Heidegger'sbook by the German philosophicalworld in 1927
would have been tempered - without detracting from Heidegger's
achievement- had Germans been more familiar with the pragmatist
tradition. The material link between Peirce's pragmatismand the more
recent existentialist movement, founded in Heidegger's existential
ontology, is the central importance attached to the analysis of prescientificexperience. Both Peirce and Heidegger view subjectivitynot
throughthe mirrorof epistemologicalreflection,but as - in a Heideggerian German - Dasein in language and history. This means that
Peirce, like Heidegger after him, can be found posing the question of

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Notes on Receptionof AmericanPragmatismin Germany,1899-1952 31

the meaning of existence,and that Peirce sees reality not as the antithesisof subjectivity,but as somethingthat is always already mediated
by the sign process (semiosis).
The hermeneutic language in which Heidegger expresses himself
should not be allowed to disguisea congruencewith pragmatistthinking
at many points. Heidegger'sintentionin Sein und TLeitwas to renew the
questionof the meaningof existence,a question that is already somehow
understoodwheneverit becomesa topic of conversation. There is always
an "average" understandingthat dominatesthe question,and the problem
is to recognize this, and see throughit. Existence must be questioned
with regard to its self-evidence, the multiplicityof meanings through
which existenceperceivesentitiesmust be made explicit. It is through
the manifold significanceof entities that the constitutionof existence
becomesexperience,and hence experiencebecomes the possibilityof relating to the world, the possibilitythat determinesthe perspectiveunder
which the world revealsitselfto me. Within the circle of this questioning, knowledge is absorbed as a process of self-understandingthrough
things. Knowledge "occurs" throughinterpretationwithin situations; it
does not seek itself,it is not for its own sake; its concern is to act adequately to situations,to "know one's business"wherethe "business"is common property. Dasein can be interpretedand reinterpretedindefinitely.
The futurereveals a new reality,and in the light of a new reality the
past also takeson a new appearance. While travellingforwardinto a new
realityin the future,man is at the same time on his way into a new past.
As existenceis illuminatedin this way, truthcomes into being. Not just
the individualas individualis involved,but also the other as other. It is,
perhaps,in the decisive significanceattached to the other in the interhave most in common.
pretationof Ufethatpragmatismand existentialism
Knowledge is always situated within a horizon that is not itself
determinablein termsof knowledge. This is what Heideggerhas in mind
when he says that knowledge is a founded mode of Being-in-the-world.
It is also the message behind pragmatic relativism: all knowledge is
relativeto a situation. The truth value of knowledge lies in the clarification of situations,in the fact that particular operations belong to
particular situations. Pragmatismhas also done much to uncover the
concealed presuppositionsof modern science. Long before Heidegger it
had shown what sort of pre-scientificand pre-philosophicalexperience
of the world must be presupposedif science is to emerge. This level of
awareness on top of the so-called "natural" standpoint is apriori, but

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32 Klaus Oehler
not in the way assumed by classical transcendentalphilosophy. The
pragmatistswere quick to see that the apriori in its full scope is not
simply identical with the conditions of the possibility of objective
knowledgeof objects, but that this also impliesthat basic understanding
which life has prior to all conceptual determinationof reality. The
foundationof existence occurs within the sphereof this understanding.
It seems to me that on this basic question it is indeed justifiable to
equate the teachingsof Peirce and Heidegger.
It is thus not surprisingthat an importantrole is played in pragmatic
idealism by the interpretationof our implicit understandingof things.
For Peirce this applies not merelyto the critique of words but to trends
of thought. As his paper on "The Fixation of Belief" shows, the
historicaldimensionmust be absorbed within philosophicalmethod. In
Germany this method, following Dilthey and Heidegger, is known as
hermeneutics,but its basic characteristicshave been part of American
philosophicalthinkingfor at least a century. There is even a case to
mode of
be made for maintaining that the historico-hermeneutical
thought has been specific to American philosophicalthinking since its
beginnings. This tendencymay have somethingto do with the uniquely
American synthesisof a varietyof European philosophicaland theological
traditions. It is certain,at any rate, that philosophicalhermeneuticshas
never been a German monopoly,and it can be argued that it is only
thanks to Peirce and other American epistemologiststhat certain
anachronistic figures of thought, carried over from Kantianism into
of language
Germanhermeneuticphilosophy,leadingto the hypostatisation
as the subject of history,have been excised. Language, the structuresof
which are continuallybeing transformedin the course of history,must
also be seen as mediated. It was also Peirce who recognizedthe pressure
exertedby realityon the structureof language: the forceor resistanceof
externalnature, and the force or compulsionof social power structures.
With uncanny insight he describes in "The Fixation of Belief" the
methodsof total dominationin a way that freeshim of any suspicionof
having failed to recognize the objective frameworkwithin which social
behaviour must be understood- or of sublimating it to a politico-*
socially neutrallevel. The American pragmatistswere always well aware
that the objective frameworkon the basis of which alone social action
can be understoodis constituted by language, work and power. The
names of Peirce, James, Dewey and Mead have long since become
symbolsof this knowledgethroughoutthe world. If thereseems to be a

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Notes on Receptionof AmericanPragmatismin Germany,1899-1952 33

need today to bring home to German philosophicalhermeneuticsthat
traditionis not an absolute power, and that the real problemis to make
traditioncomprehensiblewithin the structureof social life, "so that we
can give conditionsoutside traditionaccording to which transcendental
rules governingthe world view and action vary empirically",16then it
only servesas a reminderof how much German philosophicalhermeneutics could long ago have learnt from the American pragmatists. Instead
theirtheorieshave fordecades been ignorantlydefamedas "Americanism".
Justhow stubbornthis prejudice is, and how deeply-rootedin German
thinking,an example will show. In 1966, a conversation took place
betweenMartin Heidegger and the editor of the German weekly magazine, Der Spiegel, Rudolf Augstein. Heidegger requested that the conversationshould not be published during his lifetime. He saw it as an
opportunityto answer criticisms that had been made of his attitude
during the Third Reich and to offeran explanation of his behaviour.
The conversationwas publishedafter his death in 1976 under the title:
"Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten".18 Even in this final statement,
made at the end of a long life, Heidegger was unable to resist denouncing the Americans' "pragmatism",which he identifieswith positivism: "They [the Americans] are still caught up in a type of thinking
that, as pragmatism,promotestechnical operationand manipulation,but
at the same time bars the way to an awarenessof the specificcharacter
of modern technology. There are, nevertheless,here and there in
America attemptsbeing made to break away from pragmatic-positivist
thinking."17When he was in Hamburg in 1967 Heidegger told me that
pragmatismwas nothing but a "Weltanschauung for engineersand not
for human beingsin the full senseof the word". The alignmentof pragmatism with positivismis typical of the superficialview of pragmatism
held by the German middle-class during the first half this century.
Hitler's hatred of "Americanism" was a pervertedform of this Antiamericanism,which he gave vent to in one of his monologuesin 1942 at
the "Fhrerhauptquartier":"I have a hatred and an aversion of the
deepest sort against Americanism. There is not a single European state
with which one feels less sympathy".18
Although a new picture of the philosophyof American pragmatism
has developedamong informedGerman philosopherssince the renaissance
of interestin Peirce, it would be unrealisticto assert that for the mass
of public opinion in Germany and Europe as a whole the word "pragmatism" is free of prejudices. To the average, uninformedmind, it is

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34 Klaus Oehler
today still vaguely associated with the conception, which Heidegger
so clearly but erroneouslyput into words, of somethingthat "promotes
technicaloperationand manipulation,but at the same time bars the way
to an awarenessof the specificcharacterof moderntechnology". Anyone
who knows the historyof American pragmatismfrom Peirce to Dewey
will realisethat just the oppositeis the case.

Universitat
Hamburg

NOTES
* Translator'snote: This is an authorizedtranslationof a text based on Klaus
Oehler'sintroductions
to the Jerusalemtranslationof James'Pragmatism(W. James,
Der Pragmatismo:Ein Neuer Name fur alte Denkmetboden,
Felix Meiner Verlag,
Hamburg 1977) and to his own translationof Peirce's "How to Make Our Ideas
Clear" (Charles S. Peirce,Ueber die KlarbeitunsererGedanken,VittorioKlostermann
Frankfurt
am Main,1968) - JohnStopford,
of Hamburg,OxfordUniversity.
University
1. WilhelmJerusalem,
"Mcinc Wege und Ziclc" in RaymundSchmidted., Die
derGegenwart
in Selbstdarstellungen,
III (Leipzig:Felix MeinerVerlag,1922)
Pbilosopbie
S3-9S.
2. Berichtber den III. Internationalen
Kongressfr Philosophiczu Heidelberg
1. bis 5. September1908, Th. Elsenhansed., (Heidelberg,1909).
3. Ludwig Stein, "Pragmatism"in Archiv fur Gescbicbteder Pbilosopbie,XXI,
1909 (Berlin:Carl HaymannsVerlag).
des
4. GntherJacoby,Der Pragmatismo.Neue Babncnin der Wissenscbaftslebre
AusUnds. Eine Wrdigung(Leipzig: Drr, 1909).
5. Max Scheicr, "Erkenntnis
und Arbeit. Eine Studieber Wert und Grenzende*
Motivs in der Erkenntnisder Welt" in Die Wissens
pragmatischen
formenund die
Gesellscbaft,
(Leipzig: Der Neue-GeistVerlag,1926), 231-486.
6. Gustar Mller,"CharlesPeirce" in Archivfr Gescbicbteder Pbilosopbie,XL,
1931 (Berlin:Carl HermannsVerlag), 227-238. See also E. Waibel,Der Pragmatismo
hi der Gescbicbteder Pbilosopbie(Bonn, 19H)> and Klaus Oehler,"Ein in Vergessenheit
des Deutschen Idealismus:JohannGottlieb Fiehte" in
geratenerZeichen-theoretiker
Zeicbenkonstitution.
Aktendes 2. Semiotiscben
KolloquiumsRegens
burg,A. Lange-Seidl
ed., (Berlin:De Gruyter,1980), pp. 63-75.
7. Cf., Max Horkheimer,"Zum Problem der Vahrheit" (1935) in Kritiscbe
S. Fischer,1968) 228-76 and Zur Kritikder instruTbeorie,I (Frankfurt-am-Main:
mentellen
Vernunft(1947) (Frankfurtam Main: S. Fischer,1967).
8. MartinJay, The DialecticalImagination:A Historyof the FrankfurtSchool
and the Instituteof Social Research1923-1950 (Boston: Little,Brownand Co., 1973).
9. Ibid., p. 289.
10. ArnoldGehlen,Der Menscb. SeineNatur und seineStellungin der Welt (Berlin:
Junkerund Dnnhaupt,1940).

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1899-1952 35
in Germany,
Noteson Receptionof AmericanPragmatism
11. Ibid., pp. 326f.
12. Ibid., p. 18*.
13. JrgcnYon Kempski,CharlesSandersPrircennd der Pragmatismus
(Stuttgart:
Kohlhammer,
1952).
14. MartinHeidegger,Beingand Time, tr. JohnMacquarrieand Edward Robinson
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell,19*2).
in Pb'tlosopbiscbe
If. JrgcnHabermas, "Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften"
Rundschau,Beiheft5, 1967, 179.
16. Der Spiegel,1976, No. 23, pp. 193-219.
17. Ibid., p. 214.
1941-1944. AlbrechtKnauer
18. Adolf Hitler. Monologetm FMbrerbauptquartier,
Vcrlag,Hamburg,1980, tub 7.1. 1942.

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