Cases Used:

Basis of Relief granted by Court; Averments contained in body;

Prayer

the court may determine. its adequacy for allowance of

relief on the basis of the averments contained in the body of
the pleading
may grant relief although there is no prayer because the
prayer is not even considered an essential part of a pleading.
Case/s:
Vda. De Manalo vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 349 SCRA 136.
Barnuevo vs. Fuster, 29 Phil. 600
Certificate of Title; Conclusiveness with respect to ownership of land
Petitioner also argues that the plotting made by NLTDRA was anomalous
because Survey Plan FP-1540, on which private respondents title was based,
could not be located. This argument lacks merit. The law does not require
resorting to a survey plan to prove the true boundaries of a land covered by a
valid certificate of title; the title itself is the conclusive proof of the realtys metes
and bounds. Section 47 of the Land Registration Act, or Act No. 496, provides
that (t)he original certificates in the registration book, any copy thereof duly
certified under the signature of the clerk, or the register of deeds of the province
or city where the land is situated, and the seal of the court, and also the owners
duplicate certificate, shall be received as evidence in all the courts of the
Philippine Islands and shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein
except so far as otherwise provided in this Act. It has been held that a certificate
of title is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described
therein and other matters which can be litigated and decided in land registration
proceedings.
Case/s:
Carvajal vs. CA, 280 SCRA 351[1997]
Constructive Dismissal
There may be constructive dismissal if an act of clear
discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes
so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose
any choice by him except to forego his continued employment.
Case/s:

Hyatt Taxi Services, Inc. vs. Catinoy, 359 SCRA 686, G.R. No. 143204
Escheat
Case/s:
In Re: Estate of Lao Sayco, 21 PHIL 445.
Laches and Prescription; Applicability and Requisites in registered land
In a number of cases, the Court has held that an action to
recover registered land covered by the Torrens System may not be
barred by laches. Laches cannot be set up to resist the
enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right. Laches, which is a
principle based on equity, may not prevail against a specific
provision of law, because equity, which has been defined as justice
outside legality, is applied in the absence of and not against
statutory law or rules of procedure.
In recent cases, however, the court held that while it is true
that a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered
landowner may lose his right to recover possession of his
registered property by reason of laches.
Yet, even if we apply the doctrine of laches to registered
lands, it would still not bar petitioners claim. It should be stressed
that laches is not concerned only with the mere lapse of time. The
following elements must be present in order to constitute laches:
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is
made for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the defendants
conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant
that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his
suit; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.
Case/s:
The Heirs of Anacleto B. Nieto vs. The Municipality of Meycauayan
Bulacan 540 SCRA 100 [1997]

Motion for Reconsideration

1. The subject Motion actually consists of two

motions, a Motion for New Trial and a Motion for
Reconsideration. While the Court agrees that the
Motion for New Trial lacks merit for the reason that
the documents sought to be presented are not newly
discovered evidence, the Court does not agree that
the Motion for Reconsideration is pro forma.
The Court is guided by the rulings in Coquilla v.
Commission on Elections, to wit:
x x x The mere reiteration in a motion
for reconsideration of the issues raised by
the parties and passed upon by the court
does
not
make
a
motion pro
forma; otherwise, the movants remedy would
not be a reconsideration of the decision but a
new trial or some other remedy. But, as we
have held in another case:
Among the ends to which a motion for
reconsideration is addressed, one is precisely
to convince the court that its ruling is
erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or
the evidence; and in doing so, the movant has
to dw ell of necessity upon the issues passed
upon
by
the
court . If
a
motion
for
reconsideration may not discuss these issues, the
consequence would be that after a decision is
rendered, the losing party would be confined to
filing only motions for reopening and new trial.

Indeed, in the cases where a motion for

reconsideration
was
held
to
be pro
forma, the motion was so held because (1)
it was a second motion for reconsideration,
or (2) it did not comply with the rule that
the motion must specify the fi ndings and
conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or
not supported by the evidence, or (3) it

failed to substantiate the alleged errors, or

(4) it merely alleged that the decision in
question was contrary to law, or (5) the
adverse
party
was
not
given
notice
thereof. The 16-page motion for reconsideration
fi led
by
petitioner
in
the
COMELEC en
banc suff ers from none of the foregoing defects,
and it was error for the COMELEC en banc to rule
that petitioners motion for reconsideration
was pro forma because the allegations raised
therein are a mere rehash of his earlier
pleadings or did not raise new matters. Hence,
the fi ling of the motion suspended the running of
the 30-day period to fi le the petition in this
case, which, as earlier shown, was done within
the reglementary period
provided
by
law. (Emphasis supplied)

and in Marina
Appeals, thus:

Properties

Corporation

v.

Court

Under our rules of procedure, a party

adversely aff ected by a decision of a trial court
may move for reconsideration thereof on the
following grounds: (a) the damages awarded
are excessive; (b) the evidence or contrary
to law, making express reference to the
pertinent evidence or legal provisions. It
is settled that although a motion for
reconsideration
may
merely
reiterate
issues already passed upon by the court,
that by itself does not make it pro
forma and is immaterial because what is
essential is compliance with the requisites of
the Rules. xxx.
x x x x
Where the circumstances of a case do
not show an intent on the part of the
pleader to merely delay the proceedings,
and his motion reveals a bona fi de eff ort

of

to
present
additional
matters
or
to
reiterate his arguments in a diff erent
light, the courts should be slow to declare
the
same
outright
as pro
forma. The
doctrine relating to pro forma motions has a
direct bearing upon the movants valuable right
to appeal. It would be in the interest of justice
to accord the appellate court the opportunity to
review the decision of the trial court on the
merits than to abort the appeal by declaring
the motion pro forma, such that the period to
appeal
was
not
interrupted
and
had
consequently lapsed. (Emphasis supplied)
2. Should the questioned interlocutory order be

subject to attack only on one ground, as in the case of

the default declaration herein involved, a motion for
reconsideration against the order complained of would
necessarily and inevitably contain a repetition of the
ground previously alleged. In so doing, the movant is
praying the court to give his motion a second look, in
the hope that the court would realize its supposed
error, correct the same, and thereby preclude the
necessity of seeking relief in a higher tribunal.
3.
It goes without saying, however that every
court has the power and indeed the duty to review and
amend or reverse its findings and decisions when its
attention is timely called to any error or defect therein.
Case/s:

1. PNB VS. PANEDA 515 SCRA 639, 647-649

2. BA Finance Corporation vs. Pineda 119 SCRA 493, 503
3. Luzon Brokerage vs. CA, 176 SCRA 483, 491, as reiterated
in Fernan vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 546, 551
Trademarks; descriptive word can be used as part of a
coined mark
While a descriptive term or phrase may not be registered as a trademark or trade name by
itself, it may be used as part of a coined word or mark, and as a consequence, may lose its

generic or descriptive element. The coined word may then be registered as trademark or
tradename. For instance, the word pas is generic or descriptive and may not, by itself,
be registered as a mark. However, as used to form the coined word Salompas, pas
loses its descriptive property and the resulting coined word can be monopolized and
registered as a trademark.
Case/s:
Marvez Commerical Co. Inc. vs. Petra Hawpia & Co., 18 SCRA 1178 (1966).
Payment of Wages; Who has burden of proving

1. Even the fact that a plaintiff admits that some

payments have been made does not change the burden
of proof. The defendant [employer] still has the burden
of establishing payments beyond those admitted by
plaintiffs.
2.
x x x one who pleads payment has the burden of
proving it. The reason for the rule is that the
pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records,
remittances and other similar documents which
will show that overtime, differentials, service
incentive leave, and other claims of workers
have been paid are not in the possession of the
worker but in the custody and absolute control
of the employer. Thus, the burden of showing
with legal certainty that the obligation has
been discharged with payment falls on the
debtor, in accordance with the rule that one who
pleads payment has the burden of proving it. x x x1

Case/s:
1. Jimenez et al., vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 116960, April 2,
1996.
2. Dansart Security Force & Allied Services Company vs. Bagoy, 622
SCRA 694, G.R. No. 168495, July 2, 2010
Possession; Recovery
The action to recover property pertains to the owner of the thing, and he
may proceed not only against the person in actual possession but against
1

Dansart Security Force & Allied Services Company vs. Bagoy, 622 SCRA 694, G.R. No. 168495, July 2,
2010.

anyone unlawfully detaining it. The possessor has the presumption of title in his
favor, but if the plaintiff can prove his title as owner and establish the identity of
the property claimed as his, he will be entitled to recover the property, even if the
possession seems legalized by a conveyance.
Case/s:
Mendoza vs. Fulgencio, 8 PHIL. 243; Cleto vs. Salvador, 11 PHIL. 416; Vargas
vs. Egamino, 12 PHIL. 56; Samson vs. Salvilla, 12 Phil. 497; Peres vs. Cortes,
15 PHIL. 211; Salacup vs. Rambac, 17 PHIL. 21; Cid vs. Peralta, 24 PHIL. 142
Presumption of Death
Both provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intended as
a substitute for facts and so are not to be available when there are facts.
With particular reference to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation
which it presents is one in which the facts are not only unknown but
unknowable. By hypothesis, there is no specific evidence as to the time of
death . . . ." . . . it is assumed that no evidence can be produced. . . . Since
the facts are unknown and unknowable, the law may apply the law of
fairness appropriate to the different legal situation that arises." (IX
Wigmore on Evidence, 1940 ed., 483.)
In In re Wallace's Estate, 220 Pac. 683, which the Court of Appeals
cited the applied with the respect to the deaths of the Navarro girls,
pointing out that "our rule is taken from the Fourth Division of Sec. 1936
of the California Code of Civil Procedure," the Supreme Court of
California said:
When the statute speaks of "particular
circumstances from which it can be inferred"
that one died before the other it means that
there are circumstances from which the fact of
death by one before the other may be inferred
as a relation conclusion from the facts proven.
The statute does not mean circumstances
which would show, or which would tend to
show, probably that one died before the other.
Grand Lodge A.O.W.W. vs. Miller, 8 Cal. App. 28,
96 Pac. 22. When by circumstantial evidence
alone, a party seeks to prove a survivorship
contrary to the statutory presumption, the
circumstances by which it is sought to prove
the survivorship must be such as are
competent and sufficient when tested by the
general rules of evidence in civil cases. The
inference of survivorship cannot rest

upon mere surmise, speculation, or

conjecture.
As
was
said
in
Grand
Lodge vs. Miller, supra, "if the matter is left to
probably, then the statute of the presumption."
(emphasis ours)
It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and
of that of the foregoing decision that the evidence of the survivorship need
not be direct; it may be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where there
are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be
made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of
evidence controls.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro

died before her son is based purely on surmises, speculations, or
conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. The opposite
theory that the mother outlived her son is deduced from established
facts which, weighed by common experience, engender the inference as a
very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of
evidence by, which civil cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail.
It can not be defeated as in an instance, cited by Lord Chief Justice
Kenyon, "bordering on the ridiculous, where in an action on the game
laws it was suggested that the gun with which the defendant fired was not
charged with shot, but that the bird might have died in consequence of the
fight." (1 Moore on Facts, 63, citing Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R. 468.)
Case/s:
Joaquin vs. Navarro (93 PHIL 257)
Trademarks; descriptive word can be used as part of a composite mark
1. A composite mark is a mark consisting of two or more elements or a
combination of words, phrases or words and designs or symbols or color schemes. In
determining whether a composite mark may be monopolized and registered as a
trademark or trade name, the component elements are not to be considered as separate
and apart; the design or mark as a whole, the combination of all elements, must be looked
into. For the commercial impression of a trade name is derived from it as a whole, not
from its elements, separate and considered in detail. If the composite mark as a whole
serves the function of the office of a trademark, then it may be monopolized or registered
as a trademark, even though one or more components thereof may not, be themselves, be
validly appropriated as such because they are generic or descriptive of the goods.
2. The generally accepted rule that a symbol or figure which represents something
in universal use by the public generally or by a particular class of people may not be

exclusively be appropriated as a trademark is not absolute. The rule is generally

applicable only when the symbol or figure is used by itself. However, it the symbol or
figure is used in combination with other distinguishing elements, the design as a whole
may be exclusively appropriated and registered as a trademark.
Case/s:
1. Inchausti & Co. vs. Song Fo & Co., 21 PHIL. 272 (1912); Ong Ai Gui v. Director of
Patents, 96 PHIL. 673.
2. Forbes, Munn & Co. vs. Ang San To, 40 PHIL. 272 (1919).