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Abstract
The proximal causes of a significant percentage of oil and gas
industry accidents relate to human error and unsafe behaviour
at the worksite. In order to maximize safe behaviours and
reduce unsafe behaviours, supervisors and managers need to
understand the factors influencing them before introducing
behavioural safety interventions. This paper argues that the
same level of scientific expertise should be applied to the
diagnosis, design and evaluation of behavioural safety
interventions as is devoted to engineering interventions.
Introduction
The oil and gas industry is at the forefront of modern
engineering technology and practice. This success is founded
on well established, scientific processes which are used to
establish the causes of technical failures by gathering
diagnostic data, to design and test interventions, and then to
evaluate whether they were fit for purpose. It would be
inconceivable for an oil company to ask a psychologist to
design a pipe connector or to diagnose a generator failure.
Qualified specialists with relevant knowledge and skills are
used for these tasks. This paper argues that the same level of
scientific expertise should be applied to the diagnosis, design
and evaluation of behavioural safety interventions.
In recent years, the oil and gas industry has realised that
they need to address the behavioural basis of safety, as well as
technological and procedural solutions (1),. They tend to refer
to this as Human Factors or Behavioural-Based Safety. The
term 'safety behaviour intervention' is used here to mean any
intervention designed to enhance safety by changing human
behaviour. This would cover safety observation and
reinforcement programmes, as well as various kinds of safety
training, coaching, role modelling etc. If we look at the
introduction of behaviour-based safety interventions, are they
based on the same level of attention to scientific knowledge as
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Evaluation
The final step in the process is to determine whether or not the
safety intervention has met the stated objectives. (17)
evaluation hierarchy which assesses effects in terms of
knowledge, attitudes, behaviours and organisational indicators,
is often used for this purpose (see for example, (18)). If a
behavioural safety intervention is to be properly evaluated,
then baseline data should be collected prior to its introduction.
This pre-testing can show levels of knowledge, attitude,
behaviour, and organisational outcomes (eg safety records)
before the safety intervention is launched. These data should
be collected again after the intervention to determine whether
any change has occurred. Another evaluation design involves
setting up a matched control group who do not receive the
intervention and their subsequent performance can be
compared with the test group. Evaluation data should be
collected not just immediately after the intervention but also 612 months later. What is important is whether behaviour
change is sustained and is being supported at the worksite.
Safety climate surveys can also be used to track whether
cultural change through the organisation is being achieved.
Continued analyses of accident and near miss data can also
indicate whether the desired behaviour change is occurring or
the problem behaviours are still in evidence.
Postscript
Human behaviour is influenced by a wide range of external
and internal factors. Silver bullet interventions for changing
safety behaviour do not exist in psychology any more than
they do in engineering. Simple behavioural safety solutions
which are claimed to fix a company's safety problems will
have been designed by someone who does not understand the
complexity of human behaviour or of organizational life.
References
(1) OGP (2001) Human Factors. London: International Association
of Oil and Gas Producers.
(2) Kirwan, B. & Ainsworth. P. (1992) Introduction to Task
Analysis. London: Taylor and Francis.
(3) Seamster, T., Redding, R. & Kaempf, G. (1997) Applied
Cognitive Task Analysis in Aviation. Aldershot: Ashgate.
(4) Swezey, R., Owens, J. Bergendy, M. & Salas, E. (1998) Task and
training requirements methodology. Ergonomics, 41, 16781697.
(5) Mearns, K., Whitaker, S. & Flin, R. (2001) Benchmarking safety
climate in hazardous environmenst. Risk Analysis, 21, 771-786.
(6) Flin, R., Mearns, K., O'Connor, P. & Bryden, R. (2000) Safety
climte: Identifying the common features. Safety Science, 34,
177-192.
(7) Strauch, B. (2001) Investigating Human Error. Incidents,
Accidents and Complex Systems. Aldershot: Ashgate.
(8) Gordon, R., Flin, R. & Mearns, K. (2001) Collecting human
factors data from accidents and incidents. SPE Production and
Facilities, May, 73-83.
(9) Hancock, P. & De Ridden, S. (2002) Behavioural accident
Appendix 1
Relevant scientific journals human behaviour and safety.
Accident Analysis and Prevention
Ergonomics
Human Factors
Human Factors and Aerospace Safety
International Journal of Aviation Psychology
Journal of Applied Psychology
Journal of Safety Research
Quality and Safety in Healthcare
Safety Science
Work and Stress
SPE 86624
Organisational climate
Diagnostic
Research
Design Safety
Intervention
Accident
analysis
Organisational climate
Analysis of
safe perfmance
Implement and
Evaluate
Positive loop
Refine
Near-miss or
accident
Negative loop