EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS

1 People v Cayat
Facts/Issue: Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain
Province, and a member of the non-Christian tribes, was found guilty of
violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for having acquired and
possessed one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, which is not a
native wine. The law made it unlawful for any native of the Philippines who
is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy,
receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine
or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines
and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to
prior to the passage of the law. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act
1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the equal
protection of the laws, violates due process clause, and is an improper
exercise of police power.

The prohibition enshrined in Act 1397 is designed to insure peace and order
in and among non-Christian tribes. It applies equally to all members of the
class evident from perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation
against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of
culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.

2 Tolentino v Board of Accountancy

HILARION C. TOLENTINO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY, ROBERT ORR FERGUSON and HANS
HAUSAMANN, defendants-appellees.
Quijano, Rosete & Tizon for plaintiff-appellant.
Perkins, Ponce Enrile, Contreras and Claro M. Recto for defendant-appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Held: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of

the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classification. (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must
be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same
class.

This is an action for declaratory relief filed by plaintiff in the Court of First
Instance of Manila for the purpose of testing the constitutionality of section
16-A of Commonwealth Act No. 3105, otherwise known as the Philippine
Accountancy Law, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 342. The ground
advanced for the claim of unconstitutionality is that "it is a class legislation
since by its terms it excludes persons engaged in other callings or
professions from adopting, acquiring or using a trade name in connection
with the practice of such callings or professions."

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or
substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical distinctions. It is not based
upon accident of birth or parentage, as counsel for the appellant asserts,
but upon the degree of civilization and culture. The term non-Christian
tribes refers, not to religious belief but in a way, to the geographical area
and more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled
communities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindora, supra.) This distinction
is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar
conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.

The action is addressed against the Board of Accountancy, Robert Orr

Ferguson, and Hans Hausamann and notice thereof has been served on the
Solicitor General under section 4 of rule 66 of the Rules of Court; but the
Board of Accountancy did not answer the complaint, nor has the Solicitor
General intervened. Only Ferguson and Hausamann appeared and
answered through counsel. Attorney Claro M. Recto was allowed to
intervene asamicus curiae. The case was submitted for judgment on the
pleadings. After the parties had submitted their memoranda, the court
dismissed the complaint holding that the disputed law does not offend
against the constitution. From that decision the plaintiff appealed to this
Court.

As the facts are not disputed, and the case was submitted on the
pleadings, we are quoting hereunder the facts as found by the lower court
in its decision.
The complaint alleges that the plaintiff is a Filipino citizen and a
certified public accountant duly admitted to the practice of
accountancy as per certificate No. 1224 issued on March 16, 1948;
that the Board of Accountancy is an administrative body created by
law and vested with the power and authority to regulate and
supervise the practice of the profession of accountancy in the
Philippines, and that the defendants Robert Orr Ferguson and Hans
Hausamann are foreigners, the former being a British subject and
the latter a Swiss subject, both admitted to the practice of
accountancy in the Philippines; that said two defendants have been
and are practicing their profession as certified public accountants
under the trade name "Fleming and Williamson"; and that Section
16-A of Act No. 3105 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 342,
authorizing accountants to practice their profession under a trade
name, is unconstitutional on the ground that it excludes persons
engaged in other callings and professions from adopting or
acquiring or using a trade name.
In their answer the defendant Robert Orr Ferguson and Hans
Hausamann practically admitted the foregoing allegations of the
complaint. Said defendants allege that Commonwealth Act No. 342
amending Act No. 3105, authorizing the use of a trade name in the
practice of the profession of accountancy is not a class legislation,
nor does it violate the provision of the Constitution with respect to
equal protection of the laws; that the plaintiff has no right or
interest adversely affected by said law and that he is entitled to the
benefits thereof and may use a trade or name firm name in the
practice of his profession as accountant.
Upon leave the court Atty. Claro M. Recto appeared as amicus
curiae supporting the validity or constitutionality of the provision of
law questioned by the plaintiff.
The parties are agreed as to the material facts alleged in the
pleadings. They are also agreed that the firm name "Fleming and
WIlliamson" is an old trade name of accountants which was used
originally in 1952 by Messrs. D.M. Flemung and J. Williamson. The
right to use this firm name was sold to various parties until the end

it was acquired at the defendants Robert Orr Ferguson and Hans

Hausamann in 1946. on June 10, 1946, defendants Robert Orr
Ferguson and Hans Hausamann formed a co-partnership styled
"Ferguson and Hausamann" doing business under the trade name
"Fleming and Williamson". The articles of co-partnership were
presented for registration in the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the same date. On June 13, 1936, this trade name
"Fleming and Williamson" was registered in the Bureau of
Commerce in accordance with Act No. 3883, as amended by Act
No. 4147, as the firm name of the partnership "Ferguson and
Hausamann," under which the said defendants would practice their
profession as certified public accountants in the Philippines.
On September 17, 1948, the partnership of "Ferguson and
Hausamann" applied for the renewal of the registration of "Fleming
and Williamson" as their trade name in accordance with the
provisions of Act No. 3883, as amended by Act No. 4147, and on
the same date said trade name or business name was so
registered.1wphl.nt
The defendant Board of Accountancy did not appear or answer
notwithstanding service of summons upon it and the upon the
Solicitor General. By agreement of the parties, the case was
submitted for decision upon the pleadings presented and the
memoranda filed by the parties.
We believe that the issues involved in the present case may be boiled down
as follows: (1) whether or not the plaintiff has sufficient cause of action to
question the constitutionality of Commonwealth act No. 342; and (2)
whether or not said Act is constitutional.
1. Plaintiff brought this action for the purpose of testing the
constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 342 because, according to the
complaint, it constitutes class legislation for "by its term it excludes
persons engaged in other callings or professions from adopting, acquiring
or using a trade name in connection with such calling or profession." His
main objection centers on the exclusive character of the law which extends
its benefits only to those engaged in the profession of accountancy. It is
obvious that he seeks the declaratory relief not for his own personal
benefit, or because his rights or prerogatives as an accountant, or as an
individual, are adversely affected, but rather for the benefit of persons
belonging to other professions or callings, who are not parties to this case.

He does not claim having suffered any prejudice or damage to him or to his
rights or prerogatives as an accountant by the use of the disputed name by
the defendants. His complaint is rather addressed against the propriety of
the use of said trade name by the defendants because it is misleading and
is liable to defraud the public. Plaintiff, therefore, has no actual justiciable
controversy against the herein defendants which may give him the right to
secure relief by asserting the unconstitutionality of the law in question. This
case, therefore, does not properly come under rule 66 of the Rules of Court
which authorizes the institution of an action for declaratory relief.
The authorities are unanimous that in order that an action for declaratory
relief may be entertained, it must be predicated on the following requisite
facts or conditions: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the
party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial
determination. These requisite facts are wanting and, therefore, the
complaint must fail for lack of sufficient cause of action.
Justiciability; its requisites. Except that accomplished physical
wrong need not be alleged in a petition for declaratory relief, a case
of such nature must exhibit all the usual conditions of an ordinary
action. There must be (1) real parties in interest (2) asserting
adverse claims and (3) presenting a ripe issue. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania summarized its exhaustive opinion on the
requisites of justiciability of an action for declaratory relief by
saying that the court must be "satisfied that an actual controversy,
or the ripening seeds of one, exists between parties, all of whom
are sui juris and before the court, and that the declaration sought
will be a practical help in ending the controversy." Justice Brandeis
thought that "the fact that the plaintiff's desires are thwarted by its
own doubts, or by the fears of others does not confer a cause of
action." But the doubt becomes a justiciable controversy when it is
translated into a claim of right which is actually contested. (Moran's
Comm. on the Rules of Court, vol. II, pp. 131-132, 3rd Ed.).
Granting for the sake of argument that plaintiff has established the
requisite facts to entitle him to claim for declaratory relief, we are,
however, of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 342 does not offend
against the equal protection clause of our Constitution on the ground of
class legislation, for the reason that said Act applies alike to all persons
pursuing the same calling or profession under the same conditions or

requirements. Said Acts gives the right or affords the same privileges to all
accountants without distinction or discrimination. This benefit is extended
to the defendants as well as to the plaintiff. The only requirement is that
they should comply with the provisions of Act No. 3883 as to the procedure
to be followed relative to the use of the chosen trade name. So long as the
law applies to all alike, the requirements of equal protection are met.
(Louisiana ex rel. Francis vs, Reswober, 329 U.S. 559). The discriminations
which are open to objections are those in which persons engaged in the
same business are subjected to different privileges under the same
conditions. (Soon Hing vs. Crowley, 113 U.S., 703). The authorities on this
point are numerous but for our purpose it is sufficient to quote some which
are deemed representative.
It is a general rule that legislation which affects alike all persons
pursuing the same business under the same conditions is not such
class legislation as is prohibited by constitutional provisions. The
discrimination which are open to objection are those in which
persons engaged in the same business are subjected to different
restrictions or are held entitled to different privileges under the
same conditions. Part of the liberty of a citizen consists in the
enjoyment, upon terms of equality with all others in similar
circumstances, of the privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling or
trade and of acquiring, holding, and selling property. The
constitutional guaranty as to the equal protection of the laws,
moreover, requires that no impediment should be interposed to the
pursuits of anyone except as applied to the same pursuits by others
under similar circumstances and that no greater burdens in
engaging in a calling should be laid upon one than are laid upon
others in the same calling and condition. (12 Am. Jur., 187.).
The general rule is well settled that legislation which, in carrying
out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the
sphere of its operation its affects all persons similarly situated, is
not within the prohibition of the 14th Amendment. The mere fact
that legislation is based on a classification and is made to apply
only to a certain limited group of persons, and not to others, does
not affect its validity, if it is so made that all persons subject to its
terms are treats alike under similar circumstances and conditions.
(12 A. Jur., 143.)
The legislature may classify professions, occupations, and business,
according to natural and reasonable lines of distinction, and if a

statute affects like all persons of the same class it is not invalid as
class legislation; . . . (16 C.J. S., 966.)
Classification of businesses, occupations, and callings may be
made according to natural, reasonable, and well-organized lines of
distinction, and the mere fact that a statute or ordinance applies
only to a particular position or profession, or to a particular trade
occupation, or business, or discriminates between persons in
different classes of occupations or lines or business, does not
renders it unconstitutional as class legislation, and such statutes
are valid whenever the partial application or discrimination is based
on real and reasonable distinctions existing in the subject matter,
and affects alike all persons of the same class or pursuing the same
business under the same conditions; . . . (16 C.J.S., 967.)
It is not true that Commonwealth Act. No. 342 precludes practitioners of
other professions, occupations or calling from using a trade name in
connection with the practice of their professions, occupation or calling.
While said Act does not mention other professions, occupations or calling, it
does not mean that they are precluded from using a trade name as this
privilege is likewise given to them in other similar laws. We may mention
Commonwealth Act No. 294 for mechanical engineers, Republic Act No. 318
for chemical engineers, and even the corporation law as regards corporate
names (Tolentino's Commentaries on Commercial Laws, vol. II, p. 753).
Assuming that Commonwealth act No. 342 grants to accountants a
privilege not accorded to members of other professions or callings, that
alone would not render the Act discriminatory or violative of the equal
protection clause of the constitution, for that clause only means "that no
person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws
which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in
like circumstances". (Missouri vs. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31.) And the
Legislature may classify professions, occupations, and business according
to natural and reasonable lines of distinction, and if a statute affects like all
persons of the same class it is not invalid as a class legislation." (16 C.J.S.,
966).
The claim that Commonwealth Act No. 342 is discriminatory because it was
approved only to protect foreign accountants has no basis in law or in fact,
for there is nothing that bears it out. Said Act applies to all accountants in
general without distinction.

The claim that said Act contravenes the principle of separation of powers is
likewise untenable. The Act does not encroach upon the powers of the
Executive Department as represented by the Board of Accountancy simply
because it attempts to regulate the profession of accountants. If our
legislature can create the Board of Accountancy, it can certainly amend the
law that gave life to it without in any way encrouching on the prerogatives
of the Executive Department of our government.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed with costs against the
appellants.

3 Ichong v Hernandez
4 Tan Ty v Land Tenure Administration
TAN TY, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION (defunct) now LAND AUTHORITY,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents-appellees.
Melencio Fortuno for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor
General Antonio A. Torres, Solicitor Raul I. Goco and Special Attorney
Magno B. Pablo for respondents-appellees.
, J.:
The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in Civil Case No.
68028), is appealed to this Court by Tan Ty, a Chinese citizen, raising the
issue of the qualification of a non-Filipino citizen to lease land previously
expropriated by the Government for resale to its bona fide tenants and
occupants and to other qualified persons, under the provisions of Republic
Act 1162, as amended by Republic Act 1599.
The case arose from the denial by the Land Tenure Administration (now
replaced by Land Authority) of the application of Tan Ty, a Chinese, to lease
four lots (Nos. 19, 20, 21, and 24, Block No. 3) of the Fable Estate in Paco,
Manila, which was purchased by the government in 1955 to be subdivided

into small lots for resale to its bona fide tenants and occupants and to
other persons. The denial of the aforementioned application was based on
the fact that, although applicant Tan Ty was able to establish that she was
the tenant of the lots applied for even prior to the governments acquisition
of the Estate, her application to lease the same was filed with the Land
Tenure Administration only on 21 October 1957, or after the said lots had
been allocated to other parties.1 Tan Tys claim to priority in the lease of
the lots was also rejected, for the reason that under the law, the privilege
to lease lands expropriated by the government for resale may be availed of
only by tenants or occupants qualified to purchase, but who are not
financially capable at the start of purchasing at cost the lot or lots occupied
by them. And applicant Tan Ty is not such tenant or occupant qualified to
buy the land.
On appeal by the applicant, the President, through the Assistant Executive
Secretary, affirmed the ruling of the Land Tenure Administration. It was held
that although the applicant may not be considered disqualified by the fact
of her Chinese citizenship, the legal prohibition against alien acquisition of
real property being directed against the purchase thereof and not to a mere
leasing of the same, Tan Tys application had to be denied because it is filed
after the lots applied for had been allocated to other applicants. Besides,
the decision stated, investigation disclosed that applicant Tan Ty was not an
occupant of the area applied for, in fact, no construction existed thereon.
The applicant was staying in a building adjacent to the lots in question, and
originally owned by her but which she later sold to Roxas Chua de Ayala.
When her motion for reconsideration of the Presidents decision was
denied, Tan Ty instituted certiorari proceeding in the Court of First Instance
of Manila (Civil Case No. 68028), charging the Land Tenure Administration
(whose functions were taken over by the Land Authority) of having
committed grave abuse of discretion in allocating Lots Nos. 19, 20, 21, and
24 of Block 3 of the Fable Estate to other persons, thus depriving petitioner
of her property rights thereto without due process of law. After the
respondents Land Authority and Executive Secretary had filed their
answers, and the parties their respective memoranda, the case was
submitted for judgment on the pleadings.
In its decision of 5 July 1967, the court ruled that petitioner, being a
Chinese and therefore disqualified to purchase the disputed lots, is equally
without qualification to lease the same, the right to lease, under the law,
arising merely from the applicants right to purchase. Her claim that she
was deprived of the right to equal protection of the law was, likewise,
overruled. The court declared that the equal protection clause is not

without limitations; that there are rights that the law reserves only to
Filipino citizens, such as the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office,
to operate public services and others. The right to own lands is one of
them. The applicant moved to reconsider this decision, and when it was
denied, she interposed the present appeal.
The lower court could not have ruled otherwise. Admittedly, appellant is not
qualified to purchase the land involved in the case on account of her
Chinese citizenship. She insists, however, that as a bona fide tenant
thereof, she is entitled to lease the property, citing in support of her
allegation Section 3 of Republic Act 1162, 2 as amended by Republic Act
1599, which provides -.
SEC. 3. The landed estates or haciendas expropriated by virtue of this Act
shall be subdivided into small lots, none of which shall exceed one hundred
and fifty square meters in area, to be sold at cost to the tenants, or
occupants, of said lots, and to other individuals, in the order mentioned;
Provided, That if the tenant of any given lot is not able to purchase said lot,
he shall be given a lease from month to month of said lot until such time
that he is able to purchase the same; Provided, further, That in the event of
lease, the rentals that may be charged by the Government shall not exceed
eight per cent per annum of the assessed valuation of the property leased.
The legal provisions abovequoted is too clear to cause any confusion or
diverging interpretations. The pervading aim of the law, which properly
should guide the construction to be placed on any of its provisions, is for
the State to provide home lots to its citizens, to enable them to own at
least the land on which their houses are built. Hence, the mandate to the
Administration to acquire landed estates, break them up into small lots not
exceeding 150 square meters in area, for resale at cost to the tenants or
occupants thereof, not to other persons. And if a tenant is in no position to
buy the lot he is occupying at the time of its acquisition by the government,
the law even grants him the privilege to lease the same from the
government on monthly basis, until such time that he is able to purchase
the same. No other conclusion can be derived from the provision than that
the lease mentioned therein can be availed of only by one who is qualified,
but is in no financial position for the present to buy the land. It certainly
would not justify the lease of the lots to non-Philippine citizens,
notwithstanding the fact that they may have really been the tenants
thereon even prior to the acquisition of the expropriated property by the
government. To extend to these aliens the benefit of the first proviso of
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 1162 above-quoted, not withstanding their

permanent disability to acquire title to land under the Constitution, would

result in their acquiring possession in perpetuity. This is not only
incompatible with the essential temporary nature in law of a contract of
lease, but, in effect, would be a violation of the Constitutional inhibition. For
a perpetual lease of land would be practically an alienation thereof.
Appellant asks whether the provision as thus construed would not
constitute a deprivation of appellants right to property without due process
of law, or amount to a denial to appellant, a resident of the Philippines, of
the equal protection guarantee of the Constitution.
It must be remembered in this connection that the fact alone that the law
withdraws from non-Filipinos the enjoyment of certain rights exclusively
reserved to Philippine citizens does not expose such law to charges of
constitutional infirmity. For classification will constitute no violation of the
individuals right to equal protection as long as it is not unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious. The established and recognized principle is that
classification is not unreasonable where it is based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences, is germane to the aim and purpose
of the law, is not limited to existing conditions, and it applies equally to all
members of the same class, under similar conditions.3 A legislation that
affects a particular class would not infringe the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the laws, provided said statute applies uniformly and
without discrimination to everyone of that class.4 In this case, a
classification based on citizenship is more than justified. The requirement
that lots in an expropriated estate shall be leased only to those who are
qualified in law to buy the same can hardly be considered unreasonable.
Republic Act 1162 was not enacted to allow the government to go into the
real estate business, by leasing lots to those who desire and can afford to
rent. It is rather aimed at giving realization and meaning to the policy of
the State to provide land for the landless citizens and enabling them to
acquire home-lots at minimum cost. Clearly, the measure of
reasonableness is reached.
Neither can it be seriously contended that by the governments denial of
appellants application to lease the lots, and their allocation in favor of
other persons, appellant was deprived of property rights without due
process. It was said, not inappropriately, that due process, as a
constitutional mandate, is based on reasons.5 No irrationality can be said
to characterize the denial of appellants application. Her occupancy of the
lots as a tenant of the previous owner on a month-to-month basis did not
confer upon her any vested right on the property leased that the new

owner was bound to respect. And nothing appears on the record that the
government, in exercising the right of eminent domain, had agreed to
respect any existing contract in favor of tenants like the appellant.
While appellant may have introduced improvements on the lot leased, by
so doing despite absence of a fixed term, the lessee took the risk of not
being able to recoup the value of said improvements before being
compelled to vacate. For this mischance, the lessee is solely responsible.
The law is clear that at the expiration of the lease the lessor is not
compellable to acquire the improvements made by the lessee (Civil Case *
of the Philippines, Article 1678).
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision of the court below, the same
is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

5 Universal Corn and Products v Rice and Corn Board

UNIVERSAL CORN PRODUCTS, INC., ET AL., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
RICE AND CORN BOARD, ET AL., respondents appellees.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz, Nazareno and Associates for petitionersappellants.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellees.
FERNANDO, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of Judge Guillermo Torres of Pasig, Rizal dated
August 6, 1962, dismissing an amended petition for declaratory relief
seeking a judicial declaration of illegality of the construction placed by
respondent Rice and Corn Board of its Resolution No.10 in connection with
Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act No. 108. What was sought, without
success, was a ruling that petitioner Universal Corn Products, Inc. could
retain its co-petitioners, all aliens, in its employ, contending that a
dismissal from employment on the strength of the aforesaid construction
by respondents would be to give it a retroactive, and under the
circumstances, an unconstitutional effect.1wph1.t
The amended petition of February 8, 1961 after the averments as to the
petitioners and respondents alleged that pursuant to the power vested in

respondent Rice and Corn Board by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 3018,
Resolution No.10 was promulgated dated November 21, 1960, a particular
regulation of which specifically provides: "No person who is not a citizen of
the Philippines shall be employed in any capacity in any Filipino-owned
establishment engaged in any of the lines of activity in the rice and/or corn
industry except technical personnel whose employment may be authorized
by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Rice and
Corn Board."1 Then came a paragraph that petitioner Universal Corn
Products, Inc. "is a corporation the capital stock of which is wholly owned
by citizens of the Philippines and is engaged in certain lines of activity
covered by Republic Act No. 3018 and Resolution No.10 of the Rice and
Corn Board."2 It was then stated that all its employees numbering over 200
are Filipinos, with the exception of co-petitioners, then holding the positions
of executive vice-president, comptroller, sales manager, chief
warehouseman, assistant plant superintendent, cashier, and sales
supervisor,3 and that such alien employees "have been with the Universal
Corn Products, Inc. long before the enactment into law of Republic Act No.
3018 and the promulgation of Resolution No.10 of the Rice and Corn
Board."4 The next two paragraphs would impugn the construction placed on
Resolution No.10 for its retroactivity insofar as it would be made to apply to
the alien petitioners with the result that their dismissal would be called for
and for its unconstitutionality insofar as such individuals and other persons
similarly situated would be deprived of their means of livelihood without
due process of law and would be denied the equal protection of the law.
The amended petition next stressed the propriety of a judicial declaration
as to the interpretation that must be placed on the aforesaid Resolution
No.10 and Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act No. 108 to avoid the taint of
retroactivity and unconstitutionality.5
Respondents, the National Rice and Corn Board and its chairman as well as
members, in their answer of March 9, 1961, in effect admitted the
allegations of the petition but denied the legal conclusion asserted by
petitioners to flow therefrom.6 More specifically, they disputed the alleged
retroactive character of the construction, the truth according to them being
that regardless of the date of employment, "upon the passage of Republic
Act No. 3018 and the regulation in question," which is a mere reproduction
of Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act No. 108 as amended by Republic Act
No. 134 "employment of aliens in the regulated industry has become
unlawful and contracts of employment entered prior to the passage of
Republic Act No. 3018 have become legally impossible of performance . . .
"Respondents likewise denied the allegation of unconstitutionality on due
process and equal protection grounds, the statute being a valid measure
under the police power of the state . . .7 There were likewise allegations as

to the impropriety of the action for declaratory relief and the absence of a
cause of action.8 After invoking special defenses centered mainly on the
validity under American constitutional law doctrines of the action taken by
respondents, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the petition, with
costs, which, as above pointed out, was granted by the lower court in the
decision, now the subject of this appeal.
The decision must be affirmed. There is no valid ground for reversal. The
contention that the interpretation by respondents of Resolution No.10 and
Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act No. 108 suffers from the vice of
retroactivity or afflicted with the taint of unconstitutionality is far from
persuasive.
On the question of the retroactivity of the construction placed by
respondent Rice and Corn Board on its Resolution No. 10 in connection with
Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act No. 108, it is undeniable of course that if
such be the case petitioners could successfully impugn the appealed
decision. For as early as 1913, this Court with Justice Moreland
as ponente announced: "It is a rule of statutory construction that all
statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless
the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective
effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language
used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the
retrospective effect. The cases supporting this rule are almost without
number."9 Subsequently in 1925, this Court through Justice Malcolm
reiterated the doctrine. Thus: "A sound canon of statutory construction is
that a statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless
the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express
terms of the statute or by necessary implication. Following the lead of the
United States Supreme Court and putting the rule more strongly, a statute
ought not to receive a construction making it act retroactively, unless the
words are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be
annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be
otherwise satisfied. No court will hold a statute to be retroactive when the
legislature has not said so." 10 That is still the rule; it has stood the test of
time. 11
It suffices to refer to the pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 3018 to
show that the imputation of retroactivity lacks support in law. The act was
approved on August 2, 1960 and made to take effect on January 1, 1961,
except as to certain provisions specifically designated. More precisely, with
reference to rules and regulations, it is provided that they could be issued

by the Rice and Corn Board within thirty (30) days from the date of
approval, namely, August 2, 1960; such rules and regulations which may be
necessary to carry out its provision shall take effect fifteen (15) days after
their publication in a newspaper of general circulation printed in
Manila. 12 Barely two months ago, where it was shown that the collection of
interest on a deficiency income tax assessment dated only from the
effectivity of the applicable Republic Act, such deficiency income taxes in
question having been assessed and unpaid before such a date, this Court,
speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, sustained the Court of Tax Appeals in
its holding "that said Section 51 (d), as amended, is not being applied
retroactively as contended by petitioner herein." 13 To the same effect is
this citation from Salcedo and Ignacio v. Carpio: 14 "We are sorry to say that
this contention is not correct. To apply the provision of Republic Act No. 546
to the petitioners is not to apply it retrospectively, because to do so is to
make said Act merely effective, not before, but after the date it was
approved or became effective, and it will affect their continuance in office,
not before, but after the approval of Republic Act No. 546. The fact that
they have been appointed prior thereto does not make said Act of
retroactive effect."
Two recent decisions speak similarly, People v. Yu Bao 15 and People v. Ong
Tin. 16 According to the former: "Lastly, appellant would have us declare the
penal provisions of Republic Act No. 1180 in the nature of an ex post
facto law and, therefore, unconstitutional, if applied to his case, upon the
argument that although he was not yet engaged in the retail business on
May 15, 1954, he was issued a license to engage therein and had entered
the retail business on May 22, 1954, prior to the approval of the Act on June
19, 1954; and yet his having so engaged, although legal at its inception has
been penalized and made criminal by the law. We also find this argument
unattainable. An ex post facto law is one that "makes an act done before
the passage of a law, innocent when done, criminal and punish(es) such act
. . . " (Mekin v. Wolfe, 2 Phil. 74). Applied to appellant's case, Republic Act
No. 1180 does not penalize this alien appellant for having engaged in the
retail business prior to its approval; what the law penalizes is his having
done so thereafter." According to the latter: "The next issue raised by
defense counsel refers to the proposition that even assuming that Republic
Act No. 1180 is constitutional, yet the same does not apply to the accused
inasmuch as he has obtained his permit and license to engage in the retail
trade before said law was approved and before it became effective. We find
no merit in this contention because the acts constituting the crime for
which appellant has been convicted in the case at bar were all
executed after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 1180, and by no means

can We consider appellant's conviction as the result of the application to

him of an ex post facto law."
Petitioners are vocal in their fears that to construe Resolution No.10 in
connection with Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act No. 108 as to require the
dismissal of alien personnel would be to run the risk of an unconstitutional
interpretation. Such doubts and misgivings are unjustified. A recent
decision of this Court, King v. Hernaez, 17 of far-reaching significance, ought
to have stilled such misplaced apprehension. Thus: "It is hard to see how
the nationalization of employment in the Philippines can run counter to any
provision of our Constitution considering that its aim is not exactly to
deprive a citizen of a right that he may exercise under it but rather to
promote, enhance and protect those that are expressly accorded to a
citizen such as the right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. The
nationalization of an economic measure when founded on grounds of public
policy cannot be branded as unjust, arbitrary or oppressive or contrary to
the Constitution because its aim is merely to further the material progress
and welfare of the citizens of the country. This is what we expressed in no
uncertain terms in the Ichong case when we declared constitutional the
nationalization of the retail trade. Indeed, we said there that it is a law
'clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself, and
indisputably falls within the scope of police power, through which and by
which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare
of its citizens.' True, this fundamental policy was expressed in a decision
the subject of which concerns the constitutionality of the Retail Trade Act,
but since the Anti-Dummy Law is but a mere complement of the former in
the sense that it is designed to make effective its aims and purposes and
both tend to accomplish the same objective either by excluding aliens from
owning any retail trade or by banning their employment if the trade is
owned by Filipinos, and the target of both is 'the removal and eradication of
the shackles of foreign economic control and domination' thru the
nationalization of the retail trade both in ownership and employment, the
pronouncement made in one regarding its constitutionality applies equally
if not with greater reason to the other both being complementary one to
the other. Indeed, in nationalizing employment in retail trade the right of
choice of an employer is not impaired but its sphere is merely limited to the
citizens to the exclusion of those of other nationalities."
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. With costs against
petitioners.
6 Gomez v Palomar

FACTS: Petitioner Benjamin Gomez mailed a letter at the post office in San
Fernando, Pampanga. It did not bear
the special anti-TB stamp required by the RA 1635. It was returned to the
petitioner. Petitioner now assails the
constitutionality of the statute claiming that RA 1635 otherwise known as
the Anti-TB Stamp law is violative of
the equal protection clause because it constitutes mail users into a class for
the purpose of the tax while leaving
untaxed the rest of the population and that even among postal patrons the
statute discriminatorily grants
exemptions. The law in question requires an additional 5 centavo stamp for
every mail being posted, and no mail
shall be delivered unless bearing the said stamp.
ISSUE: Is the Anti-TB Stamp Law unconstitutional, for being allegedly
violative of the equal protection clause?
HELD: No. It is settled that the legislature has the inherent power to select
the subjects of taxation and to grant
exemptions. This power has aptly been described as "of wide range and
flexibility." Indeed, it is said that in the
field of taxation, more than in other areas, the legislature possesses the
greatest freedom in classification. The
reason for this is that traditionally, classification has been a device for
fitting tax programs to local needs and
usages in order to achieve an equitable distribution of the tax burden.
The classification of mail users is based on the ability to pay, the
enjoyment of a privilege and on administrative
convenience. Tax exemptions have never been thought of as raising
revenues under the equal protection clause.
7 Asosacion de Agricultores v talisay-silay milling
8 ASLP v DAR
9 People v Vera
10 meralco v Public Utilities Employees Assoc
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 44 of the Rules of Court
interposed by the petitioner Manila Electric Company against the decision
of July 15, 1946 of the Court of Industrial Relations, which reads as follows:
Although the practice of the company, according to the
manifestations of counsel for said company, has been to grant one
day vacationwith pay to every workingman who had worked for
seven consecutivedays including Sundays, the Court considers

justified the oppositionpresented by the workingmen to the effect

that they need Sundays andholidays for the observance of their
religion and for rest. The Court,therefore, orders the respondent
company to pay 50 per cent increasefor overtime work done on
ordinary days and 50 per cent increase for work done during
Sundays and legal holidays irrespective of the numberof days they
work during the week.
The appellant contends that the said decision of the Court of
IndustrialRelations is against the provision of section 4, Commonwealth Act
No. 444, which reads as follows:
No person, firm, or corporation, business establishment or
place or center of labor shall compel an employee or laborer to
work during Sundays and legal holidays, unless he is paid an
additionalsum of at least twenty-five per centum of his regular
remuneration: Provided, however, Thast this prohibition shall not
apply to publicutilities performing some public service such as
supplying gas,electricity, power, water, or providing means of
transportationor communication.
After a careful consideration of the issue involved in this appeal, we
are of the opinion and so hold that the decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations is erroneous od contrary to the clear and express provision of the
above quoted provisions. The power of theCourt to settle industrial disputes
between capital and labor, which include the fixing of wages of employees
or laborers, granted by the general provisions of section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, has beenrestricted by the above quoted
special provisions of Commonwealth ActNo. 444, in the sense that public
utilities supplying electricity,gas, power, water, or providing means of
transportation or communication may compel their employees or laborers
to work duringSundays and legal holidays without paying them an
additional compensation of not less than 25 per cent of their regular
remuneration on said days.
Since the provisions of the above quoted section 4, are plain and
unambiguous and convey a clear and definite meaning, there is no need of
resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation orconstruction in order to
determine the intention of the Legislature.Said section 1 consists of two
parts: the first, which is the enactmentclause, prohibits a person, firm or
corporation, business establishment,or place or center of labor from
compelling an employee or laborer towork during Sundays and legal

holidays, unless the former pays thelatter an additional sum of at least

twenty five per centum of his regular remuneration; and the second part,
which is an exception,exempts public utilities performing some public
service, such assupplying gas, electricity, power, water or providing means
oftransportation or communication, from the prohibition establishedin the
enactment clause. As the appellant is a public utility that supplies the
electricity and provides means of transportation to the public, it is evident
that the appellant is exempt from the qualifiedprohibition established in the
enactment clause, and may compel its employees or laborers to work
during Sundays and legal holidays without paying them said extra
compensation.
To hold that the exception or second part of section 4,
CommonwealthAct No. 444, only exempts public utilities mentioned therein
from the prohibition to compel employees or laborers to work during
Sundaysand legal holidays, but not from the obligation to pay them an
extraor additional compensation for compelling them to work during
thosedays, is to make the exception meaningless or a superfluity, thatis, an
exception to a general rule that does not exist, because theprohibition in
the enactment clause is not an absolute prohibitionto compel a laborer or
employee to work during Sundays and legal holidays. The prohibition to
compel a laborer or employee to workduring those days is qualified by the
clause "unless he is paid anadditional sum of at least twenty five per
centum of his regular remuneration," which is inseparable from the
prohibition whichthey qualify and of which they are a part and parcel. The
secondportion of section 1 is in reality an exception and not
a provisoalthough it is introduced by the word "provided"; and it is
elementalthat an exception takes out of an enactment something which
wouldotherwise be part of the subject matter of it.
To construe section 4, Commonwealth Act No. 444, as exempting
public utilities, like the appellant, from the obligation to pay the additional
remuneration required by said section 4 should they compel their
employees or laborers to work on Sundays and legalholidays, would not
make such exception a class legislation, violative of the constitutional
guaranty of equal protectionof the laws (section 1 [1] Art. III of our
Constitution). For itis a well-settled rule in constitutional law that a
legislation which affects with equal force all persons of the same class and
notthose of another, is not a class legislation and does not infringesaid
constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws, if thedivision into
classes is not arbitrary and is based on differenceswhich are apparent and
reasonable. (Magonn vs. Illinois Trust Savings Bank, 170 N. S., 283, 294;

State vs. Garbroski, 111 Iowa, 496; 56 L. R. A., 570.) And it is evident that
the division made by section 4, of Commonwealth Act No. 444, of persons,
firms, and corporations into two classes: one composed of public utilities
performing somepublic service such as supplying gas, electricity, power,
water orproviding means of transportation; and another composed of
persons,firms, and corporations which are not public utilities and do
notperform said public service , is not arbitrary and is based ondifferences
which are apparent and reasonable.
The division is not arbitrary, and the basis thereof is reasonable.
Public utilities exempted from the prohibition set forth in the enactment
clause of section 4, Commonwealth Act No. 444, are required to perform a
continuous service including Sundays andlegal holidays to the public, since
the public good so demands,and are not allowed to collect an extra charge
for services performed on those days; while the others are not required to
do so and are free to operate or not their shops, business, or industries on
Sundays and legal holidays. If they operate andcompel their laborers to
work on those days it is but just andnatural that they should pay an extra
compensation to them, because it is to be presumed that they can make
money or business by operating on those days even if they have to pay
such extra remuneration. It would be unfair for the law to compel
publicutilities like the appellant to pay an additional or extra compensation
to laborers whom they have to compel to work duringSundays and legal
holidays, in order to perform a continuous service to the public. To require
public utilities performingservice to do so, would be tantamount to penalize
them forperforming public service during said days in compliance withthe
requirement of the law and public interest.
The conclusion on which the dissenting opinion is based, which is
alsosubstantially the basis of the resolution of the lower court, is that "As to
them [referring to public utilities like the petitioner] section4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 444 may be considered as not having been enacted
at all. . . . Therefore, when there is a labor dispute as in the present case,
and the dispute is submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for decision
or settlement, the court is free to providewhat it may deem just and more
beneficial to the interested parties,and that freedom to settle and decide
the case certainly includesthe power to grant additional compensation to
workers who work onSundays and holidays. The general power granted by
section 1, 4, and13 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, are not affected in any
way or senseby section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 444."

10

This conclusion finds no support in law, reason or logic. It is a well

settled rule of statutory construction adopted by courts of last resort in the
States that if one statute enacts some thing in general terms,and
afterwards another statute is passed on the same subject, whichalthough
expressed in affirmative language introduces special conditions or
restrictions, the subsequent statute will usually be considered asrepealing
by implication the former regarding the matter covered by the subsequent
act; and more specially so when the latter act is expressed in negative
terms , as where for example it prohibits a certain thing for being done, or
where it declares that a given act shall be performed in a certain manner
and not otherwise. (See Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2d ed., p. 354, and
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3d ed., Vol. 1, section 1922, and cases
therein cited.)
In accordance with this rule, the provision of Commonwealth Act No.
103 which confers upon the Court of Industrial Relations power to settle
dispute between employers and employees in general, including those
relating to compulsion of laborers to work on Sundays and legalholidays
and additional compensation for those working on those days,should be
considered as impliedly repealed by section 4 of Act No. 444,which limits or
restricts the minimum of the additional compensationand specifies the
persons, firms or corporation who may be requered to pay said
compensation. That is, that the Court of Industrial Relations may, under the
provision of said section 4, order a person, firm orcorporation or business
establishment or place or center of labor whocompel an employee or
laborer to work on Sundays and legal holidays,to pay him an additional
compensation of at least 25 per centum of his regular remuneration; but
said court can not require public utilities performing public service
mentioned therein to pay saidextra compensation to laborers and
employees required by them towork on Sundays and legal holidays,
because the necessity of publicservice so requires.lawphil.net
It is evident that the principal purpose of the Legislature in
enactingsaid section 4, is not only to restrict the general power of the Court
of Industrial Relations granted by Act No. 103, to fix the minimumadditional
compensation which an employer may be required to pay a laborer
compelled to work on those days, but principally to exemptpublic utilities
affected with public interest, from the payment ofsuch additional
compensation. If it were the intention of the lawmakersin enacting section
4 of the Act No. 444 to fix the limit of the minimum of additional
compensation of laborers working on those days, withoutexempting the
public utilities, that is, leaving intact the general power of the court to

require the public utilities to pay said additional compensation, the law
would have only provided, in substance, that allemployers are prohibited
from compelling their laborers to work onSundays and legal holidays
without paying them an additional compensationof not less than 50 per
cent of their regular remuneration.
That the intention of the Legislature is to exempt the public
utilitiesunder consideration from the prohibition set forth in the
enactmentclause of section 4, Act No. 444, is supported by the provision
ofsection 19 of Act No. 103. As amended this section provides "that with
exception of employers engaged in the operation of public services orin the
business coupled with a public interest, employers will notbe allowed to
engage the services of the strike breakers within fifteendays after the
declaration of the strike; which shows a contrario sensu that public utilities
performing public services are permitted to engage the services of strike
breakers within fifteen days, that is,immediately upon the declaration of
the strike. The same public interest, the reason of the exception in the
above quoted provision, underlies the exception provided in section 4, of
Act No. 444.
Therefore, the ruling of the Court of Industrial Relations quoted in the
first part of this decision appealed from, being contrary to law, is set aside.
So ordered.
11 N a t i o na l D ev e l o pm en t C o m p a n y a n d Ne w A gr i x v s .
P hi l i p p i n e Vet er a ns Bank
Facts:A g r i x M a r k e t i n g e x e c u t e d i n f a v o r o f r e s p o n d e n t a
r e a l e s t a t e m o r t g a g e o v e r th re e p arc e ls of la nd . A gr ix l at er
o n w en t ba nk ru p t. I n ord er t o re ha b il it a t e
t he c o m p a n y , t h e n P r e s i d e n t M a r c o s i s s u e d
Pr e s i d e n t i a l D e c r e e 1 7 1 7 w h i c h mandated, a
mong others, the extinguishing of all the mortg
a g e s a n d l i e n s at t a ch in g t o t h e prop er t y of A g ri x, an d
c rea t in g a C la im s C om m it te e t o
p ro c es s c l a i m s a g a i n s t t h e c o m p a n y t o b e a d m i n i s t e r e d
m a i n l y b y N D C . R e s p o n d e n t t h e r e o n fi l e d a c l a i m a g a i n
s t t h e c o m p a n y b e f o r e t h e C o m m i t t e e . P e t i t i o n e r s howe
ver filed a petition with the RTC of Calamba, Laguna invoking the provision
of the law which cancels all mortgage liens against it. Respondent took
measures toex tr aj ud i ci a ll y f o re c lo s e w hi ch t he pe ti t io n er s
o pp os e d by fi li ng a no t he r c as e in t h e s a m e c o u r t . T h e s e
c a s e s w e r e c o n s o l i d a t e d . T h e RTC h e l d i n f a v o r o f
t h e respondent on the ground of unconstitutionality of the decree; mainly

11

violation of th e s ep ar a ti on o f p ow e rs , i m p ai rm en t of o bl ig at io n of
co n tr a c ts , a nd v i o l a ti o n of the equal protection clause. Hence this
petition.Issue:

Is the respondent estopped from questioning the constitutionality of the

lawsince they first abided by it by filing a claim with the Committee?

Is PD 1717 unconstitutional?Ruling:O n t h e i s s u e o f e s t o p p e l ,
the Court held that it could not apply in
t h e present case since when the respondent filed his claim, President
Marcos was thesupreme ruler of the country and they could not question
his acts even before thec ou r ts b e ca us e o f h i s ab s o lu t e po w e r ov er
al l go ve rnm en t i ns ti tu t i o ns w h en h e was the President. T h e
creation of New Agrix as mandated by the decree was
a l s o r u l e d a s u nc o ns ti t ut i o n al
s i nc e i t vi ol a te d t he p ro hi bi t i o n th a t
th e B a ta s a ng Pa m b a ns a ( C o n g r e s s ) s h a l l n o t p r o v i d e f o r t
he formation, organization, or regulation of private c
orporations unless such corporations are owned or co
n t r o l l e d b y t h e government.
PD 1 7 17 w as he l d a s un co ns t i t u ti on a l on th e o th er g ro un d s
th a t it w a s a n invalid exercise of police power, It had no lawful subject
and no lawful method. Itviolated due process by extinguishing all
mortgages and liens and interests whichare property rights unjustly taken.
It also violated the equal protection clause
byl u m p i n g t o g e t h e r a l l s e c u r e d a n d u n s e c u r e d c
r e d i t o r s . I t a l s o i m p a i r e d t h e obligation of contracts, even
though it only involved purely private interests.
13 Victoriano vs Elizalde Rope Workers Union
Political Law Primacy of the Constitution over Contractual Rights
Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo member, has been an employee of the
Elizalde Rope Factory since 1958. He was also a member of the EPWU.
Under the CBA between ERF and EPWU, a close shop agreement is being
enforced which means that employment in the factory relies on the
membership in the EPWU; that in order to retain employment in the said
factory one must be a member of the said Union. In 1962, Victoriano
tendered his resignation from EPWU claiming that as per RA 3350 he is an
exemption to the close shop agreement by virtue of his being a member of
the INC because apparently in the INC, one is forbidden from being a
member of any labor union. It was only in 1974 that his resignation from
the Union was acted upon by EPWU which notified ERF about it. ERF then
moved to terminate Victoriano due to his non-membership from the EPWU.
EPWU and ERF reiterated that he is not exempt from the close shop
agreement because RA 3350 is unconstitutional and that said law violates
the EPWUs and ERFs legal/contractual rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.

HELD: The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As

such, an INC member may refuse to join a labor union and despite the fact
that there is a close shop agreement in the factory where he was
employed, his employment could not be validly terminated for his nonmembership in the majority therein. Further, the right to join a union
includes the right not to join a union. The law is not unconstitutional. It
recognizes both the rights of unions and employers to enforce terms of
contracts and at the same time it recognizes the workers right to join or
not to join union. But the RA recognizes as well the primacy of a
constitutional right over a contractual right.

14 PASEI v Drilon
Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged
principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female
of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutionalvalidity of Dept.
Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing the
Temporary Suspension of Deployment of FilipinoDomestic and Household
Workers. It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and
females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only
to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation
of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking
power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing
for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor
General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged
guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court
that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where
there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing
mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and
protection of the Filipino workers.
Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the
challenged Department Order No. 1.
Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid
classification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class
by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was
exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female
contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the
constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and

12

women. It admits of classification, provided that:

xxx
1.
2.
3.
4.

Such classification rests on substantial distinctions

That they are germane to the purpose of the law
They are not confined to existing conditions
They apply equally to al members of the same class

(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school

and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said
applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the
operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.

Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of
the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right,
as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to therequirements of
public safety as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of
female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as
been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1
constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest
the DOLE with rule making powers.

15 TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ

Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture
and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational
Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382,
as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985
and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for
securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with
accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the
NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court
denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and
administered as previously scheduled.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946,
known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the
following manner:
"SECTION 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the
standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination
for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and
regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines."
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its
functions as specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:
"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a
recognized college of medicine;

Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to

medical schools:
"Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any student
who has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any
offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of
completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of
eligibility for entrance to a medical school from theBoard of Medical
Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former
professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in
this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from
establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that
may be deemed admissible.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education,
Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform
admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an
additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for
admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school
year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an
aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the
selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its
calculated to improve the quality of medical educationin the country. The
cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT,
shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after
consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT
rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as
presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the
issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the
medical colleges.
Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.
Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain
minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medicalschools in
the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-

13

waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all
the important interests and needs in a word, the public order of the
general community. An important component of that public order is the
health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of
which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and
regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is
whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of
passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one
hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community,
on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by
recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches
has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health
and safety of the public.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this
type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to
the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by
selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other
things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the
aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need
to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our
professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the
current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test
like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading
the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing]
the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold that
the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of
legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the
protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence
and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds
for disease or trauma.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the
respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary
injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

16 Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. vs Ormoc City et al

Equal Protection
In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: There shall be paid to the
City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the
Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal tax
equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of
America and other foreign countries. Though referred to as a production
tax, the imposition actually amounts to a tax on the export of centrifugal
sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar
alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar
produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest
averring that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides: It shall not be in the power of the
municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and
merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any
attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of
an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be
void. And that the ordinance is violative to equal protection as it singled
out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost for no other sugar mill
is found in the city.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection.
HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if Sec
2287 of the RAC had already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA
2264) which effectively authorized LGUs to tax goods and merchandise
carried in and out of their turf, the act of Ormoc City is still violative of
equal protection. The ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only
centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinances enactment,
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city
of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms
applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be
singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar
central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is
now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the
tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

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