The Likely Impact of The U.S. - Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement On Colombian Workers

The Likely
Impact of the
U.S.–Colombia
Trade Promotion
Agreement on
Colombian
Workers
Lauren Damme
About DĒmos
Dēmos is a non-partisan public policy research and advocacy organization. Headquartered in New York City, Dēmos works
with advocates and policymakers around the country in pursuit of four overarching goals: a more equitable economy; a vi-
brant and inclusive democracy; an empowered public sector that works for the common good; and responsible U.S. engage-
ment in an interdependent world.
Dēmos was founded in 2000.

Miles S. Rapoport, President
Tamara Draut, Vice President of Policy and Programs
Author Bio
Lauren Damme is a Policy Advisor to the International Program at Dēmos. She is also a Policy Analyst in the Economic
Growth and Next Social Contract programs at the New America Foundation.
Board of Directors
Current Members Amelia Warren Tyagi
Co-Founder & EVP/COO, The Business Talent Group
Stephen Heintz, Board Chair
President, Rockefeller Brothers Fund Ruth Wooden
President, Public Agenda
Miles Rapoport, President
Marc C. Alexander Members, Past & On Leave
Professor of Law, Seton Hall University
President Barack Obama
Ben Binswanger
Chief Operating Officer, The Case Foundation Tom Campbell
Raj Date Juan Figeroa
Chairman & Executive Director, Cambridge Winter
Robert Franklin
Christine Chen
Strategic Alliances USA Charles Halpern
Amy Hanauer Sara Horowitz
Founding Executive Director, Policy Matters Ohio
Van Jones
Sang Ji
Partner, White & Case LLP Eric Liu
Rev. Janet McCune Edwards Spencer Overton
Presbyterian Minister
Robert Reich
Clarissa Martinez DeCastro
Director of Immigration & National Campaigns, David Skaggs
National Council of La Raza
Linda Tarr-Whelan
Arnie Miller
Founder, Isaacson Miller Ernest Tollerson
Wendy Puriefoy Affiliations are listed for identification purposes.

President, Public Education Network
As with all Dēmos publications, the views expressed in this report
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Dēmos Board of Trustees.
Copyright
© 2010 Dēmos: A Network for Ideas & Action

Table of Contents
Summary 1
The Role of Labor in Colombia’s Development 2
Legal overview: Colombia Labor Law 4
Law: Freedom of Association, the Right to Strike,
and the Right to Collective Bargaining 5
Reality: Freedom of Association, the Right to Strike,

and the Right to Collective Bargaining 6
Law: Collective Pacts 11
Reality: Collective Pacts 11
Law: Associative Work Cooperatives 11
Reality: Associative Work Cooperatives 12
Law: Elimination of Discrimination in Employment and Occupation 13
Reality: Elimination of Discrimination in Employment and Occupation 13
Labor Rights and the Uribe Administration 14
The U.S.–Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Labor 17

Summary of Chapter 17: Labor 17
Labor Impacts and the FTA: Are the Labor Provisions Strong Enough? 18
The FTA and U.S. Leverage over Colombia’s Labor Situation 20
Policy Recommendations 23
Conclusion 26
List of Sources 27
Endnotes 32
Contact 35
The Likely Impact of the U.S.–Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement on Colombian Workers 1
Summary
This brief explores the impacts of the trade promotion agreement (referred to as the FTA) be-
tween the U.S. and Colombia on labor and labor rights in Colombia and offers policy recommen-
dations to Congress and the Administration. The report first provides an overview of the labor
situation in Colombia, drawing upon interviews with NGOs, advocacy organizations, academic
experts, government officials, and labor representatives in both Colombia and the United States.
Second, it provides an analysis of trade promotion agreement as it relates to Colombia’s labor sit-
uation and explores the impacts of the FTA upon different social and economic sectors. Finally,
the briefing provides guidance for how Congress and the Obama Administration should go for-
ward to ensure that the trade agreement with Colombia improves, rather than erodes, labor stan-
dards and worker rights in Colombia.
As Congress considers the ratification of the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, Co-
lombia’s labor situation has become the central obstacle to its passage. While most analysts agree
that the FTA is relatively unimportant to the U.S. and will have “minimal to no effect on out-
put or employment,”1 it could have strong effects on Colombian workers. Moreover, there is con-
cern about Colombia’s commitment and ability to uphold the labor standards in the FTA given
its poor history of respecting labor rights and unionism.
Proponents of the FTA have high hopes for how it might positively affect Colombia’s economy
and political situation, as well as Colombian workers. The preamble to the United States-Colom-
bia FTA, signed February 27, 2006, states that the pact aims to:
• Promote broad-based economic development in order to reduce poverty and generate

opportunities for sustainable economic alternatives to drug-crop production;
• Create new employment opportunities and improve labor conditions and living stan-
dards in their respective territories;
• Protect, enhance, and enforce basic workers’ rights, strengthen their cooperation on
labor matters, and build on their respective international commitments on labor mat-
ters.
Will the FTA live up to these labor goals and promote broader development in Colombia? This
brief attempts to answer these questions. First, we examine the role of labor in Colombia’s de-
velopment. Second, we provide an overview of Colombian labor law and its current implemen-
tation. Third, we analyze the labor chapter of the FTA and its probable impacts on Colombian
labor. Last, given this analysis, we offer a set of policy recommendations for Congress to consid-
er in regard to ratification of the FTA and steps that could improve the situation for Colombian
workers.
2
The Role of Labor in Colombia’s Development
Broadly-based economic development improves the livelihoods of people throughout a society. In

a labor-rich and capital-poor country like Colombia, broad development must be based upon the
country’s ability to involve and utilize its greatest resource: labor. An estimated 60 percent of Co-
lombia’s 18.2 million workers work in the informal sector, and most of these receive less than the
minimum wage.2 Of the 47 percent of Colombian workers who do receive salaries, only 23 per-
cent earn higher than the minimum wage, work under the maximum limit of 48 hours per week,
and are affiliated with a social security, health, and pension program.3 In 2009, about 4.5 percent
of the workforce was unionized.4
Colombia also suffers from high levels of inequality in the distribution of both wealth and land.
The poorest 20 percent of the population accounts for less than three percent of earnings, while
the richest 20 percent takes home about 64 percent of the national income and the richest 10 per-
cent take home fully 50 percent of earnings.5 Land distribution is extremely important in a soci-
ety in which 3.4 million people work on small, isolated land holdings and produce 40 percent of
the food consumed in the country. However, just 0.5 percent of landowners possess 60 percent of
Colombia’s land.6
All these conditions militate against broad based economic development in Colombia. Currently,
a majority of its 18.2 million working people face significant obstacles to sharing the fruits of any
prosperity and achieving economic security.
Raising and enforcing labor standards helps to level the bargaining power of employers and em-
ployees, ensuring that the benefits of economic growth are more widely shared. Respect for such
standards also accomplishes other development goals. For instance, reducing the worst forms of
child labor helps ensure that more children get an education instead of going to work, which leads
to a more skilled workforce and better future for a nation. Likewise, reducing discrimination in
employment helps ensure more women and ethnic minorities become a part of the workforce,
which allows developing countries to utilize more of their human capital and increase social in-
clusion, leading to greater political stability.
Respect for the right to form unions and collectively bargain is especially critical in advancing de-
velopment. These rights promote better working conditions, less wage inequality, less exploitation
of vulnerable workers, and more investment in the skills of workers, enabling them to compete in
the global marketplace. “The contribution of trade unions to the reduction in wage inequality is
a well-established empirical finding,” noted a 2008 report by the International Labor Organiza-
tion (ILO). “Recent economic studies have increasingly recognized that collective bargaining has
a positive effect on wages without much negative impact on the overall employment or econom-
ic performances.”7 Other research has demonstrated the linkage between unionization and skills
development and increased wages and benefits.8
The United States has a strong interest in raising labor standards worldwide. Nations that expe-
rience more growth and widely shared prosperity, in part thanks to higher labor standards, can
become bigger markets for U.S. exports and investments, and can become more democratic and
politically stable. Higher labor standards abroad also help reduce the degree to which foreign
workers can undercut workers in the United States. This won’t matter in regard to goods and ser-
vices where disparities in labor costs are so vast that it makes no sense to keep jobs in the United
States. But it will make a difference if the benefits of outsourcing are more marginal. There is less
incentive to move jobs overseas if corporations are going to encounter the same set of labor regu-
lations that exist in the United States, such as minimum wage laws, workplace health and safety
protections, unemployment insurance, workmen’s compensation, and required contributions into
social insurance programs that provide health and retirement security.
To both support development and allow U.S. workers to reap the rewards of higher global labor
standards, the U.S. government should push its trading partners to raise their labor standards
and also assist them in the implementation of labor laws. In the case of Colombia, strengthen-
ing labor law enforcement is especially important due to 1) the country’s large, vulnerable work-
ing population, and 2) the country’s poor record in protecting both human and labor rights.
Ideally, a trade agreement with the United States would help to create more shared prosperity
by reducing the obstacles to economic security that Colombian workers face. This could be the
case if the FTA did, in fact, serve as a lever or catalyst to help raise labor standards and ensure
better enforcement of such standards.
The U.S. seems to be in an especially strong position to influence Colombia’s actions due to Co-
lombia’s greater relative economic dependence upon the U.S. for trade: the U.S. is Colombia’s
largest trading partner, importing $13.09 billion in goods from Colombia in 2008 (a 30 percent
increase from 2007, although the recession has shrunk imports about 20 percent), whilst Colom-
bia was the 29th largest U.S. import supplier, accounting for less than one percent of U.S. imports
in 2008.9 In addition, Colombia is one of the foremost recipients of U.S. aid, receiving $663 mil-
lion in grant aid in 2009, contributing to an estimated $7.9 billion in aid from 1996 -2010.10
Will the passage of the FTA increase or decrease U.S. capacity to influence Colombia’s labor sit-
uation? The next section gives a brief outline of Colombia’s current framework of labor law. Based
upon a series of interviews with Colombian rights activists, unionists, and government officials,
the section attempts to shed light on the differences between theory and reality in Colombian la-
bor rights today, focusing especially the state of syndicalism in Colombia.
4
Legal overview: Colombia Labor Law
As shown below in Figure 1, Colombia has ratified the eight core ILO conventions on labor
rights outlined above which are automatically incorporated into the domestic legislation.11 In ad-
dition, Colombia’s Substantive Labor Code (Código Sustantivo del Trabajo), provides further de-
tail on labor legislation.
Figure 1:
List of International Human and Labor Rights Conventions Ratified by Colombia
UN covenants on human International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ICE-
and worker rights SCR
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-

crimination, CERD
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ICCPR
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against

Women, CEDAW
Convention on the Rights of the Child, CRC
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the in-
volvement of children in armed conflict
ILO Fundamental Con- Convention No. 29 on Forced Labor

ventions from the 1998
Declaration of Funda- Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right
mental Principles and to Organize
Rights at Work
Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining
Convention No. 100 on Equal Remuneration
Convention No. 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labor
Convention No. 111 on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)
Convention No. 138 on the Minimum Age for Admission to Employment
Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor
None of these steps toward labor protections cover workers in the informal economy: an estimat-
ed 60 percent of the Colombian workforce. This legislation and the Substantive Labor Code ap-
ply only to workers with an official contract of employment, leaving independent contractors, the
self-employed, and informal sector workers unprotected and without rights.
In 2002, in support of a request for an International Monetary Fund stand-by loan of $2.1 bil-
lion, the Colombian government undertook significant and controversial pension and labor leg-
islation reforms with the aim of reducing the cost of labor and thus increasing employment in
the formal sector. These included reform of the pension scheme to increase minimum contribu-
tion periods, push back the age of retirement, and increase the contribution rate of workers. Cit-
ing the ‘inflexibility’ of the formal labor sector and high labor costs as the reasons for Colombia’s
large informal sector, the reform, which was eventually passed as the controversial Law 789 of
2002, extended daytime working hours, reduced overtime payments for labor, and decreased sev-
erance payments.12
Current President Alvaro Uribe also undertook public sector reform to reduce spending and debt
at the behest of the IMF. As a result, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the Ministry
of Health were downsized and merged to create the Ministry of Social Protection (MPS), a de-
cision that has severely weakened the ability of the government to protect workers’ rights.13 MPS
is now the lead ministry in the administration and enforcement of labor legislation. According to
the U.S. Department of Labor (2008), at the end of 2006, MPS conducted 29,267 administrative
investigations, sanctioning 2,904 businesses (about 10 percent of those inspected) and imposed
fines of 7.3 billion pesos, or $3.6 million USD (about $1240 per business at the September 2009
exchange rate). The efficacy of these fines in enforcing labor legislation is unknown. However, ac-
cording to the AFL-CIO, the MPS currently has 273 inspectors for all of Colombia’s 18.2 mil-
lion strong workforce, meaning that each inspector is responsible for almost 67,000 workers.14
The rest of this section provides a brief overview of the Colombian legal framework in two of the
four core areas: 1) Freedom of association and recognition of the right to collective bargaining,
and 2) elimination of discrimination in employment and occupation. Due to the scope of this
briefing, the serious issues of human trafficking or Colombia’s widespread problems with exploi-
tation of child labor and forced labor will not be addressed.15
Law:
Freedom of Association, the Right to Strike, and the Right to Collective
Bargaining
The Substantive Labor Code and Constitution recognize the right to form trade unions and the
right to collective bargaining.16 Until 2008, labor unions were subject to the approval of MPS
before they could legally function (including strike), and the MPS denied 253 union registra-
tions between 2002 and 2008.17 Although the Colombian Supreme Court has divested the MPS
of this capacity, regulations implementing the rulings have not yet been put into effect. In addi-
tion, employers continue to dispute the registration of the union, violating ILO Conventions 87
and 98.18 When a union represents more than one-third of a company’s employees, all employees
are covered by collective bargaining agreements, rather than just union members. The Substan-
tive Labor Code expressly prohibits employer attempts to interfere in a worker’s decision to join
a trade union, through either discrimination in employment, bribery (including higher wages or
other benefits), or other types of pressure. It also states that employers cannot dismiss, suspend,
or change the working conditions of employees in the process of establishing a trade union, al-
though this is not necessarily the case in practice.19
For example, under Law 789 of 2002, a company may divide its production units, prohibiting la-
bor relations between the units and thus prohibiting the formation of a single union, the contin-
uation of an existing union, or collective bargaining as a single unit. 20 The minimum number of
25 employees needed to register a union is also prohibitive to the freedom of association and right
6
to collective bargaining of Colombian workers, as most workers are situated in employment en-
vironments with less than 10 coworkers, and if they are not, the company can divide into small-
er units, as described. Employers also undermine unions and their bargaining power by offering
certain employees incentives (such as better wages or working conditions) to keep them from join-
ing a union.21
Both the constitution and Substantive Labor Code protect workers’ right to strike (if they have a
contract of employment, as mentioned), but a strike can be declared illegal for a number of rea-
sons, in which case the employer can fire all workers involved, including union members.22 For
example, Article 416 of the Labor Code prohibits workers and unions in services deemed ‘essen-
tial’ by the government, or all public services, from striking or collective bargaining, although the
ILO CEACR has found that many of the areas in which strikes are banned are ‘not necessarily
essential’.23 For example, in 2005, the government declared a strike by union workers at a state-
owned oil company ECOPETROL illegal, leading to the dismissal of 253 union members.24
Federations and confederations of trade unions also cannot declare strikes: a regulation the ILO
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) has
asked the Colombian government to change.25
If a worker is dismissed as a result of an ‘illegal strike’, they can be ‘blacklisted’ from employment
in the public sector for 10 to 15 years, a practice the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Associa-
tion (CFA) found “to be inconsistent with the principles of freedom of association and…a seri-
ous threat to trade union rights”.26 The Constitutional Court of Colombia ruled this exception of
public employees from the right to collective bargaining to be unconstitutional due to Colombia’s
ratification of the ILO conventions (151 and 154) on the right to collective bargaining.27 In Feb-
ruary 2009, the Uribe Administration issued Decree 535, which purportedly provides bargaining
rights to public sector employees, but only allows for the submission of a ‘respectful’ request by
employees every two years (concertación), which the government has no obligation to accept.28
Also in response to the 2005 ruling against Article 416, the government created a tripartite com-
mittee (acuerdo tripartito) to create bargaining legislation and to develop methods to combat im-
punity in unionist assassinations, and to promote and enforce signed ILO labor conventions. The
Tripartite Committee includes the three biggest labor union federations (CUT, CGT, and CTC),
worker representatives, and government officials.29
Reality:
Freedom of Association, the Right to Strike, and the Right to Collective
Bargaining
“I am worried about the deaths of unionists,
but I am even more worried about the death of unionism.”
– Julio Roberto Gómez, CGT Secretary General, (Interview, 2009)
The Secretary General of CGT, the second largest union confederation in Colombia, has good
reason to be worried. Violence against unionists is aimed more at erasing gains they have made in
protecting their freedom of association and their right to collective bargaining than at the union-
ists themselves.30
The State of Unionism
According to the ENS SISLAB (sistema de información laboral y sindical), a department of the la-
bor school that compiles and disseminates information on Colombia’s labor system, about 4.5
percent of the 18.2 million strong workforce was unionized in 2009, or about 822,000 workers.
These workers belong to 2,933 unions.31
Colombian unions have the option of joining one of three union confederations to help consoli-
date their bargaining power and expand their voice at national and international levels. The larg-
est federation is CUT (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores), representing 527,542 members and 731
unions. The second largest is CGT (Confederación General de Trabajo), with 120,329 members and
540 unions. The third is CTC (Confederación de Trabajadores de Colombia), with 45,307 members
and 167 unions.32
The generally weak state of Colombian unions can be attributed to the physical danger of being
a union member, but it is also a result of a private sector that is deeply unfriendly to unions. The
government and private sector have supported growth in other forms of employment that under-
mine Colombians’ rights to association and to collective bargaining, as will be detailed below.
Obstructing Freedom of Association: Violence Against Unionists
“Colombians should have the right to organize, and still live”

– Lisa Haugaard, Latin American Working Group (Interview 2009)
Colombia is well-known for being the most dangerous place in the world for unionists—more
unionists are killed in Colombia each year than in the rest of the world combined. Unionist assas-
sinations are a serious obstacle to unionists’ right to live, much less Colombian workers’ freedom
of association and right to collective bargaining. In 2008, of the 76 labor activist murders docu-
mented by the 2009 Annual Survey of Trade Union Rights Violations, 49 were from Colombia.
This marks a 25 percent increase from 2007, when 39 were murdered. In 2009, at least 34 labor
unionists were assassinated in Colombia.
In the past 23 years, from January first, 1986 to August 7th, 2009, 2,704 unionists have been
killed, or about one unionist murder every three days. In addition, 4,418 union members have re-
ceived death threats, 1611 have been forcibly displaced, and at least 10,364 violations against their
life, liberty, and integrity have been recorded.33
From 2002-2008 (about the Uribe Administration’s tenure), the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) records that 609 unionists have been killed, compared to 297 in
the rest of the world.34 More precisely, since Uribe came into power on August 7th of 2002, 505
unionists have been murdered.35 However, the often quoted number of ‘more than 2,700 union-
ists killed in the past two decades’ used to directly discredit the Uribe Administration is mislead-
ing, as assassinations have decreased by 73 percent since he came into office (as shown in Figure
2). Colombian unionist assassinations have also become a smaller contribution to worldwide mur-
ders of unionists, from 83 percent of assassinations in 2001 to 65 percent in 2008, and the gen-
eral trend of murders has declined (see Figure 2 on page 8). Still, Figure 2 shows a trend of set-
backs for every gain.
8
Figure 2: Tracing Colombian Unionist Murders, 2001-2008

250
200
150 Worldwide Unionist

Assassinations
Colombian Unionist
100 Assassinations
50
0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Source: Compiled from International Confederation of Free Trade Unions’ (ICFTU) annual surveys of violations
of trade union rights, 2002–2009.
Still, Figure 2 shows a trend of setbacks for every gain, and falling assassination numbers may
only mask increases in other serious violations of unionists’ rights, such as the more ‘low profile’
death threats. Many Colombian interviewees told Dēmos that the negative international public-
ity that stemmed from high-profile unionist killings has led to the use of more shrewd methods
for intimidation of those who defend both labor and human rights. These methods are often more
effective precisely because they are relatively lower profile than murders. The composition of hu-
man rights violations—762 in 2008 alone—are shown in Figure 3 below.
Figure 3: Human Rights Violations Against Colombian Unionists, 2007-2008

Type of violation 2007 2008
Threats 246 497
Forced displacement 101 154
Homicides 39 49
Arbitrary detention 19 26
Harassment 16 19
Attack with or without injuries 12 8
Disappearance 2 5
Torture 2 3
Illegal raid 4 1
Total 441 762
Source: Sinderh database, Escuela Nacional Sindical, Cuaderno de Derechos Humanos no. 21, 2009.
In the interviews Dēmos conducted with unionists, academics, senators, and human rights groups
in Bogota from 29th June to 4th July 2009, every interviewee could cite examples of intimidation
via death threats, threats to loved ones, assassination attempts, forced displacement (exile), wire-
tapping, and/or physical following of family and children. Many of these numbers do not show
up on the frequently-quoted assassination statistics but reflect the campaign of fear that helps to
suppress union activity.
Who exactly is responsible for these violations? The lack of effective investigation means that only
estimates are possible. From 1986–August 2009, the alleged perpetrator of unionist murders is
known in only 598 of the 2,704 murders that have been committed, or in only 22 percent of cases.
In those 598 cases, the ENS estimates
Figure 4:
that paramilitaries are the alleged per-
Who is Committing Crimes Against Unionists? 2007
petrators of 65 percent of unionist mur-
Guerillas, 11 ders, while 23.4 percent are committed
Violations, 3% by guerrillas and 8.2 percent by public
Paramilitaries, 38
(state) forces.36 Figure 4 shows the 2008
Violations, 9% ENS estimate of those responsible for
the 418 rights violations against union-
State Actors, 27
ists in the year 2007.
Violations, 9%
Most assume the government is behind

much of the violence and intimidation
Unknown, 342 against unionists, acting as intellectu-
Violations, 82%
al authors even if the violations are car-
ried out by paramilitary groups, a be-
lief that has been given increasing credit
as more scandals involving members of
the Uribe party and their ties to para-
Source: Escuela Nacional Sindical. 2007 report on human rights violations
against Colombia unionists, 2008.
military groups (known as ‘parapoli-
tics’) have come to light, a situation ad-
Figure 5: dressed further in the Labor Rights and
Who is Committing Crimes Against Unionists? the Uribe Administration section be-
2005-2007 low.
418
379 The state has been directly connected
348 with extra-judicial killings of 49 union-
ists since 1986, most of which have oc-
curred during the Uribe administration.
In each case, the unionists were subject-
ed to prior human rights violations by
Guerillas
the state in conjunction with paramili-
tary groups and then presented as guer-
Paramilitaries
rillas or civilians killed in combat.37
State Actors
Figure 5 goes on to compare the change
Unknown in crime authorship in years 2005-2007.
2005 2006 2007 At first glance, Figure 5 would appear
Sources: Escuela Nacional Sindical, Informe sobre la Violación a los Derechos
to show a decrease in state and paramil-
Humanos de los y las Sindicalistas Colombianos en el Año 2005. Escuela Nacio- itary actions against unionists. Howev-
nal Sindical. Report on human rights violations against Colombia unionists,
2007.
10
er, the number of violations in which the perpetrator is “unknown” has increased in recent years,
as has the number of overall human rights violations against unionists. Thus it may be that per-
petrators are improving their ability to commit these crimes anonymously, making accusations
more difficult for human rights defenders. Aside from the very real threat of violence, the per-
sonal costs of being a unionist run deeply through daily life. They are publicly and privately stig-
matized by the government, being labeled as members of guerrilla groups, enemies of the state,
or communists. This can then lead to being targeted for murder by paramilitaries affiliated with
government officials or the Colombian military itself.38
When asked about his security situation and its effects on everyday life, Tarcisio Mora Godoy,
the president of CUT, the largest Colombian labor federation, stated that “My mobile phone is
tapped. The government listens to everything I say. If I tell someone, I’ll meet you at this place
and time, they know. So I ask you, do you want to invite me to your house?”
Unionists therefore face obstacles to their work and lives on several fronts. According to the Sol-
idarity Center, “Selective and systematic violence against union leaders and members reinforces
anti-union strategies used by private employers and the Colombian state, thus merging govern-
ment repression with anti-union discrimination.”39 The ‘unknown’ factor of violations of union-
ists’ human rights is only made possible by the extraordinary levels of impunity for these crimes.
Impunity
“The largest single obstacle to worker rights in Colombia today is the climate of violence
with impunity, since the right to live is a fundamental prerequisite for the exercise of any
other right.”
– The Solidarity Center
Violence against unionists will continue until aggressors are held accountable for their actions.
A study of the courts system nationwide has concluded that the 111 sentences (referring to 118
unionist deaths) that have convicted the defendants of homicide lead to a 95.6 percent impunity
rate for unionist murder in Colombia. Impunity rates for other violations, such as physical attacks,
death threats, kidnappings, and forced displacement, range from about 99 to 100 percent, leading
to an overall impunity rate of 98.3 percent for violence against unionists.40
In mid-2007, under international pressure from labor and human rights groups and national pres-
sure from an administration keen to sign a trade agreement with the U.S., the Attorney General
began investigating crimes against unionists under a special subunit. The subunit has not opened
investigations on all of the unionist murders that occur each year, meaning that the judiciary sys-
tem falls further behind each year. In 2009, the ENS reports that one case of the 34 unionist mur-
ders is being investigated. In 2008, 49 cases were reported to be closed, but 49 unionist assassina-
tions occurred, meaning that no net progress was made.41
However, of the 2,704 unionists killed since 1986, the Attorney General recognizes only 1,354
cases and in July 2009 had only 1.119 physical records, meaning that, at best, the subunit is inves-
tigating only about 40 percent of the cases.42 However, of the 1,546 victims to which these cas-
es refer, about 35 percent do not refer to actual unionists, but to other victims, and the ENS esti-
mates that the subunit is investigating only about 25 percent of all unionist murders.43
The Law on Justice and Peace of 2005 (Ley 975 de 2005 ‘Ley de justicia y paz’) was passed to ad-
dress the problem of impunity as the government negotiated the demobilization of paramilitary
groups.44 The law guides the legal process of rapidly trying and sentencing paramilitaries, who re-
ceive a maximum of 5 to 8 years imprisonment in exchange for the full confession of their crimes
in freely given confessions (versions libres). However, the law’s weak sanctions for the torture, ab-
duction and killing of unionists and impossible time in which prosecutors must file suit (60 days)
has led it to be dubbed the “Law of Impunity”, according to the International Confederation of
Trade Unions.45 The ICFTU states that the law “does not guarantee that truth will be established,
as it does not address the clarification of the crimes that have been perpetrated, or include any
criticism of the political and intellectual leaders of the groups responsible for the crimes.”
Law: Collective Pacts

Union-negotiated collective bargaining agreements apply to all workers in a firm when the union
members represent more than one third of the workforce. When a union represents less than a
third of a workforce, employers can directly create agreements, or collective pacts (pactos colec-
tivos), with their employees as an alternative to negotiating a collective bargaining agreement
through a union. Law 50 of 1990 legalizes collective pacts, which are registered with but not
monitored or controlled by the MPS.46 Because the Substantive Labor Code predominantly refers
to collective bargaining agreements as those between unions and employers and because pacts are
legally recognized as separate entities, the legislation protecting the labor rights of workers does
not apply to employees in collective pacts, a loophole which is used by employers to avoid labor
regulations and weaken unions.47
Reality: Collective Pacts

In 2006, collective pacts covered almost 62,000 workers in Colombia.48 But ENS researcher Hec-
tor Vasquez finds that in the majority of cases, collective pacts do not represent real negotiations
in which workers can autonomously make requests and elect their representatives, but to the con-
trary, are imposed by the company through threats, giving the workers no alternative but to ac-
cept the terms of the agreement.49 This view is widely acknowledged.
In practice, collective pacts are used as a strategy to undermine union formation and activity, and
to provide incentives or threats to get workers to leave unions. The ILO CEACR has observed
incidences in which businesses, the government, and the judicial system gave preference to non-
unionized workers and collective pacts over agreements with trade unions.50 For example, when
workers in the cut flower industry tried to form a union in 2001, their company imposed a col-
lective pact and “took away benefits, transportation expenses, lunch money, seniority and vaca-
tion pay from the unionized workers” while they were negotiating a contract, in direct violation
of the law.51
Law: Associative Work Cooperatives

Another form of employment that impedes workers’ rights to collective bargaining is associative
work cooperatives, or CTAs (cooperativas de trabajo asociado).52 These are groups of five to twenty
employees who act as both workers and managers to agree upon terms of a contract (work rules,
provision of social security, and compensation) with an employer.53 Upon their establishment,
12
CTAs were not “subjected to the labor legislation applicable to dependent workers.”54 This is be-
cause CTA associates are contracted as temporary workers to another employer upon whom they
are not deemed ‘dependent’. According to these laws, the goal of this form of employment is to
generate and maintain work for their associates in an autonomous, self-sustaining, self-governing
manner. However, the CTAs are widely recognized as a vehicle for employers to decrease costs by
avoiding labor regulations and their responsibilities to workers.55
In an attempt to address U.S. concerns about Colombia’s lack of respect for international labor
standards,56 the Colombian government issued Decree 4588 in 2006 (Decreto 4588 de 2006), al-
though the decree fails to bring employees in CTAs under the protection of the Substantive La-
bor Code. In a further step, in 2008 the government sanctioned Law 1233, which commanded
CTAs to contribute the equivalent of 9 percent of wages to three social security organizations,
including the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (Bienestar Familiar) from January 1, 2009.57
However, although employers normally pay two-thirds of these contributions, CTA employees
must pay 100 percent of these contributions. The ALF-CIO has shown that these contributions
cut the earnings of a CTA worker earning the minimum wage by 42 percent.58 This is a serious
problem as Colombia’s minimum wage already does not “provide sufficient income to purchase
the basic market basket of goods for a family of four,” according to the U.S. State Department.59
Cooperatives are now monitored and controlled by the Superintendent of Economic Solidarity,
but they are still solely responsible for the payment of social security (health, pension, and work-
man’s compensation) of their workers. Small cooperatives billing less than 220 million pesos per
year, or just over $110,000 USD, are exempt from any of these responsibilities.60
Reality: Associative Work Cooperatives

Despite these changes in the regulation of CTAs, there is continuing outcry about the labor rights
abuses that have resulted from the widespread growth in the use of CTAs.
CTAs have spread rapidly across Colombia, from 732 covering 55,496 workers in 2000 61 to over
3,000 in 2007, encompassing more than 400,000 workers.62 The growth of CTAs is widely rec-
ognized to have had a negative impact on workers’ rights, limiting their opportunities to form
unions and allowing employers to evade the Labor Code and other legislative protections for
workers by subcontracting workers via the CTA. In 2004, 75 percent of cooperatives were found
to have worker abuse or other irregularities by the Colombian Government.63 The government
has finally recognized that CTAs constituted a “delaborization” of the workforce in contradiction
of the ILO core conventions.64 Still, the passage of Decree 4588 of 2006 and Law 1233 of 2008
does not force employers to respect labor rights.
However, there is some public opposition to CTAs in the Colombian government. Senator Cece-
lia Lopez commented that CTAs have led to increased informality of the formal sector, leading to
jobless growth, and that the vast majority of CTAs operate outside of labor law with the approval
of the government, which has no political will to change the situation.65 The Senator also stated
that altering the laws will not be effective in changing the way cooperatives operate because the
CTAs are not controlled by the government anyway.
Law: Elimination of Discrimination in Employment and Occupation

The Constitution of Colombia obligates the government to promote equality in working oppor-
tunities and to protect and support those who are vulnerable, marginalized, or discriminated
against on the basis of gender, race, national or family origin, language, religion, political opin-
ion, or philosophy.66 The Labor Code recognizes the equality of all workers and the right to equal
protections and guarantees by the law.67
Passed in 2006, Law 1010 prohibits employment discrimination, defining it as different treatment
on “the basis of race, gender, family or national origin, religious creed, political preference, so-
cial status, or other factors not pertinent to employment.”68 Law 1010 (Article 6) further requires
employers to prevent and resolve workplace harassment issues through confidential mechanisms,
although victims can contact local labor inspectorates, police, or municipal representatives. Pen-
alties for employment harassment are set by the Disciplinary Code and the Substantive Labor
Code, or Law 1010 itself, which requires fines from both the harasser and company, in addition
to a requirement for the employer to pay 50 percent of medical treatments and other costs result-
ing from the harassment.
The Colombian legal framework also contains laws specifically protecting women, people with
disabilities, and members of indigenous and Afro-Colombian groups from discrimination in the
workplace.69 For example, Law 581 of 2001 aims to support the “adequate and effective partici-
pation of women in decision-making levels in different branches of public institutions…”70 How-
ever, the legislation has been criticized for failing to clearly express the principle of equal remu-
neration for work of equal value, which would ensure that work that is different but of equal value
is fairly remunerated.71
Reality: Elimination of Discrimination in Employment and Occupation

For many Colombian workers, especially women and people of indigenous and Afro-Colombian
descent, daily reality is far removed from these legal protections.
Women
According to the U.S. Department of Labor,72 Colombia has made great strides in promoting
women’s rights, especially in the realm of employment. However, persistent problems exist. Al-
though women constitute 58 percent of the workforce of Colombia,73 they earn 23 to 30 percent
less than men74 and are 1.4 to two times more likely than men to be unemployed, depending on
their location.75 Most female workers are in the informal economy, and are thus unprotected by
labor law, disproportionately increasing their exposure to poor and unstable working conditions,
sexual harassment with impunity, forced pregnancy tests and dismissal due to pregnancy.76
Indigenous and Afro-Colombian Groups
Members of Afro-Colombian and indigenous groups make up over 20 percent of the popula-
tion of Colombia.77 Although the government of Colombia does not track labor statistics for in-
digenous and Afro-Colombian groups, The Colombian National Planning Department78 reports
that Afro-Colombian men earn from 70 to 80 percent of wages earned by non-Afro-Colombi-
14
ans. However, Afro-Colombian civil servants earn only 21 percent of the wages earned by non-
Afro-Colombians.79
Labor Rights and the Uribe Administration

“One cannot be democratic without recognizing the
importance of unionism.”
– Senator Jorge Enrique Robledo, (Senate Hearing, 2008)
“Uribe is not convinced of the value of human rights.

In this sense, he is not a real democrat.”
– Senator Cecelia Lopez (Interview, 2009)
The Uribe Administration, which came into power in 2002, has been largely unsupportive of
labor rights in favor of more neoliberal economic policies aimed at stimulating the economy
through support of capital-owners, rather than labor. However, as discussed earlier, in Colom-
bia, broadly-based economic development is not possible if the working class does not share in the
fruits of prosperity, which requires protection of their labor rights.
The Uribe Administration does not have a strong track record in this area. Laws such as 789 of
2002 have reduced workers’ earnings and benefits in favor of private sector capital-owners.80 The
Uribe Administration has backed Law 50 of 1990, which the Solidarity Center argues ‘trumps’
much of the core labor legislation because it “gives employers broad power to dismiss workers on
grounds of business necessity,” weakening labor protections. Government-backed growth of un-
regulated CTAs has led to “devastating social and laboral consequences” in Colombia as work-
ers are stripped of their constitutional rights.81 Legal strikes have been militarized by the govern-
ment, declared to be against “national interests,” and discredited as being affiliated with FARC,
which has lead not only to death threats against strike leaders, but to the murder of unionists as-
sociated with the strikes.82 The ILO CEACR has received testimony from Colombian unions
against the administration on cases of the restructuring, closure, and reopening of public institu-
tions, during which the government has fired unionized workers and hired non-unionized work-
ers in their place with restrictions upon their ability to organize.83
The Uribe Administration has also publicly stigmatized the work of human and labor rights de-
fenders. In a letter to the Colombian government, the AFL-CIO condemned a February 2009
incident in which President Uribe publicly labeled human and labor rights defenders as the “in-
tellectual bloc of FARC.” This stigmatization condones and encourages the harassment of union-
ists by employers and paramilitaries. Total violations against unionists under Uribe are shown on
the next page in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Violations Against Unionists Under the Uribe Administration,

August 7, 2002 – August 7, 2009
Type of Violation Number of Cases Percentages
Threats 2,290 58.5%
Homicides 505 12.9%
Forced displacements 444 11.3%
Arbitrary detentions 291 7.4%
Harassment 208 5.3%
Attack with or without injury 71 1.8%
Disappearances 32 .8%
Illegal search 29 .7%
Kidnappings 26 .7%
Torture 19 .5%
Total 3,915 100%
Source: Death Isn’t Mute. Cuaderno de Derechos Humanos no. 21, Escuela Nacional Sindical, Medellin, Colombia. November
2009.
The Ministry of Social Protection (MSP), which should be safeguarding workers’ rights, is wide-
ly regarded as being underfunded and lacking political will, possibly due to the violence and the
threats of dismissal or violence against judicial officials.84 When Dēmos asked an unnamed gov-
ernment official (Interview, 2009) what the Colombian government needed to better implement
labor laws, he said, “nothing,” going on to state that there was “nothing wrong” with the govern-
ment’s current implementation of labor law, and that in the end, it is up to the private sector to
follow laws.
The administration’s attitude towards labor rights has become higher profile with the arrest of
Jorge Noguera, Uribe’s former chief of DAS, Colombia’s equivalent of the CIA. DAS was tasked
and funded to protect unionists from paramilitary attacks. Noguera has been arrested as a part of
a parapolitics scandal in which over 40 members of Congress have been detained and 83 investi-
gated for their collaboration with paramilitary groups.85 Noguera was arrested for allegedly hand-
ing a “hit list” to paramilitary group which included the names of 23 trade unionists, almost all
of whom were subsequently killed or forced to flee the country. He has been accused of putting
DAS at the service of the paramilitaries.86
Uribe’s DAS has continued to be involved in illegal wiretapping and surveillance scandals in
which detailed files on labor and human rights activists, including sensitive information about
their DAS-provided protections, have been provided to the DAS departments conducting exten-
sive illegal surveillance. This surveillance has been found to cover all those who pose potential
threats to the Uribe administration, including opposition party members, clergy, human rights
defenders, journalists, academics, unionists, and union federations.87
Uribe has so far managed to escape personal implication in these scandals, but at the same time
has floated a proposal in Congress to allow any politicians implicated in a scandal to avoid prison.
16
Indeed, extra-judicial killings of unionists attributable directly to security forces have increased
250 percent under Uribe.88 Extra-judicial killings, or ‘ falsos positivos’, are civilian murders com-
mitted by army soldiers in which the army dresses the civilian bodies as combatants to increase
their body count and demonstrate results.
To address U.S. worries over Colombia’s respect for labor rights, the government of Colombia has
pointed to the Tripartite Committee (Acuerdo Tripartito) as evidence of their efforts to promote
labor rights.89 However, the three biggest union federations have reported that these consultations
don’t function with regularity and are undermined by authorities.90 Due to this hostile climate,
the federations report that they have tried to focus on areas of common interest which may be
easier to agree upon, but without better results. In reference to the implementation of the agree-
ment, CUT, CGT, and CTC state that an exchange of opinions occurs during the consultations,
but that they cannot perceive any government interest in negotiation or compromise. As the Pres-
ident of CUT, Tarsicio Mora Godoy, told Dēmos, “In the meetings, the government asks us what
we need and we tell them what we need. They then dismiss us, and change nothing.”91
The Uribe Administration is rightly credited with increasing security and weakening FARC, but
the systematic erosion of social protections has seriously undermined the social movement for
rights and unions, without which Colombia cannot promote broad development. Some voices
within the government, such as those of opposition senators Cecelia Lopez and Jorge Robledo,
have argued for better social protections and respect for labor rights. However, these senators are
currently in the minority and can thus effect little change on their own.
The U.S.–Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Labor
Upholding labor standards in any country with a large, unregulated informal sector is difficult
even if the political will to do so exists. But Colombian government attitudes towards labor rights
are indifferent at best, and hostile at worst. Dēmos was told by one official in the Ministry of In-
dustry, Trade, and Tourism that, “it is up to the private sector to implement labor laws in the end,
not the government,” in response to worries that the FTA will drive the Colombian private sec-
tor to increase competitiveness by lowering costs through reductions in employees’ pay and bene-
fits. As a response to concerns in the U.S. Congress about Colombian labor issues, the Colombi-
an government argued that the FTA will lead to increased development in Colombia, which will
then lead to improved human and labor rights.92 This seems questionable, since in order for the
FTA to promote “broad-based development” in Colombia, development must involve the work-
ing class, which will require promoting and protecting labor rights.
Without the political will of the current administration to support labor rights, who will the FTA
benefit? Does the free trade agreement present an opportunity to improve labor standards and
respect for labor rights in Colombia? In an attempt to answer these questions, this section first
briefly outlines the labor provisions in the FTA before analyzing their strengths and weaknesses.
It then examines economic and labor impacts of the FTA on vulnerable labor sectors of the Co-
lombian economy, including workers in rural areas, indigenous and Afro-Colombian workers. Fi-
nally, it looks at how enactment of the FTA would affect the U.S. capacity to influence Colom-
bia’s labor standards.
Summary of Chapter 17: Labor

First, Articles 17.1 and 17.2 affirm both the U.S. and Colombia’s commitment to respect core in-
ternational labor standards, as outlined by the ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work. These include: freedom of association; the effective recognition of the right to col-
lective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of compulsory or forced labor; the effective abo-
lition of child labor and the worst forms of child labor; and the elimination of discrimination in
respect of employment and occupation. Article 17.3 further requires that both parties “shall not
fail to enforce labor laws...in a manner affecting trade or investment between the U.S. and Co-
lombia. All people with “legally recognized” interests have access to an independent tribunal to
enforce these labor laws (Article 17.4).
A “Labor Affairs Council” and a “contact point” within each country’s labor ministry is estab-
lished in Article 17.5 to oversee the implementation of Chapter 17 labor provisions. Although
these entities may make recommendations (by consensus), they have no ability to enforce deci-
sions. The contact point does, however, facilitate “cooperative labor consultations” (Article 17.8),
which are a mandatory precursor to solving disagreements via the dispute settlement mecha-
nism.
Article 17.6 and Annex 17.6 establish a “Labor Cooperation and Capacity Building Mechanism,”
overseen by the Labor Affairs Council, which promotes cooperation on labor issues related to the
ILO Declaration, as well as improvement of labor relations and administration, inspectorates,
dispute resolution, and working conditions, amongst others. An important final clause (4) of the
annex on public participation includes a requirement for each party to “consider the views of its
worker and employer representatives, as well as the views of other members of the public.”
18
Labor Impacts and the FTA: Are the Labor Provisions Strong Enough?
There are some key problems that weaken the labor provisions of Chapter 17 in the U.S.-Colom-
bia FTA. Although the agreement was renegotiated in 2007 make adherence to the ILO’s prin-
ciples enforceable by the dispute settlement mechanism, these principles are insufficient in the
case of Colombia.
The widespread mistreatment of workers and violence against unionists is well-known, but the
labor provisions have a narrow focus. Paragraph 1 (a) of Article 17.3 reads, “A Party shall not fail
to effectively enforce its labor laws (…) in a manner affecting trade or investment between the Parties
(…)” (emphasis added). It remains to be seen how much added legal effort will need to be expend-
ed for workers to prove that their violated rights have affected trade or investment with the U.S.
These provisions are also narrow because violations refer only to employer-employee relations.
However, it is known that much of the violence committed against workers and unionists in Co-
lombia is perpetrated by paramilitaries and other groups considered separate to Colombian em-
ployers or government, meaning that most rights infractions will not fall under the agreement.
This separation of government and employers from paramilitary groups is not necessarily reality,
as revealed by the ongoing scandals exposing close ties between paramilitaries and the Colom-
bian congress.
The FTA also commits the U.S. and Colombia to provide “fair, equitable, and transparent” do-
mestic tribunals for the enforcement of labor laws.99 In a country with a 97 percent rate of impu-
nity for unionist murders, much less that of other labor law violations, it seems unlikely that such
a narrowly-applicable labor provision will change conditions for workers in Colombia: the poor
treatment of whom is a major point of contention in U.S. Congress over the FTA.
The other issue with the enforcement provision of Chapter 17 (Article 17.3) is that it opens a win-
dow for the Colombian government to decrease overall labor standards. In Article 17.8, the FTA
explicitly states that “the setting of standards and levels in respect of minimum wages by each
Party shall not be subject to obligations under this Chapter. Each Party’s obligations under this
Chapter pertain to enforcing the level of the general minimum wage established by that Party.”
Combined with the narrow range of enforcement, these clauses have been interpreted to open the
way for decreasing overall labor standards, such as minimum wage.100 In other words, although
decreasing salaries for specific sectors can be considered a form of anti-competitive behavior, the
government may decrease the general Colombian minimum wage.
Lastly, a frequently-cited problem for Colombian workers is the anti-unionist sentiment of the
Uribe Administration. Article 17.5 (paragraph 7) allows for the creation of a “national labor advi-
sory or consultative committee comprising representatives of its labor and business organizations”
but does not require that the views of labor are heard or considered.
Rural Labor Impacts
Colombia has a rural population of over 11 million people—almost 25 percent of Colombia’s

population—and about two-thirds live in poverty.101 According to Oxfam, these small farmers
currently supply over 40 percent of domestic food consumption, and are about 90 percent of Co-
lombia’s agricultural producers. Agricultural employment accounts for over 20 percent of Colom-
bia’s total employment, and generates 8.3 percent of Colombia’s GDP.102 Agriculture and small
farmers thus play a major role in rural employment.
Colombia has a price band system through which it smoothes fluctuations in the prices of sta-
ple foods and ensures base prices for domestic producers. It also has a Public Mechanism for the
Administration of Quotas, which also encourages importers to purchase from domestic produc-
ers. However, under the FTA, U.S. agricultural goods will no longer be subject to either system,
and the U.S. will be granted tariff-free quotas that often exceed past total imports of the goods.
This has led to worries that heavily-subsidized U.S. agricultural products will flood the Colom-
bian market and destroy domestic production. In addition, rural producers are unhappy that they
were not consulted during the negotiation of the FTA, a breach of ILO Convention 169 on in-
digenous and tribal peoples.103
Indeed, they should be upset. The estimated agricultural impacts of the FTA on Colombia’s
domestic producers are overwhelmingly negative. A recent study calculates that small farmers
will see reductions in income ranging from 16 to over 45 percent, depending on their produced
crops.104 Oxfam Colombia estimates that the current FTA will destroy at least 20 percent of em-
ployment for small farmers who already live on less than $3.90 per day, or 15,000 jobs.105 The
same study estimates that Colombian agricultural production will be reduced by more than $218
million annually in the first six years of FTA implementation, leading to a 15 percent reduction
in harvested land. As discussed at the beginning of this briefing, the Colombia has massive in-
equalities in terms of both wealth and land, and the impact of the FTA on rural farmers will only
serve to increase this gap.
For example, the implementation of the FTA will allow U.S. corn exports to bypass Colombia’s
domestic purchase requirement system, designed to support domestic producers (Chapter 2, Ar-
ticle 2.15). The duty-free allowance to the U.S. is greater than the total amount of yellow corn
Colombia imports from the rest of the world.106 Thus U.S. corn exports to Colombia are estimat-
ed to increase by 21 percent ($45 million) annually, leading to a 23 percent decline in Colombian
domestic prices and a 6.9 percent decrease in domestic production.107
Similarly, with the implementation of the FTA, Colombian rice farmers will experience the tran-
sition from total protection—an 80 percent tariff on all rice imports—to none over the imple-
mentation period of 17 years. U.S. paddy and processed rice exports to Colombia are estimat-
ed to increase from “the negligible level” of one million dollars in 2005 to up to $28 million the
first year of the FTA to an estimated $110 to $200 million a year in the longer term.108 Based on
USDA figures, the removal of the 80 percent tariff over the implementation period will result in
a 44 percent decline in Colombia’s domestic rice prices, resulting in an increase in domestic de-
mand of over 17 percent—but at the same time, a 22 percent decline in Colombia’s domestic pro-
duction of rice.109
The one agricultural area in which Colombia might benefit as a result of the FTA is in sugar ex-
ports to the U.S. However, the U.S. has maintained a quota for sugar and sugar-containing prod-
ucts to protect domestic producers, limiting Colombian sugar exports to the U.S.
The Colombia government acknowledges these likely losses, but claim that these negative im-
pacts are offset by other economic benefits that will trickle down to create positive social impacts
on groups which may not directly benefit from the FTA. However, an interview with the afore-
mentioned high-ranking official in the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Tourism revealed that
20
the government does not have a plan for retraining or supporting the thousands of rural laborers
who will lose their employment. These laborers may become tempted to engage in coca cultiva-
tion or join paramilitary and guerrilla groups. Indeed, during the FTA negotiations, the Colom-
bian Ministry of Agriculture stated that the negative impact of the FTA on farmers would lead to
“migration to the cities or other countries (especially the United States), working in drug cultiva-
tion zones, or affiliating with illegal armed groups.”110 These impacts would thus lead to increased
violence and coca cultivation, undermining key goals of U.S. policy toward Colombia.
Racially Concentrated Impacts
Afro-Colombian and indigenous groups are strongly opposed to the FTA, for several reasons.
First, they claim that they were not consulted in the FTA negotiation process,111 a violation
of their rights as protected by Law 70 of 1993, which recognizes the right of Afro-Colombian
groups to collectively occupy, own, and manage their ancestral lands, and requires the Colombian
government to consult with their leadership in making decisions affecting their lands and rights.
The groups fear the FTA will negatively impact Afro-Colombian and indigenous farmers, who
will not be able to compete with heavily-subsidized U.S. agricultural goods.
In addition, despite the protections afforded by Law 70, Afro-Colombians have been dispropor-
tionately affected by forced displacement by paramilitary groups (with government approval).
This displacement has occurred because their lands, especially in the Pacific Basin region, have
been found to be rich in natural resources after the creation of the 1993 law. The FTA will ce-
ment their displacement and may cause environmental damage to their ancestral lands as foreign
investors purchase lands from their displacers to develop natural resources.112
An “Afro-Latino Letter to Congress” representing over 50 Afro-Colombian groups, argues that

the lack of specific labor regulations regarding Afro-Colombian and indigenous groups in the
FTA will not protect Afro-Colombian workers from “endemic” racial discrimination.113 In the
same letter, Afro-Colombian groups cited NAFTA as an example of what is to come. It states
that NAFTA has displaced over one million small farmers in Mexico, led to increased illegal mi-
gration, and that the dispute mechanism has been used by mining corporations to fight legislation
and rights protecting Afro-descendent and indigenous groups in Mexico.
The FTA and U.S. Leverage over Colombia’s Labor Situation

The U.S.–Colombia FTA gives the United States new incentives and mechanisms to monitor the
labor situation in Colombia and to press for improvements. Proponents of the FTA thus argue
that the United States will have new leverage with which to improve worker rights in Colombia.
In addition, some proponents of the FTA argue for its passage to “reward and institutionalize the
dramatic progress made” by the Uribe Administration, and further argue that “rejecting a free-
trade agreement with Colombia…would sacrifice our national interest in a stable, peaceful, and
prospering hemisphere.”114 These claims merit careful scrutiny.
Ironically, the passage of the FTA may remove the biggest incentive for the Uribe Administra-
tion to respond to labor rights advocates. Passage of the FTA may thus further weaken union ac-
tivity. Some rights organizations believe that, in the same way Guatemalan unionist murders fell
and then rose again after the passage of CAFTA, passage of the U.S.-Colombia FTA will lead
to a halt in progress for the labor rights movement in Colombia.115
At the same time, passing the FTA may decrease the ability of the U.S. to influence Colombia’s
labor situation. The weak labor provisions and mechanism of enforcement in the FTA mean that
it will likely be difficult to influence future activity of the Colombian government using FTA-
provided sanctions in response to labor law violations.
According to the AFL-CIO, enactment of the FTA will not incentivize the government to im-
plement existing labor law or improve labor legislation.116 In fact, an interview with the aforemen-
tioned official in the Colombian Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Tourism (which was responsi-
ble for the negotiations of the FTA), revealed that the FTA is seen as “an opportunity to promote
more cooperatives” in order to increase the competitiveness of Colombian labor. Cooperatives, as
discussed, are widely recognized as a form of labor used to bypass labor protections. Ratification
of this FTA by the U.S. Congress could thus solidify CTAs as a legitimate and acceptable form
of labor in Colombia.
In addition, even if a change in leadership led the Colombian government to become more re-
sponsive on labor rights, the FTA could still undermine the labor situation in Colombia through
its negative effects on rural workers. Indeed, the possibility of rural workers turning to paramili-
taries and drug cultivation raises the troubling prospect that the FTA could undermine Colom-
bia’s security situation. Rather than “sacrificing our national interest in a stable, peaceful, and
prospering hemisphere,” passing the FTA may in fact create greater instability and violence by
pushing more workers into poverty without creating other options and opportunities besides drug
cultivation or guerrilla activities.
Learning from CAFTA and NAFTA
“The subcontracting of labor and more generally the flexibilization of the labor market
undercut the well-intentioned efforts to create a culture of compliance…
it is not the lack of knowledge of labor rights but a fear of unemployment
that inhibits workers from exercising their labor rights.”
– Washington Office on Latin America
Lessons from CAFTA (also known as DR-CAFTA, the Dominican Republic-Central America
Free Trade Agreement) and NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) may be in-
structive in the case of the U.S.-Colombian FTA, as the agreements share a number of similari-
ties in the labor chapter (CAFTA) and the dispute settlement mechanism (CAFTA and NAF-
TA). For example, the Labor Cooperation and Capacity Building Mechanism established in
Article 17.6 and Annex 17.6 are similar to that established in the CAFTA agreement, and this
has not served to improve labor outcomes in CAFTA countries despite significant investment by
the U.S.
Overall, the CAFTA labor provisions have been viewed as ineffective in creating better labor
standards and an environment of respect for labor rights. The Washington Office on Latin Amer-
ica (WOLA) recently completed a three-year study investigating the implementation of labor
rights reforms as specified in the DR-CAFTA of 2005. DR-CAFTA included about $20 million
22
USD in funding to improve labor rights practices and enforcement in the DR-CAFTA coun-
tries.117
WOLA’s 2009 study found that “union representatives, labor lawyers and human rights organiza-
tions consistently maintained that labor rights practices in their countries have not improved since
DR-CAFTA was signed” despite the stated commitments of the governments to implement labor
reforms. In addition to continued violence against labor rights activists and organizers, WOLA
discovered that “employers continue to demonstrate a disregard for labor rights and the govern-
ments are still too weak to force compliance.” However, in many cases, (for example, Guatemala,)
governments lack the political will to force employers to comply with labor legislation and the la-
bor provisions of the trade agreement. WOLA concluded that the U.S. funds were “insufficient to
resolve the long-standing labor problems and impunity that plague the region” and that the funds
could not offset the lack of political will to improve the situation. Also, in many cases, these funds
were distributed to organizations that lacked the necessary skills or capacity to be effective.
An Institute for International Economics report states that Colombia FTA’s labor chapter is
weaker than that of DR-CAFTA’s because the FTA “does not direct the parties to establish a list
of labor experts that would be called upon in the event of a dispute”.118 The DR-CAFTA expe-
rience, combined with Colombia’s poor record of unionist violence, does not bode well for post-
FTA advancement of labor rights in Colombia.
Policy Recommendations
Based on the above analysis of the labor situation in Colombia and the impacts of the free trade
agreement, Dēmos has developed a set of policy recommendations to be implemented through ei-
ther changes to the FTA itself, or barring that possibility, the creation of side agreements such as
those included in the DR-CAFTA negotiations on labor.
Consider the Relationship between Labor Impacts and Security Interests
First, when considering the labor impacts of this FTA, Congress should consider negative im-
pacts on Colombian labor, especially on Colombia’s large and vulnerable rural worker popula-
tion, as threats to not only broadly-based development, but security interests in the country. The
vulnerability of rural labor to coca cultivation and paramilitary and guerrilla violence means
that harming rural labor without providing constructive alternatives is counterproductive to U.S.
counter-terrorism, security, and counter-narcotics aid to Colombia, which has amounted to $5.7
billion USD from 1996–2009.119 Many U.S. agricultural goods, as specified in this briefing, are
expected to supplant local Colombian production. American taxpayer-funded agricultural subsi-
dies to U.S. farmers mean that U.S. taxpayers are paying to put Colombian subsistence farmers
out of business, and then paying again for security aid to Colombia to fight the resulting increase
in violence that poverty brings.
Dēmos recommends that the U.S. Congress require legislation and programs that would offset
negative labor impacts and stabilize labor markets. For example, the provision of jobs and skills
training programs for rural farmers and laborers affected by U.S. agricultural products can keep
workers from turning to coca or violence. These programs can also increase the productivity and
competitiveness of rural workers through the promotion of technology transfer. Each of these
steps will decrease the need for security spending in Colombia as broadly-based development
leads to alternative opportunities for Colombians, and thus decreased violence.
Require Broader Enforcement of Labor Standards, Protecting U.S. and Colom-

bian Workers
If the text of the FTA could be renegotiated, creating stronger enforcement of labor standards
would mean altering the text of the FTA to make all failed enforcement of domestic labor legisla-
tion punishable under the dispute settlement mechanism, rather than just failures affecting trade
or investment between Colombia and the U.S. The protection of minimum wages must also be
included in the text and enforceable under the agreement to protect the poorest Colombians from
domestic legislation aimed at increasing the competitiveness of Colombian business through de-
creasing the cost of labor. Upholding labor standards in Colombia will protect U.S. workers from
competition with labor made cheaper through exploitation, and at the same time protection Co-
lombian workers from exploitation.
24
Reform the Distribution of Fines under the Dispute Settlement Mechanism
However, even if the FTA is altered to include broader enforcement of labor standards, establish-
ing stronger enforcement may mean reconsidering the way in which the dispute settlement mech-
anism redistributes fines. Instead of returning the fines for labor infractions to a government en-
tity, fines could go directly to agreed-upon labor programs or representatives, such as the three
largest Colombian labor confederations CUT, CGT, or CTC.
A reformation of the dispute settlement mechanism can also be aimed at fighting Colombia’s un-
acceptable level of impunity in labor cases. According to Adam Isacson of the Center on Interna-
tional Policy, although the Colombian justice system is a positive contributor to the fight against
impunity, it simply does not have enough resources to handle its caseload.120 Strengthening the
capacity of the labor judicial system to help fight impunity is thus critical to stemming labor rights
violations in Colombia. However, the cases of the DR-CAFTA countries have shown that de-
spite government promises and efforts prior to signing CAFTA, weakness in judicial systems
persist after the implementation of an FTA. As such, in the case of Colombia, the reformation of
the dispute settlement mechanism or creation of a side agreement addressing the redistribution
of fines collected for Colombian labor infractions could include channeling a specified portion of
fines collected for labor violations directly to the labor justice system.
Empower and Fund ILAB to Oversee Labor-Related Issues in International

Trade
Currently, the U.S. lacks the capacity to enforce the mutually agreed labor standards in bilateral
trade agreements. The U.S. International Labor Affairs Bureau (ILAB) could be an appropriate
body to oversee and enforce labor standards, but it is currently underfunded. The Obama admin-
istration and Congress should increase support for the ILAB for this purpose. A stronger ILAB
could be instrumental in supporting labor initiatives in Colombia, as well as U.S. security inter-
ests through broad based development programs focused upon Colombian workers.
Reject Negotiation without Consultation
All Colombian civil society and labor rights representatives interviewed by Dēmos agreed that
human and labor rights representatives, Afro-Colombian and indigenous group representatives,
and small, micro, and medium sized enterprise (SME) representatives were not consulted by the
Colombian government in any meaningful way during the negotiation process of the FTA. In the
case of Afro-Colombian and indigenous groups, this is a violation of Colombia’s constitution.
Passing the FTA constitutes a tacit acceptance of the negotiation process and the manner in
which the Colombian ‘democracy’ operates—without the rule of law or democratic input and
with suppression through violent means. Whether or not renegotiation of the FTA text becomes
possible, Congress could demand that the Colombian government give SME representatives,
human and labor rights groups, Afro-Colombian and indigenous groups a voice through mean-
ingful consultation. These consultations can be used to inform either renegotiation of the FTA
text or in the establishment of side agreements. For example, Oxfam Colombia, amongst oth-
er groups, has called for the establishment and stronger regulation of a region-specific minimum
wage tied to inflation and GDP fluctuations.121 Carlos Quesada of Global Rights has recom-
mended the creation of a ‘code of ethics’ to be enforced upon U.S. companies, so that Colombian
workers are able to hold companies accountable on labor and human rights issues, avoiding labor
exploitation scandals similar to those in the flower, textile, and sugarcane industries.122
A wider consultation can help Colombia offset the worst labor impacts of the FTA by generating
innovative ways to offset negative impacts, and result in a greater ‘buy in’ of the FTA and its re-
sultant commercial operations by labor, human rights, Afro-Colombian and indigenous groups.
The ‘buy-in’ of the Colombian people is especially important in the case of Colombia, as the gov-
ernment does not fully or even partially control large parts of its territory.
New Administration, New Attitude toward Labor
According to Colombian Senator Cecelia Lopez, the impacts of the FTA can be improved with-
out renegotiation, but the Colombian government must implement better labor and rural socio-
economic policies that focus on developing Colombia’s internal market, leveling the distribution
of income, and generating employment.123 Although the Uribe administration has made progress
on security issues, it has shown an inability or unwillingness to pursue deeper labor reform to-
ward labor-friendly policies, and until now U.S. pressure to respect labor rights has led to super-
ficial reforms covering more subversive methods of intimidation of workers.
The Uribe administration is currently at the end of its last term, although another “Uribista” may
be elected president. Colombian politics are personalistic in nature. This means that the next
elected administration, even if it is “Uribista”, will be unlikely to be able to take as strong of a po-
sition against labor and still retain the level of popularity enjoyed by Uribe.
For those U.S. Congress members interested in raising and upholding labor standards, delaying
the decision on the U.S.-Colombia FTA may allow time for a new and more flexible Colombian
administration to come into power. A new administration may be influenced to have the political
will to end impunity, support and protect unionists, and empower labor and labor rights groups,
as well as implement policies aimed at offsetting the worst labor impacts of the FTA.
26
Conclusion
The U.S.-Colombia FTA will have negative impacts on several sectors of Colombian labor, in-
cluding rural and agricultural workers, who are vulnerable to drug cultivation and violence. The
Colombian government has not yet formed a plan to offset these impacts, nor does it seem incen-
tivized to do so. In addition, the weak labor provisions and enforcement laid out in Chapter 17
of the agreement mean that it will be difficult for the U.S. to influence future activity of the Co-
lombian government through the official FTA enforcement and sanction system. The FTA will
therefore not increase the influence the U.S. is able to have on Colombian activity in this area, and
at the same time, the labor provisions that will not protect Colombian workers from their own
anti-labor government. Indeed, the FTA may further restrict the government’s ability to protect
vulnerable sectors. Together, these negative effects on the Colombian labor situation mean that
the FTA will not promote broad-based development in Colombia.
In sum, the U.S.-Colombia FTA does not appear to achieve any of its three labor-related aims as
laid out in the preamble, namely those to promote broad-based economic development, to provide
alternative opportunities to drug cultivation, and to protect, enhance, and enforce basic workers’
rights. Indeed, it may do the exact opposite. Harming rural workers may lead to increased drug
cultivation and paramilitary and guerrilla activity, neutralizing U.S. military and anti-narcotics
aid to Colombia. In addition, the U.S. government will lose the ‘carrot’ of the FTA to incentivize
the Colombian government to generate improvements in labor standards in Colombia. With an
anti-labor administration in power, this will lead to further degeneration of labor standards and
ongoing impunity for labor rights violations.
In light of these findings, Dēmos has recommended that the U.S. Congress consider the follow-
ing when deciding whether to ratify the U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement:
• the relationship between the FTA’s impacts on labor in Colombia and U.S. security in-
terests in the country;
• the need for broader enforcement of labor standards within the FTA;
• the need to reform the distribution of fines under the dispute settlement mechanism
to ensure funds go toward improvements in the labor justice system and labor rights
movement rather than back to an anti-labor administration;
• the value of a stronger and better-funded ILAB to oversee the improvement of labor
standards in Colombia;
• the need for consultation of concerned actors in Colombia with regard to the FTA to
fully understand its impacts, including human and labor rights groups; and finally,
• to consider postponing the ratification of the U.S.-Colombia FTA until these require-
ments have been met and possibly until a new Colombian administration comes to
power.
The FTA’s negligible impacts on the U.S. economy do not provide a strong incentive to pass the
FTA on economic grounds. As a chiefly political agreement then, the U.S.-Colombia free trade
agreement should be considered on political grounds. Colombia’s labor situation has become the
central political obstacle to passing the FTA for a good reason—it is poor. In its current form, the
FTA will not improve the state of unionists and workers in Colombia. Dēmos therefore recom-
mends that the agreement not be ratified until its impacts on Colombian labor can be improved.
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Tickner, A. Associate Professor, Universidad de los Andes, Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Interview. Bogotá,
Colombia. July 2009.
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research Service (ERS). Elasticities in the Trade Liberal-
ization Database
International Food Consumption Patterns. Accessed 17 August 2009. Available at: http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Inter-
nationalFoodDemand/
Rice Outlook. Accessed 17 August 2009. Available at: http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/outlook/.
United States Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2005. 8 March 2006. Accessed 27
August 2009. Available at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41754.htm.
2001 Country Report on Human Rights: Colombia. (March 2002). Accessed 29 August 2009. Available at: http://www.
state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/wha/8326.htm.
2008 Country Report on Human Rights: Colombia. (February 2009). Accessed 29 November 2009. Available at: http://
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119153.htm.
Human Rights Reports—Colombia. Annual reports available for 1999-2008. Washington, D.C. Accessed 24 August
2009. Available at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/.
United States Department of Commerce. Top U.S. Trade Partners. (2009). Accessed 12 November 2009. Available at:
http://ita.doc.gov/td/industry/otea/ttp/Top_Trade_Partners.pdf.
United States International Trade Commission. U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement: Potential Economy-wide and
Selected Sectoral Effects. Publication number 3896. Investigation No. TA-2104-023. Washington, D.C. December 2006.
Accessed 2 August 2009. Available at: http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub3896.pdf.
United States Trade Representative. Preamble to U.S.-Colombia TPA. Accessed: 31 Aug. 2009. Available from: http://
www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/colombia/asset_upload_file708_10150.pdf.
United States Labor Education in the Americas Project (US LEAP). Talking Points, April 2008. Accessed 12 August
2009. Available at: http://www.usleap.org/files/TalkingPointsApril08.pdf.
Viáfara López, C. A. Plan Integral de Largo Plazo para la Población Negra, Afrocolombiana, Palenquera y Raizal: Consul-
taría Desarrollo Económico—Género. Departamento Nacional de Planeación. Bogota, Colombia. 7 June 2007. Accessed
22 August 2009. Available at: http://www.dnp.gov.co/paginas_detalle.aspx?idp=885.
Vogt, J. Global Economic Policy Specialist, Government Affairs. American Federation of Labor and Congress of Indus-
trial Organizations (AFL-CIO). Interview. Washington, D.C. June 2009.
Washington Office on Latin America. DR-CAFTA and Worker’s Rights: Moving from paper to practice. May 2009. Ac-
cessed 22 August 2009. Available at: http://www.wola.org/media/Rights%20and%20Development/WOLA_RPT_
WorkersRights_FNL.pdf.
World Bank. The Gap Matters: Poverty and Well-Being of Afro-Colombians and Indigenous Peoples. Environmentally and
Socially Sustainable Development Unit, Latin America and The Caribbean Region. 20 July 2005. Accessed 2 September
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60016_20050809094739/Rendered/PDF/330140CO.pdf.
XE.com, September 2009.
32
Endnotes
1. In a 2006 analysis of the impacts of the FTA on the U.S. economy, the United States International Trade Com-
mission declared that, “the primary effects of the TPA will be improved U.S. access to the Colombian market and
an increase in U.S. exports to Colombia,” since over 90% of Colombian exports to the U.S. already enter free of
duty. However, the same study found that these ‘primary effects’ themselves matters little to the U.S. in economic
terms. The words ‘little impact’ and ‘not likely to result in notable effect’ are used throughout the USITC’s 2006
sector-by-sector analysis of the impact of the FTA on the U.S. economy. In 2005, U.S. merchandise exports to
Colombia ($5.0 billion USD) were less than 1 percent of total U.S. exports, and the Commission’s analysis predicts
that, after full implementation of the FTA (in almost twenty years), U.S. exports will be higher by $1.1 billion
USD, leading to “an increase of less than 0.05 percent of U.S. GDP.” In addition, they find that “there is likely to
be minimal to no effect on output or employment for most sectors in the U.S. economy” (positive or negative), with
the exception.
2. Escuela Nacional Sindical, 2005; Perry et.al, 2007.
3. Oxfam Colombia, 2009.
4. SISLAB, 2009.
5. CEPAL, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2008.
6. Oxfam Colombia, 2009; United Nations, 2006.
7. Global Wage Report 2008 / 09: Minimum wages and collective bargaining; Towards policy coherence, ILO,
2008, p. 44.
8. Economic Policy Institute, 2009; Mishel and Walters, 2003; Gunderson, 2003; and Card, Lemieux and Riddle,
2002.
9. U.S. Department of Commerce, 2009.
10. Just the Facts, 2009.
11. 1991 Constitución Política de la República de Colombia, Article 53.
12. IMF, 2003.
13. Vásquez, 2007; Oxfam, 2009.
14. AFL-CIO, 2009.
15. For more information, see U.S. Department of Labor, 2008; ILO International Program on the Elimination of
Child Labor (IPEC), 2009.
16. Constitución Política de la República de Colombia, Articles 38-39; Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, Articles 12 and
353.
17. SISLAB, June 2009.
18. Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, Article 372; Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, Article 359; Código Sustantivo del
Trabajo, Article 365; Law 50 of 1990; Colombian trade union federations, 2002; Código Sustantivo del Trabajo,
Article 470-471.
19. Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, Article 59(4) and 354(1), 354(2)(a); Código Sustantivo del Trabajo Article 354(2)
(b).
20. ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, 2000; The Solidarity Center, 2006.
21. USITC, 2006.
22. Constitución Política de la República de Colombia, Article 56; Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, Articles 430 and
450; Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, Article 450 and 451.
23. Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, Article 416; CEACR, 2006.
24. The Solidarity Center, 2006.
25. Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, Article 417; International Labor Conference, 2005.
26. ILO CFA, 2006.
27. ILO, 2006, 2007.
28. AFL-CIO, 2009. P. 32.
29. ILO Mission to Colombia, 2007.
30. ENS, 2006.
31. SISLAB, 2009.
32. ENS, 2008.
33. ENS, 2009.

34. ICFTU, 2009.
35. AFL-CIO, 2009.
36. ENS, 2009.
37. ENS, 2009.
38. Human Rights NGOs letter to Uribe, 2008..
39. Solidarity Center, 2006, p. 18.
40. ENS, 2009.
41. ENS, 2009.
42. ENS, 2009; AFL-CIO, 2009.
43. ENS, 2009.
44. El Congreso de Colombia, 2005.
45. ICFTU, 2006.
46. U.S. State Department, 2002.
47. U.S. Department of State, 2008.
48. ENS, 2007.
49. Vasquez, 2008.
50. International Labor Conference, 2004.
51. The Solidarity Center, 2006.
53. Benavides, 2006.
54. Government of Colombia, Law 79 of 1988, Law 10 of 1991.
55. Bienvenides, 2009.
56. Puyo, 2007.
57. El Empleo, 2008.
58. AFL-CIO, 2009.
60. El Empleo, 2008.
61. Benavides, 2006.
64. Puyo, 2007.
65. Lopez Interview, 2009.
66. Constitución Política de la República de Colombia, Article 13, 25, 53.
67. Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, Article 10.
68. Government of Colombia, 2006.
69. Law 22 of 1967, Government of Colombia, 2009.
70. Puyo, 2007.
71. Solidarity Center, 2006.
72. U.S. Department of Labor, 2008.
73. Departamento Nacional de Planeación , 2006.
74. ILO, 2007; ENS, 2005.
75. Viafara, 2007.
76. Solidarity Center, 2006.
77. World Bank, 2005.
78. Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2007.
79. Viáfara, 2007.
34
80. Rodríguez, 2009.

81. Benavides, 2009, p. 68.
82. ITUC, 2009, USLEAP, 2008.
83. U.S. Department of Labor, 2008.
84. Solidarity Center, 2006; U.S. Department of State, 2005.
85. Associated Press, 2009; AFL-CIO, 2009.
86. USLEAP, 2008.
87. The scandal has been in the Colombian press for some time, especially in La Semana 2009.
88. ENS, 2009.
89. Puyo, 2007.
90. CUT, CGT and CTC 2007.
91. Mora Godoy Interview, 2009.
92. Ministry Interview, 2009.
93. U.S. International Trade Commission, 2006, p. 128.
94. Article 17.3, paragraph 1b.
95. LAC, 2006.
96. Article 17.4, paragraph 2.
97. Daza interview, 2009.
98. CUT Interview, 2009.
99. Article 17.4, paragraph 2.
100. Daza interview, 2009.
101. Oxfam America and US Office on Colombia, 2009.
102. Forero, 2003; Pesquera & Rodriguez, 2009; Departamento AdministrativoNacionalde Estadística, 2008.
103. Deslinde, 2009; ILO, 1989.
104. Garay et al, 2009.
105. Pesquera & Rodriguez, 2009.
106. Garay et. Al, 2009.
107. Based on USDA ERS price elasticities, 1989, 2006.
108. USITC, 2006.
109. USDA Economic Research Service price elasticities (1989, 2006).
110. (Colombian Ministry of Agriculture, 2004.
111. Interview with Association of Displaced Afro-Colombians AFRODES, 2009.
112. Interview with Global Rights, 2009.
113. “Afro-Latino Letter to Congress” 2006.
114. Griswald & Hidalgo, 2008.
115. USLEAP, 2008.
116. USITC, 2006, pp. 6-23.
117. WOLA, 2009.
118. Elliot, 2006.
119. Just the Facts, 2009.
120. Isacson interview, 2009.
121. Oxfam Colombia, 2009.
122. Quesada Interview, 2009.
123. Lopez Interview, 2009.
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The Likely

Dēmos was founded in 2000.

Wendy Puriefoy Affiliations are listed for identification purposes.

© 2010 Dēmos: A Network for Ideas & Action

Reality: Freedom of Association, the Right to Strike,

Law: Collective Pacts 11

Reality: Collective Pacts 11

Law: Associative Work Cooperatives 11

Reality: Associative Work Cooperatives 12

Law: Elimination of Discrimination in Employment and Occupation 13

Reality: Elimination of Discrimination in Employment and Occupation 13

Labor Rights and the Uribe Administration 14

The U.S.–Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Labor 17

The FTA and U.S. Leverage over Colombia’s Labor Situation 20

• Promote broad-based economic development in order to reduce poverty and generate

The Role of Labor in Colombia’s Development

Broadly-based economic development improves the livelihoods of people throughout a society. In

Legal overview: Colombia Labor Law

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ICCPR

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against

Convention on the Rights of the Child, CRC

ILO Fundamental Con- Convention No. 29 on Forced Labor

Convention No. 100 on Equal Remuneration

Convention No. 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labor

Convention No. 111 on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)

Convention No. 138 on the Minimum Age for Admission to Employment

Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor

The State of Unionism

Obstructing Freedom of Association: Violence Against Unionists

“Colombians should have the right to organize, and still live”

Figure 2: Tracing Colombian Unionist Murders, 2001-2008

150 Worldwide Unionist

Figure 3: Human Rights Violations Against Colombian Unionists, 2007-2008

Most assume the government is behind

Law: Collective Pacts

Reality: Collective Pacts

Law: Associative Work Cooperatives

Reality: Associative Work Cooperatives

Law: Elimination of Discrimination in Employment and Occupation

Reality: Elimination of Discrimination in Employment and Occupation

Indigenous and Afro-Colombian Groups

Labor Rights and the Uribe Administration

“Uribe is not convinced of the value of human rights.

Figure 6: Violations Against Unionists Under the Uribe Administration,

The U.S.–Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Labor

Summary of Chapter 17: Labor

Rural Labor Impacts

Colombia has a rural population of over 11 million people—almost 25 percent of Colombia’s

Racially Concentrated Impacts

An “Afro-Latino Letter to Congress” representing over 50 Afro-Colombian groups, argues that

The FTA and U.S. Leverage over Colombia’s Labor Situation

Learning from CAFTA and NAFTA

Consider the Relationship between Labor Impacts and Security Interests

Require Broader Enforcement of Labor Standards, Protecting U.S. and Colom-

Reform the Distribution of Fines under the Dispute Settlement Mechanism

Empower and Fund ILAB to Oversee Labor-Related Issues in International

Reject Negotiation without Consultation

New Administration, New Attitude toward Labor

33. ENS, 2009.

80. Rodríguez, 2009.

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