Jonathan Barnes

Engineering
Dr. Immel
December 17th, 2009
Executive Summary
On February 1st, 2003, the shuttle craft Columbia disintegrated in Earth’s
atmosphere upon re-entry. It was its twenty-eighth and final mission. Seven lives were
lost during this disaster.
This disaster dealt with several issues over a period of sixteen days since the
shuttle launched from Kennedy Space Center. During Columbia’s ascent into Earth’s
atmosphere approximately 81 seconds after takeoff, a light colored piece of debris was
spotted in video footage originating near the orbiter. The debris was seen falling at 550
ft/s as it struck the left wing of the shuttle craft. Later, it was concluded that the light
piece of debris was in fact a tile from the external fuel tank of the space craft. Once this
was discovered, a conclusion was established that this sort of thing happened
frequently during launches and it was of no concern to the safety of the shuttle crew.
On day eight of the mission, a Mission Management Team (MMT) meeting was held to
discuss potential issues. The left wing of the Columbia was brought up in the meeting
several times. MMT participants reported that the foam strike caused by the debris was
not an issue and that a safe return trip for the seven crewmen was inevitable. The
potential serious damage was left unchecked due to poor management and lack of
specking up. Eight days after that meeting, the minor damage the Columbia took on its
left wing from the foam strike caused by the external fuel tank became worse as
Columbia re-entered the atmosphere. The carbon heat panels that protect the shuttle
from atmospheric heat upon re-entry were damaged when the left wing was stuck. The
damage worsened during re-entry and resulted in the destruction of Shuttle Columbia
and the loss of the seven crewmen.
After much investigation from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB),
it was concluded that two major factors caused this disaster. One factor was the foam
strike, the other was the lack of good management and proper action. People lost their
lives after this terrible tragedy, a shuttle was completely destroyed, and NASA looked
terrible in front of the United States. Corrective action must be taken. After this tragedy,
NASA and other organizations established new rules and guidelines to assure this
never happens again. Foam strikes are now constantly examined and checked in the
event they occur. Employees are also encouraged to speak up if they feel
uncomfortable with a certain situation. Before the Columbia disaster, money was the
name of the game for NASA. Now the game is safety. Inspection and communication
are very important when it comes to problem solving and safety and unfortunately, the
Columbia was poorly taken care of. Evidence shows that several NASA employees
were well aware of the potential damage and failed to speak up during vital meetings.
This tragedy could have been avoided if head engineers took the responsibility to
examine the damage. In conclusion, with the right procedures and precautions, a
tragedy like Shuttle Columbia will never happen again.