CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

FUNDEMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

SIMILARITIES, DISTINCTION and LIMITATIONS

1.

INHERENT POWERS
POLICE POWER

SIMILARITIES
*THE 3 POWERS ARE INHERENT IN
THE STATE AND MAY BE EXERCISED
BY IT WITHOUT THE NEED OF
EXPRESS CONSTITUTIONAL GRANT

DIFFERENCES
-PP REGULATES LIBERTY AND
PROPERTY
-PP MAY BE EXERCISED ONLY BY THE
GOVERNMENT
-PROPERTY TAKEN BY PP IS
DESTROYED BECAUSE IT IS NOXIOUS
OR INTENDED FOR NOXIOUS
PURPOSE

2.

EMINIENT DOMAIN

*THE 3 POWERS ARE NOT

NECESSARY BUT INDESPENSABLE.
THE STATE CANNOT CONTINUE OR
BE EFFECTIVE UNLESS IT BE ABLE
TO EXERCISE THEM

-THE COMPENSATION PROVIDED BY

PP IS THE ATRUISTIC FEELING THAT
HE HAS CONTRIBUTED FOR THE
GENERAL WELFARE
-ED AFFECT ONLY PROPERTY RIGHTS
-ED MAY BE EXERCISED BY SOME
PRIVATE ENTITIES
-PROPERTY TAKEN IS INTENDED FOR
PUBLIC USE OR PURPOSES AND
THEREFORE WHOLESOME

3.

TAXATION

*THE 3 POWERS ARE METHODS

WHICH THE STATE INTERFERES WITH
PRIVATE RIGHTS

-THE COMPENSATION EQUIVALENT

OF THE PROPERTY EXPROPRIATED
-TAXATION AFFECT ONLY PROPERTY
RIGHTS
-TAXATION MAY BE EXERCISED BY
THE GOVERNMENT ONLY
-PROPERTY TAKEN INTENDED FOR
PUBLIC USE OR PURPOSE
-THE COMPENSATION THERFOR IS
PROTECTION AND PUBLIC
IMPROVEMENTS FOR TAXES PAID

*THE 3 POWERS PRESUPPOSE AN

EQUIVALENT COMPENSATION FOR
THE RIGHTS INTERFERED WITH
*THE 3 POWERS ARE EXERCISED
PRIMARILY BY THE LEGISLATURE

POLICE POWER
DEFINITION, SCOPE and CHARACTERISTICS
Provided by jurisprudence (INCHONG V HERNANDEZ) a law which purpose is to remedy a real actual threat
and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and
country from dominance and control. Such enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State,
thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future.
(ORTIGAS v CA) adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or
RA 2264 states that implied power of the municipality should be liberally construed in its favour, to give more
power to the local government in promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the
community. This is found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police
power, e.g. the power to promote health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people.
(PRC v DE GUZMAN) that MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with
legislative power and it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Police power as an
inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the legislative to make, ordain and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for subjects of the same.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

WHO MAY EXERCISE

*LEGISLATIVE
*LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS (RA 7160 sec 16)
(MMDA v GARIN) that the MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that MMDA is not a local
government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power and it has no power to enact ordinances for
the welfare of the community. Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the
legislative to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances
either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and for subjects of the same.
TEST OF A VALID EXERCISE (LIMITATIONS)
It is well settled rule in jurisprudence that the test to determine the validity of a police measure is as
follows:
a.
b.

The interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the exercise of police power
The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals

*LAWFUL SUBJECT
(TAXI CAB OPERATORS OF MANILA v BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION) , an administrative regulation phasing
out taxicabs more than six years old was held a valid police measure to protect the riding public and promote their
comfort and convenience. In addition, the State in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to
promote the safety and general welfare of the people. Hence, there is no infringement of the equal protection
clause because it is common knowledge that taxicabs in Manila are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more
constant use, creating a substantial distinction from taxicabs of other places
(TIO v VRB) Taxation has been made the implement of the states police power. The levy of the 30% tax is
for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly
because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of
pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax
remains a valid imposition. In addition, if the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie
industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering the unfair competition
posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fibre of the viewing public brought about by the availability
of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences;
and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the
activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayors permit and municipal license
fees are required to engage in business.
(DEPED v SAN DIEGO), , the court ruled that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like
the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into medical
schools" and of "improving the quality of medical education in the country and is recognized as a valid exercises
of governmental power. The country is entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the
ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public
from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our
bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
Police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The subject of the
challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of
the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily
entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of
the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and
ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
(SANGALANG v IAC) the opening of two erstwhile private roads in Bel Air Village on the basis of
stipulations in the deeds of the donation covering the said streets that they would be available to the general public
under certain condition is a valid exercise of police power. Its rationale was the demands of the common good, in
terms of traffic decongestion and public convenience.
(DEL ROSOARION v BENGZON), that the Generics Act; it implements the constitutional mandate for the
State to protect and promote the right to health of the people and to make essential goods, health and
other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. The alleged unequal treatment of government
physicians, dentists and veterinarians on one hand and those in the private practice in the other, is a
misinterpretation of the law. The salesgirl at the drugstore counter merely informs the customer of all available
products, but does not determine all the other drug products or brands that have the same generic name and their
corresponding process. The penal sanction in violation of the law is indispensable because they are the teeth of the
law. Without them, the law would be toothless. The Generics Act and the implementing administrative orders of the

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

Secretary of Health are constitutional. The purpose of the Generics Act is to promote and require the use of generic
drug products that are therapeutically equivalent to their brand name counterparts. The effect of the drug does
not depend on its brand but on the active ingredients
(TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEY v COMELEC), all broadcasting, whether radio or by
television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more
individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting
companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit
broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of
the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In
granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends
considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.
Thus, the regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the
case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for
what the industry gets. As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is
taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.
(OPLE v TORRES), an administrative order which establishes a National Computerized Identification
Reference System for the express purpose of facilitating transactions with the government is not a valid exercise of
police power and therefore a violation of the rights to privacy. The order pressures the people to surrender their
privacy by giving information about them on the pretext that it will facilitate the delivery of basic services. Given
the record power of computer, only the indifferent will fail to perceive the danger that the order gives the
government the power to compile a devastating dossier against the unsuspecting citizen
*LAWFUL MEANS
(YNOT v IAC) The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province
will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill
them there. As for the carabeef, prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so say the executive order, it could
easily be circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for
the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should fillow no reason either to prohibit their
transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat.
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted
the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not
properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander,
were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedas bond of
P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard,
thus denying due process
(PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE v COMELEC) the court held that the resolution does not constitute a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain. To compel print media companies to donate Comelec-space amounts to
taking of private personal property for public use or purposes without the requisite just compensation. The extent
of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint
upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory donation, measured by the advertising
rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial
indeed.
The requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use are the necessity for the taking and the
legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent
Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to
Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the
heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted
the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship
between that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not
casually to be assumed. The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution,
but not without payment of just compensation (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying
compensation for Comelec space is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission.
EMINENT DOMAIN
(RULE 67, RULES OF COURT RE: EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS)
RULE 67
Expropriation
Section 1.The complaint. The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a verified complaint
which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of expropriation, describe the real or personal property sought
to be expropriated, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or
interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the separate interest of each defendant. If the title to any property

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

sought to be expropriated appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals,
or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are
the real owners, averment to that effect shall be made in the complaint. (1a)
Section 2.Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized government depositary. Upon the filing of the
complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or
enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary
an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank
subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the
deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the
authorized government depositary.
If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained and the amount to be deposited shall be
promptly fixed by the court.
After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in
possession of the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the
parties. (2a)
Section 3.Defenses and objections. If a defendant has no objection or defense to the action or the taking of his
property, he may file and serve a notice of appearance and a manifestation to that effect, specifically designating
or identifying the property in which he claims to be interested, within the time stated in the summons. Thereafter,
he shall be entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same.
If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense to
the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within the time stated in the summons. The answer shall
specifically designate or identify the property in which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and extent of
the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his property. No counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the answer or any subsequent pleading.
A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the court, in the interest of justice, may permit
amendments to the answer to be made not later than ten (10) days from the filing thereof. However, at the trial of
the issue of just compensation whether or not a defendant has previously appeared or answered, he may present
evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for his property, and he may share in the distribution of
the award. (n)
Section 4.Order of expropriation. If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to
expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may
issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to
be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such
appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding
except on such terms as the court deems just and equitable. (4a)
Section 5.Ascertainment of compensation. Upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall
appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to
the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the
time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within which
their report shall be submitted to the court.
Copies of the order shall be served on the parties. Objections to the appointment of any of the commissioners shall
be filed with the court within ten (10) days from service, and shall be resolved within thirty (30) days after all the
commissioners shall have received copies of the objections. (5a)
Section 6.Proceedings by commissioners. Before entering upon the performance of their duties, the
commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform their duties as commissioners,
which oath shall be filed in court with the other proceedings in the case. Evidence may be introduced by either
party before the commissioners who are authorized to administer oaths on hearings before them, and the
commissioners shall, unless the parties consent to the contrary, after due notice to the parties, to attend, view and
examine the property sought to be expropriated and its surroundings, and may measure the same, after which
either party may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The commissioners shall assess the consequential
damages to the property not taken and deduct from such consequential damages the consequential benefits to be
derived by the owner from the public use or purpose of the property taken, the operation of its franchise by the
corporation or the carrying on of the business of the corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall
the consequential benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the
actual value of his property so taken. (6a)
Section 7.Report by commissioners and judgment thereupon. The court may order the commissioners to report
when any particular portion of the real estate shall have been passed upon by them, and may render judgment
upon such partial report, and direct the commissioners to proceed with their work as to subsequent portions of the
property sought to be expropriated, and may from time to time so deal with such property. The commissioners shall
make a full and accurate report to the court of all their proceedings, and such proceedings shall not be effectual
until the court shall have accepted their report and rendered judgment in accordance with their recommendations.
Except as otherwise expressly ordered by the court, such report shall be filed within sixty (60) days from the date
the commissioners were notified of their appointment, which time may be extended in the discretion of the court.
Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of the court shall serve copies thereof on all interested parties, with notice
that they are allowed ten (10) days within which to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire. (7a)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

Section 8.Action upon commissioners' report. Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the
preceding section, or even before the expiration of such period but after all the interested parties have filed their
objections to the report or their statement of agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept the report
and render judgment in accordance therewith, or, for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners
for further report of facts, or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or it may accept the
report in part and reject it in part and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the
plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation, and to the defendant just compensation
for the property so taken. (8a)
Section 9.Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are
conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the
property to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled
thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the
court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already
been made. (9a)
Section 10.Rights of plaintiff after judgment and payment. Upon payment by the plaintiff to the defendant of the
compensation fixed by the judgment, with legal interest thereon from the taking of the possession of the property,
or after tender to him of the amount so fixed and payment of the costs, the plaintiff shall have the right to enter
upon the property expropriated and to appropriate it for the public use or purpose defined in the judgment, or to
retain it should he have taken immediate possession thereof under the provisions of section 2 hereof. If the
defendant and his counsel absent themselvesfrom the court, or decline to receive the amount tendered, the same
shall be ordered to be deposited in court and such deposit shall have the same effect as actual payment thereof to
the defendant or the person ultimately adjudged entitled thereto. (10a)
Section 11.Entry not delayed by appeal; effect of reversal. The right of the plaintiff to enter upon the property of
the defendant and appropriate the same for public use or purpose shall not be delayed by an appeal from the
judgment. But if the appellate court determines that plaintiff has no right of expropriation, judgment shall be
rendered ordering the Regional Trial Court to forthwith enforce the restoration to the defendant of the possession of
the property, and to determine the damages which the defendant sustained and may recover by reason of the
possession taken by the plaintiff. (11a)
Section 12.Costs, by whom paid. The fees of the commissioners shall be taxed as a part of the costs of the
proceedings. All costs, except those of rival claimants litigating their claims, shall be paid by the plaintiff, unless an
appeal is taken by the owner of the property and the judgment is affirmed, in which event the costs of the appeal
shall be paid by the owner. (12a)
Section 13.Recording judgment, and its effect. The judgment entered in expropriation proceedings shall state
definitely, by an adequate description, the particular property or interest therein expropriated, and the nature of the
public use or purpose for which it is expropriated. When real estate is expropriated, a certified copy of such
judgment shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the property is situated, and its effect shall
be to vest in the plaintiff the title to the real estate so described for such public use or purpose. (13a)
Section 14.Power of guardian in such proceedings. The guardian or guardian ad litem of a minor or of a person
judicially declared to be incompetent may, with the approval of the court first had, do and perform on behalf of his
ward any act, matter, or thing respecting the expropriation for public use or purpose of property belonging to such
minor or person judicially declared to be incompetent, which such minor or person judicially declared to be
incompetent could do in such proceedings if he were of age or competent. (14a)
DEFINITION, POWER AND SCOPE
-

Power of Expropriation

The highest and the most exact idea of property remaining in the government that may acquire from some
public purpose through a method in the nature of a compulsory sale of the State.

Article 3, Sec. 9: Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
-

Should be strictly interpreted against the expropriator and liberally construed in favour of the property
owner
Distinguished from destruction from necessity:

May be validly undertaken even by private individuals

Not allowed in eminent domain

Cannot require the conversion of the property taken to public use

No need for payment of just compensation

(AMERICAN PRINT WORKS v LAWRENCE), the destruction of the property in question does not come under the
right of eminent domain, but under the right of necessity, of self-preservation. The right of eminent domain is a
public right; arises from the laws of society and is vested in the state or its grantee, acting under the right and
power of the state, or benefit of the state, or those acting under it. The right of necessity arises under the laws of
the society it self. It is the right of self-defence, of self-preservation, whether applied to persons or to property. It is a

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

private right vested in every individual, and with which the right of the state or state necessity has nothing to do. In
addition, destruction from necessity cannot require the conversion of the property taken from public use, nor is
there any need for the payment of just compensation.
Note: Right to eminent domain is a public right, it arises from the laws of society and is vested in the state,
or benefit of the state, or those under it; whereas the right to necessity is under the laws of society or
society itself, right of self-defense or self-preservation
WHO MAY EXERCISE
The following are allowed to practice the P.E.D:
1.

Congress;

2.

President of the Philippines;

3.
4.

various local legislative bodies;

certain public corporation (Land Authority, National Housing Authority); quasi-public corporation
(Philippine National Railways, PLDT Co., Meralco)

ELEMENTS
NECESSITY OF EXERCISE
NOTE:
Questions of necessity or wisdom are essentially political when decided by the national legislature
and are usually not subject to judicial review.
Conformably to the rule that the power of eminent domain should be interpreted liberally in
favour of the private property owner, the judiciary has assumed the power to inquire into whether the
authority conferred upon such delegate has been correctly and properly exercised by it. This will involve
looking into whether the expropriation contemplated by the delegate is necessary or wise.
Necessity of the Exercise decided by a delegate only of the national legislature;
Judiciary whether the expropriation contemplated by the delegate is necessary or wise
(REPUBLIC v LA ORDEN) It is the rule in this jurisdiction that private property may be expropriated for public
use and upon payment of just compensation; that condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the
public good and there is a genuine necessity therefor of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the
power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether or not
there is a genuine necessity therefor.
It does not need extended argument to show that whether or not the proposed opening of the Azcarraga
extension is a necessity in order to relieve the daily congestion of traffic on Legarda St., is a question of fact
dependent not only upon the facts of which the trial court very liberally took judicial notice but also up on other
factors that do not appear of record and must, therefore, be established by means of evidence. The parties should
have been given an opportunity to present their respective evidence upon these factors and others that might be of
direct or indirect help in determining the vital question of fact involved, namely, the need to open the extension of
Azcarraga street to ease and solve the traffic congestion on Legarda street.
(CITY OF MANILA v CHINESE COMMUNITY) the power of judicial review on expropriation is not limited to the
inquiry of the existence of law that grants a municipal corporation to expropriate private lands for public purpose.
The court has the responsibility to (1) ensure that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent
domain, and (2) that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. There are two conditions
imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: (1) the land must be private; and, (2) the purpose must
be public. The taking of land in the exercise of power of eminent domain of the state is not a judicial question but
the court is bound to interfere to prevent an abuse of the discretion delegated by the legislature. The very
foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public
character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land.
The court ruled that the cemetery is a public property and it found no great necessity to allow the expropriation of
the land by the City of Manila thus thereby affirmed the decision of the lower court.
PRIVATE PROPERTY
NOTE: Properties include real and personal, tangible and intangible properties

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

Eg: Churches, franchises and other religious properties and cemeteries

EXCEPTIONS: money and chose in action a personal right not reduced into possession but recoverable by
a suit at law, a right to receive, demand or recover a debt, demand or damages on a cause of action ex
contractu or for a tort or omission of duty; conjectural both as to its validity and value.
(REPUBLIC v PLDT), in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require
the telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject to
the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. The use of lines and services to allow interservice connection between the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a subject to an easement of
right of way.
(NTC v PLDT) a similar ruling was made (REPUBLIC v PLDT) where PLDT was required to inter-connect with
a private communication company
TAKING
*may include trespass without actual eviction of the owner, material impairment of the value of the
property or prevention of the ordinary uses for which the property was intended.
REQ. OF TAKING:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The expropriator must enter a private property

The entry must be for more than a momentary period.
The entry must be under warrant or colour of legal authority.
The property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected.
The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

(REPUBLIC v CASTELLVI) in this case the SC pronounced the requisites of taking under eminent domain
and these are as follows:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

The expropriator must enter a private property

The entry must be for more than a momentary period.
The entry must be under warrant or colour of legal authority.
The property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected.
The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

In this case, the government had rented and started occupying a parcel of land and when the owner
refused to continue extending the lease, commenced expropriation proceedings. As the property was supposed to
be assessed for purposes of JC from the time of the taking, the government argued that it should be deemed to
have taken in the same in the previous years, when the lease commenced, and not in the year where the
proceeding (EXPROPRIATION) began. The SC applying the requisites held that, it is clear that the taking of the
owners property for purposes of ED cannot be considered to have taken in1974 when the Rep. commenced to
occupy the property as lessee thereof. We find no merit in the contention of the owner that two essential element in
taking of property under the power of ED, namely 1. That the entrance and occupation by the condemner must be
for a permanent and indefinite period, and 2. That in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from
the property and deprived from its beneficial use, where not present when the republic entered the owners
property.
(NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v HON. SYLVA G. AGGUERE), the right of way easement, resulting in the
restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines falls within the
ambit of expropriation
TAKING UNDER POLICE POWER
*aimed at improving the general welfare, and whatever damages are sustained by the property owners are
regarded as merely incidental to a proper execution of such power; loss - damnm obsque injuria;
recompensation - altruistic feeling special injury - if he suffers more than his aliquot part of the damages,
he will be entitled to payment of the corresponding compensation.
(RICHARDS v WASHINGTON) it was shown that an exhaust fan installed in a tunnel to clear it of smoke
after the passage of trains through it blew most of the smoke directly into the house of the petitioner,
which sustained more than the damage incurred by the other houses in the vicinity. The US SC held that
there was as to Richards a taking under the power of eminent domain for which he was entitled for JC
INVALID TAKING UNDER POLICE POWER
(QUEZON CITY v ERICTA), an ordinance requiring private cemeteries to reserve a certain area of their
memorial parks for paupers as been considered a taking which would require payment of just compensation, and
not an exercise of police power
(PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUITE v COMELEC), the SC declared as unconstitutional a resolution of the
respondent electoral body directing the newspapers to provide free comelec space of not less than one-half page
for the common use of political parties and candidates. The SC held that the compulsory donation was a taking of
private property without payment of just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the respondent

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

did not establish the necessity of the taking, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising
space, let alone its own authority to exercise the power of eminent domain
PUBLIC USE
Any use directly available to the general public as a matter of right and not merely of forbearance or
accommodation.
-Res communes subject to direct enjoyment by any and all members of the public indiscriminately
-Telephone or light companies such services are demandable as a matter of right by any one prepared to
pay for them
-Any member of the general public, as such, can demand the right to use the converted property for his
direct and personal convenience.
-if the lot is transferred already, it ceases to be public property and come under the exclusive ownership of
the transferees; the promotion of social objectives is more paramount.
-Slum clearance - valid object of expropriation under the modern expanded interpretation of public use.
(PROVINCE OF CAM SUR v CA), the SC held that, the expropriation of the property authorized by the
questioned resolution is for public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the
direct benefit and advantage of the people of CamSur. Once operational, the center would make available to the
community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the
livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public
purpose requirement of the constitution.
JUST COMPENSATION
*full and fair equivalent of the property taken from the private owner by the expropriator; intended to
indemnify the owner fully for the loss he has sustained as a result of the expropriation.if it is prejudicial to
the public, it will not satisfy the requirement of just compensation.
WHO IS THE OWNER WHO SHALL RECEIVE THE PAYMENT
(KNETCH v CA), the term owner as applied in ED cases refers to all those who have lawful interest in the
property to be condemned, including a mortgage, a lessee and a vendee in possession under an executory
contract
DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION: JUDICIAL FUNCTION
(NHA v REYES), there were several P.D promulgated by Pres. Marcos providing JC for property under
expropriation should either be the sworn valuation made by the owner or the official assessment thereof,
which would be lower. The SC applied this rule on the ground that its constitutionally should be presumed
as it had not been challenged
(EPZA v DULAY), the SC invalidated the Reyes case and reversed holding that, the method of ascertaining
JC under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends
to render those Court inutile in a matter which under the constitution is reserved to it for final
determination. It is violation of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation
in the tax documents us unfair and wrong. And it is repulsive to the basic concept of justice and fairness to
allow the hapzard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgement of a court
promulgated only after expert commissioner have actually viewed the property, after evidence and
argument pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to fair and
just determination have been judiciously evaluated.
FORM OF JUST COMPENSATION
(MANAAY v JUICO)
(LAND BANK v CA)
TIME OF ASSESING JUST COMPENSATION
(HLI v PARC), the taking of property expropriated for agrarian reform purposes was considered to have
occurred upon or on the date of the approval of the petitioners Stock Distribution Plan by the PARC, in view
of the fact that this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and posses the agricultural land in
HL. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock
distribution scheme only upon approval of the SDP, that is, Nov. 21, 1989. Thus, such approval is akin to a
notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. The property in this case was
considered taken by way of expropriation on the said date, or in 1989, despite the revocation of the SDP
more than 20 years ago
RIGHT OF LAND OWNER IN CASE OF NON-PAYMENT OF JC
(REPUBLIC v LIM), the decision made final in1940 but the owner was not been able to be paid in 50 years,
thus the SC held, in summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that non-payment of compensation does
not entitle the private land owner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

the government failed to pay the compensation within 5 years from the finality of judgement in the
expropriation proceedings, the owner concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their
property. This is in connection with the principle that the government cannot keep the property and
dishonour judgement.

DUE PROCESS
DEFINITION
due process is a guaranty against any arbitrariness on part of the government, whether committed by
legislature, executive or the judiciary. If the law itself reasonably deprives a person of his life, liberty and property,
hence, he is denied of the due process of law.
ELEMENTS:
PERSONS
(Villegas v Hui chong) it was held that while it is true that the Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit
aliens within its territory, once an alie is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This is a
guarantee inludes the means of livelihood.
DEPRIVATION
-To deprive is to take away forcibly or to prevent possessing, enjoying or using something, as applied in
due process, deprivation means denial of ones life, liberty and property.
LIFE
it was held that life should embrace the enjoyment by individual of all the God-given faculties that can
make his life worth living. Included in the guaranty therefore would be the his right to give full rein to all his natural
attributes, to expand the horizons of his mind, to widen the reach of his capabilities, to enhance those moral and
spiritual values that can make his life more meaningful and rewarding
it was held that it is the obligation of the state to protect the life of the mother and of the unborn from
conception
LIBERTY
it was held that liberty is the freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the
upright honourable conscience of the individual.
NOTE: Liberty granted under the due process clause, is not unbridled license; it is liberty regulated by law. Thus, a
person is free to act but he may exercise his right only in such a manner as not to injure the rights of others.
PROPERTY
Property is anything that can come under the right of ownership and be subject to contract. This will
include things-real, personal, tangible and intangible-that are within the commerce of men,
ASPECTS:
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
NOTE: Substantive due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering the rights of the
person to his life, liberty and property. The inquiry regards is not whether or not the law is enforced in accordance
with the prescribed manner but whether or not, to begin with, it is a proper exercise of legislative power.
(Kwong Sing v City of Manila) if such law was intended to protect the public from deception and
misunderstanding that might arise there is no violation of due process.
(Yu Cong Eng v Trinidad) a law stating that it shall be unlawful for any person, company, partnership or
corporation engaged in commerce, industry or any other activities for the purpose of profit in the Philippines to
keep its account books in any language other than English, Spanish or local dialect, must be invalidated for such it
is oppressive and arbitrary.
(Inchong v Hernandez) if political independence is nonetheless legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not
real and positive if people are subject to economic control and domination of others, especially of not of their own
race and country.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The justice that procedural due process guarantees, is that which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry renders judgement only after trial.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

10

TWIN REQUIREMENT:
a.

NOTICE AND HEARING

(Vanita Maritime Co. Inc v NLRC) the twin requirement of notice and hearing constitute the essential
elements of due process and neither of these elements can be eliminated without running afoul of the constitutional
guaranty.
b.
c.

NO AWARD OF RELIEF IF NOT PRAYED

JUDICIAL DUE PROCESS
The following are the requirements of procedural due process under judicial proceedings:
a.
b.
c.
d.

There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it
Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the property
which is the subject of the proceedings
The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard
Judgement must be rendered upon lawful hearing

IMPARTIAL AND COMPETENT COURT

(Ynot v IAC) the closed mind has no place in an open society. It is part of the sporting idea of fair play to
hear the other side before and opinion or decision is made by those who are sitting in judgement. Obviously, one
side is only half of the question; the other half must also be considered in order to reach and impartial verdict.
(Javier v Comelec) the court has repeatedly demanded the cold neutrality of an impartial judge as an
indispensable imperative to bolster due process. Thus, a judge must not only be impartial but must appear impartial
as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just.
JURISDICTION; HOW ACQUIRED:
1.
2.

IN ACTION PERSONAM- jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired by the court by his voluntary
appearance or through service of summons upon him.
QUASI IN REM- jurisdiction of the court is derived from the power it may exercise over the property.
Jurisdiction over the person is not essential, provided the relief granted by the curt is limited to such as can
be enforced against the property itself. Notice by publication is sufficient in these cases

NOTICE AND HEARING

Under jurisprudence,(David v Aquilzan) a decision without hearing is null and void ab initio and may be
attacked directly or collateraly
Under jurisprudence,(DBP v Bautista) if there is a denial of right to be heard, the decision rendered is of no
way binding to the person.
RIGHT TO APPEAL:
a.

c.

EXC:
a.

The right to appeal is not essential to the right to hearing. Except when granted by the
constitution, appeal may be allowed or denied by the legislature in its discretion
b. If allowed by law, it must be exercised strictly in accordance to the provisions of law and rules
the right to appeal in coming in minimum appellate jurisdiction of the SC as specified in Art 8 sec. 5 par2 of
the constitution:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in
relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

(Colano v Cruz) if the appeal was based on pure question of law, which came under irreducible review powers
of law, such appeal is rejected.
EXCEMPTION TO THE RIGHT OF HEARING:
a.

ABATEMENT OF NUISSANCE PER SE- is objectionable under all circumstances because it presents
danger to the welfare of the community. This kind of nuisance may be abated summarily, that is, without
the necessity of judicial authorization.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
b.

11

IN CASE WHERE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION IS APPLICABLE- it would not deny the right of a person
of hearing, provided there is a natural and rational connection between the fact proved and the fact
ultimately presumed from such fact.

JUDGEMENT
Provided by the constitution must be based on the facts and of the law. ( Art 8, section 14)
in order for judgement to be done it must conform to and be supported by evidence and pleadings
ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS
REQUISITES:
In administrative proceedings, the requisites of procedural due process are the following:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present evidence in support thereof
The tribunal must consider the evidences presented
The decision must have something to support it self
The evidence must be substantial
The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing
The tribunal or body of judges must act on its or his own independent consideration
The board or body should, in all controversial questions render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know various issues involve, and the reasons for the decision rendered.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS
ARTICLE 3 SECTION 1

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor any person shall
be denied of the equal protection of law.
NOTE:
*Arbitrariness can be challenged by the basis of due process
*If the act assailed is unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the Equal protection
clause
DEFINITION
(Inchong v Hernandez, supra) it was held, that equal protection simply requires that all person or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed
NOTE:
*In other words, similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favour to some and
unjust discriminate against the other
*Equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favour and individual class or privilege
SUBJECTS OF PROTECTION
(Smith, Bell v Natividad) it was held, that equal protection clause is available to all persons, natural as well
as juridical. However, artificial persons, are entitled only to the protection as their property is concerned.
NOTE:
*Equal protection =

1. NATURAL PERSON
2. JURIDICAL PERSON
3. ARTIFICIAL PERSON = PROPERTY

CLASSIFICATION
(Victoriano v Elizalde) it was held that equal protection of laws allows classification. Classification in law,
as in other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they
agreed with one another in certain particulars. A law is not valid because of simple inequality so it goes without
saying, that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality that is the very idea
of classification is that of inequality. All that is required for a valid classification , which means classification should
be based on substantial distinction which makes for real differences, it must be germane to the purpose of law,
must not be limited to existing conditions; and that it must apply equally to each number of class
(Biraogo v Truth Commission)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

12

REQUIREMENTS: [G E L S]
1.
2.
3.
4.

It
It
It
It

must
must
must
must

be based on Substantial distinction

be Germane to the purpose of law
not be Limited to existing condition
apply Equally to each member of class

SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTION
(Ceniza v COMELEC) it was held, that the classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component
cities the basis of their revenue is based on substantial distinction. The revenue of the city would show whether or
not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent, social, economic and political unit. It
would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from
the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need continued support of the provincial
government. Thus, justifying the continued participation of voters in the election of provincial officials in some
instances.
(Dumlao v Comelec) it was held, that the equal protection clause of the constitution does not forbid all
legal classification. It only proscribes arbitrary and unreasonable classification.
(Nunez v Sandiganbayan) it was held, that there is no discrimination to persons convicted in the
sandigang bayan in giving them only certiorari with the Supreme court as distinguished from those convicted in the
trial courts, who could appeal to the immediate appellate court and even to the Supreme court and so would have
more prospects of reversal of the decision against them. Trial in the sandigang bayan is conducted by the 3 justices
constituting each division, and their unanimous vote is needed for a decision, which conceivable be more carefully
reached than that of any courts.
(PASE v Drilon) it was held, that a Filipina domestic working in abroad were a class themselves
distinguishable from other workers, and more so from Filipina overseas contract workers in general, because of the
special risk, to which their class is exposed owing the nature and conditions of their employment.
(Intl School Alliance of Educatiors v Quisumbing) it was held, that applying the principle equal pay for
equal work. Persons who work with substantial equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to school, its international character notwithstanding. If
employee accords employees perform equal work the presumption is borne logic and human experience. If the
employer pays the employee less than the rest it is for the employer to explain why he receives less than the
others. That would be insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against the employee, it is for the employer
to explain why employee is treated unfairly.
(DECS v San Diego) it was held, that the 3 flunk rule for NMAT did not violate the equal protection of laws
clause on the grounds that a substantial distinction exist between medical students and other students not
subjected to the 3 flunk rule. The medical profession directly affect the very lives of the people, unlike any other
carriers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation.
(Tadtad v Secretary) it was held, that the law on deregulating the oil industry is deemed unconstitutional
on the grounds that it is discriminated the new players, in so far placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis-vis the established companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter.
RELEVANCE/GERMANE TO THE PURPOSE OF LAW
*The classification is based on Substantial distinction, will be invalid if not germane to the purpose of law
*If classification is germane to the purpose of law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally present
and future conditions, such classification does not violates the equal protect guarantee of the constitution
NOTE: the SC found the distinction between men and women RA 9262, which address violence committed against
women and children, as spelled out in the declaration of policy.
(Dumlao v COMELEC, supra) it was held, that the classification, even if it is based on substantial
distinction, will still be invalid if it is not germane to the purpose of law. One class may be treated differently from
another where the groupings are based on reasonable and real distinctions. If classification is germane to the
purpose of law, concerns all members of class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the
classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee.
DURATION
NOTE: The 3rd requirement is meant that classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the
problem sought to be corrected continues to exist.
(Pp v Cayat, supra) it was held that classification between non-Christian tribe which are prohibited from
drinking foreign liquors and more civilized countrymen are sustained, as it was intended to apply as long as the
difference between the two groups continued to exist
APPLICABILITY TO ALL

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

13

NOTE: The classification will be rendered invalid if all members of the class were not similarly treated, both as to
rights conferred and obligation imposed
SEARCH AND SIEZURE
ARTICLE 3 SECTION 2
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable search and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall be issued except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or produce, and particularity describing the
place to be searched or the persons or things to be seized
ARTICLE 3 SECTION 3
1.

The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order
of the court or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

2.

Any evidence obtained in violation of this or preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

SCOPE AND PROTECTION

(Moncado v Peoples court) the rights against search and seizures and to the privacy of communication and
correspondence are available to all persons including aliens whether accused or not. (Moncado rule is abandoned,
Stonehill v Dionko overturned it)
(Stonehill vs Diokno) juridical persons, like corporations, are also entitled to the guaranty and are
protected by the search and seizure clause.
-The officer may act in behalf of the corporation, provided with board resolution challenging the validity of the
search
-particularized items to be seized
-One search warrant one violation
(Alih vs Castro) one cannot just force his way into any mans house on the illegal orders of superior,
however lofty his rank. Indeed, even the humblest hovel is protected from official intrusion because of the ancient
rule, revered in all free regimes, that mans house is his castle.
MEANING OF SEARCH
(Katz v US) the right to be left alone extends not only to the privacy of ones home but also to his office or
business establishment, including the papers and effects that may be found there.
(Florida v Jardines) it was held, that the front porch of a home is part of the home itself as granted by the
fourth amendment. Typically, ordinary citizens are invited to enter onto the porch, either explicitly or implicitly, to
communicate with the house occupants. Police officers, however, cannot go beyond the scope of that invitation.
Entering a persons porch for the purposes of conducting search requires broader license than the one commonly
given to general public. Without such a license, the police officers were conducting an unlawful search in violation
of the fourth amendment.
(Missouri v Mcneely) it was held, that provided by the fourth amendment, protection against warrantless
searches applies to blood alcohol tests unless specific exigent circumstance exist. Because each case must be
considered an exigent circumstance, but there is no reason to create a categorical rule. Further, it was held that the
protection against bodily intrusions outweigh the states interest in gaining evidence quickly.
(Maryland v King June) it was held, that conducting a DNA swab test as part of the arrest procedure does
not violate the fourth amendments because the test serves a legitimate state interest and is not so invasive so as
to require a warrant. The routine administrative procedures that occur during a booking for an arrest do not require
the same justification and the search of location. Further, it was held, that ascertaining an arrestees identity and
criminal history is a crucial part of the arrest procedure and that a DNA test is valid and informative as
fingerprinting. Determining an arrestees criminal history also serves the legitimate state interest of determining
what level of risk the individual poses to the public and what conditions should be be set on his release of custody
REQUISITE OF A VALID SEARCH: [P D E P O]
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Based on Probable cause

Probable cause Determined personally by the judge
Determination must be made after Examination under oath or affirmation of the complaint and the
witnesses he may produce.
Must Particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized
The warrant must be in connection with One particular offense only

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

14

EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE (under Req.1)

(Burgos v Chief of staff) probable cause refers to as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. Further, mere generalizations statements that
are attached in the affidavit submitted for a warrant will not satisfy the requirement for a probable cause.
-for the purpose of establishing the probable cause the applicant must have personal knowledge of the
facts/circumstances if none of these then itll be considered a hearsay evidence, which is considered void.
-the description must be specific not general
(Stonehill v Diokno, supra) warrants were issued upon applications alleging a violation of Central Bank
circulars, Tariff and Custom Law, the Internal Revenue Code and the RPC. In other words, if there are no specific
offenses alleged in the alleged application. The averments thereof in the said application were abstract. As a
consequence, it will be impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating the given provision of our law.
(Asian Surety v Herrera) a search warrant shall be annulled if it is issued for separate distinct offenses
thus, there is no probable cause. The rule is probable cause shall be based on only one offense only. [eg. Warrant
was issued for 4 separate offenses, viz., estafa, falsification, tax evasion, insurance fraud]
(Castro v Pabalan) a warrant must refer to only one particular offense.
(Pita v CA) a warrant must be first been issued after the judge shall have been convinced of the existence
of probable cause
-rule of thumb was there a search warrant?
PERSONAL DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE BY THE JUDGE (under Req. 2)
(Placer v Villanueva) the issuance of warrant of arrest was not a ministerial function of the judge who had
the right to determine for himself the existence of probable cause. While he could rely on the findings of the
prosecutor, he was never the less bound thereby.
-Judge may rely, but naturally the judge must determine personally on whether or not there is probable cause.
[Basis: RULE 112, SECTION 6 OF THE RULES OF COURT, providing that a judge may issue a warrant of arrest only if
he is satisfied from the investigation conducted by him or the prosecutor that there is probable cause. Under this
section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing, a warrant or order of
arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals certification
and require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
a probable cause. ]
(Ho v People) there is a distinction between the objectives of the prosecutor and the judge in determining
the probable cause. The prosecutor determines whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is
guilty and should be held on trial. On the other hand, the judge determines if a warrant of arrest should be issued to
place the accused in immediate custody so as not to frustrate the ends of justice. In other words, the judge should
not rely on the recommendations alone of the prosecutor but must independently arrive at his own conclusion
based not only on the bare report of the prosecutor but also on other relevant documents.
(Webb v De leon),it was held, that the matter of few hours doesnt necessarily mean that there is no
presumption of probable cause determined by the judge.
-If the records are intact there is presumption the judge has read the entire affidavit
-an order of arrest is not a requirement for a warrant of arrest to be issued
-issue an order directing the prosecutor to submit the records of the case
EXC: DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE BY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS
(Harvey v Santiago) that the requirement for probable cause is strictly speaking, not applicable in
deportation proceedings, which are not criminal in nature. The order of deportation is purely administrative, its
purpose being not punishment but the return to his country of the alien who has violated the conditions of his
admission in local state.
-the requirement is there should be a final determination that an alien should be deported.
EXAMINATION OF APPLICANT BY THE JUDGE (under req. 3)
NOTE: Under RULE 126, SECTION 4 OF THE RULES OF COURT, the judge, before issuing the search warrant, must
personally examine in form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complaint and any

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

15

witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them, and attach to the record their sworn statements
together with any affidavits submitted
(Alvarez v CFI) the SC annulled the search warrant issued on the strength of an affidavit based on reliable
information which, according to the affiant was correct based of his knowledge and belief. It must be noted
however, that he did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the
information received from reliable person.
-Test: Based on personal knowledge of the affiant, whether it must be proved that information is ground for perjury?
(Burgos v Chief of Staff, supra) it was held, that the constitution requires no less than personal knowledge
by the complaint or his witness of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified.
(Mata v Bayona) it was held, that mere affidavit of the complaint and his witnesses were not enough to
sustain the issuance of a search warrant. The judge must take depositions in writing and attach them to the record
as these are necessary to enable the court to determine the existence of probable cause
(Ponsica v Ignalaga)it was held, that declarations by the affiants in their sworn statements that are
generalities, mere conclusion of theirs, not positive statements of particular facts within their personal knowledge
shall be rejected the finding of probable cause because there had been no searching interrogation of the witness as
required by the constitution.
-only judge who can issue warrants.
PARTICULARITY OF DISCRIPTION
(Burgos v Chief of staff, supra) it was held, that search warrant that are general in nature shall be annulled
and the properties to be seized must be described with particularity.
(Nolasco v Pano) it was held, that in a search warrant there should be a definite guideline as to what items
may the searching team may lawfully seized, without which, gives the officers of law discretion regarding what
articles they should seize. It is thus in a nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate
requiring particular description of the things to be seized. Search warrants of similar description of a general
warrant were considered null and void for being too general.
(20th Century Fox v CA) it affirmed the ruling of Nolasco v Pano where the properties sought to be seized
were described as television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners without specific indication
that they were being used in violation of the anti-piracy law.
(Pp v Tee) it was held, that the constitutional requirement of a reasonable particularity of description of
the things to be seized is primarily meant to enable law enforcers serving the warrant to: 1. Identify the properties
to be seized and this prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and 2. Leave the said officers with no discretion
regarding the articles to be seized and this prevent unreasonable search and seizures. What the constitution seeks
to avoid are search warrants that are broad and general characteristics, which would authorize police officers to
undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidences or articles relating to the
offense. However, it is not required that technical description, be required, particularity, where the nature of goods
to be seized, their description must be rather general, since the requirement of a technical description would mean
that no warrant could issue.
IN CONNECTION WITH ONE PARTICULAR OFFENSE
(Prudente v Dayrit) it was held, that Valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is
to be determined personally by the Judge, after examination under oath and affirmation of the complainant, and
that witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to
be seized. The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense and the Judge must, before issuing
Search Warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, In writing and under oath, the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their
sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted
LIBERT OF ABODE
ART. 3 SEC 7. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law.
PURPOSE
The purpose of the guaranty is to further emphasize the individuals libery as sadeguarded in general by
the dueprocess clause.
Liberty under tgat clause includes:
a.
b.
c.

Right to choose ones residence

To leave it whenever he pleases
To travel where ever he wills

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

16

LIMITATIONS
The liberty of abode is, however subject to specific restrictions:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Upon a lawful order

Public safety
Public health
National security

CASES:
VILLAVECENCIO v LUKBAN, the mayor of manila was not sustained when he deported 170 women of illrepute to Davao, it was held; these women despite being in sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels
but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guarantees as are other citizensto change their
domicile from Manila to another locality. On contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer
who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence.
MANOTOC v CA, petitioner manotoc was out on bail; facing several charges of estafa, filed motion for
permission to leave the country relative to business transactions and opportunities Went to the SC invoking his
right to travel. The SC denied his motions on the grounds that, his petition was dismissed on the principal ground
that the condition of the bail bond that he would be available at any time the court should require his presence was
a valid restriction of the right to travel. Moreover, his reason for leaving was not urgent, and it had not been shown
that his sureties had been agreed to his departure
MARCOS v MANGLAPUS, the SC sustained the refusal of the government to allow the petitioner (MARCOS)
to return, on the grounds that IT WOULD ENDAGER NATIONAL SECURITY. It was held, that there is sufficient basis for
this apprehension, as against the minoritys contention that the petitioner was, like any other citizen, entitled to
come back to his own country.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
ART 3, SEC 5 No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall be forever allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
OTHER RELEVANT PROVISIONS
PREAMBLE
ART 2, SEC 6
ART 7, SEC 28
ART 18, UNIVERSAL DECLARATOIN OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to
change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone in the community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
RELIGION DEFINED
Any specific system of belief, worship, conduct, etc., often involving a code of ethics and philosophy. In
AGLIPAY v RUIZ, to the effect that it is a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his
creator.
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (THE NON ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE; APPROPRIATION OF SECTARIAN PURPOSE)
The separation of was expressed on the first paragraph of Art 3 Sec 5, NO LAW SHALL BE MADE
RESPECTING AN ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION OR PROHIBITING THE FREE EXERCISE THERE OF. It was now rendered
more emphatic by Art 2 Sec 6 THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE SHALL BE INVIOLABLE
CASES:
ENGEL V. VITALE (THE SCHOOL PRAYER CASE), it was declared unconstitutional; the recitation by the
students in public schools in NYC of a prayer composed by the board of regents, concededly for the purpose of
setting the spiritual tone of school day. The court, declared that it is no part of the business of the government to
compose official prayers for any group of American people, to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by
the government. While welcome to the believer, the prayer was not acceptable to the non-believer, although
significantly, he was not required to recite it. The state thus aligned itself with the worshiper as against the atheist
and violated its obligation to maintain an attitude of strict neutrality on religious matter. The fact that the prayer
was addressed to a non-denominational Almighty God, without any sectarian identification, did not excuse the
State from this duty of impartiality

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

17

EVERSON V. BOARD OF EDUCATION, the ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE simply means that the state cannot set
up a church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one religion over the other nor force nor
influence a person to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion; that the state cannot punish a person for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance; that no tax in
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activity or institution whatever they may be
called or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion; that the state cannot openly or secretly
participate on the affairs of any religious organization or group and vice versa.
LEMON V. KURTZMAN, sponsorship, financial support, and active support of the sovereign in religious
activity would connote a violation of the ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE. Or to put it still another way, that there is no
violation of the establishment clause if:
a.
b.
c.

The statute has a secular legislative purpose

It principal effect in one that neither advances nor inhibits religion
It does not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion

ZURACH V. CLAUSON, it was held that the wall of separation between church and state had not been
breached by a release-time arrangement which enabled the students in a public school to attend religious
instruction classes in a nearby private building. At their request, they had been excused from their classes by the
school authorities during the time of the religious instruction, but subject to their obligation to make up for the time
lost during another period. The court ruled that the state had merely bent over backward to accommodate the
religious needs of the students and had not thereby actually involved itself in a religious activity in violation of the
constitution
BOARD OF EDUCATION V. ALLEN, a law required the petitioner to lend textbooks free of charge to all
students from grade 7-12, including those attending private schools. Attacked on its constitutional grounds insofar
as it extended its benefits to parochial schools, the statute was sustained by the US courts, stating The law merely
makes available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend school books for free of charge. Books are
furnished at the request of the pupil and ownership remains, at least technically, in the state. Thus, no funds or
books are furnished to parochial schools, and the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to school. Perhaps
free books make it more likely that some children choose to attend a sectarian school, but that was true of the
state-paid bus fares and does not alone demonstrate an unconstitutional degree of support for a religious
institution.
AGLIPAY V. RUIZ, any benefit INDIRECTLY ENJOYED by a religious institution, as long as such benefit was
only incidental to a legitimate secular objective, would not violate prohibition
INTRAMURAL RELIGIOUS DISPUTE
It is clear that intramural disputes regarding religious dogma and other matters of faith are outside the
jurisdiction of the secular authorities. These are questions that may be resolved by the religious authorities
themselves and among themselves only. It is also settled that whatever dogma is adopted by a religious group
cannot be binding upon the state if it contravenes a valid laws.
RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND WORSHIP
ASPECTS:
FREEDOM TO BELIEVE
The individual is free to believe or disbelieve as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He may
indulge his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or not at all; embrace or reject any
religion and etc. However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the majority,
he has full freedom to believe as he pleases.
FREEDOM TO ACT ON ONES BELIEF
When the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom
to do so becomes subject to the authority of the state. As great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all the
other right guaranteed by the constitution, can be enjoyed only with proper regards to the rights of others. It is
error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it impotent in
protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to
society. And this is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the
purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.
CASES:
WEST VIRGINIA V. BARNETTE (p 452)
CANTWELL V. CONNECTICUT, a statute made it punishable for anyone to solicit money or any other form of
assistance except for a religious, charitable or philanthropic cause as determined by the secretary of the public
welfare council. The courts struck it down as censorship of religion. Noting the extraordinary power giver to the
secretary, the court commented that If he finds that the cause is not that of religion, to solicit for it becomes a
crime. Furthermore, Cantwell and his sons were soliciting in a peaceful manner. When one of the records they

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

18

played angered some of the hearers, who asked them to leave they immediately did so. Such solicitation for
religious purposes, even if abrasive, could not be validly prohibited
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY V. CITY OF MANILA, a religious corporation engaged in the sale of Bibles and
other religious articles was required to obtain a license and pay the corresponding fee for being engaged in the sale
of merchandise. The court held. The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified
just like other restraints of freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of any
substantive evil which the state has the right to prevent. In this case at bar, it is true that the price asked for
religious articles was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same, but this cannot mean
that the plaintiff was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said merchandise for profit. For this reason,
the provision of the City Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, which requires the payment of a license fee for
conducting the business in general merchandise cannot be applied to the plaintiff society for in doing so, it would
impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of disseminating
of religious belief
EBRANILAG V. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT (p 451)
RELIGIOUS TESTS
The constitutional prohibition against religious test is aimed against the government to prevent a person
for exercising his civil and political rights because of his religious beliefs.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
SEC. 4, ART. III;
SEC 18 (1), ART. III
IMPORTANCE AND SCOPE
This is the right that is always curtailed when a free society falls under a repressive regime. The
constitution provides that sovereignty resides in the people who manifest it regularly through their suffrages and,
more frequently and generally, by the assertion of their freedom of expression.
Every citizen has a right to offer his views and suggestions in the discussion of the common
problems of the community or the nation. This is not only a right but a duty. From the mass various ideas proposed,
the people can, in their collective wisdom and after full deliberation, choose the best remedies to the difficulties
they face.
.
MODES OF EXPRESSION
Freedom of expression is usually exercised through:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Language
Oral
Written
Symbolism

ELEMENTS
The elements of freedom of expression are as follows:
a.

b.

Freedom from previous restraint or censorship

Restraint upon these freedoms may be either:
1. Content-based
2. Content neutral
Freedom from subsequent punishment

FREEDOM FROM CENSORSHIP

CASES:
GROSJEAN V. AMERICAN PRESS CO, a statute imposing a tax upon all periodicals publishing more than
20,000 copies per issue was declared INVALID because it tend to limit the circulation of any such periodical seeking
to avoid the payment of tax. IT WAS AN INDIRECT ATTEMPT TO RESTRICT THE WIDE DISSEMINATION OF IDEAS,
TRACING THE ROOTS OF UNPOPULAR SCHEMES OF THE ENGLISH MONARCH TO DISCOURAGE CRITICISM AGAINST
THE THRONE. A free press stands one of the great interpreters between the government and the people. To allow it
to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.
NY TIMES V. UNITED STATES (p 491)
IGLESIA NI CRISTO V. CA, two issues were raised to wit, whether the MTRCB had the power to review the
petitioners program and clear them from showing on television and, assuming it had, whether it gravely abused its

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

19

discretion in prohibiting their exhibition as X-rated material. The programs were barred from public viewing by the
board for attacking certain doctrines and practices of the catholic and protestant religions, but were sustained by
the RTC, which also prohibited the board from requiring the petitioner to submit its programs to it for previous
clearance. The CA reversed the RTC ruling, prompting the INC to go to the SC to ask for relief. The court held, that
the board on the first issue but found that it should not have banned the telecast of the programs because they did
not attack but merely criticized the other religions on the exercise by the INC of its freedom of expression and
religion. The criticism did not create a clear and present danger requiring prior restraint of the state. Indeed the
board had committed grave abuse of discretion, and such censorship powers manifested by the board is in
violation of the bill of rights.
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB V. COMELEC (p 496)
ADIONG V. COMELEC, the court held that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles,
pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes
crucial in this kind of election propaganda, not the financial resources of the candidate. Whether the candidate is
rich and, therefore, can afford to dole-out more decals and stickers or poor and without the means to spread out the
same number of decals and stickers is not as important as the right of the owner to freely express his choice and
exercise his right of free speech. The owner can even prepare his own decals or stickers for posting on his personal
property. To strike down the right and enjoin it is impermissible encroachment of his liberties. The prohibition on
posting decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in authorized areas designated by the
COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the constitution.
FREEDOM FROM PUNISHMENT
Freedom of speech includes freedom after the speech. Without this assurance, the citizen would
hesitate to speak for fear he might be provoking the vengeance of the officials he criticized. Even as criticism is not
conditioned on the consent of the government, so too, is no subject to its subsequent chastisement. In a free
society, the individual is not supposed to speak in timorous whispers or with bated breath but with the clear voice of
the unafraid. Nevertheless, freedom of expression is not absolute notwithstanding that the language of the
guaranty, unlike some other provisions of the bill of rights, is unqualified. Like all rights, it is subject to police power
and may be properly regulated for the purpose and interest of public welfare. The freedom of expression does not
cover ideas offensive to public order or decency of reputation of persons, which are entitled for the protection of the
state.
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE
CASES:
SCHENCK V. US, the accused in this case was convicted of a violation of the Espionage act for having
caused insubordination in the armed forces of the US and obstructing enlistment and recruitment services. It was
held that, The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are such of
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the state has a
right to prevent. It they do, the speaker shall be punished; otherwise not. It is a question of the proximity and
degree. The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. These acts had created a
clear and present danger to the national security. When a nation is at war many things that might be said in times
of peace are such hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and no court
could regard then as protected by a constitutional right. The rule is that the danger created must not only be clear
and present but must also be traceable to the ideas expressed. Unless, this nexus is established, the individual may
not be held accountable. The term PRESENT refers to the element of time. It used to be identified with imminent
and immediate danger. The DANGER must not only be probable but very likely inevitable. What finally emerge from
the clear and present danger cases are a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances be punished.
REYES V. BAGATSING (p 517)
NAVARRO V. VILLEGAS, there was a petition for mandamus to compel the mayor of manila to issue a permit
to enable certain student groups to hold a public rally, again at Plaza Miranda. The mayor had also refused,
claiming the same ground as predecessor, to wit, fear of public disorder as result of the speeches to be delivered at
the intended meeting. This time, however, it was respondent and not the petitioner was sustained. It is grounded
based on the difference in the factual conditions of manila in1947, which it described as peaceful, and in 1970, at
the height of student arrest and activism. Manila was then in ferment, the people were edgy and the speeches
planned to be delivered at Plaza Miranda, the most sensitive place in the city, could view of the Court ignite the
turbulence the mayor wanted to prevent.
RUIZ V. GORDON, the applicants to hold an assembly should:
a.
b.

c.
d.

Inform the licensing authority on the date, the public place, where and the time when it will
take place (IF IT WERE A PRIVATE PLACE ONLY THE CONSENT OF THE OWNER IS REQUIRED)
Such application should be filed well ahead of time to enable the public official to appraise
whether there may be valid objection to the grant of the permit or to its grant but to another
place.
Clear and present danger test should be the standard for the decision reached
If he is of the view that there is such imminent danger and evil, the applicants must be heard
on the matter.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
e.

20

Decision whether favourable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest

opportunity

CRITICISM OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT (SEC. 4-PART, ART. III) (p523)

CASES:
US V. BUSTOS, the interest of the society and the maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of
free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under
a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound may be relieved by the balm of clear conscience. A public official must
not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts.
LAGUNZAD V. SOTTO VDA. DE GONZALES, however the court decreed a qualification. The petitioner had
filmed a romanticized biography of a local official who had been murdered and become a sort of folk hero. The
mother objected to the fictionalized embellishments in the movie and sought to restrain its exhibition. The court
sustained her n the following grounds: Petioners averment that provate respondent did not have any property right
over the life of Moises Padilla since the latter was a public figure is neither well taken. Being a public figure does not
automatically destroy in toto a persons right to privacy. The right to invade a persons privacy to disseminate public
information does not extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he
or she may be. In this case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of
Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance on the film because without it, it would be a drab
story of torture and brutality
ART AND OBSCENITY (SEC. 4-PART, ART. III)
CASES:
PP V. GO PIN, the accused was convicted for exhibiting nude paintings and pictures notwithstanding the
claim that he had done so in the interest of art. The Court noting that he had charged a fee for admission to his
exhibition held that his purpose was merely commercial and not artistic.
PP V. PADAN, the live exhibition of sexual intercourse was not a form of art but is plainly pornography
which is obscene in nature.
GONZALES V. KATIGBAK, censorship of moving pictures was challenged in this case. The petitioner had
questioned the classification of the move as for adults only by the Board of Censors. The court dismissed the
petition solely on the ground that there are not enough votes for a ruling that there was a grave abuse of discretion
committed by the respondent in the said classification.
ASSEMBLY AND PETITION FOR REDRESS TO GRIEVANCES (SEC. 4-PART, ART. III)
READ ALSO BP 880, THE PUBLIC ASSEMBLY ACT
TESTS
THE AUSPICES TEST (NOT PREVAILING)
CASE:
EVANGELISTA V. EARNSHAW, the AUSPICES TEST is applied in this case, where the mayor of manila had
prohibited the communist party from holding any kind of meeting, revoking for this purpose all permits previously
granted by him, particularly on the ground that the said party has been found (by the fiscals office only) to be an
illegal association. The SC declared that, it will be readily seen that the doctrine and principles advocated and urged
in the constitution and bylaws of the Communist Party of the Philippines, the speeches uttered, delivered, and made
by its members in public meetings or gathering before, are highly seditious ain that they suggest and incite
rebellious conspiracies and disturb and obstruct the lawful authorities in their duties. Considering the actions of the
so called president of the Communist Party, it is evident that he cannot expect that the defendant will permit the
party from holding any meeting or parades in the manner herein described. The respondent, whose sworn duty, it is
to see that nothing occurs which would tend to provoke or incite the people to disturb the peace of the community
or the safety or order of the government, did only the right thing under the circumstances, that is , cancel and
withdraw, as was done, the permit previously issued by him to the said communist party, in accordance with the
power granted by law to him. (IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT PURPOSE TEST IS ALREADY APPLIED IN THIS JURISDICTION)
THE PURPOSE TEST
CASES:
DELA CRUZ V. ELA, the power was expanded (POWER TO ASSEMBLY AND PETITION) when the SC upheld
the municipal mayor who, when asked to issue a permit for the use of a particular part of a public plaza, designated
another part of the ground that the place requested might lead to disruption of the rites that might be held in a
nearby church.
TANADA V. BAGATSING, the Mayor of manila refused to issue a permit for holding a rally at Liwasang
bonifacio and the petitioner went to SC on mandamus. The SC granted the petition but changed the meeting place

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

21

to Ugrante Field, a private park. It is well settled the clear and present danger principle does not preclude the SC
from regulating the time, place and a manner of the holding of a peaceable assembly. It is the content of the
speeches therein made that enjoys the widest immunity. Those voting for the transfer of the pace of the rally and
for a time different that that sought in the petition took in consideration the accessibility of Liwasang Bonifacio,
there were elements that took advantage of such occasion, especially after dark, resulting in injury to, if not loss of
lives of, participants in the rally, the police, and innocent bystanders. It is of the essence of respect for
constitutional rights that the rally be allowed, but it is equally this courts duty to avoid such danger. Hence, the
transfer of the site and the modification as to time.
MALABANAN V. RAMENTO, several student leaders were suspended for one year when they held a
demonstration in the premises the university outside the area permitted by the school authorities, which disrupted
classes and disturbed the work of the administrative personnel. It was held that the penalty imposed was out of
proportion to the petitioners misdeed and emphasized that the students did not shed their constitutional rights of
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate, although these rights were not unlimited
VILLAR V. TIP, several students were barred from re-enrolment because they had practiced demonstrations
in the exercise of their freedom of expression. However, relief was denied some of the petitioners who could have
validly excluded on the basis of their academic deficiencies for as the Court put it, the academic freedom enjoyed
by institutions of higher learning includes the right to set academic standards to determine failing grades suffice for
the expulsion of students
AQUINO V. BAGATSING, in this case the SC allowed the petitioners to march several points in Metro Manila
and converge at the Luneta Grandstand for the purpose of holding a rally to commemorate the assassination of
Benigno S. Aquino Jr. The Court held the petitioners to their assurance that the march and rally would be peaceful
and also directed the law enforcement officers assigned to police the demonstration to be in proper uniform with
clearly exposed identification tags and to observe a discreet distance from the demonstrators.
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT BETWEEN PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA
CASE:
TELEBAP V. COMELEC,
LIVE COVERAGE OF CRIMINAL TRIAL
CASE:
KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, 360 SCRA 744 (READ ALSO THE DISSENT OF J. PUNO)
CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR VIOLATING CONFIDENTIALITY RULE
CASE:
FORTUN V. QUINSAYAS, G.R. NO. 194578, 2/13/13
RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION (SEC. 8, ART. III)
CASES:
SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. CA, The SC declared that, the Constitutional provisions enshrined on
Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful
concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that the Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s.
1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws
concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers
and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which
will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. Therefore in the absence of any legislation
allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.
LIBERTY FLOUR MILLS EMPLOYEES ASSN V. LIBERTY FLOUR MILLS INC., the SC held that, It is the policy of
the State to promote unionism to enable the workers to negotiate with management on the same level and with
more persuasiveness than if they were to individually and independently bargain for the improvement of their
respective conditions. To this end, the Constitution guarantees to them the rights "to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations and peaceful concerted actions including the right to strike in accordance with law."
There is no question that these purposes could be thwarted if every worker were to choose to go his own separate
way instead of joining his co-employees in planning collective action and presenting a united front when they sit
down to bargain with their employers. It is for this reason that the law has sanctioned stipulations for the union
shop and the closed shop as a means of encouraging the workers to join and support the labor union of their own
choice as their representative in the negotiation of their demands and the protection of their interest vis-a-vis the
employer.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

22

The Court would have preferred to resolve this case in favor of the petitioners, but the law and the facts
are against them. For all the concern of the State, for the well-being of the worker, we must at all times conform to
the requirements of the law as long as such law has not been shown to be violative of the Constitution. No such
violation has been shown here.
IN RE EDILLON: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to
comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one
of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free
to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses.
The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further
the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of the
regulatory program the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice law before
the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the
fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as
unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.
ACCESS TO INFORMATION
(SEC. 7, ART. III)

RELATE TO SEC. 16 (4), ART. VI (RE PUBLICATION OF LEGISLATIVE JOURNALS), AND SEC. 20, ART. VI (RE RECORDS
AND BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS OF CONGRESS)
CASES:
VALMONTE V. BELMONTE, "The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." An informed citizenry with access to the diverse
currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and
discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The
cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this
system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people.
Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and
caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust,
institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power,
would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under
limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution. The right to information is
an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to
information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech
and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public
disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well in checking abuse in government. Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees,
the right to information is not absolute. The people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern",
and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure
is limited to "transactions involving public interest", and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of "public interest" or "public
concern", and is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
FECHEGARAY V. SECRETARY, the SC held that making the Lethal Injection Manual inaccessible to the
convict was unconstitutional and saw no reason why he could not obtain a copy should he so desire. It declared that
the contents of the manual were matters of public concern which the public may want to know either because
these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen.
TANADA V. TUVERA (RESOLUTION OF THE MR), where the court ordered the publication of all laws and
other measures having the force and effect of law. The SC stated that the furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that
cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
(SEC. 10, ART. III)
No law impairing the obligation and contracts shall be passed
CONTRACT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

23

DEFINITION- any lawful agreement on property or property rights, whether real or personal, tangible or
intangible. The agreement may be executed or executory. The parties may be private persons only, natural or
artificial or private person on the one hand and the government or its agencies on the other hand.
INCLUSIONS: FRANCHISES/CHARTERS TO PRIVATE ENTITIES
EXCLUSIONS: LICENSE; PUBLIC OFFICE (BUT NOT SALARY ALREADY EARNED FROM PUBLIC OFFICE)
LAW
DEFINITION-includes statutes enacted by the national legislature, E.O and administrative regulations, and
ordinances.
EXCLUSION: QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS
WHEN LAW IMPAIRS CONTRACT: IF APPLIED RETROACTIVELY (NOT PROSPECTIVELY)
OBLIGATION
DEFINITION- the obligation of the contract is the vinculum juris or the tie that binds the parties to each
other. The obligation of a contract is the law or duty that binds the parties to perform the undertaking or agreement
according to its terms and intent.
IMPAIRMENT
DEFINITION- is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract.
LIMITATIONS
Despite having the impairment clause, a contract valid at the time of its execution may be legally modified
or even completely invalidated by a subsequent law. If the law is a proper exercise of police power, it will prevail
over the contract. The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police
power of the state and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the state, but all such
regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require
or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity
E.G., SEC. 11, ART. XII, CONSTITUTION
No franchises to operate a public utility shall be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject
to amendment, alteration or repeal by the congress when the common good so requires
CASES:
ILUSORIO V. CAR, the issue was whether a pre-existing share tenancy contract could validly converted by
the tenant into leasehold tenancy in accordance with the provisions of a subsequent law. The SC held that it is
allowed because the prohibition contained in the constitutional provision against impairing the obligation and
contracts is not absolute one and is not to be read as literal exactness like mathematical formula. Such provisions
are restricted to contracts with respect to property, or some object of value, and confer rights which may be
asserted in a court of justice, and have no application to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of
the general legislative powers of the state involving the public right and public welfare of the entire community
affected by it. They do not prevent proper exercise by the state of its police power. By enacting regulations
reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the society, even
contracts may thereby effected; for such matter cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the state to
regulate and control them.
ORTIGAS & CO. V. FEATI BANK, in this case two lots sold by the petitioners on condition that they were to
be used as residential purposes were subsequently acquired by the respondent, which stated erection of a
commercial building thereon. The petitioner sought to restrain such construction on the strength of the stipulated
condition but the respondent invoked a resolution adopted by the municipal council of Mandaluyong declaring the
area to be a commercial and industrial zone. The SC upheld the respondent, ruling that the zoning resolution had
been adopted in exercise of the police power, which was superior to the impairment clause and so could modify the
provisions of the said contract.
LOZANO VS. V. MARTINEZ, the SC rejecting the challenge on BP 22 on the grounds that it contravened the
impairment clause, the SC said: We find no valid ground to sustain the contention that BP22 impairs freedom to
contract. The freedom to contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into lawful contracts.
Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides we must bear in mind that checks cannot be
categorized as contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in modern day and age, has become a convenient
substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from regulatory power of
the state.
TIRO V. HONTANOSAS, the SC declared that a government directive which in effect discontinued the
assignment of salaries of public school teachers to their creditor was not offensive to the impairment clause
because the latter could still collect its loans after the salaries had been drawn by the employees themselves

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

24

GANZON V. INSERTO, it was held that the clause would be violated by the substitution of a mortgage surety
bond as security for a payment of loan as this would change the terms and conditions of the original mortgage
contract over the mortgagees objection Remarkably, the change was made by the decision of the TC, which is not
supposed to be covered by the term law as used in the impairment clause. In Art 12 sec 11, it is provided that no
franchises to operate a public utility shall be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration or repeal by the congress when the common good so requires. It shall be submitted that this
reservation is not at all necessary in as much as the subject of the franchise is necessarily connected with the
public welfare and so is embraced in the police power of the state.
EX POST FACTO LAWS
(SEC. 22, ART. III)
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted
EX POST FACTO
KINDS
The following are considered as ex post facto law:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

A law that makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent
when done, and punishes such an act
A law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater that it was when committed
A law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment that the law annexed
to the crime committed
A law that alters legal rules of evidence, and receives less or different testimony that the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender.
A law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty
or the deprivation of a right for something which when alone was lawful
A law which deprives persons accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which they
have become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of a
proclamation of amnesty

CHARACTERISTICS
An ex post facto law must:
a.
b.
c.

Refer to criminal matters

Be retroactive in application
To the prejudice of the accused

CASES:
BAYOT V. SANDIGANBAYAN, a law amending RA 3019 provided for the suspension pendent lite of any public
officer or employee accused of offenses involving fraudulent use of public funds or property. It was held that the
amendment was not ex post facto even if applied retroactively because the suspension was not punitive in nature
but it is merely preventive.
NUNEZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN, PD 1606 itself, creating the sandiganbayan, was held to be not a penal law
and therefore not ex post facto
RODRIGUEZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN, PD 1606 creating the sandiganbayan was held not to be an ex post facto
law notwithstanding the petitioners claim that he and his witnesses, who were living in Cagayan de oro, would be
incurring tremendous expenses in coming to and from his trial in Manila where the sandiganbayna was holding
hearing. The disadvantage or inconvenience was only limited and unsubstantial.
KATIGBAK V. SOLICITOR GENERAL, the forfeiture of the property provided for the RA 1379 being in the
nature of a penalty; and being axiomatic that a law is ex post facto which inter alia makes criminal act done before
the passage of the law and which innocent when done, and punishes such and act, or, assuming to regulate civil
right and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty of deprivation of a right for something which when done was
lawful, it follows that that penalty of forfeiture prescribed in such act cannot be applied to acquisition made prior to
the passage without running afoul to the constitutional provision condemning ex post facto laws or bill of attainder.
BILL OF ATTAINDER
CHARACTERISTICS
Is a legislative act that inflicts punishment without trial, is essence being the substitution of legislative fiat
for judicial determination of guilt. It is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial that
becomes a bill of attainder.
CASE:
PP V. FERRER, G.R. NOS. L-32613-14, DECEMBER 27, 1972 (597)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

25
NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT (SEC. 20, ART. III)

No person shall be imprisoned for the debt or non-payment of debt of a poll tax
DEBT
DEFINITION- any civil obligation arising from contract, express or implied
CASE:
SURA V. MARTIN, the defendant in a civil action was ordered arrested for contempt of court because of his
failure, owing to his insolvency, to pay plaintiff past and future support. The SC held that such arrest is invalid as it
would in effect authorize his imprisonment for debt in violation of the constitution
CRIME- although debtor can be imprisoned for non-payment of debt, he can validly punished for criminal
action if he contracted his debt through fraud.
CASES:
LOZANO V. MARTINEZ, SUPRA, the SC held that the gravamen of the offense punished under BP22 is the
act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonoured upon presentation for payment. It is not
the non-payment of ab obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended to coerce a debtor to pay his
debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting
them in circulation, because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as on offense against property, but an offense against public order.
US V. CARA, 41 PHIL 826
POLL TAX
Since a tax is not a debt but rises from the obligation of a person to contribute his share in the
maintenance of the government, failure to pay the same can be validly punished with imprisonment, The only
exception is failure to pay poll tax, which is defined as a specific fixed sum levied upon every person belonging to a
certain class without regard to his property or occupation
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
(SEC. 18, ART. III)
No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as punishment for a crime whereof
the party shall been duly convicted

DEFINITION
The condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against his will, to labour
for another, whether paid or not.
EXCEPTIONS
Punishment of a crime whereof the party has been duly convicted.
CASES:
PP V. SOZA, the SC held upheld the national defence act which requires the able-bodied 20yr old males to
undergo military training in preparation for their duty to defend the state grounded on Art 2 sec 4 of the
constitution
ROBERTSON V. BALDWIN, naval enlistment is also not covered by the constitutional prohibition. A person
enlists in the service of a merchant vessel may be compelled to remain in such service until the end of the voyage
for which he contracted. Otherwise, it would be possible for its crew to desert the ship in a foreign port, making it
difficult for the owners to recruit new hand s to continue the voyage and bring the vessel back to the port of origin.
US V. POMPEYA, it was held that persons may validly pressed into service under pose comitatus for
apprehension of criminals. A requirement to its effect was sustained under this case. Where the SC declared that
tin pursuit of persons who have violated the law such as brigands the authority might command all male
inhabitants in the certain age to assist them. This would be justified under police power.
KAISAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY V. GOTAMCO SAWMILLS, the striking workers in industries affected
with public interest, like the lumber industry in this case, or public utilities such as light and telephone companies
may be required to return to work pending settlement of labour disputes. The purpose of such compulsion is to
prevent disruption, to the detriment of the public of essential services being performed by the strikers.
APPLICATION

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

26
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

READ ALSO RULE 102 OF THE RULES OF C0URT)

WHEN AVAILABLE
The liberty of an individual may be resorted by habeas corpus where he is subjected to physical restraint,
such as arbitrary detention. Even moral restraint is a ground for the issuance of this writ.
CASES:
ALCANTARA V. DIR. OF PRISONS, a person imprisoned for a crime of a political complexion during the
Japanese Occupation could demand his release on habeas corpus after restoration of the legitimate government on
the ground that his sentence was automatically extinguished. A prisoner may secure his release if he was convicted
by a court without jurisdiction, or where his sentence has become invalid.
GUMABON V. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, the same right is available to persons sentenced to a longer penalty
that that subsequently meted out to another person convicted of the same.
ZAFRA V. CITY WARDEN, habeas corpus may also be resorted to in case of unlawful denial of bail
EXC: ERRORS OF LAW: PRIVILEGE IS NA
CASE:
CELESTE V. PEOPLE, where the decision is tainted with errors of law, a petition for habeas corpus will not
lie. If the alleged error does not go to the jurisdiction of the court, the proper remedy would not be the prerogative
writ but an ordinary appeal.
EXC TO EXC: ERROR INVOLVES VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
CASE:
CONDE V. RIVERA, 45 PHIL 650
PROCEDURE
GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION (READ SEC. 18, ART. VII)
In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety so requires it, he (PRESIDENT) for a period of 60
days may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines under martial law.
CASES:
LANSANG V. GARCIA, the SC declared that it had the power to inquire into factual basis on the suspension
of the privilege if the writ of habeas corpus by Pres. Marcos in 1971 and to annul the same of no legal ground can
be established.
GARCIA-PADILLA V. ENRILE, the SC reversed the Lansang decision and revived the Montenegro doctrine,
reiterating that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was a political question to be resolved
by the president alone. (THIS RULING HAS BEEN ABROGATED BY SECTION 18 ART 7 WHICH CONSTITUTIONALUZED
THE LANSANG DOCTRINE)
ILAGAN V. ENRILE, (629)
SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
(SEC. 16, ART. III)
All person shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial,
or administrative bodies
RELATED PROVISIONS
SEC 14 (1), ART. III

(1) No person shall be held answerable to criminal offense without due process of law

SEC 5 (3) AND (5), ART. VIII;

(3) The supreme court shall have the power to assign temporarily judges of lower courts to
other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed 6
months without the consent of the concerned judge.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

27

(5) to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights
XXXXXXXXX. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases. XXXXXXXXXXXXX

SEC 15, ART. VIII

All cases or matters filed after the effectively of the constitution must be decided or resolved
within 24 months from submission for the SC. And, unless, reduced by the SC, 12 months for
all lower collegiate courts and 3 months for all lower courts

SEC. 7, ART. IX-A

Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter
brought before it within 60 days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution.
XXXXXXXXXXX
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS
[SEC 14 (1), ARTICLE III]

No person shall be held to answer criminal offense without due process of law
Art 3 sec 1 deals with due process in general and covers both substantive and procedural aspects.
Moreover, it applies to all kinds of proceedings, civil, criminal and administrative. By contrast, Section 4 Par 1 of the
same article is restricted to criminal cases only and purely to their procedural requirements.
CRIMINAL DUE PROCSS requires the accused be tried impartial by an impartial competent court in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and with proper observance of all the rights accorded him under
the constitution and the applicable statutes. Eg. The denial from him of the right to preliminary investigation, as
required by law, will constitute a denial of due process.
CASES:
SALES V. SANDIGANBAYAN, the right to preliminary investigation is not among the rights granted to the
accused in the bill of rights. It is purely statutory. Even so, denial of this right in the absence of a valid waiver will
constitute a violation of due process. The SC held in this case, that, while the right to preliminary investigation is
statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, it is a component of due process in criminal justice, The right
to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence
formally at risk of incarceration of some other penalty is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive
right. To deny the accuseds claim to preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his
right to due process.
GALMAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN (658)
MARTELINNO V. ALEJANDRINO, the SC declared that the spate of publicity in this case did not focus on the
guilt of the petitioners but rather on the responsibility of the government for what was claimed to be a massacre of
Muslim trainees. If there was trial by newspaper at all, it was not of the petitioner but of the government. Absent
her is a showing of failure of the court martial to protect the accused form massive publicity encouraged by those
connected with the conduct of the trial either by a failure to control the release of information or to remove the trial
to another venue or to postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have subsided
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
(SECTION 17, ARTICLE III)
No person shall be compiled to be a witness against himself (NAPOLES )
SCOPE
As long as the question will tend to incriminate, the witness is entitled to privilege. In all other cases, he
may not refuse to answer provided that the question is relevant and otherwise allowed even if the answer may tend
to embarrass him or subject to him to civil liability. The right may not be invoked where the question asked relates
to a past criminality for which the witness can no longer be prosecuted, as where the crime has already prescribed
or he has already been acquitted or convicted hereof. He may also not refuse to answer where he has previously
granted immunity under a validly enacted statute.
CASES:
U.S. V. TAN TENG, where a person charge with rape was examined for gonorrhoea, which might have been
transmitted to the victim. The SC held that the examination to be valid, saying that it was no different form
examining fingerprints or other parts or features of his body for identification purposes.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

28

BELTRAN V. SAMSON, the SC held that writing is something more than moving body, or hand or the fingers;
writing is not a pure mechanical act, because it requires application of intelligence and attention; and, in the case at
bar, writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier.
WHEN AVAILABLE
It is well settled rule that the privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked only when and as the
incriminating question is asked, since the witness has no way of knowing the advance the nature and effect of the
question to be put to him. This is true however only of the ordinary witness. In the case of the accused himself, it is
settled that he can refuse at the outset altogether to take the stand as a witness for the prosecution on the
reasonable assumption that the purpose of his interrogation will to be incriminate him.
CASES:
PP V. RONDERO, GR. NO. 125687, DEC 9, 1999
PP V. GALLARDE, G.R. NO. 133025, FEB 17, 2000
GALMAN V. PAMARAN, 138 SCRA 274 (1985)
WAIVER
The right against self-incrimination may be waived, either directly or by failure to invoke it, provided the
waiver is certain and unequivocal and intelligently, understanding and willingly made. Thus, one who is under a
subpoena duces tecum voluntarily surrenders an incriminating paper which is put in evidence against him is
deemed to have waived the privilege, as so too is an accused who takes the witness stand and offers testimony on
his behalf
CUSTODIAL RIGHTS
(SECTION 12, ARTICLE III)
1.

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel
preferably to his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These right cannot be waived except in writhing and in the presence of
counsel

2.

No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited

3.

Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this section or sec 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him

4.

The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families

READ ALSO:
RA 7438 (AN CT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSONS ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION)
RA 7309 (AN ACT CREATING THE BOARD OF CLAIMS)
CASES:
Custodial investigation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken in to custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action on any significant ways. A custodial
investigation begins when there is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and the investigation has
started to focus on a particular person as a suspect.
Eg. When a police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an
alleged offense
MIRANDA V. ARIZONA, the US SC declared: (647)
PP V. GALIT, concerning the treatment of a person under custodial investigation. The confession was
rejected because of the proven torture inflicted on the accused. Moreover, before his interrogation, he was informed
of his rights in a lengthy statement followed by hr question whether he was ready to make his statement which he
agreed. Such a long question, allowed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that
the accused be informed of his rights.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

29

PP V. MACAM, the right to counsel attached upon the start of the investigation, when the investigating
officer starts to ask questions to elicit information, confessions or admission from the accused. The counsel
guarantee was intended to assure the assistance of counsel at trial, in as much as the accused was confronted
with both the intricacies of the law and advocacy of the public prosecutor. However as a result of the changes on
the patterns of the police investigation, todays accused confronts both expertise adversaries and the judicial
system as well before trial. It is therefore appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of the
prosecution even before trial. The law enforcement machinery at present involves critical confrontations of the
accused by the prosecution at pre-trial proceedings where the result might well settle the accused fate and reduce
the trial itself or a mere formality. A police line-up is considered a critical stage of the proceedings. After the start
of the custodial investigation any identification of an uncounselled accused made in police line-up is inadmissible. It
is true where the police officers first talked to victims before confrontation was held. The circumstances were such
as to impart improper suggestions to the mind of the victims that may lead to a mistaken identification. Appellants
were handcuffed and had contusions in their faces.
DELA TORRE V. CA, the right to counsel is not available during a police line-up as this is not considered part
of the custodial investigation
PP V. COMPIL, (RE THE OPERATIVE ACT IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATIONS), the accused in this case, upon his
arrest in Quezon, where he had fled, subjected by the police to informal inculpatory interrogation that continued
during their trip back to manila, where his formal investigation was conducted at the police station. He was not
even then assisted by counsel, who arrived the following day. The SC held that his right to counsel began when the
interrogation started in Quezon. The operative act, is when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that
lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements.
PP V. SUAREZ, (RE-ENACTMENT IN ABSENCE OF COUNSEL, INADMISSIBLE), a re-enactment of crime in the
absence of counsel is inadmissible evidence against the accused.
BAIL (SECTION 13, ARTICLE III)
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable under reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be release on
recognizance as may be provided by law.
The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habea corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
READ ALSO RULE 114, THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CASES:
GARCIA-PADILLA V. ENRILE, the SC has reversed this case stressing Section 13 of article 3 by preserving
the right to bail even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended.
YAP V. CA, the respondent court fixed the bail for the appellant in the sum of 5.5M equivalent to his civil
liability to the complainant as founded by the TC. The SC applying the rule against excessive bail, reduced the
amount to 200T, stating that, bail is not intended as to punishment nr as in satisfaction of civil liability which
should be necessary awaits the judgement of the appellate court.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
(SEC. 14 (A), ART. III)
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
XXXXXXXXXXXXX
CASES:
PP V. TEMPONGKO, the SC declared in absolving the accused stating, the theory of the prosecution has
too many loose ends that it has failed to tie up to the satisfaction of the court. The guilt of the appellant has not
been established beyond doubt and so cannot be affirmed in those appeal. The denfense is weak, to be sure, but for
all the persuasive arguments of the SolGen and private prosecutor, this court remains unconvinced that the
appellant raped the complainant. The appellant may have been lying, and there is evidence of this but we are not
prepared to accept, to the point of moral certainty, that the complainant was telling the truth. The ambiguous
evidence of the prosecution cannot justify our condemning the appellant to prison for the rest of his life where there
are whispers of doubt that he is guilty
PP V. MIRANTES, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot by itself
affect constitutional presumption of innocence enjoyed by the accused, particularly when the prosecutions
evidence is weak. The evidence of the prosecution must be strong enough to pierce the shield of this presumptive
evidence and to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Where the evidence of the prosecution
is insufficient to overcome this presumption, necessarily, the judgement of conviction of the trial court must be set
aside. The onus probandi on the prosecution is no discharged by casting doubts upon the innocence of an accused,
nut by eliminating all reasonable doubts as to his guilt.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

30

PP V. RESANO, the failure of the accused to testify may prejudice him if the prosecution as already
established a prima facie case against him
RIGHT TO BE HEARD
SEC. 14 (2), ART. III); TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION
XXXXX shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself XXXX
CASES:
ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 369 SCRA 394
PP V. ALCALDE, G.R. 139225, MAY 29, 2002
PP V. DY, G.R. 115236, JANUARY 29, 2002
PP V. VALDESANCHO, G.R. 137051, MAY 30, 2001
PP V. OSTIA, G.R. NO. 131804, FEBRUARY 26, 2003
PP V. FLORES JR., G.R. NO. 128823-24, DECEMBER 27, 2002
SPEEDY TRIAL
Sec 14 (2) XXXXXX To have a speedy, impartial and public trial XXXXX
(READ ALSO RA 8493, OR THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1998)
CASES:
SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT V. HOW, G.R. NO. 140863, AUGUST 22, 2000
DOMONDON V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 166606, NOVEMBER 29, 2005
PEREZ V. ESTRADA, an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right belongs to him, more than
anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly
dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of
long ago. A public trial is synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the courts doors must be open to
those who wish to com, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves woth decorum and observe the trial process.
PEOPLE V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 140285, SEPTEMBER 27, 2006
THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION; RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS
Sec 14 (2) XXXXXTo meet the witness face to faceXXXXXX
Sec 12 (2) XXXXXX and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness and the
production of evidence in his behalf XXXXX
CASES:
PP V. RAMOS, an affidavit implicating the accused as a drug pusher was rejected as mere heresy by the SC
because the affiant had not been presented in the court and so could not be examined by the defence.
COMBATE V. SAN JOSE, an accused convicted of a crime an offense must be annulled for convicting him by
mere affidavits and denying him the right to counsel, to trial, and to cross-examine the affiants.
TALINO V. SANDIGANBAYAN, the SC reiterated the rule that where several co-accused are given a separate
trial, the evidence given against them at the other trial where they had no opportunity to cross examine the
witnesses is not admissible against them.
PP V. BARDAJE, a witness was subpoenaed on request of the accused but instead of taking steps to compel
her attendance, the judge held the dense responsible for bringing her to the trial, stating that her testimony would
dispense with if she failed to appear. The SC considered this as denial of the accused to compulsory process
PROHIBITED PUNISHMENTS
(SEC. 19)
1.

Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless compelling resin involving heinous crimes,
the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
2.

31

The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or

detainee or the ise of substandard inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions
shall be dealt with by law

CASES:
ECHEGARAY V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, the SC sustained death penalty as restored under the said law
PP V. DIONISIO, the mere severity does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. It declared that it
takes ore that merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe penalty to be obnoxious to the
constitution to come under the ban, the punishment must be flagrantly and plainly oppressive, wholly and
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
(SEC. 21)
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act
REQUISITES
VALID COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION
COMPETENT COURT
VALID PLEA
TERMINATION OF THE CASE
O APPEAL BY THE PROSECUTION
O CRIMES COVERED
DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING EVENT
INSEPARABLE OFFENSES
CASES:
OLAGUER V. MILITARY COMMISION, (SEE HOWEVER, TAN V. BARRIOS, 190 SCRA 686) it was held that
military tribunals had no jurisdiction to try cases of civilians, which fell under the competence of the ordinary civil
courts even during the period of martial law. The judgement of the military tribunals in these cases was, therefore,
invalidated and the petitioners released. Taking the ruling into account of Cruz v Enrile, the SC declared that, no
breach of constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy of punishment would result from the retrial of
petitioners cases, for the simple reason that the absence of jurisdiction of the courts martial to try and convict
petitioners prevented the first jeopardy from attaching. Valid previous proceedings are required in order that the
defence of double jeopardy can be raised by the accused in the second proceeding.
(NOTE: In Tan v Barrios, the SC held that the decision on Olaguer case shall be applied prospectively, hence no
retroactive nullification of finnal judgements, whether conviction or acquittal, rendered by the military courts
against civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision.)
TOYOTO V. RAMOS, the petitioners, as members of the group known as the Urban Poor, were arrested and
prosecuted for participating in a March and rally. No bail was recommended for their provisional release. At the trial,
the prosecution was able to present only one witness despite repeated postponement. The court dismissed the
case. The petitioners sued for habeas corpus after being in custody for more than a year and they had not yet been
released, on the grounds that a preventive detention action had been issued against them Later, in their return, the
respondent asked that the case be dismissed as moot and academic because temporary release of the petitioners,
but only if their release was to be considered permanent. The SC sustained the petitioners, stating that, ordinarily, a
petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the restraint on the liberty of the petitioners is lifted
temporarily or permanently. But in this case presents a different situation. The question to be resolved is whether
the state can reserve the power tor e-arrest a person for an offense after a court of competent jurisdiction has
absolved him of the offense. Yes, because the release of the petitioners being merely temporary it follows that they
can be re-arrested at any time despite their acquittal by any court of competent jurisdiction, we hold that such
reservation is repugnant to the government of laws and not of men principle. Under this principle, the moment a
person is acquitted on a criminal charge he and no longer be detained or rearrested for the same offense. This
concept is so basic and elementary that it needs no elaboration
PP V. CITY OF MANILA, the accident in question in this case occurred on October 17 1972. The information
for serious physical injuries was filed with the city court on October 18, on the same day that the victim died. On
October 20, the accused was arraigned, pleaded guilty, was ordered imprisoned. On October 24, however he was

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

32

again charged with homicide thru reckless imprudence negligence based on the same accident, but on November
17, the city court dismissed the information on the ground of double jeopardy. The SC affirmed the decision of the
LC which held that no new fact had supervened since the arraignment and conviction of the accused under the first
information. The victims death did not occur after the first prosecution
PP V. SALEY, the SC held that conviction of illegal recruitment under the LC does not bar prosecution of the
offender for estafa
PP V. TAC-AN, (SEE HOWEVER, RA 8294), in this case an offense was charged of unlawful possession of
unlicensed firearm penalized under a special statute and another offense was charged of murder under the RPC. It
was held by the SC that it is elementary that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one against a
second or later prosecution of the same offense, and that when the subsequent information charges another and
different offense, although arising frim the same act or set of acts, there is no prohibition of double jeopardy. Hence,
it would appear that these 2 offenses in themselves are quite different form each other, such that in principle, the
subsequent filing of the case of murder is not to be regarded as having placed appellant in a prohibited second
jeopardy.
PEREZ V. CA, a person previously acquitted of consented abduction was subsequently charged with
qualified seduction arising from the same act on which the earlier prosecution was based. The SC held that there
was no DJ, the court declared that a plea for DJ cannot be accorded merit where tow indictment are perfectly
distinct in point of law, however closely they may appear to be connected in fact. Protection for against DJ may be
invoked inly for the same offense or identical offense. Where 2 different laws define two crimes, proper jeopardy as
to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of another although both offenses arise from the same technical
offense.
PP V. RELOVA, a person was charged under a city ordinance with having installed a device in his ice plant
that lowered his electric meter readings to prejudice the city government. The information was, however, dismissed
on the grounds of prescription, having been filed 2 months after discovery of the offense. Later, the same
defendant was charged anew, this time before the court of first instance, for theft of electric current under the RPC.
On motion the judge dismissed the case on the grounds of DJ. The SC sustained the dismissal, stating that, under
Art 4 sec 22 of the 1973 constitution the first sentence stated the general rule that the constitutional protection
against DJ is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different form the offense charged
in first or prior to prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set
of acts. The second sentence of the same provision embodies the exception to the general rule, that the
constitutional protection against DJ is available although the prior charge under and ordinance be different form the
RPC, provided that both offenses spring form the same act or set of acts.
FREE ACCESS TO COURTS
Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied
to any person by reason of poverty

CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES

A.

CITIZENSHIP UNDER THE 1935, 1973 & 1987 CONSTITUTIONS

1987 CONSTITUTION
The following are considered citizens of the Philippines:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this constitution
Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines
Those who are born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon attaining the age of majority
Those who are naturalized in accordance to law

1935 CONSTITUTION
The following are considered citizens of the Philippines:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Those who were citizens of the Philippines Islands at the time of the adoption of the Common
Wealth Constitution on November 15, 1935
Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, prior to the adoption of the
Common Wealth Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Island
Those whose fathers were citizens of the Philippines
Those whose mothers were citizens of the Philippines and, upon attaining majority age,
elected Philippine citizenship
Those who are naturalized in accordance to law

1973 CONSTITUTION
B. CHILDREN OF FILIPINO PARENTS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

33

Only children born to Filipino fathers were granted natural born citizenship under the Commonwealth
constitution. If a child was born of an alien father and a Filipino mother, he followed the citizenship of the father and
acquired at best only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon attaining majority
age. The only exception was born of unlawful wedlock, in which case he acquired the citizenship of the legally
known parent.
Under the new rule, the child is considered a natural born citizen provided either of his parents is a Filipino
citizen. A Filipino citizenship of a mother will now confer natural born citizenship upon the child, without necessary
election as before upon his attaining majority age.
C. ELECTION OF FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP
The right of election permitted under the present constitution was available only to those born to Filipino
mothers under the 1935 constitution who, had that charter not been changed, would have been able to elect
Philippine citizenship upon attaining the majority age. That right was retained in Art. 3 sec 1.
D. NATURALIZATION
Naturalization is a process by which a foreigner acquires, voluntary or by operation of law, the citizenship
of another state. It may by direct or derivative.
DIRECT NATURALIZATION is effected by:
a.
b.
c.
d.

individual proceedings, usually judicial, under general naturalization laws

by special act of the legislature, often in favour of distinguished foreigner who have rendered
some notable service to local state
by collective change of nationality as a result of cession or subjugation
by adoption of orphan minors as nationals of the state where they are born

DERIVATIVE NATURALIZATION
a.
b.
c.

conferred on the wife of the naturalized husband

on minor children of the naturalized parent
on the alien woman upon marriage to a national

1. PROCEDURE
Under existing laws an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial or administrative
naturalization or derivative naturalization.
The steps involved in Judicial Naturalization:
a.
b.
c.
d.

e.

At least one year before he files his petition for naturalization, the applicant shall file with the
office of the SOLGEN a declaration of his intention to be a citizen of the Philippines
Filing must be with the RTC of the province where the petitioner resides for at least one year
The petition must state important data regarding the petitioner (eg. Name, age, etc..)
The clerk of court shall have the duty to publish the same in the official gazette and in one
newspaper of general circulation once a week for three consecutive weeks in the province or
city
At least 6 months after the last publication, but in no case within 30 days before any election,
the hearing shall begin, at which the petitioner shall establish all the allegations of his
petition, to be corroborated by at least 2 credible witnesses

The petitioner is required to possess the following qualification:

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

he must be not less than 18 years of age on the date of the hearing of the petition
he must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than 10 years
he must be of good moral character and believe in the principles of the constitution
he must own a real estate in the Philippines worth not less than 5K
he must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any of the principal Philippine
languages
he must have enrolled his minor children of school age ro any public or private schools
recognized by the Office of private education in the Philippines

The 10 year residence requirement has been reduced to 5 years when the applicant possesses any of the
following requirements:
a.
b.
c.
d.

e.

having honourably held office under the government of the Philippines or under that of any of
the provinces, cities municipalities, or political subdivision thereof
having established a new industry or introduce a useful invention in the Philippines
being married to a Filipino woman
having engaged as a teacher in the Philippines in a public or recognized private school not
established for exclusive instruction of children of persons of a particular nationality or race in
any of the branches of education or industry for a period not less than 2 years
having been born in the Philippines

Disqualified for naturalization:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

g.
h.

34

persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of

persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments
persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas
Polygamist or believers in the practice of polygamy
Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude
Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases
Persons who, during the period of residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with
the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos
Citizens or subject of nations with who the Philippines is at war, during the period of such war
Citizens or subject of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become
natural citizens thereof.

2. EFFECTS
Naturalization shall confer upon the petitioner all the rights of a Philippine citizen except only those
reserved by the constitution to natural born citizens of the Philippines.
3. REVOCATION
Naturalization is not an incontestable or irrevocable status. Under existing law, a person may be
denaturalized on petition of the SOLGEN on the ground that his certificate of naturalization was obtained frequently;
that he establish his permanent residence abroad within 5 years after his naturalization; that the petition was based
on an invalid declaration of intention; that his minor children failed to comply with the educational requirement
through his fault or neglect; or he allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation of our naturalization laws.
E. MIXED MARRIAGES
Under the constitution article 7 sec 4, Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their
citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law to have renounced it.
F. LOSS AND REACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP
According to CA 68 Philippine citizenship may be lost:
G. DUAL CITIZENSHIP
The following are to possess dual citizenship:
a.
b.
c.

those born of Filipino mothers and or fathers in foreign country which follow the principle of jus soli
those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country
such children are citizens of the country
those who marry aliens of by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless
by their acts or omissions they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship

H. NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS
Under the constitution, Art 5 sec 2, Natural born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with par.3 section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural born citizens.
I. DUAL ALLEGIANCE
Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to public interest and shall be dealt with by law. Dual citizenship was
allowable but not dual allegiance. Citizenship requires allegiance and dual citizenship requires dual allegiance. A
citizen owes his total allegiance to his country but a dual citizen must share his allegiance to 2 or even more states,
which may even be in conflict with each other