Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Peter H. Ditto
Lisa K. Lockhart
Department of Psychology and Sociology
Texas A&M UniversityKingsville
The tendency for people to rate attitude-confirming information more positively than attitude-disconfirming information (biased assimilation) was studied in a naturalistic context. Participants watched and evaluated the first 1996 Presidential Debate between Bill Clinton and Bob
Dole. Regression analyses revealed that predebate attitudes but not expectations predicted
postdebate argument evaluations and perceived attitude change. Participants evaluated the arguments that confirmed their predebate attitudes as being stronger than the arguments that
disconfirmed their predebate attitudes, and they perceived their postdebate attitudes to have become more extreme than their predebate attitudes. Self-reported affective responses mediated
the association between predebate attitudes and postdebate argument evaluations. The role of
affect in information-processing theories and the significance of the findings for sociopolitical
debates are discussed.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Dr. Geoffrey D. Munro, Department of Psychology, St. Marys College of Maryland, St. Marys City,
MD 20686. E-mail: gdmunro@smcm.edu
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MUNRO ET AL.
17
METHOD
Participants
Seventy undergraduates (34 women and 36 men) at a medium-sized state university received course credit for their
participation in the study. Of the 70 participants, 60 were
successfully contacted by telephone before the second presidential debate. All analyses include only those participants
that completed the measure in question.
Procedure
The first debate between Democratic President Bill
Clinton and the Republican challenger Bob Dole took
place on October 6, 1996. Participants arrived at the experimental session half an hour before the live broadcast
of the ClintonDole debate. During this time, participants
completed consent forms as well as several measures assessing attitudes toward the election, feelings toward the
candidates, and expectations about which candidate would
win the debate. The television was turned off so participants were not exposed to any of the media predictions or
commentaries that occurred immediately prior to the debate. The live broadcast of the debate was then projected
on a film screen in a medium-sized classroom at precisely
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MUNRO ET AL.
the time when the debate started. Participants were instructed to watch the debate and evaluate the arguments of
each candidate to the best of their abilities. At the end of
the debate, the television projection was immediately terminated so that none of the postdebate media analyses or
commentaries was presented to participants. Therefore,
the arguments presented by each candidate during the debate were presented in real time as the debate was happening. After the debate, participants completed a set of
postdebate measures. Participants were then asked to provide their first names and telephone numbers if they would
agree to be called in the coming weeks to answer several
more questions. All participants provided this information.
Between 7 and 10 days later, participants were called and
asked to respond to a set of follow-up measures.
Predebate Measures
Before the debate, participants responded to three sets of
questions assessing (a) interest and involvement in the presidential campaign, (b) attitudes regarding the election and
feelings toward the candidates, and (c) expectations regarding the debate.
Clinton and positive numbers indicate more favorable attitudes and feelings toward Dole.
Postdebate Measures
Immediately following the debate, participants responded
to four sets of questions assessing (a) evaluations of the debate, (b) affective reactions to the debaters, (c) cognitive responses generated during the debate, and (d) postdebate political attitudes.
the predebate attitude assessment was also included. Participants rated their current positions about the presidential election
given the arguments presented in the debate.
19
Follow-Up Measures
Beginning 1 week after the first debate, participants were
called by telephone and asked to answer several more questions regarding the debate. Of those who were contacted, all
agreed to participate. Sixty of the 70 participants present at
the debate were contacted. Those that were not contacted by
the day of the second 1996 Presidential Debate (October 16,
1996) were not called again.
During the follow-up telephone interview, participants responded to two sets of questions that were analogous to those
presented after the debate. First, they responded to several
questions assessing their evaluations of the debate, including
their opinion about who won the debate and the quality of the
arguments presented by each debater. Second, they were
again asked a set of political attitude questions assessing how
much they perceived their opinions to have changed because
of the debate and their current position regarding the election. No affective reactions or cognitive responses were obtained at the 1-week follow-up interview.
RESULTS
Overview of Analyses
There were three goals for organizing the data analyses.
First, a group of descriptive analyses was conducted with the
aim of providing a characterization of this sample regarding
opinions concerning the presidential election. Second, regression analyses were conducted to determine whether responses to the predebate measures predicted postdebate reactions. Third, a group of mediational regression analyses was
conducted to examine the role of affective reactions during
the debate as potentially important components of any effect
of the predebate measures on postdebate reactions.
Descriptive Analyses
Descriptive analyses conducted on the predebate measures
indicated that the distributions did not deviate greatly from
the assumptions of normality. As can be seen in Table 1,
participants as a group scored near the midpoint of the
scales measuring whether they would have watched the debate (M = 3.54) and their involvement in the election (M =
4.74). The predebate attitude index reflected the United
States voting population in that Clinton was rated more favorably and liked more than Dole (M = 0.91). Also, per-
Biased assimilation. Biased assimilation was assessed by examining responses to the debate evaluation measures. First, the question assessing which candidate partici-
20
TABLE1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearsons Correlations of Predebate, Postdebate, and Follow-Up Measures
Measures
Predebate measures
1. Watch
2. Involvement
3. Attitude
4. Expectancy
Postdebate measures
5. Perceived winner
6. Quality index
7. Positive affect
8. Negative affect
9. Positive cognitive responses
10. Negative cognitive responses
11. Perceived attitude change
12. Actual attitude change
Follow-up measures
14. Perceived winner
15. Quality index
16. Perceived attitude change
17. Actual attitude change
ap
SD
3.54
4.74
0.91
1.63
1.18
2.06
1.76
1.36
.41b
.04
.18
.27a
.10
.39b
1.26
1.82
1.11
2.37
1.26
1.26
0.16
0.33
2.43
3.52
4.20
3.83
2.92
2.87
2.43
1.56
.31
.28a
.34b
.29a
.10
.15
.17
.13
.53b
.59b
.68b
.72b
.61b
.58b
.50b
.07
0.90
1.33
0.10
0.00
2.23
3.57
2.21
1.68
.28a
.28a
.11
.13
.61b
.61b
.41b
.03
.09
.13
.11
.03
.12
.08
.10
.12
.07
.07
.28a
.26a
10
11
12
.28a
.21
.24a
.25a
.28a
.26a
.01
.05
.79b
.81b
.75b
.69b
.57b
.57b
.54b
.76b
.78b
.76b
.63b
.49b
.50b
.86b
.73b
.63b
.59b
.56b
.72b
.62b
.53b
.48b
.83b
.65b
.50b
.59b
.43b
.33b
.30a
.23
.06
.05
.79b
.83b
.41b
.50b
.76b
.83b
.43b
.39b
.83b
.80b
.59b
.50b
.67b
.75b
.50b
.41b
.66b
.72b
.53b
.35b
.60b
.60b
.42b
.24
.57b
.60b
.49b
.19
.44b
.47b
.40b
.65b
13
14
15
16
.81b
.56b
.38b
.54b
.46b
.38b
Affect. Affective reactions to the two debaters were examined by creating two factors out of the four affect items.
The items happy and pleased were highly correlated
(Clinton: r[70] = .84, p < .001; Dole: r[70] = .83, p < .001) and
were thus averaged into a positive affect index. Similarly, the
items angry and irritated (Clinton: r[70] = .73, p < .001;
Dole: r[70] = .81, p < .001) were averaged into a negative affect index. Affect difference scores were created by subtracting each of the two Clinton affect factors from the corresponding Dole affect factors.
For both affect difference scores, predebate attitude was
the only significant predictor (positive: = .66, t[69] =
6.65, p < .001; negative: = .71, t[69] = 7.42, p < .001).
These analyses indicate that those who held more favorable
prior attitudes and feelings toward Dole reported more positive and less negative affect in response to Dole relative to
Clinton. A regression summary table can be found in the
top half of Table 3.
Biased cognitive elaboration. Biased cognitive elaboration was assessed by examining self-coded positive and
negative cognitive responses generated toward each debater.
3In addition, the Clinton quality index and the Dole quality index were an-
21
Attitude change. In practical terms, the most important measures assessing the actual effects of the debate on
viewers political opinions were those measuring attitude
change. The first attitude change measure was the degree to
which participants perceived their opinion to have moved as
a result of the debate (perceived attitude change). Predebate
attitude was the only significant predictor of perceived attitude change, = .59, t(68) = 5.02, p < .001.5 Those who held
more favorable prior attitudes toward Dole were more likely
to have perceived their postdebate attitudes as having
moved in the direction of Dole. The perceived attitude
change measure can be contrasted with an actual attitude
change measure created by subtracting responses to the
postdebate measure from responses to the predebate measure of participants current attitudes toward the election.
The regression analysis on the actual attitude change measure revealed no significant predictors (see Table 4 for a
summary).
One-week follow-up measures. The follow-up measures were submitted to the same analyses as reported earlier
with one exception. For each follow-up measure the analogous immediate postdebate measure was entered as a predictor variable in addition to the four predebate measures. For
example, for the follow-up measure assessing perceived winner, the predebate measures watch, involvement, predebate
attitude, and expectancy as well as the immediate postdebate
4A neutral cognitive response difference score was also created and analyzed, revealing no significant effects. It will not be further discussed.
5The inconsistent degrees of freedom for all analyses involving the immediate postdebate measure assessing perceived attitude change are a result of the choice of one participant not to answer that question.
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MUNRO ET AL.
TABLE 2
Summary of Regression Analyses for Immediate Postdebate (and Follow-Up) Biased Assimilation Measures
B
SE B
0.98 (0.22)
0.63 (0.35)
0.17 (0.07)
0.18 (0.06)
0.13 (0.07)
(0.59)
1.70 (1.17)
0.16 (0.12)
0.20 (0.14)
0.14 (0.10)
0.24 (0.17)
(0.08)
.46** (.28**)
.10 (.04)
.15 (.05)
.06 (.03)
(.63**)
7.05 (0.66)
1.13 (0.30)
0.01 (0.07)
0.15 (0.12)
0.36 (0.05)
(0.76)
2.37 (1.93)
0.22 (0.20)
0.28 (0.22)
0.19 (0.15)
0.33 (0.26)
(0.10)
.57** (.15)
.01 (.03)
.09 (.07)
.12 (.02)
(.72**)
Note. Numbers in parentheses indicate follow-up analyses. Immediate postdebate perceived winner: R2 = .32, MSerror = 4.24;
follow-up perceived winner: R2 = .69, MSerror = 1.67. Immediate postdebate quality index difference score: R2 = .38, MSerror = 8.21;
follow-up quality index difference score: R2 = .71, MSerror = 4.05 (ps < .001).
*p < .05. **p < .01.
TABLE 3
Summary of Regression Analyses for Affect and Cognitive Response Measures
Dependent Variables and Predictor Variables
Positive (negative) affect difference score
Constant
Predebate attitude
Expectancy
Involvement
Watch
Positive (negative) cognitive response difference score
Constant
Predebate attitude
Expectancy
Involvement
Watch
SE B
7.07 (7.54)
1.57 (1.54)
0.05 (0.10)
0.27 (0.19)
0.28 (0.03)
2.52 (2.23)
0.24 (0.21)
0.30 (0.26)
0.21 (0.18)
0.36 (0.31)
.66** (.71**)
.02 (.04)
.13 (.10)
.08 (.01)
9.27 (7.20)
1.02 (0.94)
0.22 (0.13)
0.24 (0.10)
0.56 (0.34)
1.91 (1.98)
0.18 (0.18)
0.23 (0.23)
0.16 (0.16)
0.27 (0.28)
.62** (.58**)
.10 (.06)
.17 (.07)
.23* (.14)
Note. Numbers in parentheses indicate negative affect or negative cognitive responses analyses. Positive affect difference score: R2
= .50, MSerror = 9.40; negative affect difference score: R2 = .53, MSerror = 7.29; positive cognitive response difference score: R2 = .41,
MSerror = 5.32; negative cognitive response difference score: R2 = .35, MSerror = 5.72 (ps < .001).
*p < .05. **p < .01.
measure assessing perceived winner were all entered simultaneously as predictor variables. If the predebate attitude index
does not significantly predict the follow-up measure, then it
would suggest that predebate attitude does not have any additional effect during the 1-week delay. If the predebate attitude
index does significantly predict the follow-up measure, then
it would suggest that predebate attitude does have an additional effect on the follow-up measure over and above the immediate postdebate effect. If another predebate measure significantly predicts the follow-up measure, then it would
suggest that a delayed effect is present that does not appear
until after the immediate postdebate assessment.
The two biased assimilation measures revealed somewhat inconsistent findings. On both measures, the analogous immediate postdebate measures were significant
predictors (perceived winner: = .63, t[59] = 7.15, p <
.001; quality index difference score: = .72, t[59] = 7.55, p
< .001). In addition, predebate attitude was a significant
predictor on the perceived winner measure, = .28, t(59) =
3.05, p < .01. However, neither predebate attitude nor any
other predebate measure was a significant predictor on the
quality index difference score, = .15, t(59) = 1.46, p < .15
(see Table 2 for a summary). Therefore, for each measure,
the strong positive correlation between the follow-up mea-
23
TABLE 4
Summary of Regression Analyses for Immediate Postdebate (and Follow-Up) Attitude Change Measures
Dependent Variables and Predictor Variables
SE B
2.28 (0.77)
0.81 (0.40)
0.40 (0.05)
0.00 (0.14)
0.17 (0.63)
(0.30)
1.73 (1.67)
0.16 (0.17)
0.21 (0.21)
0.14 (0.14)
0.24 (0.24)
(0.12)
.59** (.33*)
.22 (.03)
.00 (.13)
.08 (.34*)
(.32*)
0.35 (1.64)
0.07 (0.01)
0.09 (0.17)
0.07 (0.03)
0.10 (0.35)
(0.69)
1.31 (1.13)
0.12 (0.10)
0.16 (0.14)
0.11 (0.09)
0.18 (0.16)
(0.10)
.08 (.01)
.08 (.14)
.09 (.04)
.08 (.25*)
(.65**)
Note. Numbers in parentheses indicate follow-up analyses. Immediate postdebate perceived attitude change: R2 = .31,
MSerror = 4.36; follow-up perceived attitude change: R2 = .37, MSerror = 3.37 (ps < .001). Immediate postdebate actual
attitude change: R2 = .03, MSerror = 2.50 (p = .73); follow-up actual attitude change: R2 = .49, MSerror = 1.58 (p < .001).
*p < .05. **p < .01.
sure and its analogous immediate postdebate measure suggests that the biased assimilation effect remains after 1
week. Furthermore, the perceived winner measure revealed
predebate attitude to be a significant predictor over and
above the predictive power of the analogous immediate
postdebate measure. This suggests modest support for a
longer lasting effect of predebate attitude on evaluationsa
bias that continues to occur even beyond the immediate reactions to the debate information.
The attitude change measures also revealed inconsistent
findings with regard to the predictive value of predebate attitude. For both the perceived attitude change and actual attitude change measures, the analogous immediate
postdebate measures were significant predictors (perceived
attitude change: = .32, t[58] = 2.53, p < .02; actual attitude change: = .65, t[59] = 6.58, p < .001). In addition,
the likelihood that the participant would have watched the
debate measure was a significant predictor for both attitude
change measures (perceived attitude change: = .34, t[58]
= 2.65, p < .02; actual attitude change: = .25, t[59] =
2.18, p < .001). These findings indicate that those who reported being less likely to watch the debate perceived their
attitudes to have changed in the direction of Dole 1 week
after the debate and their attitudes did change in the direction of Dole (as assessed by the prepost measure of actual
attitude change). Because this variable was not associated
with the attitude change measures immediately after the debate, these effects represent a delayed effect. Finally,
predebate attitude was a significant predictor of perceived
attitude change, = .33, t(58) = 2.33, p < .03 (see Table 4
for a summary). This indicates that those who had more favorable predebate attitudes and feelings toward Clinton
(Dole) perceived their attitudes to have moved in the direction of Clinton (Dole) 1 week after the debate. Again, this
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MUNRO ET AL.
DISCUSSION
Considering the importance of the U.S. Presidential Election,
it is comforting to believe that presidential debates sway
some significant portion of the voting public toward the candidate with the stronger political arguments. The results of
25
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MUNRO ET AL.
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