The Battle of Vozuca, Ozren Mountains,

June-July 1994
The Bosnian Army's confidence in its ability to take
the war to the Serbs was growing, and the ARBiH
General Staff prepared plans for a much more ambitious offensive in the Ozren mountains. Its aim was to
cut off and capture the southern end of the Serb-held
Ozren salient around Vozuca, thus freeing up an
important road route-the UN's so-called "Route
Duck" -connecting the cities of Tuzla and Zenica.
The operation would be the largest yet conducted and
would involve a coordinated attack by major elements
of the 2nd and 3rd Corps-up to 14,000 assault
troops-directly under General Delic's supervision.
In a preliminary move, elements of the 2nd Corps
seized an important hilltop- Vijenac-from VRS 1 st
Krajina Corps troops in May. The capture of the hill
gave the ARBiH an excellent observation point over
the Krivaja River valley and Vozuca while shielding
nearby Muslim-held towns. The defeat was a severe
psychological blow to the Serbs, who lost an entire
company of troops killed or captured.
The main operation began on 18 June, breaking the
10-day-old UN-sponsored cease-fire. The ARBiH
plan called for a pincer movement with 2nd Corps
troops attacking from the east and 3rd Corps troops
from the west to link up in the middle of the 10kilometer-wide salient. The initial advance took the
VRS Ozren Tactical Group of "Doboj" Operational
Group 9 by surprise and quickly penetrated Serb lines.
Over the next week, Muslim troops continued the
attack, gradually pushing through VRS defenses. By
26 June, ARBiH 2nd and 3rd Corps units were within
3 kilometers of linking up.
The VRS, however, was preparing a bold counterstrike, having shifted elite Ist Krajina and East Bosnian Corps units into the salient. By 1 July an initial
counterattack had drawn ARBiH 3rd Corps elements
away from their main axis. As the Muslim troops
maneuvered to block the Serb thrust, the VRS allowed
them to walk into an uncharted minefield upon which
it had previously targeted artillery. The ARBiH
casualties were heavy, and the shock of the action per-

mined the VRS reinforcements to counterattack and

drive both 2nd and 3rd Corps forces back to their start
lines by 4-5 July.
The Battle of Vozuca was an eye-opening experience
for both the ARBiH and the VRS. The Bosnian Army
had satisfied itself that it could penetrate Serb
defenses and almost defeat a major VRS force. It also
had a number of weaknesses and vulnerabilities that
the VRS could exploit. As the ARBiH General Staff
would find throughout the year, their units often
tended to overextend themselves during an advance,
leaving their flanks open to Serb counterattacks. They
learned also that command and control during offensive operations was far more difficult than on the
defense, particularly for an army with such limited
tactical communications. The Muslims needed tools
and tactics to deal with the Serbs' extensive minefields and devastating artillery fire. The VRS, too, discovered several weaknesses that needed to be dealt
with, notably the inadequate training and discipline of
many of its frontline infantry units, who tended to
panic when ARBiH sabotage units appeared in their
rear. Overall, the thinness of VRS frontline defenses
and the ease with which the Muslims usually penetrated them was troubling. VRS strengths in senior
command leadership, communications, firepower, and
mobility, however, allowed the Serbs to counter the
more lightly armed Muslim infantry and drive them
back out. Nevertheless, as the VRS was to find repeatedly over the next year, winning battles against the
Muslims was becoming a near-run thing.