Philippine Coconut, Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), Manuel V. Del Rosario, Domingo P. Espina, Salvador P. Ballares, Joselito A. Moraleda, Paz M. Yason, Vicente A. Cadiz, Cesaria De Luna Titular, and Raymundo C. De Villa, Petitioners, vs. Republic of the Philippines, respondent. Facts: In 1971, R.A. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company to administer the Coconut Investment Fund. The declaration of martial law in September 1972 saw the issuance of several presidential decrees purportedly designed to improve the coconut industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund. In G.R. Nos. 177857-58, class action petitioners COCOFED and a group of purported coconut farmers and COCOFED members, hereinafter COCOFED et al. collectively seek the reversal of the judgments and resolutions of the anti-graft court insofar as these issuances are adverse to their interests. As a procedural issue, COCOFED, et al. and Ursua contends that in the course of almost 20 years that the cases have been with the anti-graft court, they have repeatedly sought leave to adduce evidence (prior to respondents complete presentation of evidence) to prove the coco farmers actual and beneficial ownership of the sequestered shares. The Sandiganbayan, however, had repeatedly and continuously disallowed such requests, thus depriving them of their constitutional right to be heard. Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioners COCOFED et al. were not deprived of their right to be heard; and (2) whether or not the right to speedy trial was violated. Ruling: (1) No, petitioner COCOFEDs right to be heard had not been violated by the mere issuance of PSJ-A and PSJ-F before they can adduce their evidence. As it were, petitioners COCOFED et al. were able to present documentary evidence in conjunction with its Class Action Omnibus Motion dated February 23, 2001 where they appended around four hundred (400) documents including affidavits of alleged farmers. These petitioners manifested that said documents comprise their evidence to prove the farmers ownership of the UCPB shares, which were distributed in accordance with valid and existing laws. Lastly, COCOFED et al. even filed their own Motion for Separate Summary Judgment, an event reflective of their admission that there are no more factual issues left to be determined at the level of the Sandiganbayan. This act of filing a motion for summary judgment is a judicial admission against COCOFED under Section 26, Rule 130 which declares that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. (2) No. As a matter of settled jurisprudence, but subject to equally settled exception, an issue not raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. The sporting idea forbidding one from pulling surprises underpins this rule. For these reasons, the instant case cannot be dismissed for the alleged violation of petitioners right to a speedy disposition of the case. It must be clarified right off that the right to a speedy disposition of case and the accuseds right to a speedy trial are distinct, albeit kindred, guarantees, the most obvious difference being that a speedy disposition of cases, as provided in Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution. In fine, the right to a speedy trial is available only to an accused and is a peculiarly criminal law concept, while the broader right to a speedy disposition of cases may be tapped in any proceedings conducted by state agencies